Cases 25-48

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 179491, January 14, 2015

ALEJANDRO C. ALMENDRAS, JR., Petitioner, v. ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review filed by petitioner Alejandro C. Almendras, Jr., from the 27 January 2006
Decision and 28 August 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73088. 1 The CA
affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case No. 3343 2 finding petitioner
liable for damages.
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THE FACTS
As culled from the CA, petitioner sent letters with similar contents on 7 February 1996 to House Speaker
Jose de Venecia, Jr., and on 26 February 1996 to Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of Oil Carriers, Inc. The
controversial portion of the first and second letters reads as follows:
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This is to notify your good self and your staff that one ALEXIS DODONG C. ALMENDRAS, a brother, is not
vested with any authority to liaison or transact any business with any department, office, or bureau, public
or otherwise, that has bearing or relation with my office, mandates or functions. x x x.
Noteworthy to mention, perhaps, is the fact that Mr. Alexis Dodong C. Almendras, a reknown blackmailer,
is a bitter rival in the just concluded election of 1995 who ran against the wishes of my father, the late
Congressman Alejandro D. Almendras, Sr. He has caused pain to the family when he filed cases against us:
his brothers and sisters, and worst against his own mother.
I deemed that his act of transacting business that affects my person and official functions is malicious in
purpose, done with ill motive and part of a larger plan of harassment activities to perforce realise his egoistic
and evil objectives.
May I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the above information to concerned
officials and secretariat employees of the House of Representatives. 3
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xxxx
These letters were allegedly printed, distributed, circulated and published by petitioner, assisted by Atty.
Roberto Layug, in Digos, Davao del Sur and Quezon City, with evident bad faith and manifest malice to
destroy respondent Alexis C. Almendras good name. Hence, the latter filed an action for damages arising
from libel and defamation against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Digos City.
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THE RTC RULING

In the course of trial at the lower court, petitioner failed to present any evidence, except his Answer, despite
several rescheduling of hearings at his instance.4 The trial court thus submitted the case for decision, and
eventually ruled that respondent was libeled and defamed. For the sufferings, social ridicule, defamation and
dishonor caused by petitioners letters, respondent was awarded damages, as follows: P5,000,000.00 as
moral damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; P10,000.00 for litigation expenses; and attorneys
fees in the amount of 25% of whatever amounts actually received by plaintiff for this judgment.5
Petitioner moved for reconsideration and/or new trial,6 but the same was denied by the trial court.7
THE CA RULING
On intermediate appellate review, the CA ruled that petitioner was not denied due process. It noted that
petitioner was given full opportunity to present his evidence, but he vehemently disregarded the
proceedings by merely absenting himself from trials without valid excuses. 8
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The appellate court also ruled that the letters were not privileged communications, since petitioner was not
acting as a member of the Congress when he sent them. In fact, his letter stated that he extends his
apology for bringing this personal matter in the open. He was, as maintained by the respondent, sending
open libelous and unsealed letters, duly published and circulated in Digos, Davao del Sur, and Quezon
City.9 Consequently, the CA upheld the damages awarded by the trial court, the amounts being consistent
with the social and financial standing of the parties involved. 10
We now rule on the final review of the case.
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THE ISSUES
From the foregoing, we reduce the issues to the following:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived due process;
(2) Whether or not the letters are libelous in nature;
(3) Whether or not the letters fall within the purview of privileged communication; and
(4) Whether or not respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.
OUR RULING
We deny the petition.
Petitioner anchors his appeal on the ground that his letters are covered by privileged communications. He
insists that he has the legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to
protect, being then a Congressman duty-bound to insulate his office and his constituents from the dubious
and mistrustful pursuits of his elder brother.11 Moreover, the letters were also not meant to be circulated or
published. They were sent merely to warn the individuals of respondents nefarious activities, and made in
good faith and without any actual malice. Respondents testimony that he learned the existence of the letter
from others cannot be countenanced, as no witness corroborated this. At best, it is only hearsay.12
On the denial of his motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, he maintains that his own counsel Atty.
Leonardo D. Suario categorically admitted that he did not know of petitioners ailment and thus did not make
the proper manifestations in Court. His failure to attend the hearing was not of his own volition, but because
of his doctors strict advice since he earlier underwent a quadruple coronary artery bypass at the St. Lukes
Medical Center-Heart Institute in Quezon City on 16 July 2001, just a day before the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial was filed. While his counsel represents him, the latters mistakes should
not deprive him of his day in court to present his side.13
As to the damages, petitioner avers that since respondent never testified on any suffering he sustained or
why he is entitled to them, the same must not be awarded.
On the other hand, respondent asserts that petitioners letters do not fall within the purview of privileged
communication because it was published and read by the secretariat of the House of the Representatives,
and not exclusively communicated to persons who have some interest or duty in the matter and who have
the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement. Moreover, he was not acting as a
member of congress when he sent the letters. The writing of a personal matter (which petitioner admitted in
the letters), not relating to the functions of a member of Congress cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be
deemed to be privileged and insulated from suit arising therefrom. 14
Malice has also been sufficiently proven because the language of the letters in fact shows that the writer had
some ill-feeling towards the respondent by using the words such as reknown blackmailer and bitter rival.
There is sufficient showing that petitioner bore a grudge against the respondent and that there was rivalry
or ill-feeling between them.15
Anent the damages, respondent believes that they were rightly awarded, taking into consideration his
testimony in the lower court,16 and the financial and social standing of the parties herein. 17
First, we rule that petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process.
Settled is the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. The only exception is when the
negligence of the counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.
In such instance, the remedy is to reopen the case and allow the party who was denied his day in court to
adduce evidence. However, perusing the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the general rule. 18
Petitioner was given several opportunities to present his evidence or to clarify his medical constraints in
court, but he did not do so, despite knowing full well that he had a pending case in court. For petitioner to
feign and repeatedly insist upon a lack of awareness of the progress of an important litigation is to unmask a
penchant for the ludicrous. Although he rightfully expected counsel to amply protect his interest, he cannot
just sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case. In keeping with the normal course of events, he
should have taken the initiative of making the proper inquiries from his counsel and the trial court as to the
status of his case. For his failure to do so, he has only himself to blame. 19 The Court cannot allow petitioner
the exception to the general rule just because his counsel admitted having no knowledge of his medical
condition. To do so will set a dangerous precedent of never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege
their own fault or negligence to support the clients case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the
operation of law.20
Second, we find that petitioners letters are libelous in nature and do not fall within the purview
of privileged communication.
For an imputation to be libelous under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following requisites must
be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the
victim must be identifiable.21
Consequently, under Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if true, if
no good intention and justifiable motive is shown. As an exception to the rule, the presumption of malice is
done away with when the defamatory imputation qualifies as privileged communication. 22 In order to qualify
as privileged communication under Article 354, Number 1, 23 the following requisites must concur: (1) the
person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at
least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2)
the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the
matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the
communication are made in good faith and without malice. 24
Were petitioners letters defamatory in nature? We believe so.

In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and
should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by the
persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. 25 In the
instant case, the letters tag respondent as a reknown black mailer, a vengeful family member who filed
cases against his mother and siblings, and with nefarious designs. Even an impartial mind reading these
descriptions would be led to entertain doubts on the persons character, thereby affecting that persons
reputation.
Malice can also be presumed inasmuch as the letters are not privileged in nature. Petitioners contention that
he has the legal, moral or social duty to make the communication cannot be countenanced because he failed
to communicate the statements only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the matter
alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement. A written
letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among
the public.26 Examination of the letters would reveal that petitioner himself intended for the letters to be
circulated (and they were so) when he said that:
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May I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the above information to concerned
officials and secretariat employees of the House of Representatives. 27
This lack of selectivity on his part is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged
communication because such publication created upon the minds of the readers a circumstance which
brought discredit and shame to respondents reputation.28
Lastly, having duly proved that all the elements of libel are present in this case, we rule that the
damages awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court must be modified and
equitably reduced.
In awarding damages in libel cases, the court is given ample discretion to determine the amount, depending
upon the facts of the particular case.29 Article 2219 of the Civil Code expressly authorizes the recovery of
moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. However, while no proof of
pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, x x x it is nevertheless essential
that the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal
connection to defendants acts.30 Considering that respondent sufficiently justified his claim for damages
(i.e. he testified that he was embarrassed by the said letters [and] ashamed to show his face in [sic]
government offices31), we find him entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
However, we equitably reduce the amounts32 awarded because even though the letters were libellous,
respondent has not suffered such grave or substantial damage to his reputation to warrant receiving
P5,000,000 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. In fact, he was able to successfully
secure an elected position in recent years. Accordingly, we reduce the award of moral damages from
P5,000,000 to P100,000 and exemplary damages from P100,000 to P20,000.
The award of attorneys fees is not proper because respondent failed to justify satisfactorily his claim, and
both the trial and appellate courts failed to explicitly state in their respective decisions the rationale for the
award.33 It is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather
than the rule, and counsels fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the
court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable
justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to
speculation and conjecture. In all events, the court must explicitly state in the text of the decision, and not
only in the decretal portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorneys fees. 34 The same is true for
the award of litigation expenses because respondent failed to satisfactorily justify his claim.
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WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. The 27 January 2006 Decision and 28 August 2007 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73088 are hereby MODIFIED, in that: (1) the award of moral
damages is reduced from P5,000,000 to P100,000; (2) the award of exemplary damages is reduced from
P100,000 to P20,000; and (3) litigation expenses and attorneys fees are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
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FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 210634, January 14, 2015
NORIEL R. MONTIERRO, Petitioner, v. RICKMERS MARINE AGENCY PHILS., INC., Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO,C.J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on certiorari1 seeking to nullify the Decision dated 8 August
20132and the Resolution dated 6 January 20143 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
126618.
Facts
On 26 February 2010, respondent Rickmers Marine Agency Phils., Inc. (Rickmers), on behalf of its foreign
principal, Global Management Limited, hired petitioner Noriel Montierro as Ordinary Seaman with a basic
monthly salary of USD420. He was assigned to work on board the vessel M/V CSAV Maresias.4
Sometime in May 2010, while on board the vessel and going down from a crane ladder, Montierro lost his
balance and twisted his legs, thus injuring his right knee. 5 Thereafter, on 31 May 2010, he was examined in
Livorno, Spain by Dr. Roberto Santini, who recommended surgical treatment at home and found him unfit for
duty.6 Thus, on 2 June 2010, Montierro was repatriated to the Philippines for further medical treatment. 7
On 4 June 2010, two days after his repatriation, Montierro reported to Dr. Natalio G. Alegre II, the companydesignated physician. He underwent a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan of his right knee. The MRI
showed he had meniscal tear, posterior horn of the medical meniscus, and minimal joint fluid. Upon the
recommendation of Dr. Alegre, Montiero underwent arthroscopic partial medical meniscectomy of his right
knee on 29 July 2010 at St. Lukes Medical Center.8
On 20 August 2010, Montierro had his second check-up with Dr. Alegre, who noted that the formers surgical
wounds had healed, but that there was still pain and limitation of motion on his right knee on gaits and
squats. The doctor advised him to undergo rehabilitation medicine and continue physical therapy.9
On 3 September 2010, the 91st day of Montierros treatment, Dr. Alegre issued an interim disability
grade of 10 for stretching leg of ligaments of a knee resulting in instability of the joint. He advised
Montierro to continue with the latters physical therapy and oral medications. 10
Montierro further underwent sessions of treatment and evaluation between 17 September 2010 and 28
December 2010.11
On 3 January 2011, the 213th day of Montierros treatment, Dr. Alegre issued a final assessment as
follows:
Subjective Complaints:
Cannot flex the knee to 100%
No swelling noted
Limited range of motion of right knee
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Assessment:
Medial Meniscal Tear, Knee Right
S/P Arthroscopic Meniscectomy
Plan:
Disability Grade of 10 is given
based on section 32 of the POEA
contract. Lower Extremities #20,
stretching leg of the ligaments of
a knee resulting in instability
of the joint. x x x12
Meanwhile, on 3 December 2010, one month before Dr. Alegres issuance of the final disability grading,
Montierro filed with the labor arbiter a complaint for recovery of permanent disability compensation in the
amount of USD89,000, USD2,100 as sickness allowance, plus moral and exemplary damages and attorneys
fees.13 To support his claim for total permanent disability benefits, Montierro relied on a Medical Certificate
dated 3 December 2010 issued by his physician of choice, Dr. Manuel C. Jacinto, recommending total
permanent disability grading, and explaining the formers medical condition as follows:
Patients condition started at work when he accidentally fell from a ladder causing his (R) knee to be twisted.
Patients symptoms of pain and limited flexion of (R) knee persisted, thus he was assessed to be physically
unfit to go back to work.14
LA AND NLRC RULINGS
In a Decision dated 29 June 2011, the LA held that Montierro was entitled to permanent total disability
benefits under the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC).
The LA relied on the 120-day rule introduced by the 2005 case Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad.15 The rule
equates the inability of the seafarer to perform work for more than 120 days to permanent total disability,
which entitles a seafarer to full disability benefits.16 The LA also awarded one-month sickness allowance and
attorneys fees.
On 26 October 2011, Rickmers elevated the case to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), 17which
affirmed the Decision of the LA on 5 June 2012. Rickmers filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the NLRC
denied.18 This denial prompted Rickmers to file a Rule 65 Petition with the CA. 19
CA Ruling
On 8 August 2013, the CA rendered a Decision partially granting the Petition. It affirmed the NLRC ruling
insofar as the latter awarded Montierro one-month sickness allowance. 20 The CA held, however, that he was
entitled merely to Grade 10 permanent partial disability benefits.21 It also dropped the award of attorneys
fees granted to him earlier.22
In its Decision downgrading the claim of Montierro to Grade 10 permanent partial disability benefits only,
the CA ruled that his disability could not be deemed total and permanent under the 240-day rule established
by the 2008 case Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.23Vergara extends the period to 240 days
when, within the first 120-day period (reckoned from the first day of treatment), a final assessment cannot
be made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, provided a declaration has been made to
this effect.24
The CA pointed out that only 215 days had lapsed from the time of Montierros medical repatriation on 2
June 2010 until 3 January 2011, when the company-designated physician issued a Grade 10 final disability
assessment. It justified the extension of the period to 240 days on the ground that Dr. Alegre issued
an interim disability grade of 10 on 3 September 2010, the 91st day of Montierros treatment, which was
within the initial 120-day period.
Further, the CA upheld the jurisprudential rule that, in case of conflict, it is the recommendation issued by
the company-designated physician that prevails over the recommendation of the claimants physician of
choice.
On the deletion of the award of attorneys fees, the CA reasoned that there was no sufficient showing of bad
faith in Rickmers persistence in the case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of its
cause based on the recommendation of the company-designated physician.
RULE 45 PETITION
Hence, Montierro filed a Rule 45 Petition with this Court. He contends in the main that he is entitled to full
disability benefits. To support this thesis, he raises two arguments.
First, Montierro insists that the 120-day rule laid down in the 2005 case Crystal Shipping, and not the 240day rule introduced by the 2008 case Vergara, applies to this case. Montierro cites the more recent
casesWallem Maritime Services, Inc., v. Tanawan,25Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v.
Mesina,26 and Valenzona v. Fair Shipping Corp.,27 all of which applied the Crystal Shipping doctrine despite
the fact that they were promulgated after Vergara.
Second, he claims that the medical assessment of his personal physician, to the effect that the formers
disability is permanent and total, should be accorded more weight than that issued by the companydesignated physician.28
Montierro also raises in his petition the issue of attorneys fees, which he believes he is entitled to as he was
compelled to litigate.
ISSUES
The issues to be resolved are the following: (1) whether it is the 120-day rule or the 240-day rule that
should apply to this case; (2) whether it is the opinion of the company doctor or of the personal doctor of
the seafarer that should prevail; and (3) whether Montierro is entitled to attorneys fees.
OUR RULING
120 day rule vs. 240 day rule
The Court has already delineated the effectivity of the Crystal Shipping and Vergara rulings in the 2013
case Kestrel Shipping Co. Inc. v. Munar,29 by explaining as follows:
Nonetheless, Vergara was promulgated on October 6, 2008, or more than two (2) years from the time
Munar filed his complaint and observance of the principle of prospectivity dictates that Vergara should not
operate to strip Munar of his cause of action for total and permanent disability that had already accrued as a
result of his continued inability to perform his customary work and the failure of the company-designated
physician to issue a final assessment.
Thus, based on Kestrel, if the maritime compensation complaint was filed prior to 6 October 2008,
the 120-day rule applies; if, on the other hand, the complaint was filed from 6 October 2008
onwards, the 240-day rule applies.
In this case, Montierro filed his Complaint on 3 December 2010, which was after the promulgation
ofVergara on 6 October 2008. Hence, it is the 240-day rule that applies to this case, and not the 120-day
rule.
Montierro cannot rely on the cases that he cited, a survey of which reveals that all of them involved
Complaints filed before 6 October 2008. Wallem Maritime Services30 involved a Complaint for disability
benefits filed on 26 November 1998. In Maersk Filipinas Crewing,31 while the Decision did not mention the
date the Complaint was filed, the LAs Decision was rendered on 14 April 2008. Lastly, in Valenzona,32 the
Complaint was filed sometime before 31 January 2003. It thus comes as no surprise that the cases
Montierro banks on followed the 120-day rule.
Applying the 240-day rule to this case, we arrive at the same conclusion reached by the CA. Montierros
treatment by the company doctor began on 4 June 2010. It ended on 3 January 2011, when the company
doctor issued a Grade 10 final disability assessment. Counting the days from 4 June 2010 to 3 January
2011, the assessment by the company doctor was made on the 213th day, well within the 240-day period.
The extension of the period to 240 days is justified by the fact that Dr. Alegre issued an interim disability
grade of 10 on 3 September 2010, the 91st day of Montierros treatment, which was within the 120-day
period.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Montierros condition cannot be deemed a permanent total disability.
Company doctor vs. personal doctor
Vergara also definitively settled the question how a conflict between two disability assessments the
assessment of the company-designated physician and that of the seafarers chosen physician should be
resolved.33 In that case, the Court held that there is a procedure to be followed regarding the determination
of liability for work-related death, illness or injury in the case of overseas Filipino seafarers. The procedure is
spelled out in the 2000 POEA-SEC, the execution of which is a sine qua non requirement in deployments for
overseas work.34
The procedure is as follows: when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the
vessel, his fitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated physician. The physician has 120
days, or 240 days, if validly extended, to make the assessment. If the physician appointed by the seafarer
disagrees with the assessment of the company-designated physician, the opinion of a third doctor may be
agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer, whose decision shall be final and binding on them. 35
Vergara ruled that the procedure in the 2000 POEA-SEC must be strictly followed; otherwise, if not availed
of or followed strictly by the seafarer, the assessment of the company-designated physician stands. 36
In this case, Montierro and Rickmers are covered by the provisions of the same 2000 POEA-SEC. It is the
law between them. Hence, they are bound by the mechanism for determining liability for a disability benefits
claim. Montierro, however, preempted the procedure when he filed on 3 December 2010 a Complaint for
permanent disability benefits based on his chosen physicians assessment, which was made one
month before the company-designated doctor issued the final disability grading on 3 January 2011,the
213th day of Montierros treatment.
Hence, for failure of Montierro to observe the procedure provided by the POEA-SEC, the assessment of the
company doctor should prevail.
Moreover, Rickmers exerted real efforts to provide Montierro with medical assistance. The companydesignated physician monitored Montierros case from beginning to end. Upon the formers recommendation,
Montierro even underwent arthroscopic partial medical meniscectomy of his right knee. The company-doctor
likewise gave him physical therapy. Lastly, he issued his certification on the basis of the medical records
available and the results obtained.
Further, a juxtaposition of the two conflicting assessments reveals that the certification of Montierros doctor
of choice pales in comparison with that of the company-designated physician. Fitting is the following
discussion of the CA:
To contest the company-designated physician's disability assessment of Grade 10, Montierro relied on the
total permanent disability assessment of his physician of choice. In contrast to his physician's
assessment embodied in a one-page medical certificate dated December 3, 2010 which did not
even indicate any test or procedure that may have been performed or conducted when he
examined and determined Montierro's disability, however, the company-designated physician's finding
is entitled to greater weight and respect because it was arrived at after Montierro was regularly examined in
coordination with other doctors, prescribed with medications, and given physical therapy and rehabilitation
sessions from June 4, 2010 until January 3, 2011. In the face of these well-defined facts, We find it only
reasonable, if not logical, to give credence to the company physician's finding rather than that of Montierro's
physician of choice.
Having extensive personal knowledge of the seafarer's actual medical condition, and having closely,
meticulously and regularly monitored and treated his injury for an extended period, the company-designated
physician is certainly in a better position to give a more accurate evaluation of Montierro's health condition.
The disability grading given by him should therefore be given more weight than the assessment of
Montierro's physician of choice.37
Attorneys fees
On the premise that there was no showing of bad faith on the part of the employer, forcing Montierro to
litigate, the CA dropped the award of attorneys fees. We arrive at the same conclusion by using another
route.
Indeed, the general rule is that attorney's fees may not be awarded where there is no sufficient showing of
bad faith in a party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of ones
cause.38 The rule, however, takes a turn when it comes to labor cases.
The established rule in labor law is that the withholding of wages need not be coupled with malice or bad
faith to warrant the grant of attorneys fees under Article 111 of the Labor Code. 39 All that is required is that
lawful wages be not paid without justification, thus compelling the employee to litigate. 40
The CA thus relied on a wrong consideration in resolving the issue of attorneys fees. Be that as it may,
Montierro is not entitled to attorneys fees, even if we apply the correct rule to this case.
Montierro, as earlier mentioned, jumped the gun when he filed his complaint one month before the
company-designated doctor issued the final disability grading. Hence, there was no unlawful withholding of
benefits to speak of. Precisely because Montierro was still under treatment and awaiting the final assessment
of the company-designated physician, the formers act was premature.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The CA Decision dated 8 August 2013 and
Resolution dated 6 January 2014 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 204702, January 14, 2015
RICARDO C. HONRADO, Petitioner, v. GMA NETWORK FILMS, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
We review1 the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) ordering petitioner Ricardo C. Honrado (petitioner) to
pay a sum of money to respondent GMA Network Films, Inc. for breach of contract and breach of trust.
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The Facts
On 11 December 1998, respondent GMA Network Films, Inc. (GMA Films) entered into a TV Rights
Agreement (Agreement) with petitioner under which petitioner, as licensor of 36 films, granted to GMA
Films, for a fee of P60.75 million, the exclusive right to telecast the 36 films for a period of three years.
Under Paragraph 3 of the Agreement, the parties agreed that all betacam copies of the [films] should pass
through broadcast quality test conducted by GMA-7, the TV station operated by GMA Network, Inc. (GMA
Network), an affiliate of GMA Films. The parties also agreed to submit the films for review by the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) and stipulated on the remedies in the event that MTRCB
bans the telecasting of any of the films (Paragraph 4):
The PROGRAMME TITLES listed above shall be subject to approval by the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) and, in the event of disapproval, LICENSOR [Petitioner] will either replace the
censored PROGRAMME TITLES with another title which is mutually acceptable to both parties or, failure to
do such, a proportionate reduction from the total price shall either be deducted or refunded whichever is the
case by the LICENSOR OR LICENSEE [GMA Films].3 (Emphasis supplied)
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Two of the films covered by the Agreement were Evangeline Katorse and Bubot for which GMA Films paid
P1.5 million each.
In 2003, GMA Films sued petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) to collect P1.6
million representing the fee it paid for Evangeline Katorse (P1.5 million) and a portion of the fee it paid
forBubot (P350,0004). GMA Films alleged that it rejected Evangeline Katorse because its running time was
too short for telecast5 and petitioner only remitted P900,000 to the owner of Bubot (Juanita Alano [Alano]),
keeping for himself the balance of P350,000. GMA Films prayed for the return of such amount on the theory
that an implied trust arose between the parties as petitioner fraudulently kept it for himself.6
Petitioner denied liability, counter-alleging that after GMA Films rejected Evangeline Katorse, he replaced it
with another film, Winasak na Pangarap, which GMA Films accepted. As proof of such acceptance, petitioner
invoked a certification of GMA Network, dated 30 March 1999, attesting that such film is of good broadcast
quality7 (Film Certification). Regarding the fee GMA Films paid for Bubot, petitioner alleged that he had
settled his obligation to Alano. Alternatively, petitioner alleged that GMA Films, being a stranger to the
contracts he entered into with the owners of the films in question, has no personality to question his
compliance with the terms of such contracts. Petitioner counterclaimed for attorneys fees.
cralawre d
The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court dismissed GMA Films complaint and, finding merit in petitioners counterclaim, ordered GMA
Films to pay attorneys fees (P100,000). The trial court gave credence to petitioners defense that he
replaced Evangeline Katorse with Winasak na Pangarap. On the disposal of the fee GMA Films paid forBubot,
the trial court rejected GMA Films theory of implied trust, finding insufficient GMA Films proof that
petitioner pocketed any portion of the fee in question.
GMA Films appealed to the CA.
cralawre d
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA granted GMA Films appeal, set aside the trial courts ruling, and ordered respondent to pay GMA
Films P2 million8 as principal obligation with 12% annual interest, exemplary damages (P100,000),
attorneys fees (P200,000), litigation expenses (P100,000) and the costs. Brushing aside the trial courts
appreciation of the evidence, the CA found that (1) GMA Films was authorized under Paragraph 4 of the
Agreement to reject Evangeline Katorse, and (2) GMA Films never accepted Winasak na Pangarap as
replacement because it was a bold film.9
On petitioners liability for the fee GMA Films paid for Bubot, the CA sustained GMA Films contention that
petitioner was under obligation to turn over to the film owners the full amount GMA Films paid for the films
as nowhere in the TV Rights Agreement does it provide that the licensor is entitled to any commission x x x
[hence] x x x [petitioner] Honrado cannot claim any portion of the purchase price paid for by x x x GMA
Films.10 The CA concluded that petitioners retention of a portion of the fee for Bubot gave rise to an implied
trust between him and GMA Films, obligating petitioner, as trustee, to return to GMA Films, as beneficiary,
the amount claimed by the latter.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner prays for the reinstatement of the trial courts ruling while GMA Films attacks
the petition for lack of merit.
cralawred
The Issue
The question is whether the CA erred in finding petitioner liable for breach of the Agreement and breach of
trust.
cralawred
The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition. We find GMA Films complaint without merit and accordingly reinstate the trial courts
ruling dismissing it with the modification that the award of attorneys fees is deleted.
Petitioner Committed No Breach of Contract or Trust
MTRCB Disapproval the Stipulated Basis for Film Replacement
The parties do not quarrel on the meaning of Paragraph 4 of the Agreement which states:
The PROGRAMME TITLES listed [in the Agreement] x x x shall be subject to approval by the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) and, in the event of disapproval, LICENSOR [Petitioner]
will either replace the censored PROGRAMME TITLES with another title which is mutually acceptable to both
parties or, failure to do such, a proportionate reduction from the total price shall either be deducted or
refunded whichever is the case by the LICENSOR OR LICENSEE [GMA Films]. 11 (Emphasis supplied)
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryFFF
Under this stipulation, what triggers the rejection and replacement of any film listed in the Agreement is the
disapproval of its telecasting by MTRCB.
Nor is there any dispute that GMA Films rejected Evangeline Katorse not because it was disapproved by
MTRCB but because the films total running time was too short for telecast (undertime). Instead of rejecting
GMA Films demand for falling outside of the terms of Paragraph 4, petitioner voluntarily acceded to it and
replaced such film with Winasak na Pangarap. What is disputed is whether GMA Films accepted the
replacement film offered by petitioner.
Petitioner maintains that the Film Certification issued by GMA Network attesting to the good broadcast
quality of Winasak na Pangarap amounted to GMA Films acceptance of such film. On the other hand, GMA
Films insists that such clearance pertained only to the technical quality of the film but not to its content
which it rejected because it found the film as bomba (bold).12 The CA, working under the assumption that
the ground GMA Films invoked to reject Winasak na Pangarap was sanctioned under the Agreement, found
merit in the latters claim. We hold that regardless of the import of the Film Certification, GMA Films
rejection of Winasak na Pangarap finds no basis in the Agreement.
In terms devoid of any ambiguity, Paragraph 4 of the Agreement requires the intervention of MTRCB, the
state censor, before GMA Films can reject a film and require its replacement. Specifically, Paragraph 4
requires that MTRCB, after reviewing a film listed in the Agreement, disapprove or X-rate it for telecasting.
GMA Films does not allege, and we find no proof on record indicating, that MTRCB reviewed Winasak na
Pangarap and X-rated it. Indeed, GMA Films own witness, Jose Marie Abacan (Abacan), then Vice-President
for Program Management of GMA Network, testified during trial that it was GMA Network which
rejected Winasak na Pangarap because the latter considered the film bomba.13 In doing so, GMA Network
went beyond its assigned role under the Agreement of screening films to test their broadcast quality and
assumed the function of MTRCB to evaluate the films for the propriety of their content. This runs counter to
the clear terms of Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Agreement.
Disposal of the Fees Paid to Petitioner Outside of the Terms of the Agreement
GMA Films also seeks refund for the balance of the fees it paid to petitioner for Bubot which petitioner
allegedly failed to turn-over to the films owner, Alano. 14 Implicit in GMA Films claim is the theory that the
Agreement obliges petitioner to give to the film owners the entire amount he received from GMA Films and
that his failure to do so gave rise to an implied trust, obliging petitioner to hold whatever amount he kept in
trust for GMA Films. The CA sustained GMA Films interpretation, noting that the Agreement does not
provide that the licensor is entitled to any commission.15
This is error.
The Agreement, as its full title denotes (TV Rights Agreement), is a licensing contract, the essence of
which is the transfer by the licensor (petitioner) to the licensee (GMA Films), for a fee, of the exclusive right
to telecast the films listed in the Agreement. Stipulations for payment of commission to the licensor is
incongruous to the nature of such contracts unless the licensor merely acted as agent of the film owners.
Nowhere in the Agreement, however, did the parties stipulate that petitioner signed the contract in such
capacity. On the contrary, the Agreement repeatedly refers to petitioner as licensor and GMA Films as
licensee. Nor did the parties stipulate that the fees paid by GMA Films for the films listed in the Agreement
will be turned over by petitioner to the film owners. Instead, the Agreement merely provided that the total
fees will be paid in three installments (Paragraph 3).16
We entertain no doubt that petitioner forged separate contractual arrangements with the owners of the films
listed in the Agreement, spelling out the terms of payment to the latter. Whether or not petitioner complied
with these terms, however, is a matter to which GMA Films holds absolutely no interest. Being a stranger to
such arrangements, GMA Films is no more entitled to complain of any breach by petitioner of his contracts
with the film owners than the film owners are for any breach by GMA Films of its Agreement with petitioner.
We find it unnecessary to pass upon the question whether an implied trust arose between the parties, as
held by the CA. Such conclusion was grounded on the erroneous assumption that GMA Films holds an
interest in the disposition of the licensing fees it paid to petitioner.
cralawre d
Award of Attorneys Fees to Petitioner Improper

The trial court awarded attorneys fees to petitioner as it deemed it just and reasonable 17 to do so, using
the amount provided by petitioner on the witness stand (P100,000). Undoubtedly, attorneys fees may be
awarded if the trial court deems it just and equitable.18 Such ground, however, must be fully elaborated in
the body of the ruling.19 Its mere invocation, without more, negates the nature of attorneys fees as a form
of actual damages.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision, dated 30 April 2012 and Resolution, dated 19
November 2012, of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The Decision, dated 5 December 2008, of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 223) is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that the award
of attorneys fees is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
cralawla wlibrary
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 203384, January 14, 2015
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SPS. JOSE CASTUERA AND PERLA
CASTUERA,Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 26
March 2012 Decision2 and 14 August 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85015,
affirming the 31 January 2005 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 70, Iba, Zambales, in Land
Registration Case No. RTC-N-92-I and denying the motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The Facts
Andres Valiente owned a 3,135-square meter land in Barangay Siminublan, San Narciso, Zambales. In 1978,
he sold the property to respondents Jose and Perla Castuera (Spouses Castuera). On 21 May 2003, the
Spouses Castuera filed with the RTC an application5 for original registration of title over the property.
The Spouses Castuera presented three witnesses to support their application. The three witnesses were (1)
former barangay captain and councilman Alfredo Dadural, (2) Senior Police Officer 2 Teodorico Cudal, and
(3) Perla Castuera. All witnesses testified that the Spouses Castuera owned the property.
The Spouses Castuera also presented documentary evidence to support their application. The documents
included tax receipts and an advance plan6 with a notation, Checked and verified against the cadastral
records on file in this office and is for registration purposes. This survey is within the Alienable and
Disposable land proj. No. 3-H certified by Director of Forestry on June 20, 1927 per LC Map No. 669 Sheet
1.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an
opposition to the application for original registration.
The RTCs Ruling
In its 31 January 2005 Decision, the RTC granted the application for original registration of title over the
property. The RTC held:
From the evidence submitted by the applicants, they have shown preponderantly that they are the lawful
owners in fee simple and the actual possessors of Lot 6553 of the San Narciso Cadastre. They are entitled
therefore to a judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the said land pursuant to the provisions of the
new Property Registration Decree (PD 1529).7
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. The Spouses Castuera attached to their
appellees brief a certification8 from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),
stating:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the tract of land situated at Brgy. Siminublan, San Narciso, Zambales containing an
area of ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN (1847.00) SQUARE METERS as shown and
described in this sketch as verified by Cart. Nestor L. Delgado for Sps. Jose Castuera and Perla Castuera was
found to be within the Alienable or Disposable, Project No. 3-H, certified by then Director of Forestry, manila
[sic] on June 20, 1927 per LC Map No. 669, sheet No. 1. 9
The Court of Appeals Ruling

In its 26 March 2012 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. The Court of Appeals held
that:
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides for the
instances when a person may file for an application for registration of title over a parcel of land:
Section 14. Who May Apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of first Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Accordingly, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title must prove the
following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Section 14(1) of the law requires
that the property sought to be registered is already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration is filed.
Applying the foregoing in the present case, We find and so rule that the trial court is correct in granting
appellees application for original registration of the subject land. A scrutiny of the records shows that there
is substantial compliance with the requirement that the subject land is alienable and disposable land. It
bears to emphasize that the Advance Plan has the following notations:
Checked and verified against the cadastral records on file in this office and is for registration purposes.[]
This survey is within the alienable and disposable land proj. no. 3-H certified by Director of Forestry on June
20, 1927 per LC Map No. 669, Sheet 1.
In Republic v. Serrano, the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the trial court and this Court that the
parcel of land subject of registration was alienable and disposable. It held that a DENR Regional Technical
Directors certification, which is annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence, constitutes
substantial compliance with the legal requirement:
While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable and disposable
character of the land applied for,
the Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision
plan submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It
clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as
July 18, 1925.[]
The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary. It bears
noting that no opposition was filed or registered by the Land Registration Authority or the DENR to contest
respondents applications on the ground that their respective shares of the lot are inalienable. There being
no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the Certification may thus be equitably
extended in favor of respondents.
While in the case of Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Supreme Court overturned the grant by the lower
courts of an original application for registration over a parcel of land in Batangas and ruled that a CENRO
certification is not enough to certify that a land is alienable and disposable:
[]Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do
so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
However, in the recent case of Republic vs. Carlos R. Vega, et al., as an exception to the strict application of
the stringent rule imposed in the above pronouncement that the absence of these twin certifications justifies
a denial of an application for registration, the Supreme Court, in its sound discretion, and based solely on
the evidence on record, may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the ground of substantial compliance
showing that there has been a positive act of government to show the nature and character of the land and
an absence of effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only apply to applications for
registration currently pending before the trial court prior to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all
future applications.
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the trial court only on January 31, 2005, prior to the
above pronouncement[.] We believe that the same rule shall apply to the present case allowing the
registration of the subject property as there is substantial compliance with the requirement that the land
subject of registration is an alienable and disposable land. Besides, appellees had attached to their
appellees brief a Certification from the DENR-CENR Office issued on December 2, 1999, which states the
following:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the tract of land situated at Brgy. Siminublan, San Narciso, Zambales containing
an area of ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN (1,847) SQUARE METERS as shown and
described in this sketch as verified by Cart. Nestor L. Delgado for Sps. Jose Castuera and Perla Castuera was
found to be within the Alienable or Disposable, Project No. 3-H, certified by then Director of Forestry, Manila
on June 20, 1927 per LC Map No 669, Sheet No. 1.10
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 14 August 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion. Hence, the present petition.
The Issue
Petitioner raises as issue that the advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the
alienable and disposable character of the property.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the alienable and disposable
character of the property. The Spouses Castuera, as applicants for registration of title, must present a
certified true copy of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretarys declaration or
classification of the land as alienable and disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Juan
Fabio,11citing Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,12 the Court held that:
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it is not enough for the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant
for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In
addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. Such copy of the DENR
Secretarys declaration or the Presidents proclamation must be certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of such official record. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.13
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the 26 March 2012 Decision and 14 August
2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85015. Respondents Jose and Perla Castueras
application for registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 194499, January 14, 2015

MANUEL R. PORTUGUEZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 seeking the reversal of the Decision2 dated August 12,
2010 and the Resolution3 dated November 9, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32096.
The CA affirmed in toto the Decision4 dated August 29, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 70, finding petitioner Manuel R. Portuguez (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.5
The case stemmed from the Information6 dated April 21, 2003, charging petitioner of the crime of violation
of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for illegal possession of five centigrams (0.05 gram) of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, the accusatory portion of which reads:
On or about April 16, 2003, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing five centigrams (0.05 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was
found positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of the
said law.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. 7 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
During the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense stipulated, among others, on the due
execution and genuineness of the Request for Laboratory Examination 8 dated April 16, 2003 and Chemistry
Report No. D-687-03E9 issued by the Forensic Chemist, Police Senior Inspector Annalee R. Forro (P/Sr. Insp.
Forro). The parties also stipulated on the existence of the plastic sachet including its contents which had
been the subject of the said Request except for its source or origin. 10 After entering into the aforementioned
stipulations, the testimony of P/Sr. Insp. Forro was dispensed with.11
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution, through the testimonies of Police Officer 1 (PO1) Aldrin R. Mariano (PO1 Mariano) and PO1
Janet Sabo (PO1 Sabo), established the following:
On April 16, 2003, a confidential asset went to the Pasig City Police Station, City Hall Detachment, to report
the illegal drug activities of a certain alias Bobot at Balmores Street, Barangay Kapasigan, Pasig City. Upon
receipt of the information, the chief of said station formed a buy-bust team wherein PO1 Mariano was
designated as the poseur-buyer. After coordinating with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and
preparing the buy-bust money, the team and its asset proceeded to Balmores Street. Arriving thereat, the
asset pointed to Bobot as the target person. PO1 Mariano saw Bobot and petitioner transacting illegal drugs.
When PO1 Mariano and the asset met petitioner and Bobot on the road, the asset asked petitioner, Pre,
meron pa ba? At this point, petitioner looked at PO1 Mariano and thereafter, attempted to run. However,
PO1 Mariano was able to take hold of him. Then, the other police operatives arrived. Petitioner was asked to
open his hand. Upon seeing the suspected shabu on his hand, they arrested petitioner, informed him of his
constitutional rights and boarded him on their service vehicle. Before leaving the area, PO1 Mariano placed
the markings EXH A ARM 04-16-03 on the seized shabu. Thereafter, the police operatives brought
petitioner to the Rizal Medical Center for physical examination before they proceeded to the police station for
investigation.12
On cross-examination, PO1 Mariano testified that at a distance of seven to eight meters, he saw Bobot
handing something to petitioner. PO1 Mariano said that the intended buy-bust operation failed because of
the commotion petitioner caused when he tried to run away. PO1 Mariano also testified that he got hold of
petitioner because he was nearer to him. He claimed that the other police operatives ran after Bobot but
they failed to arrest him.13
In addition, prosecution witness PO1 Sabo testified that on the same day of April 16, 2003, she delivered the
seized shabu and the Request for Laboratory Examination14 to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory for chemical analysis.15 Chemistry Report No. D-687-03E16 prepared by P/Sr. Insp. Forro revealed
the following results:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
A One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings EXH A ARM 04/16/03 containing 0.05
gram of white crystalline substance.
xxxx
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the tests for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
xxxx
CONCLUSION:
Specimen A contains Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Version of the Defense
Petitioner testified that at the time of his arrest, he was fixing the katam and was eating infront of his house
with his friends Jonjon Reynoso, Jonjing Reynoso and Junior Da Silva. Two persons from the Pasig Police
headquarters arrived and spoke to his sister who used to work at the said headquarters. When his sister
called him, he was mistaken to be Bobot and thus, they arrested him. Petitioner denied that he was in
possession of the shabu allegedly seized from him. He claimed that he saw the said shabu for the first time
at the headquarters. Petitioner also claimed that at the time he was arrested on April 16, 2003, Bobot was
actually detained at a jail in Bicutan.17
On cross-examination, petitioner admitted that his sister was a former errand girl at the police
headquarters. He divulged that at the time of his arrest, while he was then repairing a katam, two male
persons whom petitioner identified as Efren and Dennis approached his sister. Efren told petitioner that the
target person of the police officers was Bobot. Petitioner claimed that PO1 Mariano and PO1 Sabo arrived a
few minutes thereafter and he was arrested in the presence of his sister, Efren and Dennis. Petitioner also
claimed that the target person Bobot is his younger brother, Jovito Portuguez. He admitted that Bobot was
admitted to a rehabilitation center in Bicutan since he used to sell illegal drugs. He maintained that the
police officers already had with them the sachet of shabu when they arrested him.18
Dawn Portuguez, daughter of petitioner, testified that in the afternoon of April 16, 2003, two male persons
arrived at the house of her aunt and asked for her father. She testified that petitioner was then sleeping in
the nearby house of his friend, Junior. She then called for her father and, upon their return, four persons,
one of whom was in police uniform, approached them and arrested petitioner. She informed her mother of
what happened and the latter proceeded to the headquarters where petitioner was brought. 19
Last to testify for the defense was Maritess Portuguez, petitioners sister. She testified that her brother was
then sleeping in a nearby house when apprehended by the police officers. She averred that after her brother
was arrested, they agreed not to file a complaint against the said police officers. On cross-examination, she
said that she heard her niece shouting. Sensing a commotion, she hurried infront of their house and there
she saw the police officers accosting her brother.20
The RTCs Ruling
On August 29, 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision21 finding petitioner guilty as charged. The RTC invoked the
principle of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, gave credence to the testimony
of PO1 Mariano, and rejected the self-serving testimony of petitioner and the obviously manufactured
testimonies of his witnesses. The fallo of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused MANUEL PORTUGUEZ is hereby found GUILTYbeyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165 and is hereby
sentenced to Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day to Twenty (20) Years and to pay a FINE of Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).

Pursuant to Section 21 of Republic Act 9165, any authorized representative of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) is hereby ordered to take charge and have custody over the plastic sachet of
shabu, object of this case, for proper disposition.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.22
The CAs Ruling
On August 12, 2010, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA held that petitioner was deemed to
have waived his right to question the irregularity of his arrest since he failed to move to quash the
Information on this ground and instead, elected to proceed with the trial. The CA also held that petitioner
was caught in flagrante delicto when he was arrested by the police officers as PO1 Mariano saw him buying
illegal drugs from Bobot. The CA agreed with the RTC that the police officers were presumed to have
regularly performed their official duties. The CA opined that the integrity of the seized shabu had been
preserved by the concerned police officers.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration23 was denied by the CA in its Resolution24 dated November 9, 2010.
The CA held that the lack of inventory or photographs taken after petitioners apprehension does not render
the evidence inadmissible. The CA stressed that the integrity of the evidence taken from petitioner was duly
preserved.
Hence, this petition raising the sole assignment of error that the CA erred in affirming the conviction of
petitioner by the RTC.
Petitioner avers that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti, as well as the
regularity of the chain of custody. He submits that the testimony of PO1 Sabo was insufficient to establish
the identity of the shabu seized and the regularity of the chain of custody. Petitioner opines that the failure
of the police officers to observe the proper procedure, such as the lack of physical inventory and the nontaking of photographs, for the custody of the allegedly confiscated drug compromised its integrity. Moreover,
petitioner posits that the prosecution failed to establish a valid buy-bust operation as there was no preoperation report and coordination report filed with the PDEA. Finally, petitioner argues that, assuming that
the alleged shabu was recovered from him, the same is inadmissible in evidence for being a fruit of the
poisonous tree. Petitioner prays that he be acquitted.25
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
asserts that the totality of the evidence presented in this case clearly indicates that: (1) the sale of a
prohibited drug had taken place; (2) petitioner was caught in the act of buying the prohibited drug; (3)
petitioner was immediately arrested by the police officers upon consummation of the sale; and (4) the police
officers found in petitioners possession a prohibited drug, which was later confirmed through the chemistry
examination as shabu. Moreover, the OSG argues that non-compliance with the procedure laid down in R.A.
No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) does not render void and invalid the seizure of
dangerous drugs, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officers, as in this case. Lastly, the OSG relies on the CAs ruling on the legality of
petitioners arrest and the admissibility of the confiscated evidence.26
Our Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The essential elements in illegal possession of dangerous drugs are (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possess the said drug. 27
This Court holds that all the aforementioned essential elements in illegal possession of dangerous drugs
were proven in this case.
A close look at the sequence of events narrated by the prosecution witnesses particularly by PO1 Mariano
indicates that an intended buy-bust operation was about to be carried out against Bobot. Said operation was
not successful as no sale took place between the intended poseur-buyer, PO1 Mariano, and Bobot. Bobot was
also able to evade arrest.
Nonetheless, PO1 Mariano and the asset chanced upon an ongoing transaction between petitioner and
Bobot. It bears stressing that petitioner was particularly identified by PO1 Mariano as the person who bought
the suspected sachet of shabu from Bobot. When petitioner attempted to run, PO1 Mariano was able to grab
him. And when petitioner was asked to open his hand, 28 found in his possession was the same sachet that he
bought from Bobot. Through chemical analysis, the contents of the same sachet were found to be shabu.
The Court gives full faith and credence to the testimonies of the police officers and upholds the presumption
of regularity in the apprehending officers performance of official duty. It is a settled rule that in cases
involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police
officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence
to the contrary.29 However, petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the
presumption that the arresting officers regularly performed their duties. Except for his bare allegations of
denial and frame-up, and that the police officers had mistakenly identified him as Bobot, his younger
brother, nothing supports his claim that the police officers were impelled by improper motives to testify
against him. Needless to stress, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved, unless there is a
showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. 30 On petitioners claim that
at the time of his arrest, Bobot was actually confined in a rehabilitation center in Bicutan, 31 we note that
petitioner failed to fulfill his promise32 to prove it as fact.
Likewise, this Court has invariably viewed with disfavor the defenses of denial and frame-up. Such defenses
can easily be fabricated and are common ploy in prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession of
dangerous drugs. In order to prosper, such defenses must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. 33
Moreover, it bears stressing that in weighing the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses vis--vis those of
the defense, the RTC gave more credence to the version of the prosecution. This Court finds no reason to
disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial judge, the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on
appeal.34 The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses,
having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The
rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the CA as in this case. 35
Lastly, petitioner claims that there were no inventory and photographs of the prohibited item allegedly
seized from him. He argues that as a result of this failure, there is doubt as to the identity and integrity of
the drugs, and there was a break in the chain of custody of the evidence.
The argument does not hold water.
Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, this Court has held that non-compliance with the above-mentioned requirements is
not fatal. Non-compliance with Section 21 of the IRR does not make the items seized inadmissible. What is
imperative is the preservation of the integrity and the evidential value of the seized items as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.36

In this case, the chain of custody was established through the following link: (1) PO1 Mariano marked the
seized sachet subject of the in flagrante delicto arrest with EXH A ARM 04-16-03 which stands for his full
name, Aldrin Reyes Mariano;37 (2) a request for laboratory examination of the seized item was signed by
P/Sr. Insp. Rodrigo E. Villaruel;38 (3) the request and the marked item seized were personally delivered by
PO1 Sabo and received by the PNP Crime Laboratory on the same day of the arrest on April 16, 2003; (4)
Chemistry Report No. D-687-03E39 confirmed that the marked item seized from petitioner was
methamphetamine hydrochloride; and (5) the marked item was duly identified by PO1 Mariano in court and
offered in evidence.
Hence, it is clear that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized drugs were preserved. This Court,
therefore, finds no reason to overturn the findings of the RTC that the drugs seized from petitioner were the
same ones presented during trial. Accordingly, we hold that the chain of custody of the illicit drugs seized
from petitioner remains unbroken, contrary to the assertions of petitioner.
In sum, we find no reversible error committed by the RTC and CA in convicting petitioner of illegal
possession of drugs. It is hornbook doctrine that the factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial
court are binding on this Court unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with
arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.40 This case is no exception to the rule. All told, this Court thus
sustains the conviction of petitioner for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 12, 2010 and the Resolution dated
November 9, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32096 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 200013, January 14, 2015

BETTY GEPULLE-GARBO, REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MINDA G. ROSALES(NOW
REPRESENTED BY HER NEW ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, GARY LLOYD G. ROSALES), Petitioner, v.SPOUSES
VICTOREY ANTONIO GARABATO AND JOSEPHINE S. GARABATO, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition1 for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the May 20, 2011
Decision2and January 5, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87912 affirming
the August 7, 2006 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 108 dismissing the
petition5 for cancellation of certificate of title filed by petitioner Betty Gepulle-Garbo against respondents
Victorey and Josephine Garabato, for insufficiency of evidence.
The facts of the case follow.
Nick Garbo6 (Nick) was married to Eduviges Garabato (Eduviges) sometime before 1978. During their
marriage, they had a daughter named Florence Garabato (Florence) who in turn had a son out of wedlock,
respondent Victorey Antonio Garabato (Victorey). During the subsistence of Nick and Eduviges marriage,
Nick cohabited with petitioner Betty Gepulle-Garbo (Betty).
On June 17, 1977, a Deed of Sale7 was executed between Eduviges and Florence whereby the former sold to
the latter a 303-square meter parcel of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 17986, in
Pasay City. The deed of sale was signed by Nick Garbo.
On May 12, 1978, Eduviges passed away. Three months after, on August 12, 1978, Nick married Betty. On
October 26, 1988, Florence registered the property in her name and was issued TCT No. 126959. 8 Florence
died on March 4, 1992 while Nick died on February 28, 1996.
In 1996, respondent Victorey, married to co-respondent Josephine, registered the subject property in his
name by virtue of a Deed of Sale9 executed by Florence in his favor. On October 15, 1996, respondent was
issued TCT No. 136900.10
On August 2, 2001, petitioner filed a petition11 for cancellation of TCT No. 136900 against respondents. She
impugns the validity of the June 17, 1977 Deed of Sale on the ground that the signatures of Nick and
Eduviges were forged by Florence. Petitioner also assailed the deed of sale between Florence and Victorey.
Petitioner claimed that Nick had previously sought the examination of his alleged signature on the June 17,
1977 Deed of Sale by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI examiner allegedly found that the
questioned signature and the standard signatures of Nick were not written by one and the same person.
Petitioner further alleged that Nick had filed a criminal complaint for falsification against Florence though the
case was dismissed due to lack of probable cause. In addition, petitioner averred that on February 6, 1993,
Nick wrote a letter12 to respondent Victorey reminding him that the subject property was his despite the
transfer of title. Petitioner prayed for the cancellation of TCT No. 136900 and the issuance of a new
certificate of title in her name.
Victorey and Josephine denied the allegation of forgery. They raise that the action had prescribed and/or
barred by laches. Further they claimed that Betty has no cause of action as the subject property is the
paraphernal property of Eduviges. Lastly, they assert that the sale was regular, valid and genuine. They
asserted that the signatures appearing on the deeds of sale are true and genuine signatures of the parties
including Nick Garbo.13
During the trial,petitioner asserted that Nick left real properties including the property covered by TCT No.
136900. She claimed that by virtue of a holographic will14 executed by Nick on December 30, 1980, the
subject property was bequeathed to her. In the same will, he disinherited his daughter, Florence. Petitioner
admitted that the said holographic will was never probated.
In addition, to support her claim that Florence is not entitled to the property, she presented an Agreement of
Partition15 where Florence is one of the parties.Petitioner contended that Florence is thus not entitled to the
subject property since she already received her share. Petitioner also admitted that said agreement was
never signed by Florence.
Petitioner presented as witness,Mr. Bienvenido Albacea, a handwriting expert and retired employee of the
NBI, who at the time of the conduct of the examination of the subject deed of sale was a Document
Examiner II of the NBI. Albacea stated that in 1992, he was requested to examine the signatures of Nick
appearing in the deeds of sale dated June 17, 1977 and June 15, 1977 and compared it with the specimen
signatures appearing in the Alien Registration Form No. 3, 16 a document17 from the Treasurers Office of
Pasay City and several receipts18 issued by Nick to his lessees. After he conducted an examination of the
signatures in these documents, he concluded that the questioned and the standard signatures of Nick were
not written by one and the same person.
Petitioner also presented as witness Mr. Reynaldo Buenaventura who testified that he has leased the subject
property since 1972 and has paid the rent to petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent Victorey denied that Florence forged the signature of Nick Garbo. He
admitted that he purchased the property from Florence for a valid consideration and registered it late
because he had no money. Respondent Victorey presented a document entitled Affidavit of Waiver 19 dated
June 17, 1977 executed by Nick stating that Eduviges acquired a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 17986
and that Nick did not contribute a single centavo to buy the parcel of land. It further stated that Nick waived
all his rights, title and interest and possession to land in favor of his wife, Eduviges.
In its August 7, 2006 Decision,20 the RTC dismissed the complaint for cancellation of title filed by petitioner.
The dispositive portion of the decision states, to wit:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, after study of the evidence presented, this Court finds that plaintiff
failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence her cause of action. Accordingly, the complaint for
cancellation of certificate of title is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
Defendants counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC held that petitioner failed to prove that the signatures of Nick and Eduviges Garbo were forgeries.
The RTC did not give credence to the testimony of Albacea, holding that courts are not bound by expert
testimonies and that the relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province
of the trial court to decide. There was no evidence presented to prove Nicks ownership over the subject
land. The RTC also noted that from the time the assailed deed of sale and the affidavit of waiver were
executed on June 17, 1977 until the subject property was registered in Florence Garabatos name on
October 26, 1988, Nick never instituted a civil case to question the alleged forgery by his daughter. It was
only after Nicks death that petitioner filed the civil suit.
The RTC, likewise, did not find any legal ground to declare the deed of sale between Florence and
respondent Victorey invalid. Petitioner merely questioned the validity of the deed of sale without any
allegations. Petitioner failed to present any evidence to show why said document should be nullified.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling that petitioner failed to prove by clear, positive and convincing
proof of forgery in Nicks signature in the deed of sale. The CA also held that Mr. Albaceas opinion as to the
truth or falsity of the signature of Nick Garbo is not binding and conclusive upon the court since the request
for examination of the deed of sale was not upon the order of the trial court but at the instance of the
petitioner. Such examination brings suspicion as to the bias or prejudice of the examining party. Moreover,
while it was concluded that there was variance in the compared signatures, such mere variance cannot be
considered conclusive proof that the signature was forged. The CA also emphasized that the deed of sale
being a notarized document bears the presumption of regularity in its execution.
As to the deed of sale between Florence and Victorey, the CA agreed with the trial court that aside from
presenting the xerox copy of the deed of sale, petitioner failed to present any evidence to show why said
document should be nullified. The appellate court stated that petitioner merely questioned the fact that the
document was notarized long after the death of Florence. However, the fact that the document was notarized
long after Florences death does not mean that her signature was a forgery, absent any evidence showing
such.
Hence, this petition.

Petitioner insists that the signatures of Nick and Eduviges Garbo on the June 17, 1977 Deed of Sale
executed in favor of Florence were forged. To support her claim, petitioner reproduced for reference the
signatures of Nick in the earlier deed of sale dated June 15, 1977 and compared it with Nicks signature in
the assailed Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Waiver both dated June 17, 1977. She pointed out that Nicks
signatures in the three documents are congruent and exactly alike in all details and are products of a tracing
process from his alleged signature in the Deed of Sale dated June 15, 1977. As evidence, petitioner
presented the findings of the handwriting expert, Bienvenido Albacea in the Questioned Documents Report
No. 109-29222 dated February 26, 1992 stating that the questioned and the standard signatures of Nick
Garbo were not written by one and the same person. In addition, petitioner avers that since 1972, Nick was
the one collecting the rentals on the subject premises and after his death, herein petitioner.
Petitioner also asserts that a close comparison of the alleged signature of Eduviges Garbo in the questioned
Deed of Sale dated June 17, 1977 and her alleged signature in the Deed of Sale dated June 15, 1977 would
show that the said two signatures are exactly alike in all details which would also show that the alleged
signature of Eduviges Garbo in the questioned Deed of Sale dated June 17, 1977 is a product of a tracing
process from that of her alleged signature in the June 15, 1977 Deed of Sale and which would show by clear
and convincing evidence that the alleged signature of Eduviges Garbo in the questioned Deed of Sale dated
June 17, 1977 is fake or a forgery.
Petitioner also assailed the validity of the subsequent deed of sale executed between Florence and
respondent Victorey and notarized in 1996. Petitioner claims that the said deed of sale although notarized is
a mere private document because Florence could not appear before the notary public in 1996 because she
died in 1992.
Respondents assert that in a petition for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised by the
parties and passed upon by this Court. Respondents submit that the trial court and the CA did not err in
their observation that there is nothing in petitioners testimony which showed forgery committed by the
respondents. Respondents aver that the CA did not err when it found failure on the part of the petitioner to
meet the criteria for determining whether a signature was forged. Respondents stress that Albacea who
though claimed to have found variance in the compared signatures did not however point out distinguishing
marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between the genuine and false specimens of writing which
would ordinarily escape notice or detection by an untrained observer. According to respondents, petitioner
failed to present evidence or justification to show why the subject document should be nullified.
The Court is essentially presented the question of whether the signatures of Nick and Eduviges appearing on
the instruments were forged.
Petition is without merit.
The issue raised by petitioner is essentially factual in nature, the determination of which is best left to the
courts below. Well settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. 23The function of the Court
in petitions for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by
the lower courts.24 As a matter of sound practice and procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the
factual findings of trial courts, more so, when as here, such findings are undisturbed by the appellate
court.25Stated otherwise, the Court refrains from further scrutiny of factual findings of trial courts, more so
when those findings are affirmed by the CA. To do otherwise would defeat the very essence of Rule 45 and
would convert the Court into a trier of facts, which is not meant to be. Certainly the rule admits
exceptions26 none, however, is applicable to the case at bar. Absent any application of any of the recognized
exceptions, this Court is bound by the findings of fact by the lower courts. 27
In any event, Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is the duty of a
party to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence required by
law.28
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence, the
burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.29 One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that
which is offered in opposition to it.30 The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between
the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is
theorized to have been forged.31
In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission, United Presbyterian Church, USA,32 the Court identified
and explained the factors involved in the examination and comparison of handwritings:
x x x [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general
characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards
spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be
found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the
formers authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of
experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into
consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the
questioned signature is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or
paper used, play an important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is,
in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the
character of a questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or
dissimilarities, between that questioned handwriting and an authentic one. 33
The opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court, the experts function being to
place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion. 34 This principle holds true
especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be
determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently
existing ones.35A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts,
because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive
at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.36
Here, both the RTC and CA found that Albacea did not explain the manner of examination of the specimen
signatures in reaching his conclusion. Albacea did not point out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or
detection by an untrained observer. The Court also aptly ruled that courts are not bound by expert
testimonies especially that the examination was upon the initiative of Nick and Betty and they had complete
control on what documents and specimens to be examined by the NBI. Betty, in coming before us, had the
onus of showing that the signatures were forged. She fell short of demonstrating that her case fell within the
limited exceptions for disturbing conclusiveness of factual findings of lower courts.
The petitioner having not shown any reason for us to disturb the ruling of the courts a quo, we are
constrained to affirm the decision of the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The May 20, 2011 Decision and the January
5, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87912 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187892, January 14, 2015
UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC. Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated January 21, 2009 and the
Resolution2dated May 7, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88210.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On April 16, 2004, petitioner Ungay Malobago Mines, Inc. filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legaspi
City, a verified petition3 seeking the reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4784 of the
Cadastral Survey of Albay, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act (RA) 264 and Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1529.5 The case was docketed as LRA Case No. RT-2720 and raffled off to Branch 4. In its petition,
petitioner alleged: that it is the registered owner of a mining patent covered by OCT No. 4784 which was
issued by then President Diosdado Macapagal on July 20, 1962 and entered in the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Albay on September 4, 1962; that sometime in April 2004, it requested for a certified true copy
of OCT No. VH-4784 from the Register of Deeds of Albay, but despite a diligent search, the said copy could
not be located by the said office leading one to believe that the same was permanently lost or destroyed;
that the property was free from all liens and encumbrances of any kind whatsoever and there existed no
deeds or instruments affecting the same which had been presented for or pending registration with the
Register of Deeds of Albay; and that the owner's duplicate of OCT No. VH-4784 which would serve as a basis
for the reconstitution, was attached thereto.
During the initial hearing, petitioner, through counsel, showed compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements. Trial thereafter ensued. The Republic opposed the petition.
On July 17, 2006, the RTC rendered its decision6 dismissing the petition.
The RTC found that there was no factual and legal basis to warrant the reconstitution of petitioner's alleged
lost certificate of title. It found that while petitioner submitted a purported owner's duplicate of OCT No. VH4784, the same was not signed by then Register of Deeds, Ramon Balana, both on the face and the dorsal
side thereof; that the owner's duplicate certificate being an original duplicate, should contain the original
signature of the Register of Deeds just like the original certificate which should have been on file with the
Register of Deeds; that even if the said duplicate had the documentary seal of the office, it was considered a
scrap of paper without any probative value since the Register of Deeds as an ex-officio mining recorder has
no signature authenticating said duplicate; and to rule otherwise would make the signature of the Register
of Deeds a useless dispensable ceremony in a Torrens title which would open the floodgates to fraud which
would destroy the registration system. The RTC further ruled that since petitioner is not the owner of the
surface land which had already been titled to Rapu Rapu Minerals, Inc. and petitioner is claiming only the
minerals underneath, it is not entitled to the certificate of title over its mining patent.
Petitioner filed its appeal with the CA. After the parties had filed their respective pleadings, the case was
then submitted for decision.
On January 21, 2009, the CA issued its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the 17 July 2006 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City
(Branch 4) in LRA Case No. RT-2720 dismissing the petition of Ungay Malobago Mines, Inc. for the
reconstitution of OCT No. VH-4784 is AFFIRMED.7
In so ruling, the CA found that since petitioner is not the registered owner of the land covered by OCT No.
VH-4784 and citing our earlier ruling in Ungay Malobago Mines, Inc v. Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC)8where we declared that as a grantee of a mining patent, petitioner did not become the owner of the
land where the minerals are located, hence, it has no personality to file for the reconstitution of lost or
destroyed certificate of title. The CA ruled that petitioner's mining patent did not qualify as an interest in
property as contemplated by RA No. 26 so as to give petitioner the authority under the law to initiate a
petition for the reconstitution of said OCT. The CA affirmed the RTC's findings that the owner's duplicate of
OCT No. VH-4784 presented by petitioner was insufficient to serve as a basis for the reconstitution of the
original of said OCT because of the absence of the signature of the Register of Deeds.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in its Resolution dated May 7, 2009.
Petitioner is now before us raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF RECONSTITUTION, ERRED
IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE SUBJECT OF RECONSTITUTION WHICH IS PETITIONER'S MINING PATENT
OR RIGHT TO EXPLORE AND EXTRACT MINERALS WITHIN THE LAND DESCRIBED IN THE TITLE THE TITLE
ITSELF (OCT) SERVING MERELY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REGISTRATION AS THIS WAS THE PROCEDURE FOR
REGISTRATION OF MINING PATENTS AT THE TIME.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ABSENCE OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS IN THE ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE REGISTERING THE MINING PATENT EVEN IF DUE ONLY TO OBVIOUS
INADVERTENCE AND ABSENT ANY FRAUD HAS THE EFFECT OF RENDERING THE ENTIRE INSTRUMENT
VOID, INCLUDING THE GRANT OF MINING PATENT ITSELF CONTAINED THEREIN, AS TO PREVENT
RECONSTITUTION OF THE SAME.9
Anent the first issue, petitioner claims that the CA erred in categorizing the reconstitution in this case as
reconstitution of ownership of the property itself (surface ownership), when in law and in fact, it is really a
reconstitution of evidence of the grant by the state in favor of petitioner of the right to explore and extract
mineral deposits within the area described in the original certificate of title; that the concept and nature of
the right to explore and mine a piece of land (referred to as mining patent) is separate and distinct from
right and title of ownership over the property itself and are not inconsistent to and exclusive of each other.
The Torrens title is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein, and
other matters which can be litigated and decided in land registration proceedings. 10 When the Torrens
Certificate of Title has been lost or destroyed, RA No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the
reconstitution of such title. Sections 5 and 10 of RA No. 26 state:
Section 5. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or
4(a) of this Act may be filed with the register of deeds concerned by the registered owner, his assigns, or
other person having an interest in the property. The petition shall be accompanied with the necessary
sources for reconstitution and with an affidavit of the registered owner stating, among other things, that no
deed or other instrument affecting the property had been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the
nature thereof, the date of its presentation, as well as the names of the parties, and whatever the
registration of such deed or instrument is still pending accomplishment. If the reconstitution is to be made
from any of the sources enumerated in section 2(b) or 3(b), the affidavit should further state that the
owner's duplicate has been lost or destroyed and the circumstances under which it was lost or destroyed.
Thereupon, the register of deeds shall, no valid reason to the contrary existing, reconstitute the certificate of
title as provided in this Act.
Section 10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered owner or person in interest from
filing the petition mentioned in section five of this Act directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based
on sources enumerated in sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act: Provided, however, That
the court shall cause a notice of the petition, before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the
manner stated in section nine hereof: And provided, further, That certificates of title reconstituted pursuant
to this section shall not be subject to the encumbrance referred to in section seven of this Act.
Thus, the persons who can file the petition for reconstitution of a lost certificate are the registered owner, his
assigns or persons in interest in the property. In this case, petitioner admitted that it was not the owner of
the land on which the mining patent was issued as the same was owned and registered in the name of Rapu
Rapu Minerals Inc. Thus said petitioner's witness, Atty. Cela Magdalen A. Agpaoa, to wit:
Q. Can you tell the [H]on. Court where is this mining patent situated or located, if you know?
A. This mining patent covers several parcels of land situated in the various barangays in Rapu Rapu, more
concentrated in [B]arangay Pagcolbon, Rapu Rapu, Albay.
Q. You want to tell the [H]on. Court that this mining patent cannot be seen on the surface? Is that what you
want to tell the [H]on. Court, Madam Witness?
A. That is right, because this mining patent is a right over minerals found beneath the surface.
Q. I see. I'm showing to you again the Report made by the Land Registration Authority which forms part of
the records which is now marked as Exhs J and J-1 consisting of two (2) pages. A copy of which was sent
to Atty. Cela Magdalen A. Agpaoa, collaborating counsel.
My question to you is this, are you this Atty. Cela Magdalen Agpaoa, the collaborating counsel?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Did you receive a copy of this report?
A. Yes, I do (sic).
Q. Did you read the contents of this report?
A. Yes, I do (sic).
Q. I am inviting your attention to this Exh. J, par. (2) of the technical description of the parcel of land
described on Plan LP- 714-A inscribed on the certified xerox copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. VH4784 appears to overlap Lot Nos. 984, 985, 986 1007, 1008, 1009, 1014, Pls-858-B, of the Rapu Rapu
Public Land Subdivision.
My question to you is this, are you aware of these lots mentioned in this report?
A. Yes, I am sir.
Q. Why? Can you tell the [H]on. court why you are aware of all these lots, which this mining patent appears
to overlap all these lots, which I mentioned?
A. The various parcels of land mentioned in VH No. 4784 are actually surface lands, actual parcels of land
which have already been acquired by the petitioner's activated (sic) corporation for purposes of
consolidating the surface rights and the mining rights, referred to in VH No. 4784.
Q. Now, another question, you said that these lots mentioned here are the surface lots, am I correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Tell the [H]on. Court since these are surface lots, do you know who owns now all these lots you
mentioned in this report, madam witness?
A. Yes sir, I do.
Q. Tell the [H]on. Court who is now the owner of these lots?
A. It is now owned by the petitioner's affiliated company, the Rapu Rapu Minerals, Incorporated.
Q. Do you know also this Rapu Rapu Minerals, Incorporated?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Why do you know this corporation, Madam Witness?
A. I am also their legal counsel, sir.
Q. Have you seen these surface lots which are mentioned in this report?
A. Yes, I did sir.
Q. Why, for how many times have you seen these lots mentioned in this report, madam witness?
A. I started actually going to these particular parcels of land when I personally negotiated the sale between
the original owners and the company which I represented, the Rapu Rapu Minerals, Incorporated, as far as
in 2002, sir.
Q. You want to tell the [H]on. court that you have seen these lots mentioned in this report personally?
A. Yes, sir. I go to the island in Rapu Rapu and during the negotiation time we met with the original owners,
and I personally inspect and take a look at that particular parcels of land covered by the mining patent.
xxxx
Q. Can you tell the court who is the President of this Rapu Rapu Minerals, Incorporated, Madam Witness?
A. The current duly-elected President of Rapu Rapu Minerals, Incorporated is Mr. Roderick R.C. Salazar III.
Q. Do you know also the president of Ungay Malobago Mines, Incorporated?
A. Yes, I do sir.
Q. Who is the president, if you know?
A. It is also Mr. Roderick R.C. Salazar III, sir.
Q. As far as you know, what is now the status of these several lots you mentioned in this report?
A. They are now registered under the name of Rapu Rapu Minerals, Inc. and presently being used for mining
purpose.
Q. What do you mean that it is now registered in the name of Rapu Rapu Minerals, Inc.?
A. These surface lands are now owned by this corporation called Rapu Rapu Minerals, Inc., an affiliated
company of Ungay Malobago Mines, Inc.
Q. Do you know if these lots mentioned in this report are already titled properties?
A. Yes, these are titled properties.11
In Ungay Malobago Mines, Inc. v. IAC,12 herein petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of
free patents against private respondents therein. Petitioner was claiming ownership over the surface land
subject matter of its mining patents which also included Lode Patent No. V-46 covered by OCT No. VH-4784,
the title sought to be reconstituted in this case. Petitioner did so as the Director of Lands had issued free
patents on portions of the lots covered by petitioner's mining patent. We ruled in favor of private
respondents. We found that the issuance of the lode patents on mineral claims by the President of the
Philippines in 1962 in favor of the petitioner granted to it only the right to extract or utilize the minerals
which may be found on or under the surface of the land. On the other hand, the issuance of the free patents
by the respondent Director of Lands in 1979 in favor of the private respondents granted to them the
ownership and the right to use the land for agricultural purposes but excluding the ownership of, and the
right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the surface.
The above-cited case, as well as petitioner's admission in this case, established that the surface land
covered by its mining patent under OCT No. VH-4784, which title is sought to be reconstituted, is not owned
by petitioner. Thus, not having an interest on the land amounting to a title to the same, petitioner is not
possessed of a legal personality to institute a petition for judicial reconstitution of the alleged lost OCT No.
VH-4785.
Petitioner contends that Section 11 of RA No. 26 includes persons who are not the registered owners but
who have registered interest in the property covered by the Torrens title which was lost or destroyed who
can file a petition for reconstitution of title, to wit:
Section 11. Petitions for reconstitution of registered interests, liens and other encumbrances, based on
sources enumerated in sections 4(b) and/or 4(c) of this Act, shall be filed, by the interested party, with the
proper Court of First Instance. The petition shall be accompanied with the necessary documents and shall
state, among other things, the number of the certificate of title and the nature as well as a description of the
interest, lien or encumbrance which is to be reconstituted, and the court, after publication, in the manner
stated in section nine of this Act, and hearing shall determine the merits of the petition and render such
judgment as justice and equity may require.
A petition for judicial reconstitution of a registered interest, lien or encumbrance, may be filed only when the
certificate of title affected has not been totally destroyed, that is, when said certificate of title is composed of
more than one sheet and only the portion of the additional sheet, on which such interest, lien or
encumbrance was noted is missing.13 The reconstitution in this case does not only refer to a registered
interest which was noted on an additional sheet of a certificate of title but the reconstitution of a lost
certificate. Therefore, petitioner's reliance on Section 11 to support its claim that it can file for the
reconstitution of OCT No. VH-4784 is misplaced.
Petitioner argues that what it actually sought is the reconstitution of evidence of the grant by the State in
favor of petitioner of the right to explore and extract mineral deposits within the area described in the
original certificate of title. Petitioner's filing of the reconstitution for that purpose is not within the purview of
RA No. 26 which deals with lost or destroyed certificates attesting title to a piece of land.
Based on our above discussion, we find no need to discuss petitioner's second assignment of error.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated January 21, 2009 and the Resolution
dated May 7, 2009 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 211211, January 14, 2015
ROMMEL B. DARAUG, Petitioner, v. KGJS FLEET MANAGEMENT MANILA, INC., KRISTIAN GERHARD
JEBSEN SKIPSREDER, MR. GUY DOMINO A. MACAPAYAG AND/OR M/V IBIS
ARROW, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Rommel B.
Daraug (petitioner)questioning the September 25, 2013 Decision2 and the January 29, 2014 Resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 121327. The assailed CA issuances affirmed the Decision 4 and
the Resolution5 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which reversed the August 12, 2010
Decision6 of Labor Arbiter Geobel A. Bartolabac (LA), granting petitioners claim for permanent disability
compensation, sick wages, damages, and attorneys fees by disposing the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents to pay jointly and
severally complainant as follows:
1.
Permanent Disability compensation [in] accordance with the AMOSUP CBA in the
sum of US$89,100.00;
2.
Sick wages for 130 days in the sum of US$1,986.38;
3.
Moral and Exemplary damages in the sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(p300,000.00);
4.
Attorneys fees in the sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the judgment award.
SO ORDERED.7
The Facts
Petitioner was employed by respondent KGJS Fleet Management Manila, Inc. (KGJS) for the second time on
December 7, 2007 to serve as motorman on board the vessel M/V Fayal Cement.
On December 23, 2007, while petitioner was working in the storage room, several steel plates fell and hit his
leg. Specifically, it resulted in the fracture of his right fibula and tibia. He was then medically repatriated,
examined and treated by the company-designated physicians, Dr. Fidel C. Chua (Dr. Chua) of Trans-Global
Health Systems, Inc., Makati City; and Dr. Tiong Sam Lim (Dr. Lim), an orthopedic surgeon from Chinese
General Hospital. After his treatment, Dr. Lim and Dr. Chua concluded that petitioners right leg was fully
healed and that he was fit to work.8 On January 16, 2009, he executed the Certificate of Fitness to
Work9 releasing KGJS of any liability that might arise as a result of his injury. Much later, he underwent
several examinations which confirmed that he was fit to work. 10
On May 12, 2009, petitioner was hired again by KGJS for the third time, for and in behalf of its foreign
principal, respondent Kristian Gerhard Jebsen Skipsreder AS (KGJS AS), as a motorman on board M/V Ibis
Arrow. The contract of employment,11 approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration(POEA), was for a period of nine (9) months with a basic salary of US$643.00 exclusive of
overtime and other benefits commencing on January 4, 2009. It contained a clause stating that [t]he
NSA/NMU-AMOSUP Model Agreement CBAs as applicable shall be considered to be incorporated into and to
form part of the contract.12
On October 31, 2009, while petitioner was working in the engine room, he accidentally slipped and fell,
injuring his right leg again. On November 3 and 12, 2009, the doctors of Meyer Servicos Medicus Clinic in
Brazil found that he had sustained a severe bruise/hematoma on his right leg and recommended that he
disembark from the vessel and continue his treatment in his home port. 13 He was then medically repatriated
on November 14, 2009.
Almost immediately upon his arrival on November 16, 2009, petitioner reported to Dr. Chua who, in turn,
referred him again to Dr. Lim. After an x-ray test found no fracture on his leg, Dr. Lim recommended that he
take anti-inflammatory drugs and antibiotics for his injury. Concurring in the findings and recommendations
of Dr. Lim, Dr. Chua diagnosed petitioner to have suffered from contusion hematoma.14 After re-evaluating
him on December 4, 2009, and again on December 21, 2009, Dr. Lim found that petitioner
had recovered from his injuries and declared him fit to work. From the time he was repatriated until he
was declared fit to work, he was paid his sick wages. 15 Again, he executed another Certificate of Fitness to
Work.16
About two and a half months later, on March 5, 2010, petitioner filed a complaint 17 against KGJS and KGJS
AS, seeking permanent disability benefits under the NSA/NMU-AMOSUP CBA, sick wages, damages, and
attorneys fees. In his Affidavit-Complaint,18 he claimed that his latest injury which occurred on board
theM/V Ibis Arrow, together with his previous accident on board the M/V Fayal Cement, rendered him
permanently disabled.
It appears that on April 13, 2009, after the filing of his complaint, petitioner sought the services of Dr.
Manuel C. Jacinto, Jr. (Dr. Jacinto) of Sta. Teresita General Hospital in Quezon City. Dr. Jacinto issued a
medical certificate19 attesting that petitioner was suffering from open fracture on his right fibula and that he
was no longer fit to work. Dr. Jacinto also noted that:
The patient still complains of pains particularly on ambulation and in the performance of his duties which
entails prolonged standing, thus, he was assessed to be physically unfit to go back to work. 20
Thus, when petitioner filed his position paper21 on June 9, 2010, he contended that the injuries he had
suffered while in the service of the respondents entitled him to be compensated.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
After the submission of all the pleadings, the LA rendered his decision granting petitioners claims. In finding
them meritorious, the LA found the medical assessment of the company-designated physicians unreliable
and biased in favor of the respondents.22 The LA observed that petitioner was injured twice, once while he
was assigned to work in the vessel M/V Fayal Cement and, again, on board the M/V Ibis Arrow.Also, the LA
personally observed petitioner to have difficulty in walking, bending and carrying any weight and concluded
that the diagnosis of Dr. Jacinto was more credible and superior than the findings of the companydesignated physicians.23
As to petitioners claim for 130 days of sick wages, the LA also found it to be meritorious but limited it to
$1,986.38, considering that the respondents had already paid a portion of it.
The LA likewise sustained his claim for damages and attorneys fees, opining that the respondents acted in
bad faith when they unjustifiably refused to give what was due him under the circumstances.
Ruling of the NLRC
As stated above, the NLRC reversed the LA ruling. The NLRC was of the considered view that the finding of
Dr. Lim that petitioner was fit to work should have been given credence, considering the time and effort that
he spent in monitoring and treating his condition. The NLRC noted that he was under the care of Dr. Lim
from November 17, 2009 until he was declared fit to work on December 21, 2009. It also found that there
was neither any medical evidence to dispute Dr. Lims findings nor any proof that he questioned the findings
of Dr. Chua. The NLRC concluded that his open fracture must have been sustained after he was declared fit
to work on December 21, 2009. 24
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA opined, as the NLRC did, that the findings of Dr. Lim and Dr. Chua should have been given credence.
For the appellate court, the extensive medical attention given by the company-designated physicians to
petitioner from the very beginning enabled them to be familiar with, and acquire a detailed knowledge of, his
medical condition, as compared to just one (1) day of examination by Dr. Jacinto. For said reason, the CA
concluded that petitioner was no longer entitled to disability benefits when he was declared fit to work by
the company-designated physicians.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner charges that the CA abused its discretion and committed a palpable error in reversing the
findings of the LA. According to him, the findings of the LA, being a trier of facts, should be given high
regard and respect even finality on appeal.25
In asserting his right to claim disability compensation, petitioner argues that because of the injury to his
right leg, he continues to experience difficulty in walking, standing and is incapacitated to perform the usual
physical, strenuous and stressful activities which are the usual function of seafarers on board a vessel.26 For
him, the findings of Dr. Jacinto should have been given weight because the said doctor examined and
treated him as an independent orthopedic medical specialist who had no special relationship with him, other
than that of doctor-patient. He ascribes bias to the company-designated physicians considering that they
regularly receive retainer fees from the respondents.
Lastly, petitioner imputes bad faith on the part of the respondents claiming that during the mediation
proceedings before the CA, the parties, upon the initiative of the respondents, agreed to settle the case for
the amount of $35,000.00. The hearing was set on July 20, 2013 for the settlement, but the respondents,
without any justifiable reason, did not comply. Petitioner, in the alternative, prays for the enforcement of the
settlement agreement.27
Position of the Respondents

For their part, the respondents counter that petitioner merely suffered a bruise while on board the M/V Ibis
Arrow for which he was accorded extensive treatment until he was declared fit to work. According to the
respondents, considering that the medical documents submitted would show that he was already declared fit
to work, he must have fractured his right fibula sometime in April of 2010, that is, after his employment with
them. They posit that his claim for permanent disability should be dismissed. 28
As for the alleged settlement in the CA, the respondents contend that they simply withdrew their offer to
petitioner because he misrepresented himself as recuperating in his hometown in Iloilo during the mediation
proceedings in the CA when all the while he was actually abroad working as a seafarer under the Imperial
Victory Shipping Agency (Imperial). They claimed that the evidence would show that the pre-employment
medical examinations conducted on petitioner showed that he was fit to work; and in fact had already
served two (2) employment contracts with Imperial. Furthermore, the respondents found out that he also
filed a claim against Imperial for disability benefits. 29
The Courts Ruling

Petitioner is in error in its submission that the findings of the LA in labor cases were final and binding upon
courts exercising appellate jurisdiction. The general rule is that due to its recognized expertise as a result of
its specific jurisdiction, the findings of the LA are accorded great respect if: one, they concurred with the
findings of the NLRC; and two, if they are supported by substantial evidence.
The foregoing rule is not absolute and admits of exceptions. Thus, in the following instances, the Court is
compelled to resolve both factual issues along with the legal ones: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 30
In the case at bench, the factual findings of the LA differ from those of the NLRC and the CA. This
divergence of positions constrains the Court to review and evaluate assiduously the evidence on record and
determine whether or not petitioner is entitled to disability benefits.
Petitioner Did Not Comply
With The Procedures
In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.31(Vergara), it was stated that the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), through the POEA, has simplified the determination of liability for work-related death,
illness or injury in the case of Filipino seamen working on foreign ocean-going vessels. Every seaman and
the vessel owner (directly or represented by a local manning agency) are required to execute the POEA
Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) as a condition sine qua non prior to the deployment of the
seaman for overseas work. The POEA-SEC is supplemented by the Collective Bargaining
Agreement(CBA) between the owner of the vessel and the covered seaman.
In this case, the parties entered into a contract of employment in accordance with the POEA-SEC and they
agreed to be bound by the CBA. Thus, in resolving petitioners claim for disability compensation, the Court
will be guided by the procedures laid down in the POEA-SEC and in the CBA. On this point, Section 20(B)(3)
of the POEA-SEC provides:
Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent
to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by
the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a postemployment medical examination by a companydesignated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to
so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed a compliance. Failure of
the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to
claim the above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be
agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctors decision shall be final and
binding on both parties.
On the other hand, the CBA between petitioner and the respondents states that:
20.1.3.2 The degree of disability which the employer, subject to this Agreement, is liable to pay shall be
determined by a doctor appointed by the Employer. If a doctor appointed by the seafarer and his
Union disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer
and the Seafarer and his Union, and the third doctors decision shall be final and binding on both
parties. The copy/ies of the medical certificate and other relevant medical reports shall be made available
by the Company to the seafarer.
[Emphases supplied]
Interpreting an almost identical provision of the CBA, the Court ruled, in the recent case of Philippine
Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag32(Dumagdag), that a seafarers non-compliance with the
mandated procedure under the POEA-SEC and the CBA militates against his claims. In Dumagdag, the Court
explained:
The POEA-SEC and the CBA govern the employment relationship between Dumadag and the petitioners. The
two instruments are the law between them. They are bound by their terms and
conditions, particularly in relation to this case, the mechanism prescribed to determine liability for a
disability benefits claim. In Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Velasquez, the Court said: "The POEA Contract, of
which the parties are both signatories, is the law between them and as such, its provisions bind both of
them." Dumadag, however, pursued his claim without observing the laid-out procedure. He
consulted physicians of his choice regarding his disability after Dr. Dacanay, the company-designated
physician, issued his fit-to-work certification for him. There is nothing inherently wrong with the
consultations as the POEA-SEC and the CBA allow him to seek a second opinion. The problem only arose
when he pre-empted the mandated procedure by filing a complaint for permanent disability compensation
on the strength of his chosen physicians opinions, without referring the conflicting opinions to a third doctor
for final determination.
xxxx
The filing of the complaint constituted a breach of Dumadags contractual obligation to have the
conflicting assessments of his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding opinion. The
petitioners could not have possibly caused the non-referral to a third doctor because they were not aware
that Dumadag secured separate independent opinions regarding his disability. Thus, the complaint should
have been dismissed, for without a binding third opinion, the fit-to-work certification of the companydesignated physician stands, pursuant to the POEA-SEC and the CBA. As it turned out, however, the LA and
the NLRC relied on the assessments of Dumadags physicians that he was unfit for sea duty, and awarded
him permanent total disability benefits.
We find the rulings of the labor authorities seriously flawed as they were rendered in total
disregard of the law between the parties the POEA-SEC and the CBA on the prescribed procedure
for the determination of disability compensation claims, particularly with respect to the resolution of
conflicting disability assessments of the company-designated physician and Dumadags physicians, without
saying why it was disregarded or ignored; it was as if the POEA-SEC and the CBA did not exist. This is
grave abuse of discretion, considering that, as labor dispute adjudicators, the LA and the NLRC
are expected to uphold the law. For affirming the labor tribunals, the CA committed the same
jurisdictional error.
As we earlier stressed, Dumadag failed to comply with the requirement under the POEA-SEC and the CBA to
have the conflicting assessments of his disability determined by a third doctor as was his duty. He offered
no reason that could have prevented him from following the procedure. Before he filed his complaint, or
between July 19, 2007, when he came homeupon completion of his contract, and November 6, 2007, when
Dr. Dacanay declared him fit to work, he had been under examination and treatment (with the necessary
medical procedures) by the company specialists. All the while, the petitioners shouldered his medical
expenses, professional fees and costs of his therapy sessions. In short, the petitioners attended to his health
condition despite the expiration of his contract. We, therefore, find it puzzling why Dumadag did not bring to
the petitioners attention the contrary opinions of his doctors and suggest that they seek a third opinion.
Whatever his reasons might have been, Dumadags disregard of the conflict-resolution procedure under the
POEA-SEC and the CBA cannot and should not be tolerated and allowed to stand, lest it encourage a similar
defiance. We stress in this respect that we have yet to come across a case where the parties referred
conflicting assessments of a seafarers disability to a third doctor since the procedure was introduced by the
POEA-SEC in 2000 whether the Courts ruling in a particular case upheld the assessment of the companydesignated physician, as in Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission
(Second Division) and similar other cases, or sustained the opinion of the seafarers chosen physician as
in HFS Philippines, Inc. v. Pilar, cited by the CA, and other cases similarly resolved. The third-doctor-referral
provision of the POEA-SEC, it appears to us, has been honored more in the breach than in the compliance.
This is unfortunate considering that the provision is intended to settle disability claims voluntarily at the
parties level where the claims can be resolved more speedily than if they were brought to court.
Given the circumstances under which Dumadag pursued his claim, especially the fact that he
caused the non-referral to a third doctor, Dr. Dacanays fit-to-work certification must be
upheld. In Santiago v. Pacbasin Ship Management, Inc., the Court declared: "[t]here was no agreement on
a third doctor who shall examine him anew and whose finding shall be final and binding. x x x [T]his Court is
left without choice but to uphold the certification made by Dr. Lim with respect to Santiagos disability."
On a different plane, Dumadag cannot insist that the "favorable" reports of his physicians be chosen over
the certification of the company-designated physician, especially if we were to consider that the physicians
he consulted examined him for only a day (or shorter) on four different dates between December 5, 2007
and April 13, 2008. Moreover, we point out that they merely relied on the same medical history, diagnoses
and analyses provided by the company-designated specialists. Under the circumstances, we cannot simply
say that their findings are more reliable than the conclusions of the company-designated physicians. 33
[Emphases supplied]
As in Dumadag, petitioner in this case failed to observe the prescribed procedure of having the conflicting
assessments on his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding opinion. Considering that petitioner
failed to observe the procedures laid down in the POEA-SEC and CBA, the Court is left without a choice but
to uphold the certification issued by the respondents physicians with respect to his fitness or disability.
Petitioners Claim for Benefits
Was Premature
Actually, petitioners filing of his claim was premature. The Court has held that a seafarer may have basis to
pursue an action for total and permanent disability benefits, if any of the following conditions are
present:
(a) The company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or
disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment
would address his temporary total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days;
(b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification issued by the company designated physician;
(c) The company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or
240-day period, as the case may be, but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under
Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion;
(d) The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other
doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is not only
permanent but total as well;
(e) The company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a
dispute on the disability grading;
(f) The company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or workrelated under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of
the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work;
(g) The company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer
refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits; and
(h) The company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day
or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of said
periods.34
Significantly, however, when petitioner filed his complaint with the arbitration office on April 5, 2010, hehad
yet to consult his own physician, Dr. Jacinto. It means that, at that time, he was simply armed with: 1]
the medical findings of the company-designated physician that he was fit to work; and 2] his Affidavit
Complaint35 where he made his own conclusion that his right leg was again fractured because of the
incident that occurred in the M/V Ibis Arrow, stating:
11. That my injuries which I sustained in my previous accident on board the

vessel FAYAL CEMENT had recurred and its recurrence was triggered
by my injury which I sustained due to the bad fall on board the vessel
MV IBIS ARROW.
12. x x x x
13. That I feel that my injuries has (sic) already rendered me permanently
disabled, hence I am now seeking my permanent disability
compensation in accordance with my CBA, my sick wages for 130 days,
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees and other benefits
provided by law.
Dr. Jacintos findings cannot
be accorded more weight over
those of the Company-Designated
Physicians
Moreover, in Dumadag, the seafarer consulted his own physician on four (4) dates. The petitioner in the case
at bench was examined by his own doctor for only one (1) day, that is, on April 13, 2010, almost four (4)
months after he was declared fit to work by the company-designated doctors. Even worse, the medical
certificate of Dr. Jacinto failed to state the reasons on which he based his conclusion. Thus, the Court finds
that the conclusions of Dr. Jacinto cannot prevail over the findings of the respondents physicians.
Petitioner is Fit to Work
Aside from the finding of the company-designated physicians, it is worthy to note that the evidence on
record indubitably shows that petitioner continued to work as a seaman under another employer. As aptly
pointed out by the respondents, petitioner was able to acquire gainful employment with Imperial and was
able to fully serve two (2) separate employment contracts with them. 36 Several medical certifications from
his pre-employment examinations were even issued attesting to his overall fitness. 37 Certainly, the Court
cannot ignore these facts.
Petitioner is not
Entitled to his
Monetary Claims
In view of the foregoing, petitioner is not entitled to his monetary claims. It should be remembered that
permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or
work of similar nature, that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a
person of his mentality and attainment could do. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is
compensated, but rather the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of ones earning capacity.38 As
petitioner was never actually incapacitated, it would be highly unjust if he would be awarded the disability
benefits which the law accords only to the deserving and utterly unfair to the respondents if they would be
made to pay.
The Court also denies the ancillary claims for sick wages, damages and attorneys fees for lack of factual and
legal bases.
chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
cralawla wlibrary
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015
ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty. Christine Antenor-Cruz
Limpin for allegedly filing a false General Information Sheet (GIS) with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon 12 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The facts are culled from the pleadings.
In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter as
President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from his
post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to St. Lukes Medical Center as the Vice President for
Finance.
On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another
corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for updating purposes. The
GIS4identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and President.
Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, on December 18, 2008, LCI applied
for voluntary dissolution with the SEC.
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly
listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she knew that he had already
resigned and had never held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of
LCI. He also never received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be
taken up. He has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of LCI.
Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the
BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was provisional to comply with SEC requirements. It
would have been corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary dissolution shortly
thereafter. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her certification served
to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008. 5
She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on October 13, 2008, she
sent Guarin a text message and asked him to meet with her so he may sign a Deed of Assignment
concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in the affirmative and said that he would meet with her on
Friday, October 17, 2008. Guarin, however, neglected to show up at the arranged time and place for
reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the strength of Guarins positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on
November 27, 2008.
To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting, Atty. Limpin presented Secretarys Certificates
dated May 16, 20066, May 22, 20067, and June 13, 20078 bearing Guarins signature.
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints against the directors and officers
of LCI, where she and Guarin are co-respondents: Senator Roxas, et al. v. Celso de los Angeles, et
al.9 and SEC v. Legacy Card, Inc.10 In those proceedings, Guarin raised as a defense that the November 27,
2008 GIS was spurious and/or perjured. She averred that this Court held that when the criminal
prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary
proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory
findings.11 During the mandatory preliminary conference, however, both parties stipulated that the
complaint filed by Senator Roxas was dismissed as to Guarin. 12
Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant disbarment. She
stated that merely presenting the GIS does not constitute as proof of any unethical conduct, harassment
and malpractice.
In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 14 of the CPR and
thus recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for three months. It noted that based on
the submissions of the parties, Guarin was never a stockholder of LCI consequently making him ineligible to
be a member of the BOD. Neither was there proof that Guarin acted as the President of LCI but was a mere
signatory of LCIs bank accounts. This made the verified statement of Atty. Limpin untrue. 15
Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the authority to appoint or designate directors
or officers of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was aware that this procedure was not legally permissible. Despite
knowing this to be irregular, she allowed herself to be dictated upon and falsely certified that Guarin was a
stockholder, chairman and president of the company. The Secretarys Certificates with Guarins signature
Atty. Limpin presented were of no moment since in these Guarin merely acceded to become a signatory of
bank accounts and these do not show that Guarin was a stockholder.
The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution16 adopted in toto the CBD Report. Atty. Limpin
moved for reconsideration17 but was denied in the March 21, 2014 Resolution18 of the IBP Board of
Governors.
We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule
1.02 of the CPR.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than
seek exceptions as loopholes.19 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in
violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.20
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. As
Justice Malcolm stated [t]he serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where
there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is
innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with
his oath.21
Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27, 22 Rule 138 of theRules
of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office
and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice.
After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP that there is no
indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in
the BOD and be the president of the company.23 It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that
Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the same in good faith, her
certification also contained a stipulation that she made a due verification of the statements contained
therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he
never signed the instrument. We also note that there was no submission which would support the allegation
that Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty.
Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and
Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of having Mr. de
los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the corporation despite the rules enunciated in
the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of
the CPR.
However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpins action in submitting a false document we see it fit to
increase the recommended penalty to six months suspension from the practice of law.
chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty.
Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 204444, January 14, 2015
VIRGILIO C. BRIONES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND CASH ASIA CREDIT
CORPORATION,Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated March 5, 2012 and the Resolution3 dated
October 4, 2012 of the Court of Appeals(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 117474, which annulled the Orders dated
September 20, 20104 and October 22, 20105 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 173 (RTC) in Civil
Case No. 10-124040, denying private respondent Cash Asia Credit Corporations (Cash Asia) motion to
dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
cralawred
The Facts
The instant case arose from a Complaint6 dated August 2, 2010 filed by Virgilio C. Briones (Briones) for
Nullity of Mortgage Contract, Promissory Note, Loan Agreement, Foreclosure of Mortgage, Cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.290846, and Damages against Cash Asia before the RTC. 7 In his
complaint, Briones alleged that he is the owner of a property covered by TCT No. 160689 (subject
property),and that, on July 15, 2010, his sister informed him that his property had been foreclosed and a
writ of possession had already been issued in favor of Cash Asia. 8 Upon investigation, Briones discovered
that: (a) on December 6, 2007, he purportedly executed a promissory note, 9 loan agreement,10 and deed of
real estate mortgage11covering the subject property (subject contracts) in favor of Cash Asia in order to
obtain a loan in the amount of P3,500,000.00 from the latter; 12 and (b) since the said loan was left unpaid,
Cash Asia proceeded to foreclose his property.13 In this relation, Briones claimed that he never contracted
any loans from Cash Asia as he has been living and working in Vietnam since October 31, 2007. He further
claimed that he only went back to the Philippines on December 28, 2007 until January 3, 2008 to spend the
holidays with his family, and that during his brief stay in the Philippines, nobody informed him of any loan
agreement entered into with Cash Asia. Essentially, Briones assailed the validity of the foregoing contracts
claiming his signature to be forged.14
For its part, Cash Asia filed a Motion to Dismiss15 dated August 25, 2010, praying for the outright dismissal
of Brioness complaint on the ground of improper venue. 16 In this regard, Cash Asia pointed out the venue
stipulation in the subject contracts stating that all legal actions arising out of this notice in connection with
the Real Estate Mortgage subject hereof shall only be brought in or submitted to the jurisdiction of the
proper court of Makati City.17 In view thereof, it contended that all actions arising out of the subject
contracts may only be exclusively brought in the courts of Makati City, and as such, Brioness complaint
should be dismissed for having been filed in the City of Manila. 18
In response, Briones filed an opposition,19 asserting, inter alia, that he should not be covered by the venue
stipulation in the subject contracts as he was never a party therein. He also reiterated that his signatures on
the said contracts were forgeries.20
The RTC Ruling

In an Order21 dated September 20, 2010, the RTC denied Cash Asias motion to dismiss for lack of merit. In
denying the motion, the RTC opined that the parties must be afforded the right to be heard in view of the
substance of Brioness cause of action against Cash Asia as stated in the complaint. 22
Cash Asia moved for reconsideration23 which was, however, denied in an Order24 dated October 22, 2010.
Aggrieved, it filed a petition for certiorari25 before the CA.
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The CA Ruling
In a Decision26 dated March 5, 2012, the CA annulled the RTC Orders, and accordingly, dismissed Brioness
complaint without prejudice to the filing of the same before the proper court in Makati City.27 It held that the
RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying Cash Asias motion to dismiss, considering that the subject
contracts clearly provide that actions arising therefrom should be exclusively filed before the courts of
Makati City only.28 As such, the CA concluded that Brioness complaint should have been dismissed outright
on the ground of improper venue,29 this, notwithstanding Brioness claim of forgery.
Dissatisfied, Briones moved for reconsideration,30 which was, however, denied in a Resolution31 dated
October 4, 2012, hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in
ordering the outright dismissal of Brioness complaint on the ground of improper venue.
The Courts Ruling
At the outset, the Court stresses that [t]o justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, [the
petitioner] must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion
conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical
manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered grave, discretion must be exercised in a
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law.32
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA gravely abused its discretion in ordering
the outright dismissal of Brioness complaint against Cash Asia, without prejudice to its re-filing before the
proper court in Makati City.
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court governs the rules on venue of civil actions, to wit:
Rule 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS
SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the
municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or
in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
SEC. 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. If any of the defendants does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of said
defendant located in the Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court of the place where
the plaintiff resides, or where the property or any portion thereof is situated or found.
SEC. 4. When Rule not applicable. This Rule shall not apply
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue
thereof.
Based therefrom, the general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over
the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal
actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the
plaintiff. As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils.33 instructs that the parties, thru a
written instrument, may either introduce another venue where actions arising from such instrument may be
filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue, viz.:
The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as qualified by
Section 4 of the same rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the
suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file
their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other
agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.
As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that
such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as exclusively,
waiving for this purpose any other venue, shall only preceding the designation of venue, to the
exclusion of the other courts, or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely
an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.34 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In this relation, case law likewise provides that in cases where the complaint assails only the terms,
conditions, and/or coverage of a written instrument and not its validity, the exclusive venue stipulation
contained therein shall still be binding on the parties, and thus, the complaint may be properly dismissed on
the ground of improper venue.35 Conversely, therefore, a complaint directly assailing the validity of the
written instrument itself should not be bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and
should be filed in accordance with the general rules on venue. To be sure, it would be inherently consistent
for a complaint of this nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation when it, in fact, precisely assails
the validity of the instrument in which such stipulation is contained.
In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in nature, considering
that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of Makati City. However, it
must be emphasized that Brioness complaint directly assails the validity of the subject contracts, claiming
forgery in their execution. Given this circumstance, Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid
venue stipulation, as his compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Hence,
pursuant to the general rules on venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a court in the City of
Manila where the subject property is located.
In conclusion, the CA patently erred and hence committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Brioness
complaint on the ground of improper venue.
chanroble slaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 5, 2012 and the Resolution
dated October 4, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 117474 are hereby ANNULLEDand SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated September 20, 2010 and October 22, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 173 in Civil Case No. 10-124040 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
cralawla wlibrary
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 193383-84, January 14, 2015
CBK POWER COMPANY LIMITED, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,Respondent.
[G.R. NOS. 193407-08]
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. CBK POWER COMPANY LIMITED,Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated March 29, 2010 and
the Resolution3 dated August 16, 2010 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc in C.T.A. E.B. Nos. 469
and 494, which affirmed the Decision4 dated August 28, 2008, the Amended Decision5 dated February 12,
2009, and the Resolution6 dated May 7, 2009 of the CTA First Division in CTA Case Nos. 6699, 6884, and
7166 granting CBK Power Company Limited (CBK Power) a refund of its excess final withholding tax for the
taxable years 2001 to 2003.
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The Facts
CBK Power is a limited partnership duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and
primarily engaged in the development and operation of the Caliraya, Botocan, and Kalayaan hydroelectric
power generating plants in Laguna (CBK Project). It is registered with the Board of Investments (BOI) as
engaged in a preferred pioneer area of investment under the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987. 7
To finance the CBK Project, CBK Power obtained in August 2000 a syndicated loan from several foreign
banks,8 i.e., BNP Paribas, Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank, Limited, Industrial Bank of Japan, Limited, and Societe
General (original lenders), acting through an Inter-Creditor Agent, Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank, a Japanese bank
that subsequently merged with the Industrial Bank of Japan, Limited (Industrial Bank of Japan) and the Fuji
Bank, Limited (Fuji Bank), with the merged entity being named as Mizuho Corporate Bank (Mizuho Bank).
One of the merged banks, Fuji Bank, had a branch in the Philippines, which became a branch of Mizuho Bank
as a result of the merger. The Industrial Bank of Japan and Mizuho Bank are residents of Japan for purposes
of income taxation, and recognized as such under the relevant provisions of the income tax treaties between
the Philippines and Japan.9
Certain portions of the loan were subsequently assigned by the original lenders to various other banks,
including Fortis Bank (Nederland) N.V. (Fortis-Netherlands) and Raiffesen Zentral Bank Osterreich AG
(Raiffesen Bank). Fortis-Netherlands, in turn, assigned its portion of the loan to Fortis Bank S.A./N.V. (FortisBelgium), a resident of Belgium. Fortis-Netherlands and Raiffesen Bank, on the other hand, are residents of
Netherlands and Austria, respectively.10
In February 2001, CBK Power borrowed money from Industrial Bank of Japan, Fortis-Netherlands, Raiffesen
Bank, Fortis-Belgium, and Mizuho Bank for which it remitted interest payments from May 2001 to May
2003.11 It allegedly withheld final taxes from said payments based on the following rates, and paid the
same to the Revenue District Office No. 55 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR): (a) fifteen percent
(15%) for Fortis-Belgium, Fortis-Netherlands, and Raiffesen Bank; and (b) twenty percent (20%) for
Industrial Bank of Japan and Mizuho Bank. 12
However, according to CBK Power, under the relevant tax treaties between the Philippines and the
respective countries in which each of the banks is a resident, the interest income derived by the
aforementioned banks are subject only to a preferential tax rate of 10%, viz.:13
BANK
COUNTRY OF
RESIDENCE
Fortis Bank S.A./N.V.
Belgium
Industrial Bank of
Japan
Raiffesen Zentral Bank
Osterreich AG
Mizuho Corporate
Bank
Japan
Austria
Japan
PREFERENTIAL RATE
UNDER THE RELEVANT TAX
TREATY
10% (Article 111, RP-Belgium Tax
Treaty)
10% (Article 113, RP-Japan Tax
Treaty)
10% (Article 113, RP-Austria Tax
Treaty)
10% (Article 113, RP-Japan Tax
Treaty)
Accordingly, on April 14, 2003, CBK Power filed a claim for refund of its excess final withholding taxes
allegedly erroneously withheld and collected for the years 2001 and 2002 with the BIR Revenue Region No.
9. The claim for refund of excess final withholding taxes in 2003 was subsequently filed on March 4,
2005.14
The Commissioner of Internal Revenues (Commissioner) inaction on said claims prompted CBK Power to file
petitions for review before the CTA, viz.:15
(1) CTA Case No. 6699 was filed by CBK Power on June 6, 2003 seeking the refund of excess final
withholding tax in the total amount of P6,393,267.20 covering the year 2001 with respect to interest
income derived by [Fortis-Belgium], Industrial Bank of Japan, and [Raiffesen Bank]. An Answer was filed by
the Commissioner on July 25, 2003.
(2) CTA Case No. 6884 was filed by CBK Power on March 5, 2004 seeking for the refund of the amount
of P8,136,174.31 covering [the] year 2002 with respect to interest income derived by [Fortis-Belgium],
Industrial Bank of Japan, [Mizuho Bank], and [Raiffesen Bank]. The Commissioner filed his Answer on May
7, 2004.
xxxx
(3) CTA Case No. 7166 was filed by CBK [Power] on March 9, 2005 seeking for the refund of [the amount
of] P1,143,517.21 covering [the] year 2003 with respect to interest income derived by [Fortis-Belgium],
and [Raiffesen Bank]. The Commissioner filed his Answer on May 9, 2005. (Emphases supplied)
CTA Case Nos. 6699 and 6884 were consolidated first on June 18, 2004. Subsequently, however, all three
cases CTA Case Nos. 6699, 6884, and 7166 were consolidated in a Resolution dated August 3,
2005.16
The CTA First Division Rulings

In a Decision17 dated August 28, 2008, the CTA First Division granted the petitions and ordered the refund
of the amount of P15,672,958.42 upon a finding that the relevant tax treaties were applicable to the
case.18 It cited DA-ITAD Ruling No. 099-0319 dated July 16, 2003, issued by the BIR, confirming CBK Powers
claim that the interest payments it made to Industrial Bank of Japan and Raiffesen Bank were subject to a
final withholding tax rate of only 10% of the gross amount of interest, pursuant to Article 11 of the
Republic of the Philippines (RP)-Austria and RP-Japan tax treaties. However, in DA-ITAD Ruling No. 1260320 dated August 18, 2003, also issued by the BIR, interest payments to Fortis-Belgium were likewise
subjected to the same rate pursuant to the Protocol Amending the RP-Belgium Tax Treaty, the provisions of
which apply on income derived or which accrued beginning January 1, 2000. With respect to interest
payments made to Fortis-Netherlands before it assigned its portion of the loan to Fortis-Belgium, the CTA
First Division likewise granted the preferential rate. 21
The CTA First Division categorically declared in the August 28, 2008 Decision that the required International
Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) ruling was not a condition sine qua non for the entitlement of the tax relief
sought by CBK Power,22 however, upon motion for reconsideration23 filed by the Commissioner, the CTA First
Division amended its earlier decision by reducing the amount of the refund from P15,672,958.42
to P14,835,720.39 on the ground that CBK Power failed to obtain an ITAD ruling with respect to its
transactions with Fortis-Netherlands.24 In its Amended Decision25 dated February 12, 2009, the CTA First
Division adopted26 the ruling in the case of Mirant (Philippines) Operations Corporation (formerly: Southern
Energy Asia-Pacific Operations [Phils.], Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Mirant),27 cited by the
Commissioner in his motion for reconsideration, where the Court categorically pronounced in its Resolution
dated February 18, 2008 that an ITAD ruling must be obtained prior to availing a preferential tax rate.
CBK Power moved for the reconsideration28 of the Amended Decision dated February 12, 2009, arguing in
the main that the Mirant case, which was resolved in a minute resolution, did not establish a legal
precedent. The motion was denied, however, in a Resolution29 dated May 7, 2009 for lack of merit.
Undaunted, CBK Power elevated the matter to the CTA En Banc on petition for review,30 docketed as C.T.A
E.B. No. 494. The Commissioner likewise filed his own petition for review,31 which was docketed as C.T.A.
E.B. No. 469. Said petitions were subsequently consolidated. 32
CBK Power raised the lone issue of whether or not an ITAD ruling is required before it can avail of the
preferential tax rate. On the other hand, the Commissioner claimed that CBK Power failed to exhaust
administrative remedies when it filed its petitions before the CTA First Division, and that said petitions were
not filed within the two-year prescriptive period for initiating judicial claims for refund. 33
The CTA En Banc Ruling

In a Decision34 dated March 29, 2010, the CTA En Banc affirmed the ruling of the CTA First Division that a
prior application with the ITAD is indeed required by Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) 1-2000, 35 which
administrative issuance has the force and effect of law and is just as binding as a tax treaty. The CTA En
Banc declared the Mirant case as without any binding effect on CBK Power, having been resolved by this
Court merely through minute resolutions, and relied instead on the mandatory wording of RMO 1-2000, as
follows:36
III. Policies:
xxxx
2.
Any availment of the tax treaty relief shall be preceded by an application by filing BIR Form
No. 0901 (Application for Relief from Double Taxation) with ITAD at least 15 days before the
transaction i.e. payment of dividends, royalties, etc., accompanied by supporting
documents justifying the relief. x x x.
The CTA En Banc further held that CBK Powers petitions for review were filed within the two-year
prescriptive period provided under Section 22937 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 199738 (NIRC),
and that it was proper for CBK Power to have filed said petitions without awaiting the final resolution of its
administrative claims for refund before the BIR; otherwise, it would have completely lost its right to seek
judicial recourse if the two-year prescriptive period lapsed with no judicial claim filed.
CBK Powers motion for partial reconsideration and the Commissioners motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing Decision were both denied in a Resolution39 dated August 16, 2010 for lack of merit; hence, the
present consolidated petitions.
The Issues before the Court
In G.R. Nos. 193383-84, CBK Power submits the sole legal issue of whether the BIR may add a
requirement prior application for an ITAD ruling that is not found in the income tax treaties signed by
the Philippines before a taxpayer can avail of preferential tax rates under said treaties. 40
On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 193407-08, the Commissioner maintains that CBK Power is not entitled to
a refund in the amount of P1,143,517.21 for the period covering taxable year 2003 as it allegedly failed to
exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial redress. 41
The Courts Ruling

The Court resolves the foregoing in seriatim.
A. G.R. Nos. 193383-84
The Philippine Constitution provides for adherence to the general principles of international law as part of the
law of the land. The time-honored international principle of pacta sunt servanda demands the performance
in good faith of treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the agreement. In this jurisdiction,
treaties have the force and effect of law.42
The issue of whether the failure to strictly comply with RMO No. 1-2000 will deprive persons or corporations
of the benefit of a tax treaty was squarely addressed in the recent case of Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue43 (Deutsche Bank), where the Court emphasized that the obligation
to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of RMO No. 1-2000, viz.:
We recognize the clear intention of the BIR in implementing RMO No. 1-2000, but the CTAs outright denial
of a tax treaty relief for failure to strictly comply with the prescribed period is not in harmony with the
objectives of the contracting state to ensure that the benefits granted under tax treaties are enjoyed by duly
entitled persons or corporations.
Bearing in mind the rationale of tax treaties, the period of application for the availment of tax treaty relief as
required by RMO No. 1-2000 should not operate to divest entitlement to the relief as it would
constitute a violation of the duty required by good faith in complying with a tax treaty. The denial of the
availment of tax relief for the failure of a taxpayer to apply within the prescribed period under the
administrative issuance would impair the value of the tax treaty. At most, the application for a tax treaty
relief from the BIR should merely operate to confirm the entitlement of the taxpayer to the relief.
The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of RMO No. 12000. Logically, noncompliance with tax treaties has negative implications on international relations, and
unduly discourages foreign investors. While the consequences sought to be prevented by RMO No. 1-2000
involve an administrative procedure, these may be remedied through other system management
processes, e.g., the imposition of a fine or penalty. But we cannot totally deprive those who are
entitled to the benefit of a treaty for failure to strictly comply with an administrative issuance
requiring prior application for tax treaty relief.44 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The objective of RMO No. 1-2000 in requiring the application for treaty relief with the ITAD before a partys
availment of the preferential rate under a tax treaty is to avert the consequences of any erroneous
interpretation and/or application of treaty provisions, such as claims for refund/credit for overpayment of
taxes, or deficiency tax liabilities for underpayment.45 However, as pointed out in Deutsche Bank, the
underlying principle of prior application with the BIR becomes moot in refund cases as in the present
case where the very basis of the claim is erroneous or there is excessive payment arising from the
non-availment of a tax treaty relief at the first instance. Just as Deutsche Bank was not faulted by the Court
for not complying with RMO No. 1-2000 prior to the transaction, 46 so should CBK Power. In parallel, CBK
Power could not have applied for a tax treaty relief 15 days prior to its payment of the final withholding tax
on the interest paid to its lenders precisely because it erroneously paid said tax on the basis of the
regular rate as prescribed by the NIRC, and not on the preferential tax rate provided under the different
treaties. As stressed by the Court, the prior application requirement under RMO No. 1-2000 then
becomesillogical.47
Not only is the requirement illogical, but it is also an imposition that is not found at all in the applicable
tax treaties. In Deutsche Bank, the Court categorically held that the BIR should not impose additional
requirements that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements,
especially since said tax treaties do not provide for any prerequisite at all for the availment of the benefits
under said agreements.48
It bears reiterating that the application for a tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to
confirm the entitlement of the taxpayer to the relief.49 Since CBK Power had requested for confirmation
from the ITAD on June 8, 2001 and October 28, 2002 50 before it filed on April 14, 2003 its administrative
claim for refund of its excess final withholding taxes, the same should be deemed substantial
compliance with RMO No. 1-2000, as in Deutsche Bank. To rule otherwise would defeat the purpose of
Section 229 of the NIRC in providing the taxpayer a remedy for erroneously paid tax solely on the ground of
failure to make prior application for tax treaty relief.51 As the Court exhorted in Republic v. GST Philippines,
Inc.,52 while the taxpayer has an obligation to honestly pay the right taxes, the government has a corollary
duty to implement tax laws in good faith; to discharge its duty to collect what is due to it; and to justly
return what has been erroneously and excessively given to it.53
In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the CTA En Banc committed reversible error in affirming the
reduction of the amount of refund to CBK Power from P15,672,958.42 to P14,835,720.39 to exclude its
transactions with Fortis-Netherlands for which no ITAD ruling was obtained. 54 CBK Powers petition in G.R.
Nos. 193383-84 is therefore granted.
The opposite conclusion is, however, reached with respect to the Commissioners petition in G.R. Nos.
193407-08.
B. G.R. Nos. 193407-08
The Commissioner laments55 that he was deprived of the opportunity to act on the administrative claim for
refund of excess final withholding taxes covering taxable year 2003 which CBK Power filed on March 4,
2005, a Friday, then the following Wednesday, March 9, 2005, the latter hastily elevated the case on petition
for review before the CTA. He argues56 that the failure on the part of CBK Power to give him areasonable
time to act on said claim is violative of the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and of
primary jurisdiction.
For its part, CBK Power maintains57 that it would be prejudicial to wait for the Commissioners ruling before it
files its judicial claim since it only has 2 years from the payment of the tax within which to file both its
administrative and judicial claims.
The Court rules for CBK Power.
Sections 204 and 229 of the NIRC pertain to the refund of erroneously or illegally collected taxes. Section
204 applies to administrative claims for refund, while Section 229 to judicial claims for refund. In both
instances, the taxpayers claim must be filed within two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or
penalty. However, Section 229 of the NIRC further states the condition that a judicial claim for refund may
not be maintained until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner. These
provisions respectively read:
SEC. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes. The
Commissioner may xxxx
(C) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without authority, refund the
value of internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition by the purchaser, and, in his
discretion, redeem or change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit for use and refund their value
upon proof of destruction. No credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files
in writing with the Commissioner a claim for credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the
tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a return filed showing an overpayment shall be considered as a
written claim for credit or refund.
xxxx
SEC. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in
any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or
illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, of any
sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected without authority, or of any sum
alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has
been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such
tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of
payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: x x x.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Indubitably, CBK Powers administrative and judicial claims for refund of its excess final withholding taxes
covering taxable year 2003 were filed within the two-year prescriptive period, as shown by the table
below:58
WHEN
WHEN
LAST DAY OF
WHEN
WHEN
FINAL
REMITTANC THE 2-YEAR
PETITION
INCOME
E
ADMINISTRATIVE
FOR
TAXES
RETURN
PRESCRIPTIVE
CLAIM WAS
REVIEW
WERE
FILED
PERIOD
FILED
WAS
WITHHEL
FILED
D
February
03/10/03
03/10/05
March 4, 2005
03/09/05
2003
May 2003
06/10/03
06/10/05
March 4, 2005
03/09/05
With respect to the remittance filed on March 10, 2003, the Court agrees with the ratiocination of the CTAEn
Banc in debunking the alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Had CBK Power awaited the action
of the Commissioner on its claim for refund prior to taking court action knowing fully well that the
prescriptive period was about to end, it would have lost not only its right to seek judicial recourse but its
right to recover the final withholding taxes it erroneously paid to the government thereby suffering
irreparable damage.59
Also, while it may be argued that, for the remittance filed on June 10, 2003 that was to prescribe on June
10, 2005, CBK Power could have waited for, at the most, three (3) months from the filing of the
administrative claim on March 4, 2005 until the last day of the two-year prescriptive period ending June 10,
2005, that is, if only to give the BIR at the administrative level an opportunity to act on said claim, the Court
cannot, on that basis alone, deny a legitimate claim that was, for all intents and purposes, timely filed in
accordance with Section 229 of the NIRC. There was no violation of Section 229 since the law, as worded,
only requires that an administrative claim be priorly filed.
In the foregoing instances, attention must be drawn to the Courts ruling in P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd. v.
David60(Kiener), wherein it was held that in no wise does the law, i.e., Section 306 of the old Tax Code (now,
Section 229 of the NIRC), imply that the Collector of Internal Revenue first act upon the taxpayers claim,
and that the taxpayer shall not go to court before he is notified of the Collectors action. In Kiener, the Court
went on to say that the claim with the Collector of Internal Revenue was intended primarily as a notice of
warning that unless the tax or penalty alleged to have been collected erroneously or illegally is refunded,
court action will follow, viz.:
The controversy centers on the construction of the aforementioned section of the Tax Code which reads:
SEC. 306. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in
any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or
illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any
sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit
has been duly filed with the Collector of Internal Revenue; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained,
whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress. In any case, no such suit or
proceeding shall be begun after the expiration of two years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty.
The preceding provisions seem at first blush conflicting. It will be noticed that, whereas the first sentence
requires a claim to be filed with the Collector of Internal Revenue before any suit is commenced, the last
makes imperative the bringing of such suit within two years from the date of collection. But the conflict is
only apparent and the two provisions easily yield to reconciliation, which it is the office of statutory
construction to effectuate, where possible, to give effect to the entire enactment.
To this end, and bearing in mind that the Legislature is presumed to have understood the language it used
and to have acted with full idea of what it wanted to accomplish, it is fair and reasonable to say without
doing violence to the context or either of the two provisions, that by the first is meant simply that the
Collector of Internal Revenue shall be given an opportunity to consider his mistake, if mistake has been
committed, before he is sued, but not, as the appellant contends that pending consideration of the claim,
the period of two years provided in the last clause shall be deemed interrupted. Nowhere and in no wise
does the law imply that the Collector of Internal Revenue must act upon the claim, or that the
taxpayer shall not go to court before he is notified of the Collectors action. x x x. We understand
the filing of the claim with the Collector of Internal Revenue to be intended primarily as a notice
of warning that unless the tax or penalty alleged to have been collected erroneously or illegally is
refunded, court action will follow. x x x.61 (Emphases supplied)
That being said, the foregoing refund claims of CBK Power should all be granted, and, the petition of the
Commissioner in G.R. Nos. 193407-08 be denied for lack of merit.
chanroble slaw
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. Nos. 193383-84 is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 29, 2010 and
the Resolution dated August 16, 2010 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc in C.T.A. E.B. Nos. 469 and
494 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered REINSTATING the Decision of the CTA
First Division dated August 28, 2008 ordering the refund in favor of CBK Power Company Limited the
amount of P15,672,958.42 representing its excess final withholding taxes for the taxable years 2001 to
2003. On the other hand, the petition in G.R. Nos. 193407-08 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
cralawla wlibrary
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 195272, January 14, 2015
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (FORMERLY PRUDENTIAL BANK), Petitioner, v. SPOUSES
DAVID M. CASTRO AND CONSUELO B. CASTRO, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For resolution is the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated 26 November 2009 of the
Court of Appeals, Special Sixth Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 88870 and the Resolution 2 dated 14 January 2011
of the Court of Appeals, Second Division denying the motion for reconsideration, which reversed and set
aside the judgment3 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 97 (RTC) dismissing the
complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Sheriffs Certificate of Sale and Damages against Prudential Bank.
The Complaint has its origins from the two loans contracted by respondent Spouses David M. Castro
(David)4 and Consuelo B. Castro (Consuelo) from Prudential Bank in the amounts of P100,000.00 and
P55,000.00 in July and August 1987. The first loans maturity date was on 18 January 1988 while the
second loan had a maturity date of 23 February 1988. The P100,000.00 loan was secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage (REM) over petitioners' property located in Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 364277 while the P55,000.00 loan was secured by another REM over two parcels of land located
in Alaminos, Laguna covered by TCT Nos. T-2225 and T-2226, registered in the name of Davids mother,
Guellerma Malabanan.
The loans remained unpaid as of 30 April 1996 and the balances ballooned to P290,205.05 on the
P100,000.00 loan and P96,870.20 on the P55,000.00 loan. Prudential Bank, through counsel, filed two
separate petitions for foreclosure of the mortgage. In their first petition, Prudential Bank admitted that
through inadvertence, the photocopies of the first two pages of the REM covering the properties in Laguna
were mixed and attached to the photocopies of the last two pages of the REM covering the Quezon City
property.5 Thus, in the Notice of Sheriffs Sale, the name Guellerma Malabanan rep. by her AIF David M.
Castro appeared as mortgagor while the amount of mortgaged indebtedness is P96,870.20. The real
property described therein however is the Quezon City property.
On 26 August 1996, the Quezon City property was sold at a public auction in favor of Prudential Bank whose
winning bid was P396,000.00.
In their Complaint, Spouses Castro alleged that the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of the Quezon City
property is null and void for lack of notice and publication of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Spouses
Castro proffered that the property foreclosed is not one of the properties covered by the REM executed by
Guellerma Malabanan which was the basis of the Notice of Sheriffs Sale which was posted and published.
Spouses Castro prayed for the declaration of the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale as null and void and for award
of damages.6
In their Answer, Prudential Bank asserted that Spouses Castro were fully aware that the Quezon City
property was to be foreclosed considering that the obligation secured by it remained unpaid as of the date of
the foreclosure sale. Prudential Bank cited a clerical and harmless inadvertence in the preparation of the
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure but nonetheless, it claimed that Spouses Castro, having been notified of
the scheduled foreclosure of the mortgage of the Quezon City property, should have noticed the
inadvertence and alerted the sheriff. Their failure to do so, Prudential Bank added, clearly amounted to
laches.7
The issue before the RTC was whether Prudential Bank legally complied with the jurisdictional requirement of
due notice prior to the extrajudicial sale of the property in question. The trial court ruled in favor of
Prudential Bank and dismissed the complaint. It found that:
x x x there was no substantial defect on the published and posted notice of Sheriffs sale. The public had
been sufficiently informed of the identity of the property to be sold, identity of the mortgagor-borrower
whose unpaid loan is secured by the mortgage and the identity of the mortgagee. The notice did not render
plaintiffs themselves uninformed of the nature of the property to be sold. 8
The trial court further held that the objective of notice was attained since there was sufficient publicity of the
sale through newspaper publication and that there was no showing that the property was sold for a price far
below its value, an intimation of collusion between the sheriff who conducted the sale and the bank. 9
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court stressed the
importance of notice in a foreclosure sale and ruled that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in
compliance with statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating the sale. 10
Prudential Bank filed a motion for reconsideration. In a Resolution dated 14 January 2011, the Court of
Appeals, Second Division, expounded on the previous Decision. The appellate court clarified that the
erroneous designation of Guellerma Malabanan as mortgagor, instead of David, did not affect the validity of
the notice. With respect to the amount of the mortgaged indebtedness however, the appellate court noted
that the discrepancy vis-a-vis the actual amount owed by Spouses Castro is so huge that it can hardly be
considered immaterial. The appellate court opined that declaring a small amount of indebtedness in the
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure and in the notice of sheriffs sale would effectively depreciate the value
of the property. The appellate court then concluded that statutory provisions governing publication of notice
of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with and that even slight deviations will invalidate
the notice.11
Petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), being the successor-in-interest of Prudential Bank, by virtue
of the merger of the two banking institutions with BPI as the surviving entity, filed the instant petition for
review defending the ruling of the trial court and reiterating that the published Notice of Sheriffs Sale would
show that the subject of the sale, the Quezon City property, was sufficiently and properly described and
identified. Petitioner refuted the appellate courts finding that by indicating a lower amount of indebtedness,
the notice depreciated the value of the property subject of sale. Petitioner cited Olizon v. Court of
Appeals,12 wherein the court declared that immaterial errors and mistakes cannot affect the sufficiency of
the notice. Petitioner reiterated Prudential Banks right to foreclose the mortgage constituted over the
Quezon City property because the loan secured by the mortgage had not been paid when it fell due and
remained so when the mortgage was scheduled for foreclosure. 13
In her Comment, Consuelo points out as glaringly erroneous the Notice of Sheriffs Sale which named the
mortgagor as Guellerma Malabanan and the mortgage indebtedness as P96,870.20. Consuelo avers that
the properties, the foreclosure of which Prudential Bank appears to seek in its petition, were situated in
Laguna, thus, the Sheriff of Quezon City had no jurisdiction to issue a Notice for Sale of said property.
Consuelo insists that even if the property was sold for more than the mortgage indebtedness, such would
not render the sale valid because public policy is involved in the need for strict compliance with the
requirements of notice in extrajudicial foreclosures of mortgage. It was posited that a lesser amount of
indebtedness as stated in the notice would mislead a potential bidder in public auction and subject the value
of the property to risk of unwarranted diminution. Finally, Consuelo counters that petitioners reliance on
Olizon is misplaced because the alleged failure of notice in said case lay in the fact that the notice was
published in a newspaper in lieu of being posted. Consuelo argues that in this case the property itself was
misidentified in the petition for foreclosure.14
The submissions of the parties indicate the basic issue to be whether the errors in the Notice of Sheriffs
Sale invalidate the notice and render the sale and the certificate of such sale void.
We find merit in the petition.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that foreclosure proceedings have in their favor the presumption of
regularity and the party who seeks to challenge the proceedings has the burden of evidence to rebut the
same.15 In this case, respondent failed to prove that Prudential Bank has not complied with the notice
requirement of the law.
Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Act No. 3135 laid down the procedure regarding foreclosure sale:
Sec. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province in which the property sold is situated; and
in case the place within said province in which the sale is to be made is subject to stipulation, such sale shall
be made in said place or in the municipal building of the municipality in which the property or part thereof is
situated.
Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three
public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more
than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.
Sec. 4. The sale shall be made at public auction, between the hours of nine in the morning and four in the
afternoon; and shall be under the direction of the sheriff of the province, the justice or auxiliary justice of
the peace of the municipality in which such sale has to be made, or a notary public of said municipality, who
shall be entitled to collect a fee of five pesos each day of actual work performed, in addition to his expenses.
In Philippine National Bank v. Maraya, Jr.,16 we elucidated that one of the most important requirements of
Act No. 3135 is that the notice of the time and place of sale shall be given. If the sheriff acts without notice,
or at a time and place other than that designated in the notice, the sheriff acts without warrant of law. 17 In
this case, the property sold in the public auction is located in Quezon City and the foreclosure sale
proceeded as scheduled at 10:00 oclock in the morning on 26 August 1996 at the Hall of Justice in Quezon
City with Prudential Bank as the winning bidder, registering the highest bid of P396,000.00.
In Century Savings Bank v. Samonte18 citing Olizon v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court reiterated the purpose of
the rule on notice, to wit:
The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property to be sold,
and of the time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of securing bidders and to
prevent a sacrifice of the property. If these objects are attained, immaterial errors and mistakes will not
affect the sufficiency of the notice; but if mistakes or omissions occur in the notices of sale, which are
calculated to deter or mislead bidders, to depreciate the value of the property, or to prevent it from bringing
a fair price, such mistakes or omissions will be fatal to the validity of the notice, and also to the sale made
pursuant thereto.20
The mistakes and omissions referred to in the above-cited ruling which would invalidate notice pertain to
those which: 1) are calculated to deter or mislead bidders, 2) to depreciate the value of the property, or 3)
to prevent it from bringing a fair price.
In this case, the Notice of Sheriffs Sale21 states:
NOTICE OF SHERIFFS SALE

Upon extra-judicial petition for sale under Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, filed Prudential Bank,
mortgage[e]/s, against Guellerma Malabanan rep. by her AIF David M. Castro mortgagor/s, with residence
and postal address at Sta. Rosa, Alaminos, Laguna to satisfy the mortgaged indebtedness, which as of July
1996 amounts to NINETY SIX THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS & 20/100 (P96,870.20)
excluding penalties[,] charges, attorneys fees and all the legal fees and expenses for the foreclosure and
sale, the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Quezon City or her duly authorized Deputy, will sell at PUBLIC AUCTION to the
highest bidder FOR CASH and in Philippine Currency, on the 26th day of AUGUST, 1996, at 10:00 oclock in
the morning, or soon thereafter, infront of the main entrance of the Hall of Justice (beside the Quezon City
Hall) Elliptical Road, Diliman, Quezon City, the following described real estate property, together with all the
improvements existing thereon to wit:
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

NO. 364277
Registry of Deeds Quezon City
A parcel of land (Lot 5-B of the subd. Plan (LRC) Psd-339863, approved as a nonsubdn. project, being a
portion of Lot 5, Blk. 1, (LRC) Psd-45612, LRC Rec. No. 5975), situated in the Dist. of Tandang Sora, Quezon
City. Bounded on the NE., points 4 to 1 by Road Lot 1 (LRC) Psd-45612; on the SE., points 1 to 2 by Lot 5C; on the SW., points 2-3 by Lot 5-A, both of the subdn. plan; and on the NW., points 3-4 by Lot 371- New
Psd- 36060. x x x x containing an area of ONE HUDNRED (100) SQUARE METERS, more or less.
Prospective bidders or buyers are hereby enjoined to investigate for themselves the title of the said real
estate property and the encumbrances thereon, if any there be.
With jurisprudence as the measure, the errors pointed out by respondents appear to be harmless. The evils
that can result from an erroneous notice did not arise. There was no intention to mislead, as the errors in
fact did not mislead the bidders as shown by the fact that the winning registered bid of P396,000.00 is over
and above the real amount of indebtedness of P209,205.05. As correctly observed by the trial court, the
amount mentioned in the notice did not indicate a collusion between the sheriff who conducted the sale and
the respondent bank. Notably, the mentioned amount of P96,870.20 refers to the mortgage indebtedness
not the value of the property. Equally notable is the announcement in the notice that the amount excludes
penalties, charges, attorneys fees and all legal fees and expenses for the foreclosure and sale.
As regards the designation of Guellerma Malabanan as the mortgagor, we agree with the reference made by
the Court of Appeals to the case of Langkaan Realty Devt Inc. v. UCPB which ruled that the erroneous
designation of an entity as the mortgagor does not invalidate the notice of sale. 22
The notice rule was complied with when the Notice of Sheriffs Sale was published in Philippine Recorder, a
national newspaper of general circulation once a week for three consecutive weeks or on 29 July, 5 and 12
August 1996. As a matter of fact, the foreclosure procedure undertaken by Prudential Bank was supported
by the following documents: Affidavit of Publication,23 Notice of Sheriffs Sale,24 Sheriffs Certificate of
Sale,25 Affidavit of Posting,26 and Minutes of the Auction Sale.27 Indubitably, these documents evidenced the
regular and lawful conduct of the foreclosure proceedings.
There is much significance in the fact that David admitted on the witness stand that he knew that there was
an application for foreclosure on their Quezon City property but the REM used as basis of the foreclosure
covered the Laguna properties. Upon learning this information, he should have registered his objection or
sought clarification from the sheriffs office. Instead, he let the public auction run its course and belatedly
objected to the sale.
For failure to overcome the burden of showing that the foreclosure proceedings is tainted with irregularity,
the Certificate of Sale should be upheld.
chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 26 November 2009 Decision and 14 January 2011 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88870 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 24 January 2007
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 97 in Civil Case No. Q-97-32018 isREINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
cralawla wlibrary
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 202687, January 14, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERIC PAVIA Y PALIZA @ JERIC AND JUAN
BUENDIA Y DELOS REYES @ JUNE, Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
For resolution of the Court is the appeal filed by Jeric Pavia and Juan Buendia (appellants) from the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 7 February 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04020. The CA
affirmed the Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, San Pedro, Laguna which found
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs punishable
under Section 13, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. Appellants were sentenced to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
cralawred
The Antecedents
On 29 March 2005, at around 6:00 in the evening, a confidential informant reported to SPO3 Melchor dela
Pea (SPO3 Dela Pea) of the San Pedro Municipal Police Station, San Pedro, Laguna, that a pot session was
taking place at the house of a certain Obet located at Barangay Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna. Upon receipt of
the information, SPO3 Dela Pea formed a team to conduct police operations against the suspect. The team
was composed of the confidential informant, PO2 Rommel Bautista (PO2 Bautista), PO3 Jay Parunggao (PO3
Parunggao), PO1 Jifford Signap and SPO3 Dela Pea as team leader.3
At around 9:00 in the evening of the same date, the team proceeded to the target area. When the team
arrived, the members saw that Obets house was closed. Since the house was not surrounded by a fence,
PO2 Bautista approached the house and peeped through a small opening in a window where he saw four
persons in a circle having a pot session in the living room. PO3 Parunggao then tried to find a way to enter
the house and found an unlocked door. He entered the house, followed by PO2 Bautista and they caught the
four persons engaged in a pot session by surprise. After they introduced themselves as police officers, they
arrested the four suspects and seized the drug paraphernalia found at the scene. 4 Among those arrested
were herein appellants, from each of whom a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance were
confiscated by PO3 Parunggao after he conducted a body search on their persons. 5 PO3 Parunggao marked
the plastic sachet he seized from appellant Pavia with JP, representing the initials of Jeric Pavia while that
taken from appellant Buendia was marked, also by PO3 Parunggao, with JB, representing the initials of
Juan Buendia.6 These plastic sachets were transmitted to the crime laboratory for qualitative examination
where they tested positive for shabu.7
Consequently, appellants were charged with violation of Section 13, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 in two
separate but identically worded informations which read:
That on or about 29 March 2005, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused without authority of the law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody [of] METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE, commonly known as shabu, a dangerous drug, weighing zero point zero two (0.02) gram,
in the company of two persons.8
When arraigned, both appellants pleaded not guilty to the offense. 9
A joint trial of the cases ensued.

In defense, appellants provided a different version of the incident. According to them, on the questioned
date and time, they were roaming the streets of Baranggay Cuyab, selling star apples. A prospective buyer
of the fruits called them over to his house and requested them to go inside, to which they acceded. When
they were about to leave the house, several persons who introduced themselves as policemen arrived and
invited appellants to go with them to the precinct. There, they were incarcerated and falsely charged with
violation of the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002. 10
The Ruling of the RTC

The trial court found that the prosecution was able to prove the offense charged through the spontaneous,
positive and credible testimony of its witness. The trial court noted that the police officers carried out a
lawful arrest before they proceeded with the bodily search of appellants. Moreover, there was no clear and
convincing evidence that the team of PO3 Parunggao was inspired by any improper motive when they
carried out their operation. Thus, the testimony of PO2 Bautista on the witness stand, narrating the events
leading to the apprehension of appellants, deserves full faith and credit. 11

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, upon a finding that the evidence on record support the
trial courts conclusion that a lawful arrest, search and seizure took place, and that the prosecution fully
discharged its burden of establishing, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements necessary for the
conviction of the offense charged.12
On the contention of appellants that their warrantless arrest was illegal and, therefore, the items seized
from them as a result of that arrest were inadmissible in evidence against them, the CA held that this
argument totally lacks merit. According to the CA:
We stress at the outset that the [appellants] failed to question the legality of their warrantless arrest. The
established rule is that an accused [is] estopped from assailing the legality of [his] arrest if [he] failed to
move for the quashing of the Information against [him] before [his] arraignment. Any objection involving
the arrest or the procedure in the courts acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be
made before [he] enter[s] [his] plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
In any event, we carefully examined the records and now hold that the warrantless arrests conducted on
[appellants] were valid. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure lists the situations when a
person may be arrested without a warrant x x x.
xxxx
Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless arrest of
an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence in its totality, we hold that the prosecution successfully established
that the petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto.
We emphasize that the series of events that led the police to the house where the pot session was
conducted and to their arrest were triggered by a tip from a concerned citizen that a pot session was in
progress at the house of a certain Obet at Baranggay Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna. Under the circumstances,
the police did not have enough time to secure a search warrant considering the time element involved in
the process (i.e., a pot session may not be an extended period of time and it was then 9:00 p.m.). In view
of the urgency, SPO3 Melchor dela Pea immediately dispatched his men to proceed to the identified place to
verify the report. At the place, the responding police officers verified through a small opening in the window
and saw the accused-appellants and their other two (2) companions sniffing shabu to use the words of
PO2 Bautista. There was therefore sufficient probable cause for the police officers to believe that the
accused-appellants were then and there committing a crime. As it turned out, the accused-appellants indeed
possessed and were even using a prohibited drug, contrary to law. When an accused is caught in flagrante
delicto, the police officers are not only authorized but are duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
In the course of the arrest and in accordance with police procedures, the [appellants] were frisked, which
search yielded the prohibited drug in their possession. These circumstances were sufficient to justify the
warrantless search x x x that yielded two (2) heat-sealed plastic sachets of shabu. x x x
xxxx
All the x x x requirements for a lawful search and seizure are present in this case. The police officers had
prior justification to be at a certain Obets place as they were dispatched by their desk officer; they
arrested the [appellants] as they had reason to believe that they were illegally using and possessing a
prohibited drug and drug paraphernalia. The search of the [appellants] incident to their arrest yielded the
confiscated crystalline substance which later proved to be shabu. In the course of their lawful intrusion,
they inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia scattered in the living room. As these items were
plainly visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them.
xxxx
As correctly found by the trial court, the [appellants'] story is unworthy of belief. Their denial must fail in the
light of the positive identification and declarations made by the prosecution witness. As stated earlier, PO2
Bautista testified in a straightforward and categorical manner regarding the identities of the malefactors. He
did not waver despite the defense counsel's rigid questioning.
Courts generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to the facility with which an accused can
concoct it to suit his or her defense. As evidence that is both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot
attain more credibility than the testimony of the prosecution witness who testified clearly, providing thereby
positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed. One such positive evidence is the result of
the laboratory examination conducted by the PNP crime Laboratory on the drugs recovered from the
[appellants] which revealed that the confiscated plastic sachets tested positive for the presence of "shabu:
two (2) heated transparent plastic sachet with markings JB and JP containing 0.02 gram of white
crystalline substance each both yielded positive results. 13
With respect to appellants claim that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody because the
police operatives failed to strictly comply with Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, the CA has this to say:
The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.
Contrary to what the [appellants] want to portray, the chain of custody of the seized prohibited drug was
shown not to have been broken. After the seizure of the plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance from the [appellants'] possession and of the various drug paraphernalia in the living room, the
police immediately brought the [appellants] to the police station, together with the seized items. PO3
Parunggao himself brought these items to the police station and marked them. The plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance was marked "JB" and "JP". These confiscated items were immediately
turned over by PO2 Bautista to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office Calabarzon, Camp Vicente Lim,
Calamba City for examination to determine the presence of dangerous drugs. After a qualitative examination
conducted on the specimens, Forensic Chemist Lorna Ravelas Tria concluded that the plastic sachets
recovered from the accused-appellants tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a prohibited
drug, per Chemistry Report Nos. D-0381-05 and D-0382-05.
When the prosecution presented these marked specimens in court, PO2 Baustista positively identified them
to be the same items they seized from the [appellants] and which PO3 Parunggao later marked at the police
station, from where the seized items were turned over to the laboratory for examination based on a duly
prepared request.
Thus, the prosecution established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized items from the time
they were first discovered until they were brought for examination. Besides, as earlier stated, the
[appellants] did not contest the admissibility of the seized items during the tria1. The integrity and the
evidentiary value of the drugs seized from the accused-appellants were therefore duly proven not to have
been compromised.
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that failure to strictly comply, with Section 2l (1), Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from
him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In the present case, we see substantial compliance by the police with the required procedure on the custody
and control of the confiscated items, thus showing that the integrity of the seized evidence was not
compromised. We refer particularly to the succession of events established by evidence, to the overall
handling of the seized items by specified individuals, to the test results obtained, under a situation where no
objection to admissibility was ever raised by the defense. All these, to the unprejudiced mind, show that the
evidence seized were the same evidence tested and subsequently identified and testified to in court. 14 x x x
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal.
Appellants are charged under Section 13, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which provides:
Section 13. Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings. Any person
found possessing any dangerous drug during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the
proximate company of at least two (2) persons, shall suffer the maximum penalties provided for in Section
11 of this Act, regardless of the quantity and purity of such dangerous drugs.
The elements for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165 are the same
as those for the violation of Section 11 of the law: (1) possession by the accused of an item or object
identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; (3) the free
and conscious possession of the drug by the accused, 15 with the additional element that (4) the accused
possessed the prohibited or dangerous drug during a social gathering or meeting, or in the company of at
least two persons.
As correctly found by the CA, the evidence for the prosecution showed the presence of all these elements.
The testimony of PO2 Bautista on this point is determinative:
q.
When you said PO3 Parunggao saw that the door of the house was not
locked, what did you do?
He entered the house and we followed him, maam [sic].
a.
xx
xx
q. In what part of the house where [sic] this [sic] people engaged in a pot
session?
a. At the sala, maam [sic].
q. And what was their reaction when PO3 Parunggao and the rest of the
team barged in?
a. They were surprised, maam [sic].
xx
xx
q. And what did you do after that?
a. PO3 Parunggao introduced ourselves as police officers, maam [sic].
q. What happened after that?
a. We confiscated the drug paraphernalias [sic] and then PO3 Parunggao
conducted body search and was able to confiscate shabu from the two
of the people there maam [sic].
q. Where were you when PO3 Parunggao conducted a search?
a. I was behind him, maam [sic].
q. Did you see him conducting a search?
a. Yes, maam [sic].
q. What did you see him doing?
a. I saw that he was able to confiscate small plastic sachet containing
shabu, maam [sic].
q.
a.
q.
a.
q.
a.
q.
From whom?
From Jeric Pavia and Juan Buendia, maam [sic].
If this Jeric Pavia is in court right now, will you be able to point to him?
Yes, maam [sic].
Please point to him?
That man in the first row wearing yellow shirt, maam [sic] (pointed to a
person inside the courtroom who, when asked answered by the name of
Jeric Pavia).
You said that you saw PO3 Parunggao confiscated plastic sachet
containing shabu from Jeric Pavia, from what part of his body was he
able to confiscate the same?
From the pocket of Jeric Pavia, maam [sic].
a.
xx
xx
q. You said that PO3 Parunggao confiscated plastic sachet with white
crystalline substance from two person [sic], one was identified as Jeric
Pavia, who was the other one?
a. It was Juan Buendia, maam [sic]
q. Please identify him if he is in court?
a. That man also in the first row, at the right portion, wearing yellow shirt
(pointed to a person who, when asked answered by the name of Juan
Buendia).
q. Where were you when PO3 Parunggao confiscated from Juan Buendia
the plastic sachet of shabu?
a. I was behind him, maam [sic].
xx
xx
q. On [sic] what part of the body of Juan Buendia was the item taken by
Officer Parunggao?
a. Also in [sic] his pocket, maam [sic].16
The same testimony of PO2 Bautista also established the chain of custody of the prohibited drugs taken from
appellants. Thus:
q.
a.
q.
a.
q.
a.
You said that you saw PO3 Parunggao confiscated [sic] plastic sachet
containing shabu from Jeric Pavia, from what part of his body was he
able to confiscate the same?
From the pocket of Jeric Pavia, maam [sic].
And do you know what PO3 Parunggao do with the item?
He placed marking on it, maam [sic].
In what place did he put the marking?
At the police station maam [sic].
q.
a.
q.
a.
q.
a.
q.
a.
q.
What markings did he place?

It was marked JP representing the initials of accused Jeric Pavia, maam
[sic].
Where were you when Officer Parunggao placed that marking on the
item?
I was beside him, maam [sic].
Can you describe the plastic sachet?
It is a small transparent plastic sachet which contains white crystalline
substance otherwise known as shabu, maam [sic].
Who was in possession of the plastic sachet from the time PO3
Parunggao took it from the possession of Jeric Pavia up to the police
station?
It was P03 Parunggao, maam [sic].
I am showing to you a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance
with markings JP, please identify the same?
This is the same item confiscated from Jeric Pavia, maam [sic].
a.
xx
xx
q. Did you come to know what Officer Parunggao do with the plastic sachet
confiscated from Juan Buendia?
a. He brought it to the police station, maam [sic].
q. And what did he do with it?
a. He placed the markings JB, maam [sic].
q. Who was in possession of the plastic sachet with markings JB from
Aplaya [where the pot session took place] to the police station?
a. It was PO3 Parunggao, maam.
q. I am showing to you a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance
with markings JB, please identify the same?
a. This is the same item confiscated from Juan Buendia by PO3 Parunggao,
maam [sic].17
It is likewise important to note that it was PO2 Bautista himself who brought the request 18 for laboratory
examination of the substance taken from appellants from the San Pedro Police Station to the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Calamba City, thereby ensuring that the integrity of the confiscated items are preserved. Thus,
the fact that the apprehending team did not strictly comply with the procedural requirements of Section
21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render appellants arrest illegal or the items seized
from them inadmissible in evidence.
As held by this Court in the case of People v. Llanita:19
RA 9165 and its subsequent Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do not require strict compliance as
to the chain of custody rule. x x x. We have emphasized that what is essential is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Briefly stated, non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the
custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render
void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.

xxxx
x x x. We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 may not always be
possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to
all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence.
Finally, both the trial court and the CA rejected appellants defense of denial and frame-up for failure to
substantiate the same.
Indeed, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it
can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong
and convincing evidence. In the case before us, appellants failed to present sufficient evidence in support of
their claims. Aside from their self-serving assertions, no plausible proof was presented to bolster their
allegations.20 Consequently, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the police officers were
inspired by any improper motive, this Court will not appreciate the defense of denial or frame-up and
instead apply the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement
agents.21
In view of the foregoing, we see no reason to deviate from the well-discussed decision of the CA, its findings
and conclusions having been supported by both law and applicable jurisprudence.
chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7 February 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04020
isAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 148748, January 14, 2015
IMELDA, LEONARDO, FIDELINO, AZUCENA, JOSEFINA, ANITA AND SISA, ALL SURNAMED
SYJUCO, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner-Intervenor, v. FELISA D.
BONIFACIO AND VSD REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision 1 dated February 23, 2001 and
Resolution2 dated June 26, 2001 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 57777, which affirmed in toto the
Decision3 dated January 9, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 126 of Caloocan City in Civil Case
No. C-366.
The present controversy involves a parcel of land, measuring around 2,835 square meters, which originally
formed part of a wider tract of land, dubbed as the Maysilo Estate (subject land).
The factual antecedents, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioners Imelda, Leonardo, Fidelino, Azucena, Anita, and Sisa, all surnamed Syjuco (collectively referred
to as petitioners) are the registered co-owners of the subject land, located in the then Barrio of Balintawak,
Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-108530 4 issued by
the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City on March 26, 1984. The subject land is particularly described under
petitioners certificate of title as follows:
It is hereby certified that certain land situated in the Caloocan, Metro Manila, Philippines, bound and
described as follows:
Un terreno (Lote No. 3-B del plano de subdivision Psd-706, parte del Lote No. 23-A, plano original Psu-2345
de la Hacienda de Maysilo), situado en el Barrio de Balintawak, Municipio de Caloocan, Provincia de Rizal.
Linda por el NE. con el Lote No. 3-D del plano de subdivision; por el SE., con el Lote No. 3-C del plano de
subdivision; por el SO. con el Lote No. 7; y por el No. con el Lote No. 3-A del plano de subdivision. x x x
midiendo una extension superficial de DOS MIL OCHOCIENTOS TREINTA Y CINCO METROS CUADRADOS
CON TREINTA DECIMETROS CUADRADOS (2, 835), mas o menos. x x x la fecha de la medicion original 8 al
27 de Septiembre, 4 al 21 de Octubre y 17-18 de Noviembre de 1911 y la de la subdivision, 29 de Diciembre
de 1924. (Consta la descripcion decinica en el Certificado de Transferencia de Titulo No. 10301)
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xxxx
is registered in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of
IMELDA G. SYJUCO; LEONARDO G. SYJUCO; FIDELINO G. SYJUCO; AZUCENA G. SYJUCO; JOSEFINA G.
SYJUCO; ANITA G. SYJUCO; SISA G. SYJUCO, all of legal age, single, Filipinos, - as owner thereof in fee simple, subject to such of the encumbrances mentioned in Section 39 of said Act as
may be subsisting, and to the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court with respect to the
inheritance left by the deceased Monica Galauran and Mariano Mesina. (From T.C.T. No. 12370)
Petitioners have been in open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the subject land, by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest, since 1926. Petitioners traced back their title over the subject
land to TCT No. 10301 issued on February 26, 1926 to Monica Jacinto Galauran. Thereafter, TCT No. 10301
was replaced by TCT No. 8685 under the names of Avelina Baello, Felisa Baello, Dolores Baello, Eduardo
Mesina, and Fausto Galauran (Avelina Baello, et al.). TCT No. 8685 was then replaced by TCT No. 12370
under the names of the brothers Martin V. Syjuco (Martin) and Manuel V. Syjuco (Manuel) pursuant to a
Deed of Sale of Real Estate5 dated February 7, 1949 executed by Avelina Baello, et al. in favor of the siblings
Martin and Manuel. TCT No. 12370 was, in turn, replaced by TCT No. 48566 issued on July 1, 1964 in
Martins name alone in accordance with a Partition Agreement 7 executed by the brothers on June 16, 1964.
Upon Martins death, petitioners inherited the subject land, and following the extrajudicial partition they
executed on June 27, 1976, they registered said land in their names, as co-owners, under TCT No. T-108530
issued on March 26, 1984. Petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been paying the real property
taxes over the subject land since 1949.8
cralawlawlibrary
Among the annotations on TCT No. T-108530 are two encumbrances constituted by petitioners and/or their
predecessors-in-interest on the subject land, particularly: (1) a lease agreement dated September 24,
1963, in favor of Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company (Manufacturers Bank), over a portion of the
subject land, with the condition that the buildings which the lessee had constructed thereon shall become
the property of the lessor/s after the expiration of the lease agreement; and (2) another lease agreement
dated December 20, 1971, in favor of a certain Chan Heng, over the remaining portion of the subject
land.9
cralawla wlibrary
Sometime in 1994, however, petitioners learned that a broker named Exequiel Fajardo, through a
Letter10dated March 9, 1994, offered for sale the subject land along with the improvements thereon to a
certain Luis Ong, giving the following description of the property and terms of the offer:
AREA:
Location:
Owner:
2,835.30 square meters

Lot No. 23-A-4-B-2A-3B, PSD 706, TCT265778, Register of
Deeds, Kalookan City
Kalookan City (beside LRT Station)
Felisa D. Bonifacio
The terms of this offer are as follows:

Price:
P35,000.00 per square meter
Payment 50% downpayment;
Terms:
Petitioners found out that the purported owner of the subject land, respondent Felisa D. Bonifacio
(Bonifacio), was the sub-lessee of Kalayaan Development Corporation, which, in turn, was the sub-lessee of
Manufacturers Bank, which was the direct lessee of petitioners. Petitioners also learned that respondent
Bonifacio was able to register the subject land in her name under TCT No. 265778, which was issued on
March 29, 1993 by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City. Respondent Bonifacios certificate of title
described the subject land as follows:
It is hereby certified that certain land situated in the Caloocan City, Philippines, bounded and described as
follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B of the subd. plan, Psd-706, L.R.C. Rec. No. ), situated in Balintawak,
Caloocan Rizal, Bounded of the E., along line 1-2 by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-D, on the SE., along line 2-3 by lot
23-A-4-B-2-A-3-C; both of the subd. plan on the SW., along line 3-4 by lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-6; and on the NW.,
along line 4-1 by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A of the subd. plan. Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan, being N.
71 deg. 17E., 1,285.85 m. from BLLN No. 1, Caloocan thence; S. 01 deg. 46W., 27.70 m. to point 2; S 64
deg. 30W., 105.15 m. to point 3; N 23 deg. 12 W., 26.39 m. to point 4; N. 65 deg. 22E., 116.78 m. to pt.
of beginning, containing an area of TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE SQ. METERS AND
THIRTY SQ. DECIMETERS (2,835.30). All pts. referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the
ground by old pts. Bearings true; date of original survey, Date of subd. survey, Dec. 29, 1922,
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is registered in accordance with the provisions of the Property Registration Decree in the name of
FELISA D. BONIFACIO, of legal age, Filipino, widow, as owner thereof in fee simple, subject to such of the encumbrances mentioned in Section 44 of said Decree
as may be subsisting[.] x x x.11
Respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778 was issued pursuant to an Order 12 dated October 8, 1992 of the RTC
of Caloocan City, Branch 125, in L.R.C. Case No. C-3288, entitled In the Matter of Petition for Authority to
Segregate an Area of 5,680.1 Square Meters from Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, PSD-706 (PSU-2345) of Maysilo
Estate and Issuance of Separate Certificate of Title in the Name of Felisa D. Bonifacio. RTC-Branch 125
granted respondent Bonifacios petition for segregation because:
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that in Case No. 4557 for Petition for Substitution
of Names, in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 1, the then Presiding Judge Cecilia
Muoz Palma, issued an Order dated May 25, 1962 (EXHIBIT N) substituting Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal as one of the registered owners of several parcels of land forming the Maysilo
Estate and covered by, among others, Original Certificate of Title No. 994 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal with among others Eleuteria Rivera Bonifacio to the extent of 1/6 of 1-189/1000
per cent of the entire Maysilo Estate. On January 29, 1991, Eleuteria Rivera Bonifacio executed
in favor of Felisa D. Bonifacio, herein petitioner, a Deed of Assignment (EXHIBIT M) assigning
all her rights and interests over Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A, Psd-706 and Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, Psd706, both lots being covered by O.C.T. 994 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. That even prior to the
execution of the Deed of Assignment but while negotiations with Eleuteria Rivera Bonifacio were going on,
petitioner already requested the Lands Management Sector, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, National Capital Region, to prepare and issue the Technical Descriptions of the two lots subject of
this petition. As requested by petitioner, Elpidio T. de Lara, Chief, Technical Services Section, Lands
Management Sector, DENR-NCR, issued on June 20, 1990, two technical descriptions (EXHIBITS J and K)
covering the two lots. After the issuance of the technical descriptions, the petitioner requested Geodetic
Engineer Jose R. Rodriguez to prepare a sketch plan of the two lots subject of this petition. As requested,
Engr. Rodriguez prepared a sketch plan (EXHIBIT L) based from Exhibits J and K which was submitted
to the Lands Management Services, formerly Bureau of Lands, for verification and checking. That Mr.
Benjamin V. Roque, Chief, Topographic and Special Map Section, Land Management Services, formerly
Bureau of Lands, certified on July 31, 1992 that the sketch plan (EXHIBIT L) is a true and correct plan of
Lots 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A and 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, both on Psd-706. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, RTC-Branch 125 decreed in the same Order:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and orders the segregation
of Lots 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A and 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B both on Psd-[706] from Original Certificate of Title No. 994
of the Register of Deeds of Rizal in favor of the herein petitioner.
Upon the finality of this order and the payment of the prescribed fees if any and presentation of the
clearances of said lots, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City is ordered to issue a new transfer
certificate of title in the name of herein petitioner Felisa D. Bonifacio over Lots 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A
and 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B both on Psd-[706] of O.C.T. 994 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. 13
For unexplained reasons, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City issued TCT No. 265778 to respondent
Bonifacio on March 29, 1993 even before RTC-Branch 125 declared its Order dated October 8, 1992,
granting respondent Bonifacios petition for segregation, final and executory on April 6, 1993. 14
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Civil Case No. C-366 before

RTC-Branch 126
To protect their rights and interest over the subject land, petitioners lodged a Petition 15 on July 28, 1994,
docketed as Civil Case No. C-366 before RTC-Branch 126, Kalookan City, praying for the declaration of nullity
and cancellation of respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778 over the subject land in view of petitioners
subsisting TCT No. T-108530 over the very same property. In an Order16 dated July 28, 1994, RTC-Branch
126 deemed Civil Case No. C-366 as a special civil action for quieting of title and not an ordinary civil action
for recovery of ownership of land.
Subsequently, petitioners discovered that respondent Bonifacio sold the subject land in favor of respondent
VSD Realty & Development Corporation (VSD Realty), and that TCT No. 265778 in the name of respondent
Bonifacio had already been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 285313 17 in the name of respondent VSD
Realty on September 12, 1994. As a result, petitioners filed on April 25, 1995 an Amended
Petition,18impleading respondent VSD Realty in Civil Case No. C-366.
Petitioners contended before RTC-Branch 126 that although TCT No. T-108530 of petitioners, on one hand,
and TCT No. 265778 of respondent Bonifacio and TCT No. 285313 of respondent VSD Realty, on the other
hand, contained different technical descriptions, said certificates of title actually pertained to one and the
same property. According to petitioners, respondents certificates of title over the subject land could have
only been obtained fraudulently given that:
a) No subsequent survey of the Lot could have been obtained, approved by

the Director of Lands, and presented by the respondent as there exists
an original isolated survey thereto for which Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 10301 covering the said land was issued as early as 26 February
1926 in the name of Monica Jacinto Galauran, married to Mariano
Mesina.
b) TCT No. 265778 was issued in the name of the respondent Felisa
Bonifacio on 29 March 1993 before the issuance on 6 April 1993 by the
Branch Clerk of Court (RTC Branch 125 in L.R.C. No. C-3288) of a
Certificate of Finality of the aforesaid Order dated 8 October 1992.

c) TCT No. 265778 was issued to Felisa Bonifacio on 29 March 1993 without
the Register of Deeds of Kalookan City requiring the presentation of the
owners duplicate copy of O.C.T. No. 994.19
Respondent Bonifacio filed her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim 20 on October 11, 1994. She denied
knowledge of petitioners TCT No. T-108530 and maintained that the technical description of the land
covered by petitioners TCT No. T-108530 is different from that in her TCT No. 265778. Respondent
Bonifacio also averred that the technical description of the land covered by her TCT No. 265778 had been
verified and approved by the Land Management Services of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR); that she acquired a valid title, TCT No. 265778, over the subject land pursuant to a court
order in a land registration case; and that Civil Case No. C-366 was a collateral attack on the validity of her
TCT No. 265778. Respondent VSD Realty, in its Manifestation21 filed on June 31, 1995, adopted respondent
Bonifacios aforementioned Answer.
In the Pre-Trial Order22 dated February 23, 1995 of RTC-Branch 126, the parties agreed on the following
stipulation of facts and issues:
STIPULATION OF FACTS:
1. That the petitioners are in possession of the lot in question; and
2. That the respondent is never in possession of the lot in question.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Technical Description is one and the same as appearing on both titles; and
2. Whether or not the TCT No. 265778 of the respondent is a valid title.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Petitioners presented several documentary exhibits23 and the testimonies of Leonardo de Guzman Syjuco,
one of the petitioners;24 Renato T. Malindog, Land Registration Examiner of the Caloocan City Registry of
Deeds;25 and Engineer (Engr.) Elpidio T. de Lara (De Lara), Chief of Technical Services Section, Land
Management Sector (LMS), DENR.26 In its Order27 dated November 29, 1995, RTC-Branch 126 admitted all
the evidence presented by petitioners.
RTC-Branch 126 summarized petitioners evidence as follows:
Leonardo Syjuco testified that he, together with the other petitioners in this case, inherited the subject
property from their late father, Martin Syjuco, as shown in Entry No. 15033/T-No. 108530 annotated in TCT
No. T-108530 (Exhibit A). His father and his uncle, Manuel Syjuco, in turn acquired the same from the
Baello Family through a Deed of Real Estate (Exhibit H). Thereafter, Martin and Manuel executed a deed of
partition (Exhibit I) and their father was issued TCT No. 4856 (Exhibit G) over the subject property. He
has been paying the tax declaration on said property as evidenced by tax receipts (Exhibits J to J-14).
They then leased the property to Manufacturers Bank who was the one who built the improvements on the
same with stipulation that they will become the owners of these improvements after the expiration of the
lease. They also subleased the property to Kalayaan Development Corporation (KDC, for short) and
respondent Bonifacio is a lessee of KDC. One of their tenants informed him that their property was being
offered for sale and so he instituted measures to protect their interest. He also discovered the existence of
TCT No. T-265778 (Exhibit C) in the name of respondent Bonifacio which he claims to be void as there can
be no segregation of a property that was previously segregated. Witness admits having executed a lease in
favor of a certain John Hay. He likewise admitted that the technical description appearing on the property
lease to John Hay is not the same as the technical description appearing on Exh. A. He claims that when
they inherited the property, the technical description was already recorded thereon and it was the Registry
of Deeds who placed the same on the property.
Renato T. Malindog, an examiner of the Register of Deeds of Kalookan City, testified that prior to the
issuance of TCT No. 265778, derivative documents were filed before their office such as the Court Order
dated October 8, 1992 in L.R.C. Case No. C-3288; the Certificate of Finality to said Order dated April 6,
1993; the subdivision plan to Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A and Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B also PSD-706 with Plan No.
SK-007501-00024-D and annexed to said documents were the technical description for Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3A, PSD-706 and the technical description for Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B also of PSD-706. Based on their record,
documents were [received] regarding the order of finality but there was no showing that the tax clearance
[was] registered in their office. Likewise, based on the document presented to them, the office who issued
the technical description was from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Land
Management Sector, and one Teodoro E. Mundo, Jr. is the Chief Survey Division of said office.
Elpidio T. de Lara, Chief of the Technical Services Section of the Department of Agrarian and Natural
Resources, affirms to having certified to the technical description [o]n July 9, 1990, referred to as Lot 23-A4-B-2-A-3-B of subdivision plan PSD 706, based on a request by Felisa Bonifacio. He made the Note:
Subject for field survey on Exhibit M so that the corresponding technical description be identified in the
plan. Before issuing the technical description for the subject lot, he complied with the processes of having
the technical description researched from their records. From their record, he had not issued a technical
description for the subject lot and they have no record in their office of such. The corresponding B-37
technical description attached to the letter request came from the Land Management Bureau, which is the
survey of the technical description. At the time the request was made until the time the certification was
issued, he did not meet Felisa Bonifacio and said request was filed in their office and sent to the technical
services department.28
Respondents, in turn, presented documentary exhibits29 and called to the witness stand Geodetic Engr.
Evelyn G. Celzo (Celzo) of the Land Management Services, DENR; 30 Fernando D. Macaro (Macaro), Land
Registration Examiner of the Caloocan City Register of Deeds; 31 and Attorney (Atty.) Kaulayao V. Faylona,
Director and Corporate Secretary of respondent VSD Realty.32
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RTC-Branch 126 summed-up respondents evidence as follows:
Evelyn G. Celzo, a geodetic engineer from the Land Management Services, testified that she was ordered
to conduct a verification survey of Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B of PSD 706 by their Regional Technical Director,
Roquesa de Castro. The survey was conducted on August 23, 1994 and its result [was] contained in a
report dated April 17, 1995 (Exhibit 4) which she prepared and submitted. She and her team personally
went to the place and found out that two (2) stores, namely, Fairy Mart and Zenco Footstep were the
present occupants of the lot. They likewise informed the adjoining lots that they were going to execute a
verification survey. BPM 119 in Kalookan Cadastre was the reference point to determine whether the lot was
really in that place. BPM 153, Kalookan Cadastre were used as common points to identify the technical
description in Felisas lot. However, insofar as Exhibit A is concerned, the technical description of said
property did not contain these common points. The DENR, NCR, has record of all technical descriptions
approved and verified in said office. She points out that only one (1) technical description is allowed for a
particular lot. In conducting the survey verification, the certified TCT was furnished to them by Felisa
Bonifacio, together with the relocation survey filed at the Technical Reference Section. As to the adjoining
lots, they secured the map of the Maysilo Estate Plan, under the relocation survey, they found out that the
lot belonged to Felisa Bonifacio and the technical description is the same as the technical description
submitted to her. Her verification survey was approved as reflected in the original plan from the Bureau of
Land Verification Survey (Exhibit 7). She also stated that before the survey, she conducted a research as
to the origin of the technical description from her office and from the Bureau of Lands in Binondo but there
were no available record. Neither was there any record about the original owner. When the certified copy of
TCT No. 265778 was given to her, there were no annotations of adverse claims and so she did not anymore
inquire from the Registry of Deeds whether there were new annotations made thereon.
Atty. Kaulayao V. Faylona, a director and Corporate Secretary of VSD Realty Corporation, testified that a
real estate broker offered for sale to VSD two (2) lots along Avenida and occupied by Fairmart and Uniwide
Sales, Inc. Among the documents shown to him by the seller were the Order of Judge Geronimo S. Mangay,
of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 125 (Exhibit 2), as well as the Transcript of Case No.
C-3288 (Exh. 3). While he found the issuance of said Order by the Court regular, he also requested for a
verification survey from the sellers group in order to make sure that the lot appearing in the technical
description is also the lot actually being occupied by the buildings already mentioned thereon. The actual
verification survey was conducted by the DENR through Engr. E. Celzo as evidenced by a report (Exh. 4)
submitted for the purpose. Moreover, a verification plan (Exh. 7) approved by the DENR was likewise
prepared in connection with the verification survey. He even personally went to the sala of Judge Mangay
and verified from the then Deputy Branch Clerk of Court, the authenticity of the transcript that was given to
him which the said Branch Clerk of Court confirmed as having been issued by said court. He did not
however go over the petition filed by Felisa Bonifacio since what was important was that the title was issued
in the land registration proceedings. He knew that Felisa was not in possession of the said property as it
was being occupied by business establishments who were all not owners of the lot. As to payments of realty
taxes due on the property, he claims that the title would not have been issued in the first place [and] the
taxes [would] not [have] been previously paid. Insofar as VSD is concerned, the corporation was up-to-date
in its payment of realty taxes over their property. He stresses that there is no other owner of the lot in
question except Felisa Bonifacio because there was only one (1) lot with that technical description. The said
approved technical description appearing on Felisas lot was issued by the DENR which is actually the
custodian of the technical descriptions of lands under the Land Registration System, which was confirmed by
Mr. Elpidio T. de Lara, complainants witness. 33
Macaros testimony was not included in the foregoing prcis of respondents evidence by RTC-Branch 126.
Macaro affirmed before RTC-Branch 126 the existence of respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778. Macaro
further testified that the standard operating procedure at the Caloocan City Registry of Deeds was to require
the presentation of the certification stating that the court order directing issuance of the certificate of title
had already become final and executory, before actually issuing said certificate of title; but he was unable to
explain how in this case respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778 was issued on March 29, 1993, before the
Certificate of Finality of the Order dated October 8, 1992 in Civil Case No. C-3288 was issued by RTC-Branch
125 on April 6, 1993.
On January 9, 1998, RTC-Branch 126 rendered its Decision in Civil Case No. C-366, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the petition of the petitioners;

2) Declaring that the technical description described in TCT No. 108530 by
the petitioners is not the same as the technical description on
[respondent] Bonifacios title (TCT No. 265778, now TCT No. 285313);
3) Declaring that TCT No. 265778 is a valid title and considering that
respondent VSDs title, T-285313, replaced the former title, VSD is
hereby declared the owner of the land in question, that is, Lot 23-A-4-B2-A-3-B of PSD 706;
4) For petitioners to pay attorneys fees and the costs of this suit.34
Comparing the technical descriptions in petitioners TCT No. T-108530 and respondents TCT Nos. 265778
and 285313, RTC-Branch 126 noted the bare differences in the land areas and lot numbers contained
therein, and concluded that said technical descriptions were not one and the same and that petitioners TCT
No. T-108530 did not pertain to the same parcel of land described in respondent Bonifacios TCT No.
265778. RTC-Branch 126 also pointed out that petitioners own witness, Engr. De Lara, testified that his
office, Technical Services Section of the DENR, had not previously issued the technical description appearing
on respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778. Engr. De Laras certification of the technical description of
respondent Bonifacios property was issued for the first time on July 9, 1990 only after complying with all
the legal processes necessary for the purpose, such as, among other things, conducting a research from
their office records which showed that no such technical description on the subject property was previously
issued and further stating that the B-37 technical description came from the Land Management Bureau
which was the survey of the technical description.35 RTC-Branch 126 further cited the testimony of Engr.
Celzo of Land Management Services who conducted the verification survey during which it was revealed that
while common points were used in identifying the technical description in TCT No. 265778, no such
common points existed in the technical description appearing on petitioners[] title. RTC-Branch 126 saw no
reason to doubt the testimonies of Engrs. De Lara and Celzo consistent with the rule that government
officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity and strong evidence is necessary to rebut
this presumption.
RTC-Branch 126 also categorically upheld the validity of respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778 as it was
issued pursuant to the Order dated October 8, 1992 of the Caloocan City RTC-Branch 125. RTC-Branch 126
said that it could not question the order of a co-equal court and brushed aside petitioners claim of
continuous possession of the subject property because such fact alone could not defeat respondents title
over said property registered under the Torrens system. Absent any showing by clear and convincing proof
that TCT No. 265778 of respondent Bonifacio, now TCT No. 285313 of respondent VSD Realty, was
irregularly issued, RTC-Branch 126 accorded said titles the conclusive presumption of validity.
CA-G.R. CV. No. 57777 before the
Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed an appeal36 before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV. No. 57777, with the
following sole assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ANNUL[L]ING [RESPONDENTS] TITLES WHICH OVERLAP THE EXISTING
TITLE IN THE NAMES OF THE PETITIONERS.37
Petitioners asserted that the technical description of the land in their TCT No. T-108530 and that in
respondents TCT Nos. 265778 and 285313 pertain to one and the same land. Petitioners argue that RTCBranch 126 failed to appreciate the probative value of Engr. De Laras testimony on this particular issue.
According to petitioners, Engr. De Laras certification dated July 9, 1990 on the correctness of the technical
description of Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, PSD 706, was based merely on the B-37 survey attached to
respondent Bonifacios letter-request, hence, Engr. De Laras certification included a notation [s]ubject for
field survey since he did not know the location of the land referred to by the technical description. The B37 survey or the subdivision plan of PSD 706 was neither presented before RTC-Branch 126 in this case nor
before RTC-Branch 125 in Civil Case No. C-3288 (respondent Bonifacios Petition for Segregation 38); thus,
petitioners contended that there was no evidence as to when the survey was made, under whose name the
survey was made, and as to whether or not the said survey had the requisite government approval.39
Petitioners added that it was incorrect for RTC-Branch 126 to conclude that Engr. De Laras office had never
issued any technical description pertaining to the subject land prior to July 9, 1990, and what Engr. De Lara
actually said was that there was no record in his office of the technical description of the subject land as
appearing in petitioners TCT No. T-108530. Petitioners also maintained that the Survey Order dated August
22, 1994 and the Verification Plan of Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, PSD 706, dated April 28, 1995 had no probative
value as (1) said Survey Order was not authenticated; (2) said Survey Order was incomplete and uncertain
as it did not specify the lot to be surveyed, its location, and its technical description; and (3) the verification
survey was conducted only on August 23, 1994, after respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778 was issued on
March 29, 1993, consequently, said survey could not validate the irregular issuance of TCT No. 265778.
Additionally, petitioners alleged the following irregularities in the issuance of respondent Bonifacios TCT No.
265778:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Civil Case No. C-3288, respondent Bonifacios Petition for

Segregation, is rooted in a Deed of Assignment of the subject land
purportedly executed on January 29, 1991 by Eleuteria Rivera
Bonifacio in favor of respondent Bonifacio, but said Deed merely
copied the technical description of the land issued and certified on
June 19, 1990 upon the request of respondent Bonifacio herself.
Respondent Bonifacio merely attached to her Petition for Segregation
in Civil Case No. C-3288 a sketch plan of the subject land, not an
approved survey or subdivision plan.
Respondent Bonifacio stated in her Petition for Segregation in Civil
Case No. C-3288 that her and her transferors possession of the
subject land was open, public, and notorious without any known
claimants[,]40 but she later admitted that she had never been in
possession of the said property.
Respondent Bonifacio attached to her Petition for Segregation a real
property tax computation sheet for the subject property which was in
the name of Martin V. Syjuco, who was petitioners predecessor-ininterest.41
Respondent Bonifacio obtained TCT No. 265778 over the subject
(6)
property on March 29, 1993 whereas the order authorizing the

issuance of said certificate of title became final and executory only
on April 6, 1993.
The Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 265778 to respondent
Bonifacio without requiring the presentation of Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 994, which covered the vast land from whence
respondent Bonifacios property was purportedly segregated, and the
requisite tax clearance in respondent Bonifacios name.
Respondents asseverated that the technical descriptions contained in their TCT Nos. 265778 and 285313, on
one hand, and in petitioners TCT No. T-108530, on the other, do not pertain to the same land; that
respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778 was issued pursuant to a valid court order by RTC-Branch 125 in
Civil Case No. C-3288; and that petitioners Civil Case No. C-366 before RTC-Branch 126 was a collateral
attack on the validity of respondents titles.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed in
toto the Decision dated January 9, 1998 of RTC-Branch 126 in Civil Case No. C-366.
Aside from essentially adopting the ratiocination in the appealed judgment of RTC-Branch 126, the Court of
Appeals also espoused respondents argument that Civil Case No. C-366, instituted by petitioners before
RTC-Branch 126, was a collateral attack on the validity of respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778, in
violation of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree. The appellate court, comparing the parties respective certificates of title, further ruled that:
[A] careful scrutiny of TCT Nos. 108530 and 265778 revealed relevant similarities. Both TCTs originate from
OCT No. 994 pursuant to Decree No. 36455, Record No. 4429. TCT No. 108530 was first originally
registered on May 03, 1917, in contrast to Bonifacios title (TCT No. 265778) which was [registered] in 1912.
In view of this, we quote the ruling enunciated by the court in Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System v.
Court of Appeals and reiterated in the cases of Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals and Mascarias
v. Court of Appeals.
Where two certificates (of title) purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails. x x x. In
successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or
interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and the
person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly
or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof.
Hence, in point of priority in issuance, the title of Bonifacio prevails over that of the [petitioners]. Since, the
land in question has already been registered under OCT 994, in the year 1912, the subsequent registration
of the same land on May 03, 1917 is null and void.42(Citations omitted.)
The Court of Appeals lastly pointed out that petitioners possession of the subject land cannot defeat
respondent Bonifacios title thereto:
While we recognize the fact that the [petitioners] have been in 44 years of continuous possession, still, we
should not lose sight of the fact that [respondent] Bonifacio is an owner of an earlier issued title. The
imprescriptibility of Bonifacios title cannot be defeated by the [petitioners] continuous possession of the
questioned lot. To hold otherwise, the efficacy of the conclusiveness of the certificate of title, which the
Torrens System seeks to insure, would be futile and nugatory.43 (Citations omitted.)
The Court of Appeals concluded that since respondent Bonifacio is the owner of the subject land, validly
registered in her name, she is within her rights in selling said property to respondent VSD Realty, making
the latters TCT No. 285313 also valid.
Hence, the present petition for review.
Petitioners reiterate their position that their TCT No. T-108530 and respondents TCT Nos. 265778 and
285313 pertain to one and the same land, and that the latter titles have been fraudulently obtained.
Petitioners also aver that their undisturbed possession of the subject property gives them a continuing right
to seek the aid of a court to ascertain and determine the nature and effect of respondents adverse claim on
the subject land.
In addition, petitioners pray for this Court to take judicial notice of supervening events relative to the
indiscriminate issuance or proliferation of fake titles derived from OCT No. 994 covering the Maysilo Estate.
They point out that the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Senate Committees on Justice and Human
Rights, Urban Planning, and Housing and Resettlement, already conducted separate investigations of this
serious land title anomaly and had submitted their respective reports on the matter. The DOJ Committee
Report dated August 28, 1997 and Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998 validated OCT
No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917; declared OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917 as non-existent; and
recommended the cancellation of all titles derived from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917.
Petitioners, thus, argue that respondent Bonifacios title, which originated from OCT No. 994 registered in
1912, is null and void as the only authentic OCT No. 994 is the one issued pursuant to Decree No. 36455
originally registered on May 3, 1917.
In their Comment, respondents stand by the propriety of the Decision dated February 23, 2001 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 57777 and the Decision dated January 9, 1998 of RTC-Branch 126 in Civil
Case No. C-366. Respondents also exhort this Court not to take judicial notice of the DOJ and Senate
committee reports because those are irrelevant to the present case as the true date of registration of OCT
No. 994 has never been an issue herein. At any rate, respondents insinuate that there was a mistake in the
indication in the title of respondent Bonifacio that it originated from OCT No. 994 registered in 1912,
claiming that the same must have been [caused by either] a clerical error or a mental lapse.
RULING
On the propriety of petitioners
action to quiet title over the subject
land.
The Court, at the outset, finds untenable the contention that the action instituted by petitioners is a
prohibited collateral attack on the certificate of title of respondents over the subject land.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 152944 states:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
To determine whether an attack on a certificate of title is direct or indirect, the relevance of the object of the
action instituted and the relief sought therein must be examined. The rule was explained in Catores v.
Afidchao45 as follows:
When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify
the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct
when the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted.)
The instituted action in this case is clearly a direct attack on a certificate of title to real property.
In their complaint for quieting of title, petitioners specifically pray for the declaration of nullity and/or
cancellation of respondents TCT Nos. 265778 and 285313 over the subject land. The relief sought by
petitioners is certainly feasible since the objective of an action to quiet title, as provided under Article 476 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, is precisely to quiet, remove, invalidate, annul, and/or nullify a cloud on
title to real property or any interest therein by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title.
The Court also finds bereft of merit the contentions that petitioners action to quiet title had already
prescribed and/or that the titles of respondents over the subject land have already become incontrovertible
and indefeasible based on Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. - The decree of registration shall
not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right
of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper
Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one
year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such
petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an
interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or
other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of
title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any
case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible
for the fraud. (Emphases added.)
The above-quoted rule has well-settled exceptions.
It is an established doctrine in land ownership disputes that the filing of an action to quiet title is
imprescriptible if the disputed real property is in the possession of the plaintiff. One who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his
title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being that his undisturbed
possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by
one who is in possession.46
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In this case, petitioners have duly established during the trial that they and/or their predecessors-in-interest
have been in uninterrupted possession of the subject land since 1926 and that it was only in 1994 when
they found out that respondent Bonifacio was able to register the said property in her name in another title.
It was also only in 1995 when petitioners learned that respondent Bonifacio was able to sell and transfer her
title over the subject land in favor of respondent VSD Realty.
Moreover, the rule on the incontrovertibility or indefeasibility of title has no application in this case given the
fact that the contending parties claim ownership over the subject land based on their respective certificates
of title thereon which originated from different sources. Certainly, there cannot be two or even several
certificates of title on the same parcel of real property because a land registration court has no jurisdiction
to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case
and a second decree for the same land would be null and void, since the principle behind original
registration is to register a parcel of land only once.47 The indefeasibility of a title under the Torrens system
could be claimed only if a previous valid title to the same parcel of land does not exist. Where the issuance
of the title was attended by fraud, the same cannot vest in the titled owner any valid legal title to the land
covered by it; and the person in whose name the title was issued cannot transmit the same, for he has no
true title thereto. This ruling is a mere affirmation of the recognized principle that a certificate is not
conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and that an earlier
certificate for the same land is in existence.48
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Accordingly, petitioners filing of an action to quiet title over the subject land is in order.
On the propriety of remanding this
case for further proceedings before the
Court of Appeals.
In VSD Realty & Development Corporation v. Uniwide Sales, Inc.,49 this Court remanded the case before the
Court of Appeals, citing Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, 50 and held:
In the main, respondent Baello contends that the Court erred in not declaring petitioner VSDs
TCT No. T-285312 as null and void, considering that it is derived from Felisa Bonifacios TCT No.
265777/T-1325, which, in turn, is derived from the false and fictitious OCT No. 994 dated April
19, 1917. The records of this case, however, show that Felisa Bonifacios TCT No. 265777/T1325 and VSDs TCT No. T-285312 are derived from the legitimate OCT No. 994 registered on May
3, 1917, which date has been held as the correct date of registration of the said OCT in Manotok
Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation. In her Motion for Leave and Time to File
Judicial Affidavit of Mr. Felino Cortez and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, which the
Court granted, respondent Baello contends that she has additional evidence showing that the
copy of Felisa Bonifacios TCT No. 265777/T-1325 that was presented to the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan, for the purpose of the issuance of petitioner VSDs TCT No. T-285312, was tampered
with to fraudulently reflect that it was derived from the legitimate and authentic OCT No. 994
dated May 3, 1917. It is alleged that the original microfilm copy retained by the LRA shows that Felisa
Bonifacios TCT No. 265777/T-1325 did not originate from the legitimate and authentic OCT No. 994 dated
May 3, 1917, but was instead derived from OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1912. Baello cited Manotok
Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, which allowed the presentation of evidence
before a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to ascertain which of the conflicting claims of
title should prevail, even though the case had already been decided; and the additional evidence
was presented in connection with a motion for reconsideration of this Courts decision.
The Court notes that in Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, the Court
pronounced that there is only one OCT No. 994, which is correctly registered on May 3, 1917, and
that any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated April 17, 1917 is void, for such mother
title is inexistent.
The Court recognizes the importance of protecting the countrys Torrens system from fake land
titles and deeds. Considering that there is an issue on the validity of the title of petitioner VSD,
which title is alleged to be traceable to OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917, which mother
title was held to be inexistent inManotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, in
the interest of justice, and to safeguard the correct titling of properties, a remand is proper to
determine which of the parties derived valid title from the legitimate OCT No. 994 registered on
May 3, 1917. Since this Court is not a trier of facts and not capacitated to appreciate evidence of
the first instance, the Court may remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings, as it has been similarly tasked in Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development
Corporation on these bases:
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari,the Court may, whenever
necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the evidence on such issues to any of its
members or to an appropriate court, agency or office. The delegate need not be the body that rendered the
assailed decision.
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The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review findings of fact. Its conclusions as to findings of
fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a body that is fully capacitated and has a
surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters, including documentary evidence.
In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before it to the Court of
Appeals. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court commissioned the former Thirteenth Division of the
Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the controversy, more particularly to determine the actual
area reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex which
are open spaces and/or areas reserved for certain purposes, determining in the process the validity of
such postulates and the respective measurements of the areas referred to. The Court of Appeals therein
received the evidence of the parties and rendered a Commissioners Report shortly thereafter. Thus,
resort to the Court of Appeals is not a deviant procedure.
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of authority to the Court of
Appeals to receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court
may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner when a question of fact, other than upon the
pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into
effect. The order of reference can be limited exclusively to receive and report evidence only, and the
commissioner may likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The commissioner is likewise mandated
to submit a report in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference.
In Republic, the commissioners report formed the basis of the final adjudication by the Court on the matter.
The same result can obtain herein.51 (Emphases added.)
The Court notes, however, that several matters have already transpired during the pendency of this case
that bear considerable relation in the resolution of the main question of which of the respective titles of the
parties over the subject land is valid.
Firstly, the Court observes that the certification as indicated in petitioners title, which the latter submitted
during the trial, shows that it originated from OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917, thus:
It is further certified that said land was originally registered on the 3rd day of May, in the year nineteen
hundred and seventeen, in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume A9, page 226, as Original Certificate of Title No. 994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455, issued in L.R.C. ___
Record No. 4429.
This certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4856/T-25, which is cancelled by virtue
hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.52 (Emphasis added.)
On the other hand, the title of respondent Bonifacio, the one presented during the trial, shows that it
likewise originated from OCT No. 994, but such mother title states only the day and the year of its original
registration as follows:
It is further certified that said land was originally registered on the 19th day of ___, in the year nineteen
hundred and twelve, in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila, Volume ___,
Page ___, as Original Certificate of Title No. 994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. ___, Record
No. 4423, in the name of ___.
This certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of Title No. 994, which is cancelled by virtue hereof in
so far as the above-described land is concerned.53 (Emphasis added.)
Curiously, the title of respondent VSD Realty is supposed to be a direct transfer from the title of respondent
Bonifacio, yet, the certification as to the original registration of its mother title OCT No. 994 provides the
registration date of May 3, 1917, thus:
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 3rd day of May, in the
year nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, Volume A-9-A, Page 226, as Original Certificate of Title No. 994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued
in L.R.C. ___ Record No. 4429 in the name of ___.
This certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 265778/T-1325which is
cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.
Entered at the City of Kalookan,

Philippines, on the 12th day
of September in the year nineteen
hundred and ninety-four at 1:23
p.m.54 (Emphases added.)
Furthermore, a certified true copy of respondent Bonifacios title, which petitioners have obtained just prior
to the filing of the Petition at bar and attached to their Reply dated December 12, 2001, now shows that the
date of the original registration of respondent Bonifacios mother title - OCT No. 994 - has changed from the
19th day of an unspecified month55 in 1912 to May 3, 1917, and the place of registration from Manila to
Rizal. Aside from these changes, the portions that were left blank in the earlier copy of respondent
Bonifacios title have already been filled-up in the latest copy of the same, thus:
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 3rd day of May, in the year
nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
Volume A-9-A, Page 226, as Original Certificate of Title No. 994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued
in L.R.C. ___ Record No. 4429 in the name of ___.
This certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of Title No. 994 which is cancelled by virtue
hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.
Entered at Caloocan City, Philippines,

on the 29th day of March in the year
nineteen hundred and ninety-three at
3:20 a.m.56(Emphases added.)
Secondly, the Court notes that the Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
herein a Motion for Intervention with attached Petition-in-Intervention, pursuant to the recommendation in
the Report dated May 25, 1998 of the Senate Committees on Justice, Human Rights, Housing, and Urban
Planning and Resettlement, that the OSG be mandated to intervene in land disputes before the court, on
cases whether pertaining to government or private lands as the OSG may determine, involving fake titles,
duplication of titles or similar anomalies, to guide the court on the position of the government and to involve
the concerned government entities particularly the Land Registration Authority in a concerted effort to
protect the integrity of the Torrens system of land title registration.57 The motion was granted and the
Petition of the Republic was admitted in the Courts Resolution58 dated December 8, 2004.
The OSG manifests, among others, that petitioners TCT No. T-108530, in reliance to the conclusions of the
DOJ and Senate committees, is the valid certificate of title covering the subject land as it could be traced
back to the authentic OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917; conversely, respondents TCT Nos. 265778
and 285313 are null and void as these originated from the spurious OCT No. 994 registered in 1912.
Respondents filed their Comment [to the Republics intervention] 59 on June 1, 2005. Interestingly,
respondents now contend that their TCT Nos. 265778 and 285313 are derivatives of OCT No. 994
registered on April 19, 1917, hence, they capitalize on the rulings of this Court in Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals 60 and Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals61 that those titles derived from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917 prevail over those titles
derived from OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 considering the priority of the date of registration.
Thirdly, the Court reiterates that the validity of OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917, and the nonexistence of a purported OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917, have already been exhaustively passed
upon and settled with finality in the Resolution[s] dated December 14, 2007 and March 31, 2009 in Manotok
Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation.62
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In Angeles v. The Secretary of Justice,63 this Court reiterated its pronouncements in Manotok Realty, Inc. v.
CLT Realty Development Corporation64 that the true and valid OCT No. 994 was registered on May 3, 1917,
not on April 19, 1917, and that any title that traces its source to the latter date is deemed void and
inexistent. The Court was also explicit that the cases of MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v.
Court of Appeals had already been rendered functus officio, thus, these cases can no longer be
cited as precedents. The Court expounded as follows:
It is important to emphasize at this point that in the recent case resolved by this Court En Banc in 2007,
entitled Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation (the 2007 Manotok case), as well as
the succeeding resolution in the same case dated March 31, 2009 (the 2009 Manotok case), the controversy
surrounding the Maysilo Estate and the question of the existence of another OCT No. 994 have been finally
laid to rest. All other cases involving said estate and OCT No. 994, such as the case at bar, are bound by
the findings and conclusions set forth in said resolutions.
As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous cases decided by this Court which have held that
there are two existing OCT No. 994, dated differently, and the one from which she and her co-plaintiffs (in
Civil Case No. C-424) derived their rights was dated earlier, hence, was the superior title. Regrettably,
petitioners claim no longer has a leg to stand on. As we held in the 2007 Manotok case:
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court should be affirmed or set aside is
whether or not the titles invoked by the respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from the so-called
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OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are void or otherwise should not be recognized by this
Court. Since the true basic factual predicate concerning OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one such
OCT differs from that expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become
virtually functus officio except on the basis of the law of the case doctrine, and can no longer be relied
upon as precedents.
Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly issued on April 19, 1917 validly and
actually exists, given the following conclusions made by this Court in the 2007 Manotok case:
First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received
for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which
should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as
appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on
[19] April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date
when the title took effect.
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Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 is void, for such
mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an
OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an
inexistent OCT. x x x.
Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals andGonzaga v. Court of
Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No.
994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the
conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any
other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar.
To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports regarding OCT No. 994. In the
2007 Manotok case, this Court constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases on
remand, declaring as follows:
Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the findings made by the DOJ and the
Senate, or even consider whether these are admissible as evidence, though such questions may be
considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the parties. x x x. The reports cannot conclusively
supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible they may be taken into account as evidence on
the same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact that they were rendered
by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept them without inquiry. The
facts and arguments presented in the reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly
the courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them.
There are many factual questions looming over the properties that could only be threshed out in the remand
to the Court of Appeals. x x x.
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xxxx
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this
Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this
Resolution.
Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the evidence engaged in by said Special Division, and
adopted the latters conclusions as to the status of the original title and its subsequent conveyances. This
case affirmed the earlier finding that there is only one OCT No. 994, the registration date of
which had already been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April 1917 and categorically
concluded that OCT No. 994 which reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its registration date is
null and void.65 (Emphases added.)
In Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation v. Bonifacio,66 this Court upheld the validity of the titles
to a portion of land which originally formed part of the Maysilo Estate which were sourced from OCT No. 994
registered on May 3, 1917, and declared as null and void a title purportedly overlapping the said land which
traced its roots from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917. The Court found that it was physically
impossible for Eleuteria Rivera, the person whom respondent Bonifacio claims to be her predecessor-ininterest, to be an heir of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal because it would turn out that Eleuteria Rivera was
older than her alleged grandmother Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, to wit:
Eventually, on March 31, 2009, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution reversing its Decision of November
29, 2005 and declaring certain titles in the names of Araneta and Manotok valid. In the course of discussing
the flaws of Jose Dimsons title based on his alleged 25% share in the hereditary rights of Bartolome Rivera,
Eleuteria Riveras co-petitioner in LRC No. 4557, the Court noted:
. . . However, the records of these cases would somehow negate the rights of Rivera to claim from Vidal.
The Verification Report of the Land Registration Commission dated 3 August 1981 showed that Rivera was
65 years old on 17 May 1963 (as gathered from the records of Civil Case Nos. 4429 and 4496). It can thus
be deduced that, if Rivera was already 65 years old in 1963, then he must have been born around
1898. On the other hand, Vidal was only nine (9) years in 1912; hence, she could have been born
only on [1903]. This alone creates an unexplained anomalous, if not ridiculous, situation wherein Vidal,
Riveras alleged Grandmother, was seven (7) years younger than her alleged grandson. Serious doubts
existed as to whether Rivera was in fact an heir of Vidal, for him to claim a share in the disputed portions of
the Maysilo Estate.
The same is true in this case. The Death Certificate of Eleuteria Rivera reveals that she was 96
years old when she died on February 22, 1997. That means that she must have been born in
1901. That makes Rivera two years older than her alleged grandmother Maria de la Concepcion
Vidal who was born in 1903. Hence, it was physically impossible for Eleuteria Rivera to be an
heir of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)
Considering all of the above matters, especially the fact that respondents claim that their respective titles,
TCT Nos. 265778 and 285313, are derivatives of OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917, which this
Court had already repeatedly declared to be a non-existent and invalid title, the Court rules in favor of
petitioners. As held in Manotok, [a]ny title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April
1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent.67
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WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated February
23, 2001, as well as the Resolution dated June 26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 57777
which affirmed in toto the Decision dated January 9, 1998 of Branch 126 of the RTC of the City of Caloocan
in Civil Case No. C-366, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. TCT No. 265778 in the name of Felisa D.
Bonifacio and TCT No. 285313 in the name of VSD Realty & Development Corporation are
declared NULLand VOID. The Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City is DIRECTED to CANCEL the said
certificates of title.
SO ORDERED.
CLUB FILIPINO CASE..ONLINE

SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 180147, January 14, 2015
SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL.,1Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 180148]
ARIS PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL., Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 180149]
SARA LEE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL., Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 180150]

CESAR C. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL., Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 180319]
FASHION ACCESSORIES PHILS., INC., Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL.,Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 180685]
EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL., Petitioners, v. NLRC, ARIS PHILIPPINES, INC., FASHION
ACCESSORIES PHILS., INC., SARA LEE CORPORATION, SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC., COLLIN
BEAL AND ATTY. CESAR C. CRUZ, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
This treats of the 1) Motion for Reconsideration with Urgent Petition for the Courts Approval of the Pending
Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Herein Statement and Confession of Judgment to Buy Peace
and/or Secure against any Possible Contingent Liability by Sara Lee Corporation filed by Sara Lee
Philippines Inc. (SLPI), Aris Philippines Inc. (Aris), Sara Lee Corporation (SLC) and Cesar C. Cruz, 2) Motion
for Reconsideration filed by Fashion Accessories Phils. Inc. (FAPI), and 3) Manifestation of Conformity to the
Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Confession of Judgment to Buy Peace and/or to Secure against
any Possible Contingent Liability by Petitioner SLC.
In the Decision dated 4 June 2014, this Court directed SLPI, Aris, SLC, Cesar Cruz, and FAPI, collectively
known as the Corporations, to post P725 Million, in cash or surety bond, within 10 days from the receipt of
the Decision. The Court further nullified the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
dated 19 December 2006 for being premature.
The Motion for Reconsideration is anchored on the following grounds:
A. The Court failed to consider the Motion for Leave of Court to file and Admit Herein Statement and
Confession of Judgment to Buy Peace and/or to Secure Against any Possible Contingent Liability by Petitioner
Sara Lee Corporation (hereafter the compromise agreement) filed by petitioner Sara Lee Corporation on
June 23, 2014 before receipt of the Decision of June 04, 2014 on July 31, 2014 with the conformity of the
respondents in their Manifestation and Conformity to the Petitioners Motion for Leave to File and Admit
Statement of Confession of Judgment dated July 04, 2014 which could have terminated the present cases
and avoid delays with its remand for further proceedings below.
B. The Court did not duly rule on the violations of the rights of due process of Petitioner SLPI as shown by
the following:
1. The Labor Arbiter has never acquired jurisdiction over Petitioner SLPI which was never impleaded as a
party respondent and was never validly served with summons which fact was specifically mentioned in
NLRCs Resolution of December 19, 2006; and
2. There is no employer-employee relationships between Petitioner SLPI and the respondents.

C. The Court did not duly rule on the violations of the rights of due process of Petitioner SLC because of the
following:
1. The Labor Arbiter has never acquired jurisdiction over Petitioner SLC which was never impleaded as a
party respondent and was never validly served with summons which fact was specifically raised by the Court
as an issue in page 12 of the Decision of June 04, 2014 but remained unresolved; and
2. There is no employer-employee relationship between Petitioner SLC and the respondents.

D. The Court did not duly rule on the violations of the rights of due process of Petitioner Cesar C. Cruz as
shown by the following:
1. The Labor Arbiter has never acquired jurisdiction over Petitioner Cesar C. Cruz who was never impleaded
as a party respondent and was never validly served with summons; and
2. There is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner Cesar C. Cruz and the respondents.
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E. There was no legal impediment for the NLRC to issue its Resolution of December 19, 2006 vacating the
Labor Arbiters Decision and remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceeding as no Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued by the Court of Appeals and the rule on
judicial courtesy remains the exception rather than the rule.
F. The Court did not duly rule on the applicability of the final and executory Decision of Fullido, et al., v. Aris
Philippines, Inc. and Cesar C. Cruz (G.R. No. 185948) with respect to the present consolidated cases
considering the identical facts and issues involved plus the fact that the Court in Fullido sustained the
findings and decisions of three (3) other tribunals, i.e., the Court of Appeals, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter.
G. The Court failed to consider the prescription of the complaints for money claims filed by the respondents
against the Petitioners under Article 291 of the Labor Code due to the lapse of three (3) years and four (4)
months when Petitioners were impleaded as respondents only through the amendment of complaints by the
complainants, the respondents herein.
H. The Court also did not consider that the Complaints filed by the respondents are barred byres
judicata because of the final and executory decision rendered by the Voluntary Arbitrator on the identical
facts and issues in the case filed by the labor union representing the respondents against Petitioner API.
I. Contrary to the Decision of June 04, 2014, the Abelardo petition (CA GR SP No. 95919, Pacita S. Abelardo
v. NLRC, Aris, Philippines, Inc.) was filed earlier than the Macatlang petition (CA GR SP No. 96363) as shown
by the lower docket number, thus, the Macatlang petition should be the one dismissed for forum shopping.
J. In fixing the bond to PhP725 Million which is 25% of the monetary award, the Court failed to consider the
En Banc Decision in McBurnie v. Ganzon, 707 SCRA 646, 693 (2013) which required only the posting of a
bond equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the monetary award. 2
We briefly revisit the factual milieu of this case.
Aris permanently ceased operations on 9 October 1995 displacing 5,984 rank-and-file employees. On 26
October 1995, FAPI was incorporated prompting former Aris employees to file a case for illegal dismissal on
the allegations that FAPI was a continuing business of Aris. SLC, SLP and Cesar Cruz were impleaded as
defendants being major stockholders of FAPI and officers of Aris, respectively.
On 30 October 2004, the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of 5,984 Aris employees illegal and awarded
them monetary benefits amounting to P3,453,664,710.86. The judgment award is composed of separation
pay of one month for every year of service, backwages, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
The Corporations filed a Notice of Appeal with Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond. They posted a P4.5 Million
bond. The NLRC granted the reduction of the appeal bond and ordered the Corporations to post an
additional P4.5 Million bond.
The 5,984 former Aris employees, represented by Emilinda Macatlang (Macatlang petition), filed a petition
for review before the Court of Appeals insisting that the appeal was not perfected due to failure of the
Corporations to post the correct amount of the bond which is equivalent to the judgment award.
While the case was pending before the appellate court, the NLRC prematurely issued an order setting aside
the decision of the Labor Arbiter for being procedurally infirmed.
The Court of Appeals, on 26 March 2007, ordered the Corporations to post an additional appeal bond of P1
Billion.
In our Decision dated 4 June 2014, we modified the Court of Appeals Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96363 dated 26 March 2007 is
MODIFIED. The Corporations are directed to post P725 Million, in cash or surety bond, within TEN (10) days
from the receipt of this DECISION. The Resolution of the NLRC dated 19 December 2006 is VACATED for
being premature and the NLRC is DIRECTED to act with dispatch to resolve the merits of the case upon
perfection of the appeal.3
We also resolved the procedural issue of forum-shopping by holding that the 411 petitioners of the Pacita
Abelardo petition (Abelardo petition) are not representative of the interest of all petitioners in Macatlang
petition. The number is barely sufficient to comprise the majority of petitioners in Macatlang petition and it
would be the height of injustice to dismiss the Macatlang petition which evidently enjoys the support of an
overwhelming majority due to the mistake committed by petitioners in the Abelardo petition.
The Motion for Reconsideration has no merit.
The Corporations score this Court for failing to consider the ruling in McBurnie v. Ganzon4 which purportedly
required only the posting of a bond equivalent to 10% of the monetary award.
The Corporations gravely misappreciated the ruling in McBurnie. The 10% requirement pertains to the
reasonable amount which the NLRC would accept as the minimum of the bond that should accompany the
motion to reduce bond in order to suspend the period to perfect an appeal under the NLRC rules. The 10%
is based on the judgment award and should in no case be construed as the minimum amount of bond to be
posted in order to perfect appeal. There is no room for a different interpretation when McBurnie made it
clear that the percentage of bond set is provisional, thus:
The foregoing shall not be misconstrued to unduly hinder the NLRCs exercise of its discretion, given that the
percentage of bond that is set by this guideline shall be merely provisional. The NLRC retains its authority
and duty to resolve the motion and determine the final amount of bond that shall be posted by the
appellant, still in accordance with the standards of "meritorious grounds" and "reasonable amount." Should
the NLRC, after considering the motions merit, determine that a greater amount or the full amount of the
bond needs to be posted by the appellant, then the party shall comply accordingly. The appellant shall be
given a period of 10 days from notice of the NLRC order within which to perfect the appeal by posting the
required appeal bond.
The Corporations argue that there was no legal impediment for the NRLC to issue its 19 December 2006
Resolution vacating the Labor Arbiters Decision as no TRO or injunction was issued by the Court of Appeals.
The Corporations assert that the rule on judicial courtesy remains the exception rather than the rule.
We do not agree. In the recent case of Trajano v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club,5 this Court gave a brief
discourse on judicial courtesy, which concept was first introduced in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v.
Court of Appeals,6 to wit:
x x x [t]he principle of judicial courtesy to justify the suspension of the proceedings before the lower court
even without an injunctive writ or order from the higher court. In that case, we pronounced that [d]ue
respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations should have prompted the appellate
court to wait for the final determination of the petition [for certiorari] before taking cognizance of the case
and trying to render moot exactly what was before this [C]ourt. We subsequently reiterated the concept of
judicial courtesy in Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. v. Court of Appeals.
We, however, have qualified and limited the application of judicial courtesy in Go v. Abrogarand Republic v.
Sandiganbayan. In these cases, we expressly delimited the application of judicial courtesy to maintain the
efficacy of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and held that the principle of judicial courtesy applies
only if there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and
moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. Through these cases, we
clarified that the principle of judicial courtesy remains to be the exception rather than the rule. 7
The Corporations argument is specious. Judicial courtesy indeed applies if there is a strong probability that
the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot as a result of the continuation of the proceedings
in the lower court. This is the exception contemplated in the aforesaid ruling and it obtains in this case. The
19 December 2006 ruling of the NLRC would moot the appeal filed before the higher courts because the
issue involves the appeal bond which is an indispensable requirement to the perfection of the appeal before
the NLRC. Unless this issue is resolved, the NLRC should be precluded from ruling on the merits on the
case. This is the essence of judicial courtesy.
The other grounds raised by the Corporations in this Motion for Reconsideration such as the denial of due
process due to invalid service of summons on SLPI, SLC and Cesar Cruz; prescription, res judicata, and the
applicability of the Fulido case8 with the instant case were all raised and resolved by the Labor Arbiter in
favor of former Aris employees in its Decision dated 30 October 2004. That same decision was appealed by
the Corporations before the NLRC. The perfection of said appeal through the posting of a partial bond was
put into question and that is precisely the main issue brought before the appellate court and before us.
By urging this Court to make a definitive ruling on these issues petitioners would have us rule on the merits,
which at this point this Court cannot do as the labor proceedings remain incomplete. If at all, the stage that
has been passed is the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. And, without the NLRC stage, the Labor
Arbiters decision is final and executory. It is obvious that petitioners do not want either of the two options
now open to them: a) allow the finality of the adverse judgment in the amount of P3,453,664,710.86, or b)
file the P750 Million bond for the review by the NLRC of the P3,453,664,710.86 decision of the Labor
Arbiter. They would want their liability finally reduced to just half of the amount of the required appeal
bond, or P350 million. The injustice to the employees is patent.
Now we proceed to tackle the Motion filed by the parties to Admit Confession of Judgment.
The Corporations entered into a compromise with some of the former Aris employees which they designate
as Confession of Judgment. The Corporations reason that a resort to judgment by confession is the
acceptable alternative to a compromise agreement because of the impossibility to obtain the consent to a
compromise of all the 5,984 complainants.
A confession of judgment is an acknowledgment that a debt is justly due and cuts off all defenses and right
of appeal. It is used as a shortcut to a judgment in a case where the defendant concedes liability. It is seen
as the written authority of the debtor and a direction for entry of judgment against the debtor.9
The Corporations cite the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Bisaya Land Transportation Co. 10 to outline
the distinction between a compromise agreement/judgment on consent and a confession of
judgment/judgment by confession, thus:
x x x a motion for judgment on consent is not to be equated with a judgment by confession. The former is
one the provisions and terms of which are settled and a agreed upon by the parties to the action, and which
is entered in the record by the consent and sanction of the court, Hence, there must be an unqualified
agreement among the parties to be bound by the judgment on consent before said judgment may be
entered. The court does not have the power to supply terms, provisions, or essential details not previously
agreed to by the parties x x x. On the other hand, a judgment by confession is not a plea but an affirmative
and voluntary act of the defendant himself. Here, the court exercises a certain amount of supervision over
the entry of judgment, as well as equitable jurisdiction over their subsequent status. 11
In the same breadth, the Corporations also acknowledge that a compromise agreement and a judgment by
confession stand upon the same footing in that both may not be executed by counsel without knowledge and
authority of the client. If we were to rely on the Corporations submission that all 5,984 complainants SPAs
could not be obtained, then the Confession of Judgment is void.
Even if we dismiss the Corporations choice of designation as pure semantics and consider the agreement
they entered into with the complainants as a form of a compromise agreement, we still could not approve
the same.
We elucidate.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put
an end to one already commenced. It is an agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing
or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their difficulties by mutual consent in the manner which they agree on,
and which everyone of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing. 12
A compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy; and must have been
freely and intelligently executed by and between the parties. 13
Article 227 of the Labor Code of the Philippines authorizes compromise agreements voluntarily agreed upon
by the parties, in conformity with the basic policy of the State to promote and emphasize the primacy of
free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as
modes of settling labor or industrial disputes.14 The provision reads:
ART. 227 Compromise Agreements. Any compromise settlement, including those involving labor standard
laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau or the regional office of the
Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon the parties. The National Labor Relations Commission
or any court shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of noncompliance
thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud,
misrepresentation, or coercion.
A compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is reasonable and the employee signed the
waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he was entering into. 15
The compromise agreement which the Corporations deem as Confession of Judgment is reproduced in full
below:
CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT
The undersigned counsel, by virtue of the special authority granted by HILLSHIRE earlier attached as Annex
B and made an integral part hereof seeks the approval of this Honorable Court of this Judgment by
Confession under the following terms and conditions, to wit:
1. HILLSHIRE will pay to the 5,984 respondents (complainants) the total amount of THREE HUNDRED FORTY
TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND AND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS
(PhP342,284,800.00) or at FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (PhP57,200.00) for each
respondent (complainant) inclusive of the attorneys fees of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY
PESOS (PhP8,580.00) which each respondent (complainant) will actually pay to their counsel of record as
the total consideration for the dismissal with prejudice of all the pending cases before this Honorable Court
and all the cases pending before the National Labor Relations Commission against all the petitioners.
2. The above agreed amount of THREE HUNDRED FORTY TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR
THOUSAND AND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (PhP342,284,800.00) shall be distributed as follows:
2.1 FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND SIX [HUNDRED] TWENTY PESOS (PhP48,620.00) to each respondent
(complainant), and
2.2 EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS (PhP8,580.00) to the lawyer of each respondent
(complainant) by virtue of the Special Power of Attorney given by each respondent (complainant) to lead
Emilinda D. Macatlang who gave SPA to Atty. Alex Tan.
3. HILLSHIRE will deposit the amount of THREE HUNDRED FORTY TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED EIGHTYFOUR THOUSAND AND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (PhP342,284,800.00) with a local bank duly licensed by the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) within sixty (60) days from the date of the issuance of a Certificate of
Finality and/or Entry of Judgment of the Decision of this Honorable Court on this Confession of Judgment.
4. The amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY PESOS (PhP48,620.00) shall be paid
directly to each respondent (complainant) and the corresponding attorneys fees of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS (PhP8,580.00) shall be paid to their lawyers (duly authorized by an SPA) by the
bank through a managers check.
5. The total deposit of THREE HUNDRED FORTY TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (PhP342,284,800.00) must be claimed by the respondents (complainants) from the
depository bank within two (2) years from the date of the Certificate of Finality or Entry of Judgment issued
by this Honorable Court.
6. Any balance of the deposited amount which remains unclaimed by the respondents (complainants) within
the two (2) year period referred to above shall automatically revert and be returned to and may be
withdrawn by HILLSHIRE and/or its attorney-in-fact, without the necessity of any prior Order or permission
from this Honorable Court.
7. Thereafter, upon expiration of the two (2) year period referred to above, HILLSHIREs obligation to make
any payment to the respondents (Complainants) shall ipso facto cease, expire and terminate and the
judgment by confession shall be considered satisfied, fulfilled and terminated.
8. The bank to which the amount of the confessed judgment (PhP342,284,800.00) is deposited shall be
authorized by HILLSHIRE through the undersigned attorney to pay to individual respondents (complainants)
listed in the original Decision dated October 30, 2004 of the Labor Arbiter and/or their lawyers the above
agreed amounts subject to the following conditions:
8.1 Complainants shall personally claim the payment to them from the bank upon presentation of any
recognized government IDs such as Drivers License, Senior Citizens Card, Voters ID, SSS ID, Unified
Multipurpose Identification Card, Postal ID, Passport, or Certification Under Oath by the Barangay Chairman
as to the identity of the respondent (complainant), or
8.2 By the duly authorized representative of respondent (complainant) evidenced by a duly notarized Special
Power of Attorney in case the respondent (complainant) cannot personally claim his/her payment due to
sickness or physical disability.
9. The lead complainant, Ms. Emilinda D. Macatlang, and Atty. Alex Tan shall take adequate steps to inform
all the respondents (complainants) by personal notice or media announcement of this confession of
judgment upon receipt of the Decision of this Honorable Court.
10. All fully paid respondents (complainants) shall execute a Waiver, Release and Quitclaim.
11. Upon the approval of this Confession of Judgment by this Honorable Court, all cases pending before this
Honorable Court and the NLRC shall automatically be considered dismissed, terminated and of no force and
effect.
Petitioners invite the attention of this Honorable Court that the above monetary consideration for both the
respondents (complainants) and their counsel under the above terms and conditions have been agreed upon
with Atty. Alex Tan before the filing of this confession of judgment.
To reiterate, this confession of judgment is made by HILLSHIRE for the purpose of buying peace and/or to
secure to the said petitioner and the other Petitioners against any possible contingent liability which may
accrue to them as a consequence of their having been made Respondents in the Complaints filed by the
Complainants before the NLRC. 16
A review of the compromise agreement shows a gross disparity between the amount offered by the
Corporations compared to the judgment award. The judgment award is P3,453,664,710.86 or each
employee is slated to receive P577,149.85. On the other hand, the P342,284,800.00 compromise is to be
distributed among 5,984 employees which would translate to only P57,200.00 per employee. From this
amount, P8,580.00 as attorneys fees will be deducted, leaving each employee with a measly P48,620.00.
In fact, the compromised amount roughly comprises only 10% of the judgment award.
In our Decision, the appeal bond was set at P725 Million after taking into consideration the interests of all
parties. To reiterate, the underlying purpose of the appeal bond is to ensure that the employer has
properties on which he or she can execute upon in the event of a final, providential award. Thus, nonpayment or woefully insufficient payment of the appeal bond by the employer frustrates these ends. 17 As a
matter of fact, the appeal bond is valid and effective from the date of posting until the case is terminated or
the award is satisfied.18 Our Decision highlights the importance of an appeal bond such that said amount
should be the base amount for negotiation between the parties. As it is, the P342,284,800.00 compromise
is still measly compared to the P725 Million bond we set in this case, as it only accounts to approximately
50% of the reduced appeal bond.
In Arellano v. Powertech Corporation,19 we voided the P150,000.00 compromise for the P2.5 Million
judgment on appeal to the NLRC. We note that the compromise is a mere 6% of the contingent sum that
may be received by petitioners and the minuscule amount is certainly questionable because it does not
represent a true and fair amount which a reasonable agent may bargain for his principal. 20
In Mindoro Lumber and Hardware v. Bacay,21 we found that the private respondents individual claims,
ranging from P6,744.20 to P242,626.90, are grossly disproportionate to what each of them actually received
under the Sama-samang Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sakdal. The amount of the settlement is indubitably
unconscionable; hence, ineffective to bar the workers from claiming the full measure of their legal
rights.22
The complainants filed a motion for reconsideration asking this Court to modify its Decision on the ground
that the parties have entered into a compromise agreement. The complainants justified their acquiescence
to the compromise on the possibility that it will take another decade before the case may be resolved and
attained finality. We beg to disagree.
In our Decision, we have already directed the NLRC to act with dispatch in resolving the merits of the case
upon receipt of the cash or surety bond in the amount of P725 Million within 10 days from receipt of the
Decision. If indeed the parties want an immediate and expeditious resolution of the case, then the NLRC
should be unhindered with technicalities to dispose of the case.
Accepting an outrageously low amount of consideration as compromise defeats the complainants legitimate
claim.
In Unicane Workers Union-CLUP v. NLRC,23 we held the P100,000.00 amount in the quitclaim is
unconscionable because the complainants had been awarded by the labor arbiter more than P2 million. It
should have been aware that had petitioners pursued their case, they would have been assured of getting
said amount, since, absent a perfected appeal, complainants were already entitled to said amount by virtue
of a final judgment. We proceeded to state that:
Not all quitclaims are per se invalid as against public policy. But, where there is clear proof that the waiver
was wrangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its
face, then the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. 24
In fine, we will not hesitate to strike down a compromise agreement which is unconscionable and against
public policy.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Leave of Court to
File and Admit Herein Statement and Confession of Judgment; and the respondents Partial Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit. The directive in the Decision dated 4 June 2014 to the National
Labor Relations Commission to act with dispatch to resolve the merits of the case upon perfection of the
appeal is hereby REITERATED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015
RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case stemmed from three (3) letter-complaints for Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice endorsed to
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for appropriate action. The first letter-complaint,1 dated March 2,
2009, was filed by the commissioned notaries public within and for the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
namely, Atty. Butch Cardinal Torio, Atty. Nepthalie Pasiliao, Atty. Dominique Evangelista, and Atty. Elizabeth
C. Tugade (complainants) before the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan
(RTC-Lingayen) against Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. (Atty. Siapno) for notarizing documents without a
commission.
In their letter, complainants alleged that Atty. Siapno was maintaining a notarial office along Alvear Street
East, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and was performing notarial acts and practices in Lingayen, Natividad and
Dagupan City without the requisite notarial commission. They asserted that Atty. Siapno was never
commissioned as Notary Public for and within the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City.
Instead, he applied and was commissioned to perform notarial functions by Executive Judge Anthony Sison
of the RTC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan from March 22, 2007 to December 31, 2008. His notarial
commission, however, was never renewed upon expiration. Complainants presented evidence supporting
their allegations such as the pictures of Atty. Siapnos law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan; and documents to
prove that Atty. Siapno performed acts of notarization in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City, to wit: (1)
Addendum to Loan and Mortgage Agreement2 showing that the Promissory Note was notarized before Atty.
Siapno in Lingayen, Pangasinan in 2007; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale, 3 dated January 24, 2008, notarized in
Natividad, Pangasinan; (3) Joint Affidavit of Two Disinterested Persons Re: Given Name and Date of
Birth,4 dated January 6, 2009, notarized in Dagupan City; and (4) Acknowledgement of Debt, 5dated January
24, 2008, notarized in Dagupan City.
Complainants also averred that Atty. Siapno had delegated his notarial authority to his secretaries, Mina
Bautista (Bautista) and Mary Ann Arenas (Arenas), who wrote legal instruments and signed the documents
on his behalf.
On March 17, 2009, the RTC-Lingayen forwarded the said letter-complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA)6 which, in turn, indorsed the same to the OBC.
The second letter-complaint7 was filed by Audy B. Espelita (Espelita) against Atty. Pedro L. Santos (Atty.
Santos). It alleged that in 2008, Espelita lost his drivers license and he executed an affidavit of loss which
was notarized by Atty. Santos. The said affidavit, however, was denied for authentication when presented
before the Notarial Section in Manila because Atty. Santos was not commissioned to perform notarial
commission within the City of Manila.
The third letter-complaint8 came from a concerned citizen reporting that a certain Atty. Evelyn who was
holding office at Room 402 Leyba Bldg., 381 Dasmarias Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, had been notarizing and
signing documents for and on behalf of several lawyers.
In its Resolution,9 dated June 9, 2009, the Court directed the Executive Judge of the RTC-Lingayen to
conduct a formal investigation on the complaint against Atty. Siapno and Executive Judge Reynaldo G. Ros
(Judge Ros) of the RTC-Manila to conduct a formal investigation on the alleged violation of the Notarial Law
by Atty. Santos, and the illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn, and thereafter, to submit a report and
recommendation thereon.
Re: Complaint against Atty. Siapno
With regard to the complaint against Atty. Siapno, the Executive Judge conducted a hearing wherein the
complainants affirmed the allegations in their letter-complaint. For his part, Atty. Siapno denied the
accusations and averred that the law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, was not his and that Bautista and
Arenas were not his secretaries.10
In her Report and Recommendation,11 the Executive Judge found that Atty. Siapno was issued a notarial
commission within the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, from January 20, 2003 to December 31, 2004
and February 8, 2005 to December 3, 2006. His commission, however, was cancelled on June 8, 2006 and
he was not issued another commission thereafter. The Executive Judge found Atty. Siapno to have violated
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission when he performed notarial functions without commission and
recommended that he be fined in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
The Court agrees with the findings of the Executive Judge but not to the recommended penalty.
A review of the records and evidence presented by complainants shows that Atty. Siapno indeed maintained
a law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, just beside the law office of one of the complainants, Atty. Elizabeth
Tugade. It was also proven that Atty. Siapno notarized several instruments with an expired notarial
commission outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court. Section 11, Rule III of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice provides that:
Jurisdiction and Term A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the
first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary
public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted the commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not perform
notarial functions in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City of the Province of Pangasinan since he was not
commissioned in the said places to perform such act.
Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routine act. It is
invested with substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public.12 It must be emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a private document
into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public
must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, Atty. Siapno violated not only
his oath to obey the laws particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times. 13
In a plethora of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to disciplinary action for notarizing documents
outside their territorial jurisdiction or with an expired commission. In the case of Nunga v. Viray,14 a lawyer
was suspended by the Court for three (3) years for notarizing an instrument without a commission.
In Zoreta v. Simpliciano,15 the respondent was likewise suspended from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years and was permanently barred from being commissioned as a notary public for notarizing
several documents after the expiration of his commission. In the more recent case of Laquindanum v.
Quintana,16 the Court suspended a lawyer for six (6) months and was disqualified from being commissioned
as notary public for a period of two (2) years because he notarized documents outside the area of his
commission, and with an expired commission.
Considering that Atty. Siapno has been proven to have performed notarial work in Ligayen, Natividad and
Dagupan City in the province of Pangasinan without the requisite commission, the Court finds the
recommended penalty insufficient. Instead, Atty. Siapno must be barred from being commissioned as notary
public permanently and suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Re: Complaints against Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelyn
In a letter,17 dated July 29, 2013, Judge Ros informed the Court that he could not have complied with the
June 9, 2009 and August 4, 2009 orders of the Court because he was no longer the Executive Judge of the
RTC-Manila at that time. To date, no formal investigation has been conducted on the alleged violation of
Atty. Santos and the reported illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn.
With respect to the complaints against Atty. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered
to RE-DOCKET the same as separate administrative cases.
The incumbent Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila, whether permanent or in acting capacity, is ordered to
conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to submit his Report and Recommendation within sixty
(60) days from receipt of copy of this decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years and BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public, effective upon his
receipt of a copy of this decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Office of the Court
Administrator, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and be recorded in the
personal files of the respondent.
With respect to the complaints against Atty. Pedro L. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is
ordered to RE-DOCKET them as separate administrative cases. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Manila, is ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to submit his Report and
Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of a copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. P-11-2940, January 21, 2015
JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., Complainant, v. GEORGE E. VIAJAR, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 4, BUTUAN CITY, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an administrative case for Dishonesty, Grave Abuse of Authority, Usurpation of Judicial
Authority, and Malfeasance and Graft and Corruption filed by Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. (complainant) of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Butuan City, against Sheriff IV George E. Viajar (respondent).
cralawre d
The Antecedent Facts
Complainant alleged that on 26 March 2010, he issued a Writ of Execution (writ) in Civil Case No. 3985
entitled Felipe Gorme, Sr., Adela Gorme, Crisanta Gorme-Gado and Felipe Saludo v. Fast Cargo Transport
Corporation and Romy Estrella. According to complainant, respondent received the writ on the same day it
was issued but he withheld the writ and filed the Sheriffs Return of Service only on 21 June 2010.
Complainant further alleged that respondent arrogated judicial powers upon himself by receiving P68,000
from the judgment creditor and failing to deposit it to the court. Complainant also alleged that respondent
submitted an unreasonably high Sheriffs fees, through padded and imaginary charges, as can be seen from
the Statement of Liquidation he submitted which contained the following charges:
(a) Two P5,800, without receipts;
(b) Publication of Sheriffs Notice of Sale P15,000, published without the required raffle;
(c) Lifting of levy P5,000, without receipt;
(d) Representation allowances P4,500; and
(e) Withheld amount from the judgment creditor P28,260.
Complainant alleged that respondent refused to follow the Rules of Court when he failed to demand payment
directly from the judgment creditor. Respondent took it upon himself to make a determination that the
judgment creditor in Civil Case No. 3985, Fast Cargo Transport Corporation, is the same as Fast Cargo
Logistics Corporation. In addition, respondent mailed a copy of the writ of execution to the judgment debtor
in Cebu City instead of serving the writ. He then proceeded to execute a levy garnishment and conducted
an illegal sale. By purposely not giving notice to the judgment debtor and its counsel, respondent deprived
some of the parties of their right to participate. Respondent allegedly conducted a simulated bidding,
awarded the property to the judgment creditor, received P800,000 for the bid but did not deposit the money
with the Clerk of Court. On 15 June 2010, respondent executed a Sheriffs Certificate of Redemption with
accompanying acknowledgment receipt which showed that he charged the judgment debtor additional
expenses of P40,000 as actual expenses and P40,000 as Sheriffs fees. Respondent then allowed the
judgment debtor to withdraw the amount of P460,647 from him and only informed the trial court through an
addendum of Return of Service submitted on 24 June 2010. The trial court ordered respondent to deposit
the P800,000 paid by the highest bidder to the court but he refused and only gave a vague explanation.
In his comment, respondent denied that he deliberately withheld the making of the return of the writ. He
alleged that on 24 May 2010, he proceeded with the auction sale since there was no sign that the judgment
debtor would settle its obligation. On 25 May 2010, he delivered P575,000 out of the bid amount of
P800,000 to the judgment creditor to satisfy the obligation. Respondent alleged that on 9 June 2010,
Terence Saavedra (Saavedra), a representative of Fast Cargo Logistics Corporation who claimed to also
represent Fast Cargo Transport Corporation, came to the trial court and informed him that he wanted to
redeem the property. Respondent alleged that Saavedra returned on 15 June 2010, made a proposal to
satisfy the judgment amount and the Sheriffs expenses, and he received the amount on the same day.
Respondent further alleged that the amount of P69,000 as estimated expenses was approved by
complainant because he was supposed to go to Cebu City to serve the writ. However, he changed his plans
because he learned that the judgment creditor still had property in Butuan City. He added that the judgment
creditor opted not to deposit the estimated amount of expenses and instead personally handed it to him.
Respondent further stated that it is discretionary upon complainant whether to approve his expenses.
Respondent denied that he made a judicial pronouncement that Fast Cargo Transport Corporation is the
same as Fast Cargo Logistics Corporation. He claimed that he observed the change in the corporate name on
15 August 1997 and that complainant was duly informed when he submitted his Sheriffs Return of Service.
Respondent denied that he deliberately refused to deposit the amount of P800,000. He added that
P575,000 was already delivered to the judgment creditor. He stressed that he did not receive a single
centavo for his personal benefit.
In its Resolution dated 15 June 2011, this Court re-docketed the complaint as a regular administrative
complaint and referred the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 3,
for investigation, report and recommendation.
cralawred
The Report and Recommendation of the Executive Judge

After conducting his investigation, Executive Judge Francisco F. Maclang found that respondent committed
the following violations:
1. Respondent did not enforce the writ by personally going to Cebu City. Instead, respondent mailed a copy
of the writ to Fast Cargo Transport Corporation.
2. Respondent mailed to Fast Cargo Transport Corporation not only the writ but also the notice of levy of
execution. As such, Fast Cargo Transport Corporation was not given an option to select what personal or real
property would be levied by respondent. Respondent was not able to show that Fast Cargo Transport
Corporation has no bank account or other personal property that would justify the immediate levy on its real
property.
3. Respondent did not immediately return the writ after the judgment had been satisfied in part or in full.
Instead, he submitted the Report on 21 June 2010, or almost three months after the issuance of the writ on
26 March 2010.
4. Respondent did not present any evidence that the written Notice of Sale had been published once a week
for two consecutive weeks in one newspaper. Respondent presented one Sheriffs Notice of Sale. He also
presented an official receipt issued by The Peoples Guardian showing payment for P15,000 on 25 May 2010
but the publication was dated 28 April 2010. Respondent likewise failed to give a copy of the Notice of Sale
to Fast Cargo Transport Corporation.
5. Instead of turning over the payment to the Clerk of Court for delivery to the judgment creditor,
respondent took it upon himself to deliver the bid amount. He also made a conclusion that Fast Cargo
Transport Corporation changed its name to Fast Cargo Logistics Corporation.
6. Respondent charged an exorbitant amount of sheriffs expenses of P68,260 even if he did not actually go
to Cebu City. Even the actual expenses reflected on the Sheriffs Return, amounting to P40,000, were
exorbitant. Respondent also failed to explain why he demanded P460,627 from Fast Cargo Transport
Corporation after the Certificate of Sale was issued.
7. In his letter dated 1 July 2010, respondent included the amount of P176,112.60 allegedly representing
lawyers expenses from 6 November 2001 to 6 August 2007. He also admitted that he gave money to the
Register of Deeds and the Assessors Office to facilitate the release of the papers.
8. Respondent approved the Certificate of Sale instead of giving the same to the court for approval.
9. Respondent failed to show that The Peoples Guardian had been awarded the right to publish the Notice of
Sale through a raffle conducted by the Office of the Clerk of Court.
10. Respondent failed to submit receipts for the following amounts:
a. 5,800;
b. P5,000;
c. P4,500;
d. P28,620; and
e. P40,000.
The investigating judge noted that respondent initially admitted that he had been remiss in the performance
of his duties and that he expressed willingness to accept any disciplinary action. After some time,
respondent recanted and denied all the charges against him. The investigating judge recommended that
respondent be imposed the corresponding sanctions by this Court.
cralawred
The Report and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Memorandum dated 28 August 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) agreed with the
findings of the investigating judge that respondent did not follow the basic procedure for implementing a
writ of execution.
The OCA stressed that respondent should have personally demanded the payment of the principal obligation
from the judgment debtor. If, upon verification, respondent noticed that the name of the corporation
appeared to have been changed, he should have inquired from the judgment debtor if Fast Cargo Transport
Corporation is the same as Fast Cargo Logistics Corporation. In addition, the OCA stated that respondent
failed to show that he accorded the judgment debtor the option to choose which among its personal or real
properties may be levied upon.
The OCA noted that respondent seemed unaware of the rule that he has to make a report to the court even
if the writ is not satisfied in full. He did not make periodic reports on the status of the implementation of the
writ of execution. The OCA likewise found that respondent failed to show proof that The Peoples Guardian
was awarded the right to publish the Notice of Sale through a raffle conducted by the Office of the Clerk of
Court. Respondent could not prove the fact of publication because he could not present a copy of the
newspaper clipping where the Notice of Sale was published and the Affidavit of Publication by the publisher.
Further, the Official Receipt for P15,000 that respondent presented was dated 25 May 2010 but the dates of
publication were on 2, 9 and 16 May 2010.
The OCA found that respondent was guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The OCA recommended that
respondent be imposed the penalty of suspension from office without pay for six months. However,
considering that respondent had already retired from the service, the OCA further recommended that the
amount corresponding to respondents salary for six months should instead be deducted from his retirement
benefits.
cralawred
The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the findings of the OCA and increase the recommended penalty.
We must stress once again that sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice. 1 As agents of
the law, they are called upon to discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence. 2 In serving the
courts writs and processes and implementing its orders, they cannot afford to err without affecting the
integrity of their office and the efficient administration of justice. 3
In this case, respondent had been remiss in performing his responsibilities.

First, respondent violated a basic rule by failing to do his ministerial duty to make periodic reports on the
writ. Section 14, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 14. Return of writ of execution. - The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it
immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in
full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the
reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be
enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings
taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports
shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof
promptly furnished the parties.
In this case, the writ of execution was issued on 26 March 2010. Respondent received it on the same day.
Respondent made his Report on 21 June 2010. Respondent ignored the directive of the Rules requiring him
to make a report to the court every 30 days on the proceedings taken on the writ until the judgment is
satisfied in full, or when the effectivity of the writ expires. We cannot accept respondents explanation that
the main reason for his failure to make his report was that there were still activities to be undertaken in the
process of his implementation of the writ. The Rule is clear. Even when the judgment has not yet been fully
satisfied, respondent is mandated to submit his periodic report to the court. Respondent failed to do so.
Respondent likewise failed to show that he personally demanded from the judgment debtor the immediate
payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution, and of all lawful fees. In addition, respondent
failed to show that he accorded the judgment debtor the option to choose which among its real or personal
properties would be levied upon. Section 9(b) of Rule 39 states that [i]f the judgment obligor cannot pay all
or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment
obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature
whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter
the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the
judgment. In this case, respondent just levied upon the property of the judgment debtor without
demanding payment of the judgment debt, and without giving the judgment debtor the option to choose
which of its properties may be levied upon.
In addition, respondents duty to execute a judgment is ministerial and he need not look outside the plain
meaning of the writ of execution.4 When a sheriff is faced with an ambiguous execution order, prudence and
reasonableness dictate that he seek clarification from the judge. 5 When confronted with the question of
whether Fast Cargo Transport Corporation is the same as Fast Cargo Logistics Corporation, respondent
should have consulted with the judge. Instead, he decided on his own that they are one and the same
corporation. Respondent relied on the words of Atty. Audie Bernabe, counsel of the judgment creditor,6when
his proper course of action should have been to seek clarification from the judge.
As regards the publication of the sale, we agree with the OCA that respondent failed to show that The
Peoples Guardian was selected by raffle in accordance with Section 15(c), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Respondent failed to present a copy of the newspaper clipping where the Notice of Sale was
published as well as the affidavit of publication by the publisher. Further, the official receipt presented by
respondent was dated 25 May 2010 but the Notice of Sale was supposed to have been published on 2, 9 and
16 May 2010.
Respondent also admitted that he accommodated the judgment creditors request to include the amount of
P176,112.60 as lawyers expenses which was not part of the decision. Respondent explained:
x x x the judgment creditor asked this amount to be included, to take chances that it might [be] accepted
by the judgment debtor, and to give the benefit of the doubt, the undersigned Sheriff accommodated the
said claim, though to his personal knowledge it is not a valid claim since it was not part of the judgment
amount as mentioned in the writ of execution[.] 7
Again, respondent went beyond the terms of the writ of execution although he knew that the judgment
creditors claim was not valid.
As regards the Sheriffs expenses, respondent himself admitted that some of the amount he included did not
have receipts and were, therefore, not justified.8
The OCA found respondent guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty in the performance of his duties,
which, considering the circumstances, we deem to be serious dishonesty. Both offenses are punishable with
dismissal from the service.9 However, in recommending the imposable penalty, the OCA considered the
following as mitigating circumstances in favor of respondent: (1) this is respondents first offense; (2)
respondent had been in the service for 15 years; and (3) humanitarian reasons. Thus, the OCA
recommended that the penalty of suspension from office without salary for six months should instead be
meted on respondent. In view of respondents retirement from the service, the OCA further recommended
that the amount corresponding to six months salary be instead deducted from respondents retirement
benefits. We modify the recommended penalty by increasing the suspension from six months to one year.
Considering that respondent already retired from the service, the amount corresponding to one years salary
should instead be deducted from respondents retirement benefits.
chanroble slaw
WHEREFORE, we find George E. Viajar GUILTY of grave misconduct and serious dishonesty and impose
upon him the penalty of SUSPENSION from office without pay for one year. In view of Viajars retirement
from the service, we direct the Finance Division, Financial Management Office of the OCA to deduct the
amount corresponding to his one years salary from the retirement benefits due him.
SO ORDERED.
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SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191540, January 21, 2015
SPOUSES JOSE O. GATUSLAO AND ERMILA LEONILA LIMSIACO-GATUSLAO, Petitioners, v. LEO RAY
V. YANSON, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Petitioners spouses Jose O. Gatuslao and Ermila Leonila Limsiaco-Gatuslao (petitioners) are assailing the
December 8, 20091 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Cad. Case No. 092802 which granted respondent Leo Ray2 Yansons (respondent) Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of Writ of
Possession over the properties being occupied by petitioners, as well as the February 26, 2010 RTC
Order3denying petitioners motion for reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Ermila Leonila Limsiaco-Gatuslao is the daughter of the late Felicisimo Limsiaco (Limsiaco) who
died intestate on February 7, 1989. Limsiaco was the registered owner of two parcels of land with
improvements in the City of Bacolod described as Lots 10 and 11, Block 8 of the subdivision plan Psd-38577
and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-334294 and T-24331.5
Limsiaco mortgaged the said lots along with the house standing thereon to Philippine National Bank (PNB).
Upon Limsiacos failure to pay, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage and caused the properties
sale at a public auction on June 24, 1991 where it emerged as the highest bidder. When the one-year
redemption period expired without Limsiacos estate redeeming the properties, PNB caused the consolidation
of titles in its name. Ultimately, the Registry of Deeds of Bacolod City cancelled TCT Nos. T-33429 and T24331 and in lieu thereof issued TCT Nos. T-3088186 and T-3088197 in PNBs name on October 25, 2006.
On November 10, 2006, a Deed of Absolute Sale 8 was executed by PNB conveying the subject properties in
favor of respondent. As a consequence thereof, the Registry of Deeds of Bacolod City issued TCT Nos. T3111259 and T-31112610 in respondents name in lieu of PNBs titles.
Then, as a registered owner in fee simple of the contested properties, respondent filed with the RTC an ExParte Motion for Writ of Possession11 pursuant to Section 7 of Act No. 3135,12 as amended by Act No. 4118
(Act No. 3135, as amended),13 docketed as Cad. Case No. 09-2802.
In their Opposition,14 petitioners argued that the respondent is not entitled to the issuance of an expartewrit of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 since he was not the buyer of the subject properties
at the public auction sale and only purchased the same through a subsequent sale made by PNB. Not being
the purchaser at the public auction sale, respondent cannot file and be granted an ex parte motion for a writ
of possession. Petitioners also asserted that the intestate estate of Limsiaco has already instituted an action
for annulment of foreclosure of mortgage and auction sale affecting the contested properties. 15 They argued
that the existence of the said civil suit bars the issuance of the writ of possession and that whatever rights
and interests respondent may have acquired from PNB by virtue of the sale are still subject to the outcome
of the said case.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC granted the issuance of the writ of possession in an Order 16 dated December 8, 2009. It cited the
Courts pronouncement in China Banking Corporation v. Lozada,17viz:
The Court recognizes the rights acquired by the purchaser of the foreclosed property at the public auction
sale upon the consolidation of his title when no timely redemption of the property was made, x x x.
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased
if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to
the possession of the said property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership
in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. x x x Possession of the land then
becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title,
the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
The purchaser, therefore, in the public auction sale of a foreclosed property is entitled to a writ of possession
x x x.18
PNB, therefore, as the absolute owner of the properties is entitled to a writ of possession. And since
respondent purchased the properties from PNB, the former has necessarily stepped into the shoes of the
latter. Otherwise stated, respondent, by subrogation, has the right to pursue PNBs claims against
petitioners as though they were his own.
The dispositive portion of the above Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby issues a writ of possession in favor of movant Leo Ray
V. Yanson ordering Spouses Jose and Mila Gatuslao, their heirs, assigns, successors-in-interest, agents,
representatives and/or any and all other occupants or persons claiming any interest or title of the subject
property to deliver the possession of said property to the herein movant/ petitioner.
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioners moved for reconsideration20 which was denied in an Order21 dated February 26, 2010, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Oppositors is hereby DENIED. Thus, the Order dated
December 8, 2009 stands.
SO ORDERED.22
Respondent on March 19, 2010 moved to execute the possessory writ23 while petitioners on April 15, 2010
filed with this Court the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On September 30, 2010, the RTC issued an Order24 directing the implementation of the writ. And per
Sheriffs Return of Service,25 the same was fully implemented on March 14, 2011.
cralawre d
Issues
1.
According to petitioners, the pending action for annulment of foreclosure of mortgage and the
corresponding sale at public auction of the subject properties operates as a bar to the issuance of a
writ of possession;
2.
Claiming violation of their right to due process, petitioners likewise assert that as they were not
parties to the foreclosure and are, thus, strangers or third parties thereto, they may not be evicted
by a mere ex parte writ of possession; and
3.
Lastly, petitioners argue that respondent, a mere purchaser of the contested properties by way of a
negotiated sale between him and PNB, may not avail of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 7 of
Act No. 3135, as amended, as he is not the purchaser at the public auction sale. Petitioners further
contend that respondent has no right to avail of the writ even by way of subrogation.
Our Ruling
Preliminarily, we note that petitioners direct resort to this Court from the assailed Orders of the RTC violates
the rule on hierarchy of courts. Their remedy lies with the Court of Appeals. Considering however the
length of time this case has been pending and in view of our January 26, 2011 Resolution 26 giving due
course to the Petition, we deem it proper to adjudicate the case on its merits.
The Petition is denied.
It is settled that the issuance of a Writ of
Possession may not be stayed by a pending
action for annulment of mortgage or the
foreclosure itself.
It is petitioners stand that the pending action for annulment of foreclosure of mortgage and of the
corresponding sale at public auction of the subject properties operates as a bar to the issuance of a writ of
possession.
The Court rules in the negative. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Golden Power Diesel Sales Center,
Inc.27reiterates the long-standing rule that:
[I]t is settled that a pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure sale does not stay the issuance
of the writ of possession. The trial court, where the application for a writ of possession is filed, does not
need to look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. The purchaser is entitled to a
writ of possession without prejudice to the outcome of the pending annulment case.
This is in line with the ministerial character of the possessory writ. Thus, in Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Tarampi,28 it was held:
To stress the ministerial character of the writ of possession, the Court has disallowed injunction to
prohibit its issuance, just as it has held that its issuance may not be stayed by a pending action for
annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.
Clearly then, until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of
competent jurisdiction, the issuance of a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the
trial court. The same is true with its implementation; otherwise, the writ will be a useless paper
judgment a result inimical to the mandate of Act No. 3135 to vest possession in the purchaser
immediately.29(Emphases supplied)
Clearly, petitioners argument is devoid of merit.
Petitioners are not strangers or third
parties to the foreclosure sale; they
were not deprived of due process.
Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, sets forth the following procedure in the availment of and issuance
of a writ of possession in cases of extrajudicial foreclosures, viz:
SECTION 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First
Instance (Regional Trial Court) of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to
give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the
use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale
was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such
petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral
proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under
the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other
real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in
accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such
petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered
Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the
court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the
province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.
Although the above provision clearly pertains to a writ of possession availed of and issued within the
redemption period of the foreclosure sale, the same procedure also applies to a situation where a purchaser
is seeking possession of the foreclosed property bought at the public auction sale after the redemption
period has expired without redemption having been made. 30 The only difference is that in the latter case, no
bond is required therefor, as held in China Banking Corporation v. Lozada,31 thus:
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased
if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to
the possession of the said property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership
in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in fact demand
possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond in
accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No such bond is required after the
redemption period if the property is not redeemed. x x x32 (Emphasis supplied)
Upon the expiration of the period to redeem and no redemption was made, the purchaser, as confirmed
owner, has the absolute right to possess the land and the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a
ministerial duty of the court upon proper application and proof of title. 33
Nevertheless, where the extrajudicially foreclosed real property is in the possession of a third party who is
holding the same adversely to the judgment debtor or mortgagor, the RTCs duty to issue a writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser of said real property ceases to be ministerial and, as such, may no
longer proceed ex parte.34 In such a case, the trial court must order a hearing to determine the nature of
the adverse possession.35 For this exception to apply, however, it is not enough that the property is in the
possession of a third party, the property must also be held by the third party adversely to the judgment
debtor or mortgagor,36 such as a co-owner, agricultural tenant or usufructuary.37
In this case, petitioners do not fall under any of the above examples of such a third party holding the
subject properties adversely to the mortgagor; nor is their claim to their right of possession analogous to
the foregoing situations. Admittedly, they are the mortgagor Limsiacos heirs. It was precisely because of
Limsiacos death that petitioners obtained the right to possess the subject properties and, as such, are
considered transferees or successors-in-interest of the right of possession of the latter. As Limsiacos
successors-in-interest, petitioners merely stepped into his shoes and are, thus, compelled not only to
acknowledge but, more importantly, to respect the mortgage he had earlier executed in favor of
respondent.38 They cannot effectively assert that their right of possession is adverse to that of Limsiaco as
they do not have an independent right of possession other than what they acquired from him. 39 Not being
third parties who have a right contrary to that of the mortgagor, the trial court was thus justified in issuing
the writ and in ordering its implementation.
Petitioners claim that their right to due process was violated by the mere issuance of the writ of possession
must likewise fail. As explained, petitioners were not occupying the properties adversely to the mortgagor,
hence, a writ of possession may be issued ex parte. And precisely because of this ex partenature of the
proceedings no notice is needed to be served 40 upon them. It has been stressed time and again that the ex
parte nature of the proceeding does not deny due process to the petitioners because the issuance of the writ
of possession does not prevent a separate case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale.41
Consequently, the RTC may grant the petition even without petitioners participation. Nevertheless, even if
the proceedings in this case was supposed to be ex parte, the records of the case would show that
petitioners side on this controversy was actually heard as evidenced by the numerous pleadings 42 filed by
them in the lower court. In fact, in its July 27, 2009 Order,43 the RTC expressly directed respondent, in
observance of equity and fair play x x x to furnish [petitioners] with a copy of his motion/petition and to
show x x x proof of compliance thereof x x x.44 Then and now, the Court holds that a party cannot invoke
denial of due process when he was given an opportunity to present his side. 45
Respondent is entitled to the

issuance of writ of possession.
Petitioners insist that respondent is not entitled to the issuance of the writ of possession under Section 7 of
Act No. 3135 as he is only a buyer of the subject properties in a contract of sale subsequently executed in
his favor by the actual purchaser, PNB. To them, it is only the actual purchaser of a property at the public
auction sale who can ask the court and be granted a writ of possession.
This argument is not tenable. Respondent, as a transferee or successor-in-interest of PNB by virtue of the
contract of sale between them, is considered to have stepped into the shoes of PNB. As such, he is
necessarily entitled to avail of the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, as if he is PNB. This
is apparent in the Deed of Absolute Sale46 between the two, viz:
1.
The Vendor hereby sells, transfer[s] and convey[s] unto[, and] in favor of the
Vendee, and the latters assigns and successors-in-interest, all of the formers
rights and title to, interests and participation in the Property on an AS IS, WHERE
IS basis. It is thus understood that the Vendee has inspected the Property and has
ascertained its condition.
3.
The Vendor is selling only whatever rights and title to, interests and participation
it has acquired over the Property, and the Vendee hereby acknowledges full knowledge
of the nature and extent of the Vendors rights and title to, [and] interests and participation
in the Property.
4.
x x x The Vendee further agrees to undertake, at its/his/her expense, the

ejectment of any occupant of the Property.47 (Emphases in the original)
xxxx
Verily, one of the rights that PNB acquired as purchaser of the subject properties at the public auction sale,
which it could validly convey by way of its subsequent sale of the same to respondent, is the availment of a
writ of possession. This can be deduced from the above-quoted stipulation that [t]he [v]endee further
agrees to undertake, at xxx his expense, the ejectment of any occupant of the [p]roperty. Accordingly,
respondent filed the contentious ex parte motion for a writ of possession to eject petitioners therefrom and
take possession of the subject properties.
Further, respondent may rightfully take possession of the subject properties through a writ of possession,
even if he was not the actual buyer thereof at the public auction sale, in consonance with our ruling
inErmitao v. Paglas.48 In the said case, therein respondent was petitioners lessee in a residential property
owned by the latter. During the lifetime of the lease, respondent learned that petitioner mortgaged the
subject property in favor of Charlie Yap (Yap) who eventually foreclosed the same. Yap was the purchaser
thereof in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Respondent ultimately bought the property from Yap. However,
it was stipulated in the deed of sale that the property was still subject to petitioners right of redemption.
Subsequently and despite written demands to pay the amounts corresponding to her monthly rental of the
subject property, respondent did not anymore pay rents. Meanwhile, petitioners period to redeem the
foreclosed property expired on February 23, 2001. Several months after, petitioner filed a case for unlawful
detainer against respondent. When the case reached this Court, it ruled that therein respondents basis for
denying petitioners claim for rent was insufficient as the latter, during the period for which payment of rent
was being demanded, was still the owner of the foreclosed property. This is because at that time, the period
of redemption has not yet expired. Thus, petitioner was still entitled to the physical possession thereof
subject, however, to the purchasers right to petition the court to give him possession and to file a bond
pursuant to the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. However, after the expiration of the
redemption period without redemption having been made by petitioner, respondent became the owner
thereof and consolidation of title becomes a right. Being already then the owner, respondent became
entitled to possession. Consequently, petitioners ejectment suit was held to have been rendered moot by
the expiration of the period of redemption without petitioner redeeming the properties. This is considering
that petitioner already lost his possessory right over the property after the expiration of the said period.
Although the main issue in Ermitao was whether respondent was correct in refusing to pay rent to
petitioner on the basis of her having bought the latters foreclosed property from whom it was mortgaged,
the case is enlightening as it acknowledged respondents right, as a subsequent buyer of the properties from
the actual purchaser of the same in the public auction sale, to possess the property after the expiration of
the period to redeem sans any redemption. Verily, Ermitao demonstrates the applicability of the provisions
of Section 7 of Act No. 3135 to such a subsequent purchaser like respondent in the present case.
All told, the Court affirms the RTCs issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent.
chanroble slaw
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The December 8, 2009 and February 26, 2010 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Cad. Case No. 09-2802 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 200333, January 21, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOMINGO DILLA Y PAULAR, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Appellant Domingo Dilla y Paular was charged with the crime of murder for the death of his brother, Pepito
Dilla y Paular (Pepito). Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution, it was shown that at around
5:30 in the afternoon of July 22, 2003, at Sitio Ilaud, Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur, Pepito was working on his
farm when appellant suddenly appeared and shot the victim with a gun hitting him on his left thigh. The
victim managed to run but was overtaken by appellant who then stabbed him with a bolo. The son of the
victim, Pepito Jr., and Mary Jane Renegado (Renegado), witnessed the incident.
Appellant presented a different version. He claimed that it was Pepito who was the aggressor. He narrated
that Pepito went to his (appellants) house and challenged him to a fight. Dismissing the challenge, he went
out of his house and proceeded to his farm to get his carabao but the victim pursued him. They grappled for
possession of the gun and bolo. In the ensuing struggle, he struck the victim with a wrench. He denied
having fired the gun. He pointed to somebody allegedly wearing a hat who could have shot and stabbed
Pepito.
In a Decision1 dated July 13, 2009, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, found
appellant guilty of murder. Lending credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court
held that the attack on the victim was perpetrated by no other than appellant; that the attack was
treacherous as the appellant suddenly appeared and shot the victim, and after having wounded him,
stabbed him with a bolo. The RTC found appellants tale incredible and self-serving especially in view of his
positive identification by the prosecution witnesses.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder and sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, together with its accessory
penalties, condemning him to pay actual damages of P35,448.00, moral damages of P50,000.00 and
P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Pepito Dilla; the accused is credited in full for his preventive
detention should he agree in writing to abide by the rules for convicted prisoners, otherwise to 4/5 of the
same; costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.2
Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) arguing in the main that the trial court erred in
finding him guilty of the charge. He contended that there was no direct proof showing that he actually killed
the victim.
The CA, however, was not persuaded. Thus, in its June 9, 2011 Decision,3 it affirmed with modification the
findings of the RTC, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur,
in Crim. Case No. P-3466 for Murder, convicting Domingo Dilla y Paular is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accordingly, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua together with its accessory penalties,
and is further ORDERED to pay the victims heirs P35,448.00, as actual damages, P50,000.00, as moral
damages, and P75,000.00, as civil indemnity for the death of the victim.
SO ORDERED.4
Hence, this appeal. In a Resolution5 dated April 18, 2012, we required both parties to file their Supplemental
Briefs. However, both parties opted not to file the same.6 Hence, we will resolve this appeal based on the
briefs submitted by the parties before the CA.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds the appeal to be lacking in merit. The
records belie appellants contention that there was no direct proof identifying him as the perpetrator of the
crime. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Pepito, Jr. and Renegado established without a shadow of
doubt that it was appellant who mercilessly killed his brother, Pepito.
Pepito, Jr. was categorical in his testimony that -
Q Pepito Dilla, Jr., what is your relation to the victim in this case?
A He is my father.
Q How about to the accused in this case[,] Domingo Dilla?
A He is my uncle.
xx
xx
Q On July 22, 2003 at around 5:30 in the afternoon do you remember
where you were?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was at the side of the road in sitio Ilawod, Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur.
Q x x x [W]hat were you doing there?
A None, sir.
xx
xx
Q While thereat, do you remember x x x any unusual incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that all about?
A I saw my father being chased by uncle Ingo.
Q [Where did] this incident [happen]?
A In sitio Ilawod, Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur.
Q While your father was being chased by Domingo Dilla how far were you
from where you are seated now will you please point to an object outside
this [courtroom] representing the distance similar to the distance from
where you were to the place where your father [was] being chased by
Domingo Dilla?
A That my uncle was angry.
Q Will you please tell us the distance at the time you saw your father was
being chased by your uncle Domingo Dilla, what was the distance of your
father to Domingo Dilla?
A Three arms length.
Q After you saw Domingo Dilla chasing your father, what happened next?
A He shot him[,] sir.
Q Of your own knowledge, was your father hit by the shot?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why, what happened to your father?
A He [limped,] sir.
Q Will you please tell us or illustrate to us, as you have said your father
was shot by Domingo Dilla, please indicate to us the gun used by
Domingo Dilla?
INTERPRETER:
Witness indicate[d] a length of about 8 inches.
Q After your father was shot by Domingo Dilla, what happened next?
A He stabbed him.
Q Why, what was the position of your father when Domingo Dilla stab[bed]
your father?
INTERPRETER:
Witness illustrate[s] in standing position.
Q What was the position of your father when Domingo Dilla stab[bed] your
father?
A He was standing[,] sir and his 2 hands were [at] his side.
Q While your father was being stabbed by Domingo Dilla, where was the
relative position of Domingo Dilla in relation to your father?
A Domingo Dilla was in front.
Q How many times [was] your father x x x stabbed?
A One[,] sir.
Q Considering that you [are] the son of Pepito Dilla, Sr., what did you do?
A I told my grandfather that the two of them were fighting, after I told my
grandfather x x x I went back and approached them but at that time
Domingo Dilla was running.
xx
xx
Q What happened to your father?
A He was already lying on the ground[,] sir.
Q What did you do when you [saw] your father x x x already lying on the
ground?
A I asked help from the other people who also witness[ed] the incident to
bring him to the hospital.
Q What happened to your father?
A He did not reach the hospital because he died.7
Pepito, Jr.s testimony was corroborated in all material points by the testimony of Renegado. 8
In fine, both the RTC and the CA correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and properly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Moreover, appellant is not
eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines. The awards of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 and moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 are proper. In addition, the heirs of the victim are entitled to
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
Anent the award of actual damages in the amount of P35,448.00, we find that only the amount of
P15,000.00 was duly receipted.9 The amount of P20,448.0010 which supposedly pertained to expenses
incurred during the wake was not supported by receipts but consisted only of handwritten entries. As we
held in People v. Villanueva,11 when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than
P25,000.00, as in this case, the award of temperate damages of P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual
damages of a lesser amount. Accordingly, we grant temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in
lieu of actual damages. In addition, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annumfrom date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the assailed June 9, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR-HC. No. 04088
finding appellant Domingo Dilla y Paular guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Pepito Dilla y Paular the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages,
is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATIONS that appellant is not eligible for parole; appellant is further ordered to
pay the heirs of the victim P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages, all
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
cralawla wlibrary
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 207993, January 21, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. GERARDO ENUMERABLE Y DE VILLA, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
On appeal is the 31 January 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04948. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the 15 February 2011 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12 of Lipa City
convicting appellant Gerardo Enumerable y De Villa for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.
cralawre d
The Facts
The Information dated 27 August 2004 reads:
That on or about the 27th day of May, 2004 at about 11:30 oclock in the morning at Petron Gasoline Station,
located at B. Morada Ave., Lipa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
deliver, dispose or give away to a police officer-poseur buyer, 9.88 grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride locally known as shabu, a dangerous drug, contained in three (3) plastic sachets.
Contrary to Law.3
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.4 Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely: Police Officer (PO) 3 Edwalberto Villas and Police
Inspector Danilo Balmes. On the other hand, appellant waived the presentation of any defense evidence.
As found by the trial court, the facts are as follows:
From the evidence adduced by the People, the Court finds that based on the information about a deal in
shabu between the asset of PO3 Edwalberto Villas and a certain Gerry of San Pablo City, a buy-bust
operation was conducted by the elements of the Batangas City Police Station with the assistance of Police
Inspector Danilo Balmes of the CIDG Batangas Province on May 27, 2004 at 11:30 oclock in the morning at
the Petron Gasoline Station along B. Morada Ave., Lipa City.
Using two (2) pieces of marked P500.00 bills and boodle money to make the appearance of about
P24,000.00, the police asset who posed as a buyer transacted with the alias Gerry upon his arrival at the
gas station. After the exchange of the marked money and the three (3) plastic sachets of shabu placed in a
black plastic box, alias Gerry was placed under arrest. He was later identified as Gerardo Enumerable y de
Villa. The marked money was recovered from his possession by PO3 Villas who also took custody of the
specimen shabu which he marked EMV 1 to EMV 3. The three (3) sachets of shabu were turned over to the
Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory, pursuant to the request for laboratory examination of P/Supt. Fausto
Manzanilla, Jr., Chief of Police, Batangas City PNP on May 27, 2004 at 5:25 p.m. However, that Crime
laboratory indorsed the request with the specimens on June 4, 2004 at 2:30 p.m. to the Regional Crime
Laboratory in Calamba City.
Police Inspector and Forensic Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas found the specimens positive for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, as shown by Chemistry Report No. D-566-04, the
authenticity and genuineness of which were admitted by accused during the pre-trial. 5
Appellant filed a Comment with Motion for Leave to File Demurrer,6 which motion was denied by the trial
court for appellants failure to adduce any reason therefor.7
The trial court found appellant guilty of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of the trial courts
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused GERARDO ENUMERABLE y DE VILLA guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principal by direct participation of the crime of drug pushing as defined and penalized under Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
and hereby impose on him the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. The 9.88
grams of shabu are hereby ordered destroyed pursuant to the provisions of Section 21(4) and (7) of RA
9165.
The period of detention of the accused shall be deducted in his service of sentence.
Let a commitment order be issued for the transfer of custody of the accused from the BJMP Lipa City to the
National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.8
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.9 The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of appellant for the offense
charged.
Hence, this appeal.
cralawre d

In sustaining appellants conviction for the offense charged, the Court of Appeals held that the testimony of
PO3 Villas identifying the three plastic sachets of shabu as the same ones seized from appellant rendered
insignificant appellants allegation that PO3 Villas did not immediately put markings on the three sachets of
shabu at the place of arrest. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the failure of the arresting officers to
conduct a physical inventory and to take photographs of the seized items is not fatal as long as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved, as in this case.
According to the Court of Appeals, the prosecution was able to prove the unbroken chain of custody of the
prohibited drug from the time PO3 Villas confiscated the plastic sachets from appellant and marked them at
the place of arrest, to the time PO3 Villas brought the plastic sachets to the police station and turned them
over to the investigator on-duty until the time SPO1 de Castro submitted the marked plastic sachets to the
Regional Crime Laboratory Office Calabarzon for laboratory examination.
cralawre d
The Issue
The issue boils down to whether the prosecution established the identity and integrity of the confiscated
illegal drug, which is the corpus delicti of the offense charged against appellant.
cralawre d
The Ruling of the Court

We grant the appeal.
While appellant waived the presentation of evidence for his defense, he disputes the identity and integrity of
the illegal drug which is the corpus delicti of the offense charged against him. Appellant maintains that the
prosecution failed to prove the unbroken chain of custody of the illegal drug which gravely impairs its
identity. Without the identity of the corpus delicti being sufficiently established, appellant claims that he
should be acquitted.
It is settled that in prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drug, not only must the essential elements of
the offense be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but likewise the identity of the prohibited drug. The
dangerous drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a
judgment of conviction.10
Necessarily, the prosecution must establish that the substance seized from the accused is the same
substance offered in court as exhibit. In this regard, the prosecution must sufficiently prove the unbroken
chain of custody of the confiscated illegal drug. In People v. Watamama,11 the Court held:
In all prosecutions for the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the existence of the
prohibited drug has to be proved. The chain of custody rule requires that testimony be presented
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized up to the time it is offered in
evidence. To this end, the prosecution must ensure that the substance presented in court is the same
substance seized from the accused.
While this Court recognizes substantial adherence to the requirements of R.A. No. 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations, not perfect adherence, is what is demanded of police officers attending
to drugs cases, still, such officers must present justifiable reason for their imperfect conduct and show that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had been preserved. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Climaco,12 citing Malillin v. People,13 the Court held:
x x x [T]o establish guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in cases involving dangerous drugs, it is
important that the substance illegally possessed in the first place be the same substance offered in court as
exhibit. This chain of custody requirement ensures that unnecessary doubts are removed concerning the
identity of the evidence. When the identity of the dangerous drug recovered from the accused is not the
same dangerous drug presented to the forensic chemist for review and examination, nor the same
dangerous drug presented to the court, the identity of the dangerous drug is not preserved due to the
broken chain of custody. With this, an element in the criminal cases for illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, the corpus delicti, is not proven, and the accused must then be acquitted based on
reasonable doubt. For this reason, [the accused] must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt due
to the broken chain of custody over the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from him.
In this case, there was a glaring gap in the custody of the illegal drug since the prosecution failed to
sufficiently establish who had custody of the illegal drug from the moment it was allegedly transmitted to
the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory on 27 May 2004 until it was allegedly delivered to the Regional
Crime Laboratory on 4 June 2004. There was no evidence presented how the confiscated sachets of shabu
were stored, preserved or labeled nor who had custody prior to their delivery to the Regional Crime
Laboratory and their subsequent presentation before the trial court. This is evident from the testimony of
PO3 Villas, who stated he had no knowledge on who had custody of the sachets of shabu from 27 May 2004
until 4 June 2004. PO3 Villas testified thus:
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
But when the accused was arrested on May 27, 2004, records will
show that the specimen was submitted to the crime laboratory on
June 4, 2004 which is practically several days after. Am I right?
It was turned over to the duty investigator.
Who brought the specimen to the crime laboratory?
I dont know from the duty investigator, sir.
So you are not aware who brought the specimen to the crime
laboratory?
Yes, sir.
But between May 27 and June 4, 2004, who was in custody of the
specimen?
I turned it over to the duty investigator, sir.
On what date?
On May 27 after we turned over the suspect to the investigator, sir.
So your statement which says that the accused was released simply
because the specimen or the result of the examination would not
catch up with the investigation is not correct because you have not
submitted immediately the specimen to the crime laboratory?
COURT
Q
Because it was submitted seven (7) days after the apprehension?
A
I was not the one who is concerned with the submission of
the specimen to the crime laboratory. We turned it over to the
duty investigator and the duty investigator marked the specimen,
Your Honor.
ATTY. GAJITOS
Q
But you will agree that the specimen was submitted to the crime
laboratory by your investigator only on June 4, 2004 or practically a
week after the apprehension?
A
I dont know, sir. It is only now that I came to know,
sir.14 (Emphasis supplied)
The prosecution attempted to fill the gap in the chain of custody. However, such effort proved futile. On redirect examination, PO3 Villas, who earlier testified that he had no knowledge on who had custody of the
illegal drugs prior and during their delivery to the crime laboratories, merely restated the contents of the 3
June 2004 Memorandum from the Chief of the Batangas Police addressed to the Regional Chief,
corresponding to the questions of the prosecutor. In other words, PO3 Villas testified on a piece of
document he had no participation in the preparation or execution thereof. PO3 Villas testified as follows:
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ATTY. GAJITOS

Q
Do you admit there are no significant markings on this black box for
possession or identification more particularly the signature or initial
of the arresting officer?
A
No, sir.
ATTY. GAJITOS
No further question, Your Honor.

COURT
Re-direct.
PROSECUTOR
Q
During your cross-examination, you were asked regarding the fact as
a reply to the question of the defense it was after 7 days that the
specimen was actually brought to the laboratory for examination,
your answer that was correct?
A
Yes, maam.
Q
I am showing to you a document, the indorsement which came from
the Office of the Chief of Police of Batangas City dated May 27, 2004,
can you please go over the same and tell the Court what is the
relevance of that document regarding the delivery of specimen to the
crime laboratory?
A
This is the request prepared by our investigator dated May 27 in
relation to the arrest of Gerardo Enumerable wherein the subject
were three (3) plastic sachets of shabu, it was delivered to Batangas
Provincial Crime Laboratory on the same date, maam.
Q
How did you come to know it was delivered on the same date?
A
There was a stamp receipt by the Provincial Crime Laboratory office
delivered by SPO1 De Castro and received by PO3 Llarena at
Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory, maam.
Q
You likewise identified during the direct examination chemistry report
coming from Camp Vicente Lim, how would you reconcile the fact the
specimen was delivered to the Provincial Crime Laboratory and the
result came from Camp Vicente Lim?
A
It was the Provincial Crime Laboratory of Batangas PPO who made
the indorsements from Batangas Provincial Police Office to the Crime
Laboratory, Camp Vicente Lim, maam.
Q
Do you have proof to show that fact?
A
Yes, maam.
Q
What is that?
A
Letter request made by the Batangas Crime Laboratory to the Crime
Laboratory, Camp Vicente Lim, maam.
Q
This is the same request made by the Batangas Provincial Crime
Laboratory addressed to Regional Crime Laboratory, was there a
proof to show that the specimen together with the indorsement was
actually received by the Crime Laboratory Camp Vicente Lim.
A
Yes, there was a stamp of the Regional Crime Laboratory office
delivered by PO3 Vargas and received by PO3 Macabasco of the
Regional Crime Laboratory, maam.
Q
What date?
A
Q
Q
A
Q
A
It was delivered on June 3 and the specimen was received on June 4,

maam.
Why was it necessary for your office to deliver the specimen to the
Provincial Crime Laboratory, why not directly to the Crime Laboratory
of Camp Vicente Lim?
During that time there was no chemist who examined the specimen
in the Provincial Crime Laboratory so what they did was they
delivered the specimen to the Regional Crime Laboratory, maam.
My question is, why not deliver it directly to Camp Vicente Lim?
The PNP during that time did not have any budget, maam.
How much would it need to deliver the specimen?
It was cheap, sir. The problem was that the Provincial Crime
Laboratory did not have any chemist, they delivered the specimen to
the Regional Crime Laboratory that is why there are many accused
who remained at large, maam.
xxxx
Q
Who brought the specimen to the PNP Crime Laboratory?
A
The officer on duty, Your Honor.
Q
From Batangas to Camp Vicente Lim, do you know the officer?
A
The person who delivered there, it is stated in the document,
Your Honor.
Q
Who was in custody of this specimen from Batangas PNP to
the Provincial Crime Laboratory?
A
The officer, Your Honor.15 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, PO3 Villas had no personal knowledge on (1) how the illegal drugs were delivered and who delivered
the drugs from the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory to the Regional Crime Laboratory; (2) who
received the drugs in the Regional Crime Laboratory; and (3) who had custody of the drugs from 27 May
2004 to 3 June 2004 until their presentation before the trial court. The testimony of PO3 Villas merely
attests to the existence of the Memorandum from the Chief of the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory to
the Regional Crime Laboratory.
While appellant admitted during the pre-trial the authenticity and due execution of the Chemistry Report,
prepared by Police Inspector and Forensic Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas, this admission merely affirms the
existence of the specimen and the request for laboratory examination and the results thereof. Appellants
admission does not relate to the issue of chain of custody. In fact, appellant qualified his admission that the
specimens were not taken or bought from him.16 In People v. Gutierrez, the Court stated:
x x x That the defense stipulated on these matters,viz: that the specimen exists, that a request has been
made by the arresting officers for examination thereof, that a forensic chemist examined it, and that it
tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride has no bearing on the question of chain of custody.
These stipulations, which merely affirm the existence of the specimen, and the request for laboratory
examination and the results thereof, were entered into during pre-trial only in order to dispense with the
testimony of the forensic chemist and abbreviate the proceedings. x x x. 17
Since the failure of the prosecution to establish every link in the chain of custody of the illegal drug gravely
compromised its identity and integrity, which illegal drug is the corpus delicti of the offense charged against
appellant, his acquittal is therefore in order.
chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the appeal and ACQUIT appellant Gerardo Enumerable y De Villa based on
reasonable doubt and we ORDER his immediate release from detention, unless he is detained for any other
lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
cralawla wlibrary
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 202837, January 21, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAKIM MINANGA Y DUMANSAL, AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the June 30, 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 00556-MIN which affirmed the July 10, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan
City, Branch 4, finding accused-appellant Rakim Minanga y Dumansal3 (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Also on appeal is the CA Resolution4 dated November 21,
2011 denying appellants motion for reconsideration.
The case stemmed from the Information5 dated August 13, 2002 charging appellant with violation of Section
11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, for illegal possession of 12.882 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 9549.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. 6
At the trial, Police Officer 1 Rommel dela Cruz Condez (PO1 Condez) and PO2 Saldino Virtudazo (PO2
Virtudazo), Philippine National Police (PNP) officers assigned with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), and Police Senior Inspector Norman G. Jovita (P/Sr. Insp. Jovita), a Forensic Chemist, testified for
the prosecution and established the following facts:
After receiving reliable information from a police asset that appellant is actively engaged in selling illegal
drugs, a team composed of PO1 Condez, PO2 Virtudazo and the police asset was formed to conduct a buybust operation at Purok 3, Barangay 23, Holy Redeemer, Butuan City, against the appellant. PO1 Condez
was designated to act as the poseur-buyer with PO2 Virtudazo as his back-up. The team brought with them
the amount of P20,000.00 as show money.7
Upon arrival at the designated place at around 2:30 p.m. of August 12, 2002, the police asset introduced
PO1 Condez to the appellant as an interested buyer of shabu. After the appellant agreed to sell to PO1
Condez four sacks of shabu for the amount of P20,000.00, appellant told PO1 Condez to wait. Appellant
then left and after a few minutes returned. He then showed PO1 Condez four big sachets of shabu. After
receiving the four sachets, PO1 Condez examined them and being convinced of their genuineness, gave the
prearranged signal. Thus, PO2 Virtudazo rushed to the scene. The police officers introduced themselves as
PDEA agents and arrested the appellant, informing the latter of his constitutional rights. The money was not
given to appellant as it was intended only as show money. PO1 Condez marked the four sachets given by
the appellant as RCC 1 to RCC 4. The appellant was then brought to the police station for investigation. 8
At the police station, appellant was photographed in the presence of a Barangay Captain and a State
Prosecutor.9 Armed with the corresponding requests,10 the four marked sachets and the appellant were
brought by PO1 Condez and PO2 Virtudazo to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. 11 At the PNP
Crime Laboratory, the four sachets were marked as A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 by P/Sr. Insp. Jovita, the Forensic
Chemist.12 While the drug test conducted on the person of the appellant yielded a negative result, 13 the four
sachets with a total weight of 12.882 grams were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. 14
On cross-examination, PO1 Condez testified that initially the PDEA filed a case against the appellant for
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or for illegal sale of shabu but when the investigation
reached the Office of the City Prosecutor the case was modified to one for illegal possession. 15
On the other hand, the defense gave a different version of the story.
The defense presented as its witnesses Nellie Salino Nalasa (Nellie), Benhur Burdeos (Benhur), and the
appellant himself.
Nellie testified that she is the owner of a two-storey house where one Max Malubay (Max) was renting one of
the rooms on the ground floor. She said that on August 12, 2002, at around 11:30 a.m., she noticed a
commotion emanating from the adjacent room rented by Max. She saw three armed persons in white shirts
kicking appellant, a visitor of Max. After witnessing the incident, she hid herself.16
Benhur testified that on August 12, 2002, at around 12:00 noon, he saw four to five persons walking on
single file towards Nellies house. He added that he heard a commotion thereafter and saw a person named
Rakim with handcuffed hands taken by the armed men from Nellies house. He said that there was no buybust operation conducted at that time.17
As the last witness for the defense, appellant denied the charge against him. He testified that on August 12,
2002, at around 12:00 noon, five armed men forcibly entered the room rented by Max and arrested him.
He identified one of the five men as a Muslim who has a grudge against him. He claimed that the Muslim
influenced the police officers to arrest him. He added that in his presence the Muslim gave SPO3 Dindo
Alota money as payment for his arrest. He also claimed that he was mauled and brought to the police
station for investigation; that he was informed that he was arrested for selling illegal drugs; and that at the
police station he was photographed.18
On July 10, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision19 in Criminal Case No. 9549 and found appellant guilty as
charged of violation of Section 11, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (1), 20 Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC
held that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of illegal possession of drugs in this case. The
RTC said that appellants assertion that money was handed by the Muslim to the police officers in his
presence is illogical, uncommon and unconvincing. The RTC also found that the two other defense witnesses
lacked candor and their combined testimonies have earmarks of falsehood. 21 Thus, the RTC disposed of the
case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Rakim Minanga y Dumansal is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt [of] violation of Section 11, paragraph 2, Sub-par. (1) of Art II of Republic Act 9165, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of Life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Four Hundred Thousand (P400,000.00) Pesos without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The four (4) sachets of shabu [are] hereby declared confiscated in favor of the government to be dealt with
in accordance with law.
Accused shall serve his sentence at the Davao Prison and Penal Farm at Sto. Tomas, Davao del Norte and
shall be credited in the service of his sentence with his preventive imprisonment conformably with Art. 29 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
However, accused shall remain at the City Jail until the termination of Crim. Case No. 10161.
SO ORDERED.22
In its June 30, 2011 Decision, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision. In its November 21, 2011
Resolution,23the CA denied appellants motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
In his supplemental brief,24 appellant claims that the CA erred:
I.
In failing to appreciate that the buy-bust operation on 12 August [2002] as admitted to by

police officers in their testimonies, constituted the factual backdrop for the arrest and
indictment of Accused-Appellant for illegal possession of prohibited drugs;
II.
In failing to appreciate serious irregularities attendant to the entrapment operation and

procedure employed by the police officers;
III.
In affirming the lower courts appreciation and application of presumption of regularity in

the performance of official duty by the police officers;
IV.
In failing to appreciate that the failure of the prosecution to cross-examine AccusedAppellant on material and relevant points, did not destroy his oral testimony or direct
examination;
V.
VI.
VII.
In holding that appellants entry of a valid plea and active participation in the trial cured
any defect in his arrest;
In affirming the lower courts finding that the prosecution proved all the elements of the
offense; [and]
Assuming arguendo that indeed Accused-Appellant possessed the prohibited drugs, for
failing to consider that police officers may have engaged in or employed INDUCEMENT
rather than ENTRAPMENT.25
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the appellants guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
We rule in the affirmative.
The essential elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possess the said drug. 26
We find that these essential elements were proven in this case. Appellant was caught in flagrantepossessing
12.882 grams of shabu, a dangerous drug, packed in four big sachets. His possession of said dangerous
drugs is not authorized by law. And he was freely and consciously possessing the contraband as shown by
his act of handing these four sachets to PO1 Condez in an intended sale. We note that appellant was
positively identified by PO1 Condez as the one who handed over the four sachets. However, the money was
not given to appellant as it was intended only as show money.
The Court gives full faith and credence to the testimonies of the police officers and upholds the presumption
of regularity in the apprehending officers performance of official duty. It is a settled rule that in cases
involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police
officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence
to the contrary.27
On the other hand, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption
that the arresting officers regularly performed their duties. Except for his bare allegations of denial and
frame-up that a certain Muslim was behind his arrest, nothing supports his claim that the police officers
were impelled by improper motives to testify against him. In fact, in his direct testimony, appellant was
asked whether he knew said Muslim but despite the opportunity given to him, he failed to identify him in
court.28
This Court has invariably viewed with disfavor the defenses of denial and frame-up. Such defenses can
easily be fabricated and are common ploy in prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous
drugs. In order to prosper, such defenses must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. 29
Moreover, in weighing the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses vis--vis those of the defense, the RTC
gave more credence to the version of the prosecution, to which this Court finds no reason to disagree. Wellsettled is the rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
judge, the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. 30
Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conduct the
buy-bust operation and appellate courts, upon established precedents and of necessity, rely on the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses by the trial courts which have the unique opportunity, unavailable
to the appellate courts, to observe the witnesses and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under
direct and cross-examination.31
Lastly, appellant claims that there was no inventory of the prohibited items allegedly seized from him. He
argues that as a result of this omission, there is doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drugs and that
there was a break in the chain of custody of the evidence. 32
Such argument cannot prosper.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the law itself lays down exceptions to its requirements. Thus, non-compliance with the abovementioned requirements is not fatal. In fact it has been ruled time and again that non-compliance with
Section 21 of the IRR does not make the items seized inadmissible. What is imperative is the preservation
of the integrity and the evidential value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.33
In this case, the chain of custody can be easily established through the following link: (1) PO1 Condez
marked the seized four sachets handed to him by appellant with RCC 1 to RCC 4; (2) a request for
laboratory examination of the seized items marked RCC 1 to RCC 4 was signed by Police Superintendent
Glenn Dichosa Dela Torre;34 (3) the request and the marked items seized, which were personally delivered
by PO1 Condez and PO2 Virtudazo, were received by the PNP Crime Laboratory; (4) Chemistry Report No.
D-106-200235 confirmed that the marked items seized from appellant were methamphetamine
hydrochloride; and (5) the marked items were offered in evidence.
Hence, it is clear that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized drugs were preserved. This
Court, therefore, finds no reason to overturn the findings of the RTC that the drugs seized from appellant
were the same ones presented during trial. Accordingly, it is but logical to conclude that the chain of
custody of the illicit drugs seized from appellant remains unbroken, contrary to the assertions of appellant.
In sum, we find no reversible error committed by the RTC and CA in convicting appellant of illegal
possession of drugs as to warrant the modification much less the reversal thereof. It is hornbook doctrine
that the factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are binding on this Court unless there is a
clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.36 This case
is no exception to the rule. All told, this Court thus sustains the conviction of the appellant for violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
chanroble slaw
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The June 30, 2011 Decision and November 21, 2011 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00556-MIN are AFFIRMED.

With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA
AND THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON,Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
All governmental authority emanates from our people. No unreasonable restrictions of the fundamental and
preferred right to expression of the electorate during political contests no matter how seemingly benign will
be tolerated.
This case defines the extent that our people may shape the debates during elections. It is significant and of
first impression. We are asked to decide whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has the
competence to limit expressions made by the citizens who are not candidates during elections.
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify COMELECs Notice to
Remove Campaign Materials2 dated February 22, 2013 and letter3 issued on February 27, 2013.
The facts are not disputed.
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They
were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message
IBASURA RH Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second
tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.4
This tarpaulin contains the heading Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay
with a check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X mark. 5 The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.6 Those
who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those
who voted against it form Team Buhay:7
TEAM BUHAY
TEAM PATAY
Estrada, JV
Angara, Juan Edgardo
Honasan, Gregorio
Casio, Teddy
Magsaysay, Mitos
Cayetano, Alan Peter
Pimentel, Koko
Enrile, Jackie
Trillanes, Antonio
Escudero, Francis
Villar, Cynthia
Hontiveros, Risa
Party List Buhay
Legarda, Loren
Party List Ang Pamilya
Party List Gabriela

Party List Akbayan
Party List Bayan Muna
Party List Anak Pawis
During oral arguments, respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections,
but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod
City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials8 addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M.
Navarra. The election officer ordered the tarpaulins removal within three (3) days from receipt for being
oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two feet (2) by three feet
(3).9
On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied10 requesting, among others, that (1) petitioner Bishop be given a
definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and (2) pending this opinion and the
availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain. 11
On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter12 ordering the immediate removal of the
tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners. The letter of
COMELEC Law Department was silent on the remedies available to petitioners. The letter provides as
follows:
Dear Bishop Navarra:

It has reached this Office that our Election Officer for this City, Atty. Mavil Majarucon, had already given you
notice on February 22, 2013 as regards the election propaganda material posted on the church vicinity
promoting for or against the candidates and party-list groups with the following names and messages,
particularly described as follows:
Material size
Description
Image of
Message
BUHAY
Location
:
:
:
:
:
:
six feet (6) by ten feet (10)

FULL COLOR TARPAULIN
SEE ATTACHED PICTURES
CONSCIENCE VOTE (ANTI RH) TEAM
(PRO RH) TEAM PATAY
POSTED ON THE CHURCH VICINITY OF THE
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD CITY
The three (3) day notice expired on February 25, 2013.

Considering that the above-mentioned material is found to be in violation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615
promulgated on January 15, 2013 particularly on the size (even with the subsequent division of the said
tarpaulin into two), as the lawful size for election propaganda material is only two feet (2) by three feet
(3), please order/cause the immediate removal of said election propaganda material, otherwise, we shall be
constrained to file an election offense case against you.
We pray that the Catholic Church will be the first institution to help the Commission on Elections in ensuring
the conduct of peaceful, orderly, honest and credible elections.

Thank you and God Bless!
[signed]
ATTY. ESMERALDA AMORA-LADRA
Director IV13
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated
this case through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order.14 They question respondents notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter issued
on February 27, 2013. They pray that: (1) the petition be given due course; (2) a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents from further
proceeding in enforcing their orders for the removal of the Team Patay tarpaulin; and (3) after notice and
hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and void,
and permanently restraining respondents from enforcing them or any other similar order.15
After due deliberation, this court, on March 5, 2013, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from enforcing the assailed notice and letter, and set oral arguments on March 19, 2013. 16
On March 13, 2013, respondents filed their comment 17 arguing that (1) a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed before this court is not the proper remedy to question
the notice and letter of respondents; and (2) the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to regulation by
COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Hence, respondents
claim that the issuances ordering its removal for being oversized are valid and constitutional. 18
During the hearing held on March 19, 2013, the parties were directed to file their respective memoranda
within 10 days or by April 1, 2013, taking into consideration the intervening holidays. 19
The issues, which also served as guide for the oral arguments, are: 20
I.
WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ORDER BY ELECTION OFFICER MAJARUCON AND THE 27
FEBRUARY 2013 ORDER BY THE COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT ARE CONSIDERED JUDGMENTS/FINAL
ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC WHICH WOULD WARRANT A REVIEW OF THIS COURT VIA RULE
65 PETITION[;]
A.
WHETHER PETITIONERS VIOLATED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS DOCTRINE AND

JURISPRUDENTIAL RULES GOVERNING APPEALS FROM COMELEC DECISIONS;
B.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED ORDERS ARE NOT CONSIDERED

JUDGMENTS/FINAL ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC, WHETHER THERE ARE
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD ALLOW THIS COURT TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE[;]
II.
WHETHER IT IS RELEVANT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT
OR ELECTION PROPAGANDA CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT A POLITICAL CANDIDATE[;]
III.
WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OR EXPRESSION (PROTECTED SPEECH), OR ELECTION
PROPAGANDA/POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT[;]
A.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OF EXPRESSION, WHETHER

THE COMELEC POSSESSES THE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE SAME[;]
B.
WHETHER THIS FORM OF EXPRESSION MAY BE REGULATED[;]
IV.
WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ ORDER BY ELECTION OFFICER MAJARUCON AND THE 27
FEBRUARY 2013 ORDER BY THE COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE[;] [AND]
V.
WHETHER THE ACTION OF THE PETITIONERS IN POSTING ITS TARPAULIN VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE.
I
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
I.A
This courts jurisdiction over COMELEC cases
Respondents ask that this petition be dismissed on the ground that the notice and letter are not final orders,
decisions, rulings, or judgments of the COMELEC En Banc issued in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers,
reviewable via Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.21
Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise
objections relating to a grave abuse of discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction. 22 As a special civil
action, there must also be a showing that there be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law.
Respondents contend that the assailed notice and letter are not subject to review by this court, whose power
to review is limited only to final decisions, rulings and orders of the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power.23 Instead, respondents claim that the assailed notice and
letter are reviewable only by COMELEC itself pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution 24 on
COMELECs power to decide all questions affecting elections. 25 Respondents invoke the cases of Ambil, Jr. v.
COMELEC,26Repol v. COMELEC,27Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC,28 Blanco v. COMELEC,29and Cayetano v.
COMELEC,30 to illustrate how judicial intervention is limited to final decisions, orders, rulings and judgments
of the COMELEC En Banc.31
These cases are not applicable.

In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, the losing party in the gubernatorial race of Eastern Samar filed the election
protest.32 At issue was the validity of the promulgation of a COMELEC Division resolution. 33 No motion for
reconsideration was filed to raise this issue before the COMELEC En Banc. This court declared that it did not
have jurisdiction and clarified:
We have interpreted [Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution] 34 to mean final orders, rulings and
decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. This decision
must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory
order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even
a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. 35 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
However, in the next case cited by respondents, Repol v. COMELEC, this court provided exceptions to this
general rule. Repol was another election protest case, involving the mayoralty elections in Pagsanghan,
Samar.36 This time, the case was brought to this court because the COMELEC First Division issued a status
quo ante order against the Regional Trial Court executing its decision pending appeal. 37 This courts ponencia
discussed the general rule enunciated in Ambil, Jr. that it cannot take jurisdiction to review interlocutory
orders of a COMELEC Division.38 However, consistent with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v.
COMELEC,39 it clarified the exception:
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement [of filing a motion for
reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle
of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity,
or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy
available.40
Based on ABS-CBN, this court could review orders and decisions of COMELEC in electoral contests
despite not being reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc, if:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
It will prevent the miscarriage of justice;

The issue involves a principle of social justice;
The issue involves the protection of labor;
The decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity; or
The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only
adequate and speedy remedy available.
Ultimately, this court took jurisdiction in Repol and decided that the status quo ante order issued by the
COMELEC Division was unconstitutional.
Respondents also cite Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC. This case was also an election protest case involving
candidates for the city council of Muntinlupa City.41 Petitioners in Soriano, Jr. filed before this court a petition
for certiorari against an interlocutory order of the COMELEC First Division. 42 While the petition was pending
in this court, the COMELEC First Division dismissed the main election protest case. 43Sorianoapplied the
general rule that only final orders should be questioned with this court. The ponencia for this court, however,
acknowledged the exceptions to the general rule in ABS-CBN.44
Blanco v. COMELEC, another case cited by respondents, was a disqualification case of one of the mayoralty
candidates of Meycauayan, Bulacan.45 The COMELEC Second Division ruled that petitioner could not qualify
for the 2007 elections due to the findings in an administrative case that he engaged in vote buying in the
1995 elections.46 No motion for reconsideration was filed before the COMELEC En Banc. This court, however,
took cognizance of this case applying one of the exceptions in ABS-CBN: The assailed resolution was a
nullity.47
Finally, respondents cited Cayetano v. COMELEC, a recent election protest case involving the mayoralty
candidates of Taguig City.48 Petitioner assailed a resolution of the COMELEC denying her motion for
reconsideration to dismiss the election protest petition for lack of form and substance. 49 This court clarified
the general rule and refused to take cognizance of the review of the COMELEC order. While recognizing the
exceptions in ABS-CBN, this court ruled that these exceptions did not apply.50
Ambil, Jr., Repol, Soriano, Jr., Blanco, and Cayetano cited by respondents do not operate as
precedents to oust this court from taking jurisdiction over this case. All these cases cited involve
election protests or disqualification cases filed by the losing candidate against the winning
candidate.
In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for public office. Their petition is filed
to assert their fundamental right to expression.
Furthermore, all these cases cited by respondents pertained to COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial power. This case pertains to acts of COMELEC in the implementation of its regulatory powers.
When it issued the notice and letter, the COMELEC was allegedly enforcing election laws.
cralawred
I.B
Rule 65, grave abuse of discretion,
and limitations on political speech
The main subject of this case is an alleged constitutional violation: the infringement on speech and the
chilling effect caused by respondent COMELECs notice and letter.
Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the notice51 dated February 22, 2013 and letter52 dated February 27, 2013 ordering the
removal of the tarpaulin.53 It is their position that these infringe on their fundamental right to freedom of
expression and violate the principle of separation of church and state and, thus, are unconstitutional. 54
The jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter is determined from the allegations in the petition.
Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the
court and defines its powers.55 Definitely, the subject matter in this case is different from the cases cited by
respondents.
Nothing less than the electorates political speech will be affected by the restrictions imposed by COMELEC.
Political speech is motivated by the desire to be heard and understood, to move people to action. It is
concerned with the sovereign right to change the contours of power whether through the election of
representatives in a republican government or the revision of the basic text of the Constitution. The zeal
with which we protect this kind of speech does not depend on our evaluation of the cogency of the message.
Neither do we assess whether we should protect speech based on the motives of COMELEC. We evaluate
restrictions on freedom of expression from their effects. We protect both speech and medium because the
quality of this freedom in practice will define the quality of deliberation in our democratic society.
COMELECs notice and letter affect preferred speech. Respondents acts are capable of repetition. Under the
conditions in which it was issued and in view of the novelty of this case, it could result in a chilling effect
that would affect other citizens who want their voices heard on issues during the elections. Other citizens
who wish to express their views regarding the election and other related issues may choose not to, for fear
of reprisal or sanction by the COMELEC.
Direct resort to this court is allowed to avoid such proscribed conditions. Rule 65 is also the procedural
platform for raising grave abuse of discretion.
Both parties point to constitutional provisions on jurisdiction. For petitioners, it referred to this courts
expanded exercise of certiorari as provided by the Constitution as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.56 (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, respondents relied on its constitutional mandate to decide all
questions affectingelections. Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution, provides:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
....
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination
of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and
registration of voters.
Respondents reliance on this provision is misplaced.
We are not confronted here with the question of whether the COMELEC, in its exercise of jurisdiction, gravely
abused it. We are confronted with the question as to whether the COMELEC had any jurisdiction at all with
its acts threatening imminent criminal action effectively abridging meaningful political speech.
It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the effect of COMELECs notice and letter on free
speech. This does not fall under Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution. The use of the word
affecting in this provision cannot be interpreted to mean that COMELEC has the exclusive power to
decideany and all questions that arise during elections. COMELECs constitutional competencies during
elections should not operate to divest this court of its own jurisdiction.
The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution. This
provision provides for this courts original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition. This should
be read alongside the expanded jurisdiction of the court in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave abuse of discretion. Thus,
the constitutionality of the notice and letter coming from COMELEC is within this courts power to review.
During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted
with unconstitutionality on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. This includes actions by
the COMELEC. Furthermore, it is this courts constitutional mandate to protect the people against
governments infringement of their fundamental rights. This constitutional mandate outweighs the
jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC.
It will, thus, be manifest injustice if the court does not take jurisdiction over this case.
cralawre d
I.C
Hierarchy of courts
This brings us to the issue of whether petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in directly filing
their petition before this court.
Respondents contend that petitioners failure to file the proper suit with a lower court of concurrent
jurisdiction is sufficient ground for the dismissal of their petition. 57 They add that observation of the
hierarchy of courts is compulsory, citing Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor.58 While respondents claim that
while there are exceptions to the general rule on hierarchy of courts, none of these are present in this
case.59
On the other hand, petitioners cite Fortich v. Corona60 on this courts discretionary power to take cognizance
of a petition filed directly to it if warranted by compelling reasons, or [by] the nature and importance of the
issues raised. . . .61 Petitioners submit that there are exceptional and compelling reasons to justify a direct
resort [with] this Court.62
In Baez, Jr. v. Concepcion,63 we explained the necessity of the application of the hierarchy of courts:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the
policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield
the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and
thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the
Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to
justify an exception to the policy.64
In Baez, we also elaborated on the reasons why lower courts are allowed to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, citing Vergara v. Suelto:65
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened
with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important
reasons exist therefore. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies
whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of
an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in
either of these courts that the specific action for the writs procurement must be presented. This is and
should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.66 (Emphasis omitted)
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every
level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not
only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise
competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an
executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. 67 To effectively perform these functions, they are
territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial
boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence
as these are physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial
jurisdiction, which properly present the actual case that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality
of such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases
where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed
before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and
law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of
the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil
actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts
and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual
questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating in the
light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar existing precedents. Rather
than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates
these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.
In other words, the Supreme Courts role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect
constitutional rights when these become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in respect of the
hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of such doctrine.
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. 68 This court has full discretionary power to
take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . . filed directly with it for
exceptionally compelling reasons69 or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised
in the petition.70 As correctly pointed out by petitioners,71 we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive branches
of the government.72
In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners right to freedom of
expression in the present case, but also of others in future similar cases. The case before this court involves
an active effort on the part of the electorate to reform the political landscape. This has become a rare
occasion when private citizens actively engage the public in political discourse. To quote an eminent political
theorist:
[T]he theory of freedom of expression involves more than a technique for arriving at better social judgments
through democratic procedures. It comprehends a vision of society, a faith and a whole way of life. The
theory grew out of an age that was awakened and invigorated by the idea of new society in which man's
mind was free, his fate determined by his own powers of reason, and his prospects of creating a rational and
enlightened civilization virtually unlimited. It is put forward as a prescription for attaining a creative,
progressive, exciting and intellectually robust community. It contemplates a mode of life that, through
encouraging toleration, skepticism, reason and initiative, will allow man to realize his full potentialities. It
spurns the alternative of a society that is tyrannical, conformist, irrational and stagnant. 73
In a democracy, the citizens right to freely participate in the exchange of ideas in furtherance of political
decision-making is recognized. It deserves the highest protection the courts may provide, as public
participation in nation-building is a fundamental principle in our Constitution. As such, their right to engage
in free expression of ideas must be given immediate protection by this court.
A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. 74 In these cases, the
imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts from
the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.
In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and
freedom of expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court. The principles laid down in this
decision will likely influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future, especially in the context of
elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for ones chosen candidate, but also the
right to vocalize that choice to the public in general, in the hope of influencing their votes. It may be said
that in an election year, the right to vote necessarily includes the right to free speech and expression. The
protection of these fundamental constitutional rights, therefore, allows for the immediate resort to this
court.
Third, cases of first impression75 warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no
jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the United States
v. Purganan,76 this court took cognizance of the case as a matter of first impression that may guide the
lower courts:
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings,
we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first
impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts. 77
This court finds that this is indeed a case of first impression involving as it does the issue of whether the
right of suffrage includes the right of freedom of expression. This is a question which this court has yet to
provide substantial answers to, through jurisprudence. Thus, direct resort to this court is allowed.
Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim,78 this court held
that:
. . . it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of
this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a
collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its
discussion.79 (Citation omitted)
In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule with finality on
whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or performed acts contrary to the Constitution
through the assailed issuances.
Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was filed during the 2013
election period. Although the elections have already been concluded, future cases may be filed that
necessitate urgency in its resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct
resort to this court.
Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a constitutional body. InAlbano
v. Arranz,80 cited by petitioners, this court held that [i]t is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the
Court of First Instance of each and every province were [to] arrogate itself the power to disregard, suspend,
or contradict any order of the Commission on Elections: that constitutional body would be speedily reduced
to impotence.81
In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies with the lower
courts, any ruling on their part would not have been binding for other citizens whom respondents may place
in the same situation. Besides, this court affords great respect to the Constitution and the powers and duties
imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would be in the best interest of respondents, in order
that their actions may be guided accordingly in the future.
Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents acts in violation of their right to
freedom of expression.
In this case, the repercussions of the assailed issuances on this basic right constitute an exceptionally
compelling reason to justify the direct resort to this court. The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course
of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct resort to this court.
Eighth, the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent
nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.82 In the past, questions similar to
these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of courts included citizens
right to bear arms,83 government contracts involving modernization of voters registration lists, 84 and the
status and existence of a public office.85
This case also poses a question of similar, if not greater import. Hence, a direct action to this court is
permitted.
It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a direct
resort to this court. While generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the present case falls under the
recognized exceptions and, as such, may be resolved by this court directly.
cralawre d
I.D
The concept of a political question
Respondents argue further that the size limitation and its reasonableness is a political question, hence not
within the ambit of this courts power of review. They cite Justice Vitugs separate opinion in Osmea v.
COMELEC86 to support their position:
It might be worth mentioning that Section 26, Article II, of the Constitution also states that the State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined
by law. I see neither Article IX (C)(4) nor Section 26, Article II, of the Constitution to be all that adversarial
or irreconcilably inconsistent with the right of free expression. In any event, the latter, being one of general
application, must yield to the specific demands of the Constitution. The freedom of expression concededly
holds, it is true, a vantage point in hierarchy of constitutionally-enshrined rights but, like all fundamental
rights, it is not without limitations.
The case is not about a fight between the rich and the poor or between the powerful and the weak in
our society but it is to me a genuine attempt on the part of Congress and the Commission on Elections to
ensure that all candidates are given an equal chance to media coverage and thereby be equally perceived as
giving real life to the candidates right of free expression rather than being viewed as an undue restriction of
that freedom. The wisdom in the enactment of the law, i.e., that which the legislature deems to be best in
giving life to the Constitutional mandate, is not for the Court to question; it is a matter that lies beyond the
normal prerogatives of the Court to pass upon.87
This separate opinion is cogent for the purpose it was said. But it is not in point in this case.
The present petition does not involve a dispute between the rich and poor, or the powerful and weak, on
their equal opportunities for media coverage of candidates and their right to freedom of expression. This
case concerns the right of petitioners, who are non-candidates, to post the tarpaulin in their private
property, as an exercise of their right of free expression. Despite the invocation of the political question
doctrine by respondents, this court is not proscribed from deciding on the merits of this case.
In Taada v. Cuenco,88 this court previously elaborated on the concept of what constitutes a political
question:
What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter
which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically
delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to
act.89 (Emphasis omitted)
It is not for this court to rehearse and re-enact political debates on what the text of the law should be. In
political forums, particularly the legislature, the creation of the text of the law is based on a general
discussion of factual circumstances, broadly construed in order to allow for general application by the
executive branch. Thus, the creation of the law is not limited by particular and specific facts that affect the
rights of certain individuals, per se.
Courts, on the other hand, rule on adversarial positions based on existing facts established on a specific
case-to-case basis, where parties affected by the legal provision seek the courts understanding of the law.
The complementary nature of the political and judicial branches of government is essential in order to
ensure that the rights of the general public are upheld at all times. In order to preserve this balance,
branches of government must afford due respect and deference for the duties and functions constitutionally
delegated to the other. Courts cannot rush to invalidate a law or rule. Prudence dictates that we are careful
not to veto political acts unless we can craft doctrine narrowly tailored to the circumstances of the case.
The case before this court does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political
question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the powers or competence of different agencies
and departments of the executive or those of the legislature. The political question doctrine is used as a
defense when the petition asks this court to nullify certain acts that are exclusively within the domain of
their respective competencies, as provided by the Constitution or the law. In such situation, presumptively,
this court should act with deference. It will decline to void an act unless the exercise of that power was so
capricious and arbitrary so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
The concept of a political question, however, never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional
organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the
COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot
do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Marcos v. Manglapus90 limited the use of the political question doctrine:
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose
action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for
that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to
decide.91
How this court has chosen to address the political question doctrine has undergone an evolution since the
time that it had been first invoked in Marcos v. Manglapus. Increasingly, this court has taken the historical
and social context of the case and the relevance of pronouncements of carefully and narrowly tailored
constitutional doctrines. This trend was followed in cases such as Daza v. Singson92 and Coseteng v. Mitra
Jr.93
Daza and Coseteng involved a question as to the application of Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution involving the removal of petitioners from the Commission on Appointments. In times past, this
would have involved a quintessentially political question as it related to the dominance of political parties in
Congress. However, in these cases, this court exercised its power of judicial review noting that the
requirement of interpreting the constitutional provision involved the legality and not the wisdom of a manner
by which a constitutional duty or power was exercised. This approach was again reiterated inDefensor
Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.94
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,95 this court declared again that the possible existence of a
political question did not bar an examination of whether the exercise of discretion was done with grave
abuse of discretion. In that case, this court ruled on the question of whether there was grave abuse of
discretion in the Presidents use of his power to call out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless
violence.
In Estrada v. Desierto,96 this court ruled that the legal question as to whether a former President resigned
was not a political question even if the consequences would be to ascertain the political legitimacy of a
successor President.
Many constitutional cases arise from political crises. The actors in such crises may use the resolution of
constitutional issues as leverage. But the expanded jurisdiction of this court now mandates a duty for it to
exercise its power of judicial review expanding on principles that may avert catastrophe or resolve social
conflict.
This courts understanding of the political question has not been static or unbending. In Llamas v. Executive
Secretary Oscar Orbos,97 this court held:
While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary powers are
exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the issue involved concerns
the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said powers are within the limits prescribed by the
Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power of judicial review. And such review does not
constitute a modification or correction of the act of the President, nor does it constitute interference with the
functions of the President.98
The concept of judicial power in relation to the concept of the political question was discussed most
extensively in Francisco v. HRET.99 In this case, the House of Representatives argued that the question of
the validity of the second impeachment complaint that was filed against former Chief Justice Hilario Davide
was a political question beyond the ambit of this court. Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno elaborated on this
concept in his concurring and dissenting opinion:
To be sure, the force to impugn the jurisdiction of this Court becomes more feeble in light of the new
Constitution which expanded the definition of judicial power as including the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. As well observed by retired Justice Isagani Cruz,
this expanded definition of judicial power considerably constricted the scope of political question. He opined
that the language luminously suggests that this duty (and power) is available even against the executive
and legislative departments including the President and the Congress, in the exercise of their discretionary
powers.100 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Francisco also provides the cases which show the evolution of the political question, as applied in the
following cases:
In Marcos v. Manglapus, this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide. x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The allocation of constitutional boundaries is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution.
Moreover, as held in a recent case, (t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given
to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said
provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.(Emphasis and
italics supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson, speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason
is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still
not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
....
In our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether
the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. 101 (Citations omitted)
As stated in Francisco, a political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review
of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that this
right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political
question brings.
cralawred
I.E
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Respondents allege that petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Respondents insist that petitioners should have first brought the matter to the COMELEC En Banc or any of
its divisions.102
Respondents point out that petitioners failed to comply with the requirement in Rule 65 that there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.103 They add that the
proper venue to assail the validity of the assailed issuances was in the course of an administrative hearing to
be conducted by COMELEC.104 In the event that an election offense is filed against petitioners for posting the
tarpaulin, they claim that petitioners should resort to the remedies prescribed in Rule 34 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.105
The argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe
for adjudication. Ripeness is the prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed
by either branch [or in this case, organ of government] before a court may come into the picture.106
Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable
relevance especially during the elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing of the election offense
against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal
litigation is enough to curtail petitioners speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their
pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
Political speech enjoys preferred protection within our constitutional order. In Chavez v. Gonzales,107Justice
Carpio in a separate opinion emphasized: [i]f ever there is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political
expression would occupy the highest rank, and among different kinds of political expression, the subject of
fair and honest elections would be at the top.108 Sovereignty resides in the people.109 Political speech is a
direct exercise of the sovereignty. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to
protect this fundamental right.
Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable, the current
controversy is within the exceptions to the principle. In Chua v. Ang,110 this court held:
On the other hand, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with and judicial action
may be validly resorted to immediately: (a) when there is a violation of due process; (b) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question; (c) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; (d) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (e)
when there is irreparable injury; (f) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter
ego of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (g) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (h) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (i)
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (j) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy; or (k)when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.111 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
The circumstances emphasized are squarely applicable with the present case. First, petitioners allege that
the assailed issuances violated their right to freedom of expression and the principle of separation of church
and state. This is a purely legal question. Second, the circumstances of the present case indicate the
urgency of judicial intervention considering the issue then on the RH Law as well as the upcoming elections.
Thus, to require the exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case would be unreasonable.
Time and again, we have held that this court has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to except a
case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant, or when the purpose of justice requires it,
[and when] [w]hat constitutes [as] good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is
discretionary upon the court.112 Certainly, this case of first impression where COMELEC has threatened to
prosecute private parties who seek to participate in the elections by calling attention to issues they want
debated by the public in the manner they feel would be effective is one of those cases.
cralawred
II
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
II.A
COMELEC had no legal basis
to regulate expressions
made by private citizens
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power
to regulate the tarpaulin.113 However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties.
Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the
authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a noncandidate in this case.
cralawred
II.A.1
First, respondents cite Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and
space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns
and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.114 (Emphasis supplied)
Sanidad v. COMELEC115 involved the rules promulgated by COMELEC during the plebiscite for the creation of
the Cordillera Autonomous Region.116 Columnist Pablito V. Sanidad questioned the provision prohibiting
journalists from covering plebiscite issues on the day before and on plebiscite day.117 Sanidad argued that
the prohibition was a violation of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the
press. . . .118 We held that the evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a
franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or
radio or television time.119 This court found that [m]edia practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates[,] 120 thus, their
right to expression during this period may not be regulated by COMELEC. 121
Similar to the media, petitioners in the case at bar are neither franchise holders nor candidates.
cralawre d
II.A.2
Respondents likewise cite Article IX-C, Section 2(7) of the Constitution as follows: 122
....
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of
places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds,
offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the enumeration made on acts that may be penalized, it will be inferred that this provision only
affects candidates.
Petitioners assail the Notice to Remove Campaign Materials issued by COMELEC. This was followed by the
assailed letter regarding the election propaganda material posted on the church vicinity promoting for or
against the candidates and party-list groups. . . .123 Section 9 of the Fair Election Act124 on the posting of
campaign materials only mentions parties and candidates:
Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. - The COMELEC may authorize political parties and party-list
groups to erect common poster areas for their candidates in not more than ten (10) public places such as
plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like, wherein candidates can post, display or exhibit election
propaganda: Provided, That the size of the poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12) by sixteen (16) feet or
its equivalent.
Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be authorized to erect common poster areas in
not more than ten (10) public places, the size of which shall not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet or its
equivalent.
Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private places with the consent of the owner
thereof, and in public places or property which shall be allocated equitably and impartially among the
candidates. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 17 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, the rules and regulations implementing the Fair
Election Act, provides as follows:
SECTION 17. Posting of Campaign Materials. - Parties and candidates may post any lawful campaign
material in:
a.
Authorized common poster areas in public places subject to the requirements and/or
limitations set forth in the next following section; and
b.
Private places provided it has the consent of the owner thereof.

The posting of campaign materials in public places outside of the designated common
poster areas and those enumerated under Section 7 (g) of these Rules and the like is
prohibited. Persons posting the same shall be liable together with the candidates and other
persons who caused the posting. It will be presumed that the candidates and parties caused
the posting of campaign materials outside the common poster areas if they do not remove
the same within three (3) days from notice which shall be issued by the Election Officer of
the city or municipality where the unlawful election propaganda are posted or displayed.
Members of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies called upon by the Election Officer
or other officials of the COMELEC shall apprehend the violators caught in the act, and file
the appropriate charges against them. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign material in their issuances. The above provisions
regulating the posting of campaign materials only apply to candidates and political parties, and petitioners
are neither of the two.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9006 on Lawful Election Propaganda also states that these are allowed for
all registered political parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations participating under the
party-list elections and for all bona fide candidates seeking national and local elective positions subject to
the limitation on authorized expenses of candidates and political parties. . . . Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 provides for a similar wording.
These provisions show that election propaganda refers to matter done by or on behalf of and in coordination
with candidates and political parties. Some level of coordination with the candidates and political parties for
whom the election propaganda are released would ensure that these candidates and political parties
maintain within the authorized expenses limitation.
The tarpaulin was not paid for by any candidate or political party.125 There was no allegation that petitioners
coordinated with any of the persons named in the tarpaulin regarding its posting. On the other hand,
petitioners posted the tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the RH Law.
Respondents also cite National Press Club v. COMELEC126 in arguing that its regulatory power under the
Constitution, to some extent, set a limit on the right to free speech during election period. 127
National Press Club involved the prohibition on the sale and donation of space and time for political
advertisements, limiting political advertisements to COMELEC-designated space and time. This case was
brought by representatives of mass media and two candidates for office in the 1992 elections. They argued
that the prohibition on the sale and donation of space and time for political advertisements is tantamount to
censorship, which necessarily infringes on the freedom of speech of the candidates. 128
This court upheld the constitutionality of the COMELEC prohibition in National Press Club. However, this
case does not apply as most of the petitioners were electoral candidates, unlike petitioners in the
instant case. Moreover, the subject matter of National Press Club, Section 11(b) of Republic Act No.
6646,129 only refers to a particular kind of media such as newspapers, radio broadcasting, or
television.130Justice Feliciano emphasized that the provision did not infringe upon the right of reporters or
broadcasters to air their commentaries and opinions regarding the candidates, their qualifications, and
program for government. Compared to Sanidad wherein the columnists lost their ability to give their
commentary on the issues involving the plebiscite, National Press Club does not involve the same
infringement.
In the case at bar, petitioners lost their ability to give a commentary on the candidates for the 2013 national
elections because of the COMELEC notice and letter. It was not merely a regulation on the campaigns of
candidates vying for public office. Thus, National Press Club does not apply to this case.
Finally, Section 79 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, defines an
election campaign as follows:
....
(b) The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to promote
the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of
any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of
any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
The foregoing enumerated acts if performed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for
nomination for candidacy to a public office by a political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties shall not
be considered as election campaign or partisan election activity.
Public expressions or opinions or discussions of probable issues in a forthcoming election or on attributes of
or criticisms against probable candidates proposed to be nominated in a forthcoming political party
convention shall not be construed as part of any election campaign or partisan political activity
contemplated under this Article. (Emphasis supplied)
True, there is no mention whether election campaign is limited only to the candidates and political parties
themselves. The focus of the definition is that the act must be designed to promote the election or defeat of
a particular candidate or candidates to a public office.
In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public concern, that is, a statement of either
appreciation or criticism on votes made in the passing of the RH law. Thus, petitioners invoke their right to
cralawred
II.B
The violation of the constitutional right
to freedom of speech and expression
Petitioners contend that the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violate their
fundamental right to freedom of expression.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to their
regulation pursuant to their mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
notice and letter ordering its removal for being oversized are valid and constitutional. 131
II.B.1
Fundamental to the consideration of this issue is Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution:
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. 132
No law. . .
While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an opinion by the COMELEC Law Department,
this court has applied Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution even to governmental acts.
In Primicias v. Fugoso,133 respondent Mayor applied by analogy Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of
1927 of Manila for the public meeting and assembly organized by petitioner Primicias. 134 Section 1119
requires a Mayors permit for the use of streets and public places for purposes such as athletic games,
sports, or celebration of national holidays.135 What was questioned was not a law but the Mayors refusal to
issue a permit for the holding of petitioners public meeting. 136 Nevertheless, this court recognized the
constitutional right to freedom of speech, to peaceful assembly and to petition for redress of grievances,
albeit not absolute,137 and the petition for mandamus to compel respondent Mayor to issue the permit was
granted.138
In ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, what was assailed was not a law but COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 98-1419
where the COMELEC resolved to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN from
conducting exit surveys.139 The right to freedom of expression was similarly upheld in this case and,
consequently, the assailed resolution was nullified and set aside. 140
. . . shall be passed abridging. . .

All regulations will have an impact directly or indirectly on expression. The prohibition against the
abridgment of speech should not mean an absolute prohibition against regulation. The primary and
incidental burden on speech must be weighed against a compelling state interest clearly allowed in the
Constitution. The test depends on the relevant theory of speech implicit in the kind of society framed by our
Constitution.
. . . of expression. . .
Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom of expression, separate and in addition to the
freedom of speech and of the press provided in the US Constitution. The word expression was added in the
1987 Constitution by Commissioner Brocka for having a wider scope:
MR. BROCKA: This is a very minor amendment, Mr. Presiding Officer. On Section 9, page 2, line 29, it says:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. I would like to recommend to the Committee the
change of the word speech to EXPRESSION; or if not, add the words AND EXPRESSION after the word
speech, because it is more expansive, it has a wider scope, and it would refer to means of expression
other than speech.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon): What does the Committee say?
FR. BERNAS: Expression is more broad than speech. We accept it.
MR. BROCKA: Thank you.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon): Is it accepted?
FR. BERNAS: Yes.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon): Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the
amendment is approved.
FR. BERNAS: So, that provision will now read: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,
expression or of the press . . . .141
Speech may be said to be inextricably linked to freedom itself as [t]he right to think is the beginning of
freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of
thought.142
II.B.2
Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech. 143
Communication exists when (1) a speaker, seeking to signal others, uses conventional actions because he
or she reasonably believes that such actions will be taken by the audience in the manner intended; and (2)
the audience so takes the actions.144 [I]n communicative action[,] the hearer may respond to the claims by
. . . either accepting the speech acts claims or opposing them with criticism or requests for
justification.145
Speech is not limited to vocal communication. [C]onduct is treated as a form of speech sometimes referred
to as symbolic speech[,]146 such that when speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, the communicative element of the conduct may be sufficient to bring into play the
[right to freedom of expression]. 147
The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire continuum of speech from utterances made to
conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of communication.
In Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 148 students who were members of the
religious sect Jehovahs Witnesses were to be expelled from school for refusing to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge.149 In his concurring opinion, Justice Cruz discussed how the
salute is a symbolic manner of communication and a valid form of expression. 150 He adds that freedom of
speech includes even the right to be silent:
Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of Rights that
guarantees to the individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also guarantees to him the liberty not to
utter what is not in his mind. The salute is a symbolic manner of communication that conveys its message
as clearly as the written or spoken word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more
than it can be prohibited in the face of valid religious objections like those raised in this petition. To impose it
on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when their religion bids them to be silent. This
coercion of conscience has no place in the free society.
The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse ideas, including the unconventional and
even the bizarre or eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it cannot regiment thought by prescribing
the recitation by rote of its opinions or proscribing the assertion of unorthodox or unpopular views as in this
case. The conscientious objections of the petitioners, no less than the impatience of those who disagree with
them, are protected by the Constitution. The State cannot make the individual speak when the soul within
rebels. 151
Even before freedom of expression was included in Article III, Section 4 of the present Constitution, this
court has applied its precedent version to expressions other than verbal utterances.
In the 1985 case of Gonzalez v. Chairman Katigbak,152 petitioners objected to the classification of the motion
picture Kapit sa Patalim as For Adults Only. They contend that the classification is without legal and
factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression.153 This court recognized that
[m]otion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression of
the artistic impulse.154 It adds that every writer, actor, or producer, no matter what medium of expression
he may use, should be freed from the censor.155 This court found that [the Boards] perception of what
constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive.156 However, the petition was dismissed solely on the
ground that there were not enough votes for a ruling of grave abuse of discretion in the classification made
by the Board.157
II.B.3
Size does matter
The form of expression is just as important as the information conveyed that it forms part of the expression.
The present case is in point.
It is easy to discern why size matters.
First, it enhances efficiency in communication. A larger tarpaulin allows larger fonts which make it easier to
view its messages from greater distances. Furthermore, a larger tarpaulin makes it easier for passengers
inside moving vehicles to read its content. Compared with the pedestrians, the passengers inside moving
vehicles have lesser time to view the content of a tarpaulin. The larger the fonts and images, the greater the
probability that it will catch their attention and, thus, the greater the possibility that they will understand its
message.
Second, the size of the tarpaulin may underscore the importance of the message to the reader. From an
ordinary persons perspective, those who post their messages in larger fonts care more about their message
than those who carry their messages in smaller media. The perceived importance given by the speakers, in
this case petitioners, to their cause is also part of the message. The effectivity of communication sometimes
relies on the emphasis put by the speakers and on the credibility of the speakers themselves. Certainly,
larger segments of the public may tend to be more convinced of the point made by authoritative figures
when they make the effort to emphasize their messages.
Third, larger spaces allow for more messages. Larger spaces, therefore, may translate to more opportunities
to amplify, explain, and argue points which the speakers might want to communicate. Rather than simply
placing the names and images of political candidates and an expression of support, larger spaces can allow
for brief but memorable presentations of the candidates platforms for governance. Larger spaces allow for
more precise inceptions of ideas, catalyze reactions to advocacies, and contribute more to a more educated
and reasoned electorate. A more educated electorate will increase the possibilities of both good governance
and accountability in our government.
These points become more salient when it is the electorate, not the candidates or the political parties, that
speaks. Too often, the terms of public discussion during elections are framed and kept hostage by brief and
catchy but meaningless sound bites extolling the character of the candidate. Worse, elections sideline
political arguments and privilege the endorsement by celebrities. Rather than provide obstacles to their
speech, government should in fact encourage it. Between the candidates and the electorate, the latter have
the better incentive to demand discussion of the more important issues. Between the candidates and the
electorate, the former have better incentives to avoid difficult political standpoints and instead focus on
appearances and empty promises.
Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and place. 158 They are fundamentally part of
expression protected under Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.
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II.B.4
There are several theories and schools of thought that strengthen the need to protect the basic right to
First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize
government actions.
Proponents of the political theory on deliberative democracy submit that substantial, open, [and] ethical
dialogue is a critical, and indeed defining, feature of a good polity.159 This theory may be considered broad,
but it definitely includes [a] collective decision making with the participation of all who will be affected by
the decision.160 It anchors on the principle that the cornerstone of every democracy is that sovereignty
resides in the people.161 To ensure order in running the states affairs, sovereign powers were delegated and
individuals would be elected or nominated in key government positions to represent the people. On this
note, the theory on deliberative democracy may evolve to the right of the people to make government
accountable. Necessarily, this includes the right of the people to criticize acts made pursuant to
governmental functions.
Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent, should thus
be protected and encouraged.
Borrowing the words of Justice Brandeis, it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that
fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies.162
In this jurisdiction, this court held that [t]he interest of society and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of public affairs.163 This court has, thus, adopted the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open . . . [including even] unpleasantly sharp attacks
on government and public officials.164
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas. This theory was
articulated by Justice Holmes in that the ultimate good desired is better reached by [the] free trade in
ideas:165
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out.166
The way it works, the exposure to the ideas of others allows one to consider, test, and develop their own
conclusions.167 A free, open, and dynamic market place of ideas is constantly shaping new ones. This
promotes both stability and change where recurring points may crystallize and weak ones may develop. Of
course, free speech is more than the right to approve existing political beliefs and economic arrangements
as it includes, [t]o paraphrase Justice Holmes, [the] freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for
the thought that agrees with us.168 In fact, free speech may best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.169 It is
in this context that we should guard against any curtailment of the peoples right to participate in the free
trade of ideas.
Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity. This right is a means of assuring
individual self-fulfillment,170 among others. In Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc,171 this court discussed as follows:
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political
rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru
these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government
through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive
public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring
public officers and employees.172 (Emphasis supplied)
Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity. For one, [v]oluntary associations perform [an] important
democratic role [in providing] forums for the development of civil skills, for deliberation, and for the
formation of identity and community spirit[,] [and] are largely immune from [any] governmental
interference.173 They also provide a buffer between individuals and the state - a free space for the
development of individual personality, distinct group identity, and dissident ideas - and a potential source of
opposition to the state.174 Free speech must be protected as the vehicle to find those who have similar and
shared values and ideals, to join together and forward common goals.
Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to protect individuals and minorities against
majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the] framework [of democratic governance].175 Federalist framers
led by James Madison were concerned about two potentially vulnerable groups: the citizenry at large majorities - who might be tyrannized or plundered by despotic federal officials 176 and the minorities who
may be oppressed by dominant factions of the electorate [that] capture [the] government for their own
selfish ends[.]177 According to Madison, [i]t is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the
other part.178 We should strive to ensure that free speech is protected especially in light of any potential
oppression against those who find themselves in the fringes on public issues.
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory.179 This provides that nonviolent
manifestations of dissent reduce the likelihood of violence[.] 180 [A] dam about to burst . . . resulting in the
banking up of a menacing flood of sullen anger behind the walls of restriction 181 has been used to describe
the effect of repressing nonviolent outlets.182 In order to avoid this situation and prevent people from
resorting to violence, there is a need for peaceful methods in making passionate dissent. This includes free
expression and political participation183 in that they can vote for candidates who share their views, petition
their legislatures to [make or] change laws, . . . distribute literature alerting other citizens of their
concerns[,]184 and conduct peaceful rallies and other similar acts.185 Free speech must, thus, be protected
as a peaceful means of achieving ones goal, considering the possibility that repression of nonviolent dissent
may spill over to violent means just to drive a point.
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II.B.5
Every citizens expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Respondents argue that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners way of endorsing candidates
who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it. 186 As such, it is subject to regulation by
COMELEC under its constitutional mandate.187 Election propaganda is defined under Section 1(4) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 as follows:
SECTION 1. Definitions . . .
....
4. The term political advertisement or election propaganda refers to any matter broadcasted, published,
printed, displayed or exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color
motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of being associated with a
candidate or party, and is intended to draw the attention of the public or a segment thereof to promote or
oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of the said candidate or candidates to a public office. In broadcast
media, political advertisements may take the form of spots, appearances on TV shows and radio programs,
live or taped announcements, teasers, and other forms of advertising messages or announcements used by
commercial advertisers.
Political advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope of personal opinion, that appear on any
Internet website, including, but not limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in
return for consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary estimation.
On the other hand, petitioners invoke their constitutional right to communicate their opinions, views and
beliefs about issues and candidates.188 They argue that the tarpaulin was their statement of approval and
appreciation of the named public officials act of voting against the RH Law, and their criticism toward those
who voted in its favor.189 It was part of their advocacy campaign against the RH Law,190 which was not paid
for by any candidate or political party.191 Thus, the questioned orders which . . . effectively restrain[ed] and
curtail[ed] [their] freedom of expression should be declared unconstitutional and void.192
This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as highly ranked in our scheme of
constitutional values.193 These rights enjoy precedence and primacy.194 In Philippine Blooming Mills, this
court discussed the preferred position occupied by freedom of expression:
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human
rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power
of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the
influential and powerful, and of oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as
they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority
gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.195 (Citations omitted)
This primordial right calls for utmost respect, more so when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of
information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.196 A similar idea appeared in our
jurisprudence as early as 1969, which was Justice Barredos concurring and dissenting opinion in Gonzales
v. COMELEC:197
I like to reiterate over and over, for it seems this is the fundamental point others miss, that genuine
democracy thrives only where the power and right of the people to elect the men to whom they would
entrust the privilege to run the affairs of the state exist. In the language of the declaration of principles of
our Constitution, The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them (Section 1, Article II). Translating this declaration into actuality, the
Philippines is a republic because and solely because the people in it can be governed only by officials whom
they themselves have placed in office by their votes. And in it is on this cornerstone that I hold it to be selfevident that when the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly and redress of grievances are being
exercised in relation to suffrage or as a means to enjoy the inalienable right of the qualified citizen to vote,
they are absolute and timeless. If our democracy and republicanism are to be worthwhile, the conduct of
public affairs by our officials must be allowed to suffer incessant and unabating scrutiny, favorable or
unfavorable, everyday and at all times. Every holder of power in our government must be ready to undergo
exposure any moment of the day or night, from January to December every year, as it is only in this way
that he can rightfully gain the confidence of the people. I have no patience for those who would regard
public dissection of the establishment as an attribute to be indulged by the people only at certain periods of
time. I consider the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly and redress of grievances, when
exercised in the name of suffrage, as the very means by which the right itself to vote can only be properly
enjoyed. It stands to reason therefore, that suffrage itself would be next to useless if these liberties cannot
be untrammelled [sic] whether as to degree or time. 198 (Emphasis supplied)
Not all speech are treated the same. In Chavez v. Gonzales, this court discussed that some types of speech
may be subject to regulation:
Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in
order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or society. The
difference in treatment is expected because the relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g., political
speech, may vary from those of another, e.g., obscene speech. Distinctions have therefore been made in the
treatment, analysis, and evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of speech.
We have ruled, for example, that in our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and obscene speech, as well as
fighting words are not entitled to constitutional protection and may be penalized. 199(Citations omitted)
We distinguish between political and commercial speech. Political speech refers to speech both intended and
received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,200 foster[ing] informed and civic-minded
deliberation.201 On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does no more than
propose a commercial transaction.202
The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
In Justice Brions dissenting opinion, he discussed that [t]he content of the tarpaulin, as well as the timing
of its posting, makes it subject of the regulations in RA 9006 and Comelec Resolution No. 9615.203 He adds
that [w]hile indeed the RH issue, by itself, is not an electoral matter, the slant that the petitioners gave the
issue converted the non-election issue into a live election one hence, Team Buhay and Team Patay and the
plea to support one and oppose the other.204
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this
does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for
consideration by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
The second paragraph of Section 1(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, or the rules and regulations
implementing Republic Act No. 9006 as an aid to interpret the law insofar as the facts of this case requires,
states:
4.
The term political advertisement or election propaganda refers to any matter

broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or exhibited, in any medium, which contain the
name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic
representation that is capable of being associated with a candidate or party, and is intended
to draw the attention of the public or a segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or
indirectly, the election of the said candidate or candidates to a public office. In broadcast
media, political advertisements may take the form of spots, appearances on TV shows and
radio programs, live or taped announcements, teasers, and other forms of advertising
messages or announcements used by commercial advertisers.
Political advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope of personal
opinion, that appear on any Internet website, including, but not limited to, social
networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return for consideration, or
otherwise capable of pecuniary estimation.(Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that this paragraph suggests that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages
are covered.
Thus, the last paragraph of Section 1(1) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 states:
SECTION 1. Definitions - As used in this Resolution:

1.
The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office, and
shall include any of the following:
....
Personal opinions, views, and preferences for candidates, contained in blogs shall not be
considered acts of election campaigning or partisan political activity unless expressed by
government officials in the Executive Department, the Legislative Department, the
Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and members of the Civil Service.
In any event, this case does not refer to speech in cyberspace, and its effects and parameters should be
deemed narrowly tailored only in relation to the facts and issues in this case. It also appears that such
wording in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 does not similarly appear in Republic Act No. 9006, the law it
implements.
We should interpret in this manner because of the value of political speech.
As early as 1918, in United States v. Bustos,205 this court recognized the need for full discussion of public
affairs. We acknowledged that free speech includes the right to criticize the conduct of public men:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp
incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and
an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must
not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and
dignity of the individual be exalted.206
Subsequent jurisprudence developed the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, allowing
for criticism, save for some exceptions.207 In the 1951 case of Espuelas v. People,208 this court noted every
citizens privilege to criticize his or her government, provided it is specific and therefore constructive,
reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up.209
The 1927 case of People v. Titular210 involved an alleged violation of the Election Law provision penaliz[ing]
the anonymous criticism of a candidate by means of posters or circulars.211 This court explained that it is
the posters anonymous character that is being penalized. 212 The ponente adds that he would dislike very
much to see this decision made the vehicle for the suppression of public opinion.213
In 1983, Reyes v. Bagatsing214 discussed the importance of allowing individuals to vent their views.
According to this court, [i]ts value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the
dissenter [and] [t]hat is to ensure a true ferment of ideas.215
Allowing citizens to air grievances and speak constructive criticisms against their government contributes to
every societys goal for development. It puts forward matters that may be changed for the better and ideas
that may be deliberated on to attain that purpose. Necessarily, it also makes the government accountable
for acts that violate constitutionally protected rights.
In 1998, Osmea v. COMELEC found Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibits mass media
from selling print space and air time for campaign except to the COMELEC, to be a democracy-enhancing
measure.216 This court mentioned how discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates in an election are essential to the proper functioning of the government established by our
Constitution.217
As pointed out by petitioners, speech serves one of its greatest public purposes in the context of elections
when the free exercise thereof informs the people what the issues are, and who are supporting what
issues.218 At the heart of democracy is every advocates right to make known what the people need to
know,219 while the meaningful exercise of ones right of suffrage includes the right of every voter to know
what they need to know in order to make their choice.
Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC,220 this court discussed the importance of debate on public issues, and the
freedom of expression especially in relation to information that ensures the meaningful exercise of the right
of suffrage:
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open
and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials. Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate,
the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.
We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when
what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of
suffrage.221 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Speech with political consequences is at the core of the freedom of expression and must be protected by this
court.
Justice Brion pointed out that freedom of expression is not the god of rights to which all other rights and
even government protection of state interest must bow.222
The right to freedom of expression is indeed not absolute. Even some forms of protected speech are still
subject to some restrictions. The degree of restriction may depend on whether the regulation is contentbased or content-neutral.223 Content-based regulations can either be based on the viewpoint of the speaker
or the subject of the expression.
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II.B.6
Content-based regulation
COMELEC contends that the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-neutral regulation. The order was
made simply because petitioners failed to comply with the maximum size limitation for lawful election
propaganda.224
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the present size regulation is content-based as it applies only to
political speech and not to other forms of speech such as commercial speech. 225 [A]ssuming arguendo that
the size restriction sought to be applied . . . is a mere time, place, and manner regulation, its still
unconstitutional for lack of a clear and reasonable nexus with a constitutionally sanctioned objective.226
The regulation may reasonably be considered as either content-neutral or content-based. 227 Regardless, the
disposition of this case will be the same. Generally, compared with other forms of speech, the proposed
speech is content-based.
As pointed out by petitioners, the interpretation of COMELEC contained in the questioned order applies only
to posters and tarpaulins that may affect the elections because they deliver opinions that shape both their
choices. It does not cover, for instance, commercial speech.
Worse, COMELEC does not point to a definite view of what kind of expression of non-candidates will be
adjudged as election paraphernalia. There are no existing bright lines to categorize speech as electionrelated and those that are not. This is especially true when citizens will want to use their resources to be
able to raise public issues that should be tackled by the candidates as what has happened in this case.
COMELECs discretion to limit speech in this case is fundamentally unbridled.
Size limitations during elections hit at a core part of expression. The content of the tarpaulin is not easily
divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and
present danger rule as measure.228 Thus, in Chavez v. Gonzales:
A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the
clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling
reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague. 229 (Citations omitted)
Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high.230 Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and
present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming
the presumed unconstitutionality.231
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment
of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate
petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone
elses constitutional rights.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on the subject matter of the utterance or
speech.232 In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech
such as time, place, or manner of the speech.233
This court has attempted to define content-neutral restraints starting with the 1948 case of Primicias v.
Fugoso.234 The ordinance in this case was construed to grant the Mayor discretion only to determine the
public places that may be used for the procession or meeting, but not the power to refuse the issuance of a
permit for such procession or meeting.235 This court explained that free speech and peaceful assembly are
not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society.236
The earlier case of Calalang v. Williams237 involved the National Traffic Commission resolution that prohibited
the passing of animal-drawn vehicles along certain roads at specific hours. 238 This court similarly discussed
police power in that the assailed rules carry out the legislative policy that aims to promote safe transit upon
and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public.239
As early as 1907, United States v. Apurado240 recognized that more or less disorder will mark the public
assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions
feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement. . . .241 It is with this backdrop that the state is
justified in imposing restrictions on incidental matters as time, place, and manner of the speech.
In the landmark case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, this court summarized the steps that permit applicants must
follow which include informing the licensing authority ahead of time as regards the date, public place, and
time of the assembly.242 This would afford the public official time to inform applicants if there would be valid
objections, provided that the clear and present danger test is the standard used for his decision and the
applicants are given the opportunity to be heard.243 This ruling was practically codified in Batas Pambansa
No. 880, otherwise known as the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
Subsequent jurisprudence have upheld Batas Pambansa No. 880 as a valid content-neutral regulation. In the
2006 case of Bayan v. Ermita,244 this court discussed how Batas Pambansa No. 880 does not prohibit
assemblies but simply regulates their time, place, and manner.245 In 2010, this court found in Integrated Bar
of the Philippines v. Atienza246 that respondent Mayor Atienza committed grave abuse of discretion when he
modified the rally permit by changing the venue from Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda without first
affording petitioners the opportunity to be heard.247
We reiterate that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced
from the size of its medium.
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II.B.7
Justice Carpio and Justice Perlas-Bernabe suggest that the provisions imposing a size limit for tarpaulins are
content-neutral regulations as these restrict the manner by which speech is relayed but not thecontent of
what is conveyed.248
If we apply the test for content-neutral regulation, the questioned acts of COMELEC will not pass the three
requirements for evaluating such restraints on freedom of speech. 249 When the speech restraints take the
form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required for its
validity,250 and it is subject only to the intermediate approach.251
This intermediate approach is based on the test that we have prescribed in several cases. 252 A contentneutral government regulation is sufficiently justified:
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; 3 if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and 4 if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.253
On the first requisite, it is not within the constitutional powers of the COMELEC to regulate the tarpaulin. As
discussed earlier, this is protected speech by petitioners who are non-candidates.
On the second requirement, not only must the governmental interest be important or substantial, it must
also be compelling as to justify the restrictions made.
Compelling governmental interest would include constitutionally declared principles. We have held, for
example, that the welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and care for them, as parens
patriae,254 constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating . . . utterances in TV
broadcast.255
Respondent invokes its constitutional mandate to ensure equal opportunity for public information campaigns
among candidates in connection with the holding of a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
election.256
Justice Brion in his dissenting opinion discussed that [s]ize limits to posters are necessary to ensure
equality of public information campaigns among candidates, as allowing posters with different sizes gives
candidates and their supporters the incentive to post larger posters[,] [and] [t]his places candidates with
more money and/or with deep-pocket supporters at an undue advantage against candidates with more
humble financial capabilities.257
First, Adiong v. COMELEC has held that this interest is not as important as the right of [a private citizen] to
freely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech.258 In any case, faced with both rights to
freedom of speech and equality, a prudent course would be to try to resolve the tension in a way that
protects the right of participation.259
Second, the pertinent election laws related to private property only require that the private property owners
consent be obtained when posting election propaganda in the property.260 This is consistent with the
fundamental right against deprivation of property without due process of law.261 The present facts do not
involve such posting of election propaganda absent consent from the property owner. Thus, this regulation
does not apply in this case.
Respondents likewise cite the Constitution262 on their authority to recommend effective measures to
minimize election spending. Specifically, Article IX-C, Section 2(7) provides:
....
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of
places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds,
offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates.(Emphasis supplied)
This does not qualify as a compelling and substantial government interest to justify regulation of the
preferred right to freedom of expression.
The assailed issuances for the removal of the tarpaulin are based on the two feet (2) by three feet (3) size
limitation under Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615. This resolution implements the Fair Election
Act that provides for the same size limitation.263
This court held in Adiong v. COMELEC that [c]ompared to the paramount interest of the State in
guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal
significance.264 In fact, speech with political consequences, as in this case, should be encouraged and not
curtailed. As petitioners pointed out, the size limitation will not serve the objective of minimizing election
spending considering there is no limit on the number of tarpaulins that may be posted. 265
The third requisite is likewise lacking. We look not only at the legislative intent or motive in imposing the
restriction, but more so at the effects of such restriction, if implemented. The restriction must not be
narrowly tailored to achieve the purpose. It must be demonstrable. It must allow alternative avenues for the
actor to make speech.
In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of speech. Limiting the maximum size of
the tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners message and violate their right to exercise freedom of
expression.
The COMELECs act of requiring the removal of the tarpaulin has the effect of dissuading expressions with
political consequences. These should be encouraged, more so when exercised to make more meaningful the
equally important right to suffrage.
The restriction in the present case does not pass even the lower test of intermediate scrutiny for contentneutral regulations.
The action of the COMELEC in this case is a strong deterrent to further speech by the electorate. Given the
stature of petitioners and their message, there are indicators that this will cause a chilling effect on robust
discussion during elections.
The form of expression is just as important as the message itself. In the words of Marshall McLuhan, the
medium is the message.266 McLuhans colleague and mentor Harold Innis has earlier asserted that the
materials on which words were written down have often counted for more than the words themselves.267
III
Freedom of expression and equality
III.A
The possibility of abuse
Of course, candidates and political parties do solicit the help of private individuals for the endorsement of
their electoral campaigns.
On the one extreme, this can take illicit forms such as when endorsement materials in the form of
tarpaulins, posters, or media advertisements are made ostensibly by friends but in reality are really paid
for by the candidate or political party. This skirts the constitutional value that provides for equal
opportunities for all candidates.

However, as agreed by the parties during the oral arguments in this case, this is not the situation that
confronts us. In such cases, it will simply be a matter for investigation and proof of fraud on the part of the
COMELEC.
The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any relationship to any political candidate
should not be held hostage by the possibility of abuse by those seeking to be elected. It is true that there
can be underhanded, covert, or illicit dealings so as to hide the candidates real levels of expenditures.
However, labelling all expressions of private parties that tend to have an effect on the debate in the elections
as election paraphernalia would be too broad a remedy that can stifle genuine speech like in this case.
Instead, to address this evil, better and more effective enforcement will be the least restrictive means to the
fundamental freedom.
On the other extreme, moved by the credentials and the message of a candidate, others will spend their
own resources in order to lend support for the campaigns. This may be without agreement between the
speaker and the candidate or his or her political party. In lieu of donating funds to the campaign, they will
instead use their resources directly in a way that the candidate or political party would have done so. This
may effectively skirt the constitutional and statutory limits of campaign spending.
Again, this is not the situation in this case.
The message of petitioners in this case will certainly not be what candidates and political parties will carry in
their election posters or media ads. The message of petitioner, taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a social
issue that it deeply believes. Through rhetorical devices, it communicates the desire of Diocese that the
positions of those who run for a political position on this social issue be determinative of how the public will
vote. It primarily advocates a stand on a social issue; only secondarily even almost incidentally
will cause the election or non-election of a candidate.
The twin tarpaulins consist of satire of political parties. Satire is a literary form that employs such devices
as sarcasm, irony and ridicule to deride prevailing vices or follies,268 and this may target any individual or
group in society, private and government alike. It seeks to effectively communicate a greater purpose, often
used for political and social criticism269 because it tears down facades, deflates stuffed shirts, and
unmasks hypocrisy. . . . Nothing is more thoroughly democratic than to have the high-and-mighty
lampooned and spoofed.270 Northrop Frye, well-known in this literary field, claimed that satire had two
defining features: one is wit or humor founded on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque and absurd, the
other is an object of attack.271 Thus, satire frequently uses exaggeration, analogy, and other rhetorical
devices.
The tarpaulins exaggerate. Surely, Team Patay does not refer to a list of dead individuals nor could the
Archbishop of the Diocese of Bacolod have intended it to mean that the entire plan of the candidates in his
list was to cause death intentionally. The tarpaulin caricatures political parties and parodies the intention of
those in the list. Furthermore, the list of Team Patay is juxtaposed with the list of Team Buhay that
further emphasizes the theme of its author: Reproductive health is an important marker for the church of
petitioners to endorse.
The messages in the tarpaulins are different from the usual messages of candidates. Election paraphernalia
from candidates and political parties are more declarative and descriptive and contain no sophisticated
literary allusion to any social objective. Thus, they usually simply exhort the public to vote for a person with
a brief description of the attributes of the candidate. For example Vote for [x], Sipag at Tiyaga, Vote for
[y], Mr. Palengke, or Vote for [z], Iba kami sa Makati.
This courts construction of the guarantee of freedom of expression has always been wary of censorship or
subsequent punishment that entails evaluation of the speakers viewpoint or the content of ones speech.
This is especially true when the expression involved has political consequences. In this case, it hopes to
affect the type of deliberation that happens during elections. A becoming humility on the part of any human
institution no matter how endowed with the secular ability to decide legal controversies with finality entails
that we are not the keepers of all wisdom.
Humanitys lack of omniscience, even acting collectively, provides space for the weakest dissent. Tolerance
has always been a libertarian virtue whose version is embedded in our Bill of Rights. There are occasional
heretics of yesterday that have become our visionaries. Heterodoxies have always given us pause. The
unforgiving but insistent nuance that the majority surely and comfortably disregards provides us with the
checks upon reality that may soon evolve into creative solutions to grave social problems. This is the
utilitarian version. It could also be that it is just part of human necessity to evolve through being able to
express or communicate.
However, the Constitution we interpret is not a theoretical document. It contains other provisions which,
taken together with the guarantee of free expression, enhances each others value. Among these are the
provisions that acknowledge the idea of equality. In shaping doctrine construing these constitutional values,
this court needs to exercise extraordinary prudence and produce narrowly tailored guidance fit to the facts
as given so as not to unwittingly cause the undesired effect of diluting freedoms as exercised in reality and,
thus, render them meaningless.
cralawre d
III.B.
Speech and equality:
Some considerations
We first establish that there are two paradigms of free speech that separate at the point of giving priority to
equality vis--vis liberty.272
In an equality-based approach, politically disadvantaged speech prevails over regulation[,] but regulation
promoting political equality prevails over speech.273 This view allows the government leeway to redistribute
or equalize speaking power, such as protecting, even implicitly subsidizing, unpopular or dissenting voices
often systematically subdued within societys ideological ladder.274 This view acknowledges that there are
dominant political actors who, through authority, power, resources, identity, or status, have capabilities that
may drown out the messages of others. This is especially true in a developing or emerging economy that is
part of the majoritarian world like ours.
The question of libertarian tolerance
This balance between equality and the ability to express so as to find ones authentic self or to participate in
the self determination of ones communities is not new only to law. It has always been a philosophical
problematique.
In his seminal work, Repressive Tolerance, philosopher and social theorist Herbert Marcuse recognized how
institutionalized inequality exists as a background limitation, rendering freedoms exercised within such
limitation as merely protect[ing] the already established machinery of discrimination.275 In his view, any
improvement in the normal course of events within an unequal society, without subversion, only
strengthens existing interests of those in power and control. 276
In other words, abstract guarantees of fundamental rights like freedom of expression may become
meaningless if not taken in a real context. This tendency to tackle rights in the abstract compromises
liberties. In his words:
Liberty is self-determination, autonomythis is almost a tautology, but a tautology which results from a
whole series of synthetic judgments. It stipulates the ability to determine ones own life: to be able to
determine what to do and what not to do, what to suffer and what not. But the subject of this autonomy is
never the contingent, private individual as that which he actually is or happens to be; it is rather the
individual as a human being who is capable of being free with the others. And the problem of making
possible such a harmony between every individual liberty and the other is not that of finding a compromise
between competitors, or between freedom and law, between general and individual interest, common and
private welfare in an established society, but of creating the society in which man is no longer enslaved by
institutions which vitiate self-determination from the beginning. In other words, freedom is still to be created
even for the freest of the existing societies.277(Emphasis in the original)
Marcuse suggests that the democratic argument with all opinions presented to and deliberated by the
people implies a necessary condition, namely, that the people must be capable of deliberating and
choosing on the basis of knowledge, that they must have access to authentic information, and that, on this
basis, their evaluation must be the result of autonomous thought.278 He submits that [d]ifferent opinions
and philosophies can no longer compete peacefully for adherence and persuasion on rational grounds: the
marketplace of ideas is organized and delimited by those who determine the national and the individual
interest.279
A slant toward left manifests from his belief that there is a natural right of resistance for oppressed and
overpowered minorities to use extralegal means if the legal ones have proved to be inadequate.280Marcuse,
thus, stands for an equality that breaks away and transcends from established hierarchies, power structures,
and indoctrinations. The tolerance of libertarian society he refers to as repressive tolerance.
Legal scholars
The 20th century also bears witness to strong support from legal scholars for stringent protections of
expressive liberty,281 especially by political egalitarians. Considerations such as expressive, deliberative,
and informational interests,282 costs or the price of expression, and background facts, when taken together,
produce bases for a system of stringent protections for expressive liberties. 283
Many legal scholars discuss the interest and value of expressive liberties. Justice Brandeis proposed that
public discussion is a political duty.284 Cass Sustein placed political speech on the upper tier of his two-tier
model for freedom of expression, thus, warranting stringent protection. 285 He defined political speech as
both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue.286
But this is usually related also to fair access to opportunities for such liberties. 287 Fair access to opportunity is
suggested to mean substantive equality and not mere formal equality since favorable conditions for
realizing the expressive interest will include some assurance of the resources required for expression and
some guarantee that efforts to express views on matters of common concern will not be drowned out by the
speech of better-endowed citizens.288
Justice Brandeis solution is to remedy the harms of speech with more speech.289 This view moves away
from playing down the danger as merely exaggerated, toward tak[ing] the costs seriously and embrac[ing]
expression as the preferred strategy for addressing them.290
However, in some cases, the idea of more speech may not be enough. Professor Laurence Tribe observed the
need for context and the specification of substantive values before [equality] has full meaning.291Professor
Catherine A. MacKinnon adds that equality continues to be viewed in a formal rather than a substantive
sense.292 Thus, more speech can only mean more speech from the few who are dominant rather than those
who are not.
Our jurisprudence
This court has tackled these issues.
Osmea v. COMELEC affirmed National Press Club v. COMELEC on the validity of Section 11(b) of the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.293 This section prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge
print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on
Elections.294This court explained that this provision only regulates the time and manner of advertising in
order to ensure media equality among candidates.295 This court grounded this measure on constitutional
provisions mandating political equality:296
Article IX-C, Section 4

Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and
space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns
and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XIII, Section 1
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its
increments. (Emphasis supplied)
Article II, Section 26
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in these cases, we have acknowledged the Constitutions guarantee for more substantive expressive
freedoms that take equality of opportunities into consideration during elections.
The other view
However, there is also the other view. This is that considerations of equality of opportunity or equality in the
ability of citizens as speakers should not have a bearing in free speech doctrine.
Under this view, members of the public are trusted to make their own individual evaluations of speech, and
government is forbidden to intervene for paternalistic or redistributive reasons . . . [thus,] ideas are best left
to a freely competitive ideological market.297 This is consistent with the libertarian suspicion on the use of
viewpoint as well as content to evaluate the constitutional validity or invalidity of speech.
The textual basis of this view is that the constitutional provision uses negative rather than affirmative
language. It uses speech as its subject and not speakers.298 Consequently, the Constitution protects free
speech per se, indifferent to the types, status, or associations of its speakers. 299 Pursuant to this,
government must leave speakers and listeners in the private order to their own devices in sorting out the
relative influence of speech.300
Justice Romeros dissenting opinion in Osmea v. COMELEC formulates this view that freedom of speech
includes not only the right to express ones views, but also other cognate rights relevant to the free
communication [of] ideas, not excluding the right to be informed on matters of public concern.301 She
adds:
And since so many imponderables may affect the outcome of elections qualifications of voters and
candidates, education, means of transportation, health, public discussion, private animosities, the weather,
the threshold of a voters resistance to pressure the utmost ventilation of opinion of men and issues,
through assembly, association and organizations,both by the candidate and the voter, becomes a sine qua
non for elections to truly reflect the will of the electorate. 302 (Emphasis supplied)
Justice Romeros dissenting opinion cited an American case, if only to emphasize free speech primacy such
that courts, as a rule are wary to impose greater restrictions as to any attempt to curtail speeches with
political content,303 thus:
the concept that the government may restrict the speech of some elements in our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of the others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment which was designed to
secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources and to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.304
This echoes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes submission that the market place of ideas is still the best
alternative to censorship.305
Parenthetically and just to provide the whole detail of the argument, the majority of the US Supreme Court
in the campaign expenditures case of Buckley v. Valeo condemned restrictions (even if content-neutral) on
expressive liberty imposed in the name of enhanc[ing] the relative voice of others and thereby equaliz[ing]
access to the political arena.306 The majority did not use the equality-based paradigm.
One flaw of campaign expenditure limits is that any limit placed on the amount which a person can speak,
which takes out of his exclusive judgment the decision of when enough is enough, deprives him of his free
speech.307
Another flaw is how [a]ny quantitative limitation on political campaigning inherently constricts the sum of
public information and runs counter to our profound national commitment that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. 308
In fact, [c]onstraining those who have funds or have been able to raise funds does not ease the plight of
those without funds in the first place . . . [and] even if ones main concern is slowing the increase in political
costs, it may be more effective to rely on market forces to achieve that result than on active legal
intervention.309 According to Herbert Alexander, [t]o oppose limitations is not necessarily to argue that the
skys the limit [because in] any campaign there are saturation levels and a point where spending no longer
pays off in votes per dollar.310
III.C.
When private speech amounts
to election paraphernalia
The scope of the guarantee of free expression takes into consideration the constitutional respect for human
potentiality and the effect of speech. It valorizes the ability of human beings to express and their necessity
to relate. On the other hand, a complete guarantee must also take into consideration the effects it will have
in a deliberative democracy. Skewed distribution of resources as well as the cultural hegemony of the
majority may have the effect of drowning out the speech and the messages of those in the minority. In a
sense, social inequality does have its effect on the exercise and effect of the guarantee of free speech. Those
who have more will have better access to media that reaches a wider audience than those who have less.
Those who espouse the more popular ideas will have better reception than the subversive and the dissenters
of society. To be really heard and understood, the marginalized view normally undergoes its own degree of
struggle.
The traditional view has been to tolerate the viewpoint of the speaker and the content of his or her
expression. This view, thus, restricts laws or regulation that allows public officials to make judgments of the
value of such viewpoint or message content. This should still be the principal approach.
However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding equality in opportunity must provide limits to some
expression during electoral campaigns.
Thus clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by candidates or the members
of their political parties or their political parties may be regulated as to time, place, and manner. This is the
effect of our rulings in Osmea v. COMELEC and National Press Club v. COMELEC.
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or who
do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social
issue that the public must consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with
the guarantee of according the fullest possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including those
that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.
This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a private citizen which will not amount to an
election paraphernalia to be validly regulated by law.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who
are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if
what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement
of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to
meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy
of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object.
The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In
no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will
not matter whether the speech is made with or on private property.
This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as discussed, the principal message in
the twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a social advocacy.
Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio, the present law Section 3.3 of
Republic Act No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 if applied to this case, will not
pass the test of reasonability. A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without any relation to the
distance from the intended average audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters measuring 2 by
3 feet could no longer be read by the general public and, hence, would render speech meaningless. It will
amount to the abridgement of speech with political consequences.
cralawre d
IV
Right to property
Other than the right to freedom of expression 311 and the meaningful exercise of the right to suffrage, 312 the
present case also involves ones right to property.313
Respondents argue that it is the right of the state to prevent the circumvention of regulations relating to
election propaganda by applying such regulations to private individuals. 314
Certainly, any provision or regulation can be circumvented. But we are not confronted with this possibility.
Respondents agree that the tarpaulin in question belongs to petitioners. Respondents have also agreed,
during the oral arguments, that petitioners were neither commissioned nor paid by any candidate or political
party to post the material on their walls.
Even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of
petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
In Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz: 315
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an
arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the
constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws. 316 (Citation omitted)
This court in Adiong held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is so
broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property.317 Consequently, it violates Article III, Section
1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of
law. This court explained:
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose
of it; and the Constitution, in the 14th Amendment, protects these essential attributes.
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to
acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property. Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391, 41 L. ed. 780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. Property consists of the free use,
enjoyment, and disposal of a persons acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law of the land.
1 Cooleys Bl. Com. 127. (Buchanan v. Warley 245 US 60 [1917])[318]
This court ruled that the regulation in Adiong violates private property rights:
The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a
liberty interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing
and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.
Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the posting or display of
election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, except in the common poster areas sanctioned
by COMELEC. This means that a private person cannot post his own crudely prepared personal poster on his
own front door or on a post in his yard. While the COMELEC will certainly never require the absurd, there are
no limits to what overzealous and partisan police officers, armed with a copy of the statute or regulation,
may do.319
Respondents ordered petitioners, who are private citizens, to remove the tarpaulin from their own property.
The absurdity of the situation is in itself an indication of the unconstitutionality of COMELECs interpretation
of its powers.
Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be no expression
when there is no place where the expression may be made. COMELECs infringement upon petitioners
property rights as in the present case also reaches out to infringement on their fundamental right to speech.
Respondents have not demonstrated that the present state interest they seek to promote justifies the
intrusion into petitioners property rights. Election laws and regulations must be reasonable. It must also
acknowledge a private individuals right to exercise property rights. Otherwise, the due process clause will
be violated.
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 and the Fair Election Act intend to prevent the posting of election propaganda
in private property without the consent of the owners of such private property. COMELEC has incorrectly
implemented these regulations. Consistent with our ruling in Adiong, we find that the act of respondents in
seeking to restrain petitioners from posting the tarpaulin in their own private property is an impermissible
encroachments on the right to property.
cralawred
V
Tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech
We proceed to the last issues pertaining to whether the COMELEC in issuing the questioned notice and letter
violated the right of petitioners to the free exercise of their religion.
At the outset, the Constitution mandates the separation of church and state. 320 This takes many forms.
Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution, for instance provides:
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
There are two aspects of this provision.321 The first is the non-establishment clause.322 Second is the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. 323
The second aspect is at issue in this case.

Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz, imams, or any other religious make such
act immune from any secular regulation.324 The religious also have a secular existence. They exist within a
society that is regulated by law.
The Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting of the tarpaulin. But not all acts of a bishop amounts to religious
expression. This notwithstanding petitioners claim that the views and position of the petitioners, the Bishop
and the Diocese of Bacolod, on the RH Bill is inextricably connected to its Catholic dogma, faith, and moral
teachings. . . .325
The difficulty that often presents itself in these cases stems from the reality that every act can be motivated
by moral, ethical, and religious considerations. In terms of their effect on the corporeal world, these acts
range from belief, to expressions of these faiths, to religious ceremonies, and then to acts of a secular
character that may, from the point of view of others who do not share the same faith or may not subscribe
to any religion, may not have any religious bearing.
Definitely, the characterizations of the religious of their acts are not conclusive on this court. Certainly, our
powers of adjudication cannot be blinded by bare claims that acts are religious in nature.
Petitioners erroneously relied on the case of Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu 326in
claiming that the court emphatically held that the adherents of a particular religion shall be the ones to
determine whether a particular matter shall be considered ecclesiastical in nature. 327 This court in Ebralinag
exempted Jehovahs Witnesses from participating in the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious
beliefs, [no matter how] bizarre those beliefs may seem to others.328 This court found a balance between
the assertion of a religious practice and the compelling necessities of a secular command. It was an early
attempt at accommodation of religious beliefs.
In Estrada v. Escritor,329 this court adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality:
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of
religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically
into account not to promote the governments favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups
to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the government
[may] take religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental
regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to
create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.330
This court also discussed the Lemon test in that case, such that a regulation is constitutional when: (1) it
has a secular legislative purpose; (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not foster an
excessive entanglement with religion.331
As aptly argued by COMELEC, however, the tarpaulin, on its face, does not convey any religious doctrine of
the Catholic church.332 That the position of the Catholic church appears to coincide with the message of the
tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of religious speech.
On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified under Team Patay and Team Buhay
according to their respective votes on the RH Law.
The same may be said of petitioners reliance on papal encyclicals to support their claim that the expression
on the tarpaulin is an ecclesiastical matter. With all due respect to the Catholic faithful, the church doctrines
relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the
tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious
speech.
Furthermore, the definition of an ecclesiastical affair in Austria v. National Labor Relations
Commission333 cited by petitioners finds no application in the present case. The posting of the tarpaulin does
not fall within the category of matters that are beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts as enumerated in the
Austria case such as proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of
sacraments and other activities with attached religious significance.334
A FINAL NOTE
We maintain sympathies for the COMELEC in attempting to do what it thought was its duty in this case.
However, it was misdirected.
COMELECs general role includes a mandate to ensure equal opportunities and reduce spending among
candidates and their registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the speech of the electorate as it
strives to participate in the electoral exercise.
The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a caricature of those who are running for public office.
Their message may be construed generalizations of very complex individuals and party-list organizations.
They are classified into black and white: as belonging to Team Patay or Team Buhay.
But this caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.
That petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single issue
and a complex piece of legislation at that can easily be interpreted as an attempt to stereotype the
candidates and party-list organizations. Not all may agree to the way their thoughts were expressed, as in
fact there are other Catholic dioceses that chose not to follow the example of petitioners.
Some may have thought that there should be more room to consider being more broad-minded and nonjudgmental. Some may have expected that the authors would give more space to practice forgiveness and
humility.
But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is
not a detailed code that prescribes good conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their conscience,
not only in the act that they do to others but also in judgment of the acts of others.
Freedom for the thought we can disagree with can be wielded not only by those in the minority. This can
often be expressed by dominant institutions, even religious ones. That they made their point dramatically
and in a large way does not necessarily mean that their statements are true, or that they have basis, or that
they have been expressed in good taste.
Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of expression
protected by our fundamental law. It is an expression designed to invite attention, cause debate, and
hopefully, persuade. It may be motivated by the interpretation of petitioners of their ecclesiastical duty, but
their parishioners actions will have very real secular consequences.
Certainly, provocative messages do matter for the elections.
What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the electorate that tends to
rouse the public to debate contemporary issues. This is not speech by candidates or political parties to entice
votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling candidates the conditions for their election. It is the substantive
content of the right to suffrage.
This is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we should all deserve. It is protected as a
fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution. The expression in the medium chosen by petitioners
deserves our protection.
chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order previously issued is
hereby made permanent. The act of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed notice dated February 22, 2013
and letter dated February 27, 2013 is declared unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.
cralawla wlibrary
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015
DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR., Complainant, v. ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Domiciano F. Villahermosa, Sr., against Atty. Isidro L.
Caracol for deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath under Section 27, 2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases3 involving cancellation of emancipation patents and transfer
certificates of title, cancellation of special power of attorney and deeds of absolute sale and recovery of
ownership and possession of parcels of land derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 433 which
covered 23.3018 hectares of land in Valencia, Bukidnon. Counsel on record for plaintiff was Atty. Fidel
Aquino.
OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons, Fernando and Efren. As
legal heirs of Micael, Fernando received 53,298 square meters while Efren received 33,296 square meters.
Subsequently, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in their respective names.
When the agrarian reform law4 was enacted on October 21, 1972, emancipation patents and titles were
issued to Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program, who in turn sold the parcels of
land to complainants spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa. A deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of
Raymunda.
On March 2, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a decision
ordering the cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it was
not covered by the agrarian reform law. This decision was appealed to and affirmed by the DARAB Central
Board and the Court of Appeals.
On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as Addl Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Movant, filed a motion for
execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying for the full implementation of the March 2, 1994
decision.5
On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and
Demolition6 which he signed as Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela 7.
Villahermosa filed this complaint8 alleging that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions since he
obtained no authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited that Efren could not
have authorized Atty. Caracol to file the second motion because Efren had already been dead 9 for more than
a year. He claimed that Atty. Caracols real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly bought
the same parcel of land. Villahermosa presented affidavits of Efrens widow 10 and daughter11 both stating
that Efren never executed a waiver of rights and that the parcel of land was sold to Villahermosa through a
deed of sale. Both also stated that they were familiar with Efrens signature. They state that the signature
in the waiver was different from his usual signature. Villahermosa averred that Atty. Caracol committed
deceit and gross misconduct.
In addition, Villahermosa claimed that Atty. Caracol introduced falsified and manufactured evidence into the
proceedings. Atty. Caracol, in introducing a document denominated as Waiver of Rights where Efren waived
all his rights in favor of Ernesto Aguirre, was able to secure the execution of the judgment in one of the
cases12 in favor of Ernesto Aguirre. Villahermosa also filed a case 13 for falsification of public document and
use of falsified document against Ernesto Aguirre and Atty. Caracol. 14
Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as additional counsel. He said that
he had consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go ahead with the filing. Moreover, he stated that he was
not aware that there was a waiver of rights executed in Ernesto Aguirres favor.
In its Report and Recommendation,15 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP
CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts and misconduct. It found that respondent did not
present credible evidence to controvert the allegation that he was not authorized by plaintiff or counsel of
record. Respondent admitted that at the time of the filing of the second motion, Efren was dead. It noted
that Atty. Caracol did not explain how he obtained the authority nor did he present any proof of the
authority. However, there was insufficient evidence to hold him liable for falsification.
The IBP CBD stated that Atty. Caracol clearly misled and misrepresented to the DARAB, Region X that he
was counsel of Efren to protect the interest of Ernesto Aguirre, his real client, violating his oath as a lawyer.
It thus recommended that Atty. Caracol be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation but modified the penalty to one year
suspension from the practice of law.16 Atty. Caracol moved for reconsideration17 but was denied.18
Atty. Caracol filed a notice of appeal19 which this Court returned to him since no legal fees are required in
administrative cases.20
We adopt the findings of the IBP.

The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyers appearance on
behalf of his client, hence:
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to

represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him
to appear in court for his client, but the presidingjudge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear
in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever
pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as
justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by
leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his
official transactions. (Emphases supplied)
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Devt. Co., 21 this Court said that while a lawyer is not required
to present proof of his representation, when a court requires that he show such authorization, it is
imperative that he show his authority to act. Thus:
A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a
formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his clients
name. However, [a] court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party may require a lawyer to
adduce authorization from the client.22
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without being
retained nor may he appear in court without being employed unless by leave of court. 23 If an attorney
appears on a clients behalf without a retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant whom he
purports to represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his appearance unless the
purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority.24 If a lawyer corruptly or willfully
appears as an attorney for a party to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or punished for
contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction. 25
We must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained by a client, an attorney-client
relationship terminates upon death of either client or the lawyer.26
Here, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he appeared in the proceedings before the
DARAB. The records are unclear at what point his authority to appear for Efren was questioned. Neither is
there any indication that Villahermosa in fact questioned his authority during the course of the proceedings.
However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed the Motion for Issuance
of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an honest, prudent and conscientious lawyer, he
should have informed the Court of his clients passing and presented authority that he was retained by the
clients successors-in-interest and thus the parties may have been substituted. 27
We also note the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz in People v. Mendoza28 where he stated:
I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan Magalop, presumably upon the
advice of his counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol of the CLAO (now the PAO). It would seem that this lawyer was
less than conscientious when he advised his indigent client to admit a crime the man did no[t] commit. As
the ponencia observes, outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no evidence against him
presented or forthcoming. From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by which Magalop could
have been implicated.
It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who, through an incredible lack of
zeal in the discharge of his duties, was apparently willing, without any moral compunctions at all, and
without proof, to consign an innocent man to prison.
The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without cause. The defense counsel in
this case did not seem to appreciate this responsibility when he prodded Magalop to plead guilty and waived
the right to submit evidence in his behalf.29
While this observation does not serve to exacerbate Atty. Caracols liability under the present circumstances,
we would like to highlight the important role of an attorney in our judicial system. Because of the particular
nature of an attorneys function it is essential that they should act with fairness, honesty and candor towards
the courts and his clients.30 Under Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow
the Court to be misled by any artifice.
This flows out from the lawyers oath which each lawyer solemnly swears to uphold the law and court
processes in the pursuit of justice. Thus, a lawyer must be more circumspect in his demeanor and attitude
towards the public in general as agents of the judicial system.
Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less than candid about his representation. We
also observe that he has used underhanded means to attain his purpose. Atty. Caracols blatant disregard of
his duties as a lawyer cannot be countenanced. In view of his actions of contravening his lawyers oath and
in violation of Canons 8 and 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility we deem it proper
to suspend him from the practice of law for a period of one year.
chanroble slaw
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol GUILTY. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent
Atty. Isidro L. Caracol from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective upon finality of this Resolution, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
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FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 179491, January 14, 2015

THE RTC RULING

We now rule on the final review of the case.

Were petitioners letters defamatory in nature? We believe so.

brought discredit and shame to respondents reputation.28

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Ruling of the Court

Award of Attorneys Fees to Petitioner Improper

The Court of Appeals Ruling

G.R. No. 194499, January 14, 2015

Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).

would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.36

G.R. No. 200013, January 14, 2015

Defendants counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC. Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Petitioner is now before us raising the following issues:

Sick wages for 130 days in the sum of US$1,986.38;

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Position of the Respondents

The Courts Ruling

11. That my injuries which I sustained in my previous accident on board the

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

complaint filed by Senator Roxas was dismissed as to Guarin. 12

The RTC Ruling

Fortis Bank S.A./N.V.

The CTA First Division Rulings

The CTA En Banc Ruling

The Courts Ruling

NOTICE OF SHERIFFS SALE

TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

A joint trial of the cases ensued.

The Ruling of the RTC

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

What markings did he place?

void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

2,835.30 square meters

The terms of this offer are as follows:

Civil Case No. C-366 before

a) No subsequent survey of the Lot could have been obtained, approved by

Certificate of Finality of the aforesaid Order dated 8 October 1992.

RTC-Branch 126 summed-up respondents evidence as follows:

1) Dismissing the petition of the petitioners;

Civil Case No. C-3288, respondent Bonifacios Petition for

property on March 29, 1993 whereas the order authorizing the

Entered at the City of Kalookan,

Entered at Caloocan City, Philippines,

CLUB FILIPINO CASE..ONLINE

[G.R. NO. 180150]

2. There is no employer-employee relationships between Petitioner SLPI and the respondents.

2. There is no employer-employee relationship between Petitioner SLC and the respondents.

The Antecedent Facts

The Report and Recommendation of the Executive Judge

The Report and Recommendation of the OCA

The Ruling of this Court

In this case, respondent had been remiss in performing his responsibilities.

Respondent is entitled to the

x x x The Vendee further agrees to undertake, at its/his/her expense, the

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Ruling of the Court