PATRIA ESUERTE v COURT OF APPEALS (GR l-53485)

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction filed by the respondent Tan. The case started
when Tan, Junior resident physician of a hospital in Bacolod City shouted and humiliated the petitioner who is also
the head nurse at the same hospital. The incident was reported by the petitioner to the chief doctor through a letter
which was also supported by a witness who is also a petitioner herein. The respondent was asked to explain, but
instead of doing so, it filed a complaint for damages against petitioners in Cebu City. Esuerte and Jayme filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue and for being premature for failure of Tan to
exhaust administrative remedies which was however denied by the RTC and was also denied by CA. the petitioners
herein contend that Tan should have filed the case in Bacolod City and not in Cebu City because at the time of the
filing of the action, the latter was residing in Bacolod City.
Issue: Whether or not the case was filed in the proper venue.
Held:
The Rules of Court provides that in personal actions, may be commenced and tried where the defendants or any of
the defendants reside or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff. The Court said that the election belongs to the plaintiff but not to her caprice because the matter is regulated
by the Rules of Court. The rule on venue, like other procedural rules, are designed to insure a just and orderly
administration of justice or the impartial and evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding (Sy v. Tyson
Enterprises Inc., 19 SCRA 367). The option of the plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the Regional Trial Court
is either the place where the defendant resides or may be found or the place where the plaintiff resides. If plaintiff
opts for the latter, he is limited to that place. The court explained that resides is not the same with domicile, the
latter being a fixed permanent residence while resides is the actual place where the person is currently staying
whether temporary or permanent. And as the rules provide, the case should be filed where the plaintiff resides, and
not domiciled or where the plaintiff intends to stay but as to where he is at the moment.

CAPATI v. OCAMPO
G.R. L-28742
Facts:
Capati (Pampanga resident), a contractor who was constructing a building for Feati Bank (Camarines Sur) entered
into a sub contract with Ocampo (Naga City) for the construction of vault and exterior walls. The latter undertook to
finish construction on June 5, but instead finished it on June 20, therefore breaching the contract. As a result, Capati
filed an action for damages in RTC Pampanga against Ocampo. Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the venue is improper because Ocampo alleges that the contract stipulates that:
14. That all actions arising out, or relating to this contract may be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Naga.
Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, claiming that their agreement to hold the venue in the Court of First
Instance of Naga City was merely optional to both contracting parties. In support thereof, plaintiff cited the use of the
word "may " in relation with the institution of any action arising out of the contract. However, RTC granted the motion
to dismiss rationalizing that: why was there a need to put a stipulation like that in the contract when eventually the
parties can choose where to file the case. Hence, Capati appealed.

Issue:
Whether or not the stipulation of the parties are permissive or restrictive as to control the venue.
Held:
In this case, the court interpreted the use of the word may and may be. It said that the word "may" is merely
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term "may be"
connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. "May" is an auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission
or possibility. In Nicolas vs. Reparations Commission 2, a case involving the interpretation of a stipulation as to venue
along lines similar to the present one, it was held that the agreement of the parties which provided that "all legal
actions arising out of this contract ... may be brought in and submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper courts in the
City of Manila," is not mandatory.
We hold that the stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is simply permissive. By the said stipulation, the
parties did not agree to file their suits solely and exclusively with the Court of First Instance of Naga. They merely
agreed to submit their disputes to the said court, without waiving their right to seek recourse in the court specifically
indicated in Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Since the complaint has been filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, where the plaintiff resides, the venue
of action is properly laid in accordance with Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

UNIMASTERS v COURT OF APPEALS & KUBOTA

G.R. 119657
Facts:
Kubota and Unimasters entered into a Dealerhsip Agreement for Sales and Services of the products of Kubota in
Samar and Leyte provinces. The contract contained a stipulation that: All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be
filed with / in the proper Courts of Quezon City. Unimaster also contracted to obtain a credit line with Metrobank
Tacloban Branch to answer its obligations to Kubota. After five years, Unimasters filed an action with RTC Tacloban
City against Kubota, Go and Metrobank for damages of breach of contract, and injunction with prayer for TRO.
Kubota filed a motion to dismiss due to improper venue as it alleged that the action should have been filed in Quezon
City as stipulated in the contract. Unimasters contended that the case should be filed in Tacloban City in order to bind
Metrobank Tacloban in the TRO prayed for (wala gyud ni xa sa facts, but from the CA ruling ma gets nimu) RTC
however denied motion to dismiss and ruled that venue was proper citing Sec.2, Rule 4 or the Rules of Court since
Unimasters principal place of business is in Tacloban City. RTC said that the venue agreed upon by the parties in the
contract are additional places other than the place stated in the Rules of Court.
Kubota appealed to CA which ruled that the venue was improper because the stipulation respecting venue in its
Dealership Agreement with UNIMASTERS did in truth limit the venue of all suits arising thereunder only and
exclusively to "the proper courts of Quezon City. It also said that even though Kubota attended the hearing for the
injunction, it did not waive its objection to the venue, and that ssuming that KUBOTA's standard printed invoices
provided that the venue of actions thereunder should be laid at the Court of the City of Manila, this was
inconsequential since such provision would govern "suits or legal actions between petitioner and its buyers" but not
actions under the Dealership Agreement between KUBOTA and UNIMASTERS, the venue of which was controlled by
paragraph No. 7 thereof. Lastly, as to the issue of impediment to issue TRO against Metrobank Tacloban, CA said

that this is not the case since the TRO can be served at Metrobank Manila, the head office which is binding on
Metrobank Tacloban.
Issues:
Whether or not the agreement between the parties limited to the proper courts of Quezon City the venue of any
complaint filed arising from the dealership agreement.
Whether or not Kubotas participation in the hearing was a waiver of the objection to the venue.

Held:
As to the last issue, SC said that there was no waiver as can be ascertained from the facts of the case, because
even though Kubota participated in the hearing, it always asserted its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper
venue, and has expressly said that no waiver is being undertaken.
Anent the first issue, the court said that Rule 4 of the Rules of Court sets forth the principles generally governing the
venue of actions, whether real or personal, or involving persons who neither reside nor are found in the Philippines or
otherwise. Agreements on venue are explicitly allowed. "By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action
may be changed or transferred from one province to another."(Ang old pa ni na Rules of Court) Parties may by
stipulation waive the legal venue and such waiver is valid and effective being merely a personal privilege, which is
not contrary to public policy or prejudicial to third persons. It is a general principle that a person may renounce any
right which the law gives unless such renunciation would be against public policy. Written stipulations as to venue
may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that
the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law (Rule 4,
specifically). As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties
respecting the matter.
The Court said the reason for the rules on venue is convenience, thus normally, stipulations are merely permissiove.
In other words, stipulations designating venues other than those assigned by Rule 4 should be interpreted as
designed to make it more convenient for the parties to institute actions arising from or in relation to their agreements;
that is to say, as simply adding to or expanding the venues indicated in said Rule 4. On the other hand, because
restrictive stipulations are in derogation of this general policy, the language of the parties must be so clear and
categorical as to leave no doubt of their intention to limit the place or places, or to fix places other than those
indicated in Rule 4, for their actions. Of the essence is the ascertainment of the parties' intention in their agreement
governing the venue of actions between them. That ascertainment must be done keeping in mind that convenience
is the foundation of venue regulations, and that that construction should be adopted which most conduces thereto.
Hence, the invariable construction placed on venue stipulations is that they do not negate but merely complement or
add to the codal standards of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
The court said that unless the parties make very clear, by employing categorical and suitably limiting language, that
they wish the venue of actions between them to be laid only and exclusively at a definite place, and to disregard the
prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements on venue are not to be regarded as mandatory or restrictive, but merely
permissive, or complementary of said rule. The fact that in their agreement the parties specify only one of the
venues mentioned in Rule 4, or fix a place for their actions different from those specified by said rule, does not,
without more, suffice to characterize the agreement as a restrictive one. There must, to repeat, be accompanying
language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at
the place named by them,i[32] regardless of the general precepts of Rule 4; and any doubt or uncertainty as to the
parties' intentions must be resolved against giving their agreement a restrictive or mandatory aspect. Any other rule

would permit of individual, subjective judicial interpretations without stable standards, which could well result in
precedents in hopeless inconsistency.
The record of the case at bar discloses that UNIMASTERS has its principal place of business in Tacloban City, and
KUBOTA, in Quezon City. Under Rule 4, the venue of any personal action between them is "where the defendant or
any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of
the plaintiff."ii[33] In other words, Rule 4 gives UNIMASTERS the option to sue KUBOTA for breach of contract in the
Regional Trial Court of either Tacloban City or Quezon City.
The court said that the stipulation in the agreement was not mandatory or restrictive which did not preclude
Unimasters from filing the action in Tacloban due to the lack of words and expressions definitely and unmistakably
denoting the parties' desire and intention that actions between them should be ventilated only at the place selected
by them, Quezon City -- or other contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire and intention -- the
stipulation should be construed, not as confining suits between the parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as
allowing suits either in Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff.
Lastly, Kubota committed error when it said that RTC had no jurisdiction because the venue was improper. his is not
an accurate statement of legal principle. It equates venue with jurisdiction; but venue has nothing to do with
jurisdiction, except in criminal actions. This is fundamental. Assuming that venue were improperly laid in the Court
where the action was instituted, the Tacloban City RTC, that would be a procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment -precluding ventilation of the case before that Court of wrong venue notwithstanding that the subject matter is within
its jurisdiction. However, if the objection to venue is waived by the failure to set it up in a motion to dismiss, iii[36] the
RTC would proceed in perfectly regular fashion if it then tried and decided the action.

ii

iiiHernandez vs Development Bank of the Philippines

June 18, 1976
Issue: WON the action was properly filed in Batangas?
Facts: Hernandez was an employee of Development Bank for 21 yrs until his retirement due to illness. Due to his service, he
was awarded a house and lot. After receiving the statement of account, Hernandez sent to the Housing Project Committee of
the Bank a Cashier's check for full payment of the purchase price. However, the check was returned to him. Apparently, the
Committee on Organization, Personnel, and Facilities cancelled the award on the grounds that (1) Hernandez has already
retired, (2) that he has only an option to purchase, (3) many other employees have no houses, (4) that he has been given his
retirement gratuity, and (5) that the awarding of the lot to a current employee of private respondent would better serve the
objective of the Housing Project. Petitioner protested but it was refused. A complaint was filed by Hernandez with the CFI of
Batangas. Private respindent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue since the action affects title to a
house and lot in Quezon City, hence the action must be commenced and tried in Quezon City. The CFI sustained the motion.
Hence, petition.
Held: Yes. A real action is for the recovery of land, tenements, or heriditaments. A personal action is for recovery or personal
property, for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the
commission of an injury to the person or property. Under the Rules, a real action must be commenced and tried where the
property or any part thereof lies. Personal actions must be filed where any of the plaintiffs or defendants reside, at the
election of the plaintiff.
The essence of the complaint is the annulment of the cancellation of the award. Hence, the court held that the action is a
personal one because it does not involve title or ownership over the house and lot but rather it is meant to annul the
cancellation and to compel respondent to recognize that the award is valid and subsisting which cannot be unilaterally and
arbitrarily cancelled. It is also meant to compel respondent to accept the payment proferred. Thus, it may be brought in the
petitioner's place of residence.
Dismissal set aside and remanded.Notes: should have been specific performance or rescission. This was

SWEET LINE V TEVES

FACTS:
Private respondents Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro, a contractor by professions, bought tickets Nos. 0011736 and
011737 for Voyage 90 on December 31, 1971 at the branch office of petitioner, a shipping company transporting inter-island
passengers and cargoes, at Cagayan de Oro City. Respondents were to board petitioner's vessel, M/S "Sweet Hope" bound
for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu. Upon learning that the vessel was not proceeding to Bohol, since many passengers
were bound for Surigao, private respondents per advice, went to the branch office for proper relocation to M/S "Sweet Town".
Because the said vessel was already filled to capacity, they were forced to agree "to hide at the cargo section to avoid
inspection of the officers of the Philippine Coastguard." Private respondents alleged that they were, during the trip," "exposed
to the scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits," and that the tickets they bought at
Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran were not honored and they were constrained to pay for other tickets. In view thereof,
private respondents sued petitioner for damages and for breach of contract of carriage in the alleged sum of P10,000.00
before respondents Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. 2
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. This motion was premised on the condition
printed at the back of the tickets, i.e., Condition No. 14, which reads:
14. It is hereby agreed and understood that any and all actions arising out of the conditions and provisions of this ticket,
irrespective of where it is issued, shall be filed in the competent courts in the City of Cebu.
The motion was denied by the trial court. 4 Petitioner moved to reconnsider the order of denial, but no avail. 5 Hence, this
instant petition for prohibition for preliminary injunction, 'alleging that the respondent judge has departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial preoceeding" and "had acted without or in excess or in error of his jurisdicton or in gross abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE:
WON the Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the petitioner's passage tickets purchased by private respondents, which
limits the venue of actions arising from the contract of carriage to theCourt of First Instance of Cebu, valid and enforceable?
Otherwise stated, may a common carrier engaged in inter-island shipping stipulate thru condition printed at the back of
passage tickets to its vessels that any and all actions arising out of the ocntract of carriage should be filed only in a particular
province or city, in this case the City of Cebu, to the exclusion of all others?
RULING:
NO.
Petitioner contends thaty Condition No. 14 is valid and enforceable, since private respndents acceded to tit when they
purchased passage tickets at its Cagayan de Oro branch office and took its vessel M/S "Sweet Town" for passage to
Tagbilaran, Bohol that the condition of the venue of actions in the City of Cebu is proper since venue may be validly
waived, citing cases; 10 that is an effective waiver of venue, valid and binding as such, since it is printed in bold and capital
letters and not in fine print and merely assigns the place where the action sing from the contract is institution likewise citing
cases; 11 and that condition No. 14 is unequivocal and mandatory, the words and phrases "any and all", "irrespective of
where it is issued," and "shag" leave no doubt that the intention of Condition No. 14 is to fix the venue in the City of Cebu, to
the exclusion of other places; that the orders of the respondent Judge are an unwarranted departure from established
jurisprudence governing the case; and that he acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction in is the orders complained of.
On the other hand, private respondents claim that Condition No. 14 is not valid, that the same is not an essential element of
the contract of carriage, being in itself a different agreement which requires the mutual consent of the parties to it; that they
had no say in its preparation, the existence of which they could not refuse, hence, they had no choice but to pay for the tickets
and to avail of petitioner's shipping facilities out of necessity; that the carrier "has been exacting too much from the public by

inserting impositions in the passage tickets too burdensome to bear," that the condition which was printed in fine letters is an
imposition on the riding public and does not bind respondents, citing cases; 13 that while venue 6f actions may be transferred
from one province to another, such arrangement requires the "written agreement of the parties", not to be imposed
unilaterally; and that assuming that the condition is valid, it is not exclusive and does not, therefore, exclude the filing of the
action in Misamis Oriental
Considered in the light Of the foregoing norms and in the context Of circumstances Prevailing in the inter-island ship. ping
industry in the country today, We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held
as void and unenforceable for the following reasons first, under circumstances obligation in the inter-island ship. ping industry,
it is not just and fair to bind passengers to the terms of the conditions printed at the back of the passage tickets, on which
Condition No. 14 is Printed in fine letters, and second, Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of
proceedings of this nature, since the same will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers in different s of the
country who, under Condition No. 14, will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu
Again, it should be noted that Condition No. 14 was prepared solely at the ms of the petitioner, respondents had no say in its
preparation. Neither did the latter have the opportunity to take the into account prior to the purpose chase of their tickets. For,
unlike the small print provisions of contracts the common example of contracts of adherence which are entered into by
the insured in his awareness of said conditions, since the insured is afforded the op to and co the same, passengers of interisland v do not have the same chance, since their alleged adhesion is presumed only from the fact that they purpose chased
the tickets.
. Condition No. 14 is subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of actions. For, although venue may be changed or
transferred from one province to another by agreement of the parties in writing t to Rule 4, Section 3, of the Rules of Court,
such an agreement will not be held valid where it practically negates the action of the claimants, such as the private
respondents herein. The philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the
plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote 21 the ends of justice. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger
residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would most probably decide not to file
the action at all. The condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. Upon the other hand, petitioner has
branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these places. Hence, the
filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in the instant case, will not cause inconvenience to, much less
prejudice, petitioner.

Notes: There were four breaches. Cause of action: breach of contract with damages.
There was really no agreement because there was a contract of adhesion.
Fammy: wrong because there was no vitiation of consent. They could have boarded other ships or other forms of transpo.

Other grounds: they could have filed a case against the branch office which is contrary to the Clavecilla ruling (which is the
prevailing doctrine).
Fammy: it should have just allowed to file against the branch since it is only an extension of the head office.

DIAZ V JUDGE SANTOS

FACTS:

On 16 July 1991, the Mindanao Kris, a newspaper of general circulation in Cotabato City, published in its front page the news
article captioned "6-Point Complaint Filed vs. Macumbal," and in its Publisher's Notes the editorial, "Toll of Corruption," which
exposed alleged anomalies by key officials in the Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
On 22 July 1991, the public officers alluded to, namely, private respondents Sultan Macorro L. Macumbal, Sultan Linog M.
Indol, Atty. Macabangkit M. Lanto and Atty. Mohamadali Abedin, instituted separate criminal and civil complaints arising from
the libel before the City Prosecutor's Office and the Regional Trial Court in Marawi City. The publisher-editor of the Mindanao
Kris, petitioner Patricio P. Diaz, and Mamala B. Pagandaman, who executed a sworn statement attesting to the alleged
corruption, were named respondents in both complaints.
On 2 September 1991, the City Prosecutor's Office dismissed the criminal case thus 5
"WHEREFORE . . . this investigation in the light of Agbayani vs. Sayo case finds that it has no jurisdiction to handle this case
and that the same be filed or instituted in Cotabato City where complainant is officially holding office at the time respondents
caused the publication of the complained news item in the Mindanao Kris in Cotabato City, for which reason it is
recommended that this charge be dropped for lack of jurisdiction."
In the interim, the civil complaint for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 385-91 and raffled to Branch 10 of the Regional
Trial Court in Marawi City, was set for Pre-Trial Conference. The defendants therein had already filed their respective Answers
with Counterclaim.
On 18 November 1991, petitioner Diaz moved for the dismissal of the action for damages on the ground that the trial court did
not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. He vehemently argued that the complaint should have been filed in Cotabato
City and not in Marawi City.
Petitioner Diaz contends that the civil action for damages could not be rightfully filed in Marawi City as none of the private
respondents, who are all public officers, held office in Marawi City; neither were the alleged libelous news items published in
that city. Consequently, it is petitioner's view that the Regional Trial Court in Marawi City has no jurisdiction to entertain the
civil action for damages.
The petitioner is correct. Not one of the respondents then held office in Marawi City: respondent Macumbal was the Regional
Director for Region XII of the DENR and held office in Cotabato City; respondent Indol was the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Officer of Lanao del Norte and held office in that province; respondent Lanto was a consultant of the
Secretary of the DENR and, as averred in the complaint, was temporarily residing in Quezon City; and, respondent Abedin
was the Chief of the Legal Division of the DENR Regional Office in Cotabato City. 7 Indeed, private respondents do not deny
that their main place of work was not in Marawi City, although they had sub-offices therein
ISSUE:
WON VENUE in the instant civil action for damages arising from libel was improperly laid.
RULING:
YES.
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that an offended party who is at the same time a public official can only institute an
action arising from libel in two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and the place where the alleged libelous articles
were printed and first published.
Consequently, it is indubitable that venue was improperly laid. However, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue
in a motion to dismiss prior to a responsive pleading, the venue cannot truly be said to have been improperly laid since, for all
practical intents and purposes, the venue though technically wrong may yet be considered acceptable to the parties for
whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised.
Petitioner Diaz then, as defendant in the court below, should have timely challenged the venue laid in Marawi City in a motion
to dismiss, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court. Unfortunately, petitioner had already submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court when he filed his Answer to the Complaint with Counterclaim.
His motion to dismiss was therefore belatedly filed and could no longer deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide
the instant civil action for damages. Well-settled is the rule that improper venue may be waived and such waiver may occur by

laches.
Petitioner was obviously aware of this rule when he anchored his motion to dismiss on lack of cause of action over the subject
matter, relying on this Court's ruling in Time, Inc. v. Reyes. 12 Therein, We declared that the Court of First Instance of Rizal
was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 10403 because the complainants held office in Manila, not in
Rizal, while the alleged libelous articles were published abroad.
It may be noted that in Time, Inc. v. Reyes, the defendant therein moved to dismiss the case without first submitting to the
jurisdiction of the lower court, which is not the case before Us. More, venue in an action arising from libel is only mandatory if
it is not waived by defendant.
"The rule is that where a statute creates a right and provides a remedy for its enforcement, the remedy is exclusive; and
where it confers jurisdiction upon a particular court, that jurisdiction is likewise exclusive, unless otherwise provided. Hence,
the venue provisions of Republic Act No. 4363 should be deemed mandatory for the party bringing the action, unless the
question of venue should be waived by the defendant . . . . " 13
Withal, objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived; it does not, after all, involve a question of
jurisdiction. Indeed, the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court
over the person rather than the subject matter. 14 Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction.
Finally, Sec. 1 of Rule 16 provides that objections to improper venue must be made in a motion to dismiss before any
responsive pleading is filed. Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and set up defenses. Consequently,
having already submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the trial court, petitioner may no longer object to the venue which,
although mandatory in the instant case, is nevertheless waivable. As such, improper venue must be seasonably raised,
otherwise, it may be deemed waived.