Libel; privileged communication; defenses.

Below is the jurisprudence part of a pleading that we have filed in a LIBEL case that we are
handling, where the respondent is our client, and which is pending preliminary
investigation before a public prosecutor. We are sharing the same for legal research
purposes of our followers.

X x x.
I.

SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION.
1.

Xxx admits in his Reply that his case was filed out of time, having allegedly discovered the
alleged crime of Libel on July 6, 2012. (See: Par. 27, xxx Reply).
Note: The Date And Time Of Commission part of theInvestigation Data Form of this complaint
that Xxx has signed shows that, according to him, the crime of Libel that I had allegedly
committed took place in June 2012.
If we reckon the prescriptive period from June 2012, it is with more reason that this case should
be dismissed outright for having been filed out of time.
The instant case was filed on July 8, 2013.
He admits in his Reply that he has failed to comply with the one-year prescriptive period for
Libel under Art. 90, Par. 4, of the Rev. Penal Code.
His only argument against the delay was that it was too minor a reason to cause the dismissal of
his complaint.
We repeat: For failure of Xxx to meet the one-year prescriptive period for Libel, this case should
be dismissed outright.
The purpose of an Investigating Prosecutor is not to indict per sebut to find out the truth, to seek
justice, and to save an innocent citizen from the pains, tediousness and expense of unwarranted
trial.
In the case of JOSE BERNARDO vs. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, G.R. No. L-37876, May 25, 1979,
it was held that although prosecutors are endowed with ample powers in order that they may
properly fulfill their assigned role in the administration of justice x x x, (it) should be realized,
however, that when a man is haled to court on a criminal charge, it brings in its wake problems
not only for the accused but for his family as well and that therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to
weigh the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to determine the existence of a prima facie
case before filing the information in court, otherwise, it, held that, it would be a dereliction of
duty.
In the case of SUSANA B. CABAHUG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SANDIGANBAYAN, 3rd Division, and OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, G.R. No.
132816, February 5, 2002, the Supreme Court (admonished) agencies tasked with the
preliminary investigation and prosecution of crimes that the very purpose of a preliminary
investigation is to shield the innocent from precipitate, spiteful and burdensome prosecution. It
added that such investigating agencies were duty-bound to avoid, unless absolutely necessary,
open and public accusation of crime not only to spare the innocent the trouble, expense and
torment of a public trial, but also to prevent unnecessary expense on the part of the State for
useless and expensive trials. It held that when at the outset the evidence cannot sustain
a prima faciecase or that the existence of probable cause to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt
of the accused cannot be ascertained, the prosecution must desist from inflicting on any person
the trauma of going through a trial.
Thus, the Court held:

x x x.
We cannot overemphasize the admonition to agencies tasked with the
preliminary investigation and prosecution of crimes that the very purpose of a

preliminary investigation is to shield the innocent from precipitate, spiteful and

burdensome prosecution. They are duty-bound to avoid, unless absolutely
necessary, open and public accusation of crime not only to spare the innocent
the trouble, expense and torment of a public trial, but also to prevent
unnecessary expense on the part of the State for useless and expensive trials.
Thus, when at the outset the evidence cannot sustain a prima facie case or that
the existence of probable cause to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the
accused cannot be ascertained, the prosecution must desist from inflicting on
any person the trauma of going through a trial.
X x x.
2. I have shown in my Counter-Affidavit and in this Rejoinder that I have acted in GOOD FAITH and
WITHOUT MALICE OR INTENT TO COMMIT THE FELONY OF LIBEL, which are essential
elements to indict a person for Libel.
In the case of Cabahug v. People, GR No. 132816, February 5, 2002, it was held that good
faith is always presumed; that the very purpose of a preliminary investigation is to shield the
innocent from precipitate, spiteful and burdensome prosecution; that they are duty-bound to
avoid, unless absolutely necessary, open and public accusation of crime not only to spare the
innocent the trouble, expense and torment of a public trial, but also to prevent unnecessary
expense on the part of the State for useless and expensive trials; that when, at the outset the
evidence cannot sustain a prima facie case or that the existence of probable cause to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused cannot be ascertained, the prosecution must desist
from inflicting on any person the trauma of going through a trial.
Thus, the Court held:

X x x.
Contrary to the Ombudsmans ruling that bad faith on the part of petitioner was
deducible, good faith is always presumed. Therefore, he who charges another
with bad faith must prove it. In other words, the Office of the Ombudsman should
determine with certainty the facts indicative of bad faith. However, the records
show that the Office of the Ombudsman was clearly uncertain of its position on
the matter of existence of bad faith on the part of petitioner Cabahug. X x x.
X x x.
Clearly, any further prosecution of petitioner is pure and simple harassment. It is
imperative that she be spared from the trauma of having to go to trial on such a
baseless complaint. The evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case and
it is evident that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the
petitioners guilt.
X x x. Judicial power of review includes the determination of whether there was
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Under this definition, the
Sandiganbayan should have, considering the divergent positions in the Office of
the Ombudsman, granted the motion for redetermination of probable cause after
reviewing the evidence thus far submitted, and dismissed the case against
petitioner. Thus, respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the case to proceed.
X x x.
Further, in the case of FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ, et. al. vs.SANDIGANBAYAN, et. al., G.R.
No. 130872, March 25, 1999, it upheld the rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or difficult
question of law may be the basis of good faith.

3. Xxx has alleged in the Investigation Data Form of this case that he would present 4 witnesses to
prove his complaint, namely: x x x.
Why are they missing now? Xxx has failed to explain this matter. Why has Xxx not presented their
Affidavits to corroborate his allegations, despite all the opportunities to do so? Likewise, Xxx has
failed to explain this matter.
All that he has presented as of now are his own Complaint and Reply, which are self-serving and
which are unsupported by convincing evidence.
Further, Xxx has failed to present the Affidavits of the persons whose Facebook (FB) messages
he has attached to his Complaint.
As the complainant, Xxx has the burden of proof to prove his case against me and to prove that
his FB sources had given their formal consent to use their FB messages as electronic
evidenceagainst me.
Without the written permission of his FB sources, whose FB messages are private in nature,
the Anti-Wire Tapping Act deems such FB messages to be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose and in any proceeding.
Clearly, Xxx has failed to meet the quantum of evidence (substantial evidence) to establish
probable cause to indict me for Libel.
Substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA
226).
4. ADDITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE ON LIBEL.
4.1.

CONSTITUTION. - In this criminal proceeding, I am entitled to the CONSTITUTIONAL

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. (Sec. 14 [2], Article III, Bill of Rights, 1987 Constitution).
The presumption of innocence is a basic and universal human right that forms a crucial part
of my right to DUE PROCESS OF LAW and EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW (cf. 1947 U.N.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights).

4.2.

RULES OF EVIDENCE. - Rule 131, in general, of the Rules of Evidence commands that he who
makes an affirmative allegation has the burden of proof to show and establish the veracity
thereof.
Sec. 3 of Rule 131 sets forth certain basic legal presumptions, e.g., that a person is innocent of
crime or wrong, that official duty has been regularly performed, and that the law has been
obeyed.

4.3.

MALICE. - In the light of the foregoing constitutional and statutory presumptions, the complainants
in a libel case have the heavy burden of proof to destroy the aforementioned presumptions and
to show, with clear, credible, and convincing evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the
respondents had acted with ACTUAL CRIMINAL MALICE in making the questioned news articles.

4.4.

EQUIPOISE RULE. - Under the EQUIPOISE OF EVIDENCE RULE, all things being equal, that is,
where the evidence proffered by the complainants would show neither the guilt nor the innocence
of the respondents, the aforesaid constitutional and legal presumptions of innocence shouldipso
facto operate in favor of the respondents to protect their civil and human rights under the
Constitution.

4.5.

REVISED PENAL CODE ON LIBEL. ACTUAL MALICE REQUIRED. - Under Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, IF NO GOOD INTENTION AND JUSTIFIABLE MOTIVE for making it is shown,EXCEPT in
the following cases of PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS:
1.
A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; and

2.
A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedingswhich are not of confidential nature, or of
any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed
by public officers in the exercise of their functions. (emphasis supplied).

Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, inter alia, provides that in every criminal prosecution for
libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as
libelous is true, and, moreover, that it waspublished with good motives and for
justifiable ends, the defendants shall be acquitted.
Under Article 362 of the Revised Penal Code, ACTUAL MALICE, not merely presumptive
malice, is required to remove a respondent from the legal protection of the privileged
communication rule under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, supra. Article 362 provides:
Libelous remarks or comments connected with the matter privileged under the provisions of
Article 354, if made with malice, shall not exempt the author thereof nor the editor or
managing editor of a newspaper from criminal liability.
In the case of Vasquez v. CA, et. al., GR 118971, September 15, 1999, the Supreme Court,
in discussing the rule on ACTUAL MALICE, held that the prosecution must prove not only
that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
In the said case, the Court further held that a rule placing on the accused the burden of showing
the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making
such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code; that it would,
above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression; that such a rule
would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a self-governing community;
that without free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation
would be stifled; and that public discussion is a political duty and the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people:. (citing: Whitney v. California, 247 U.S. 357).
4.6.

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION. - In BRILLANTE vs. CA, ET. AL., G.R. Nos. 118757 &
121571, October 19, 2004,the Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine of PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION under Article 354, No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code, and it clarified that the
interest sought to be protected by the person making the communication need not be his own,
but may refer to an interest shared by the other members of society.
According to the Supreme Court, indeed, the purpose of affording protection to privileged
communication is to permit all interested persons or citizens with grievances to freely
communicate, with immunity, to the persons who could furnish the protection asked for.
In the case of BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, et. al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al., G.
R. NO. 107566, November 25, 2004, the Supreme Court held that the rule on PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION applies to fair comment on matters of public interest, fair comment being
that which is true, or which if false, expresses the real opinion of the author based upon
reasonable degree of care and on reasonable grounds.
The Supreme Court further held that the remedy of the person allegedly libeled is to show proof
that an article was written with the authors knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
While the law itself creates the presumption that every defamatory imputation is malicious,
nevertheless, the privileged character of a communication destroys said
presumption. The burden of proving actual malice shall then rest on the plaintiff.

4.7.

MERE ERRORS AND INACCURACIES. - In BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, supra, the Supreme
Court reiterated its holding in the prior case of Borjal vs. CA, G.R. No. 126466, 14 January
1999, 310 SCRA 1, and held that, even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere
error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. It further held:

Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression

and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not
be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for
misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much

leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical
agencies in our democracy.
X x x.