PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY.

AMPIL) 16th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos Antonio Cimagala Bedural | 2D 2012|

1. GENATO v DE LORENZO
The delivery by the donor and the acceptance by done
must be simultaneous and the acceptance by a person
other than the true done must be authorized by a proper
power of attorney set forth in a public document

W/N the donation may be revoked in this case despite the

fact that the donor had sufficient property left with her
RULING:
No.
Although in the case of the subsequent adoption of a
minor by one who had previously donated some or all of
his properties to another, the donor may sue for the
annulment or reduction of the donation within four years
from the date of adoption, he may only do so if the
donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking into
account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the
adoption of the child. (Civil Code, Articles 760, 761 and
763). Of course, the burden of proof is on the plaintiffdonor, who must allege and establish the requirements
prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment or
reduction of the donation can be adjudged.

FACTS:
The property under dispute in this case is the 530 shares
of stocks of Genato Commercal Corporation, which has
P100 par value, of the deceased Simona B. De Genato
(Director and secretary-treasurer of the said company).
The petitioners herein, 2 heirs of Simona, are claiming
that they own 530 shares of stocks of Genato Commercal
Corporation because of the donation made by Simona to
them. Respondents (other remaining heirs), however, are
trying to recover from the petitioners, their co-heirs, the
said stocks so they can include it in the intestate estate
which should later be distributed among all the surviving
children of the decedent.

Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the complaint for

annulment does not allege that the subject donation
impairs the legitime of the adopted child. Indeed it
contains no indication at all of the total assets of the
donor.

Four or five days after having Florentino Genato elected

and designated as Assitant Secretary-Treasurer of the
Corporation, 265 shares were issued in favour of
Florentino Genato and another 265 were issued in favour
of Francisco G. Genato. These were not presented as
evidence in the course of the trial; they were merely
mentioned by Florentino Genato in the course of his
testimony as a witness.
ISSUE:

W/N

there

was

valid

Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the

contrary, there is unrebutted evidence that the donor has
another piece of land (27,342 sq. m.) situated in Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal worth P273,420.00 in 1977, although then
subject to litigation.

donation?

The legal situation of petitioner-donor, as plaintiff, is

made worse by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals
that the grandfather of the donees was the owner pro
indiviso of one-half of the donated land, the effect of
which is to reduce the value of the donation which can
then more easily be taken from the portion of the estate
within the free disposal of petitioner.

RULING: NO. There was no valid donation for lack of

proper acceptance. Incontestably, one of the two donees
was not present at the delivery, and there is no showing
that Francisco Genato had authorized his brother,
Florentino to accept for both of them. The delivery by
the donor and the acceptance by done must be
simultaneous and the acceptance by a person other
than the true done must be authorized by a proper
power of attorney set forth in a public document. None
has been claimed to exist in this case.

3. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP V. COURT OF

APPEALS/ SPS. DE CASTRO, GRANADOS AND TOLENTINO
Judicial declaration for rescission of a contract is not
necessary where the contract provides for its automatic
revocation in case of violation of any of its terms and
conditions.

2. CRUZ V. CA
Although in the case of the subsequent adoption of a
minor by one who had previously donated some or all of
his properties to another, the donor may sue for the
annulment or reduction of the donation within four
years from the date of adoption, he may only do so if
the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted,
taking into account the whole estate of the donor at
the time of the adoption of the child.

FACTS
In 1930, the Sps. Eusebio De Castro and Martina Rieta,
now both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor
of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering Lot
626 in Kawit, Cavite with the condition that the done shall
not dispose or sell the property within a period of 100
years from the execution of the deed of donation
otherwise a violation would render it null and void and the
property would revert to the estate of the donors. In
1980, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, the
administrator of all properties in the province of Cavite,
sold the property in favor of Sps. Florencio and Soledad
Ignao. As a result, a TCT was issued in favor of the
spouses.

FACTS:
Eduvigis J. Cruz, a childless widow, donated a residential
lot together with the two-door apartment erected thereon
to her grandnieces private respondents herein
Later, Eduvigis Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto,
a minor, after which she extrajudicially tried to revoke
the donation, but the donees resisted.
ISSUE:
1

PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 16th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos Antonio Cimagala Bedural | 2D 2012|

Marina Rieta Granados and Theresa Rieta Tolentino filed a

complaint for nullification of deed of donation, rescission
of contract and reconveyance of real property against Sps.
Ignao and the R.C. Bishop of Imus and the R.C. Archbishop
of Manila.

automatically revert to the donor. When the Foundation

failed to comply with the conditions, de Luna revived
the said donation by executing a Revival of Donation
Intervivos with the following terms and conditions:
1)

The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of

prescription which was reversed by the CA thus the case
at bar.
2)
ISSUES
(1) W/N the action has already prescribed
(2) W/N the condition is valid
3)
RULING: NO to both issues
1) An action to enforce a contract prescribed in 10 years
hence the action has not yet prescribed. Art. 764 provides
that an action for revocation must be brought within 4
years from the non-compliance of the conditions,
however, this will only apply when the parties have not
agreed on the automatic revocation of the donaton. In the
case at bar, the deed of donation expressly provides for
the automatic revocation of the property donated in case
of violation therefore judicial declaration is not
necessary. Judicial declaration is only for determination
of the propriety of the rescission sought. When such
propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be
merely declaratory of the revocation but it is not itself
the revocatory act.

The Donee shall construct on the land and at

its expense a Chapel,
Nursery, and
Kindergarten School to be named after St.
Veronica
Construction shall start immediately and must
be at least 70% completed three years from the
date of the Deed unless the Donor grants
extensions
Automatic reversion in case of violation

The Foundation accepted and the donation was

registered and annotated in the TCT. By a Deed of
Segregation, the foundation was issued a TCT for area
the lot donated while the remaining area was retained
by the De Luna.
The children and only heirs of the late De Luna (died
after the donation) filed a complaint with the RTC for
the cancellation of the donation on the ground that the
terms were violated. The Foundation defended itself by
saying that it had partially and substantially complied
with the conditions and that the donor granted it an
indefinite extension of time to complete construction.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of
prescription (for being filed after 4 years). The heirs did
not file an MR and went straight to the SC.

2) Although the action may not be dismissed on the ground

of prescription, it may be dismissed on the ground of lack
of cause of action. The cause of action was based on a
breach of the resolutory condition, however the condition
is not valid for being contrary to public policy. Donation is
a mode of acquiring ownership and it results in an
effective transfer of title over the property from the
donor to the done. Although the donor may impose
conditions in the deed of donation, it must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and
public policy.

ISSUE
Whether the action prescribes in 4 years (based on art.
764 NCC-judicial decree of revocation of the
donation) or in 10 years (based on art. 1144
enforcement of a written contract)
RULING: 10 years
The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous
cause.

The condition in the case at bar, which is a prohibition of

alienation for 100 years, is patently unreasonable and an
undue restriction on the right of the done to dispose of
the property donated, which right is an indispensable
attribute of ownership. Since it is an considered as an
illegal or impossible condition, it will be considered as not
having been imposed. Therefore no breach was
committed.

Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations

with an onerous cause are governed not by the law on
donations but by the rules on contract. On the matter of
prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous
donation, it was held that the general rules on
prescription apply. The same rules apply under the New
Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which
provides:
Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by
the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by
the provisions of the present Title as regards that
portion which exceeds the value of the burden
imposed.

4. DE LUNA V. (CFI) JUDGE ABRIGO

Donations with an onerous cause are governed NOT by
the law on donations but by the rules on contracts.
FACTS
De Luna donated a portion of a 75 sq. m. lot to the
Luzonian University Foundation. The donation was
embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was
subject to certain terms and conditions. In case of
violation or non-compliance, the property would

It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code,

actions for the revocation of a donation must be brought
within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the
conditions of the donation. However, said article does not
apply to onerous donations in view of the specific

PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 16th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos Antonio Cimagala Bedural | 2D 2012|

provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations

are governed by the rules on contracts. The rules on
prescription and not the rules on donation applies in the
case at bar.

FACTS: In 1910, Concepcion Cirer and James Hill donated

parcels of land to the municipality of Tarlac on the
condition that it be used absolutely and exclusively for
the erection of a central school and public parks, the work
to commence within six months. The president of the
municipality of Tarlac accepted and registered the
donation.

5. CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY V CA

When a person donates land to another on the
condition that a construction be made, the condition
is akin to a resolutory (not suspensive) one. The noncompliance to the condition extinguishes the right to
the donation, but it need not occur first in order for
the donation to be effected and validated.

In 1921, Cirer and Hill sold the same property to George L.

Parks.
Later on the, the municipality of Tarlac transferred their
rights in the property to the Province of Tarlac.
Parks filed a complaint seeking the annulment of the
donation and asking that he be declared the absolute
owner of the property. Parks allege that the conditions of
the donation were not complied with.

FACTS
In 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez was a member of the
board of trustees of Central Philippine University when he
executed a donation to the school, stating that the land
must be for exclusive use of a medical college. 50 years
later, The heirs of Ramon Lopez filed an action to annul
the donation, stating the failure of the school to construct
the medical college over the land. RTC ruled in favor of
respondents, which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE: W/N the donation was coupled with a condition

precedent? W/N the action to revoke has prescribed?
HELD: No. The condition to erect a school within six
months is not a condition precedent. The characteristic of
a condition precedent is that the acquisiito of the right is
not effected while said condition is mot complied with or
is not deemed complied with. Meanwhile nothing is
acquired and there is only an expectancy of a right.
Consequently, when a condition is imposed, the
compliance of which cannot be effected except when the
right is deemed acquired, such condition cannot be a
condition precedent. In the present case the condition
that a public school be erected and a public park be made
of the donated land could not be complied with except
after giving effect to the donation.

ISSUE: Whether there is a resolutory condition

RULING:
The donation was an onerous one, where failure of the
school to construct a medical college would give the heirs
the power to revoke the donation, reverting the property
back to the heirs of the donor. It is therefore a resolutory
condition. Although, the period was not stated, and the
courts should have fixed a period, in this case, 50 years
has lapsed since the donation was executed, thus fixing a
period would serve no purpose and the property must
already be reverted back.

The action to revoke the donation has prescribed. The

prescriptive periods are: 5 years for the revocation by the
subsequent birth of children, 1 year if by reason of
ingratitude. If no special period is prescribed, 10 years,
for an onerous donation following the law of contracts and
general rules on prescriptions. The donation was made in
1910, the cause of action accrued in 1911, while the
action to revoke was filed 1924, twenty three years later.

Dissenting Opinion:
Davide considered the donation as "modal" where the
obligations are unconditional, and the fulfillment,
performance, existence or extinguishment is not
dependent on any future and uncertain event. It is more
accurate to say that the condition stated is not a
resolutory condition, rather a obligation itself, being an
onerous donation. Since this is an onerous donation, it has
to comply with the rules on Oblicon, and therefore the
courts should have fixed a period.

7. AUSTRIA-MAGAT V. CA
When the deed of donation provides that the donor will
not dispose or take away the property donated, he is in
effect making a donation inter vivos.

Ampils comment:
Davide raises some valid points. The condition can neither
be resolutory nor suspensive because a resolutory
condition (in the law on contracts) extinguishes the entire
contract, not just the condition; on the other hand, there
is nothing to revoke if the validity of a donation depends
on a suspensive condition.

Here, the 2nd characteristic of a donation mortis causa

(revocable at will) is absent.
FACTS:
Cavite, 1953:
Basilisa Comerciant, mom to five children, executed a
Deed of Donation to her five children covered by Transfer
Certificate 3268, with an area of 150 square meters. The
said document reads as follows:
xxx Kusang loob na ibinibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng
ganap at hindi na mababawi sa naulit ng apat na anak
ko at sa kanilang mga tagamagmana (sic),xxx

6. PARKS V. PROVINCE OF TARLAC

A condition which cannot be complied with except after
giving effect to the donation is not a condition precedent.

PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 16th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos Antonio Cimagala Bedural | 2D 2012|

Thereafter, the parties executed another notarized

document that stated

harmonized with its express irrevocability. In Bonsato

where the donation per the deed of donation would also
take effect upon the death of the donor with reservation
for the donor to enjoy the fruits of the land, the Court
held that the said statements only mean that after the
donors death, the donation will take effect so as to make
the donees the absolute owners of the donated property,
free from all liens and encumbrances.

xxx Na ang titulo numero TCT-T-2260 (RT-4036) ng

Lungsod ng Kabite, bahay sa loteng tirahan ng Bagong
Pook na nababanggit sa nasabing kasulatan, ay
mananatili sa poder o possession ng Ina, na si Basilisa
Comerciante habang siya ay nabubuhay at
Gayon din ang nasabing Titulo ay hindi mapapasangla o
maipagbibili ang lupa habang maybuhay ang nasabing
Basilisa Comerciante. Xxx

In Gestopa v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the

prohibition to alienate does not necessarily defeat the
inter vivos character of the donation. It even highlights
the fact that what remains with the donor is the right of
usufruct and not anymore the naked title of ownership
over the property donated. In the case at bar, the
provision in the deed of donation that the donated
property will remain in the possession of the donor just
goes to show that the donor has given up his naked title of
ownership thereto and has maintained only the right to
use (jus utendi) and possess (jus possidendi) the subject
donated property.

On Feb 1979, Basilia executed a Deed of Sale in favor of

Apolinaria Austria Magat for P5000. Basilias children
contested the act, saying that the donation was intervivos
and thereby irrevocable. The trial court disagreed, stating
it was mortis causa and therefore revocable. The case
went to the CA and the case was reversed. CA found the
document to be intervivos because of the phrase ganap
at hindi na mababawi sa naulit
Basilia, to their mind, definitely had no plans of revoking
the donation. The document executed thereafter upheld
such irrevocability.

Furthermore, the act of selling the property to petitioner

herein cannot be construed as a valid act of revocation of
donation. A formal case ought to be filed pursuant to Art
764 which speaks of an action bearing a prescriptive
period of 4 years from non compliance with the deed of
donation. In this case, the 4 year prescriptive period does
not even apply because none of the terms (if any) were
even violated.

The parties proceeded to the Supreme Court

ISSUE: w/n the Deed was intervivos.
HELD: YES.
The court found that whether the donation is inter vivos
or mortis causa depends on whether the donor intended to
transfer ownership over the properties upon the execution
of the deed.

8. EDUARTE V. CA
All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude
and are causes for revocation.

In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, the court recalls the

characteristics of a donation mortis causa,:

FACTS:
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of
land. He executed a deed of donation inter vivos of of
the land to his niece, Helen Doria. Subsequently, he
executed another deed of donation inter vivos ceding the
other of the property to Helen Doria. Helen Doria
donated a protion of the lot (157 sqm) to the Calauan
Christian Reformed Church. Helen Doria sold and conveyed
the remaining portion save some 700 meters for his
residence. Pedro Calapine sought to annul the sale and
donation to eduarte and CCRC on the ground that the
deed of donation was a forgery and that Doria was
unworthy of his liberality claiming ingratitude (commission
of offense against the person, honor or property of donor
[par. 1])

(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee

before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to
the same thing, that the transferor should retain the
ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
while alive;
(2)That before his death, the transfer should be revocable
by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may
be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor
should survive the transferee.

ISSUE:
W/N the falsification of public document committed by
Doria is an act of ingratitude against Calapine (considering
that falsification is a crime against public interest)?

For the case at bar, the phrase hindi na mababawi

definitely exudes the character of an intervivos
agreement. The other provisions therein which seemingly
make the donation mortis causa do not go against the
irrevocable character of the subject donation. According
to the petitioner, the provisions which state that the same
will only take effect upon the death of the donor and that
there is a prohibition to alienate, encumber is mortis
causa. The court disagrees. The said provisions should be

RULING: YES
In commentaries of Tolentino, it is said that all crimes
which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes of
revocation. Petitioner attempted to categorize the
offenses according to their classification under the RPC by

PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 16th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos Antonio Cimagala Bedural | 2D 2012|

deleting the first sentence. However, this is unwarranted

considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion
are considered crimes against the person of the donor
despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against
personal liberty and security under the RPC.

ingratitude). The court ordered the nephew (done) to

vacate and reconvey the property to Directo. CA affirmed.
The nephew contends that there was no real partition and
thus, there is no basis for the charge of usurpation and
ingratitude. He also contends that granting revocation is
proper, the 1 year period for such revocation has already
lapsed.

Note: Eduarte and the Church still won although the

donation was deemed by the Court to be revocable. The
Court applied the CHAIN OF TITLE THEORY because the
lands were registered lands and it has already passed
from the forger (Doria) to innocent purchasers for value
(Eduarte, et al.).

ISSUE
w/n the CA erred in revoking the deed of donation
RULING: NO
The court held that:
We find unmeritorious petitioners argument that
since there was no effective and real partition of the
subject lot there exists no basis for the charge of
usurpation and hence there is also no basis for
finding ingratitude against him.

9. NOCEDA (nephew-donee) V. CA | DIRECTO (auntdonor)

The Act of Usurpation by the donee of the donors land
is an act of ingratitude. The law does not require
conviction in order to revoke the donation; only
preponderance of evidence is needed in an action to
revoke instituted by the donor.

It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not

only the portion donated to him by Directo but he also
fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to Directo;
thus, petitioners act of occupying the portion pertaining
to Directo without the latters knowledge and consent is
an act of usurpation which is an offense against the
property of the donor and considered as an act of
ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does
not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the
offense be proved in the action for revocation.

Note: An action for revocation of a donation based on

ingratitude must file the action to revoke his donation
within 1 year from the time he had knowledge of the
ingratitude of the donee (not from the occurrence of
the act of ingratitude).
FACTS
Directo, Noceda, and Arbizo (the daughter, grandson, and
widow, respectively of the late Celestino Arbizo) extrajudicially settled a parcel of land. Directos share was
11,426 square meters, Noceda got 13,294 square meters,
and the remaining 41,810 square meters went to Maria
Arbizo. On the same day, Directo donated 625 sq.m. of
her share to her nephew.

Donee alleged that he usurped donors property in the 1st

week of September 1985 while the complaint for
revocation was filed on September 16, 1986; thus, more
than one (1) year had passed from the alleged usurpation
by petitioner of private respondents share in Lot 1121.

However, a few months later, another extra-judicial

settlement-partition of the same lot was executed. 3/5 of
the lot was awarded to Arbizo (widow) while Directo and
Noceda (daughter and grandson) got only 1/5 each.

Article 769 expressly states that

a. the donor must file the action to revoke his
donation within one year from the time he had
knowledge of the ingratitude of the done; and
that
b. it must be shown that it was possible for the
donor to institute the said action within the same
period.

Sometime on the same year when the partitions

happened, the nephew (donee) constructed his house on
the land donated to him by Directo. On the other hand,
Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the
extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion,
and constructed thereon three huts.

The concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by

the donee in order to bar the present action, which he
failed to do so. He reckoned the one year prescriptive
period from the occurrence of the usurpation and not
from the time the latter had the knowledge of the
usurpation. He also failed to prove that at the time
Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it was
possible for him to institute an action for revocation of
her donation.

Around 3 years later, the nephew removed the fence

earlier constructed by Directo, occupied the 3 huts, and
fenced the entire land of Directo without her consent.
The latter demanded Noceda to vacate her land, but
Noceda refused. [how ungrateful!]
Hence, Directo filed a complaint for the recovery of
possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of
donation, against Noceda before the lower court. A survey
was conducted and it was found that the area stated in
the settlement was smaller than the actual area of the
lot. The TC declared the second extra-judicial settlementpartition and the deed of donation revoked (because of