Canon 6.

01 Case Digests
People vs Pineda
FACTS: Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres
stand indicted before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte as
principals in five separate cases; four for murder and one for frustrated
murder. Narbasa and Alindo moved fro the consolidation of the cases
into one (1) criminal case as said cases arose out of the same
incident and motivated by one impulse. Giving a nod to the
defendants claim, the respondent Judge directed the City Fiscal to
unify all five criminal cases and to file one single information in case
1246, the other four to be dropped from the docket. The City Fiscal
balked at the Order and sought reconsideration thereof upon the
ground that more than one gun was used, more than one shot was
fired and more than one victim was killed. The respondent Judge
denied the motion to reconsider as he contends that the acts
stemmed out of a series of shots, moved by one impulse and should
therefore be treated as one crime though the series killed more than
one victim and that only one information for multiple murder should
be filed to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one.
ISSUE: WON the City Fiscal of Iligan City acted with abuse of discretion
in filing separate cases for murder and frustrated murder instead of
one for the complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated
homicide.
HELD: NO. The Highest Court ruled that upon the facts and the law ,
particularly Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the City Fiscal
correctly presented the five separate informations and in this case, the
Fiscals discretion should not be controlled. It is by no doubt, a member
of the Bars duty, as provided for in Canon 6, Rule 6.01 of The Code of
Professional Responsibility, to convict but to see that justice is done. The
suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the
innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary
action.
Canon 6, Rule 6.02
Misamin vs San Juan
FACTS: Respondent San Juan deliberately admitted to have appeared as
counsel for the New Cesars Bakery in a proceeding before NLRC for a case
involving the violations of the Minimum Wage Law while he held office as captain
in the Manila Metropolitan Police. Respondent contends that the law did not
prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession, He further avers that

his appearance as counsel while holding a government position is not among the
grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of
attorneys.
ISSUE: WON the administrative case against the defendant should prosper.
HELD: The court ruled in the negative. It noted that the charges have to be
dismissed for not having been duly proved. The Court, for the respondent, has to
say that it would not be inappropriate for him as member of the Bar to avoid all
appearance of impropriety. Certainly the fact that the suspicion could be
entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public
trust, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held
not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor ne justly
compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called
akin interest, is a matter that should not pass annotated. Respondent in his future
actuations as member of the Bar should refrain from laying himself open to such
doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him
but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an
honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remain
unsullied.
Vitriolo vs. Dasig
FACTS: This is a case for disbarment filed with this Court by high-ranking officers
of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) against Atty. Felina Dasig, also
an official of the CHED. The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in
detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.
ISSUE: WON the disbarment case against the respondent should prosper.
HELD: Yes. The Court finds the respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the
CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the
Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and
illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of
applications and requests awaiting action by her office. The lawyers acts
deliberately violated the Lawyers Oath and such may be a ground for
disbarment, suspension and other disciplinary action. The Lawyers Oath
imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or
malice. The same is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Moreover, respondents attempts to extort money are violative of
Rule 1.01 of said Code which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or
participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Said acts also
constitute breach of Rule 6.02 which bars lawyers in government service from
promoting their private interests for a lawyer in government service is a keeper of
the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps
higher than her brethren in private practice.

For these violations, the Highest Court found the respondent worthy of
disbarment.
Ramos vs Imbang
FACTS: This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension against Atty. Jose
Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
complainant, Diana Ramos, alleges that the respondent collected from her
attorneys fees while being employed by the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) and
that said respondent made her believe that a suit has been instituted against the
Jovellanoses for which Ramos paid respondent for each appearance in court.
The suit, however, has never been filed.
ISSUE: WON the disbarment or suspension case against the respondent should
prosper.
HELD: Yes. The Court finds the respondents acts constituted violations of Rules
1.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court further
noted that lawyers are to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity and
lawyers in the government service are expected to be more conscientious of their
actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only member of the
Bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.
Respondents conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character
required of all lawyers. Hence, he is disbarred form the practice of law.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26222

July 21, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE

JUDGE HERNANDO PINEDA of the Court of First Instance of
Lanao del Norte; and TOMAS NARBASA, TAMBAC ALINDO and
RUFINO BORRES, respondents.
Dominador L. Padilla for petitioner.Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and
Borres for respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres
stand indicted before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte,

as principals, in five (5) separate cases, four for murder, viz:

Criminal Case 1246 murder of Neceforo Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1247 murder of Epifania Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1248 frustrated murder of Valeriana Bontilao de
Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1249 murder of Teofilo Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1250 murder of Marcelo Mendoza.
The five informations were planted upon facts gathered by the
prosecuting attorney from his investigation. Of course, the truth of
these facts is yet to be tested in the crucible of a full-dress trial on the
merits.
The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal
facts:
On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the
spouses Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in
Pugaan City of Iligan, were asleep. It was then that guns (rifle, caliber
22) and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in rapid succession
from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter,
defendants below destroyed the door of the house, entered therein,
and let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, all minor
children of the couple and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de
Mendoza.
Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore
listed Tomas Narbasa and Tambak Alindo moved for a
consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal case." Their plea is that
"said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one
impulse."
Giving the nod to defendants' claim, respondent Judge, in an order
dated May 13, 1966, directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five
criminal cases, and to file one single information in Case 1246. He
also ordered that the other four cases, Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and

1250 "be dropped from the docket."

The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration
thereof, upon the ground that "more than one gun was used, more
than one shot was fired and more than one victim was killed." The
defense opposed.
On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider.
He took the position that the acts complained of "stemmed out of a
series of continuing acts on the part of the accused, not by different
and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should
therefore be treated as one crime though the series of shots killed
more than one victim;" and that only one information for multiple
murder should be filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases
instead of one."
Primarily to annul respondent Judge's orders of May 13, 1966 and
May 31, 1966, as having been issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion, the People came to
this Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction, and for other reliefs.
This Court, on July 1, 1966, issued the cease-and-desist order
prayed for.
The question here presented, simply is this: Should there be one
information, either for the complex crime of murder and frustrated
murder or for the complex crime of robbery with multiple homicide
and frustrated homicide? Or, should the five indictments remain as
they are?
1. The case before us calls into question the applicability of Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which reads:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.
Read as it should be, Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes

where a single penalty is to be imposed: first, where a single act

constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito
compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other (delito complejo).1
Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot from
a gun results in the death of two or more persons. Jurisprudence
teaches that, in this factual setting, the complex crime defined in the
first part of Article 48 finds application. 2 A similar rule obtains where
one stabbed another and the weapon pierced the latter's body
through and wounded another. The first died instantaneously; the
second, seven days later. This Court convicted the assailant of
double murder.3 So where a person plants a bomb in an airplane and
the bomb explodes, with the result that a number of persons are
killed, that single act again produces a complex crime. 4
A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a
number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims
expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct
crimes.5 Thus, where the six defendants, with others (armed with
pistols, carbines and also a submachine gun and Garand rifles), fired
volleys into a house killing eleven and wounding several others, each
of the said accused is "guilty of as many crimes of murder as there
were deaths (eleven).6 Again, eleven persons were indicted for
quadruple murder with the use of bolos, a pistol, a barbed arrow
and a piece of bamboo of a man, his common-law wife, and their
two children in cold blood. The accused were found guilty by the trial
court of such offense. This Court, in reversing this ruling below, held
that "[t]he four victims were not killed by a single act but by various
acts committed on different occasions and by different parties"; that
such acts "may not be regarded as constituting one single crime";
and that "[t]hey should be held as separate and distinct crimes." 7 And
a third. At the commencement exercises of an elementary school, "a
shot suddenly rang out" followed by a "series of shots" from a
pistol. Two persons lay dead and a third seriously wounded but who
later on also died. This Court there ruled that there were "three
distinct and separate murders" committed by appellant Juan Mones. 8
And finally, in People vs. Gatbunton, L-2435, May 10, 1950, the
spouses Mariano Sebastian and Maxima Capule who were asleep
were killed by one burst of machinegun fire; and then, by a second

burst of machinegun fire, two of the couple's children also asleep

were killed. The accused, Tomas Gatbunton, was found guilty by
the trial court of quadruple murder. On appeal, this Court declared
that "appellant must be declared guilty of four murders." 9
The present ease is to be differentiated from People vs. Lawas, L7618-20, June 30, 1955. There, on a single occasion, about fifty
Maranaos were killed by a group of home guards. It was held that
there was only one complex crime. In that case, however, there was
no conspiracy to perpetuate the killing. In the case at bar, defendants
performed several acts. And the informations charge conspiracy
amongst them. Needless to state, the act of one is the act of all. 10 Not
material here, therefore is the finding in Lawas that "it is impossible to
ascertain the individual deaths caused by each and everyone" of the
accused. It is to be borne in mind, at this point, that apply the first half
of Article 48, heretofore quoted, there must be singularity of criminal
act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law.11
The respondent Judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that
consolidation of the five cases into one would have the salutary effect
of obviating the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. To save
time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the
trial judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the fear
entertained by respondent Judge could easily be remedied. 12
Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City
correctly presented the five separate informations four for murder
and one for frustrated murder.
2. We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that, because
of an affidavit of one of the witnesses, possibility exists that the real
intent of the culprits was to commit robbery, and that the acts
constituting murders and frustrated murder complained of were
committed in pursuance thereof. If true, this would bring the case
within the coverage of the second portion of Article 48, which treats
as a complex crime a case where an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other.
A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has
been regularly performed.13 If the Fiscal has not seen fit to give weight

to said affidavit wherein it is alleged that certain personal properties

(transistor radio and money) were taken away by the culprits after the
shooting, we are not to jettison the prosecutor's opinion thereon. The
Fiscal could have had reasons for his act. For one thing, there is the
grave problem of proving the elements of that offense robbery. For
another, the act could have been but a blind to cover up the real
intent to kill. Appropriately to be noted here is that all the informations
charged evident premeditation. With ponderables and imponderables,
we are reluctant to hazard a guess as to the reasons for the Fiscal's
action. We are not now to say that, on this point, the Fiscal has
abused his discretion. A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his
office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information
where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the
averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different
conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of
abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize
that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work
against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him the
benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our courts being
unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a
criminal suspect's right to due process the sporting idea of fair play
may be transgressed. So it is, that in People vs. Sope 75 Phil. 810,
815, this Court made the pronouncement that "[i]t is very logical that
the prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution
of offenses, should determine the information to be filed and cannot
be controlled by the off ended party." 14
3. The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to
be substituted for that of the prosecutor's on the matter of what crime
is to be filed in court. The question of instituting a criminal charge is
one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The
information he lodges in court must have to be supported by facts
brought about by an inquiry made by him. It stands to reason then to
say that in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate
and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or
the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this
regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. We are not to be
understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in
exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it
purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for

the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the

strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to
avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute
relied upon is unconstitutional or was 'held invalid.' " 15 Nothing in the
record would as much as intimate that the present case fits into any
of the situations just recited.
1wph1.t

And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or

circumstance, we are loathe to tag the City Fiscal of Iligan City with
abuse of discretion in filing separate cases for murder and frustrated
murder, instead of a single case for the complex crime of robbery with
homicide and frustrated homicide under the provisions of Article 294
(1) of the Revised Penal Code or, for that matter, for multiple murder
and frustrated murder. We state that, here, the Fiscal's discretion
should not be controlled.
Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby
granted; the orders of respondent Judge of May 13, 1965 and May
31, 1966 are hereby set and declared null and void, and, in
consequence, the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is
made permanent insofar as it stops enforcement of the said orders;
and the respondent Judge, or whoever takes his place, is hereby
directed to reinstate Criminal Cases 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249 and
1250 as they were commenced, and to take steps towards the final
determination thereof.
Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and
Rutino Borres. So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles
and Fernando, JJ., concur.Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no
part.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 1418 August 31, 1976
JOSE MISAMIN, complainant, vs.ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN
JUAN, respondent.
RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:
It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila
Police Force and a member of the bar, respondent Miguel A. San
Juan, to be charged with being the legal representative of certain
establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent and,
what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant Jose
Misamin, to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his
employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of
the Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial on the part of
respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of the SolicitorGeneral for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it
would seem there was a change of heart on the part of complainant.
That could very well be the explanation for the non- appearance of
the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of
the Solicitor General to get at the bottom of things were thus set at
naught. Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to
be expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that
there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case for
malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the
complaints being dismissed, This is one of those instances then
where this Court is left with hardly any choice. Respondent cannot be

found guilty of malpractice.

Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits
having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the
proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the
Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that the law did not
prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He
contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a
government position, is not among the grounds provided by the Rules
of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent
also denies having conspired with the complainant Misamin's
attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into
signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay.
Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to members
of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1
Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings:
"Pursuant to the resolution of this Honorable Court of March 21,
1975, the Solicitor General's Office set the case for investigation on
July 2 and 3, 1975. The counsel for the complainant failed to appear,
and the investigation was reset to August 15, 1975. At the latter date,
the same counsel for complainant was absent. In both instances, the
said counsel did not file written motion for postponement but merely
sent the complainant to explain the reason for his absence. When the
case was again called for hearing on October 16, 1975, counsel for
complainant failed once more to appear. The complainant who was
present explained that his lawyer was busy "preparing an affidavit in
the Court of First Instance of Manila." When asked if he was willing to
proceed with the hearing' in the absence of his counsel, the
complainant declared, apparently without any prodding, that he
wished his complaint withdrawn. He explained that he brought the
present action in an outburst of anger believing that the respondent
San Juan took active part in the unjust dismissal of his complaint with
the NLRC. The complainant added that after reexamining his case,
he believed the respondent to be without fault and a truly good
person." 2
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account
respondent's practice of his profession notwithstanding his being a
police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the

Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the

suspension or removal of an attorney. The respondent's appearance
at the labor proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent
police officer of the City of Manila may appropriately be referred to
the National Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission." 3
As a matter of fact, separate complaints on this ground have been filed
and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the
National Police Commission." As for the charges that respondent
conspired with complainant's counsel to mislead complainant to admitting
having' received his separation pay and for giving illegal protection to
aliens, it is understandable why the Report of the Solicitor-General
recommended that they be dismissed for lack of evidence.

The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint

cannot prosper is in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in
re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set forth by
Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment or
suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of
evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is
innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer
of the court in accordance with his oath." 5 The Tionko doctrine has been
subsequently adhered to. 6

This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever
violations there might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of
respondent practicing his profession while holding his position of
Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That is a matter to be
decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the
charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for
respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of
impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained
that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public
trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he
possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent
in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme
that labor be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of
what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should not
pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of
the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and
misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him

but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in

an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor
remains unsullied
WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent
Miguel A. San Juan is dismissed for not having been duly proved. Let
a copy of this resolution be spread on his record.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4984. April 1, 2003]

ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J.

HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR.
ROGER PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG,
DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA
CORONACION, and JOSE RABALO,
complainants, vs. ATTY. FELINA DASIG,
respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative case for disbarment filed

against Atty. Felina S. Dasig,[1] an official of the Commission
on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross
misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorneys Oath
for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to
the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are highranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-

Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998,

complainants allege that respondent, while she was OIC of
Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are
grounds for disbarment under Section 27,[2] Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity
of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of
Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of
Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon
City, the amount of P20,000.00 and later reduced to
P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal
Affairs Service, CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and
during the effectivity of Respondents designation as
Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED,
she demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student,
the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for
facilitation of her application for correction of name
then pending before the Legal Affairs Service,
CHED
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during
the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officerin-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she
demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a student, the
amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application
for correction of name then pending before the Legal
Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition, Respondent
even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew
with full knowledge of the existence of a prior
registration
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998
and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs

Service, CHED, she demanded from Jacqueline N.

Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was
subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial
fee of P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending
before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED... In addition,
the Respondent even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a
lawyer who shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to
facilitate the application for correction of name. [3]

Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her

oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless,
groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently
dismissed.[4]
Further,
complainants
charge
respondent
of
transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section 36[5] of
Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just
debts owing to Borela Tire Supply and Novas Lining Brake
& Clutch as evidenced by the dishonored checks she
issued,[6] the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to
respondent.[7]
Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the
commission of a crime against complainant Celedonia R.
Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she
encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard
of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his
gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May 14,
1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave
threats against the respondent and her son, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 86052, was lodged with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36.[8]
Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored
and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a libelous and

unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation

of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to
justify her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and
with the end view of securing an appointment for herself.[9]
In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required
respondent to file a Comment on the charges.[10] A copy of
said resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at
Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart II Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon
City, only to be returned to this Court with the notation
Unclaimed.[11]
On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the
resolution of February 3, 1999, be served by registered mail
to respondent at her office address in CHED.
In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the
Ortigas Center Post Office informed the Court that the said
mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and signed
for by one Antonio Molon, an authorized agent of respondent
on August 27, 1999.[12]
On November 22, 2000, we granted complainants
motion to refer the complaint to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline directed respondent to submit her Answer
to the Complaint, failing which she would be considered in
default and the case heard ex parte. Respondent failed to
heed said order and on January 8, 2002, the Commission
directed her anew to file her Answer, but again she failed to
comply with the directive. As a result, the Commission ruled
that she had waived her right to file her Comment or Answer
to the Complaint and the case was mainly resolved on the
basis of the documents submitted and on record.

In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002,

the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline stated as follows:
Fromtheforegoingevidenceonrecord,itcanbeconcludedthat
respondentinviolationofheroathasagovernmentofficialandas
amemberoftheBar,indeedmadeunlawfuldemandsorattempted
toextortmoneyfromcertainpeoplewhohadpending
applications/requestsbeforeherofficeinexchangeforherpromise
toactfavorablyonsaidapplications/requests.Clearly,respondent
unlawfullyusedherpublicofficeinordertosecurefinancialspoils
tothedetrimentofthedignityandreputationoftheCommission
onHigherEducation.
Fortheforegoingreasons,itisrecommendedthatrespondentbe
suspendedfromthepracticeoflawforthemaximumperiod
allowableofthree(3)yearswithafurtherwarningthatsimilar
actioninthefuturewillbeagroundfordisbarmentofrespondent.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the full text of which reads as
follows:
RESOLVEDtoADOPTandAPPROVE,asitishereby
ADOPTEDandAPPROVED,theReportandRecommendationof
theInvestigatingCommissioneroftheaboveentitledcase,herein
madepartofthisResolution/DecisionasAnnexA:;and,finding
therecommendationfullysupportedbytheevidenceonrecordand
theapplicablelawsandrules;andconsideringthatrespondent
unlawfullyusedherpublicofficeinordertosecurefinancialspoils
tothedetrimentofthedignityandreputationoftheCommission
onHigherEducation,RespondentisherebySUSPENDEDfrom
thepracticeoflawforthree(3)years.[13]
At the threshold is the query of whether respondent
attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal

Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her

malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of
filing of the complaint, was Chief Education Program
Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of
Programs and Standards, CHED.
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government
office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official.[14] However, if said misconduct as a government
official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer,
then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the
Bar.[15]
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on
various occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services,
CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie
B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of
money as consideration for her favorable action on their
pending applications or requests before her office. The
evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure,
despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the
charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer
of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her
qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she
ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal
for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the
approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her
office.
The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and
duties of every lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground
for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The
Attorneys Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the
duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is

further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.[16] Respondents demands for sums of money
to facilitate the processing of pending applications or
requests before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul
of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions
likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does
not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988,
was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners
alone, but of all lawyers including those in government
service. This is clear from Canon 6[17] of said Code. Lawyers
in government are public servants who owe the utmost
fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more
sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations,
as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of
the public.
Respondents attempts to extort money from persons
with applications or requests pending before her office are
violative of Rule 1.01[18] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from
engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or
deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of
Rule 6.02[19] of the Code which bars lawyers in government
service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of
private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of
his office or which may be affected by the functions of his
office. Respondents conduct in office falls short of the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers,
specially from one occupying a high public office. For a
lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any
act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and

confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also

uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.
Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper
of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private
practice.
For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule
1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 1[20] and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for
acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC,
Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not
just the penalty of three years suspension from membership
in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by
the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her
name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of
this decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found
liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the
Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DISBARRED.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar
Confidant to be spread on the records of the respondent, as
well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution
to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator
for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1] Admitted to the Bar, May 30, 1986. Per 1998 LAW LIST, p. 232.

EN BANC
DIANA RAMOS,
Complainant,

A. C. No. 6788
(Formerly, CBD 382)

Present:

-versus-

ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG,

Respondent.

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,*
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
August 23, 2007

x-------------------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment or
suspension[1] against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
THE COMPLAINT

In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the

assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing
civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and
Elenita Jovellanos.[2] She gave respondent P8,500 as
attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000
only.[3]
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled
hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly,
respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and
always told her to wait outside. He would then come out
after several hours to inform her that the hearing had
been cancelled and rescheduled.[4] This happened six

times and for each appearance in court, respondent

charged her P350.
After six consecutive postponements, the
complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired
about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Bian
and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that
respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses
and that he was in fact employed in the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO).[5]
RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE

According to respondent, the complainant knew

that he was in the government service from the very
start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was
still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance
Office (predecessor of PAO) of Bian, Laguna and was
assigned as counsel for the complainant's daughter.[6]
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help
her file an action for damages against the Jovellanoses.
[7] Because he was with the PAO and aware that the
complainant was not an indigent, he declined.[8]
Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult
Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private
practitioner.[9] Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept
the complainant's case as she was unable to come up

with
the
acceptance
fee
agreed
upon.[10]
Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant
allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing the
Jovellanoses. Afraid that she might spend the cash on
hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the
P5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's
acceptance fee.[11]
A year later, the complainant requested
respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of
her daughters asked her to account for the P5,000 she
had previously given the respondent for safekeeping.
[12] Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed
and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992.[13]
On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the
PAO.[14] A few months later or in September 1994, the
complainant again asked respondent to assist her in
suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a
private practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the
complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as he
lost contact with the complainant.[15]
RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP

Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar

Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed,
received evidence from the parties. On November 22,

2004, the CBD submitted its report and recommendation

to the IBP Board of Governors.[16]
The CBD noted that the receipt[17] was issued on
July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with the PAO.
[18] It also noted that respondent described the
complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and that
respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these
reasons, the complainant would not have accepted a
spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued one.
The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the
receipt to accommodate a friend's request.[19] It found
respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on
government lawyers from accepting private cases and
receiving lawyer's fees other than their salaries.[20] The
CBD concluded that respondent violated the following
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from a client.
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal
service which he knows or should know that he is
not qualified to render. However, he may render
such service if, with the consent of his client, he can
obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.

Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the

practice of law for three years and ordered him to
immediately return to the complainant the amount of
P5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt.[21]
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the findings of the CBD that respondent
violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the
CBD's recommendation with regard to the restitution of
P5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned
from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return
the total amount, an additional suspension of six
months.[22]
THE COURT'S RULING

We adopt the findings of the IBP with

modifications.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with
honesty and integrity.[23] More specifically, lawyers in
government service are expected to be more
conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to
public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar
but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to

public service.[24]
Government employees are expected to devote
themselves completely to public service. For this reason,
the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section
7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In
addition to acts and omissions of public officials
and employees now prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared
unlawful:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related

thereto, public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession

unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict with
their official function.[25]

Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle

private cases for they are expected to devote themselves
full-time to the work of their respective offices.

In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from

the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992
while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance
of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship.[26] Respondent's admission that he
accepted money from the complainant and the receipt
confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship
between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt
showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he
was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly
violated the prohibition on private practice of
profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his
receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the
purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent
litigants.[27] Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V
of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. xxx
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the
Government in extending free legal assistance to
indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor,
administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.[28]

As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted

attorney's fees from the complainant as this was

inconsistent with the office's mission.[29] Respondent

violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees
other than his salary.
Canon 1 of the
Responsibility provides:

Code

of

Professional

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD

THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.[30] This

undertaking includes the observance of the abovementioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent
when he accepted the complainant's cases and received
attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services.
Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was
also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility because the prohibition on the private
practice of profession disqualified him from acting as
the complainant's counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against
handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees,
respondent
also
surreptitiously
deceived
the
complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint
against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he
should not have done), respondent also led the

complainant to believe that he really filed an action

against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that
the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to
pay his appearance fees for hearings that never took
place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of
the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.[31]
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the
integrity and good moral character required of all
lawyers, specially one occupying a public office.
Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain
from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust
and confidence of the citizenry in government but also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times
and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.
A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is
burdened with a high degree of social responsibility,
higher than his brethren in private practice.[32]
There is, however, insufficient basis to find
respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the
money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it
as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust
for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the
sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor
of the client)[33] nor was it given to him for a specific
purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail
bond).[34] Nevertheless, respondent should return the

P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to

attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.[35]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found
guilty of violating the lawyers oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED
from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also
ordered to return to complainant the amount of P5,000
with interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995,
within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the
personal records of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice