Taada vs Angara, GR No.

118295, 02 May 1997

FACTS
The suit was filed to nullify the concurrence of the Philippines Senate to the
Presidents Ratification of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization.
It was contended that the agreement places nationals and products of member
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products in contravention of the
Filipino First Policy.
Petitioners maintained that this Agreement was an assault on the sovereign powers
of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass legislation that
would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation would not
conform to the WTO Agreement.
ISSUE
Whether the provisions of the WTO Agreement and its annexes limit, restrict, or
impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress.
HELD
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on
the domestic level, it is however subject to limitations and restrictions voluntarily
agreed to by the Philippines as a member of the family of nations. One of the oldest
and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty engagement is
not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties
xxx. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in
its legislation such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of
the obligations undertaken.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their
state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a
convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals live with coequals, and in pursuit
of mutuality covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit
the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights.
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered
absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the

very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by
treaty stipulations.

Taada, et al., v. Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

DECISION
(En Banc)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the

concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the
international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They
argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
Further, they contended that the national treatment and parity provisions of the
WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy
of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by
Filipinos.
II.

THE ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in

worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into
a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the
Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the Agreement establishing the
WTO.]
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from
participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization
and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized,
deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate
to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for
business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did
not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments,
goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair.
xxx
xxx

xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national

economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the
international community. As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is
keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic
needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding
mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom
from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic
industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade
without discrimination cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they
are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from
envisioning a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity, the fundamental law
encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that
can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and
Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally.
And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in
Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against
the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require

the State to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials
and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles while
serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in themselves sources of causes
of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles
relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves
the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity and the promotion of industries which are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its
acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the
exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all
nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and
overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part
of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We
find no patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or
personal hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or
at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more
advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But
that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to
nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own
judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its
authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the
realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy
makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march
toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people
should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement
allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.
TANADA v. ANGARA
272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997
Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein
respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial
products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and

uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These
are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the
signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits,
restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the
Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign
trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the
said WTO agreement.
Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity ,
with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of
our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in
good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered
as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such
as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its
sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate
did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of
signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal
of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be
viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable
structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic selfdestruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make
their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

3.
Bayan Muna Vs. Romulo
Facts:

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent

themarginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was
the Secretary of ForeignAffairs during the period material to this case. Respondent
Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary. Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court Having a key determinative bearing
on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)
with
the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern
and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious
crimes adverted to cover
those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. On December 28, 2000, the RP,
through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its
terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As
of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear
to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The
Philippines is not among the 92.
Issue: Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for
contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with
universally recognized principles of internationallaw.
Held: No. Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for
imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally
recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the
fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves
criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock
the conscience of
humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the
*ICC+. The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position,
which,as already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement,
virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty
obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles. The
Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender
agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the
Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x . The
agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys
judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly
and judiciously.
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement
would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern
to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who
may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and
punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the
US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to
bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what
the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals
to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which
may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of
things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act
of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender

agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the
Rome Statute
Bayan Muna vs Romulo
G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent
the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent
Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing
the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted
to cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed
the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out
of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval
and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No.
0470 to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the nonsurrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the
RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03,
hereinafter), the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and
accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and
put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims
to protect what it refers to and defines as persons of the RP and US from frivolous
and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international
tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and
defense partnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral
agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33 other countries.

The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:

1. For purposes of this Agreement, persons are current or former Government
officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one
Party.
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the
express consent of the first Party,
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any
purpose, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country,
or expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any
international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council.
3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the
Philippines to a third country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of
that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal
has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP].
4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the
[USA] to a third country, the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that
person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has
been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the
Government of the [US].
5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one
party notifies the other of its intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of
this Agreement shall continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or any
allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of
the non-surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of
October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally
binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said
agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in
concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as
unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.

Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for
contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with
universally recognized principles of international law.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.
Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold
posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the
Agreement.
Petitioners contentionperhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized
international doctrines, practices, and jargonsis untenable. One of these is the
doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution,
wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of notes falls
into the category of inter-governmental agreements, which is an internationally
accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections
(Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:
An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many
similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of
two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the
representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats
the text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may
be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of
exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure,
or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executive agreements
have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of
executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On the other
hand, executive agreements concluded by the President sometimes take the form
of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents
denominated agreements or protocols. As former US High Commissioner to the
Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of Trade
Agreement Acts:
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments
ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of
notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. x x
x

It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03be it viewed as
the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance
thereof or as consent to be boundis a recognized mode of concluding a legally
binding international written contract among nations.
Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance
with Principles of International Law
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing
immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized
principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the
Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility
for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it
precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the [ICC] x x x.63
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as
already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually
abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under
the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender
agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the
Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x The
agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys
judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly
and judiciously.
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement
would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern
to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who
may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and
punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US,
before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind
both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the
Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to
international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which
may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of
things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act
of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender
agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the
Rome Statute.

4
VINUYA VS. SEC. ROMULO
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEA, HERMINIHILDA, MANIMBO,
LEONOR H. SUMAWANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG,
MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA
M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M.
PALACIO MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA,
FLORENCIA M. DELA PEA, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA,
VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA O. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA
CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ,
ROSALINA M.BUCO, PATRICIA A. ERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL,
MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C.
MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILLERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA
PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S.
TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA,

CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al.

In their capacity and as members of the Malaya Lolas Organization,
versus

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE

HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGNAFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGO-ALBERT,
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and
THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO

G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against
the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the
DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to
the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second
World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the
comfort women stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive
Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the
individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully
satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and
Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and
war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse
their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to
the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral
Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government
signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs
for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by
the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
ISSUE:

WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not

espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations
against Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department
has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims
against Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure.
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is
well-established that the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislativethe political
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are
delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be
undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they
advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts
certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive
agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should
espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations
matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not
to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department
has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims
of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions
which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has
his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic,
consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would
be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations
with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the
to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment
of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority
to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle,
where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys
conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to
assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from
the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and
decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are
appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to
bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is
able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. By taking
up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or

international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own
right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international
law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic
protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own
right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf
it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no
remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are
available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these
questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position
internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter
this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese
army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or
that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes
obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been
used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community
of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations
of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the
former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are
obligations erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens
norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not
admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of
equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

5.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v Duque III
Facts:
Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of
E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not
constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by President
Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses of the
Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Intl Code of Marketing and
Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly(WHA). From 19822006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for
breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.

Issue:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent intl agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law of the land
and may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is in accord with intl
agreements

MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by promulgating the
RIRR.
Held:
Sub-issue:
Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, intl law can become domestic law by transformation (thru
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional declaration
i.e treaties) The ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not been concurred by
2/3 of all members of the Senate as required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS had been
transformed into domestic law through a local legislation such as the Milk Code. The Milk Code is
almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.
No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions pertinent
WHA resolutions are customary intl law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. For an intl
rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by
states because they consider it as obligatory to comply with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO
resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were enforced or practiced by at least a
majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted most of the provisions
into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for exclusive
breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for
breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our country
as well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their babies as they see fit. WHA
Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW non-binding norms, principles and practices that
influence state behavior. Soft law is not part of intl law.
Main issue:
Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with the Milk Code such as Sec. 4(f)
->advertising, promotions of formula are prohibited,
Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young children
uo to 24 months
And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH and
respondents are prohibited from implementing said provisions.

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. HEALTH

SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III
FACTS: On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by
President Corazon Aquino by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the
president under the Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code states that the law seeks
to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes. the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take
appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages
of breastfeeding. the DOH issued RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of The Milk Code, assailing that the RIRR was
going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the
coverage of said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the
RIRR
RULING:
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and
VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are
PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions. The international instruments
pointed out by the respondents, UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW, are deemed part of the law
of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR.
Customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system.
Custom or customary international law means a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). Under the
1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that
an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. Generally accepted principles of international
law refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on

all states. The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not
prohibit advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products.
Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other
marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and
approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). In this regard, the WHA Resolutions
adopting the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. This may
constitute soft law or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence
state behavior. Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the
WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact
enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states and obligatory in
nature. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the
law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of
a law enacted by the legislature. On the other hand, the petitioners also failed to
explain and prove by competent evidence just exactly how such protective
regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all the regulatory provisions
under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court
sees no harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions
of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk
Code.

6.
Pimentel, Jr. vs Ermita, 472 SCRA 587
(Public Officer, Difference Between Ad-Interim and Acting Appointments)
Facts: President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of
their respective departments without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, while Congress is in their regular session.
Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim
appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were
previously appointed in an acting capacity.
Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of the appointments, assert that
while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or
acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, without first having obtained its consent.
Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue appointments in an
acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission
on Appointments even while Congress is in session.

EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the Presidents power of appointment. Sections

16 and 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 read:
SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. The President shall exercise the power to
appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws.
SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. (1) The President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other
competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch,
appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly
appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence
or any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy[.]
Issue: WON the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries while Congress is in session.
Held: Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary
nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office
occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department
secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as
acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in
session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by
the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint
in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session.
Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon
acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a
vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted
to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily
filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the
need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad
interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way
before the lapse of one year.

Note: Can Congress impose the automatic appointment of the

undersecretary?
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.

The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not
interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when
the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power
to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the
legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the power
to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a
person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither
may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to
an office.

Facts:
president

While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then

Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo

(GMA)

appointed

Arthur

Yap

et

al

as secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in an acting

capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a
complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot
make such appointment without the consent of the Commission on Appointment;
that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292,
only the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an
acting capacity and not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the
president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to
issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session.
Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an
officer in the civil service provided that the temporary designation shall not exceed
one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad
interimappointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.
HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided
the safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the provision that the
temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year

after the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess,
GMA issued the ad interim appointments this also proves that the president was in
good faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president.
The choice is the presidents to make and the president normally appoints those
whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary.
She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds
a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should
be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in
session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. That
person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may
make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed outsiders, such is allowed. EO 292 also
provides that the president may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an
office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting
capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President
deems that person competent.

7.
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a Junk VFA Movement, Bishop Tomas
Millamena (Iglesia Filipina Independiente), Bishop Elmer Bolocan (United Church of
Christ of the Phil.), Dr. Reynaldo Legasca, Md, Kilusang Mambubukid Ng Pilipinas,
Kilusang Mayo Uno, Gabriela, Prolabor, and The Public Interest Law Center,

petitioners, vs. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Foreign Affairs Secretary

Domingo Siazon, Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado, Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre,
Senate President Marcelo Fernan, Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Blas Ople,
Senator Rodolfo Biazon, And Senator Francisco Tatad, respondents.
Facts: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged
a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations
in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. In view of the
impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines
and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases
agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed
RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have
extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the
United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia
Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs
Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing
strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific
region. Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then President Fidel V.
Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent
Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5,
1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the
Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA,
for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
Issues (justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of
the VFA; (2) whether the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII
or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution; (3) and whether or not the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction.
Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger
of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As
taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a
taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
(2) Yes.The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21,
Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision,
is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25,
Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is
mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.
(3) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondents, the Court as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch
sentinel of the rights of the people is then without power to conduct an incursion
and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in character and
nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the

metes and bounds within which each of the three political branches of government
may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.
BAYAN vs. ZAMORA
Facts:
The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on
August 30, 1951, To further strengthen their defense and security relationship.
Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on
their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty
of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the
presence of US military bases in the Philippines.
On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things,
the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).This resulted to a
series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13,
1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively
signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through
respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the
Senate of the Philippines,the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President
and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners as legislators, non-governmental
organizations, citizens and taxpayers assail the constitutionality of the VFA and
impute to herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
Petitioner contends, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are
sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that
purpose if so required by congress, and c) recognized as such by the other
contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so
that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in
by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.
Issue:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Constitution?
Ruling:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence
of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII, which
respondent invokes, reads: No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate. Sec.
25 Art. XVIII provides : After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the
RP and the US concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in and
when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in
a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the
Senate by the other contracting state.
The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and international agreements
in general with a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties and international
agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage
or particular designation requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and
effective.
In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve presence of
foreign military bases, troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both constitutional
provisions share some common ground. The fact that the President referred the VFA
to the Senate under Sec. 21 Art. VII, and that Senate extended its concurrence
under the same provision is immaterial.

8.
G. R. No. 167919
February 14, 2007
Plaridel M. Abaya vs. Hon. Secretary Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr.
FACTS:
On May 7, 2004 Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) issued a Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012. It was
approved by DPWH Acting Secretary Florante Soriquez. This resolution
recommended the award to China Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract for the
implementation of civil works for Contract Package No. I (CP I), which consists of the
improvement/rehabilitation of the San Andres-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road, with the
lengt of 79.818 kilometers, in the island province of Catanduanes.
This Loan Agreement No. PH-204 was executed by and between the JBIC and the
Philippine Government pursuant to the exchange of Notes executed by and between
Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the
Philippines, and then Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon, in behalf of their respective
governments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Loan Agreement No. PH-204 between the JBIC and the Philippine
Government is a kind of a treaty.

HELD:
The Loan Agreement No. PH-204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes
dated December 27, 1999 between the Japanese Government and the Philippine
Government is an executive agreement.
An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement that has many
similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of
two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the
representative of the other.
treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations, memoranda
of understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of notes all are refer to international
instruments binding at international law.
Although these instruments differ from each other by title, they all have common
features and international law has applied basically the same rules to all these
instruments. These rules are the result of long practice among the States, which
have accepted them as binding norms in their mutual relations. Therefore, they are
regarded as international customary law.
That case was dismissed by the SCORP last Feb. 14 2007.
What the petitioners wanted was that Foreign funded projects also undergo the
procurement process.
The dismissal of the case somehow gave justification for the delay of the
implementing rules for foreign funded projects (IRR-B) of the procurement law If we
recall the decision of the Abaya vs Ebdane was used by the DOJ when the DOTC
Secretary was asking for an opinion from the former, during the ZTE controversy.as
ruled by the Supreme Court in Abaya v. Ebdane, an exchange of notes is considered
a form of an executive agreement, which becomes binding through executive action
without need of a vote by the
Senate and that (like treaties and conventions, it is an international instrument
binding at international law,
The second issue involves an examination of the coverage of Republic Act No. 9184,
otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act. Section 4 of the
said Act provides that it shall
apply to: the Procurement of infrastructure Projects, Goods and Consulting
Services, regardless of source of funds, whether local or foreign, by all branches and
instrumentalities of government, its departments, offices and agencies, including
government-owned and/or -controlled corporations and local government units,
subject to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 138. Any treaty or international
or executive agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the
Philippine government is a signatory shall be observed.