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Does the fact that some people take pleasure in evil things
constitute a fatal objection to utilitarianism?
By Douglas Grecian
Being that it is the most popular and influential variant of consequentialism,
utilitarianism has come under a great deal of scrutiny, with a number of criticisms
made against it. One of these objections concerns itself with the promotion and
maximisation of utility, in that there are people who take pleasure in acts that we
would consider evil. In this essay I hope to show that while this does not necessarily
constitute a fatal objection, it is certainly a problematic one that needs to be properly
addressed. This will be done by clarifying what the objection is and examining some
of the responses to it.
Before we can properly begin to answer, it is perhaps necessary to say something
about how a utilitarian would judge what is a moral action. To them, an action is
moral based on the amount of utility, or happiness, it produces. The problem, as some
critics suggest, is that it does not distinguish between different sorts of happiness. One
of the best illustrations of this is the example of Genghis Khan given by Geoffrey
Scarre. When expressing his views on happiness he said, The greatest joy is to
conquer ones enemies, to pursue them, to seize their property, to see their families in
tears, to ride their horses, and to posses their daughters and their wives (Scarre,
1996: 155). While most people would take the view that his actions were bad, and
utilitarians would agree due to the suffering he caused, the point is that from a
utilitarian aspect it could be argued that the evils committed by Genghis were partially
offset by the pleasure he took from them. For most people, this would strike them as
intuitively wrong.
The question now is how can a utilitarian reconcile this fact with the notion that moral
decisions should be based on achieving the greatest amount of happiness?
One of the typical responses might be that this kind of pleasure is actually harming
the individual without him knowing it. Another example used in this debate is that of
the roman philosopher Seneca (2BCE-AD65), when he observed that those who took
pleasure in watching others be killed was not really pleasure at all. However, this
would seem to indicate that there are certain experiences that are intrinsically wrong,
which is more of a deontological argument, and appears to be something added to
utilitarianism rather than part of it. It also needs to be clarified how this pleasure
harms a person. Some of the reasons as to why this form of happiness is harmful will
be discussed later.
Defenders could refer to the idea of higher and lower pleasure, promoted by John
Stewart Mill. Here, the actions taken by Genghis Khan may be categorised as lower
pleasures, and thus would not be considered to contribute to the overall level of
happiness as much as someone who prefers to experience the higher pleasures. There
is perhaps a possibility to argue that people act like Genghis because their
circumstances have not allowed them the opportunity to properly experience these
higher pleasures. There are a couple of objections to this approach however. Firstly, a
person can be happy from sadistic enjoyment while still participating in higher
pleasures like art and literature. Going back to the observation of Seneca, it is likely
that many of those Romans enjoying the arena would also be engaged in higher
pursuits. The point is that this argument also still fails to address the issue that evil
acts could be offset by the pleasure the agent takes in them.

In addition, using this part of Mills work to defend against this criticism would be
mistaken, since he would take the view that these actions are amoral, since he wrote
the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not
the agents own happiness, but that of all concerned (Rachels, 1986: 90). Here, a
utilitarian could argue (quite plausibly) that Genghis Khan would not be excused even
partially from his crimes because he was acting for his own happiness, rather than that
of everybody affected. This would seem to be arguing the case that since no utilitarian
would act like this, it cannot be criticised for the actions of these sorts of individuals.
Be that as it may, if the morality of someones actions is to be judged on the happiness
they produce, in this case the only happiness that can be presumed to have been
produced is that of the agent himself, which still leads to the conclusion that these
actions were partially moral.
Some opponents of utilitarianism might see the above as evidence of another problem,
that it only matters indirectly how the sum of satisfactions is distributed among
individuals (Scheffer, 1988: 17). In other words, it doesnt matter if only one person is
happy so long as that is the maximum possible happiness. While this does not strictly
relate to the topic being discussed, I think it helps to illustrate that it could be used as
an opening or support for other, perhaps more damaging criticisms.
Going back to the issue of how these sorts of actions could be self damaging, as
utilitarians argue, there appears to be little in the way of concrete definitions of how
those who take sadistic pleasure are hurting themselves. While some philosophers talk
about how they loathe themselves for their actions, it still leaves the problem that
some people respect themselves for things apt to be frowned upon by our mainly
liberal conscience (Scarre, 1996: 160). This could imply that there is an issue with
different cultural values, which is an entirely separate topic that would require its own
discussion to answer properly.
So far, the criticism we have been discussing has been in relation to utilitarianism in
general. In particular, the discussion has focused on act utilitarianism, with actions
being judged by their affect on utility. It might be that other forms would be able to
give a better defence. In particular, rule utilitarianism, which obligates people to
coordinate their activities in terms of an optimal liberal code (Hooker, 2000: 46),
could easily claim that the pleasure Genghis Khan receives does not matter, since he
followed his own rules rather than ones accepted universally. With negative
utilitarianism, it would be clear that the actions of someone like Genghis are immoral,
since he promotes suffering, while it sees that actions should be judged in how they
reduce overall misery. However, preference utilitarianism would seem to support
these kinds of actions, since it judges them on how they accord with the preferences
of those who are affected. On the other hand, Harsanyi suggests that this variant is
justified by the principle that we should treat other people, in the same way as we
want to be treated by them (Scarre, 1996: 134). Still, this does not solve the problem
that a man like Genghis is not likely to have the sorts of preferences that we would
find acceptable.

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Although there is some merit in suggesting that by looking at the objection discussed
from different views of utilitarianism the damage it does is lessened to a degree, it
would take a much more in-depth examination of these alternate interpretations to see
if this is a viable position, which is beyond the scope of this essay.
Looking over a selection of the arguments a utilitarian could use to counter the
criticism of those who take pleasure in evil things they appear to consist of either
distancing utilitarianism from such individuals, trying to show how their actions go
against utilitarian thinking, or arguing that this form of pleasure is false and/or
harmful. Although this gives defenders of this moral theory breathing room, neither
puts to rest the notion that a sadists actions are partially offset by the pleasure he takes
from them. It seems that one of the problems here is how to define the best way to
achieve happiness, since the utilitarian criterion of right conduct is generally opaque
at best (Hooker, 2000: 106). While I do not think that this means that as a moral
theory it can be used to justify any sort of sadistic behaviour, and that utilitarians
make some valid points in their defence, it gives no systematic way of excluding
those who have such aberrant pleasures. For a theory that bases itself on a rational
evaluation of actions and their consequences, this would appear a serious gap in any
calculations about maximising happiness. Ultimately, I think that although this not a
fatal objection, it is one without a satisfactory answer that perhaps is a result of some
of the more fundamental flaws in the theory.

Bibliography

Hooker et al (eds), Morality, Rules and Consequences, (Edinburgh, 2000)

Rachels, J., The Elements of Moral Philosophy, (Temple UP, 1986)
Scarre, G., Utilitarianism, (Routledge, 1996)
Scheffler (ed), Consequentialism and its Critics, (Clarendon Press, 1988)
Wolff, J., An Introduction to Political Philosophy, (OUP, 1996)