Art as Symptom: iek and the Ethics of Psychoanalytic Criticism

Author(s): Tim Dean

Source: Diacritics, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Summer, 2002), pp. 20-41
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
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SYMPTOM
ZIZEKAND THE ETHICSOF
PSYCHOANALYTICCRITICISM
AS

ART
V

TIMDEAN

This papertackles a problemthatis exemplifiedby, but not restrictedto, Slavoj Zizek's

work:the tendencyto treataestheticartifactsas symptomsof the culturein which they
were produced. Whether or not one employs the vocabulary and methods of
psychoanalysisto do so, this approachto aesthetics has become so widespreadin the
humanitiesthatit qualifiesas a contemporarycriticalnorm.As a norm,it may be subject
to debateand even contestation.Todayit is normativeto readliterature,film, and other
culturaltexts primarilyas evidence aboutthe societies that made them--evidence that
necessarily requires our hermeneutic labor in order to yield its significance. This
methodologicalprotocolremainsin place whetherone inhabitscriticalperspectivesas
ostensiblydisparateas historicist,materialist,or psychoanalyticmodes of thinking;it is
also a groundingassumptionof culturalstudies, irrespectiveof how one defines that
criticalpractice.Indeed,the issue I want to addressis quite as much a Marxistproblem
as it is a psychoanalyticone, and thereforethe way in which Zizek articulatesLacan
with Marx makes his work especially fertile terrainon which to engage this matter.As
Zizek remindsus in TheSublimeObjectoflIdeology,Lacanclaimed thatMarxinvented
the symptom[SO 11]-- an observationthatZizek has been keen to exploit from the very
beginning of his work.
Zizek's combining psychoanalysiswith Marxismin novel ways has helped make
Lacanmorepalatableto contemporarycriticalsensibilitiesby politicizingpsychoanalysis,
demonstratinghow it offers less an accountof the individualthanof society andculture.
In Zizek'shandspsychoanalytictheoryappearsless vulnerableto the standardcriticisms
that it is ahistoricaland apolitical.While a numberof critiquesof Zizek have reiterated
these common objections, nevertheless his politicizing of psychoanalysis has been
particularlyimportantduring a period that witnessed the rise of new historicism,the
institutionalizationof culturalstudies, and the escalating importanceof "the political"
as a sign-perhaps the sign-of humanitiesprofessors'seriousness.'Zizek's work has
gone a long way towardmaking Lacan seem indispensableto culturalstudies,just as
Juliet Mitchell's and Jacqueline Rose's work a decade earlier made Lacan seem
indispensableto theoreticallyrigorousfeminism.At a momentwhenthe poststructuralist
variantof Lacaniantheory was being displacedby historicistmodes of thought,Zizek
emerged on the scene to revivify psychoanalysisand make it exciting again. Thus his
work's appeal has an historicalbasis quite apartfrom Zizek's own personalcharisma
and his remarkableproductivity.It is his politicizing of psychoanalysis,as much as his
Thanksto Julia Bader and George Starr,in whose house this essay was composed.
1. For significantconsiderationsof thepolitics ofZizek'swork,see Bellamy;Chow;Guerra;
Miklitsch;Resch, "Running";Resch, "Sound."Whereasthese studiesfocus on thepolitical implications of Ziekian thinking,thepresentstudyconcerns the different(thoughrelated)question
of the ethical ramificationsof his work.

diacritics / summer 2002

diacritics32.2:21-41

21

ii:.

............

..........
..;1....

........

..... . . . . .
-.xx,

....................

renderingLacannewly accessible,thathas madeZizekpopular.I wantto argue,however,

that his style of politicizing psychoanalysiscarries a significant ethical cost, one that
follows partlyas a consequenceof Zizek'sfailureto workthroughhis theoreticalrelation
to Althusser,fromwhom he derivesthe practiceof symptomaticreadingwhile claiming
to displacethe latter'sversionof psychoanalyticMarxism.Thus I shall be arguingfor a
significant distinction between a political and an ethical psychoanalysis, suggesting
that we have been cultivatingthe formerat the expense of the latter.

SpaghettiPsychoanalysis
The notion of the symptom is central to Zizek's thinking about politics and culture.
Although in his work and in psychoanalytictheory more generallythe term symptom
carriesa rangeof conceptualmeanings, symptomatologyremainsthe governingtrope
of Ziek's oeuvre.FollowingLacan,who continuedto modifythe conceptof the symptom
throughouthis career, Zizek argues that just about anything can be understood as
symptomatic:
[I]n thefinal years of Lacan's teaching wefind a kind of universalizationof
the symptom:almost everythingthat is becomes in a way symptom,so that
finally even woman is determinedas the symptomof man. Wecan even say
that "symptom"is Lacan'sfinal answer to the eternalphilosophical question
"Whyis theresomethinginstead of nothing?"-this "something"which "is"
instead of nothing is indeed the symptom.[SO 71-72]
If, for reasons to be elaborated,virtuallyanythingcan be considereda symptom,then
this conceptualmove illuminateshow Zizek can write abouteverything,how he seems
able to renderall culturalphenomenaas gristto his theoreticalmill. Havinggraspedthe
structurallogic of the symptom,one may submitpracticallyanythingof interestto its
explanatorygrid. And while Zizek expounds more than merely one logic of symptom
formation,his structurallogics--like his many books--tend to remainvariationson a
single theme.
If, accordingto Lacanat the end of his career,the symptomhas become a condition
of subjectiveexistence ratherthana contingentproblem,thentherecan be no possibility
of curing symptoms in the manner that Freud envisioned when he invented
psychoanalysis.Yet while this universalizingof symptomatologysidelines the question
of cure, it does nothing to diminish the psychoanalytic zeal for diagnosis and
interpretation.Instead,the oppositeis true:universalizingthe symptomfuels the motive
for diagnosisandinterpretation,since symptomsareno longerlocalizedandself-evident
but lurkingeverywhere.A hermeneuticoperationbecomes necessarybefore we can see
how, for example, woman is the symptom of man.2By shifting symptoms from the
category of the exception to that of the rule, Zizek to some extent depathologizesthe
symptom,convertingit into a subjectivenorm.Butto the degreethathis methodrequires
a diagnosticstance (insofaras it encouragesan intensifiedhermeneuticvigilance vis-traises questions about the ethics of
vis the cultural field),
Zizek's symptomatology
of
the
While
Lacan's
universalizing
diagnosis.
symptom provokes fundamental
elaboratesthisparticularexamplein EnjoyYourSymptom![31-67]. Thecharac2. Zizvek
terizationof womanas the symptomof man may be understoodas a heterosexistcorrelateof the
Lacanianaxiomthat thereis no sexual relation( "il n 'ya pas de rapportsexuel").Althoughspace
prevents me from taking up this example of the symptom,I have pursued some of the issues it
raises for sexual politics in Dean, "Homosexuality."

22

epistemologicalquestionstoo, my primaryconcern lies with the ethical implicationsof

a critical approachthat regardsthe universe as perpetuallyin need of interpretation.
Readingone's worldin termsof symptomspositionsone as a hermeneutwith a particular
relation to the world-a relation of suspicion and putative mastery.Although Zizek
repeatedlypoints out that one can never masterone's "own"symptom(but only enjoy
it), his methodnonethelesssituatesthe critic in a position of hermeneuticmasteryover
the social and culturalsymptomshe or she diagnoses. One cannothelp noticing thatin
his dozen or so books no culturalartifactposes any resistanceto Zizek's hermeneutic
energy;thereis no social system or movie or operaor novel thathe cannotinterpret.We
mightsay thatthereseems to be no culturalphenomenonthat,with his Lacanianschema,
ZiVekcannotmaster.3
Zizek's hermeneuticvoracity--what Tom Cohen characterizesas his approaching
"thevast samplesof Americanpopularculturewith vampirelikeurgency"[356]-could
be understoodas but one more instanceof psychoanalysis'simperialism,its tendencyto
find exemplificationsof its principleseverywhereit turns[see Derrida;Meltzer].I would
suggest,however,thatviewing culturalphenomenathroughthe lens of symptomatology
points to a largerproblem, one that pertainsto not only psychoanalyticcriticism but
also Marxism,historicism,andculturalstudies.The problemlies in the way thattreating
aesthetic artifactsas cultural symptoms elides the specificity of art, making cultural
forms too readily apprehensibleas what Zizek, in one definitionof the symptom,calls
"the point of emergence of the truth about social relations"[SO 26]. Of course, the
category of art-and, more broadly,that of aesthetic experience-does not appearin
Zizek's work; speakingof "art"when discussing post-Lacanianideology critiquemay
appearas quaintly anachronistic.But that is exactly
point. Despite his interestin
Kantianphilosophy and his evocation of the sublime,my
Zivek's approachto cultureand
society leaves little conceptualspace for any considerationof aestheticeffects or their
significance.4
This is an ethical problembecause it eradicatesdimensionsof alterityparticularto
art, making any encounterwith the difficulty and strangenessof aesthetic experience
seem beside the point. Ratherthan finding any momentsof opacity or resistanceto his
hermeneuticschemes when engaging aesthetic artifacts,Zizek finds only a familiar
scenario-one that his readersnow recognize quickly too. Althoughhe speaks almost
continuouslyaboutotherness,no actualinstancesof othernessarepermittedto interrupt
his interpretivediscourse.Andwhile Zizek'sapproachexemplifiesthisproblemespecially
strikingly,it is farfromlimitedto his work.Business as usualthroughoutthe humanities
proceeds as if thinking about art symptomatically--as a "point of emergence of the
truthaboutsocial relations"- were the only crediblealternativeto thinkingaboutartas
3. See,for example,Zizek'sanalysisofSeptember
onlinemerely
11,whichbegancirculating
weeksaftertheevent[Welcome].As LouisMenandpointsoutaproposof Zizekandothers,the
intellectualcertaintymanifested
on theLeftin thewakeof 9/11is itselfrathertroubling:
The initialresponseof mostculturalandpoliticalcriticsto the attacksof September
thatfewpeople
1 th--a completely
unanticipated
atrocitycarriedoutbyanorganization
in theWesthadeverheardof andwhoseintentionsarestill not entirelycomprehensible- was:ItjustproveswhatI'vealwayssaid.... Thesurprising
thingaboutmostof
thepublishedreflectionson September11this howdevoidof surprisetheyare.They
areso devoidof surpriseas to be almostdevoidof thought.[98]
4. Rey Chow notes, in passing, thisfeature of iziek'swork: "Whetherhe is reading literature,film, jokes, comics, sciencefiction, philosophy,or anythingelse, Zizek is seldom interested
in theproblemof aestheticform and its relationto (the constructionof) subjectivityas such" [7].

diacritics / summer 2002

23

the creationof transcendentgenius.I findbothof thesealternativesunsatisfactorybecause

both effectively make art transparent,reducing its alterityto more familiarterms. In
what follows, I elucidate the epistemological implications of Zizek's notion of the
socioculturalsymptom, before pursuing its ethical implications and suggesting how
psychoanalysismightprovidesome conceptualresourcesfor a moreethicallydefensible
approachto aesthetics.

Arguingfor the Real

Thus far my critiqueof Zizek has arguedthat his combining Hegelian Marxismwith
Lacanianpsychoanalysisconducesto a criticalperspectiveon culturalmattersthatmakes
aesthetic forms overly familiar,renderingthem instantlyrecognizableas the products
of ideological conflict. Wereit not thatsymptomaticreadingconstitutesthe approachI
wish to critique,I would say thatZizek's work itself standsas the symptomof a much
largercriticalproblem.In otherwords,I have suggestedthatZizekmakesarttoo familiar
and thatthis criticaltendencyitself can be seen as dispiritinglyfamiliar.But it must be
acknowledged that the appearance, in 1989, of The Sublime Object of Ideology
inauguratedan innovative approachin the history of psychoanalyticcriticism. It was
not somethingfamiliarbut a wonderfullystrangenew criticalvoice thatwe heardwhen
we began reading Zizek. He revivified psychoanalytic criticism by making it more
political, more philosophical,and ultimatelymore popular;and he achieved all this by
shifting the emphasis from analyses of imaginaryand symbolic representationsto an
engagementwith that which resists representation:the real.
Following Jacques-AlainMiller's systematic periodizationof Lacanianthought,
Zizek focuses his sharpestattentionon the "late Lacan,"wherein the concept of the
real--along with the notions of drive,jouissance, Thing, and objet petit a associated
with it-comes to the fore. Lacan's insistence throughoutthe 1950s on the subjective
importanceof the signifier gave way (circa 1960) to a growing interest in what the
signifier could not accommodateand, indeed, what animatesthe symbolic universe in
the firstplace."Withthe waningof structuralismandits emphasison the quasideterminist
role of symbolic structuresin humanlife, Lacan began expending greaterspeculative
of subjectivityby symbolicforms.Whereastheconcept
energyon the underdetermination
of overdeterminationderived from psychoanalytic hermeneutics (specifically, The
Interpretationof Dreams) had promised a theory of subject formation that seemed
compatiblewith Levi-Strauss'sstructuralism,in fact the multiplydeterminingrelations
createdby chains of signifiersconnectedin a symbolic networkcould nevercompletely
determinethe subjectiveeffects they were invokedto explain.Thereis alwayssomething
left over,somethingunexplainedby symbolicdetermination.HenceFreud'sobservations
aboutthe enigmatic"navelof the dream";hence, too, Lacan'sattemptsto theorizethis
subjective underdeterminationvia a range of terms and concepts (principallythat of
l'objetpetit a).
Paradoxicallythe Freudianunderstandingof overdeterminationleads to a radically
nondeterminist
theoryof subjectivity;Lacan'saccountof the symbolicorder'sconstitutive
effects does not revoke all notions of subjectiveagency, as often has been assumedin
Anglo-Americandebatesaboutthe ideologicalconsequencesof Lacanianpsychoanalysis.
5. Zizek locates this shift in Lacan's seminar on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-60

intoEn7]. Thepublicationof thisseminarin 1986andits translation

[Ziiek, "Undergrowth"

glish in 1992 providedates thatcircumscribetheperiod duringwhichZizekwas in theprocess of

emergingas the intellectualfigure that we knowtoday.

24

To discreditthe notionof individualautonomyis not to nullify agency tout court.Much

of the confusion on this score stems from a reluctanceto engage the theoreticaldebates
of psychoanalyticMarxism,particularlyAlthusser's account of the overdetermination
of social contradictionsand the consequentrelativeautonomyof varioussocial practices,
TheAlthusserianconceptof "relative
includingthe aesthetic[Althusser,"Contradiction"].
autonomy"is one to which I shall return;for now I want to registersimply that it is the
implications of symbolic underdeterminationfor an account of political agency that
Zizek has been intenton developing throughouthis work.
He has triedto accomplishthis by explainingthe Lacanianreal-that which resists
representation--in terms of a notion of antagonismdrawn from Ernesto Laclau and
ChantalMouffe's post-Marxiantheoryof radicaldemocracy.InHegemonyand Socialist
Strategy (1985), Laclau and Mouffe employ the term antagonism to describe an
ideologicalfield'sdiscursivefailureto fully constituteitself. Ratherthanbeingconsidered
incidental, such failure actually structuresthe ideological field, while also providing
opportunitiesfor political struggle and, in principle, the possibility of social change.
Inspiredby this constellationof ideas, Zivek proceededto rewriteLaclauand Mouffe's
notion of discursive failure in terms of the Lacanianreal, arguingthat any symbolic
universe is structuredby that which it cannot accommodateand thereforenecessarily
excludes. We might say thatZizek pumpsup the concept of the real, developing it from
a relatively passive notion of inherentlimit to something like the raison d'etre of all
discursiveactivity- ideological, cultural,andotherwise.He does this by redefiningthe
connectionbetween the symbolic and the real:more thanas a relationof heterogeneity,
in which the symbolic cannot apprehendand thereforeby definitiondoes not include
the real,Zizekpicturesthe symbolic'sexclusionof the realas constitutive,as its founding
instanceand thatwhich fuels symbolic machineryeven as it threatensto disruptit. It is
this relation that Zizek describes using the term "antagonism"(or "deadlock" or
"impossibility,"as he also often characterizesit). Thus whereas Laclau and Mouffe
conceptualizeantagonismsomewhatdeconstructivelyin termsof discursive failureor
contradiction, Zizek conceptualizes antagonism more insistently in terms of the
unsymbolizablereal,therebyshiftingthe accentin a way thathas generatedconsiderable
debate among these thinkers.6
When Zizek characterizesthe ideological field as constitutedarounda deadlock
thatby definitiondoes not admitof discursiveor practicalmanipulation,the possibilities
for political struggle and meliorationstartto seem bleak. Skepticism concerning the
political implications of Zizek's psychoanalytic account of ideology has led to
disagreementoverthe statusof the Lacanianrealas constitutivelyexcludedfromsymbolic
formations.For example, JudithButlerhas arguedthat what is constitutivelyexcluded
from the sociosymbolic ordershouldbe subjectto politicalrearticulation,andtherefore
that to hypostasize the real as definitively unsymbolizableis effectively to secure a
social system thatexcludes variousminorities(includingqueers)by shuntingtheirlives
6. In his afterwordto Laclau's New Reflections, Zizvekis explicit about this distinction,
insisting that "[w]e must then distinguishthe experienceof antagonismin its radicalform, as a
limit of the social, as the impossibilityaroundwhich the social field is structured,from antagonism as the relation betweenantagonistic subject-positions:in Lacanian terms, we must distinguish antagonismas realfromthe social realityof the antagonisticfight" [Zizek, "Beyond"253;
original emphases]. Thequestionof the relationbetweenZizek'suse o the notion of antagonism
and Laclau's is one of the topics addressed in Butler,Laclau, and Zizek's Contingency,Hegemony, Universality.See also Laclau ["Theory,"esp. 15], where he makesclear the limits of his
agreementwith Zizek'sconstruingantagonismin terms of the real. In his most recent thinking,
Laclau wishes to align the real with his concept of dislocationand to retainan understandingof
antagonismas discursive,not real.

diacritics / summer 2002

25

into zones of the unthinkableandunlivable.7The problemin this debateis- andalways

has been--the ideological implications of the real; thus the aspect of Lacanian
psychoanalysisthat Zizek has broughtto the fore, theorizing it in book after book, is
still the source of greatestmisunderstanding.8
Having intervenedin this debateon more thanone occasion, I now see betterthan
I did previously how Zizek's success in explaining the concept of the real is also
paradoxicallywhat has enabled misunderstandingsto occur and, indeed, continues to
reinforceratherthandiminishthem.BecauseLacan'srealcan be definedonly negatively
(as "impossible"and suchlike), it is an infuriatinglyabstractconcept. Zizek has made
the conceptmoreaccessible by illustratingit with innumerableexamples,manyof them
drawnfromthe familiarworldof popularculture.Thusalthoughhe maintains(correctly,
in my view) that the real is inherentlynonsubstantialand has no necessary positive
content, he repeatedlyargues this philosophicalpoint throughexamples that lend the
real any numberof quite memorablepositive contents.The appeal of Zizek's workbut also one of its greatest rhetoricaldrawbacks-lies in his substituting,by way of
explanation,very concreteinstancesfor highly abstractideas. Thus we should not find
it quite so puzzlingthatButlerseems unableto graspthis elementaryconcept andkeeps
insistingthatthe constitutiveexclusions throughwhich the sociosymbolic founds itself
must be understoodin terms of racial and sexual discrimination.She attributesto the
real one kind of positive content because Zizek keeps explaining it by way of
exemplificationsthat lend it otherkinds of positive content.9

Enjoyingthe Idea of the Symptom

Anotherway of statingthis problem would be to say that Zivek's argumentaboutthe
real as nonmeaning(or resistanceto meaning)tends to be accompaniedby a frenzy of
meaning-makingactivity-a dazzling hermeneuticspectacle-on his part.Resistance
to meaningis one of Zizek's perennialthemes, but it is never allowed to interferewith
his own discursive performance.Thus althoughhe claims that "late Lacan"takes us
beyond hermeneutics(by taking us beyond the world of interpretablesignifiers to that
of the uninterpretablebecause unsymbolizablereal), Zizek seems most in his element
when he is busily interpretingthe productsof mass culture and gaily revealing their
hidden significance.This disjunctionbetween what he says and what he does suggests
more than a contradictionin Zizek's idiosyncraticcriticalpractice:it indexes the limits
of symptomaticreadingas an approachto culture.The hermeneuticquest for meaning
assumes thattrue significance remainsconcealed until it is revealedby an interpretive
act; and the notion of symptomembodies this assumption.There can be no symptom
without an interpretant.To diagnose something as a symptom is to posit a hidden
7. Butlerfirst took issue with Zizek'saccount of ideologyformation in "Arguingwith the
Real," and developed her argumentin The Psychic Life of Power.I discuss Butler'scritique of

Zi[ekandhermisunderstanding
of therealin "BodiesThatMutter."
to theexchangescollectedin Contingency,
8. In hisfinal contribution
Hegemony,Universality, Zizek notes this problem: "Perhapsthe ultimateobject of contentionin our debate is the

statusof the(Lacanian)real"[308].
9. Thisalso shedssomelighton Butler'ssophisticcontentionthat "[t]oclaimthatthereal
resists symbolizationis still to symbolizethe real as a kindof resistance"["Arguing"207]. As I

in BeyondSexuality[182-83], Butleris quitemistakenhere;yet in makingher

demonstrate

erroneousargumentshe is picking up on a significantproblemin Zizek'sworkand throwinginto

reliefjust how difficult it is to discuss the real without in some way familiarizing and thereby
betrayingit.

26

significance that must be elicited via interpretation.Hence Lacan'searly definition of

the symptomas "structuredlike a language"--thatis, as meaningfulwithoutbeing fully
transparent[Lacan,"Function"59].
By bringing out the semiotic aspect of the symptom-"the symptom being a
metaphorin which flesh or function is taken as a signifying element"- Lacanlays the
groundworkfor vastly expanding the traditionalpsychoanalyticconception of what
qualifies as a symptom [Lacan,"Agency" 166]. If a symptom can be understoodas a
metaphorin which partof the body or a somatic functiontakes theplace of a signifier,
then interpretationconsists in determiningwhat signifieror message has been replaced
by thatportionof the anatomyandwhy. The symptom'struemessage lies hiddenbehind
its corporealsurrogate.In this account we observe the steps of an argumentabout the
relationbetween languageandorganicphenomenathatfoundspsychoanalysis,namely,
thata physiological ailment(for instance,Dora'scough) may be considereda message;
thatthe message is concealedbecause a substitutionhas occurred;andthatthereforethe
message requiresdecoding via interpretation.Behind this psychoanalyticlogic lies the
metaphysicalassumptionthat truthis hidden, and it is this assumptionthat undergirds
the hermeneuticenterprise.The correlativeassumptionis thatwhateveris hiddenmust
be true,thatthe subject'struthresidesin whathe or she conceals. Hence Lacan'sremark
that "[t]he symptomis in itself, throughand through,signification,that is to say, truth,
truthtaking shape"[Seminar2 320].
This accountrepresentsthe early periodof Lacan'stheory of symptomformation,
butwe can see how his definingit semioticallyalreadyinitiatesa processof universalizing
the symptom.Structuredlike a language,the symptomis firstand foremosta sign of the
unconscious;its primarymessage is general,not specific: the unconsciousis here, and
it has somethingto say. By aligning the symptomwith the unconscious(both of which
aredefined as "structuredlike a language")andby identifyingthe truthof the symptom
as concealed thanksto a metaphoricsubsitution,Lacanaligns subjectivetruthwith the
unconscious and implies, moreover,that this truthis hidden. Hence the necessity for
interpretationto bring it out. But if the unconsciousis hidden,this is not because it lies
concealed inside the individual,in the depths of her mind or the recesses of his soul.
Rather,the unconsciousis hidden in plain view, like the purloinedletterin Poe's story
Lacanconsidersthe unconsciousto be a propertyof surfaces,not
[Lacan,"Seminar"].10
of depths;hencehis distinguishingpsychoanalysisfromdepthpsychologyandhis interest
in topology, particularlythe mathematicaltransformationof surfaces. Exteriorto the
self, the unconsciousis that"otherscene"thatemergesas an effect of symbolic life and
differentiallyaffects us all. Once it too is conceived in termsof language,the symptom
can be understoodto afflict not only hystericsbut everybody.Thus Lacan'sredefinition
of the symptomas stnthomelate in his career,thoughit has been takento marka radical
shiftin his thinking,was alwaysa latentpossibilityinsofaras his descriptionof symptoms
as "structured
like a language"andcharacterizedby metaphoricsubstitutionuniversalized
the symptomfrom the start.
One significant difference between early and late Lacanian conceptions of the
symptomis thatthe stnthomeis said to block ratherthanto elicit interpretation-though
the idea of the stnthomedoesn't seem to inhibitZizek'shermeneuticenergy.In principle,
however, the stnthome stymies interpretationbecause "late Lacan" shifts symptoms
from the symbolic registerto the real, recognizingin the symptomthatwhich binds the
subjectto his or herjouissance. As Zifek glosses this shift: "Thesymptomis not only a
10. A recent instance of the idea that the unconscious involves hiding something in plain
sight is offered by the British psychoanalystAdam Phillips, who describes a five-year-old girl
who initiates every session by walking into his consulting room, closing her eyes, and urging
Phillips tofind her [Phillips 3-9].

diacritics / summer 2002

27

cypheredmessage,it is at the sametime a way for the subjectto organizehis enjoymentthatis why,even afterthe completedinterpretation,
the subjectis notpreparedto renounce
his symptom;that is why he 'loves his symptommore than himself"' [SO 74]. In this
view, our symptoms are what keep us going, and thereforethey cannot be removed
withoutthe riskof subjectivedissolution.Symptomsprovidea certainkindof satisfaction,
as well as a measureof discomfortandpain.Herethe symptomis no longerthe resultof
a metaphoricalsubstitutionbut ratherfunctions as a sign of the unsubstitutablereal.
Lacan's shift from thinkingof symptomsin primarilysymbolic to primarilyreal terms
appealsto Zizek,who summarizeshis understandingof it thus:"This,then,is a symptom:
a particular,'pathological,'signifying formation,a bindingof enjoyment,an inertstain
resisting communicationand interpretation,a stain which cannot be included in the
circuitof discourse,of social bond network,but is at the same time a positive condition
of it" [SO 75]. Here we have encapsulatedthe structurallogic of symptomformation
that Zizek employs throughouthis work.
It is remarkablethatin this synopsisof the symptom'slogic Zizekmakesno mention
of the unconscious. Whereas for Freud and Lacan the symptom functions first and
foremostas a signof the unconscious- whetherof an unconsciouswish or an unconscious
message-for Zivekthe symptomfunctionsas a sign of the real, "aninertstainresisting
communicationand interpretation."For Freudthe symptomrepresentsa compromise
formation, a product of the conflict between unconscious wishes and the forces of
repression;for Zifek, however,the symptomis a productof antagonismbetweenlanguage
and the real. Thus Zizek converts the central Freudian idea of compromise (der
Kompromif)into a modifiednotionof Laclaueanantagonism.He neverthelessremains
in accord with classical psychoanalytic theory when it comes to the dimension of
satisfactionthatconsolidatesthe symptomandmakesit so hardto dislodge. WhatZizek
describesas "a bindingof enjoyment"(orjouissance), Freudlocates in the symptomas
a "substitute-formation,"
wherebythe satisfactionfound in the symptomhas replaced
the instinctualprocess that has been affected by defense [Freud,Inhibitions 145]. In
Freudianterms,this substitutioncan be understoodeconomicallyas a process in which
the symptomprovidesan unconsciouswish with a surrogatesatisfaction;and it can be
understoodsymbolicallyas the processthroughwhich one unconsciousidea is replaced
by anotheraccording to certain chains of association [Laplancheand Pontalis 434].
Thus both "early"and "late"Lacanianaccounts of the symptom-the symptom as a
metaphoricalsubstitution(a "cipheredmessage")andthe stnthomeas a condensationof
jouissance - can be regardedas latentin Freud.
Thanks to its theory of the unconscious, psychoanalysis tacitly universalizes
symptomatology from its inception. Epistemologically this universalization
problematizes the symptom's medical status, while at the same time facilitating
symptomatology'stranspositionfromthe clinicalto the culturalrealm.Indeed,originally
the symptomwas just as much a culturalidea as a medical one, accordingto Marjorie
Garberin Symptomsof Culture,so we should not troubleourselves unduly about its
epistemological statusfrom a clinical point of view." All it takes to extend the logic of
11.SeeGarber:"Itmightbesupposedthatthewordsymptom
itselfbeganas a medicalterm
and became more broadlyand metaphoricallyapplied, over time, to other realmsof inquiry,but
in fact this is not the case. Symptomswerefrom the beginning broadlydefined cultural indicators; it is symptomaticof our own desire to classify, categorize, and limit,that we should thinkof
them in a more restrictedpathological sense" [3]. WhileGarber'sapproachto culture, in this
and other books, exemplifiesthe kindof critical methodthat is the targeto/fmycritique,I would
like to distinguishher perspectivefrom Zizek's.Althoughshe alludes to Zizek in Symptoms of

than
andtheirmetonymic
moreinsymbolicnetworks
Culture,Garberis interested
displacements
of
inthereal.Sheclaimsas herinspiration
thehermeneutical
modellaidoutinTheInterpretation

28

symptom formationto culture and society is to conceive of the social as a space of

conflict, since symptomsare the result--and hence a sign--of conflict. As soon as one
dispenses with a functionalistsociological perspectiveand instead views the social in
termsof power relations,it immediatelybecomes clear that society is conflictual.Thus
the link to Marxis easily made, andany lingeringuncertaintyaboutwhy Lacancredited
him with inventing the symptom rapidly dissipates. Since from a psychoanalytic
perspectivethe unconsciousstandsas a sign of subjectiveconflict,Lacan'sreconceiving
the unconscious in terms of language--that is, as a social ratherthan an individual
dimension of experience--also situates symptomsbeyond the merely personalrealm.
Hence it seems little more thancriticalcommon sense when Zizek begins his inaugural
work by announcingthat culture in its entirety should be considered a compromise
formation,the symptomaticoutcome of a conflict: "All 'culture'is in a way a reactionformation,an attemptto limit,canalize-to cultivatethisimbalance,this traumatickernel,
this radical antagonismthroughwhich man cuts his umbilical cord with nature,with
animalhomeostasis"[SO 5].12
Once culture is conceived of in this manner, there can be but one politically
progressiveapproachto it, namely,demystification.The conflict that has given rise to
culturein general- andthe more local conflicts thatproduceas theirsymptomsvarious
cultural phenomena-must be interpreted so that their ideological stakes become
apparent.In this way culturalcriticism has come to be considereda form of political
work. Indeed, demystification has become the quintessential critical gesture when
respondingto culturalartifacts;it tendsto be regardedas the only responsiblealternative
to either uncritical veneration (of art) or mindless consumption (of mass cultural
entertainment). The politically progressive critic is always about the business of
unmasking,attemptingto unveil the ideological strugglesbehinda seemingly innocent
or harmoniouswork of art. Whereastraditionalpsychoanalyticcriticism decoded the
neuroticconflicts of individualartists(finding in writers' and painters'charactersthe
surrogatesof warring parts of their selves), contemporarypsychoanalytic criticism
demystifies the transindividualstruggles (whethersocial or ideological) that the work
of artis understoodto encode.
Of course, psychoanalyticMarxismin literarystudies precedesZizek and may be
traced at least to Althusser, who in Reading Capital coined the term "symptomatic
reading"to argue not only that he was approachingMarx'stext symptomatically,but
also thathe was derivinghis methodfromMarx'sown techniqueof readingthe political
Dreams, arguing that cultural symptomsmay be read according to this methodby tracing their
associations in much the way that Freud does when interpretingdreams.Garberthus draws an
analogy betweenFreudiandreamwork-the psychical translationprocess that involvescondensation and displacement-and cultural work, suggesting that reading cultural artifacts in an
associative manner may be preferable to the primarily quantitative,empirical approach that
dominatessociology and certain versions of culturalstudies.Her neopsychoanalyticmethodenables greaterattentiontoparticularityand specificity,includingthe specificitiesof literaryworks;
unlikeZiZek,Garberis inclined to bracketquestionsabout the representativenessor exemplarity
of the culturalartifactsshe considers. Perhaps as a result, Garbershows herself to be a subtler
readerof culturethan Zizek, even as she is a weaker theorist.
12. Technicallywe shoulddistinguishbetweena compromiseformation (of whichsymptoms
are an instance) and a reactionformation, since the reactionformation defendsagainst a wish
while the compromiseformationincludesthe substitutivesatisfactionof a wish. But,as Laplanche
and Pontalis argue, inpractice this distinctionis hardto sustain,because the unconsciouswish is
often discernible in the reactionformation, as well as in the compromiseformation [378]. With
respect to Ziek's characterizationof cultureas a reactionformation in the context of an argument that universalizes the symptom,I doubt that he is placing any weight on this particular
technical distinction.

diacritics / summer 2002

29

economy of David RicardoandAdamSmith.AlthussercharacterizesMarx'sstrategyas

"areadingwhich mightwell be called 'symptomatic'(symptomale),insofaras it divulges
the undivulgedevent in the text it reads,andin the samemovementrelatesit to a different
text, present as a necessary absence in the first" [Althusserand Balibar 28; original
emphases]. In this regard,Althusseralreadywas claiming in 1965 that Marx invented
the symptom-a point that Zizek overlooks in order to promote his version of
psychoanalytic Marxism as definitively superseding Althusserianism. Yet while
appropriatingfrom Althusserthe notion and practice of symptomaticreading, Zizek
does not adopt with it the crucial concept of "relativeautonomy,"at least as far as
aesthetic practiceis concerned.Although he arguesfor "the autonomyof the psychic
domain"[Metastases7], Zizekdoes not seem preparedto concedeeven relativeautonomy
to the aestheticdomain,either in principleor in practice.The result is that he borrows
fromAlthusserwhatfrommy perspectiverepresentsone of the mostproblematicaspects
of his theory.The conceptof relativeautonomymayoffera partialsolutionto the problem
I've been delineating,insofar as it adumbrateshow aesthetic forms are never only an
expressionof ideological or culturalconflicts; and thereforeit suggests that artcannot
be fully determinedby -or reducibleto- its contextualmatrix.'"
However,the problemI'm sketchingexceeds Zizek's hastinessvis-ga-visAlthusser
or the absencein his theoryof a viableconceptualspacefor specificallyaestheticeffects.
Ongoingreactionsto New Criticalformalismin literarystudieshave generatedprofound
skepticismregardingany notion of autonomywhen it comes to aestheticpractice--to
the extentthatclaims on behalfof "relativeautonomy"provokeallergicresponsesfrom
left-leaning humanities professors, who seem to regard Althusser's concept as a
dangerouslyanti-Marxianidea. In orderto retrieve what Althusser meant by relative
autonomy,I wantto develophis commitmentto discursivespecificityin termsof aesthetic
alterity,or whatI call the othernessof art.By showinghow discursivespecificityentails
considering that dimension of irreducibilityor alterity particularto distinct cultural
domains, I wish to emphasize the degree to which ethical as well as epistemological
issues areinvolvedin these debatesovercriticalapproachesto aesthetics.WhileI concede
thattreatingworksof art(or, morebroadly,textualartifacts)in less individualisticways
represents a measure of critical progress, I remain troubled by the unquestioned
assumptionthatany culturaltext shouldbe understoodas a compromiseformation,the
symptomaticproductof a conflict whose termsareat least partlyunconscious.Whether
one approachestextual forms in the context of an authorialor a culturalunconscious,
the conviction still holds that the work of art is duplicitousor ignorantof something,
that it exhibits contradictionsof which it is unawareand thereforeneeds the critic to
help reveal. Neitherartistsnortheirculturesareconsideredmastersof the conflicts that
producetheirwork;insteadthe role of mastery-of interpretingthe symptom- falls to
the demystifyingcritic.'4Hence my suggestionthatthereis somethingethically suspect

13. Althussermakesclear what he means by relativeautonomywhen he argues that "[t]he

fact that each of these times and each of these histories[including the historyof aestheticforms]
is relatively autonomousdoes not make them so many domains which are independentof the
whole: the specificity of each of these times and each of these histories-in other words, their
relativeautonomyand independence-is based on a certain typeof articulationin the whole, and
thereforeon a certain type of dependence with respect to the whole" [Reading Capital 100;
original emphases].A useful critique of Zizek'srelation to Althussermay be found in Bellamy.
For his relation to Lacan, see Althusser,Writings.A very enlighteningcritique of Althusser's
appropriationof Lacanfor his theoryof interpellationis given in Barrett.
14. A notable exceptionto this way of thinkingmay befound in a brief but suggestive essay
by Colette Soler,a Lacanianpsychoanalystwho argues thefollowing:

30

aboutthis ostensiblyprogressiveapproachto culturalforms-in otherwords,thatthere

is a significantdisjunctionbetween the politics and the ethics of culturalstudy.

SuspectingHermeneutics
The position that my critique has targetedthus far-and which I have taken Zizek's
work to exemplify--goes underthe generalrubricof the hermeneuticsof suspicion, a
phraseoriginally coined by existential phenomenologistPaul Ricoeur to describe the
interpretiveprotocolsof Nietzsche,Marx,andFreud,butthesedaysmoreoftenemployed
by culturalconservativessuch as HaroldBloom to inveigh against politicized literary
criticism." Interpretationis subject to greatercontestationin modernity,accordingto
Ricoeur,because no universalcanon remainsto govern exegesis. In the wake of "the
death of God,"the position that authorizedhermeneuticshas dissolved. Where once a
scripturalor textual double meaning had been understoodas the form throughwhich
divinity manifested itself, now double meaning tends to be apprehendedin terms of
dissimulation, and hence interpretation becomes coeval with demystification.
Ricoeur argues,"the Genealogy of Morals in Nietzsche's sense, the
"Fundamentally,"
of
theory ideologies in the Marxistsense, andthe theoryof ideals andillusionsin Freud's
sense representthreeconvergentproceduresof demystification"[34]. Viewing Marxism
andpsychoanalysisas operatingwithhomologoushermeneutics,Ricoeurprobablywould
agreethat"Marxinventedthe symptom,"thoughhe wouldbe less sanguinethanAlthusser
or Zizek aboutthe implicationsof this homology.
LikeZizekandGarberafterhim,Ricoeurfocuses his examinationof psychoanalytic
hermeneuticson TheInterpretationof Dreams,particularlythe mechanismsof distortion
thatFreudnames the "dream-work"(die Traumarbeit).We might recall that,according
to Freud,a dreamis structuredexactly like a symptom("ourprocedurein interpreting
dreams is identical with the procedureby which we resolve hysterical symptoms"
528]), andthereforeto characterizeaestheticartifactsas culturalsymptoms
[Interpretation
implies that those artifactsare formed throughthe same mechanismsof distortionthat
producedreams.Indeed, the pervasive critical notion of "culturalwork"--that is, the
kind of effects we often take literatureto be performingunbeknownstto its authors-derives by homology from this basic postulateof psychoanalytichermeneutics,even
when those critics who employ it are more likely to regardthemselves as practicing
Marxist ratherthan psychoanalytic criticism.16 Just as Garberinitiates Symptomsof
Culture by claiming that her method extends the hermeneutics outlined in The
Interpretationof Dreams, so Zizek begins his explanationof how Marx invented the
symptom by pursuinga disquisition on not symptoms but dreams. Following Freud,
Zivek insists that neitherlatent nor manifest contents of the dream should distractus

doesnotapplyto literature.
Itsattemptsin doingso havealwaysmaniPsychoanalysis
festedtheirfutility,theirunfitnessto laythegroundsforeventhemostmeagerliterary
Youcan
judgment.Why?Becauseartisticworksarenotproductsof theunconscious.
wellinterpret
a novelorpoem- i.e., makesenseof it--butthissensehasnothingto do
withthecreationof theworkitself.Thissensehasnocommonmeasurewiththework's
existence,andan enigmaremainson the sideof theexistenceof theworkof art.This
wouldevenbe a possibledefinitionof theworkin its relationto sense:it resistsinteras muchas it lendsitselfto interpretation.
pretation
[214]
15. For moreprogressivecritiquesof thehermeneuticsof suspicion,see Armstrong;Sedgwick.
16. For a representativerange of instances, see Morris; Poovey; Reynolds and Hutner;
Tompkins.

diacritics / summer 2002

31

fromthe formalprocessof distortionperformedby the dreamwork,since it is in thatset

of formaltranspositions,ratherthanin the hiddencontent,thatunconsciousdesire is to
be found:
Weshould not reducethe interpretationof dreams,or symptomsin general, to
the retranslationof the "latentdream-thought"into the "normal,"everyday
common language of intersubjectivecommunication(Habermas'sformula).
The structureis always triple; there are always three elements at work: the
manifestdream-text,the latentdream-contentor thoughtand the unconscious
desire articulated in a dream. This desire attaches itself to the dream, it
intercalatesitself in the interspacebetweenthe latentthoughtand the manifest
text; it is thereforenot "moreconcealed, deeper" in relation to the latent
thought, it is decidedly more "on the surface," consisting entirely of the
signifier'smechanisms,of the treatmentto whichthe latentthoughtis submitted.
In other words, its only place is in the form of the "dream":the real subject
matterof the dream (the unconsciousdesire) articulates itself in the dreamwork, in the elaborationof its "latentcontent." [SO 13; originalemphases]
Accurately reprising Freud's argumentin Die Traumdeutung,Zizek brings out two
significantpoints. First,classical psychoanalytichermeneuticsis moreproperlyformal
thangenerallyis assumed,insofaras its interpretiveingenuityexercises itself upon the
distinctivemode of translatingone set of ideas (the latentdream-thought)into another
set (the dream's manifest content). Unconscious desire becomes visible in the set of
transformationsthatconvertsone contentinto another,ratherthanresidingin eitherthe
earlier(latent)or subsequent(manifest)representations.
Second,by elaboratingpsychoanalytichermeneuticsas a kindof formalismin which
the contentof mentalimagesremainsutterlysecondarywhenestablishingtheirmeaning,
Zizek also clarifies the distinctionbetween psychoanalysis and depth psychology. If
meaninglies not in the latentdream-thoughtbut in the mode of its transformation,then
the truthof desiremustbe locatednot in the hiddendepthsof subjectiveinwardnessbut
in the ostensibly superficial displacements that constitute the dreamwork.By thus
reorientingthe surface-depthmodel through which hermeneutics-as-demystification
conventionally operates, Zizek goes some distance toward countering critiques of
psychoanalysis as a metaphysics of the subject and hence as a hermeneutics of
demystification.It is by virtueof its attentionto the literalnessof verbalutterancesthat
psychoanalysismay be distinguishedfrom psychology. Although Zizek never makes
reference to Ricoeur's important critique, he often claims that psychoanalytic
interpretationremainsirreducibleto demystification,insisting that "we must avoid the
simple metaphorsof demasking,of throwingaway the veils which are supposedto hide
the nakedreality"[SO28-29]. Indeed,he arguesthatthe standardpsychoanalyticcritique
of ideology, which he associates with Althusser,"no longerworks":"Wecan no longer
subjectthe ideologicaltext to 'symptomaticreading,'confrontingit with its blankspots,
with what it must repress to organize itself, to preserve its consistency" [SO 30]. At
moments such as these, ZiAek'sargumentappearsto coincide with mine.
counselsagainst-"simple metaphorsof demasking,"
Theproblemis thatwhat
Zizek
"'symptomaticreading'"- turnsout to be exactly the interpretivemethodand rhetoric
he adopts.He executes a twist on the standardcritiqueof ideology as imaginaryillusion,
yet remainscaughtwithinthe termsof thatcritique,as when he arguesthat"ideologyis
not a dreamlike illusion that we build to escape insupportablereality; in its basic
dimensionit is a fantasy-constructionwhich serves as a supportfor our 'reality' itself:
an 'illusion'which structuresoureffective, real social relationsandtherebymasks some

32

insupportable,real, impossible kernel" [SO 45]. While neatly inverting the relation
between ideology and reality, Zizek nevertheless retains the Nietzschean notion of
maskingandtherebytacitlypositionshimself as the one who unmasks,the one who will
reveal to us the "impossible"truthof social relations.This apparentinconsistencyis not
Zizek's problem as much as it is an inevitable consequence of his approach.Having
establishedhis criticalmethodin TheSublimeObjectofIdeology via a strictlyFreudian
explicationof dreamwork,Zizek remainscaughtwithin the logic of thathermeneutical
model,despitehis claimsto be movingbeyondhermeneutics.By definitiondreamworkor, analogically, cultural work, ideological work-is a process of distortion, and
generallyfollows thisprocessin reverse,trackingthe formal
psychoanalyticinterpretation
operationsthroughwhich one scenario has been transformedinto another.By tracing
backwardsa procedureof distortionor disguise, psychoanalytichermeneuticssituates
itself in the realm of demystification.Even when its purposeis less to reveal a hidden
contentthanto lay bare the surfacemechanismsby which thatcontentappearsto have
been hidden,psychoanalyticinterpretationstill representsa methodof unconcealment.'7
And while it redefines what truthconsists in, Lacanianpsychoanalysisholds onto the
notion that some form of interpretationis requiredto access subjectivetruth.

ThePsychoanalyticCritiqueof Hermeneutics
It might appearthat psychoanalysis, inauguratedas a science of interpretation,could
never escape the fundamentalpresuppositionsof hermeneuticswithin whose terms
Ricoeur and others have discussed it. After all, isn't it the psychoanalytic zeal for
interpretationthat licenses--even for Freud himself--rapid extensions of its method
from the clinical to the culturaldomain?Yet two versions of psychoanalyticthought
insist thatit shouldnot be understoodas a hermeneutic;JeanLaplanchehas gone so far
as to argue that psychoanalysis should be recognized as an antihermeneutic. By
consideringfurtherZizek's andLaplanche'simplicitandexplicit refutationsof Ricoeur,
I want to challenge the basic assumptionthata clinical methodof interpretationcan be
readily transposedto the culturalrealm. In other words, I want to take seriously the
proposition that a certain style of psychoanalytic thinking represents a break with
hermeneutics;but I also want to show how this breakunderminesthe otherwisenearly
irresistiblelogic wherebya clinical practiceis extendedto social and culturalanalysis.
On the basis of that argument,I shall suggest how Althussermight be articulatedwith
Laplanchefor the purposeof constructinga quite differentpsychoanalyticapproachto
aesthetics.
Zizek's critiqueof hermeneuticsobjects to the assumptionthat everythingcan be
translated into meaning, that full integration into the circuit of intersubjective
communicationis possible in principle.OpposingHabermas'sreadingof Freud,Zizek
contends that the former's understandingof interpretationoverlooks the "traumatic
kernel" that constitutively resists translation into sense. "Here we confront the
incommensurabilitybetween hermeneutics('deep' as it may be) and psychoanalytic
interpretation,"
Zizek argues,since "Habermascan assertthatdistortionshave meaning
as such- whatremainsunthinkablefor him is thatmeaningas such resultsfrom a certain
distortion- thatthe emergenceof meaningis basedon a disavowalof some 'primordially
repressed'traumatickernel"[Metastases27; original emphases]. By focusing on that
17. See Miklitsch: "IfZizek'sprogram cannot be labeled a 'hermeneuticsof suspicion' (if
only because he has so little usefor hermeneuticsproperand, moreimportantlyperhaps, because
ofa certaincomic, even Chaplinesque,strain in his work),it is a politics ofdemystificationfor all

that"[486].

diacritics / summer 2002

33

whichresistsmeaning(in otherwords,the real),Zizekaimsto distinguishpsychoanalytic

interpretationfrom hermeneutics.In this respect he follows Lacan, who argues that
directsthe patientto whatcannotbe interpreted,thatwhich
psychoanalyticinterpretation
hermeneuticsfails to grasp.As he explainsin TheFourFundamentalConceptsofPsychoAnalysis:
Interpretationis not open to any meaning. This would be to concede to those
who rise up against the characterof uncertaintyin analytic interpretationthat,
in effect, all interpretationsare possible, which is patently absurd. Thefact
that I have said that the effect of interpretationis to isolate in the subject a
kernel, a kern, to use Freud's own term, of non-sense, does not mean that
interpretationis in itself nonsense....
Interpretationis not open to all meanings.It is notjust any interpretation.
It is a significant interpretation,one that must not be missed. This does not
meanthatit is not this significationthatis essential to the adventof the subject.
What is essential is that he should see, beyond this signification, to what
signifier-to what irreducible,traumatic,non-meaning-he is, as a subject,
subjected.[250-51; originalemphases]
For interpretationto point not toward meaning or signification but "beyond ...
- paradoxicallyenough-beyond the frameworkof
signification"pushesinterpretation
hermeneutics.Ratherthanmakingsense of trauma,psychoanalyticinterpretationdraws
attentionto its resistanceto sense. In the clinical setting,then, interpretationrepresents
somethingquite differentfrom what hermeneuticsconventionallyunderstandsby this
term.
Laplanchedevelops a relatedcritiqueof hermeneuticsby centeringhis accountof
human subjectivity--and hence of analytic technique--on the enigmatic signifier, a
term he borrowsfrom Lacanto designate a kind of resistanceto meaningthat roughly
correspondswith the Lacanianreal (or, more precisely,correspondswith the real as an
effect internalto the symbolic). It is from a sentence I quoted earlier,in which Lacan
defines the symptomas a corporealmetaphor,that Laplanchetakes this term. Here is
the complete- andcompletelyslippery- sentence:"Betweenthe enigmaticsignifierof
the sexual traumaand the term that is substitutedfor it in an actual signifying chain
there passes the spark that fixes in a symptom the signification inaccessible to the
conscioussubjectin whichthatsymptommaybe resolved- a symptombeing a metaphor
in which flesh or function is taken as a signifying element" [Lacan, "Agency" 166;
emphasis added].'"Somewhat akin to this typically Lacaniansentence, the enigmatic
signifier poses as meaningful yet irreduciblyopaque-"inaccessible," as Lacan says
here. It does not form partof a signifying chain but instead causes somethingelse to
takeits place;the enigmaticsignifierthereforeisn't a signifierin any generalacceptance
of the term. While coining other terms (such as message) that are intended to be
synonymouswith, andthusto clarify,thatof enigmaticsignifier,Laplanchegeneralizes
this concept, making it the cornerstoneof his own distinctive psychoanalytictheory.
Throughelaborationsof this idea,he has devotedmuchof his careerto refutingRicoeur's
phenomenologicalreadingof Freud.
notion of the resistanceto sense that
Yet it is with more than simply a
Zizekian
Laplanchelaunches his refutationof Ricoeur. In sharp contrastto the Habermasian
18. "Entrele signifiantenigmatiquedu traumasexuel et le termecaquoi il vientse substituer
dans une chaine signifiante actuelle, passe l'dtincelle, quifixe dans un sympt6me,-mitaphore
ot la chair ou bien la fonction sont prises commeiliment signifiant,--la signification inaccessible au sujet conscient oi il peut se rdsoudre"[Ecrits 518].

34

paradigm of intersubjective communication, Laplanche pictures the origins of

intersubjectivityin unintelligiblecommunications;his normfor humanrelationsis not
simply misunderstanding(an idea thatHabermascan accommodateeasily enough), but
morefundamentallycommunicationsthatareunderstoodby neitherparty.In otherwords,
the enigmaticsignifierremainsenigmaticbecauseit remainsunconscious.As Laplanche
explains when glossing this concept, "If I had to give up the term 'enigmatic' to my
objectors,I should then coin the expression 'compromisedsignifier,'in the dual sense
that it is a compromise, like the symptom, as well as being compromised by the
unconsciousof its originator"["Interpretation"
158;originalemphases].In his reference
to the symptom as a compromise formation,Laplancheharksback to the passage in
which Lacancoins the termenigmaticsignifier to explain symptomformation.He also
emphasizes that intersubjectivity begins when human relations are at their most
asymmetrical,inasmuch as children are surroundedby adults who already have an
unconscious. It is not simply that an infant, whose cognitive skills are incompletely
developed, fails to understandeverythingadultscommunicateto him or her;ratherit is
a question of how adultshandlinga child communicatemessages they themselves do
not understandandof which they arenot aware.Laplanchecalls this processgeneralized
seduction. In so doing, he revives the seductiontheory that Freudabandonedin 1897,
while abstractingthe idea of seductionfrom a contingentevent and transformingit into
the necessary condition of intersubjectivity.It is by virtue of receiving unintelligible
messages from the otherthatone is seduced into relationality.19
Laplanche identifies his general theory of seduction as "the foundation of
psychoanalyticanti-hermeneutics":the enigmatic signifier thwartsinterpretationeven
as it promptsit [Laplanche,"Psychoanalysis"7]. He justifies this claim by not only
locating the origins of intersubjectivityin that which resists meaning,but also arguing
thatthepracticeof analysisconsistsin workingagainstratherthantowardtheconsolations
of sense. Engaging Ricoeur on his own turf--that of an account of psychoanalytic
hermeneuticsbased on reading TheInterpretationof Dreams-Laplanche shows how
the originaleditionof this seminalworkbrokewith hermeneuticsby outlininga method
thatrefusedall synthesesof meaning.It was only in latereditions(publishedafter 1900),
he suggests, that hermeneuticalcodes of symbolism and typicality were added to the
text, in its burgeoningfootnotes, addenda,and interpolations.Laplancheconnects this
eclipsing of Freud'soriginalinsights-by Freudhimself--with his abandonmentof the
seductiontheoryduringthe same period.As throughouthis work, Laplanchereadsthe
Freudiancorpus in terms of an intellectualrecenteringwhereby the most refractory
ideasaredisciplinedby subsequentrevisionsthatserveto concealthe radicalimplications
of the unconscious'sdecenteringof subjectivelife. This intellectualrecenteringmimes
the subjectivecentripetalismaccomplishedby the humanego, which in good dialectical
fashion synthesizes, (mis)recognizes,and comprehends.
Counteringthis synthesizingagency, the methodof free associationbreaksthings
down,dispersingattentionin multiple,oftencontradictorydirections.The free associative
method representsFreud'sgreatestdiscovery, accordingto Laplanche,because it is a
method correlativeto its object-the unconscious. Laplancheis fascinated by those
passages in TheInterpretationof Dreams where for pages and pages Freudlaboriously
tracesthe associationsof discretecomponentsof a single briefdream(suchas the famous
dream of Irma's injection), without ever gatheringtogether these associations into a
19. With respect to the question of the genealogical relation between Lacanian and
Laplancheanpsychoanalyses,it is notablethatLaplancheconnectsthisseduction-through-enigma
to the enigmatic solicitationfrom the Otherthat Lacan discusses--and Ziek elaborates--using
thephrase Che vuoi? (Whatdoes it wantfromme?). See Lacan, "Subversion"312-13; Laplanche,
"Interpretation"146-47; Zizek, Sublime 110-21.

diacritics / summer 2002

35

final meaning or interpretation. It is Freud's reluctance to specify one-to-one

correspondences-his refusalto say: "thedreammeansX"- thatpermitsLaplancheto
argue that the associative method representsa break with hermeneutics.Ratherthan
building up meaning, the analytic method breaks it down. But this antihermeneutical
approachis domesticatedby Freud'sinventionof dreamsymbolism(in which X means
Y),typical dreams,and the complexes or scenarios(Oedipus,etc.) that Freudattempts
to establish as the bedrock of unconscious significance. Laplanche regards dream
symbolism and the predeterminedmeaning of family complexes as betrayalsof the
psychoanalyticmethod.20Symbolismandparadigmaticstoriestell you whatthe enigma
means, when the significance of the enigmatic signifier lies in the fact that you can
never know what it means, since althoughit may be transmittedat least partlythrough
discourseit does not pertainto the orderof sense.

MasteringEngimas
A placeholderfor that which defies sense, the enigmatic signifier both provokes and
stymies interpretation.Laplancheviews interpretationin the hermeneuticalsense as a
strategy directed toward mastering the other's enigma; by contrast psychoanalytic
interpretationinvolves an effortto disruptthe formsof masterywith which we've made
sense of our own and others' desires. The technique of free association remains
indispensableto this enterprisebecause it fragmentssense ratherthan maintainingits
coherence. For Laplanche the antihermeneuticaltechnique that accompanies free
associationconsists in interpretationstrippeddown to pointing- a kind of pointingthat
works to punctuatethe subject'sdiscourse,cuttingit into its discretecomponents:
[T]he analyst's interpretationcorrelates exactly with the free associations,
whose course it merelypunctuates by emphasizingtheir overlaps or nodal
points.... The Germandeuten, Deutung, is here much more eloquent, and
much less "hermeneutic"than our word "interpretation":deuten auf means
to indicatewitha finger or with the eyes- "topoint," as the Lacanianswould
162]
say. ["Interpretation"
By simply pointing to elements of the subject's discourse, an analyst practicing
antihermeneuticalinterpretationattempts to punctuate that discourse and thereby
introduce some space into preexistent organizationsof meaning. The controversial
Lacanianpractice of variable length sessions makes the temporalframe of analysis
availablefor this punctuatingwork, since the choice of when to end a session marksas
especially significantwhateverhas precededthatmomentby introducinga caesurainto
the flow of discourse.In this way the end of each session is deroutinizedandopened to
greaterreflection.
Here I'm interestedless in debatingthe meritsof Lacan'stechnicalinnovationthan
in distinguishingbetween interpretationas translationinto anotherregisterof sense and
interpretationas a form of minimalistpunctuationthat equivocates sense. Ultimately,
however, my concern lies with whether or how the antihermeneuticistversion of
psychoanalyticinterpretationcan be transferredto the culturalrealm. What I find so
promisingfor culturalstudiesaboutLaplanche'stheoryof the enigmaticsignifier is its
insistenceon the irreducibilityof theenigma,its principledrefusalto assimilateeverything
20. "Readingthroughsymbolismand typicalitydoes not stimulatethe associative method,"
Laplancheinsists; "whenone is present, the other is absent, and vice versa. ... It is symbolism
which silences association" ["Psychoanalysis" 9; original emphasis].

36

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to the empireof sense.Althoughculturalstudies(especiallyin its postcolonialistvariants)

has elaboratedan ethicalcommitmentto honoringthe alterityof otherculturesandtheir
subjects- thatis, a commitmentto respectingthe variousways in whichdifferentcultural
ontologies might not make sense within the terms of hegemonic discourse--there has
been less willingness to extend this ethical commitmentto the aestheticrealm as such.
Thus althoughsocial practicesguided by the principleof others' autonomytend to be
regarded as politically desirable, the possibility of according relative autonomy to
somethingdesignated"art"tendsto be regardedas politicallysuspect.Progressivecritics
claim to accept the impossibilityof masteringthe enigmas of other persons and other
cultures,yet seem unableto accept the impossibilityof fully masteringthe enigmas of
the aesthetic domain. While we try to respect the otherness of other persons, our
interpretivepracticesdo not respect the othernessof art. It is as if art needed to come
from an alien culture before we could concede that some aspect of it remains
untranslatableinto meaning.
Insofaras it is transmitteddiscursively,the enigmaticsignifierpertainsnot only to
intersubjectiverelationsbut also to aesthetic relations;irreducibleengimas hauntour
aesthetic experience as well as affecting our involvement with other persons.
Extrapolatingfrom Laplanche,I would suggest thatas soon as one conceives alterityin
symbolic terms, one sees that otherness exceeds intersubjective and intercultural
dynamics; otherness is a property of discourse, and the enigmas of otherness are
exacerbatedby art.We mighteven say thatart'spurposelies in intensifyingthose aspects
of alterity that otherwise remain dormant in everyday discourse and conventional
intersubjectivecommunication. From this perspective, the disruption of normative
communicationwouldsignala proximityto aestheticexperience,andartwouldbe defined
less as the secludedreserveof high culturethanas the practiceor experienceof disruption
throughwhich somethinglike the enigmatic signifierbecomes palpable.
Of course, this definitionrepresentsa peculiarlymodernistunderstandingof artone whose institutionalizationgeneratedthe shibbolethof aesthetic autonomy in the
firstplace. But whereasthe New Criticalaccountof aestheticautonomyentaileda view
of art as harmoniouslyself-enclosed and ontologically distinct from mass culture,the
psychoanalytic account of relative autonomy entails a view of art as disrupting
harmoniousself-enclosures of all kinds, and as troublingratherthan reinforcingthe
boundarybetween high and low culturalforms. If we call "aesthetic"those experiences
in which meaningis disruptedby an encounterwith alterity,then the productsof mass
cultureso beloved by Zizek may give rise to an experience whose relative autonomy
from normativecoordinatesof sense requiresacknowledging.21 By readingAlthusser
throughLaplanche,I am suggesting that the concept of relative autonomypertainsto
not only culturalproductionbut also culturalreception:relative autonomyat the level
of receptionimplies a fundamentalirreducibilityto sense or understanding.Puttingthis
matterat its most schematic, I would say that Laplanche'sconcept of the enigmatic
signifier rewritesat the level of receptionwhatAlthussermeantby relative autonomy.
To the extent thatartentails a practiceor experienceof defamiliarizationin which
othernesscomes to the fore,it requiresan ethicalratherthanan epistemologicalapproach.
From this perspectivethe ethics of psychoanalyticcriticism would consist in refusing
21. Here I find myself in sympathywith TomCohen's deconstructivecritique of Zizek as
inattentiveto the textual materialityof the Hitchcockfilms he discusses: in attemptingto go
beyondthe symbolicto the real, ZizekoverlooksHitchcock'sexperimentswith language, thereby
reinscribingafairly traditionalmethodoffilm criticismthatemphasizesthe auteur,charactersin
the diegesis, the immediacyof the cinematic image, and suchlike [Cohen, "Beyond"].It is undoubtedlythe case that Cohen'sreadingsof individualHitchcockmoviesarefar moreinteresting
than Zizek's,despite the latter'senthusiasm.

38

the imperativeto overcome all enigmaticity throughdemystification.Such an ethics

would encourageus to adopta less knowingly superiorattitudetowardartby helpingto
allay the suspicionthatmeaningandmotive lie concealedbehindaestheticexpressions.
In Lacanian terms, this would entail criticism registering the effects of the real on
interpretation,ratherthanthematizingthe real throughinterpretationsthatuse aesthetic
artifacts to illustrate psychoanalytic concepts.22The hermeneuticsof suspicion that
characterizesinterpretivepracticesrunningthe gamutfrompsychoanalyticto materialist
to historicistcriticismpromotesa paranoidrelationto culturalforms,fueling the impulse
to critically masteropacity or uncertaintythroughrigorous interpretation.But just as
psychoanalysisindubitablycontributesto this projectby way of its theoriesof a cultural
unconscious and attendantculturalsymptoms,so too can psychoanalysismake us less
paranoid,less insistent on uncoveringmeaning and significance everywherewe turn.
Psychoanalysiscan help us tolerateresistancesto meaningby enablingus to appreciate
how enigmas aren't always puzzles to be decoded or obstacles to be overcome, but
insteadrepresentan ineliminablecondition of existence. Thus whereasthe concept of
the unconscious licenses a critical commitmentto demystification,the concept of the
enigmaticsignifier puts the brakeon demystification.
Having claimed thatthe enigmatic signifier remainsenigmaticbecause it remains
unconscious,I want in closing to differentiatethe implicationsfor culturalcriticismof
the concept of the unconsciousfrom those of the enigmatic signifier.The notion of the
enigmatic signifier seems preferablefor culturalcriticism to that of the unconscious,
since whereas the latter indexes a general limit to our intentionalagency, the former
indexes a more specific limit to our hermeneuticagency. It is particularlyimportantto
acknowledge the limits of interpretationwhen working in the aesthetic domain, and
thence to see how one's relation to aesthetic experience may be ethical before it is
epistemological. Diagnosing aesthetic artifactsas culturalsymptomstends to preempt
the possibility of any such ethical consideration. Although my previous work has
strenuouslyemphasizedthe need for culturaltheoryto retaina radicallypsychoanalytic
concept of the unconscious as that which disruptssubjectiveand sexual norms, I have
become skepticalaboutthe viabilityfor literarystudiesof a concept such as the cultural
unconscious.The concept of the unconsciouslicenses interpretationas an interminable
enterprisethatpermanentlydefersanalysisof the disruptiveimpactaestheticexperience
of a literarywork is endless," maintainsJacqueline
may have on us.23"Interpretation
Rose in an exemplarywork of psychoanalyticliterarycriticism [ix]; but the enigmatic
andthusto reorientthe focus of criticism.
signifierholdsthepotentialto haltinterpretation
If psychoanalysishas a futurethatconsists in more thanmerely repeatingitself in ever
varyingcontextsa la Zizek, then interpretationmay provenegligible to whatwe wantto
say next aboutart.
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