G.R. No.

L-23959 November 29, 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNINGrespondents.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.
Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented in this petition for review of an order,
dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULPIloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said case.
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et
al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of
complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates,
counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22
November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3
December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on
the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings
petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the
hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and
subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for professional services rendered
in the case, apportioned as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%
Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%
Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in the present petition.
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing but his motion was overruled on 20
January 1965. 1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case,
this Court admitted and considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner for
review. 2 The case was considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief. 3
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, 4 that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union
president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be
justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that
In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented
by legal counsel ...
is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer,
is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that
it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf
of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by
itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from
his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist
unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client
relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public
policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications

and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the
protection of courts, clients and the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:
But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to the
bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation
for legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice before the court or in the
jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5
No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to
practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time. 6
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; 7 that acting as an attorney with authority constitutes
contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, 8 and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit
of an act or an act done in violation of law; 9 and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless
confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers
are not amenable to disciplinary measures. 10
And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be
circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney. 11
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible
argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is
a court of special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception.
The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of
some of its members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present
petition for review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the present
petition that was subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as copetitioners was belated.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of
its members because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its
members; and the union was organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an
award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act
875, which provides:
Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases Appeals. Any person aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to the
Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,
since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of litigations.
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of Industrial Relations, and many
of them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said
court. If true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by
positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the
present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's fees for
respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.

A.C. No. 1261

December 29, 1983

TAN TEK BENG, complainant,

vs.
TIMOTEO A. DAVID, respondent.

DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against lawyer Timoteo A. David (admitted to the bar in 1945) for
not giving Tan Tek Beng, a nonlawyer (alleged missionary of the Seventh Day Adventists), one-half of the attorneys fees received by
David from the clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng. Their agreement reads:
December 3, 1970
Mr. Tan Tek Beng
Manila
Dear Mr. Tan:
In compliance with your request, I am now putting into writing our agreement which must be followed in connection with the accounts
that you will entrust to me for collection. Our terms and conditions shall be as follows:
1. On all commission or attorneys fees that we shall receive from our clients by virtue of the collection that we shall be able to effect
on their accounts, we shall divide fifty-fifty. Likewise you are entitled to commission, 50/50 from domestic, inheritance and commercial
from our said clients or in any criminal cases where they are involved.
2. I shall not deal directly with our clients without your consent.
3. You shall take care of collecting our fees as well as advances for expenses for the cases referred to us by our clients and careful in
safeguarding our interest.
4. It is understood that legal expenses that we shall recover from the debtors shall be turned over to our clients. Other clients who
directly or indirectly have been approached or related (sic) to you as a result of your labor are your clients.
I hereby pledge in the name of God, our Heavenly Father, that I will be sincere, honest and fair with you in connection with our
transactions with our clients. Likewise you must be sincere, honest and fair with me.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) Illegible
TIMOTEO A. DAVID
P.S.
I will be responsible for all documents entrusted me by our clients.
(Sgd.) Initial
CONFORME to the above and likewise will reciprocate my sincerity to Atty. David as stated in the last paragraph of this letter.
(Sgd.) Tan Tek Beng
MR. TAN TEK BENG
The foregoing was a reiteration of an agreement dated August 5, 1969. Note that in said agreement lawyer David not only agreed to
give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the
clients.

The business relationship between David and Tan Tek Beng did not last. There were mutual accusations of doublecross. For allegedly
not living up to the agreement, Tan Tek Beng in 1973 denounced David to Presidential Assistant Ronaldo B. Zamora, to the Office of
Civil Relations at Camp Crame and to this Court. He did not file any civil action to enforce the agreement.
In his 1974 comment, David clarified that the partnership was composed of himself as manager, Tan Tek Beng as assistant manager
and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as president and financier. When Jacinto became ill and the costs of office maintenance mounted, David
suggested that Tan Tek Beng should also invest some money or shoulder a part of the business expenses but Tan Tek Beng refused.
This case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were scheduled from 1974 to
1981. It was proposed that respondent should submit a stipulation of facts but that did not materialize because the scheduled hearings
were not held due to the nonavailability of Tan Tek Beng and his counsel.
On September 16, 1977 Tan Tek Beng died at the Philippine Union Colleges Compound, Baesa, Caloocan City but it was only in the
manifestation of his counsel dated August 10, 1981 that the Solicitor Generals Office was informed of that fact. A report on this case
dated March 21, 1983 was submitted by the Solicitor General to this Court.
We hold that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to
any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term
malpractice (Act No. 2828, amending sec. 21 of Act No. 190).
That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. The lawyer may not
seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional (2 R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 53
Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm, J., Jayme vs. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Arce vs. Philippine National Bank, 62 Phil. 569). The commercialization of law
practice is condemned in certain canons of professional ethics adopted by the American BarAssociation:
34. Division of Fees. No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or
responsibility.
35.

Intermediaries. The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any law agency, personal or

corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyers responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all
relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyers relation to his client should be
personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client. . . .
38. Compensation, Commissions and Rebates. A lawyer should accept no compensation, commissions, rebates or other advantages
from others without the knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure. (Appendix, Malcolm, Legal Ethics).
We censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical agreement. We discountenance his conduct, not
because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not know legal ethics) but because David should have known better.
Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a
member of that profession (Note 14, 7 C.J.S. 743).
WHEREFORE, respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice. A copy of this decision should be attached to his record in the
Bar Confidants office.
SO ORDERED.

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
Duran & Lim for respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous to the last
general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office;
can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can
execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint
for or against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and
serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in
Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction into office as member of the
Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your
suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can come to my
house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in Echague. I will attend the session
of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer
and notary public. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and
notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you can always find me there on every
Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to
be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief that my residence as member
of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public.
Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my
residence here in Echague.
I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meetings or social gatherings so
that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people
in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I
would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as
originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said
codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908
and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of
ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per
se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interview not
warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through
touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or
offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for
business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the
interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone
of our high calling, and are intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice
to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and

litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other
causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with
claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents
or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to
his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed,
under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or
others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar
having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender
may be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at the common law, and one of
the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been
provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind
statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain
employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas.,
625; Peoplevs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor
of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases
in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be
taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case,
suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude
toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would
amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his
intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not
to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should
be distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient
in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt
with by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby
suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929,

A.C. No. L-1117

March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of
June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged
to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he
admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such
professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he
alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a
brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of
old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome
of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the period of one month for advertising
his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there
the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the
respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 6672

Present:

- versus -

ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,

Respondent.

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

Promulgated:
September 4, 2009

x-----------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment [1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office
against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients [2] to transfer
legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance [3] and expeditious collection on their claims. [4] To
induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit [5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano
tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in
exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card: [6]
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01
Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City
Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling
card.[7]

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.[8]

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, [9] found that
respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 [10] and other canons[11] of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or
through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 [12] of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended
that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants professional practice in
violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct
themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyers
services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR,
DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers
should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. [13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is
to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently
render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called. [14]

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT
LEGAL BUSINESS.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. [16]

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR
PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally
or through an agent in order to gain employment) [17] as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.
[18]

Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed
by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited
from referrals suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory
hearing.

Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of
the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal
another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his
services.[20] Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving
benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his office. [21] Respondent
committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the
CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash
bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may
not be adversely affected.[22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire
devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients case, the
lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. [23] Either of
these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a
settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of
undivided fidelity to the clients cause.[24]

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice [25] which calls for the exercise of the Courts
disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a
prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. [26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect

the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to
clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is
grossly incommensurate to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. [27] For this reason,
lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional
cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

lawyers name;
name of the law firm with which he is connected;
address;
telephone number and
special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice
clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money
was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and
emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal
profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that
respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be
circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1),
petitioner,
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member of the bar admits of no doubt. All the
relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the integrity of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who had
purged himself of his guilt are given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being
unanimous with the late.
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated. The minute resolution dated
October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it "is without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may not be amiss. As set forth in the
resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board
of Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys
for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21,
1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,.
Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the delinquency further continue until
the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action
it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the
Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should be submit by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he
submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the
Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted a
joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda
in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution." 3
Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the
provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys. 4
The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of
his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support
of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP ByLaws are void and of no legal force and effect. 5 It was pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous case
before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6 The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was that
the integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the context of
contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively." 7
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered, there were various pleadings filed by
respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it was by persistence
in his adamantine refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it would be denied. So it
turned out. 8 It was the consensus that he continued to be oblivious to certain balic juridical concepts, the appreciation of which does
not even require great depth of intellect. Since respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his
pleadings in other cases coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with invective for which he
had been duly taken to task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the extreme
penalty of disbarment visited on him was more than justified.
Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude on his part was discernible. 9 The tone of
defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character invoked the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise
spoke of the welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his
career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the resolution of October 23, 1980. It made
certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the
legal profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed
during which he war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into account. It may likewise be said that as in the case
of the inherent power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to
discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. 11

One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as admission to the bar is concerned. So it is
likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege
burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic
move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the
transgressor, he may once again be considered for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.
The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.
January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest
recommendation" on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2of the Court, and
"consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming
nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon
as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving
recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in
favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all
parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in
this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court
created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on
the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury
not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the
same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data
bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments,
comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed
integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus
sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to
adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This
requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to
the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar
(or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State. Bar integration,
therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on
the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law, integration fosters
cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the
objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence, public
service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the
relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make reports and
recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy
judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that
politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained through
influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout the
country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order to elevate the
standards of the profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the importance of preventive
legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in the
solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec.
13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power
nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or,
more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively."

Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar integration
on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its
Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their
constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because
a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation;
and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the
court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that
privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can be no collective action
without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair
and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar
conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all
lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or
the corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a
member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings
of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which
he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue
therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary membership in any other
aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and ethical standards of the
Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the
lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper
subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar
includes the authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the
Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership
fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the
concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not impose an
unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential
inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.

A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes, even though
such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is opposed, would not
nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the Integrated Bar, it is
difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very
purposes for which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue. Even the income tax
would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious
objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other
end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted
above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a
new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which,
by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities
in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a
valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time
Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is
not unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time requires a careful
overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1)
improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful
participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of
unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more
cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the
courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the
Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar
associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an
impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty
years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been
tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar integration
show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of
15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of
Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of
eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of
unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed
opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court
Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or
2.06 per cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the
authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the
integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in
the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.