Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion (see Tandoc vs. Tensuan, L50835, October 30, 1979, 93 SCRA 880).
The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger
in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat
the first buyers rights except when the second buyer first registers in
good faith the second sale (Olivares vs.Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33)
***5. Caram v Laureta
FACTS:
On June 10, 1945, Marcos Mata conveyed a large tract of agricultural land
covered by OCT No. 3019 in favor of Claro Laureta, plaintiff, the
respondent herein. The deed of absolute sale in favor of the plaintiff was
not registered because it was not acknowledged before a notary public or
any other authorized officer. Since June 10,1945, the plaintiff Laureta had
been and is in continuous, adverse and notorious occupation of said land,
without being molested, disturbed or stopped by any of the defendants or
their representatives. In fact, Laureta had been paying realty taxes due
thereon and had introduced improvements worth not less than P20,000.00
at the time of the filing of the complaint. On May 5, 1947, the same land
covered by OCT No.3019 was sold by Marcos Mata to defendant Fermin Z.
Caram, Jr., petitioner herein. The deed of sale in favor of Caram was
acknowledged before Atty. Abelardo Aportadera. On December 9,1947,
the second sale between Marcos Mata and Fermin Caram, Jr. was
registered with the Register of Deeds. On the same date, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 140 was issued in favor of Fermin Caram Jr. The
defendant Fermin Caram Jr. claimed that he has no knowledge or
information about the previous encumbrances, transactions, and
alienations in favor of plaintiff until the filing of the complaints.
ISSUE:
by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to
register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration
with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code of
the second buyer being able to displace the first buyer; that before the
second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that he
acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the
first buyer's rights) from the time of acquisition until the title is
transferred to him by registration or failing registration, by delivery of
possession. The second buyer must show continuing good faith and
innocence or lack of knowledge of the first sale until his contract ripens
into full ownership through prior registration as provided by law."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; KNOWLEDGE OF PRIOR SALE TAINTS SECOND
PURCHASER'S PRIOR REGISTRATION WITH BAD FAITH; CASE AT BAR.
When petitioner Cruz succeeded in registering the later sale in his favor,
he knew and was informed of the prior sale in favor of respondentsspouses. Respondents appellate court correctly held that such "knowledge
of a prior transfer of a registered property by a subsequent purchasers
makes him a purchaser in bad faith and his knowledge of such transfer
vitiates his title acquired by virtue of the latter instruments of conveyance
with creates no right as against the first purchaser."
***7. (Spouses Valdez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85082,
February 25, 1991)
"Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees,
the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person
who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof,
to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith."
there can be no question that the sale of the subject lot to petitioners was
made long before the execution of the Deed of Assignment of said lot to
respondent Viernes and that petitioners annotated their adverse claim as
vendees of the property as early as September 6, 1982 with the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City. On the other hand the deed of Assignment in
favor of Viernes of the said lot was registered with the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City only on November 11, 1982 whereby a new title was
issued in the name of Viernes as above stated.
The rule is clear that a prior right is accorded to the vendee who first
recorded his right in good faith over an immovable property. In this case,
the petitioners acquired subject lot in good faith and for valuable
consideration from the Antes and as such owners petitioners fenced the
property taking possession thereof. Thus, when petitioners annotated their
adverse claim in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City they thereby
established a superior right to the property in question as against
respondent Viernes.
Petition is granted. declaring the petitioners to have the superior right to
the property in question and to be the true and lawful owners of the same.
***8. (Spouses Nuguid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77423, March
13, 1989)
4. CIVIL LAW; SALE; RECONVEYANCE; NOT POSSIBLE WHERE PROPERTY
WAS TRANSFERRED TO AN INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE. An
innocent purchaser for value is protected such that when land has already
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, reconveyance of
the same can no longer be made.
5. ID.; ID.; SALE OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY TO DIFFERENT VENDEES;
OWNERSHIP BELONGS TO VENDEE WHO FIRST RECORDED THE SALE. It
is an established fact that the first sale to Juliana Salazar was not
registered while the sale to the petitioners was registered. The disputed
property being immovable property, the ownership should belong to the
which would never have existed but for the order of the person desiring it.
In such case, the contract is one for a piece of work, not a sale. On the
other hand, if the thing subject of the contract would have existed and
been the subject of a sale to some other person even if the order had not
been given, then the contract is one of sale. If the parties intended that at
some future date an object has to be delivered, without considering the
work or labor of the party bound to deliver, the contract is one of sale. But
if one of the parties accepts the undertaking on the basis of some plan,
taking into account the work he will employ personally or through another,
there is a contract for a piece of work.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDY IN CASE OF VIOLATION OF THE WARRANTY
AGAINST HIDDEN DEFECTS. The obligations of a contractor for a piece
of work are set forth in Articles 1714 and 1715 of the Civil Code. The
provisions on warranty against hidden defects, referred to in Art. 1714 are
found in Articles 1561 and 1566. The remedy against violations of the
warranty against hidden defects is either to withdraw from the contract
(redhibitory action) or to demand a proportionate reduction of the price
(accion quanti minoris), with damages in either case.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD IN FILING AN ACTION IN CASE OF
BREACH THEREOF. The original complaint is one for damages arising
from breach of a written contract and not a suit to enforce warranties
against hidden defects. The governing law is Article 1715 (supra).
However, inasmuch as this provision does not contain a specific
prescriptive period, the general law on prescription, which is Article 1144
of the Civil Code, will apply. Said provision states, inter alia, that actions
"upon a written contract" prescribe in ten (10) years. The mere fact that
the employer accepted the work does not, ipso facto, relieve the
petitioner from liability for deviations from and violations of the written
contract, as the law gives him ten (10) years within which to file an action
based on breach thereof.
***3. (Catungal v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 146839, March 23, 2011)
CASES ON LEASE?
***1. GUZMAN, BOCALING AND CO. VS. BONNEVIE, 206 SCRA 668
1. CIVIL LAW; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; LEASE; NECESSITY OF SECURING THE
APPROVAL OF PROBATE COURT; RULE; CASE AT BAR. The Court agrees
with the respondent court that it was not necessary to secure the approval
by the probate court of the Contract of Lease because it did not involve an
alienation of real property of the estate nor did the term of the lease
exceed one year so as to make it fall under Article 1878(8) of the Civil
Code. Only if Paragraph 20 of the Contract of Lease was activated and the
said property was intended to be sold would it be required of the
administratrix to secure the approval of the probate court pursuant to Rule
89 of the Rules of Court.||| (Guzman, Bocaling & Co. v. Bonnevie, G.R. No.
86150, March 02, 1992)
***2. YEK SENG CO VS. CA, 205 SCRA 305
1. CIVIL LAW; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; LEASE; EXTENSION OF THE LEASE
CONTRACT; MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED IN ALLOWING THEREOF; DIVINO
v. MARCOS (4 SCRA 186) CITED. In extending the lease contract it was
considered important in the case of Divino v. Marcos (4 SCRA 186) that: 1)
the plaintiff had been occupying the leased premises for more than twenty
years; 2) he was assured by the defendants that he could remain in the
house as long as he continued paying the rentals; and 3) he made
landlord Dr. Wendelyn V. Yap as the person interested in taking over the
clinic. However, the negotiations did not materialize but the petitioners
managed to enter into a contract of lease for the said premises at a
monthly rental of P1,800.00 with the landlord. As a result, private
respondent Cruz brought an action for "Forcible Entry with Damages" with
the Metropolitan Trial Court which rendered its decision in favor of private
respondent. We rule in favor of private respondent. When the petitioners
and the landlord executed a new contract of lease, the lease of private
respondent was still valid and subsisting. There is no question that private
respondent has not effectively relinquished his leasehold rights over the
premises in question in view of the failure of negotiations for the sale of
the goodwill. Clearly, the transfer of the leasehold rights is conditional in
nature and has no force and effect if the condition is not complied with.|||
(Yap v. Cruz, G.R. No. 89307, May 08, 1992)
***5. UNITED REALTY CORP. VS. CA, 183 SCRA 725
1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; LEASE ON A MONTH TO MONTH BASIS;
CONSIDERED WITH A DEFINITE PERIOD. A reading of the two contracts
of lease entered into between petitioner and private respondent
hereinabove reproduced show that its period is from month to month and
that the lease may be terminated when either party gives a 5 days notice
in writing. No doubt such a stipulation between the parties demonstrates
that the agreement of lease is for a definite period and not for an
indefinite period as held by the appellate court.||| (United Realty Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 62603, March 27, 1990)
***6. LEGAR MGNT AND REALTY CORP. VS. CA, G. R. NO. 117423,
JAN. 24, 1996
1. CIVIL LAW; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; LEASE; RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY
COVERED BY THE RENT CONTROL LAW AND WHERE RENTALS ARE PAID
MONTHLY, EJECTMENT IS PROPER UPON EXPIRATION ON THE LAST DAY OF
ANY GIVEN 30-DAY PERIOD UPON PROPER DEMAND AND NOTICE. The
issue is whether the lessee of a residential property covered by the Rent
Control Law can be ejected on the basis alone of the expiration of the
verbal lease contract under which rentals are paid monthly. We resolved
this issue in the affirmative in the case of Acab vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 112285, February 21, 1995. Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877,
which is exactly the same as Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 does
not suspend the effects of Article 1687 of the New Civil Code. Thus, lease
agreements with no specified period, but in which rentals are paid
monthly, are considered to be on a month-to- month basis. . . . They are
for a definite period and expire after the last day of any given thirty-day
period, upon proper demand and notice by the lessor to vacate. . . . Where
the verbal lease agreement entered into has been validly terminated,
there is sufficient cause for ejectment under Section 5(f) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 877. cdasia||| (Legar Management & Realty Corp. v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 117423, January 24, 1996)