G.R. No.

127410 January 20, 1999

Conrado Tiu, Juan Montelibano Jr. and Isagani Jungco, petitioners
vs Court of Appeals, etc., respondents
Ponente: Panganiban
Facts:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the CA's decision upholding
the constitutionality and validity of EO No. 97-A granting the tax and duty incentives authorized under RA No. 7227
were limited to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone.
The assailed resolution has denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners.
March 13, 1992, Congress with the approval of the President passed RA 7227 creating Bases Conversion and
Development Authority for the purpose of providing funds therefor and for other purposes in SSEZ. On June 10, 1993,
President Ramos issued EO No. 97 clarifying the tax and duty incentives thus:
Sec. 1. On Import Taxes and Duties. Tax and duty-free importations shall apply only to raw materials, capital goods
and equipment brought in by business enterprises into the SSEZ. Except for these items, importations of other goods
into the SSEZ, whether by business enterprises or resident individuals, are subject to taxes and duties under relevant
Philippine laws.
The exportation or removal of tax and duty-free goods from the territory of the SSEZ to other parts of the Philippine
territory shall be subject to duties and taxes under relevant Philippine laws.
Sec. 2. On All Other Taxes. In lieu of all local and national taxes (except import taxes and duties), all business
enterprises in the SSEZ shall be required to pay the tax specified in Section 12(c) of R.A. No. 7227.
9 days after, President Ramos issued EO 97-A specifying the area within which the tax and duty free privilege was
operative. Then petitioners challenged the EO 97-A for being violative of the right to equal protection of the laws.
Ruling of CA: Respondent Court held that "there is no substantial difference between the provisions of EO 97-A and
Section 12 of RA 7227. In both, the 'Secured Area' is precise and well-defined as '. . . the lands occupied by the Subic
Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement
between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended . . .'" The appellate court concluded that such
being the case, petitioners could not claim that EO 97-A is unconstitutional, while at the same time maintaining the
validity of RA 7227.
The Court of Appeals further justified the limited application of the tax incentives as being within the prerogative of the
legislature, pursuant to its "avowed purpose [of serving] some public benefit or interest." It ruled that "EO 97-A merely
implements the legislative purpose of [RA 7227]."
Issue: Whether the E0 97-A is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution?
Held:
The constitutional rights to equal protection of the law is not violated by an executive order, issued pursuant to law,
granting tax and duty incentives only to the business and residents within the "secured area" of the Subic Special
Economic Zone and denying them to those who live within the Zone but outside such "fenced-in" territory. The
Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents. It is enough that all persons under like circumstances
or conditions are given the same privileges and required to follow the same obligations. In short, a classification based
on valid and reasonable standards does not violate the equal protection clause.
We rule in favor of the constitutionality and validity of the assailed EO. Said Order is not violative of the equal
protection clause; neither is it discriminatory. Rather, than we find real and substantive distinctions between the
circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable
classification.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from another. 6 The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply
to all those belonging to the same class.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be
limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
Purpose of Law: to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into productive uses.
Substantial Distinctions: We believe it was reasonable for the President to have delimited the application of some
incentives to the confines of the former Subic military base. It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does
not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material differences between territories, there
is no violation of the constitutional clause.

Existing Conditions: We believe that the classification set forth by the executive issuance does not apply merely to
existing conditions. As laid down in RA 7227, the objective is to establish a "self-sustaining, industrial, commercial,
financial and investment center" in the area. There will, therefore, be a long-term difference between such investment
center and the areas outside it.
Apply Equally: the classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and businesses within the "secured
area." The residents, being in like circumstances or contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the
law, are not categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted and in obligations
required.
Alonte vs. Savellano, Jr.
BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 131652
March 9, 1998
BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MAXIMO SAVELLANO, JR., THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and JUVIELYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 131728
March 9, 1998
VITUG, J.:
Pending before the court are two separate petitioners, one filed by petitioner Bayani M. Alonte, docketed G.r. No.
131652, and the other by petitioner Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed G.R. No. 131728, that assail the decision of
the respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr.., of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, of Manila finding both
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The two petitioners were consolidated.
An information for rape was filed on 05 December 1996 against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of
Bian, Laguna, and Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan.
Information contains that on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas, Bian, Laguna, accused Concepcion
brought Punongbayan to Alontes resthouse after the latters spiking of the formers drink. There, Alonte raped the
private respondent.
On December 16, 1996, Punongbayan, through her counsel, Atty. Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor (ACSP) Leonardo Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a Petition for a Change of
Venue to have the case transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila. The same has been
approved on September 20, 1997.
During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or on June 25 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted by her
parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance to which she reiterated on October 07 1997.
Meanwhile, on June 28, 1997, Atty. Ramon C.Casano on behalf of petitioners, moved to have the petition for change
of venue dismissed on the ground that it had become moot in view of complainants affidavit of desistance.
Upon arraignment on November 07 1997, petitioners both pleaded not guilty to the charge. From November 10,
1997 to December 10, 1997, petitioners filed five Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail to which the respondent judge did not
act on.
Accused are hereby sentence to suffer the indivisible penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for having been found guilty of the
crime of rape.
ISSUE: WON the desistance of the offended party extinguish the criminal liability of the accused.
HELD: An affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-called "private crimes," is not a
ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as
so earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value, like any other piece of evidence,
would be up to the court for proper evaluation.
Paragraph 3 of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits a prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of
lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in
any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not
prohibit the continuance of a prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender after the cause has been
instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of said cause. The only act that according to article 344 extinguishes the
penal action and the penalty that may have been imposed is the marriage between the offended and the offended
party.