Crim Red Notes

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!!
I.
SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATION QUESTIONS
I.
A was invited to a drinking spree by friends. After having a drink too many, A and B had a
heated argument, during which a stabbed B. As a result, B suffered serious physical
injuries. May the intoxication of A be considered aggravating or mitigating? (5%)
Answer:
The intoxication of A may be prima facie considered mitigating since it was merely
incidental to the commission of the crime. It may not be considered aggravating
as there was no clear indication from the facts of the case that it was habitual or
intentional on the part of A. aggravating circumstances are not to be presumed;
they should be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
II.
A asked b to kill C because of a grave injustice done to A by C. A promised B a reward. B
was willing to kill C, not so much because of the reward promised to him but because he
also had his own long-standing grudge against C, who had wronged him in the past. If C
is killed by , would A be liable as a principal by inducement? (5%)
Answer:
No. A would not be liable as a principal by inducement because the reward he
promised B is not the sole impelling reason which made B to kill C. To bring about
criminal liability of a co-principal, the inducement made by the inducer must be
the sole consideration which caused the person induced to commit the crime
without which the crime would not have been committed. The facts of the case
indicate that B, the killer supposedly induced by A, had his own reason to kill C
out of a long standing grudge.
III.
A.
How are the maximum and the minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence for
offenses punishable under the Revised Penal Code determined? (3%)
Answer:
For crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence shall be the penalty properly imposable under the same
Code after considering the attending mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances
according to Art. 64 of said Code. The minimum term of the same sentence shall
be fixed within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for
the crime under the said Code.
B. Under the law, what is the purpose for fixing the maximum and the minimum terms of
the indeterminate sentence? (2%)
Answer:
The purpose of the law in fixing the minimum term of the sentence is to set the
grace period at which the convict may be released on parole from imprisonment,
unless by his conduct he is not deserving of parole and thus he shall continue
serving his prison term in jail but in no case to go beyond the maximum term fixed
in the sentence.
IV.
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CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE: Chairperson: Edgardo Bruce, Jr.; Asst. Chairperson: Timothy Joseph Adriano; EDP: Sorhaya Dilabakun
Members: Jennifer Ann Bautista, Albert Rodriguez, Catherine Danao, Tin Constantino, Romeo Villarta III, Paul Lim, Clifford Chua, Clifton
Abot, Charo Rejuso, Pammy Palad, Arnold Kabanlit, Alex Rios, Kats Pioquinto, Claudine Tuazon, Garny Alegre, Carol Arciaga, Jet Lim,
Charles Sierra, Irene de Torres, RY Yambao

A. A was charged with homicide. After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to six (6)
years and one (1) day in prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Prior to his conviction, he had been found guilty
of vagrancy and imprisoned for ten (10) days of arresto menor and fined fifty pesos
(P50.00). Is he eligible for probation? Why? (3%)
Answer:
No he is not. The benefits of the Probation Law (PD 968, as amended) does not
extend to those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more
than six years (Sec. 9a).
It is of no moment that in his previous conviction A was given a penalty of only ten
(10) days of arresto mayor and a fine of P50.00.
B. May a probationer appeal from the decision revoking the grant of probation or
modifying the terms and conditions thereof? (2%)
Answer:
No. Under Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, an order granting or
denying probation is not appealable.
V.
A vehicular accident occurred on the national highway in Bulacan. Among the first to
arrive at the scene of the accident was A, who found one of the victims already dead and
the others unconscious. Before rescuers could come, A, taking advantage of the
helpless condition of the victims, took their wallets and jewelry. However, the police, who
responded to the report of the accident, caught A. What crime or crimes did A commit?
Why? (5%)
Answer:
A committed the crime of qualified theft because he took the wallets and jewelry of
the victims with intent to gain and on the occasion of a vehicular accident wherein
he took advantage of the helpless condition of the victims. But only one crime of
qualified theft was committed although there were more than one victim divested
of their valuables, because all the taking of the valuables were made on one and
the same occasion, thus constituting a continued crime.
VI.
A. What is the difference between violation of domicile and trespass to dwelling? (2%)
Answer:
The differences between violation of domicile and trespass to dwelling are:
a. The offender in violation of domicile is a public officer acting under color of
authority; in trespass to dwelling, the offender is a private person or public
officer acting in a private capacity.
b. Violation of domicile is committed in 3 different ways: (1) by entering the
dwelling of another against the will of the latter; (2) searching papers and
other effects inside the dwelling without the previous consent of the owner;
or (3) refusing to leave the premises which he entered surreptitiously, after
being required to leave the premises.
Trespass to dwelling is committed only in one way; that is, by entering the
dwelling of another against the express or implied will of the latter.
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B. A, a detention prisoner, was taken to a hospital for emergency medical treatment. His
followers, all of whom were armed, went to the hospital to take him away or help him
escape. The prison guards, seeing that they were outnumbered and that resistance
would endanger the lives of other patients, decided to allow the prisoner to be taken by
his followers. What crime, if any, was committed by As followers? Why ?
Answer:
As followers shall be liable as principals in the delivery of prisoner from jail (Art.
156, Revised Penal Code). The felony is committed not only by removing from jail
or penal establishment any person confined therein but also helping in the escape
of such person outside of said establishments by means of violence, intimidation,
bribery, or any other means.
VII.
A, a lady professor, was giving an examination. She noticed B, one of the students,
cheating. She called the students attention and confiscated his examination booklet,
causing embarrassment to him. The following day, while the class was going on, the
student, B, approached A and, without warning, slapped her. B would have inflicted
further injuries on A had not C, another student, come to As rescue and prevented B
from continuing his attack. B turned his ire on C and punched the latter. What crimes or
crimes, if any, did B commit? Why? (5%)
Answer:
B committed two counts of direct assault: one for slapping the professor, A, who
was then conducting classes and thus exercising authority; and another one for
the violence on the student C, who came to the aid of the said professor.
By express provision of Article 152, in relation to Article 148 of the Revised Penal
Code, teachers and professors of public or duly recognized private schools,
colleges and universities in the actual performance of their official duties or on
the occasion of such performance are deemed persons in authority for purposes
of the crimes of direct assault and of resistance and disobedience in Artilcles 148
and 151 of said Code. And any person who comes to the aid of persons in
authority shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority. Accordingly, the
attack on C is, in the eyes of the law, an attack on an agent of a person in
authority, not just an attack on a student.
VIII.
A. What are other acts are considered rape under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, amending
the Revised Penal Code? (3%)
Answer:
The other acts considered rape under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 are:
1. having carnal knowledge of a woman by a man by means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of authority;
2. having carnal knowledge of a demented woman by a man even if none of
the circumstances required in rape be present; and
3. committing an act of sexual assault by inserting a persons penis into the
victims mouth or anal orifice, or by inserting any instrument or object, into
the genital or anal orifice of another person.
B. The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 reclassified rape from a crime against honor, a private
offense, to that of a crime against persons. Will the subsequent marriage between the
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offender and the offended party extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed?
Explain? (2%)
Answer:
Yes. By express provision of Article 266-C of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, the subsequent valid marriage between the offender and offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed, although rape has
been classified from a crime against chastity, to that of a crime against persons.
IX.
A. A, a male, takes B, another male, to a motel and there, through threat and
intimidation, succeeds in inserting his penis into the anus of B. What, if any, is As
criminal liability? Why? (3%)
Answer:
A shall be criminally liable for rape by committing an act of sexual assault against
B, by inserting his penis into the anus of the latter.
Even a man may be a victim of rape by sexual assault under par. 2 of Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, when the offenders penis is inserted
into his mouth or anal orifice.
B. A, with lewd designs, took a 13-year old girl to a nipa hut in his farm and there had
sexual intercourse with her. The girl did not offer any resistance because she was
infatuated with the man, who was good-looking and belonged to a rich and prominent
family in the town. What crime, if any, was committed by A? Why? (2%)
Answer:
A committed the crime of consented abduction under Article 343 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
The said Article punishes the abduction of a virgin over 12 and under 18 years of
age, carried out with her consent and with lewd designs. Although the problem did
not indicate the victim to be virgin, virginity should not be understood in its
material sense, as to exclude a virtuous woman of good reputation, since the
essence of the crime is not the injury to the woman but the outrage and alarm to
her family (Valdepeas vs. People, 16 SCRA 871 [1966])
Alternative Answer:
A committed Child Abuse under Rep. Act No. 7610. As defined in said law, child
abuse includes sexual abuse or any act which debases, degrades or demeans
the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being, whose agge is below
eighteen (18) years.
X.
A. A, a married woman, had sexual intercourse with a man who was not her husband.
The man did not know she was married. What crime, if any, did each of them commit?
Why? (2%)
Answer:
A, the married woman, committed the crime of adultery under Article 333 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, for having sexual intercourse with a man not
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her husband while her marriage is still subsisting. But the man had carnal
knowledge of her, not knowing her to be married, shall not be liable for adultery.
B. A is married. He has a paramour with whom he has sexual relations on a more or less
regular basis. They meet at least once a week in hotels, motels and other places where
they can be alone. Is A guilty of any crime? Why? (3%)
Answer:
A is guilty of the crime of concubinage by having sexual intercourse under
scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife.
Having sexual relations on a more or less regular basis in hotels, motels and other
public places may be considered a scandalous circumstance that offends public
conscience, giving rise to criticism and general protest, such acts being
imprudent and wanton and setting a bad example. (People vs. Santos, 86 SCRA
705 [1978]).
Alternative Answer:
A is not guilty of any crime because a married man does not incur the crime of
concubinage by merely having a paramour, unless under scandalous
circumstances, or he keeps her in the conjugal dwelling as a mistress, or cohabits
with her in any other place. His weekly meetings with his paramour does not per
se constitute scandalous circumstance.
XI.
A childless couple, A and B, wanted to a child they could call their own. C, an unwed
mother, sold her newborn baby to them. Thereafter, A and B caused their names to be
stated in the birth certificate of the child as his parents. This was done in connivance
with the doctor who assisted in the delivery of C. What are the criminal liabilities, if any,
of the couple, A and B, C and the doctor?
Answer:
The couple A and B, and the doctor shall be liable for the crime of simulation of
birth, penalized under Article 347 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The act
of making it appear in the birth certificate of a child that the persons named
therein are the parents of the child when they are not really the biological paents
constitutes the crime of simulation of birth.
C, the unwed mother is criminally liable for child trafficking, a violation of Article
IV, Sec. 7 of Rep. Act No. 7610. The law punishes inter alia the act of buying and
selling of a child.
Alternative Answer:
The couple A and B, the unwed mother C, and the doctor being all involved in the
simulation of birth of the newborn child, violate Rep. Act No. 7610. Their acts
constitute child trafficking which are penalized under Article IV of said law.
XII.
A sold a washing machine to B on credit, with the understanding that B could return the
appliance within two weeks if, after testing the same, B decided not to buy it. Two weeks
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lapsed without B returning the appliance. A found out that B had sold the washing
machine to a third party. Is B liable for estafa? Why? (5%)
Answer:
No, B is not liable for estafa because he is not just an entrustee of the washing
machine which he sold; he is the owner thereof by virtue of the sale of the
washing machine to him. The sale being on credit, B as buyer is only liable for the
unpaid price of the washing machine; his obligation is only a civil obligation.
There is no felonious misappropriation that could constitute estafa.
XIII.
A, a business man, borrowed P500,000.00 from B, a friend. To pay the loan, A issued a
post dated check to be presented for payment 30 days after the transaction. Two days
before the maturity date of the check, A called up B and told him not to deposit the check
on the date stated on the face thereof, as A had not deposited in the drawee bank the
amount needed to cover the check. Nevertheless, B deposited the check in question and
the same was dishonored of insufficiency of funds. A failed to settle the amount with B in
spite of the latters demands. Is A guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing Check Law? Explain. (5%)
Answer:
Yes, A is liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Check Law). Although
knowledge by the drawer of insufficiency or lack of funds at the time of the
issuance of the check is an essential element of the violation, the law presumes
prima facie such knowledge, unless within five (5) banking days of notice of
dishonor or non-payment, the drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such checks.
A mere notice by the drawer A to the payee B before the maturity date of the check
will not defeat the presumption of knowledge created by the law; otherwise, the
purpose and the spirit of B.P. 22 will be rendered useless.
XIV.
A. A entered the house of another without employing force or violence upon things. He
was seen by a maid who wanted to scream but was prevented from doing so because A
threatened her with a gun. A then took money and other valuables and left. Is A guilty of
theft or of robbery? Explain. (3%)
Answer:
A is liable for the robbery because of the intimidation he employed on the maid
before the taking of the money and other valuables. It is the intimidation of person
relative to the taking that qualifies the crime as robbery, instead of simply theft.
The non-employment of force upon things is of no moment because robbery is
committed not by employing force upon things but also by employing violence
against or intimidation of persons.
B.
A fire broke out in a department store, A, taking advantage of the confusion,
entered the store and carried away goods which he later sold. What crime, if any, did he
commit? Why? (2%)
Answer:
A committed the crime of qualified theft because he took the goods on the
occasion of and taking advantage of the fire which broke out in the department
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store. The occasion of a calamity such as fire, when the theft was committed,
qualifies the crime under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
XV.
A.
When A arrived home, he found B raping his daughter. Upon seeing A, B ran
away. A took his gun and shot B, killing him. Charged with homicide, a claimed he acted
in defense of his daughters honor. Is A correct? If not, can A claim the benefit of any
mitigating circumstances? (3%)
Answer:
No, A cannot validly invoke defense of his daughters honor in having killed B
since the rape was already consummated; moreover, B already ran away, hence,
there was no aggression to defend against and no defense to speak of.
A may, however, invoke the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of having acted
in immediate vindication of a grave offense to a descendant, his daughter, under
par. 5, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
B. A chance upon three men who were attacking B with fist blows. C, one of the men,
was about to stab B with a knife. Not knowing that B was actually the aggressor because
he had earlier challenged the three men to a fight, A shot C as the latter was about to
stab B. May A invoke the defense of a stranger as a justifying circumstance in his favor?
Why? (2%)
Answer:
Yes. A may invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of stranger since he was
not involved in the fight and he shot C when the latter was about to stab B. There
being no indication that A was induced by revenge, resentment, or any other evil
motive in shooting C, his act is justified under par. 3, Article 11 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
XVI.
A and B were legally separated. Their child C, a minor, was placed in the custody of A,
the mother, subject to monthly visitations by B, his father. On one occasion, when B and
C with him to the United States where he intended for them to reside permanently. What
crime, if any, did B commit? Why? (5%)
Answer:
B committed the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article
271, in relation to Article 270, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Article 271
expressly penalizes any parent who shall take from and deliberately fail to restore
his or her minor child to the parent or guardian to whom custody of the minor has
been placed. Since the custody of C, the minor, has been given to the mother and
B has only the right of monthly visitation, the latters act of taking C to the United
States, to reside there permanently, constitutes a violation of said provisions of
law.
XVII.
A. A was nominated Secretary of a Department in the Executive Branch of the
government. His nomination was thereafter submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation. While the Commission was considering the nomination, a
group of concerned citizens caused to be published in the newspapers a full-page
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statement objecting to As appointment. They alleged that A was a drug dependent, that
he had several mistresses, and that he was corrupt, having accepted bribes or favors
from parties transacting business in his previous office, and therefore he was unfit for the
position to which he had been nominated. As a result of the publication, the nomination
was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The official sued the concerned
citizens and the newspapers for libel and damages on account of his non-confirmation.
How will you decide the case? (3%)
Answer:
I will acquit the concerned citizens and the newspapers involved, from the crime
of libel, because obviously they made the denunciation out of a moral or social
duty and thus there is absence of malice.
Since A was a candidate for a very important public position of a Department
Secretary, his moral, mental and physical fitness for the public trust in such
position becomes a public concern as the interest of the public is at stake. It is
pursuant to such concern that the denunciation was mad; hence, bereft of malice.
B. I defamatory imputations are made not by publication in the newspapers but by
broadcast over the radio, do they constitute libel? Why? (2%)
Answer;
Yes, because libel may be committed by radio broadcast. Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code punishes libel committed by means, among others, of radio
broadcast, inasmuch as the broadcast made by radio is public and may be
defamatory.
XVIII.
A. What is hazing as defined by law? (2%)
Answer:
Hazing, as defined by law, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the
recruit, neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations
such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and similar tasks or activities or
otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.
B. What does the law require before initiation rites may be performed? (3%)
Answer:
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 8049 (Anti-Hazing Law) requires that before hazing or
initiation rites may be performed, notice to the school authorities or head of
organizations shall be given seven (7) days before the conduct of such rites. The
written notice shall indicate (a) the period of the initiation activities, not exceeding
three (3) days; (b) the names of those to be subjected to activities, and (c) an
undertaking that no physical violence shall be employed by anybody during such
initiation rites.
XIX.
A. If a group of persons belonging to the armed forces makes a swift attack,
accompanied by violence, intimidation and threat against a vital military installation for
the purpose of seizing power and taking over such installation, what crime or crimes are
they guilty of? (3%)
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Answer:
The perpetrators, being persons belonging to the Armed Forces, would be guilty
of the crime of coup detat, under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, because their attack was against vital military installations which are
essential to the continued possession and exercise of governmental powers, and
their purpose is to seize power by taking over such installations.
B. If the attack is quelled but the leaders is unknown, who shall be deemed the leader
thereof? (2%)
Answer:
The leader being unknown, any person who in fact directed the other, spoke for
them, signed receipts and other documents issued in their name, or performed
similar acts, on behalf of the group shall be deemed the leader of said coup d etat
(Art. 135, R.P.C.)
XX.
A and his fiance B were walking in the plaza when they met the a group of policemen
who had earlier been tipped off that A was in possession of prohibited drugs. Upon
seeing the policemen and sensing that they were after him, handed a sachet containing
shabu to his fiance B, telling her to hide it in her handbag. The policemen saw B
placing the sachet inside her handbag. If B was unaware that A was a drug user or
pusher or that what was inside the sachet given to her was shabu, is she nonetheless
liable under the Dangerous Drugs Act? (5%)
Answer:
No. B will not be criminally liable because she is unaware that A was a drug user
or pusher or of the content of the sachet handed to her by A, and therefore the
criminal intent to possess the drug in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act is
absent. There would be no basis to impute criminal liability to her in the absence
of animus possidendi.
NOTE: All the suggested answers were copied verbatim from the handouts of
the UP Law Center.
II.
VITUG CASES (1996-2001)

EVELYN YONAHA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 112346, March 29, 1996.]
FACTS: On April 14, 1990, accused Elmer Ouano, while driving a Toyota Tamaraw bumped
and hit Hector Caete, which caused the latter's instantaneous death due to the multiple severe
9

traumatic injuries at different parts of his body." Elmer Ouano was charged with the crime of
"Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide".
When arraigned, the accused pleaded "guilty". The accused was then found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. A writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction of the monetary
award.
In his Return of Service, the MTCC Deputy City Sheriff stated that he had served the writ
on accused Elmer Ouano but the latter had manifested his inability to pay the money obligation.
Private respondents presented a "motion for subsidiary execution" with neither a notice of hearing
nor notice to petitioner. Acting on the motion, the trial court issued an order directing the issuance
of a writ of subsidiary execution.
The sheriff went to petitioner's residence to enforce the writ, and it was then, allegedly for
the first time, that petitioner was informed of Ouano's conviction. Petitioner filed a motion to stay
and to recall the subsidiary writ of execution principally anchored on the lack of prior notice to her
and on the fact that the employer's liability had yet to be established. The trial court denied
petitioner's motion. Petitioner's plea for reconsideration of the denial was likewise rejected.
ISSUE: May the petitioner be held subsidiarily liable where she was not heard on the matter of
her subsidiary liability?
HELD: NO. The statutory basis for an employer's subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code. It requires (a) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; (b)
that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; (c) that the employee is adjudged guilty of
the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not
necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties); and (d) that said
employee is insolvent. The judgment of conviction of the employee, of course, concludes the
employer and the subsidiary liability may be enforced in the same criminal case. But to afford the
employer due process, the court should hear and decide that liability on the basis of the
conditions required therefor by law.
This Court has since sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the same
criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged guilty, on the thesis that it really is a part
of, and merely an incident in, the execution process of the judgment. But, execution against the
employer must not issue as just a matter of course, and it behooves the court, as a measure of
due process to the employer, to determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose,
the legal applicability and propriety of the employer's liability. The requirement is mandatory even
when it appears prima facie that execution against the convicted employee cannot be satisfied.
The court must convince itself that the convicted employee is in truth in the employ of the
employer; that the latter is engaged in an industry of some kind; that the employee has committed
the crime to which civil liability attaches while in the performance of his duties as such; and that
execution against the employee is unsuccessful by reason of insolvency.
PEOPLE vs. ALEJANDRO ABINA and ROMEO ABINA

[G.R. NO. 129891, October 27, 1998]
FACTS: Sometime on June 24, 1986, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Nicanor Gabrino
was in the beach with Natividad Abina, Alejandro Abina, Romeo Abina, Rodolfo Escalante,
Rodrigo Caruso, Eulalio Peleo, Rufino Pogenio and Marciano Tisado, celebrating the St. John
the Baptist Feast Day. They took a bath, danced, and drank tuba. Later, Nicanor Gabrino dropped
out from the group to dip himself in the sea. Meanwhile, he heard a gunshot. Immediately, he ran
towards the group to verify the matter. He saw Eulalio Peleo down on the ground facing
upwards with Natividad Abina sitting on the right lap and holding the neck of Eulalio Peleo and
choking him; Alejandro Abina was stepping on the right hand of Eulalio Peleo, holding a pisao
with his right hand while Romeo Abina was kneeling on the left lap of Eulalio Peleo also holding
a pisao with his left hand. Also present were Rodrigo Caruso and Rodolfo Escalante. It was the
latter who grabbed the armalite from Eulalio Peleo and then he pointed the gun warning anyone
in the group, not to go near him. At this juncture, Alejandro Abina was still stepping on the right
hand of Eulalio Peleo, while Romeo Abina was kneeling on the left lap, holding a pisao with his
right hand. While Romeo and Alfredo, both surnamed Abina, were armed, they were stopped by
Rufino Pogenio who appealed to them. However, this appeal did not stop Rodrigo Caruso from
delivering the stabbing blow to Eulalio Peleo hitting him on his right chest. Seeing the latter
10

injured, the group moved and retreated to a distance of three meters, while the prostrate Eulalio
Peleo slowly stood up and ran away towards the Brgy. Rizal, but he was chased again by
Rodrigo Caruso.
Peleo was rushed to the hospital but died moments later.
ISSUES:
(1)
(2)
Did accused-appellants conspire with Caroso to commit the crime?

Are accused-appellants principals by indispensable cooperation or at least accomplices?
HELD:
(1)
No. While it is not necessary that the prior agreement to commit the crime be proved only
by direct evidence, e.g., the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, the
conditions and chain of events attending its commission, as well as the acts executed to establish
it, nevertheless, should convince the court of its existence beyond reasonable doubt. When
these circumstances, indicative of the common design to accomplish a common purpose and
objective, would have been convincingly shown, should conspiracy be deemed to have then been
duly established.
In this case, the facts pictured by the prosecution to the Court would show that
appellants, with their sister, were pinning down Eulalio when Rodrigo Caruso dealt him with the
fatal stab. Nothing else was shown to convey a coordinated action to commit the criminal act.
Simultaneity alone, however, would not be enough to demonstrate the concurrence of will or the
unity of action and purpose that could be the basis for collective responsibility of two or more
individuals particularly if, such as here, the incident occurred at the spur of the moment, for, in
conspiracy, there should be a conscious design to perpetrate the offense.
Appellants, indeed, might have wanted to insure the immobility of Eulalio since both of
them and their sister were on top of the victim. However, it would seem that they did so not to
facilitate the stabbing of the victim by Rodrigo Caroso but to prevent Eulalio from further firing his
firearm. Immediately prior to the incident, Eulalio had apparently exhibited a belligerent attitude
totally extraneous to the festive mood at the beach.
The strong likelihood that appellants were not impelled by a criminal intent to kill Eulalio
could be shown by the fact that they themselves did not inflict any harm on the victim despite the
fact that, according to the prosecution, each of them was armed with a pisao, a local sharp and
short bolo, which they could have very well used against Eulalio. In fact, appellants, evidently
stunned by the action of Caroso, forthwith released their hold on Eulalio, retreated to a distance
of around three meters and desisted from joining Rodrigo Caroso who went on to pursue the
wounded Eulalio.
(2)
No. Considering the absence of unity of purpose between appellants, on the one hand,
and Rodrigo Caroso, on the other, as well as the utter lack of proof that appellants have been
aware of any intention on the part of Caroso to kill Eulalio, neither may appellants be considered
principals by indispensable cooperation or accomplices in the commission of the crime. In People
vs. Jorge, the Court has said:
"Neither can the appellant be considered a principal by indispensable cooperation, nor an
accomplice in the crime of murder. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must
participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in
the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished. In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, the following requisites
must concur: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and (c) there must be a relation between the acts done
by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
"The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally
rendered, which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be
executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable either as a principal by indispensable
cooperation, or as an accomplice, that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation. . . ."
MILAGROS L. DIAZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

[G.R. NO. 125213, January 26, 1999]
11

FACTS: The case against petitioner sprung from the implementation of Office Order No. 83-15,
dated 03 March 1983, issued by Provincial Auditor Diosdado Lagunday, Surigao del Sur, that
directed Auditor II Dominico L. Quijada and Auditing Examiners I Victor B. Tecson and Zenaida C.
Cueto to examine the cash and other accounts of petitioner Milagros L. Diaz, then postmistress of
Tandag, Surigao del Sur. The following day of 04 March 1983, Quijada required petitioner Diaz to
produce all "cash, treasury warrants, checks, money orders, paid vouchers, payrolls and other
cash items" that she was officially accountable for. Petitioner, who was bonded for P100,000.00,
was found to have made cash payments in the total amount of six thousand one hundred
seventy-one pesos and twenty-three centavos (P6,171.23).
The audit team also found petitioner to have sold postage stamps in the sum of
P8,020.40 which she had failed to record in her cash book, and since Quijada neither considered
the cash items in the aforesaid amount of P6,171.23 as having been validly disbursed, he
reported that petitioner had incurred a total "cash shortage" of P14,191.63.
On 05 March 1986, an information for malversation of public funds was filed against petitioner
with the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation with the Sandiganbayan contending that the
Acting Provincial Fiscal of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, who had conducted the preliminary
investigation ultimately recommended the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that petitioner
was able to fully account for the alleged shortage of P14,191.63. The motion was granted. The
Tanodbayan reinvestigated the case. On 24 April 1987, Mariflor Punzalan-Castillo, the
investigating prosecutor, issued an order dismissing the complaint on the basis of her finding that
there was "no showing of bad faith on the part of the accused when she defrayed the expenses
subject of the audit;" that the shortage was incurred to defray operational expenses for the
Tandag post office; and that the shortage in cash should instead be blamed on the failure, or
delay, of the Regional Office of the Bureau of Posts in replenishing the amount spent for office
operation.
The prosecutor thereupon filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to withdraw the
information against petitioner from which the COA, through its General Counsel, excepted when
directed by the Sandiganbayan to comment. On 19 August 1987, the Sandiganbayan denied the
motion to withdraw the information and held that the restitution made by petitioner would not
exculpate her from liability.
On 01 December 1987, petitioner was arraigned. She pleaded not guilty to the
indictment.
A pre-trial was conducted on 03 December 1987 during which petitioner's counsel
informed the Sandiganbayan that the Regional Office of the Bureau of Posts had reimbursed the
entire amount for which petitioner was held accountable thereby confirming that the assailed
disbursements were truly legitimate. On 18 December 1987, petitioner wrote Presiding Justice
Francis E. Garchitorena a letter submitting to the Sandiganbayan a carbon copy of the
certification of Eduardo F. Cauilan, Chief of the Finance Section of Region XI of the Bureau of
Posts.
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting their respective versions of
the case.
On 15 March 1996, following the submission of evidence, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated its decision convicting petitioner of the crime of malversation.
ISSUES:
(1)
(2)
Did accused misappropriate public funds?

Were the amounts paid by petitioner to the Bureau of Posts restitution?
HELD:
(1)
No. In convicting petitioner, the Sandiganbayan cites the presumption in Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code that the "failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses." The presumption is, of
course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if the accused is able to present adequate evidence that can
nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use, then that presumption
would be at an end and the prima facie case is effectively negated. This Court has repeatedly
said that when the absence of funds is not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, the
presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is deemed never to have existed at
all.
12

The prosecution, upon whose burden was laden the task of establishing by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner had committed the offense charged, mainly relied on the
statutory presumption aforesaid and failed to present any substantial piece of evidence to indicate
that petitioner had used the funds for personal gain. The evidence submitted, just to the contrary,
would point out that not a centavo of the so-called "missing funds" was spent for personal use, a
matter that was later acknowledged by the Special Prosecutor who thereupon recommended the
withdrawal of the information earlier filed against petitioner. The alleged shortages in the total
amount of P14,191.63 claimed by Auditor Quijada had been explained by petitioner. On the day
of the audit, she presented a list of cash items showing that she had spent the amount of
P6,171.23 for telephone and office rentals, spare parts of the vehicle being utilized for the
delivery of mails, registration and repair of that vehicle, gasoline, fare of an employee, the salary
of another employee and petitioner's travel expense voucher. The auditor disallowed these cash
items only because at the time of audit, these payments were not yet approved by the Regional
Office. The records, nevertheless, would show that petitioner's use of the cash in her possession
for operational expenses was founded on valid authority. COA Circular No. 76-37 allowed
postmasters to make payments for gasoline, spare parts and minor repairs of vehicles subject to
reimbursement by the Regional Office. She advanced payments of salaries of employees on the
basis of Circular No. 82-21 issued by the Postmaster General. The Regional Office, through the
chief of the finance section, certified that all the payments made by petitioner were legitimate
operational expenses.
(2)
No. The conclusion made by the Sandiganbayan that the amounts paid by petitioner to
the Bureau of Posts under O.R. No. 6645668 and No. 6645670 were "restitutions" would seem to
be less than accurate. The amounts were "replenishments" coming from the Regional Office in
checks issued out in petitioner's name which she paid, after encashment, to the Bureau of Posts.
The sum of P9,807.29 that was replenished, when added to the ten items certified to be accounts
payable and to two items replenished by checks issued after 04 March 1983, approved as
operational expenses in the amount of P4,377.64, totaled P14,284.43, or even P92.80 more than
the supposed "shortage" of P14,161.63.
While it was not made clear which of the office expenses had been taken from the
proceeds of the postage stamp sales, the fact still remained, nevertheless, that the Regional
Office cleared petitioner of such accountabilities, indicating at the very least that she did not
spend the amount for personal use. The Court had heretofore recognized situations that could
necessitate the use by accountable public officials of cash on hand for pertinent expenditures in
the conduct of official business.
PEOPLE vs. CIPRIANO DE VERA, SR.

[G.R. Nos. 121462-63, June 9, 1999]
FACTS: X x x x
ISSUE: May the accused be held guilty of a complex crime when the two component offenses
are the subject of two separate informations?
HELD: NO. The record of the case will show that three separate informations were filed against
appellant, one for the murder of Gerardo Valdez, the second for homicide for the death of Perlita
Ferrer, and the third for illegal possession of firearms. This Honorable Court has held that `while
the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or more criminal cases and can render a consolidated
decision, it cannot convict the accused of a complex crime consisting of the various crimes
alleged on the two informations' (People vs. Legaspi, 246 SCRA 206, 213). Thus, appellant
cannot be held liable for the complex crime of murder with homicide but should be held liable
separately for these crimes.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. vs. CONDE RAPISORA

[G.R. No. 138086, January 25, 2001]
13

FACTS: Irene Hermo, a 17 year old household helper, was walking along the corner of
Pinagtipunan St. and Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong City after coming from Aling Naty's store
where she bought vegetables, when Conde Rapisora, the accused in this case, approached and
told her 'you're here' (nandito ka pala) to which she replied 'who are you? Conde Rapisora
introduced himself that he is her Tito Andy and told her that she could not remember him anymore
because she was still small when her mother left her to his care. Few minutes later, Conde
Rapisora called a taxicab then dragged and forced Irene Hermo to board the same to which she
did not resist because he poked a knife on her side. They proceeded to and stayed awhile at the
Filipinas Walk-in Motel where the victim recalled that the accused inserted his penis to her vagina
six times upon raping her.
ISSUE: Did the trial court err in convicting the accused of the crime of forcible abduction with
rape?
HELD: YES. The Court is satisfied that the trial court has correctly evaluated the evidence and
been right in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The crime committed, however,
is not the complex crime of "forcible abduction with rape." Forcible abduction is absorbed in the
crime of rape if the real objective of the accused is but to rape the victim, a fact that is here clearly
evident given the circumstances of the case.
The information against the accused has charged him with multiple rape, at least six
times according to the trial court in its findings. Section 3, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court 24
provides that "when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information, and
the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many
offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of
them . . ." Rapisora can thus be held responsible for as many rapes as might have been
committed by him which are duly proven at the trial.
The rapes have been committed with the use of a deadly weapon, a knife, for which
Republic Act 7659 prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance shown, appellant should only be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, not death, for each of the six counts of rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. vs. FERNANDO DULOT, ET AL.

[G.R. No. 137770, January 30, 2001]
FACTS: According to Braulo Rosete, a friend of the deceased, he was with Dajohn Bautista
when the victim went to Aling Chedeng's store to get some cigarettes. At the store, they saw one
of the accused, Felipe Baturiano, who unexplainably blamed the two friends for the loss of his
wallet. Braulo and Dajohn just decided to hurriedly leave the store and return to the latter's house.
After some time, however, the two friends went back to the store to buy some bottles of beer.
At the store, Felipe Baturiano, who was still there, suddenly threw teargas at them. The
deceased was able to dodge, but the teargas hit Braulo. With his friend's eyes in pain, Dajohn
guided him back to the house. After recovering, about thirty minutes later, Braulo insisted on
going home and request his friend to accompany him. Dajohn acceded. Dajohn would never
make it to Braulo's house.
On the way, the two teen-agers were accosted by accused-appellant Billy Baturiano and
Fernando Dulot alias Pandoy. Standing beside the two men was Fernando Dulot, wielding a
double-bladed knife. Braulo, upon seeing "Pandoy" in an attempt to stab Dajohn, yelled to warn
his friend. Dajohn was able to run a distance of ten meters and would have escaped had it not
been for the two other accused Felipe Baturiano and Gomer Baturiano who blocked his way
and eventually caught up with him.
Billy Baturiano and Gomer Baturiano held the arms and hands of Dajohn. Now trapped
and defenseless, Dajohn was stabbed repeatedly by Fernando Dulot and Felipe Baturiano.
Fernando Dulot, with the use of his double-bladed knife, delivered three stab thrusts and Felipe
Baturiano, using an icepick, gave two stab thrusts on the victim before scampering into the night.
Upon trial, the accused were found guilty of murder hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Was there a conspiracy?

Was there an evident premeditation?
Was there a treachery?
14

HELD:
(1)
YES. The concerted and synchronized acts of the four malefactors in taking the life of the
victim exhibit nothing less than conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. As a mode of
commission of a crime, it is usually characterized as a concurrence of sentiments, a joint purpose
and a concerted action, manifested by the performance of specific acts with closeness and
coordination.
The four accused collectively and individually pursued their evident common and unlawful
design of eliminating the hapless victim. The latter had already made a dash to escape accusedappellant and Fernando Dulot and would have, indeed, eluded these two assailants were it not for
the blocking maneuver of accused Gomer Baturiano and Felipe Baturiano.
Fernando Dulot and Felipe Baturiano were able to stab the deceased after accusedappellant and Gomer Baturiano held the hands and the arms of the boy and rendered him
helpless and immobile.
It does not matter then that accused-appellant did not deliver the fatal blows. The act of
one conspirator being the act of all, it is not necessary that the prosecution yet prove that all the
conspirators have actually hit and killed the victim for, instead, what would be important is that
they have performed coordinated specific acts so as to unmistakably manifest a clearly shared
design in ultimately bringing about the consummation of the crime. Singularity in intent makes all
the conspirators liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and the character of their
participation.
(2)
NO. It is an established rule that any circumstance which qualifies a killing to murder
should be proven as indubitably as the killing itself. The essence of evident premeditation is the
execution of the criminal act preceded by cool thought and reflection within a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. While courts have not infrequently regarded the existence
of conspiracy as being itself indicative of premeditation, there are instances when a finding of the
circumstance of premeditation does not automatically follow a finding of conspiracy or vice versa.
Where, as in this case, conspiracy is merely implied from concerted actions at the time of the
commission of the offense, evident premeditation can not be appreciated, there being no proof to
show how and when the plan to kill the victim is hatched or the time that has elapsed before
being carried out, in order to determine if the accused has had sufficient time between its
inception and its fulfillment to dispassionately consider and accept all its consequences. Thus, to
sustain a finding of premeditation, it must not only appear that the accused has formed a
determination to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution but that also such
determination is the result of meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent attempt.
In the instant case, the prosecution failed to prove the time when the intent to commit the
crime was engendered, the motive that gave rise to it, the means that they had beforehand
selected to carry out the criminal intent, and, in general, all such other facts and antecedents
which, when combined, would show that the accused acted with that cold and deep meditation
and tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal design.
(3)
YES. Treachery exists when, in the commission of the crime, the assailant employs
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.
In this case, treachery indubitably attended the murder of Dajohn Bautista. The manner
by which the four accused had silently waited for their intended prey to pass by, the suddenness
and the unexpectedness of their appearance, their well calculated and synchronized execution of
the crime, particularly the manner with which they held their victim defenseless before fatally
stabbing him, added with the circumstance of the sheer numbers and combined strength of four
grown men against the victim, could only underscore the fact that the four accused had employed
insidious methods to guarantee the consummation of the crime in such a way as to least afford
the victim the opportunity to flee or to defend his life.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. vs. RONNIE FLORES

[G.R. No. 138841, April 4, 2001]
FACTS: While watching a card-game in the neighborhood, Jocelyn Marie saw accusedappellant Ronnie Flores coming towards them from across the street. She promptly warned her
husband, "Umuwi ka na dahil andyan na si Ronnie." Jocelyn Marie was just too aware of the
15

standing feud between her husband and Ronnie Flores that stemmed from an unpaid debt of
P800.00, which accused-appellant had failed to pay. The incident had, at one time, led Arnel
Baldevieso himself to stab accused-appellant.
Apparently still nursing a grudge against his assailant, Flores issued threats against the
former, a fact which Jocelyn Marie had repeatedly cautioned her husband about. Accusedappellant approached the victim from the right side, placed his arm on the victim's shoulder and,
when the latter instinctively faced him, stabbed Arnel Baldevieso with a bladed instrument,
identified by the witness to be a "29." Six days after the stabbing, the victim expired. Upon trial,
the accused was convicted of the crime of murder hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Did the court err in its decision?

HELD: YES. The suddenness of an attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of
alevosia. Treachery, or "alevosia" cannot be assumed and its existence must be proven as fully
as the crime itself.
The aggression exhibited by accused-appellant Flores could not have been totally
unexpected. Although occupied with the tong-its game, Baldevieso knew that accused-appellant,
with whom he had a long standing feud and who had made no secret of his intent to kill him, was
coming his way. Even his wife's words, "Umuwi ka na dahil nandyan na si Ronnie," was a warning
he refused to heed. Verily, treachery would not be attendant when the victim, aware of the danger
on his life, chose to be courageous, instead of being cautious, and to court an obvious danger
that might have well been avoided.
Neither could the facts here shown support the charge of evident premeditation alleged
in the Information. The element of evident premeditation is manifested by the planning and
preparation undertaken by the offender prior to the commission of the crime. It is not presumed
from the mere lapse of time nor can it be deduced from sheer speculation. An intangible matter,
evident premeditation is exhibited from these circumstances (1) the time when the offender
has appeared determined to commit the crime; (2) the act evidently indicating that the offender
has clung to his determination; (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination to commit
the crime and the execution thereof during which the offender could have reflected upon the
consequences of his act. While the previously issued threats against the life of his victim may
roughly be said to indicate premeditation, absent any other evidence disclosing the true criminal
state of mind of the accused, threats of this variety are regarded by courts as casual remarks
naturally emanating from a feeling of rancor and not a resolution of the character involved in
evident premeditation. The killing of Arnel Baldevieso deviates from the natural workings of the
criminal mind which usually abhors detection and the possibility of retaliation. Instead of ensuring
that his authorship of the crime would remain unknown, accused-appellant appears to have
chosen to stab Arnel Baldevieso in broad daylight, in an accessible neighborhood corner and in
the presence of a number of other persons who could easily identify him. Needless to say, these
facts do not bear the earmarks of a carefully planned murder.
Neither does the prosecution's allegation of superior strength hold against accusedappellant. This aggravating circumstance necessitates the showing of the relative disparity in
physical characteristics, usually translating into the age, the gender, the physical sizes and the
strength, of the aggressor and the victim. There is no proof that accused-appellant utilized any
notorious inequality to his advantage.
There being no circumstance qualifying the killing of Arnel Baldevieso to murder,
accused-appellant can only be held accountable for HOMICIDE punishable under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code by reclusion temporal.
PEOPLE VS. FEDERICO LUSTRE

[G.R. No. 134562, April 6, 2002]
FACTS: In the evening of June 5, 1994, at Barangay Matacong, San Lorenzo Ruiz, Camarines
Norte, the victim, Lilibeth S. Hotamares, was lying down when her Lolo Federico knocked at the
door. The accused, Federico Lustre Y Encinas wildly kicked at the door and uttered, Lilibeth,
Lilibeth, magluwas ka diyan ta kung dai ka magluwas ako ang malaog at kakastahan kita. Out of
fear, she came out of the house. With the accused tightly gripping her hand, she was dragged all
the way to her Lolos house approximately 10 to 15 meters away. She was too afraid to yell for
help. It was in the kitchen that the rape was consummated.
16

He denies the accusations against him. He confessed to having had a very healthy
sexual life with his common-law wife although his penis was incapable of being as stiff as before,
i.e., prior to an operation on his testicles, and that his sexual appetite had dwindled by reason of
age.
Appellant submits that the actuation of Lilibeth during the alleged rape is incongruous
with the deportment of a virtuous and inexperienced girl about to be sexually violated. She did
not voice any alarm or objection nor did she show any sincere struggle to resist or fight the
alleged carnal assault.
ISSUES:
(1)
Does the absence of struggle on the part of the victim negate the commission of rape?
(2)
Does the advanced age and previous operation of the accused render him sexually
inutile?
HELD:
(1)
NO. The absence of struggle on the part of the victim does not necessarily negate the
commission of rape. Appellant undoubtedly exercises moral ascendancy and influence over 13year old Lilibeth, the latter having considered the former as her grandfather, a state that should be
enough to cow her into submission to his depraved and demented lust. Intimidated indeed, she
has been left with no choice but to fearfully succumb to the pleasure and will of her rapist. Verily,
her failure to shout for help or fight back cannot be equated as being one of voluntary submission
to the criminal intent of the accused. Fear, in lieu of force or violence, is subjective. x x x In
addition, the Court has repeatedly observed that different people act differently to a given
stimulus or type of situation and there is no standard form of behavioral response that can be
expected from those who are confronted with a strange, startling or frightening experience.
(2)
NO. Advanced age is not known to render sexual intercourse impossible nor to deter
sexual interest and capability. In fact, Lilibeths credibility is strengthened by appellants own
admission in the course of the trial that since undergoing the medical operation on his testicles
sometime in 1990, he has seldom experienced sustained erection, which could have prompted
him to resort to oral sex.
III.
QUESTION AND ANSWER

1.
Does immunity from suit of officers of international bodies include the
crime of defamation?
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent,
assuming petitioner is such, enjoy immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside of his official functions.
As mentioned, the making of such remarks is not part of official duty. (Liang vs People
January 2000)
2.
X gave Y chocolates laced with cantharide in order to excite her sexually.
However, Y died from cantharide poisoning as a result of eating too many
chocolates. May X be held liable for murder?
17

No. The case of People vs. Gaura held that it is not correct to say that the use of
poison is inherent in murder. It becomes inherent only when the offender has the intent
to kill the victim and uses poison as a means to kill him. The intention of accused was
merely to excite the woman sexually, and not to kill her. Thus, the accused is liable only
for homicide based on Art. 4, par. 1 of the RPC. Having committed a felony
(administering injurious substances), he was responsible for the consequence even if
the wrongful act done was different from that which he intended.
3.
What are the kinds of desistance recognized by law under Art.6 of the
RPC?
Legal desistance- the desistance referred to in law which would obviate criminal
liability unless the overt or preparatory act already committed in themselves constitute a
felony other than what the actor intended.
Factual desistance- actual desistance of the actor which is made after the
attempted stage of the crime; the actor is still liable for the attempt
4.
What crimes do not admit of frustrated stage?
They are those which, by the definition of a frustrated felony, the offender cannot
possibly perform all the acts of execution to bring the desired result without
consummating the offense.
1. Rape, since the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge, hence, no
matter how slight the penetration, the felony is consummated. If the male
organ failed to touch the pudenda, by some causes or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance, the felony is merely attempted. If he desisted
spontaneously, he is not liable for attempted rape, but for some other crime
such as acts of lasciviousness.
2. Arson, because this is punished as to its result, hence, the moment burning
of the property occurs, even if slight, the offense is consummated.
3. Corruption of public officers, because the offense requires the concurrence of
the will of both parties, such as that when the offer is accepted, the offense is
consummated. But when the offer is rejected, the offense is merely
attempted.
4. Adultery because the essence of the crime is sexual congress.
5. Physical injury since it cannot be determined whether the injury will be slight,
less serious, or serious unless and until consummated.
5.
X surprised his wife Y while the latter was engaged in sexual congress with
Z. X right there and then attacked Z with a bolo but the latter was able to rest the
bolo away from X. Unfortunately X (husband) was killed by Z (paramour). In the
prosecution of Z for homicide, he raises that he merely acted in self-defense. Rule
on Zs contention.
Z (paramour) is not entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense since
there was no unlawful aggression to begin with. The attack commenced by X (husband)
was in the lawful exercise of his rights as a legitimate spouse which the Revised Penal
Code itself recognizes under Art 247 when it provided for a penalty of Destierro for death
under exceptional circumstances. Art 247 does not define and penalize a felony. Hence
any attack by a husband on a paramour under the circumstances covered by this article
is not tantamount to unlawful aggression. When the attack is lawful, there can be no
unlawful aggression and consequently, no self defense.
6.
Eric suspects that his neighbor, Jet, is a member of the Akyat Bahay Gang.
One evening, Eric paid Jet a visit and told him that their affluent neighbor went out
of the country, leaving a maid to look after his mini-convenience store. Jet laid
18

down his plan to Eric, that he will rob the store and asked Eric to pose as a
lookout to which Eric assented. On the night of the planned robbery, Eric brought
his video camera and recorded the crime as committed by Jet.
Both Eric and Jet were held criminally liable. Jet interposed the defense of
instigation. Eric claimed he couldnt be held criminally liable because there was
instigation.
Both of them should be held criminally liable. There was no instigation which
could absolve the two from the crimes committed. If the one who made the instigation is
a private individual, not performing public function, both he and the one induced are
criminally liable for the crime committed: the former as principal by induction; and the
latter, as principal by direct participation.
7.
Ric, the common-law husband of Ann, sensed that the latter is having an
affair with another man due to his impotency. One night as he went home, he
caught Ann having sexual intercourse with another man. Outraged, he attacked
the man with fist blows resulting to contusions on the latters face.
A.
May Ric be held liable?
YES. Article 247 will not be applicable in this case. Even if the injuries caused
were by reason of Ric being surprised having caught Ann sleeping with another man, the
requirement that the accused and the infidel partner be legally married was absent. Ric
will not be absolved from the felony committed.
B.
Supposing Ann and Ric are legally married; if the man successfully
escaped, and it was Ann who received the fist blows, may Ric be held liable for the
contusions suffered by Ann?
NO. This case will fall under Article 247. When a legally married person
surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person and
inflicts only slight or less serious physical injury on any or both of them, will be absolved
from the felony committed.
C.
If what Ric witnessed was that Ann and the man, are not in the act of
having sexual intercourse but in the act of undressing, will he be liable?
YES. The majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court in the case of People
vs. Gonzales (69 PHIL 66) believed that there must be actual sexual intercourse.
Sexual intercourse would not include preparatory acts.
8.
Joyce pushed her classmate Joaquin down the staircase causing severe
injuries on the latter. What would be her liability?
A. Suppose Joyce was seven years old at the time of the commission of the
crime?
Joyce is exempt from criminal liability.
B. Suppose Joyce was 12 years old and she has not acted with discernment?
Joyce is still exempt from criminal liability.
C. Suppose Joyce was 12 years old and she acted with discernment in the
commission of the crime?
Joyce is criminally liable, but she is entitled to a privileged mitigating
circumstance. She is also entitled to a discretionary penalty lower by two degrees than
that prescribed by law for the crime; and may also be entitled to suspended sentence.
D. Suppose Joyce was 16 years old, is she liable?
19

YES. Joyce is liable but she is entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance.
She may also entitled to suspended sentence and the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, always in the proper period.
E. If after hearing the case and the court was convinced that Joyce committed the
crime, what will be the course of action of the court, Joyce being a youthful
offender under the law?
If after the hearing the court finds that the youthful offender has committed the
acts charged against him the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including any
civil liability charged against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of
conviction, the court, upon application of the youthful offender and if it finds that the best
interest of the public as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, shall suspend
all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of the
Department of Social Services and Development (DSWD), or to any training institution
operated by the government, or to any other responsible person, until he shall have
reached 21 years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after
considering the reports and recommendations of the DSWD, or the government training
institution or responsible person under whose care he has been committed.
F. Suppose Joaquin was killed, will the benefits be still applicable to her?
NO. The benefits of Article 192 of PD 603 shall not apply to a youthful offender
who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is
convicted of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one who is
convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals.
NOTE: Sec. 5 of RA 8369 Family Courts Act of 1997 provides that the court, if the
minor is found guilty, shall suspend the sentence without need of application.
9.
Can the aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex and age be absorbed
by treachery?
No, because treachery refers to the manner of commission of the crime, while the
latter pertains to the relationship of the victim with the offender.
10.
If the motor vehicle was used in the escape from the scene of the crime,
would it be considered an aggravating circumstance?
In People vs. Bartulas (192 SCRA 621) and in People vs. Daban (110 SCRA)
the Supreme Court held that the use of a car as a get away means aggravates the
crime. The Spanish text merely states empleando vehiculos de motor, without any
reference as the use of the vehicle whether to facilitate the commission of the crime or to
escape from the place where the crime was committed.
11.
Late one evening, A and B conspired to rob C. In the ensuing struggle, C
was stabbed with an icepick and clubbed with an iron pipe, which caused mortal
wounds leading to his death. The trial court found A and B guilty of robbery with
homicide. Would it be proper to apply evident premeditation as a generic
aggravating circumstance?
No. Evident premeditation is inherent in the crime of robbery. In the crime of
robbery with homicide, if there is evident premeditation to kill besides stealing, it may be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. In other words, evident premeditation will
only be aggravating in a complex crime of robbery with homicide if it is proved that the
plan is not only to rob, but also to kill (People vs. Pagal). In the above case, A and B
conspired merely to rob C.
20

12.
A and B were married and had a 5-month old baby, C. While C was sleeping
in a hammock, A and B had a fight. Hot-tempered and violent, A suddenly punched
C twice while inside the hammock, causing the latters death. A was charged with
parricide aggravated by treachery. A argued that treachery was absent since the
attack was spontaneous. Decide.
I would appreciate treachery. The killing of a child is murder even if the manner of
attack was not shown. The qualifying circumstance of treachery or 'alevosia' exists when
an adult person illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his death (People
vs. Retubado, 162 SCRA 276).
13.
While he was sleeping with his family by the balcony one night, X was shot
at by A, B, C and D. Instead, it was As mother B who was hit and subsequently
died. The four accused were charged with murder qualified by treachery.
A. The defense argued that there could be no treachery since it was not the
intended victim who was killed. Decide.
There was treachery. The crime committed was murder with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, as characterized by the fact that the victim was shot at close
range while she was asleep, thus ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to
the assailants. That some other person, and not the victim, was apparently the intended
victim is not incompatible with the existence of treachery. Treachery may be taken into
account even if the victim of the attack was not the person whom the accused intended
to kill (People vs. Trinidad, June 28, 1988).
B. Nonetheless,
premeditation?
may such felony as above
be aggravated
by evident
No. Evident premeditation may not be considered as a qualifying circumstance

as it cannot be said that the assailants premeditated on the killing of the actual victim
(People vs. Trinidad, Ibid).
14.
May treachery be appreciated as a qualifying or aggravating circumstance in the
crime of robbery with homicide?
No. This special complex crime is primarily classified as a crime against
property, and not against persons, homicide being merely an incident of robbery
with the latter being the main purpose and object of the criminal. (People vs.
Arizobal, December 14, 2000)
15.
May craft be absorbed by treachery?
Yes, if it is deliberately adopted as the means, method, or form for the

treacherous strategy. It may co-exist independently from treachery only when both
circumstances are adopted for different purposes in the commission of the crime.
(People vs Lab-eo, G.R. No. 133438 Jan. 16, 2002)
16.
When is the alternative circumstance of relationship mitigating? When is it
aggravating?
As a rule, relationship is mitigating in crimes against property, by analogy to the
provisions of Art. 332, RPC.
In fact, under Art. 332, when the crime committed is (1) theft, (2) swindling or
estafa, or (3) malicious mischief, relationship is exempting.
It is aggravating in crimes against persons in cases where the offender is a
relative of a higher degree than the offender, or when the offender and the offended
party are relatives of the same level, as killing a brother (People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil.
21

362), a brother-in-law (People vs. Mercado, 51 Phil. 99), a half-brother (People vs.
Nargatan, 48 Phil. 470), or adopted brother (People vs. Macabangon, 63 Phil. 1061
[Unreported]).
Serious physical injuries where victim is a descendant or lower in degree than
offender, aggravating. Except: Parent upon child by excessive chastisement; Where
victim is an ascendant / higher in degree, aggravating.
Less serious / slight physical injuries where victim is a descendant / lower in
degree, mitigating; Where victim is an ascendant / higher in degree, aggravating.
Homicide / murder aggravating whether victim is of lower or higher degree.
Crimes against chastity - aggravating whether victim is of lower or higher degree.
(J.B.L. Reyes)
17.
A, B, C, D, and E forcibly entered the house of X and Y. Armed with guns,
they took a sum of money from the latter and in the course of which shot dead X.
During the hearing, A alleged that he was intoxicated at the time of the incident
and raised this as a mitigating circumstance, on the claim that he was not a
habitual drinker. The defense did not present any further evidence to support the
claim, on the belief that it was the prosecutions duty to prove habitual
intoxication. The prosecution however, did not concede to the fact of As
intoxication. Would you grant A the benefit of intoxication as a mitigating
circumstance?
I would not. Intoxication is mitigating when it is not habitual or intentional, that is,
not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. However, to be mitigating the accused's
state of intoxication must be proved. Once intoxication is established by satisfactory
evidence, then, in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is presumed to be non-habitual
or unintentional (People vs. Apduhan, Aug. 30, 1968).
18.
In the morning of October 4, 1992, A, B, and C conspired in robbing the
house of Mr. X. That night, as the trio were approaching the house of Mr. X, they
met their friend, D. They dragged their friend along towards the house of Mr. X
and told him to stand guard and warn them should he hear anyone coming. D
agreed. A week later, all four of the accused were arrested for the crime of
robbery. Is D liable as a principal to the crime committed?
No. If the lookout was not one of the authors of the criminal design and the
planning and decision to commit the crime, but was only recruited or participated after
such decision was reached and already formed, the lookout incurs criminal liability only
as an accomplice, since he is merely an instrument of the crime who cooperates after
the decision to commit the same had already been made. In this case, D merely
concurred in the criminal resolution of A, B and C. It would be different however, if the
one who acted as a lookout in the commission of the crime was a co-conspirator in the
criminal design, in which case he shall be liable as principal by direct participation.
19.
When may a person undergo subsidiary imprisonment?

1. Under Article 39 of the RPC, subsidiary imprisonment is imposed when the
person has no property with which to meet the FINE mentioned in Article 38,
paragraph 3 at the rate of one day for each P8.00.
2. However, in order that subsidiary imprisonment may be enforced, it must be
expressly stated in the judgment that in case of failure to pay the fine, the
accused must suffer subsidiary imprisonment. In absence of such express
statement, the subsidiary imprisonment cannot be imposed. The reason is
because subsidiary imprisonment is a substitute principal penalty, not an
accessory penalty. (Ramos v. Gonong, 72 SCRA 59)
3. Moreover, there is no subsidiary penalty if:
a) The principal penalty is higher than prision correccional;
22

b) It is not of fixed duration;
c) The subsidiary penalty, though properly imposable is not expressly stated in
the judgment;
d) The penalty is not FIDS (Fine; Imprisonment and fine; destierro and fine;
suspension and fine); or
e) The penalty does not include fine.
20.
What are the distinctions between pardon by the President and by the
offended party?
1. Pardon by the President extinguishes the criminal liability of the offender; such is
not the case when the pardon is given by the offended party.
2. Pardon by the President cannot include civil liability that the offender must pay;
but the offended party can expressly waive the civil liability that the offender must
pay.
3. In cases where the law allows pardon by the offended party (Art 344), the pardon
should be given before the institution of the criminal prosecution and must be
extended to both offenders; whereas, pardon by the President is granted only
after conviction and may be extended to any of the offenders.
21.
Does compromise extinguish criminal liability?
NO, there may be compromise upon the civil liability arising from an offense but
such compromise shall not extinguish the public action for the imposition of the legal
penalty.
A contract or agreement stipulating for the renunciation of the right to prosecute
an offense or waiving the criminal liability is void. The consideration or subject matter is
illegal.
22.
Give instances when the rules under Article 48 (Complex Crimes) are not
applicable:
a) When the crimes subject of the case are covered by the doctrine of
common elements. When one crime is committed as a necessary means to
commit the other (delito complejo), they cannot be complexed if they have a
common element. If that element is used to complete the requirements for
completing the crime, the other crime would be incomplete and hence, nonexistent. (e.g. estafa thru falsification of private document, both crimes
require damage) (People vs Reyes, 56 Phil 286)
The above-mentioned doctrine does not apply to delito compuesto (single act
results in several grave or less grave). As when one single shot, with a single intent to
kill, killed to victims and the crimes committed are parricide and homicide.
b) When the crimes involved are subject to the rule of absorption of one crime
by the other; that if one offense is an element of another offense, the former
is deemed absorbed by the latter and there is only one crime. This is true
even if the penalty for the offense absorbed is higher (e.g. there is no
complex crime of illegal detention with abduction, murder with rebellion,
homicide through physical injuries).
c) In special complex crimes, (e.g. robbery with rape, rape with homicide)
23

d) Where two offenses resulting from single act are specifically punished as a
single crime, such as less serious physical injuries and slander by deed.
This is punished under Article 265, par. 2 as the single crime of less serious
physical injuries with ignominy.
e) When the crimes involved cannot be legally complexed with another felony
committed in connection therewith.
The provisions in the foregoing felonies provide that the penalty for such
felonies shall be in addition to those imposed on the other felonies
committed by the accused in relation thereto, or that the penalties prescribed
for the foregoing felonies shall not prevent the imposition upon the same
person of the penalty provided for any other felonies defined and punished by
the Code.
f)
When one of the crimes is punished by a special law and the other under the
Revised Penal Code.
23.
Discuss the applicability of Art. 49 (on penalty to be imposed in case the
crime committed be different from that intended) to abberatio ictus, error in
personae and in praeter intentionem.
Article 49 applies only to a case of mistake of identity. Aberratio ictus results in a
complex crime as when A shot B bust missed and instead hit and killed C as the two
crimes of homicide with attempted homicide are produced by a single act. In praeter
intentionem, the act is a mitigating circumstance as the injury befell on the same person
and is therefore covered by par. 3 Art. 13, and not by Art. 49.
24.
A was sentenced to destierro. While serving sentence, A entered the
prohibited area and committed robbery therein. Will ISLAW apply?
No. By entering the prohibited area, he evaded the service of sentence. ISLAW
does not apply to those who evaded sentence.
25.
Is the additional penalty for habitual delinquency affected by mitigating or
aggravating circumstances?
The answer is in the affirmative. When the law prescribes a penalty for habitual
delinquency in a manner susceptible to division into periods, it is evident that the
purpose is to avoid arbitrariness. It would be arbitrary to impose the maximum penalty in
the absence of aggravating circumstances as it would be arbitrary to impose the
minimum notwithstanding the presence of aggravating circumstances. However, the
circumstance of recidivism cannot be taken into consideration, it being an inherent
circumstance in habitual delinquency.
26.
X was sentenced by Judge Y in a single decision to multiple prison terms
for the various crimes he committed. The total years he will have to be
imprisoned exceeds 6 years. Is he entitled to probation?
X is entitled to probation. Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused
found guilty of several offenses in one decision are not and should not be added up.
The sum of the multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should not be
determinative of his eligibility for and his disqualification from probation. The multiple
prison terms are distinct from each other and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set
out in the probation law, then he is entitled thereto, unless otherwise specifically
disqualified. For Sec. 9 of par. (a) PD 968, as amended, uses the word maximum not
total. (Francisco vs CA, Aprl 1995)
24

27.
Distinguish the Probation Law (PL) and Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL).
PROBATION
1. Sentence
2. Penalty
3. Disposition
4. Violation
5. Appeal
INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE LAW
- Must not be more than 6 - Must be more than 1
years
year
- Imprisonment or fine
- Imprisonment only
- Sentence is suspended - Minimum to be served
- Entire sentence shall be - Unexpired portion is to
served
be served
- Forecloses the right to - No effect on operation of
probation
the
Indeterminate
Sentence Law
28.
When is Probation considered terminated? Is it automatically terminated
upon the expiration of its period?
Expiration of the period alone does not automatically terminate probation. There
must first be issued by the court of an order of final discharge based on report and
recommendation of probation officer. The period of probation may either be shortened or
lengthened but not to exceed the period set by law. The period of probation is deemed
the appropriate period for rehabilitation of the probationer. The order revoking the
probation or modifying the terms thereof is unappealable. (Bala VS.Martinez 181 SCRA
459)
29.
What is the distinction between CAUSES OF EXTINCTION of criminal
liability and CAUSES OF JUSTIFICATION or EXEMPTION?
Causes of extinction of criminal liability arise AFTER the commission of the
offense; while the causes of justification or exemption from criminal liability arise from
circumstances existing either BEFORE the commission of the crime or AT THE
MOMENT of its commission.
30.
The accused sold 80 cavans of palay with a value of P320, which he had
mortgaged to the PNB, without the knowledge and consent of the mortgagee.
Under Art. 319 of the RPC, the penalty for the offense is arresto mayor or a fine
double the value of the property involved. What is the applicable period of
prescription?
The period of prescription applicable is ten (10) years instead of five (5) years.
The offense under Art. 319 insofar as it is penalized with arresto mayor prescribes in five
(5) years, but the fine equivalent to double the amount of the property involved may also
be imposed as a penalty, and when said imposable penalty is either correctional or
afflictive, it should be made the basis for determining the period of prescription.
31.
Defendant was charged with the crime of grave slander in an information
filed on Oct. 19, 1962, for having allegedly proferred and uttered, on or about July
18, 1962, slanderous words and expressions against complainant. He filed a
motion to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed
because the offense alleged in the information should properly be classified as
slight oral defamation which prescribes in two (2) months. Said motion was
denied. The CFI found that the accused slandered the complainant however being
slight in nature as it arose from the heat of anger. The court sentenced the
defendant to pay a fine of P50 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs. Was the CFIs decision correct?
25

No. The accused cannot be convicted of the offense of slight oral defamation
necessarily included in the offense of grave slander charged in the information, where
the lesser offense had already prescribed at the time the information was filed. The
penalty for said act is arresto menor or a fine of 200 pesos. It being a light offense, the
crime is prescribed. (People vs. Rarang)
32.
Will prescription run even if the offender is not known?
Yes. The discovery of the crime should not be confused with the discovery of the
offender. The fact that the culprit is unknown will not prevent the period of prescription
from commencing to run.
33.
A committed a crime punishable by prision correccional. He was convicted
after trial. While serving sentence for one (1) month, A escaped. He remained at
large for five (5) years. Then, he was captured. After staying in prison for two (2)
months, he escaped again and remained at large for six (6) years. In this case, if
captured again, may A be required to serve the remaining portion of his sentence?
No, A cannot be required to serve the remaining portion of his sentence, because
the penalty of prision correccional prescribes in 10 years. On two (2) occasions, A
evaded the service of his sentence for a total of eleven (11) years.
34.
In 1984, Abet was charged with the crime of concubinage. Grace, has had a
longtime grudge against Abet, in the same year, to get back at him, she falsely
testified during the trial that she has personal knowledge that Abet has been living
in an apartment in Sampaloc with a certain Leonora, beside the house apartment
rented by Grace; and that they have comported themselves as husband and wife
publicly and privately, giving the impression that they were married. Abet was
convicted in 1987 and sentenced to prision correccional in its minimum period.
The falsity of Graces testimony was discovered in the year 1990. An
information for false testimony against the accused was filed against her in 1991.
Grace interposed prescription and asserted that since she testified in 1984 and
false testimony is a crime punishable by arresto mayor, which prescribes in 5
years, the information should have been filed on or before 1989. The prosecution,
on the other hand, contends that prescription commenced on the day the crime
was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, hence, in
accordance with Art 91, the same started to run only in 1995.
A. Rule on the matter.
Neither of the parties is correct. The general rules governing prescription is provided
for in Art 91, however, in the crime of false testimony against the accused, the penalty of
which is dependent upon the acquittal or conviction of the accused, the prescriptive
period runs from the date of finality of judgment in the main case. (People vs Maneja 72
Phil 256) In the present case, the judgment of conviction was rendered in 1987, and the
prosecution had until 1992 to file the case against Grace. Hence, the filing of the
information in 1991 is within the prescriptive period.
B. What if Grace falsely testified in favor of Abet?
If the testimony was in favor of Abet, the prescriptive period would be reckoned
from the date when the false testimony was given in court, in this case 1984. The
penalty for this kind of false testimony would also be arresto mayor, which prescribes in
5 years; hence the information filed in 1991 was way beyond the prescriptive period.
35.
A JAL plane landed in NAIA. While the passengers were disembarking, 2
passengers seized the aircraft. For what crime can they be held liable?
26

Air piracy. Whether at the time of the seizure of the plane, it was in flight or not,
is immaterial in air piracy of an international plane. This is its distinction from air piracy of
a domestic airplane.
(RA 6235)
36.
To what do the words judicial authority under Article 125 refer?
The words judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125 mean the courts of
justice or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary
detention and confinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense,
that is, the Supreme Court and other such inferior courts as may be established by law.
(Agbay vs. Ombudsman, July 1999)
37.
Can direct assault be committed during rebellion or sedition?
NO. This crime cannot be committed in times of rebellion or sedition because

direct assault requires that there is no public uprising. Note that the law in Art 148
requires that the assault be without public uprising. (People vs Abalos, July 1996)
38.
Distinguish a public officer, person in authority and an agent of a person in
authority.
For purposes of Chapter 4 of Crimes against Public Order, a clear distinction
should be kept in mind of the concepts of a public officer, as any person who takes part
in the performance of public functions in government (see Art. 203); a person in
authority, as one who is directly vested with jurisdiction; and an agent of a person in
authority, who is generally one charged with the maintenance of public order and the
protection and security of life and property (see Art. 152). A public officer is not
necessarily a person in authority or an agent of the latter, and such person in authority or
his agent are not always public officers.
39.
A, son of B, knowing that X owed B P1,000 which had already matured,
wrote a collection letter to X, falsifying Bs signature in the letter which A himself
delivered to X without Bs knowledge. X paid the amount to A and thereupon
appropriated the money for his personal use. Upon learning of the action of his
son, B filed a complaint against the former. If you were the fiscal, for what crime or
crimes would you prosecute A?
If I were the fiscal I would prosecute A for the crime of falsification of private
document. Although, the falsification was used as a means for A to misappropriate the
amount delivered to him by X, a complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a private
document is not committed because the element of damage in estafa is the same
damage which is an element of falsification of a private document. The crime is not
estafa because without the falsification of the private document A would not have
committed the defraudation. There is no complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a
private document. In spite of the relationship there is criminal liability. Relationship is an
absolutory cause in the crimes of theft, estafa and malicious mischief only.
40.
A was defendant in a collection suit for an unpaid loan extended to him by
B. In his answer under oath, A swore he did not owe B anything, much less did he
borrow any amount from him. The court found As answer to be false and rendered
judgment for B. A was later charged with, and prosecuted for, perjury for making
a false statement under oath. Decide, state your reasons.
A is not liable for perjury. Verification of the answer is not required by law. In a
decision, the Supreme court also held that a verified answer pertinent to the issue is
27

absolutely privileged. Perjury is any sworn false statement on any material matter made
before a person authorized to administer oath whenever the law so requires.
41.
Lola, a postmaster, stole a treasury warrant payable to Flor valued at
P300.00, increased the amount to P2, 300.00 by adding the figure 2 before 3
and forged Flors name as well as that of Dianne to make it appear that Flor
endorsed the warrant to Dianne and then later encashed it. Lola thereafter
misappropriated the amount represented by the altered warrant. Discuss the
liability of Lola
Falsification of a public document (treasury warrant) is committed because of the
alteration of the amount appearing in the treasury warrant, a genuine document, and
making it appear that Flor, the payee, endorsed the document to Dianne and Dianne
encashed it, which is false. The falsification was committed to facilitate the
misappropriation by Lola of the proceeds of the treasury warrant, which are public funds.
Lola, therefore, committed the complex crime of malversation thru falsification of public
document. (People vs Silvallana 61 Phil 636)
42.
While manning the traffic lights at the intersection of Espana and Washington
Streets, Patrolman Torres ordered BB to stop his taxi, threatened to arrest him and
confiscate his drivers license allegedly for speeding and reckless driving. Conversant
with the dirty ways of some traffic officers, BB pulled out his wallet, picked up his drivers
license with the hidden P20.00 bill inside and handed it to Patrolman Torres. Thereafter,
Patrolman Torres returned BBs license and allowed him to go.
What criminal prosecution may be filed against Pat. Torres under the
circumstances? Discuss.
Patrolman Torres should be charged with bribery, in the supposition that
the driver was speeding and for reckless driving. The money was given by the
driver so as not to be arrested and for his drivers license not to be confiscated.
But if the driver was not speeding nor was there reckless driving but the
policeman threatened to arrest him and confiscate his drivers license, the giving
of the money would be due to intimidation employed by the policeman. In this
case, the policeman would be liable for robbery thru intimidation.
43.
D, a detention prisoner for homicide, escaped while working at the guest house
of a provincial governor, which at the time was being rented by the province. The
detainee worked at the guest house pursuant to a note of the Governor to the Assistant
Provincial Warden asking for five men to work in the guest house. The note did not
mention the names of the prisoners under surveillance, who picked the men to compose
the work party.
Would you find the Governor and the Assistant Provincial Warden guilty of
Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners?
The Provincial Governor and the Assistant Provincial Warden cannot be
guilty of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners. This crime is committed in two
ways, to wit: (1) by a public officer who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner
in his custody or charge and (2) by a public officer in whose custody or charge a
prisoner has escaped by reason of his negligence.
Under the first mode, connivance in the escape of the prisoner on the part
of the public officer is an essential condition in the commission of the crime of
infidelity in the custody of the prisoner. No connivance in the escape of the
detention prisoner D from the custody of the Provincial Guard charged with the
duty of keeping the prisoner under surveillance can be deduced from the note of
the Governor to the Assistant Provincial Warden asking for five men to work in the
guest house as the note does not mention the names of the prisoners to be
28

brought to the guest house. The provincial guard was the one who picked men to
compose the work party.
Nor is the crime committed under the second mode. Since negligence
resulting in evasion is definite laxity amounting to deliberate non performance of
duty. If there is negligence committed, it must be that of the Provincial Guard who
is the public officer charged with the custody and guarding of the prisoner D.
44.
A has an illegitimate son B, who mauled and killed the legitimate father of
the former. Is B guilty of parricide?
NO, because Art. 246 of the RPC on parricide, in case of other ascendants
(grandparents, great-grandparents, etc.) the relationship with the killer must be
legitimate. The same is true with other descendants, that is, grandchildren, great
grandchildren, etc. Since B is an illegitimate child of A he cant be held guilty of parricide
for killing As father (Bs grandfather).
45.
X surprised his wife and her paramour in the act of illicit intercourse. He
then looked for a firearm and returned one hour later to kill the paramour in a fit of
passionate outburst. May X be held liable for murder?
No, inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. In the case of
People vs. Abarca, it was held that Article 247 of the RPC was applicable, as the
shooting was a continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused. It is not required
that the victim be killed instantly by the accused after surprising his spouse in the act of
intercourse. What is required is that the killing is the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused upon the discovery of the infidelity of the spouse. The killing
should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse.
46.
A prostitute willingly had sexual congress with a man upon the latters
assurance that she would be paid handsomely. After having sexual intercourse
with the prostitute, the man refused to pay the latter. Is the man guilty of Rape?
The new Anti- Rape Law (RA 8353) added a new circumstance that is, when
carnal knowledge was had by means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of
authority. Thus the pretext of paying a prostitute for sex and later on refusing to make
such payment after consummating the sexual act is properly characterized as fraudulent
machination that would make such act punishable as rape under 266-A (1c) of the RPC.
47.
X had three daughters. He had carnal knowledge of his eldest daughter
who did not offer any resistance and murmured only in defiance. Is X liable for any
crime?
Yes. X is liable for rape. The force or violence necessary in rape is a relative term
that depends not only on the age, size and strength of the persons involved but also
their relationship to each other. In a rape committed by a father against his own
daughter, the formers parental authority and moral ascendancy over the latter
substitutes for violence or intimidation who expectedly, would just cower in fear and
resign to the fathers wicked deeds. (People vs Rodriguez, G.R. No. 133984)
48.
The accused was charged with 6 counts of rape with homicide. He argues
that he cannot be guilty of 6 counts of rape with homicide since there was only
one woman (victim) killed. Rule on his contention.
The argument lacks merit, in the special complex crime of rape with homicide,
the homicide is used to qualify or raise a penalty provided by law. It is not necessary that
there are as many persons killed as are the crimes of rape with homicide. It is possible
that only one person is killed and the death of that person is used to qualify or to
29

aggravate the penalty for each of the rapes committed by the accused. There is one
common denominator, the homicide aggravates the penalty in all six crimes of rape.
There can be a special complex crime of homicide six counts even if only one person
is killed. (Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627)
49.
In rape cases, will the pardon of the parents of the victim without the
concurrence of the minor victim herself be effective?
NO. There are authorities holding that pardon must be granted not only by the
parents of an offended minor but also by the minor herself to be effective as an express
pardon under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in the case of People vs.
Lacson, Jr., we find the following words; Neither must we be understood as supporting
the view that the parents alone can extend a valid pardon. Far from it, for we too are of
the belief that the pardon by the parents, standing alone, is inefficacious.
50.
X struck Y in the mouth with a lead pipe, causing the loss of the latters
four front teeth. What is the crime committed?
X is liable for serious physical injury as the loss of teeth constitutes a deformity.
By deformity is meant physical ugliness, permanent and definite abnormality. It must be
conspicuous and visible. The injury contemplated is an injury that cannot be repaired by
the action of nature. The fact that the injured party may have artificial teeth, if he has the
necessary means and so desires, does not repair the injury, although it may lessen the
disfigurement. The case of a child or an old man is an exception to the rule.
51.
A, forcibly took the watch of B. With a gun in his hand fired the gun upward
to scare B from pursuing him but the bullet fatally hit C who was watching from
his window. What crime did A commit?
As long as the plan is to rob, whether the killing is committed by reason or on
occasion thereof is intentional or accidental the crime is Robbery With Homicide.
(People vs. Pecato 151 SCRA 14)
52.
X attacked Y while the latter was on her way home from work. Armed with a
knife, x succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Y. After the act, X found that Y
had some valuables with her, took it then fled. What was the crime/s committed?
Separate crimes of rape and theft/robbery. The original plan in this case was to
rape Y. Only after raping Y did X found some valuables. The taking of the valuables
was a mere afterthought when the opportunity presented itself. If the taking was
attended by violence against or intimidation against Y, the crime is robbery. Otherwise,
such as when the victim is unconscious, it is theft.
The special complex crime of robbery with rape under Art. 293 in relation to par.
1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code employs the clause when the robbery shall
have been accompanied with rape. In other words, to be liable for such crime, the
offender must have the intent to take the personal property of another under the
circumstances that make the taking one of robbery. Such intent must precede the rape.
(People vs. Moreno, G.R. No. 140033 Jan. 25, 2002)
If the original plan is to commit rape, but the acccused after committing the rape,
also committed robbery when the opportunity presented itself, the robbery should be
viewed as a separate offense.
53.
In robbery with homicide, would the killing of several persons increase the
penalty prescribed in Art. 294 of the RPC?
30

No. In robbery with homicide, the number of persons killed is immaterial; the
crime is still robbery with homicide. There is no crime of robbery with multiple homicide.
That several persons were killed on the occasion of a robbery does not increase the
penalty prescribed in Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, whenever the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide is proven to have been committed, all
those who took part in the robbery are liable as principals therein although they did not
actually take part in homicide.
54.
What distinguishes kidnapping from forcible abduction?

KIDNAPPING WITH RAPE
Crime is COMPOSITE (special complex
crime) if the woman kidnapped is also
raped
At the outset, there is NO lewd designs
Rape is not a separate crime but merely
a qualifying circumstance
Even if there are multiple rapes, there is
only one kidnapping with rape, the
others are aggravating
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE

Crime is COMPLEX under Art. 48 since
Forcible Abduction is a necessary
means to commit the rape
At the outset, there IS lewd design
Rape is also a crime
Even if there are multiple rapes, only

one rape shall be complexed with
forcible abduction, the other rapes shall
be treated as separate crimes
If rape was merely attempted, two (2) If rape is merely attempted, there is only
separate crimes- Kidnapping and forcible abduction, the attempt to rape is
Serious Illegal Detention and Attempted deemed merely a manifestation of lewd
Rape.
designs.
55.
A seduced Bs daughter. Because A refused to marry her, B threatened A
with death, unless A would marry his said daughter. Is B liable for grave threats?
Yes. B threatened A with the infliction upon his person of a wrong amounting to a
crime (homicide), imposing a condition (unless A would marry his daughter). It will be
noted that the condition imposed is not unlawful. Nevertheless, since a threat to inflict a
wrong amounting to a crime was made, B is criminally liable for the crime of grave
threats. (Luis B. Reyes)
56.
What are the principal distinctions between threat and coercion?

THREAT
Harm or wrong is FUTURE
CONDITIONAL
and
May be through an intermediary or in

writing
Generally, committed by intimidation
which is future and conditional
COERCION
Threatened harm or wrong is
IMMEDIATE,
PERSONAL
AND
DIRECT
Cannot be done by means of an
intermediary or in writing
Generally, by violence, although may
be brought about also by intimidation if
it is serious enough, direct, immediate
and personal
57.
Mr. X was married to Mrs. Y and they lived together in their conjugal house.
Mrs. Y later discovered that her husband had an illicit sexual relationship with one
of their maids. Mrs. Y lost no time in filing a complaint for concubinage
committed by keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling. Decide with reasons
on the criminal liability of Mr. X if there is any.
31

Mr. X will not incur any criminal liability for concubinage by keeping a mistress in
the conjugal dwelling. Unlike in adultery where a single sexual intercourse may
constitute such a crime. In concubinage a married man is liable only when he does any
of the ff. acts:
0
1. By keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling.
0
2. By having sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances with a woman
not his wife.
1
3. By cohabiting with her in any other place.
If the charge consists of keeping a mistress in the conjugal house, the woman
must be brought into the conjugal house by the accused husband as a concubine to fall
under this article. Thus, if the co-accused was voluntarily taken and sheltered by the
spouses in their house and treated as an adopted child being a relative of the
complainant, her illicit relations with the accused husband does not make her a mistress.
[People vs Hilao (CA) 52 OG 904]. The same line of reasoning will apply if the coaccused woman was taken into the conjugal house as a domestic helper.
Note: Neither can there be concubinage by sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances since there was no imprudent and wanton act shown to offend modesty
and sense of morality and decency. An affair with a housemaid is usually carried on
secretly so as to avoid public scandal. Hence, there can be no sexual intercourse under
scandalous circumstances.
58.
Distinguish between Bigamy (Art.349) and illegal marriage (Art. 350)
If the 2nd marriage is not perfectly valid other than due to the existence of the 1st
marriage, the crime is not bigamy but illegal marriage under Art.350. The distinctions
are:
In bigamy:
1. Subsequent marriage must be perfectly valid except that it is bigamous;
2. Refers only to the contracting of the 2nd marriage before the former marriage has
been illegally dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead.
In illegal marriage:
1. Subsequent marriage is annullable or void even if there is no first marriage
2. Covers all marriages which are otherwise voidable or null and void for causes other
than the bigamous marriage.
59. A, knowing that B was out of their room, while his bag was on top of the
table, placed a small bottle of opium in the pocket of the bag. Afterwards, A called
a policeman and told the latter that B had a bottle of opium in his pocket. What is
the crime committed?
A, being a private citizen, performed an act constituting the crime of incriminating
innocent persons under Article 363 RPC which is limited to acts of planting evidence
and the like which DO NOT in themselves constitute false prosecutions but tend directly
to cause false prosecution.
HOWEVER, if the accused who committed such act is a government official,
employee or officer including members of police agencies and the armed forces then the
provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 shall be applicable.
60.
What crime under the RPC carries the same penalty whether committed
intentionally or by negligence?
Under Article 217, the crime of Malversation is punished with the same penalty
whether the same be committed by dolo or culpa. Hence, when Malversation is
32

committed through negligence the accused is charged also under Article 217 and not
under Article 365.
Is the Indeterminate Sentence Law applicable to illegal possession of

firearm?
61.
Yes. Although the offense of illegal possession of firearm is punishable by a

special law, the penalty provided, nevertheless, has been taken from the range of
penalties found in the Revised Penal Code, thereby effectively adopting the rules set
forth therein inclusive of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
62.
Can the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm
be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstances?
Yes! In People vs Dela Cruz December 6, 2000, the Supreme Court offset the
aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
63.
Is a written notice of dishonor required for a successful prosecution of a
violation of B.P. 22?
YES. In Domagsang vs. CA (December 5, 2000), the SC held that the required
notice of dishonor must be in writing. Sec. 3 of B.P. 22 provides in part:
xxx that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such bank, such fact
shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor.
Hence, oral notice of dishonor is insufficient.
64.
May a person charged with violations of B.P. Blg. 22 be validly tried in any
municipality?
Yes. Violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes,
just like estafa. The rule is that a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly
tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. (Nieva, Jr.
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 2 Mar 97)
65.
May subsidiary imprisonment be imposed on a person convicted of
violating B.P. Blg. 22?
Yes. There is subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine
under B.P. Blg. 22 although there is no provision in said law for such penalty. The
Supreme Court, on several occasions, imposed subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency to pay fine for violation of special laws, notwithstanding the absence of such
provision in said laws.
66.
May an accomplice be punished under RA 7080 (Plunder Law)?
Yes. Under Section 2 of said law, in the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as
provided by the RPC shall be considered by the court.
67.
Is the crime of plunder malum in se or malum prohibitum?
Plunder is crime malum in se because the constitutive crimes are mala in se.
The elements of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. Moreover, any
doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is malum in se must be deemed to have been
resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the
heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The legislative declaration in
33

RA 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is malum in se. For when the
acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it
does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially. since in the
case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. (Joseph Ejercito Estrada
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 19, 2001)
68.
Agnes was driving her car someplace in Quezon City when she was
stopped by Roxas, who posed as a traffic enforcer. Suddenly, Roxas boarded the
car, pulled a gun on her and told her that he needed her vehicle. Another man,
Gungon, also boarded and pulled Agnes to the back seat as Roxas took over the
drivers seat and drove the same. Agnes was forced to take tablets, which made
her loose her consciousness momentarily. They were already in Batangas when
she awoke and noticed that her personal belongings and cash were missing. The
car stopped at a deserted area and Agnes was escorted to a site to relieve herself.
Just as she was about to get up, after relieving herself, she was shot. She passed
out but regained consciousness when the culprits had already left with her car.
She lost consciousness again and recovered only when she was already in the
hospital. What crimes were committed?
The crimes committed were: (People vs. Roberto Gungon, GR 119574)
1) Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Frustrated Murder (complex
crimes) because there was actual restraint of the victims liberty from the
time she was taken from Quezon City to a remote place in Batangas, and
the gunshot wound which was inflicted with treachery and premeditation,
would have resulted to the victims death;
2) Theft (not robbery) for the taking of the victims jewelry and cash since she
was asleep or unconscious at the back seat of the car when the taking,
which came as an afterthought, was committed; and
3) Carnapping (violation of RA 6539) because of the taking of the motor
vehicle.
69.
Does the law on Fencing (PD 612) require the accused to be, in any way,
involved in the crime of robbery or theft?
No. It is enough that these elements concur:
1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2) the accused is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the
robbery of theft, but receives, keeps, acquires, buys and/or sells, or in any
matter deals in any article, item, object or anything of value derived from
robbery or theft;
3) the accused knows or should have known that such article, item, object or
thing was the proceeds of robbery or theft; and
4) there is, on the part of the accused, an intent to gain for himself or for
another.
34

IV.
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

SUBJECTS
Book I
General principles in criminal law
Aberratio ictus
Accessories (Art. 19)
Aggravating circumstances (generic)
Aggravating circumstances (qualifying)
Aggravating: band
Aggravating: cruelty
Aggravating: dwelling
Aggravating: evident premeditation
Aggravating: motor vehicle
Aggravating: nighttime
Aggravating: recidivism
INCLUSIVE
YEARS
FREQUENCY
1999
1998
1997
1996
1999
2001
1999
2000
1999
1996
1994
1994
1996
1994
1997
1991
1993
1997
1996
1995
1994
2001
1998
1993
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
TOTALS
35
5
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
4
3

Aggravating: relationship
Aggravating : treachery
Aggravating: uninhabited place

Aggravating: unlawful entry
Alternative: Intoxication
Applicability of the RPC (Art.2)
Applicability of the RPC (Art 2)
Circumstances w/c exempt from criminal liability
Complex crime
Conspiracy
Continuing offense
Corpus Delicti
Criminal Liability
Delito continuado
Doctrine of implied conspiracy
Error in personae
Exempting circumstances
Exempting : accident
Exempting : insanity
Exempting: minority
Extinction of criminal liability
Felonies (attempted & frustrated)
Habitual Delinquency
Heinous crimes
Impossible crime
Justifying circumstances
1994
1999
1997
1993
1992
1991
1996
1997
2000
2002
1994
2000
1994
1999
1996
2000
1998
1996
1994
1993
1992
1990
1994
2001
2001
1996
1994
1993
1992
1994
1998
1999
1998
1992
1992
1991
2000
1998
1990
2000
1998
1996
1994
2001
1992
1991
1997
1995
2000
1994
1998
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
36
5
1
1
2
1
1
1
4
6
1
1
8
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
4
3
2
4

Justifying: avoidance of greater injury/evil

Justifying: defense of a stranger
Justifying: lawful exercise of a right
Justifying: self-defense
Justifying: Performance of a Duty

Life imprisonment
Mala in se
Mala Prohibita
Marriage against the provisions of the marriage law
Mitigating circumstances
Mitigating: immediate vindication of a grave
offense
Mitigating: passion & obfuscation
Mitigating : plea of guilty
Mitigating : voluntary surrender
Mitigating: No intent to commit so grave a wrong

Mitigating: Sufficient Provocation
Pardon
Penalties
Penalties containing 3 periods
Praeter intentionem
Principals
Privileged mitigating: minority

Prescription of crimes
Preventive imprisonment
Probation
2002
1990
2002
1991
1998
1996
1993
1990
2000
2000
2001
1994
2001
2001
2000
1993
1999
2002
1993
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
2002
1995
1999
1997
1992
1999
1997
1996
1992
2000
2000
1994
1991
1990
1999
1997
1995
1999
2002
2000
1995
1994
2000
1993
2001
2000
1994
1993
1999
1994
2001
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
37
5
1
2
1
2
1
3
4
1
1
3
4
1
1
5
2
4
2

Quasi-Recidivism
Reclusion perpetua
Suspension of death penalty under the RPC
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
2002
1998
1991
2001
1994
1995
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1996
1994
1993
2002
1996
1992
2000
1995
1994
1996
1995
1994
1993
2002
1998
1991
2002
1994
1996
2002
2001
1993
2001
1991
1993
1997
1990
2002
1992
1991
2002
2001
1993
2001
1997
2002
2000
1999
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
9
2
2
1
Book II
Acts of lasciviousness
Adultery
Alarms & scandal
Arbitrary Detention
Arson (Arts.320-326-B as repealed by PD 1613)
Bigamy
Carnapping
Coup d' etat
Concubinage
Conniving/consenting to evasion
Consented Abduction
Corruption of public officials
Death under exceptional circumstances
Damage to property
Death in tumultuous affray
Delay in the delivery of detained persons
Delivery of prisoners from jails
Dereliction in the prosecution of offenses
Direct assault
Direct bribery
Estafa
38
3
1
1
1
4
4
1
5
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
3
2

1997
1996
1993
1992
1991
1990
1999
1991
1994
1999
1998
1993
1992
1991
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1994
1993
1992
1990
1995
1999
1997
1999
1996
1993
2001
1993
1997
2002
1996
2002
1993
1999
1994
2001
1999
1996
1994
1990
1994
2001
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1993
Estafa through negligence

False Testimony in civil cases
False testimony favorable to defendant
Falsification of documents (Art. 171 & 172)
Forcible Abduction
Grave coercion
Homicide
Homicide w/ assault
Illegal detention
Illegal possession & use of false treasury notes
Illegal use of public funds/property
Immoral doctrines, obscene publications, etc.
Indirect Assault
Indirect bribery
Kidnapping
Kidnapping and failure to return a minor
Kidnapping w/ homicide
Libel
Marriages contracted against the marriage law
Maltreatment
Malversation
Misprision of treason
Murder
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
2
1
2
1
39
12
1
1
1
6
1
1
9
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
8
1

1991
1994
1999
1996
1994
1997
1996
1993
1991
2000
2002
2000
1998
1997
1995
1994
1993
1991
2002
2000
1996
1995
1992
1998
1992
1991
1990
2001
1990
2002
2001
2000
1998
1996
1992
1999
1998
1996
1995
1999
1997
1994
1996
1990
2002
1994
1997
1998
2002
1995
2001
Oral defamation
Parricide
Parricide w/ unintentional abortion
Perjury
Persons exempt from criminal liability

Persons in Authority
Physical Injuries (Art. 262-266)
Rape
Rape w/ homicide
Rebellion
Reckless Imprudence
Resistance & Disobedience
Robbery
Robbery with homicide
Robbery w/ rape
Simple Slander
Simulation of births
Slander by deed
Subordination of perjury
Subsidiary criminal liability
Theft (qualified)
Theft
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
40
14
1
2
1
4
1
2
7
1
4
1
1
4
2
3
1
1
1
1
3

Trespass to dwelling (qualified)

Unjust vexation
Unlicensed firearm
Usurpation of real rights
Violation of domicile
SPECIAL LAWS
Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612)
Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019)
Anti-Hazing Law (RA 8049)

Anti-Subversion Act (RA 1700)
Anti-Wiretapping Act (RA 4200)
Bouncing Checks Law ( BP 22)
On child abuse, exploitation & discrimination

(RA7610)
Code of Conduct for Public Employees(RAS 6713)
Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 6425)
Death penalty under RA 7659

Highway Robbery PD 532
Illegal Possession of Firearms
Indeterminate Sentence Law
2000
1998
2002
1994
1994
1998
1996
2002
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1996
1995
1992
1990
2001
2000
1997
1991
1990
2002
1991
1993
2002
1996
1995
1994
1992
1991
1990
2002
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1993
2001
2002
2000
1998
1996
1995
1993
1990
1998
1997
2001
2000
2001
2000
2002
1999
1994
1991
1990
1989
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
1
2
1
2
41
4
2
1
1
1
1
6
2
1
1
7
3
1
8
2
2
2

1988
1993
1996
1993
1995
1995
Law on Plunder (RA7080)

Punishing illegal Fishing (PD534)
Rights of persons arrested (RA 7438)
Trusts Receipts Law (PD 115)
Child & Youth Welfare Code
1
1
1
1
1
1
-END-
42
12
1
1
1
1
1

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RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

VITUG CASES (1996-2001)

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

PEOPLE vs. ALEJANDRO ABINA and ROMEO ABINA

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

Did accused-appellants conspire with Caroso to commit the crime?

MILAGROS L. DIAZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

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Did accused misappropriate public funds?

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

PEOPLE vs. CIPRIANO DE VERA, SR.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. vs. CONDE RAPISORA

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. vs. FERNANDO DULOT, ET AL.

Was there a conspiracy?

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. vs. RONNIE FLORES

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

ISSUE: Did the court err in its decision?

PEOPLE VS. FEDERICO LUSTRE

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

QUESTION AND ANSWER

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

What crimes do not admit of frustrated stage?

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

may such felony as above

No. Evident premeditation may not be considered as a qualifying circumstance

May craft be absorbed by treachery?

Yes, if it is deliberately adopted as the means, method, or form for the

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

When may a person undergo subsidiary imprisonment?

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

Does compromise extinguish criminal liability?

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

Will prescription run even if the offender is not known?

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

To what do the words judicial authority under Article 125 refer?

Can direct assault be committed during rebellion or sedition?

NO. This crime cannot be committed in times of rebellion or sedition because

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

What distinguishes kidnapping from forcible abduction?

FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE

Even if there are multiple rapes, only

What are the principal distinctions between threat and coercion?

May be through an intermediary or in

RED NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

Distinguish between Bigamy (Art.349) and illegal marriage (Art. 350)