G.R. Nos.

L-68379-81 September 22, 1986

EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.
Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:
The new Solicitor General has moved to dismiss this petition on the ground that as a result of supervening events it has become moot
and academic. It is not as simple as that. Several lives have been lost in connection with this case, including that of the petitioner
himself. The private respondent is now in hiding. The purity of suffrage has been defiled and the popular will scorned through a
confabulation of those in authority. This Court cannot keep silent in the face of these terrible facts. The motion is denied.
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The
former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites
of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the
petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing
trial for these murders. The incident naturally heightened tension in the province and sharpened the climate of fear among the
electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling
party.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he
claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question
the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second
Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a
division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his
proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in
broad daylight. The nation, already indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential elections in favor of Marcos, was
revolted by the killing, which flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the assailants who apparently believed they were above the
law. This ruthless murder was possibly one of the factors that strengthened the cause of the Opposition in the February revolution that
toppled the Marcos regime and installed the present government under President Corazon C. Aquino.
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and the private
respondent-both of whom have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are
larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more
important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the
simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to
us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter
because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the
dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the
vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
It is a notorious fact decried by many people and even by the foreign press that elections during the period of the Marcos dictatorship
were in the main a desecration of the right of suffrage. Vote-buying, intimidation and violence, illegal listing of voters, falsified returns,
and other elections anomalies misrepresented and vitiated the popular will and led to the induction in office of persons who did not
enjoy the confidence of the sovereign electorate. Genuine elections were a rarity. The price at times was human lives. The rule was
chicanery and irregularity, and on all levels of the polls, from the barangay to the presidential. This included the rigged plebiscites and
referenda that also elicited the derision and provoked the resentments of the people.
Antique in 1984 hewed to the line and equaled if it did not surpass the viciousness of elections in other provinces dominated by the
KBL. Terrorism was a special feature, as demonstrated by the killings previously mentioned, which victimized no less than one of the
main protagonists and implicated his rival as a principal perpetrator. Opposition leaders were in constant peril of their lives even as their
supporters were gripped with fear of violence at the hands of the party in power.

What made the situation especially deplorable was the apparently indifferent attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the
anomalies being committed. It is a matter of record that the petitioner complained against the terroristic acts of his opponents. All the
electoral body did was refer the matter to the Armed Forces without taking a more active step as befitted its constitutional role as the
guardian of free, orderly and honest elections. A more assertive stance could have averted the Sibalom election eve massacre and
saved the lives of the nine victims of the tragedy.
Public confidence in the Commission on Elections was practically nil because of its transparent bias in favor of the administration. This
prejudice left many opposition candidates without recourse except only to this Court.
Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election returns, the petitioner went to the
Commission on Elections to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival, the private respondent herein. 1 Specifically, the petitioner
charged that the elections were marred by "massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of
election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of respondent
Pacificador." 2 Particular mention was made of the municipalities of Caluya, Cabate, Tibiao, Barbaza, Laua-an, and also of San
Remigio, where the petitioner claimed the election returns were not placed in the ballot boxes but merely wrapped in cement bags or
Manila paper.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to
proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. 3 On June 7, 1984, the same
Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case
before the Commission. 4 On certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as
premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made. 5 Finally, on
July 23, 1984, the Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F.
Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the province of Antique. 6
This decision was signed by Chairman Victoriano Savellano and Commissioners Jaime Opinion and Froilan M. Bacungan. Previously
asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was a former law partner of private respondent Pacificador, Opinion had refused. 7
The petitioner then came to this Court, asking us to annul the said decision.
The core question in this case is one of jurisdiction, to wit: Was the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to
promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?
The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all member of the Batasang
Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.
Section 3 provides:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions
except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless otherwise
provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision.
While both invoking the above provisions, the petitioner and the respondents have arrived at opposite conclusions. The records are
voluminous and some of the pleadings are exhaustive and in part even erudite. And well they might be, for the noble profession of the
law-despite all the canards that have been flung against it-exerts all efforts and considers all possible viewpoints in its earnest search of
the truth.
The petitioner complains that the Proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all contests involving the members of
the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en banc. This is as it should be, he says, to insure
a more careful decision, considering the importance of the offices involved. The respondents, for their part, argue that only contests
need to be heard and decided en banc and all other cases can be-in fact, should be-filed with and decided only by any of the three
divisions.
The former Solicitor General makes much of this argument and lays a plausible distinction between the terms "contests" and "cases" to
prove his point. 8 Simply put, his contention is that the pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner and the private respondent
was not yet a contest at that time and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division of the Commission on Elections, consonant

with Section 3. The issue was at this stage still administrative and so was resoluble by the Commission under its power to administer all
laws relative to the conduct of elections, 9 not its authority as sole judge of the election contest.
A contest, according to him, should involve a contention between the parties for the same office "in which the contestant seeks not only
to oust the intruder but also to have himself inducted into the office." 10 No proclamation had as yet been made when the petition was
filed and later decided. Hence, since neither the petitioner nor the private respondent had at that time assumed office, there was no
Member of the Batasang Pambansa from Antique whose election, returns or qualifications could be examined by the Commission on
Elections en banc.
In providing that the Commission on Elections could act in division when deciding election cases, according to this theory, the
Constitution was laying down the general rule. The exception was the election contest involving the members of the Batasang
Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en banc. 11 The en banc requirement would apply only from the time a candidate for the
Batasang Pambansa was proclaimed as winner, for it was only then that a contest could be permitted under the law. All matters arising
before such time were, necessarily, subject to decision only by division of the Commission as these would come under the general
heading of "election cases."
As the Court sees it, the effect of this interpretation would be to divide the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections into two, viz.: (1)
over matters arising before the proclamation, which should be heard and decided by division in the exercise of its administrative power;
and (2) over matters arising after the proclamation, which could be heard and decided only en banc in the exercise of its judicial power.
Stated otherwise, the Commission as a whole could not act as sole judge as long as one of its divisions was hearing a pre-proclamation
matter affecting the candidates for the Batasang Pambansa because there was as yet no contest; or to put it still another way, the
Commission en banc could not do what one of its divisions was competent to do, i.e., decide a pre-proclamation controversy. Moreover,
a mere division of the Commission on Elections could hear and decide, save only those involving the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the Batasang Pambansa, all cases involving elective provincial and city officials from start to finish, including preproclamation controversies and up to the election protest. In doing so, it would exercise first administrative and then judicial powers. But
in the case of the Commission en banc, its jurisdiction would begin only after the proclamation was made and a contest was filedand
not at any time and on any matter before that, and always in the exercise only of judicial power.
This interpretation would give to the part more powers than were enjoyed by the whole, granting to the division while denying to
the banc. We do not think this was the intention of the Constitution. The framers could not have intended such an irrational rule.
We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to
hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation
of the winners.
It is worth observing that the special procedure for the settlement of what are now called "pre-proclamation controversies" is a relatively
recent innovation in our laws, having been introduced only in 1978, through P.D. No. 1296, otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code.
Section 175 thereof provided:
Sec. 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation.-The Commission shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory. It may,motu proprio or upon written
petition, and after due notice and hearing order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any
proclamation, if one has been made, on any of the grounds mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof.
Before that time all proceedings affecting the election, returns and qualifications of public officers came under the complete jurisdiction
of the competent court or tribunal from beginning to end and in the exercise of judicial power only. It therefore could not have been the
intention of the framers in 1935, when the Commonwealth Charter was adopted, and even in 1973, when the past Constitution was
imposed, to divide the electoral process into the pre-proclamation stage and the post-proclamation stage and to provide for a separate
jurisdiction for each stage, considering the first administrative and the second judicial.
Besides, the term "contest" as it was understood at the time Article XII-C. Section 2(2) was incorporated in the 1973 Constitution did not
follow the strict definition of a contention between the parties for the same office. Under the Election Code of 1971, which presumably
was taken into consideration when the 1973 Constitution was being drafted, election contests included the quo warranto petition that
could be filed by any voter on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility of the contestee although such voter was himself not claiming the
office involved. 12
The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should receive the widest possible scope conformably
to the rule that the words used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973 Constitution, the term should
be understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the
winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. Needless to stress, the term should be given a consistent
meaning and understood in the same sense under both Section 2(2) and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution.

The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the
contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of
voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the
proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the
election returns and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such
as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
All these came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections insofar as they applied to the members of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa and, under Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, could be heard and decided by it only en banc.
We interpret "cases" as the generic term denoting the actions that might be heard and decided by the Commission on Elections, only by
division as a general rule except where the case was a "contest" involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard
and decided en banc.
As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of the Batasang Pambansa
be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective
could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banconly after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late
already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates which
has resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent's theory would
make this gambit possible for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three
members in division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the Commission en banc.
After that, the delay. The Commission en banc might then no longer be able to rectify in time the proclamation summarily and not very
judiciously made by the division. While in the end the protestant might be sustained, he might find himself with only a Phyrric victory
because the term of his office would have already expired.
It may be argued that in conferring the initial power to decide the pre- proclamation question upon the division, the Constitution did not
intend to prevent the Commission en banc from exercising the power directly, on the theory that the greater power embraces the lesser.
It could if it wanted to but then it could also allow the division to act for it. That argument would militate against the purpose of the
provision, which precisely limited all questions affecting the election contest, as distinguished from election cases in general, to the
jurisdiction of the Commission en banc as sole judge thereof. "Sole judge" excluded not only all other tribunals but also and even the
division of the Commission A decision made on the contest by less than the Commission en banc would not meet the exacting standard
of care and deliberation ordained by the Constitution
Incidentally, in making the Commission the "sole judge" of pre- proclamation controversies in Section 175, supra, the law was obviously
referring to the body sitting en banc. In fact, the pre-proclamation controversies involved inAratuc vs. Commission on
Elections, 13 where the said provision was applied, were heard and decided en banc.
Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but accorded cavalier attention by the respondent Commission on
Elections is due process of law, that ancient guaranty of justice and fair play which is the hallmark of the free society. Commissioner
Opinion ignored it. Asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was formerly a law partner of the private respondent, he obstinately
insisted on participating in the case, denying he was biased.14
Given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the party in power at the time, and the particular relationship between
Commissioner Opinion and MP Pacificador, one could not be at least apprehensive, if not certain, that the decision of the body would
be adverse to the petitioner. As in fact it was. Commissioner Opinion's refusal to inhibit himself and his objection to the transfer of the
case to another division cannot be justified by any criterion of propriety. His conduct on this matter belied his wounded protestations of
innocence and proved the motives of the Second Division when it rendered its decision.
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due
process. 15 To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as
an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. 16 The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that
when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to
him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would
be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play.
Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party
and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal
hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions
and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a just decision. Where this
is probable or even only posssible, due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza. For like
Caesar's wife, he must be above suspicion. Commissioner Opinion, being a lawyer, should have recognized his duty and abided by this
well-known rule of judicial conduct. For refusing to do so, he divested the Second Division of the necessary vote for the questioned
decision, assuming it could act, and rendered the proceeding null and void. 17
Since this case began in 1984, many significant developments have taken place, not the least significant of which was the February
revolution of "people power" that dislodged the past regime and ended well nigh twenty years of travail for this captive nation. The
petitioner is gone, felled by a hail of bullets sprayed with deadly purpose by assassins whose motive is yet to be disclosed. The private
respondent has disappeared with the "pomp of power" he had before enjoyed. Even the Batasang Pambansa itself has been abolished,
"an iniquitous vestige of the previous regime" discontinued by the Freedom Constitution. It is so easy now, as has been suggested not
without reason, to send the recrds of this case to the archives and say the case is finished and the book is closed.
But not yet.
Let us first say these meager words in tribute to a fallen hero who was struck down in the vigor of his youth because he dared to speak
against tyranny. Where many kept a meekly silence for fear of retaliation, and still others feigned and fawned in hopes of safety and
even reward, he chose to fight. He was not afraid. Money did not tempt him. Threats did not daunt him. Power did not awe him. His was
a singular and all-exacting obsession: the return of freedom to his country. And though he fought not in the barricades of war amid the
sound and smoke of shot and shell, he was a soldier nonetheless, fighting valiantly for the liberties of his people against the enemies of
his race, unfortunately of his race too, who would impose upon the land a perpetual night of dark enslavement. He did not see the
breaking of the dawn, sad to say, but in a very real sense Evelio B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer because he was, like Saul and
Jonathan, "swifter than eagles and stronger than lions."
A year ago this Court received a letter which began: "I am the sister of the late Justice Calixto Zaldivar. I am the mother of Rhium Z.
Sanchez, the grandmother of Plaridel Sanchez IV and Aldrich Sanchez, the aunt of Mamerta Zaldivar. I lost all four of them in the
election eve ambush in Antique last year." She pleaded, as so did hundreds of others of her provincemates in separate signed petitions
sent us, for the early resolution of that horrible crime, saying: "I am 82 years old now. I am sick. May I convey to you my prayer in
church and my plea to you, 'Before I die, I would like to see justice to my son and grandsons.' May I also add that the people of Antique
have not stopped praying that the true winner of the last elections will be decided upon by the Supreme Court soon."
That was a year ago and since then a new government has taken over in the wake of the February revolution. The despot has escaped,
and with him, let us pray, all the oppressions and repressions of the past have also been banished forever. A new spirit is now upon our
land. A new vision limns the horizon. Now we can look forward with new hope that under the Constitution of the future every Filipino
shall be truly sovereign in his own country, able to express his will through the pristine ballow with only his conscience as his counsel.
This is not an impossible dream. Indeed, it is an approachable goal. It can and will be won if we are able at last, after our long ordeal, to
say never again to tyranny. If we can do this with courage and conviction, then and only then, and not until then, can we truly say that
the case is finished and the book is closed.
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot
and academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside
as violative of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 133486. January 28, 2000]

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the
press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections. Quite the contrary, exit
polls -- properly conducted and publicized -- can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored
countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec so as to minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without
transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our people.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 981419[1] dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body
"RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives
from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same."
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a
project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections x x x and to make [an] exit survey of the x x x vote during the elections for
national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately." [2] The electoral body believed that
such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections
(Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until
further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually
conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.
The Issues
Petitioner raises this lone issue: "Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any [other group], its agents or representatives from
conducting exit polls during the x x x May 11 elections."[3]
In his Memorandum,[4] the solicitor general, in seeking to dismiss the Petition, brings up additional issues: (1) mootness and (2) prematurity, because
of petitioner's failure to seek a reconsideration of the assailed Comelec Resolution.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition[5] is meritorious.
Procedural Issues: Mootness and Prematurity

The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election has already been held and done with.
Allegedly, there is no longer any actual controversy before us.
The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's
fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By
its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up
again in future elections.[6]
In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional
guarantees."[7] Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of
posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.
The solicitor general further contends that the Petition should be dismissed for petitioner's failure to exhaust available remedies before the issuing
forum, specifically the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, [8] when the issue
involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor,[9] when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity,[10] or when the
need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available. [11]
The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty (20) days before the election itself. Besides,
the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a
reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the Petition
involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified.
Main Issue: Validity of Conducting Exit Polls
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable
result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their
ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in the opinion of
the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998
elections.
In its Petition, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation maintains that it is a responsible member of the mass media, committed to report balanced
election-related data, including "the exclusive results of Social Weather Station (SWS) surveys conducted in fifteen administrative regions."
It argues that the holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press. It
submits that, in precipitately and unqualifiedly restraining the holding and the reporting of exit polls, the Comelec gravely abused its discretion and
grossly violated the petitioner's constitutional rights.
Public respondent, on the other hand, vehemently denies that, in issuing the assailed Resolution, it gravely abused its discretion. It insists that the
issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections";
and "to protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot." It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and
influence the voters," and that the surveys were designed "to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as to who are the winners and the
[losers] in the election," which in turn may result in "violence and anarchy."
Public respondent further argues that "exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots," as the "voters
are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution; [12] and relevant provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code.[13] It submits that the constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune to regulation by the State in the legitimate
exercise of its police power," such as in the present case.
The solicitor general, in support of the public respondent, adds that the exit polls pose a "clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and
integrity of the electoral process," considering that they are not supervised by any government agency and can in general be manipulated easily. He
insists that these polls would sow confusion among the voters and would undermine the official tabulation of votes conducted by the Commission, as
well as the quick count undertaken by the Namfrel.
Admittedly, no law prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit polls. The question can thus be more narrowly defined: May the Comelec, in the
exercise of its powers, totally ban exit polls? In answering this question, we need to review quickly our jurisprudence on the freedoms of speech and
of the press.
Nature and Scope of Freedoms of Speech and of the Press

The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. It "is a 'preferred' right and, therefore, stands on a higher level
than substantive economic or other liberties. x x x [T]his must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of
thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom." [14]
Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. [15] In the landmark case Gonzales v.
Comelec,[16] this Court enunciated that at the very least, free speech and a free press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter
of public interest without prior restraint.
The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation by the people in social
and political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change. [17] It represents a profound commitment to the principle
that debates on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open. [18] It means more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or
economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, or to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence.
And paraphrasing the eminent justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, [19] we stress that the freedom encompasses the thought we hate, no less than the
thought we agree with.
Limitations
The realities of life in a complex society, however, preclude an absolute exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Such freedoms could not
remain unfettered and unrestrained at all times and under all circumstances. [20]They are not immune to regulation by the State in the exercise of its
police power.[21] While the liberty to think is absolute, the power to express such thought in words and deeds has limitations.
In Cabansag v. Fernandez[22] this Court had occasion to discuss two theoretical tests in determining the validity of restrictions to such freedoms, as
follows:
"These are the 'clear and present danger' rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, as interpreted in a number of cases,
means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be 'extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high' before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. x x
x"[23]
"The 'dangerous tendency' rule, on the other hand, x x x may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or
immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor
is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is
sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative
body seeks to prevent."[24]
Unquestionably, this Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test. It implicitly did in its earlier decisions in Primicias v.
Fugoso[25] and American Bible Society v. City of Manila;[26] as well as in later ones, Vera v. Arca,[27]Navarro v. Villegas,[28] Imbong v. Ferrer,[29] Blo
Umpar Adiong v. Comelec[30] and, more recently, in Iglesia ni Cristo v. MTRCB.[31] In setting the standard or test for the "clear and present danger"
doctrine, the Court echoed the words of justice Holmes: "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree."[32]
A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike
in the "dangerous tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the time element; the danger must not
only be probable but very likely to be inevitable. [33] The evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a
restraint of a writing instrument.[34]
Justification for a Restriction
Doctrinally, the Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and any restriction is treated an exemption. The power to exercise prior
restraint is not to be presumed; rather the presumption is against its validity.[35]And it is respondent's burden to overthrow such presumption. Any act
that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows, [36] so it has been said.
To justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial government interest must be clearly shown. [37] Thus:
"A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government, if it furthers an
important or substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest."[38]

Hence, even though the government's purposes are legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly, stifle fundamental
personal liberties, when the end can be more narrowly achieved. [39]
The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information meant
to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage. [40] We cannot support any ruling or order "the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a
constitutional right as free speech."[41] When faced with borderline situations in which the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or the freedom
of the electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly made to assure clean and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor of freedom. For in
the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's power to regulate should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections
if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed. [42]
True, the government has a stake in protecting the fundamental right to vote by providing voting places that are safe and accessible. It has the duty to
secure the secrecy of the ballot and to preserve the sanctity and the integrity of the electoral process. However, in order to justify a restriction of the
people's freedoms of speech and of the press, the state's responsibility of ensuring orderly voting must far outweigh them.
These freedoms have additional importance, because exit polls generate important research data which may be used to study influencing factors and
trends in voting behavior. An absolute prohibition would thus be unreasonably restrictive, because it effectively prevents the use of exit poll data not
only for election-day projections, but also for long-term research. [43]
Comelec Ban on Exit Polling
In the case at bar, the Comelec justifies its assailed Resolution as having been issued pursuant to its constitutional mandate to ensure a free, orderly,
honest, credible and peaceful election. While admitting that "the conduct of an exit poll and the broadcast of the results thereof [are] x x x an exercise
of press freedom," it argues that "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a clear and present danger to the community or it
has a dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting
interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in harmony with the
official count made by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and
integrity of the electoral process."
Such arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at
random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group
polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling
group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here
are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the
reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one
can only be indicative of the other.
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls -- disorder and confusion in the voting centers -- does not justify a
total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application is without qualification as to whether the polling
is disruptive or not.[44] Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting centers. [45] There is no showing,
however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the
presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters.
Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information and ideas that
could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the survey questions will forever remain unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is
restrained, candidates, researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the impact of current events and of
election-day and other factors on voters' choices.
In Daily Herald Co. v. Munro,[46] the US Supreme Court held that a statute, one of the purposes of which was to prevent the broadcasting of early
returns, was unconstitutional because such purpose was impermissible, and the statute was neither narrowly tailored to advance a state interest nor the
least restrictive alternative. Furthermore, the general interest of the State in insulating voters from outside influences is insufficient to justify speech
regulation. Just as curtailing election-day broadcasts and newspaper editorials for the reason that they might indirectly affect the voters' choices is
impermissible, so is regulating speech via an exit poll restriction. [47]
The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather
the type of information obtained through exit polling. On the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the Comelec
end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys.
For instance, a specific limited area for conducting exit polls may be designated. Only professional survey groups may be allowed to conduct the
same. Pollsters may be kept at a reasonable distance from the voting center. They may be required to explain to voters that the latter may refuse to be
interviewed, and that the interview is not part of the official balloting process. The pollsters may further be required to wear distinctive clothing that
would show they are not election officials.[48] Additionally, they may be required to undertake an information campaign on the nature of the exercise

and the results to be obtained therefrom. These measures, together with a general prohibition of disruptive behavior, could ensure a clean, safe and
orderly election.
For its part, Petitioner ABS-CBN explains its survey methodology as follows: (1) communities are randomly selected in each province; (2) residences
to be polled in such communities are also chosen at random; (3) only individuals who have already voted, as shown by the indelible ink on their
fingers, are interviewed; (4) the interviewers use no cameras of any sort; (5) the poll results are released to the public only on the day after the
elections.[49] These precautions, together with the possible measures earlier stated, may be undertaken to abate the Comelec's fear, without
consequently and unjustifiably stilling the people's voice.
With the foregoing premises, we conclude that the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of disrupting elections, exit polls -- properly conducted
and publicized -- can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections; and for the elimination of election-fixing, fraud
and other electoral ills.
Violation of Ballot Secrecy
The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue.
Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue here.
The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the
contents of their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified.
Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who have been
assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in
accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential
disclosure to a pollster of whom they have voted for.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not
compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the
Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on May 9,
1998 is made PERMANENT. Assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1419 issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998 is
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148208

December 15, 2004

CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:
Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its continuedoperation would violate
the equal protection of the law? We hold that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other
governmental financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the2,994 rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
I.
The Case
First the facts.
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created
a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association,
Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from
further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:

Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion,
or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko
Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be
instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That the
Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act
No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose
positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act
No. 6758. [emphasis supplied]
The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in
the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and
(2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is
contended that this classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the
BSP.1 Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments:
a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not appear in the original and amended
versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of Senate Bill No. 1235; 2
b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL actually defeats the
purpose of the law3 of establishing professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP; 4 (emphasis supplied)
c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235, without
showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried
employees of the BSP;5
d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-file
personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon;6 and
e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the gross disparity
between their compensation and that of the BSP officers'.7
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.8 Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as
some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employeeshave been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner
concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents' implementation of such amounts to lack of
jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this
petition for prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue
involved.9
Respondent BSP, in its comment,10 contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the
constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and administrative
autonomy of BSP," and the mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with
sound principles of management."
The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite simplistically, he
argues that the classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to
establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national government.11
II.
Issue
Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No.
7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws." 12

III.
Ruling
A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION,
SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification created by the questioned proviso, on
its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable. As held in Victoriano
v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union,13 and reiterated in a long line of cases:14
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the
state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees
equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does
not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another
in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so
that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is
satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state
is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked
differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence,
legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not
preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.
(citations omitted)
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification.15 The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class.16 If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.17 The classification must also be germane to
the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.18
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended
to address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to
discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-andfile in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely
arbitrary in the legislative sense. 19
That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not detract from its validity.
As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases,20 this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse
invalidating a provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such provision and was merely inserted
by the bicameral conference committee of both Houses.
Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute.21 An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations.22 To justify the
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.23
B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES
OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED
APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION
A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power, we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws
exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso.
1. The concept of relative constitutionality.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable
provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application
to another.24
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances.25 Thus, if a statute in its practical
operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and
investigation in the light of changed conditions.26
Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon,27 where the Court of Appeals of New York declared as
unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning ordinance which placed the plaintiff's property in a residential district, although it was located in the
center of a business area. Later amendments to the ordinance then prohibited the use of the property except for parking and storage of
automobiles, and service station within a parking area. The Court found the ordinance to constitute an invasion of property rights which
was contrary to constitutional due process. It ruled:
While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting the use of property in accordance with a
well-considered and comprehensive plan designed to promote public health, safety and general welfare, such power is subject
to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is so whenever the zoning
ordinance precludes the use of the property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. By the same token, an
ordinance valid when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a later time, its operation under
changed conditions proves confiscatory such, for instance, as when the greater part of its value is destroyed, for which the
courts will afford relief in an appropriate case.28 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as unconstitutional as a consequence
of significant changes in circumstances. Rutter v. Esteban29 upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law - its enactment and
operation being a valid exercise by the State of its police power30 - but also ruled that the continued enforcement of the otherwise
valid law would be unreasonable and oppressive. It noted the subsequent changes in the country's business, industry and
agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because its continued operation would be grossly discriminatory and lead to the oppression of
the creditors. The landmark ruling states:31
The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which Republic Act No. 342 grants to debtors of a
monetary obligation contracted before the last global war and who is a war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the
Philippine War Damage Commission reasonable under the present circumstances?
It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar obligations who suffered from the ravages
of the last war and who filed a claim for their losses with the Philippine War Damage Commission. It is therein provided that
said obligation shall not be due and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the claim filed by
the debtor with said Commission. The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate
themselves by giving them a reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent them from being
victimized by their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal,
this is not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and so it was therein declared as a policy that as to
them the debt moratorium should be continued in force (Section 1).
But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of
Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act
No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an
opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at
least twelve (12) years before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. his period seems to
us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended, the relief
accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection
becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the
debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the only course dictated by justice,
fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us under the present circumstances is to declare that the
continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive,
and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without
effect. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

2. Applicability of the equal protection clause.

In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey32 is illuminating. The Supreme Court of Florida
ruled against the continued application of statutes authorizing the recovery of double damages plus attorney's fees against railroad
companies, for animals killed on unfenced railroad right of way without proof of negligence. Competitive motor carriers, though creating
greater hazards, were not subjected to similar liability because they were not yet in existence when the statutes were enacted. The
Court ruled that the statutes became invalid as denying "equal protection of the law," in view of changed conditions since their
enactment.
In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner,33 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky declared unconstitutional a provision of a
statute which imposed a duty upon a railroad company of proving that it was free from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle by its
engine or cars. This, notwithstanding that the constitutionality of the statute, enacted in 1893, had been previously sustained.
Ruled the Court:
The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because it applied to all similar corporations and had for its object the
safety of persons on a train and the protection of property. Of course, there were no automobiles in those days.
The subsequent inauguration and development of transportation by motor vehicles on the public highways by common
carriers of freight and passengers created even greater risks to the safety of occupants of the vehicles and of danger of injury
and death of domestic animals. Yet, under the law the operators of that mode of competitive transportation are not subject to
the same extraordinary legal responsibility for killing such animals on the public roads as are railroad companies for killing
them on their private rights of way.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct.
486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949, stated, "A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which
it is applied. The police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably."
A number of prior opinions of that court are cited in support of the statement. The State of Florida for many years had a
statute, F.S.A. 356.01 et seq. imposing extraordinary and special duties upon railroad companies, among which was that a
railroad company was liable for double damages and an attorney's fee for killing livestock by a train without the owner having
to prove any act of negligence on the part of the carrier in the operation of its train. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it
was held that the changed conditions brought about by motor vehicle transportation rendered the statute unconstitutional since
if a common carrier by motor vehicle had killed the same animal, the owner would have been required to prove negligence in
the operation of its equipment. Said the court, "This certainly is not equal protection of the law."34 (emphasis supplied)
Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law, viz:
[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that statute has any
discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. Though the
law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye
and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances,
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. 35 (emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
[W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law
may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the
constitutional prohibition.. In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If
a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. .36 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted
3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763
+ 9302 = consequential unconstitutionality of challenged proviso.
According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative of the equal protection clause
because after it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs
were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL.37 Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are
also discriminated upon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the amendment of the
charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz:
1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS);
3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, (SBGFC);

4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS);
5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP);
6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC);38 and
7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share this common proviso: a
blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly, as illustrated below:
1. LBP (R.A. No. 7907)
Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 90. Personnel. xxx

xxx

xxx

All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification standards
approved by the Bank's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and
responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and
shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit
reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules
and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to
make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758. (emphasis supplied)
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

2. SSS (R.A. No. 8282)

Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]:

(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an actuary and such other personnel as
may [be] deemed necessary; fix their reasonable compensation, allowances and other benefits; prescribe their duties and
establish such methods and procedures as may be necessary to insure the efficient, honest and economical administration of
the provisions and purposes of this Act: Provided, however, That the personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice President
shall be appointed by the SSS President: Provided, further, That the personnel appointed by the SSS President, except those
below the rank of assistant manager, shall be subject to the confirmation by the Commission; Provided further, That the
personnel of the SSS shall be selected only from civil service eligibles and be subject to civil service rules and
regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS shall be exempt from the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758 and Republic
Act No. 7430. (emphasis supplied)
3. SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289)
Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]:
xxx

xxx

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The Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation shall:

xxx

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xxx

(e) notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758, and Compensation Circular No. 10, series of 1989 issued
by the Department of Budget and Management, the Board of Directors of SBGFC shall have the authority to extend to
the employees and personnel thereof the allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently
enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other government financial institutions. (emphases supplied)
4. GSIS (R.A. No. 8291)

Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)].

xxx

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xxx

Sec. 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees. - The Board of Trustees shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxx

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xxx

(d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the GSIS' organizational and administrative
structures and staffing pattern, and to establish, fix, review, revise and adjust the appropriate compensation package for the
officers and employees of the GSIS with reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses, privileges and other benefits as may be
necessary or proper for the effective management, operation and administration of the GSIS, which shall be exempt from
Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and Republic Act No. 7430, otherwise
known as the Attrition Law. (emphasis supplied)
xxx

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5. DBP (R.A. No. 8523)

Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:
Section 13. Other Officers and Employees. - The Board of Directors shall provide for an organization and staff of officers and
employees of the Bank and upon recommendation of the President of the Bank, fix their remunerations and other emoluments.
All positions in the Bank shall be governed by the compensation, position classification system and qualification standards
approved by the Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis of actual duties and responsibilities. The
compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to
periodic review by the Board of Directors once every two (2) years, without prejudice to yearly merit or increases based on the
Bank's productivity and profitability. The Bank shall, therefore, be exempt from existing laws, rules, and regulations on
compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The Bank shall however, endeavor to make its
system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758, as amended). (emphasis supplied)
6. HGC (R.A. No. 8763)
Section 9. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of Directors. - The Board shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
xxx

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xxx

(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient management, operation and administration of the
Corporation: Provided, That all positions in the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) shall be governed by a compensation and
position classification system and qualifications standards approved by the Corporation's Board of Directors based on a
comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan
shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and which shall be exempt from
Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, and from other laws, rules and
regulations on salaries and compensations; and to establish a Provident Fund and determine the Corporation's and the
employee's contributions to the Fund; (emphasis supplied)
xxx

xxx

xxx

7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)

Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is hereby further amended to read:
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

3.
xxx

A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be
instituted as an integral component of the Corporation's human resource development program: Provided, That all positions in

the Corporation shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by
the Board based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan
shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans of other government financial institutions and shall be
subject to review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases
based on productivity and profitability. The Corporation shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and
regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its
system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied)
Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of seven other GFIs were granted the exemption
that was specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the BSP. And as if to add insult to petitioner's injury, even the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000!39
The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification between the rank-andfile and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial distinctions that made real differences between the
two classes.
The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstancethat considerably
alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653,
thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws - between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven
other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the
class. Theproviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as
practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences.40
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside
the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the
light of the fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress' power to classify so
unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a
single overt act, but gradually and progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law
bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can only be invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to
a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis confined to determining
the validity within the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated), thereby proscribing any
evaluation vis--vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among several similar enactments made over a period of time?
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption (granted to
the seven other GFIs) rests "on a policy determination by the legislature." All legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy
determination - even those that have been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to
sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process and equal protection challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently
sacrosanct in a policy determination made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of
the Constitution.
In fine, the "policy determination" argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the
BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs' who are similarly situated. It fails to
appreciate that what is at issue in the second level of scrutiny is not thedeclared policy of each law per se, but the oppressive
results of Congress' inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFIs. At bottom,
the second challenge to the constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is premised precisely on the
irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated. In the field of equal
protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws" includes the prohibition against enacting
laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law, or
permits such denial, it is unconstitutional.41
It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as
regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file
from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as
comprising one distinct class, separate from other governmental entities.
Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985 (1976) declared it as a State policy (1) to provide equal pay for substantially equal
work, and (2) to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the
positions. P.D. No. 985 was passed to address disparities in pay among similar or comparable positions which had given rise to
dissension among government employees. But even then, GFIs and government-owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs)
were already identified as a distinct class among government employees. Thus, Section 2 also provided, "[t]hat notwithstanding a
standardized salary system established for all employees, additional financial incentives may be established by government corporation
and financial institutions for their employees to be supported fully from their corporate funds and for such technical positions as may be
approved by the President in critical government agencies."42

The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the GOCCs under the SSL. Section 3(b) provides that one of the principles
governing the Compensation and Position Classification System of the Government is that: "[b]asic compensation for all personnel in
the government and government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall generally be comparable with those in
the private sector doing comparable work, and must be in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages."
Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the unified Compensation and Position Classification System of the
SSL,43 but rates of pay under the SSL were determined on the basis of, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for
comparable work. Notably, the Compensation and Position Classification System was to be governed by the following principles: (a)
just and equitable wages, with the ratio of compensation between pay distinctions maintained at equitable levels;44 and (b) basic
compensation generally comparable with the private sector, in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages.45 Also, the
Department of Budget and Management was directed to use, as guide for preparing the Index of Occupational Services, the
Benchmark Position Schedule, and the following factors:46
(1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the positions;
(2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed;
(3) the kind of supervision received;
(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work;
(5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships;
(6) kind of supervision exercised;
(7) decision-making responsibility;
(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;
(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and
(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.
The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within Salary Grades 1 to 20.
Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated in all aspects pertaining to compensation and position
classification, in consonance with Section 5, Article IX-B of the 1997 Constitution.47
Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the BSP, implicitly exempting the Monetary Board from the SSL by giving it
express authority to determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure. However, employees whose positions fall under
SG 19 and below were specifically limited to the rates prescribed under the SSL.
Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed. Significantly, each government financial institution (GFI) was not
only expressly authorized to determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure, but also explicitly exempted - without
distinction as to salary grade or position - all employees of the GFI from the SSL.
It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of exemption from the SSL, based on the perceived
need "to fulfill the mandate of the institution concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary
in character; (2) the GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with their[sic] counterparts in the private sector, not only in terms of the
provisions of goods or services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining competent personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or
were [sic] experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla positions with competent personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The need for
the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each institution, and the corresponding variance in the
benefits received by the employees is merely incidental."
The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is the central monetary authority,48 and the banker of the government and
all its political subdivisions.49 It has the sole power and authority to issue currency;50provide policy directions in the areas of money,
banking, and credit; and supervise banks and regulate finance companies and non-bank financial institutions performing quasi-banking
functions, including the exempted GFIs.51 Hence, the argument that the rank-and-file employees of the seven GFIs were exempted
because of the importance of their institution's mandate cannot stand any more than an empty sack can stand.
Second, it is certainly misleading to say that "the need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances
of each institution." Nowhere in the deliberations is there a cogent basis for the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file from the exemption
which was granted to the rank-and-file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As point in fact, the BSP and the seven GFIs are similarly

situated in so far as Congress deemed it necessary for these institutions to be exempted from the SSL. True, the SSL-exemption of the
BSP and the seven GFIs was granted in the amended charters of each GFI, enacted separately and over a period of time. But it bears
emphasis that, while each GFI has a mandate different and distinct from that of another, the deliberations show that the raison d'tre of
the SSL-exemption was inextricably linked to and for the most part based on factors common to the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role
they play in the economy; (2) the necessity of hiring and retaining qualified and effective personnel to carry out the GFI's mandate; and
(3) the recognition that the compensation package of these GFIs is not competitive, and fall substantially below industry standards.
Considering further that (a) the BSP was the first GFI granted SSL exemption; and (b) the subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did not
distinguish between the officers and the rank-and-file; it is patent that the classification made between the BSP rank-and-file and
those of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT intended,i.e., it was not based on any substantial distinction vis--vis the
particular circumstances of each GFI. Moreover, the exemption granted to two GFIs makes express reference to allowance and fringe
benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other GFIs,52 underscoring that GFIs are
a particular class within the realm of government entities.
It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of the BSP - made manifest and glaring with each and
every consequential grant of blanket exemption from the SSL to the other GFIs - that cannot be rationalized or justified. Even more so,
when the SEC - which is not a GFI - was given leave to have a compensation plan that "shall be comparable with the prevailing
compensation plan in the [BSP] and other [GFIs],"53 then granted a blanket exemption from the SSL, and its rank-and-file endowed a
more preferred treatment than the rank-and-file of the BSP.
The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when we are faced with this undeniable truth: that if
Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting the eight GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP
rank-and-file employees would have been devoid of any substantial or material basis. It bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful
discrimination was not a direct result arising from one law. "Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum." No one
is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly.
It has also been proffered that "similarities alone are not sufficient to support the conclusion that rank-and-file employees of the BSP
may be lumped together with similar employees of the other GOCCs for purposes of compensation, position classification and
qualification standards. The fact that certain persons have some attributes in common does not automatically make them members of
the same class with respect to a legislative classification." Cited is the ruling in Johnson v. Robinson:54 "this finding of similarity
ignores that a common characteristic shared by beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries alike, is not sufficient to invalidate a statute when
other characteristics peculiar to only one group rationally explain the statute's different treatment of the two groups."
The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US Court sustained the validity of the classification as there were quantitative
and qualitative distinctions, expressly recognized by Congress, which formed a rational basis for the classification limiting
educational benefits to military service veterans as a means of helping them readjust to civilian life. The Court listed the peculiar
characteristics as follows:
First, the disruption caused by military service is quantitatively greater than that caused by alternative civilian service. A
conscientious objector performing alternative service is obligated to work for two years. Service in the Armed Forces, on the
other hand, involves a six-year commitment
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Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and alternative service performers are qualitatively different. Military
veterans suffer a far greater loss of personal freedom during their service careers. Uprooted from civilian life, the military
veteran becomes part of the military establishment, subject to its discipline and potentially hazardous duty. Congress was
acutely aware of the peculiar disabilities caused by military service, in consequence of which military servicemen have a
special need for readjustment benefits55 (citations omitted)
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to
the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to
mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only superficial,56 but also arbitrary. It is not based
on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
Moreover, the issue in this case is not - as the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice Carpio-Morales would put it - whether "being an
employee of a GOCC or GFI is reasonable and sufficient basis for exemption" from R.A. No. 6758. It is Congress itself that
distinguished the GFIs from other government agencies, not once but eight times, through the enactment of R.A. Nos. 7653, 7907,
8282, 8289, 8291, 8523, 8763, and 9302. These laws may have created a "preferred sub-class within government employees," but the
present challenge is not directed at the wisdom of these laws. Rather, it is a legal conundrum involving the exercise of legislative power,
the validity of which must be measured not only by looking at the specific exercise in and by itself (R.A. No. 7653), but also as to
the legal effects brought about by seven separate exercises - albeit indirectly and without intent.
Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged "a comparable change in the factual milieu as regards the compensation, position classification
and qualification standards of the employees of the BSP (whether of the executive level or of the rank-and-file) since the enactment of
the new Central Bank Act" is of no moment. In GSIS v. Montesclaros,57 this Court resolved the issue of constitutionality notwithstanding
that claimant had manifested that she was no longer interested in pursuing the case, and even when the constitutionality of the said

provision was not squarely raised as an issue, because the issue involved not only the claimant but also others similarly situated and
whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the challenged proviso. The Court held that social justice and public interest demanded
the resolution of the constitutionality of the proviso. And so it is with the challenged proviso in the case at bar.
It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a "privilege" fully within the legislative prerogative to give or deny. However, its
subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached the
latter's right to equal protection. In other words, while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively within the
domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality of the exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review.58 So when the
distinction made is superficial, and not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between those included and
excluded, it becomes a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and the power to correct.59 As held in the United Kingdom
case of Hooper v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,60 once the State has chosen to confer benefits, "discrimination"
contrary to law may occur where favorable treatment already afforded to one group is refused to another, even though the State is
under no obligation to provide that favorable treatment. 61
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable
badge of invidious discrimination - no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket
and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as
unalikes without any rational basis.
Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to
every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those
that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on the
rest.62
In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between the rank-and-file of BSP from the
seven other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the
challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw.
IV.
Equal Protection Under International Lens
In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have followed the"rational basis" test,
coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications63 and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. 64
A. Equal Protection in the United States
In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the static "rational basis" test. Professor Gunther highlights the
development in equal protection jurisprudential analysis, to wit: 65
Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention in most contexts. Ordinarily, the command of equal
protection was only that government must not impose differences in treatment "except upon some reasonable differentiation
fairly related to the object of regulation." The old variety of equal protection scrutiny focused solely on the means used by
the legislature: it insisted merely that the classification in the statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose. Unlike
substantive due process, equal protection scrutiny was not typically concerned with identifying "fundamental values" and
restraining legislative ends. And usually the rational classification requirement was readily satisfied: the courts did not
demand a tight fit between classification and purpose; perfect congruence between means and ends was not required.
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[From marginal intervention to major cutting edge: The Warren Court's "new equal protection" and the two-tier approach.]
From its traditional modest role, equal protection burgeoned into a major intervention tool during the Warren
era, especially in the 1960s. The Warren Court did not abandon the deferential ingredients of the old equal protection: in most
areas of economic and social legislation, the demands imposed by equal protection remained as minimal as everBut the
Court launched an equal protection revolution by finding large new areas for strict rather than deferential scrutiny. A sharply
differentiated two-tier approachevolved by the late 1960s: in addition to the deferential "old" equal protection, a "new" equal
protection, connoting strict scrutiny, arose. The intensive review associated with the new equal protection imposed two
demands - a demand not only as to means but also one as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far
closer fit between classification and statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old
equal protection: means had to be shown "necessary" to achieve statutory ends, not merely "reasonably related"

ones. Moreover, equal protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new equal
protection had to be justified by "compelling" state interests, not merely the wide spectrum of "legitimate" state ends.
The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate for strict scrutiny by searching for two characteristics: the presence of
a "suspect" classification; or an impact on "fundamental" rights or interests. In the category of "suspect classifications," the
Warren Court's major contribution was to intensify the strict scrutiny in the traditionally interventionist area of racial
classifications. But other cases also suggested that there might be more other suspect categories as well: illegitimacy and
wealth for example. But it was the 'fundamental interests" ingredient of the new equal protection that proved particularly
dynamic, open-ended, and amorphous.. [Other fundamental interests included voting, criminal appeals, and the right of
interstate travel .]
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The Burger Court and Equal Protection.

The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the scope of the new equal protection, although its best established
ingredient retains vitality. There was also mounting discontent with the rigid two-tier formulations of the Warren Court's equal
protection doctrine. It was prepared to use the clause as an interventionist tool without resorting to the strict language of the
new equal protection. [Among the fundamental interests identified during this time were voting and access to the ballot,
while "suspect" classifications included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.]
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Even while the two-tier scheme has often been adhered to in form, there has also been an increasingly noticeable resistance
to the sharp difference between deferential "old" and interventionist "new" equal protection. A number of justices sought
formulations that would blur the sharp distinctions of the two-tiered approach or that would narrow the gap between strict
scrutiny and deferential review. The most elaborate attack came from Justice Marshall, whose frequently stated position was
developed most elaborately in his dissent in the Rodriguez case: 66
The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the
appropriate standard of review - strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this (sic) Court's [decisions] defy such easy
categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in
reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the equal protection clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the
degree of care with which Court will scrutinize particular classification, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal
importance of the interests adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn.
Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" approach describes many of the modern decisions, although it is a formulation that the
majority refused to embrace. But the Burger Court's results indicate at least two significant changes in equal protection
law: First, invocation of the "old" equal protection formula no longer signals, as it did with the Warren Court, an extreme
deference to legislative classifications and a virtually automatic validation of challenged statutes. Instead, several cases, even
while voicing the minimal "rationality" "hands-off" standards of the old equal protection, proceed to find the statute
unconstitutional.Second, in some areas the modern Court has put forth standards for equal protection review that, while
clearly more intensive than the deference of the "old" equal protection, are less demanding than the strictness of the "new"
equal protection. Sex discrimination is the best established example of an"intermediate" level of review. Thus, in one case,
the Court said that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives." That standard is "intermediate" with respect to both ends and means: where ends
must be "compelling" to survive strict scrutiny and merely "legitimate" under the "old" mode, "important" objectives are required
here; and where means must be "necessary" under the "new" equal protection, and merely "rationally related" under the "old"
equal protection, they must be "substantially related" to survive the "intermediate" level of review. (emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
B. Equal Protection in Europe
The United Kingdom and other members of the European Community have also gone forward in discriminatory legislation and
jurisprudence. Within the United Kingdom domestic law, the most extensive list of protected grounds can be found in Article 14 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It prohibits discrimination on grounds such as "sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status." This list is
illustrative and not exhaustive. Discrimination on the basis of race, sex and religion is regarded as grounds that require strict
scrutiny. A further indication that certain forms of discrimination are regarded as particularly suspect under the Covenant can be
gleaned from Article 4, which, while allowing states to derogate from certain Covenant articles in times of national emergency, prohibits
derogation by measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of "race, colour, language, religion or social origin."67
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a test of justification which varies with the ground of discrimination. In
the Belgian Linguistics case68 the European Court set the standard of justification at a low level: discrimination would contravene the

Convention only if it had no legitimate aim, or there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and
the aim sought to be realised.69 But over the years, the European Court has developed a hierarchy of grounds covered by Article
14 of the ECHR, a much higher level of justification being required in respect of those regarded as "suspect" (sex, race,
nationality, illegitimacy, or sexual orientation) than of others. Thus, in Abdulaziz, 70 the European Court declared that:
. . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the Council of Europe. This
means that very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a difference of treatment on the ground of sex could be
regarded as compatible with the Convention.
And in Gaygusuz v. Austria,71 the European Court held that "very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the Court
could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible with the
Convention."72 The European Court will then permit States a very much narrower margin of appreciation in relation to
discrimination on grounds of sex, race, etc., in the application of the Convention rights than it will in relation to distinctions drawn by
states between, for example, large and small land-owners. 73
C. Equality under International Law
The principle of equality has long been recognized under international law. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Non-discrimination, together with equality
before the law and equal protection of the law without any discrimination, constitutes basic principles in the protection of human
rights. 74
Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on discrimination and/or provisions about
equality.75 The general international provisions pertinent to discrimination and/or equality are the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR);76 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD);77 the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional instruments such as the American Convention on Human
Rights;78 the African Charter on Human and People's Rights;79 the European Convention on Human Rights;80 the European Social
Charter of 1961 and revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of Rights (of particular importance to European
states). Even the Council of the League of Arab States has adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994, although it has yet to
be ratified by the Member States of the League.81
The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional "first generation" rights, commonly viewed
as concerned only with constraining rather than requiring State action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires "guarantee[s]" of "equal
and effective protection against discrimination" while Articles 1 and 14 of the American and European Conventions oblige States Parties
"to ensure ... the full and free exercise of [the rights guaranteed] ... without any discrimination" and to "secure without discrimination" the
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed.82 These provisions impose a measure of positive obligation on States Parties to take steps to
eradicate discrimination.
In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and prevention of discrimination, are laid down in the
ICESCR83 and in a very large number of Conventions administered by the International Labour Organisation, a United Nations
body. 84 Additionally, many of the other international and regional human rights instruments have specific provisions relating to
employment.85
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone beyond the earlier tendency to view the prohibition against
discrimination (Article 26) as confined to the ICCPR rights.86 In Broeks87 and Zwaan-de Vries,88 the issue before the Committee was
whether discriminatory provisions in the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell within the scope of Article 26. The Dutch
government submitted that discrimination in social security benefit provision was not within the scope of Article 26, as the right was
contained in the ICESCR and not the ICCPR. They accepted that Article 26 could go beyond the rights contained in the Covenant to
other civil and political rights, such as discrimination in the field of taxation, but contended that Article 26 did not extend to the social,
economic, and cultural rights contained in ICESCR. The Committee rejected this argument. In its view, Article 26 applied to rights
beyond the Covenant including the rights in other international treaties such as the right to social security found in ICESCR:
Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not of itself contain any obligation with
respect to the matters that may be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for example, require any state to enact
legislation to provide for social security. However, when such legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State's sovereign
power, then such legislation must comply with Article 26 of the Covenant.89
Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or indirectly. A classification may be struck down if it has the purpose or
effect of violating the right to equal protection. International law recognizes that discrimination may occur indirectly, as the Human
Rights Committee90 took into account the definitions of discrimination adopted by CERD and CEDAW in declaring that:

. . . "discrimination" as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference
which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status, and which has thepurpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. 91 (emphasis supplied)
Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by
subsequent operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international
law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational
discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection
afforded to labor, compel this approach.92
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international law, we held in International School Alliance
of Educators v. Quisumbing: 93
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy
against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law
include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation - all embody the general principle
against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated
this principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and
discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted
to the physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the manner by which employers treat their
employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code
provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both
the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal
employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and [favorable] conditions
of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular
women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal
work;
xxx

xxx

xxx

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal
work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should
be paid similar salaries. (citations omitted)
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition and respect by
the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution.94 The deference stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this
Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting
adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.

Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no
support in American or English jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this
jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions.95 We should not place undue and
fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions
through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our
own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and
justice.96 Our laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the
language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our
own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and
different from others.97
In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated that: "[A]merican jurisprudence and authorities, much
less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited
persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned....[I]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional
settings and needs."98 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of
development have long since diverged. 99
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an
ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in Article II,
Section 10, in "all phases of national development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take
affirmative action in the direction of greater equality. [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support
for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.100
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including
labor.101 Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the
humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law.102 And the obligation to afford protection to labor is
incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living
reality.103 Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice
in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.104
V.
A Final Word
Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been proffered that the remedy
of petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653.
Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad
discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the
legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment. 105
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against
persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down
view would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it
enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its
instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor. 106
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not the
prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the
problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or
limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution - would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial
inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential form of
government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a
consequence,We have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the
ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest
Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution - to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, it was held
that courts have a "duty, rather than a power", to determine whether another branch of the government has "kept within
constitutional limits." Not satisfied with this postulate, the court went farther and stressed that, if the Constitution provides how
it may be amended - as it is in our 1935 Constitution - "then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the interpreter of
that constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." In fact, this very Court - speaking through Justice Laurel, an outstanding
authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, as well as one of the highly respected and foremost leaders of the Convention that
drafted the 1935 Constitution - declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of social disquietude or political excitement,

the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments" of the government.107 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a
distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower
grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, lowsalaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees
are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and
opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if
not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of
job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment This is in
accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent
standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all."108 Any act of Congress that runs counter to this
constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent rank-andfile government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit
and negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only
are they impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the
other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should
not be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years
for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty to save them from reasonless discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic
Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO,
ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike but hear me first!" It is this cry that
the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering
of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition
against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the
disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or
carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by
the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by
the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1The petitioner sued for recovery, and the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the
merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack
of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before
us in this petition for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according
the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure
should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the
legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question raised there was
the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed
the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General,
impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may
provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain
measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be
rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the
hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least
resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more
deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss
of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of
merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully
executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his
judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act
adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders
or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that
extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the
determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted
discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we
confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language to avoid
controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule
was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was
submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the
Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because
due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for
all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant
to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a
legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead,
they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of
inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme
Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more and nothing
less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed
against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby
won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow
that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent
or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his
cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is
formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also
be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable
that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem
not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a
hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the
insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because
they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence
of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We
have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel
Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be
secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn
and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The
conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human
experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are
instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per
se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the
people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The
passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has
fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public
morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the
property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due
process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the
general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least
limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual,
as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is
dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous
and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation
under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est
suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater
number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order
No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as
expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of
the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the
worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have
been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of
large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for
having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed.
The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by
farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in
agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the
consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and
branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as
follows:
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration
was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work
or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the
loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary
gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community
may be measurably and dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a
direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is
also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the
above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if
male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm
work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with
equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original
measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on theslaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing
that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought
to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering
that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As
for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply
killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be
prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that
the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to
be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged
measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after
he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to
produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner
without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the
usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in
administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however.
there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected
and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties
involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited
by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in
nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had
the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned
executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions
as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commissionmay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industrymay see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an
extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even
corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers
must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and
they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission,"
a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation
of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable
in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was
his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the
President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court,
in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now
annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never have
reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become afait accompli despite its invalidity. We
commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another
violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the
limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are
ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as
weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they
are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 74621 February 7, 1990

BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT AND BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES AND
WORKER'S UNION-FFW Represented by EDUARDO A. AFUAN, respondents.
Renato B. Pagatpatan for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:
This petition for review by certiorari seeks the annulment or modification of the Order of public respondent Minister of Labor dated
December 9, 1985 in a case for non-compliance with Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 docketed as ROXI-LSED Case No. 14-85 which 1)
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated February 3, 1986 and 2) affirmed the Order of Regional Director Eugenio I.
Sagmit, Jr., Regional Office No. XI Davao City, dated April 12, 1985, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Incorporated is hereby ordered to
pay the above-named workers, through this Office, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof, the total sum of TWO
HUNDRED EIGHTY- FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE (P284,625.00) PESOS representing their
living allowance under Wage Order No. 5 covering the period from October 16, 1984 to February 28, 1985 and under
Wage Order No. 6 effective November 1, 1984 to February 28, 1985. Respondent is further ordered to pay the
employees who are likewise entitled to the claims here presented, but whose names were inadvertently omitted in the
list and computation. (Rollo, p. 7)
Petitioner contends that the respondent Minister of Labor and Employment acted without, or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in failing to hold:
A) That the Regional Director committed grave abuse of discretion in asserting exclusive jurisdiction and in not
certifying this case to the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission for a full-blown hearing on
the merits;
B) That the Regional Director erred in not ruling on the counterclaim raised by the respondent (in the labor case, and
now petitioner in this case);
C) That the Regional Director erred -in skirting the constitutional and legal issues raised. (Rollo, p. 4)
This case originated from a complaint filed by private respondents against petitioner on September 21, 1984 with the Regional Office of
the MOLE, Region XI, Davao City for non-compliance with the provisions of Wage Order No. 5. After due healing the Regional Director
rendered a decision dated November 16, 1984 in favor of private respondents. Judgment having become final and executory, the
Regional Director issued a Writ of Execution whereby some movable properties of the hospital (petitioner herein) were levied upon and
its operating expenses kept with the bank were garnished. The levy and garnishment were lifted when petitioner hospital paid the claim
of the private respondents (281 hospital employees) directly, in the total amount of P163,047.50 covering the period from June 16 to
October 15, 1984.
After making said payment, petitioner hospital failed to continue to comply with Wage Order No. 5 and likewise, failed to comply with
the new Wage Order No. 6 which took effect on November 1, 1984, prompting private respondents to file against petitioner another
complaint docketed as ROXI-LSED-14-85, which is now the case at bar.
In its answer, petitioner raised the following affirmative defenses:

1) That the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor did not acquire jurisdiction over it for want of allegation that it has
the capacity to be sued and
2) That Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 are non-constitutional and therefore void. Significantly petitioner never averred any
counterclaim in its Answer.
After the complainants had filed their reply, petitioner filed a Motion for the Certification of the case to the National Labor Relations
Commission for a full-blown hearing on the matter, including the counterclaim interposed that the complainants had unpaid obligations
with the Hospital which might be offset with the latter's alleged obligation to the former.
Issues having been joined, the Regional Director rendered a decision on April 12, 1985 in favor of the complainants (private
respondents herein) declaring that petitioner (respondent therein) is estopped from questioning the acquisition of jurisdiction because
its appearance in the hearing is in itself submission to jurisdiction and that this case is merely a continuance of a previous case where
the hospital already willingly paid its obligations to the workers on orders of the Regional Office. On the matter of the constitutionality of
the Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6, the Regional Director declared that only the court can declare a law or order unconstitutional and until so
declared by the court, the Office of the Regional Director is duly bound to enforce the law or order.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Office of the Minister of Labor, which dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by said Office, giving rise to the instant petition reiterating the issues earlier mentioned.
The crucial issue We are tasked to resolve is whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction over money claims of workers
concurrent with the Labor Arbiter.
It is worthy of note that the instant case was deliberated upon by this Court at the same time that Briad Agro Development Corporation
v. de la Cerna, G.R. No. 82805 and L.M. Camus Engineering Corporation v. Hon. Secretary of Labor, et al. G.R. No. 83225,
promulgated on June 29,1989 and Maternity Children's Hospital vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor, et al., G.R. No. 78909, promulgated 30
June 1989, where deliberated upon; for all three (3) cases raised the same issue of jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the
Department of Labor to pass upon money claims of employees. Hence, we will be referring to these cases, most especially the case of
Briad Agro which, as will be seen later, was reconsidered by the court.
Contrary to the claim of petitioners that the original and exclusive jurisdiction over said money claims is properly lodged in the Labor
Arbiter (relying on the case of Zambales Base Metals Inc. v. Minister of Labor, 146 SCRA 50) and the Regional Director has no
jurisdiction over workers' money claims, the Court in the three (3) cases above-mentioned ruled that in view of the promulgation of
Executive Order No. 111, the ruling in the earlier case of Zambales Base Metals is already abandoned. In accordance with the rulings in
Briad Agro, L.M. Camus, and Maternity Children's Hospital, the Regional Director exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the Labor
Arbiter over money claims. Thus,
. . . . Executive Order No. 111 is in the character of a curative law, that is to say, it was intended to remedy a defect
that, in the opinion of the legislative (the incumbent Chief Executive in this case, in the exercise of her lawmaking
power under the Freedom Constitution) had attached to the provision subject of the amendment. This is clear from
the proviso: "The provisions of Article 217 to the contrary notwithstanding . . ." Plainly, the amendment was meant to
make both the Secretary of Labor (or the various Regional Directors) and the Labor Arbiter share jurisdiction. (Briad
Agro Dev. Corp. v. Sec. of Labor, supra).
Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power over labor standards
cases, and is therefore empowered to adj udicate money claims, provided there stillexists an employer-employee
relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the employer concerned. (Maternity Children's
Hospital v. Sec. of Labor, supra).
However, it is very significant to note, at this point, that the decision in the consolidated cases of Briad Agro Development Corp. and
L.M. Camus Engineering Corp. was reconsidered and set aside by this Court in a Resolution promulgated on November 9,1989. In
view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 6715, approved on March 2, 1989, the Court found that reconsideration was proper.
RA 6715 amended Art. 129 and Art. 217 of the Labor Code, to read as follows:
ART. 129. Recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits.Upon complaint of any interested party, the
Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment or any of the duly authorized hearing officers of the
Department is empowered, through summary proceeding and after due notice, to hear and decide any matter
involving the recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest, owing to an
employee or person employed in domestic or household service or househelper under this code, arising from
employer-employee relations, Provided, That such complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement; Provided,
further, That the aggregate money claims of each employee or househelper do not exceed five thousand pesos

(P5,000.00). The Regional Director or hearing officer shall decide or resolve the complaint within thirty (30) calendar
days from the date of the filing of the same . . .
Any decision or resolution of the Regional Director or hearing officer pursuant to this provision may be appealed on
the same grounds provided in Article 223 of this Code, within five (5) calendar days from 11 receipt of a copy of said
decision or resolution, to the National Labor Relations Commission which shall resolve the appeal within ten (10)
calendar days from the submission of the last pleading required or allowed under its rules.
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. Except as otherwise provided under this code, the
Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after
the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of steno graphic notes,
the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
(1) Unfair labor practice cases;
(2) Termination disputes;
(3) If accompanied with a claim of reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay,
hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relation;
(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and
lockouts; and
(6) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims
arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an
amount not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), whether or not accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
It will be observed that what in fact conferred upon Regional Directors and other hearing officers of the Department of Labor (aside from
the Labor Arbiters) adjudicative powers, i.e., the power to try and decide, or hear and determine any claim brought before them for
recovery of wages, simple money claims, and other benefits, is Republic Act 6715, provided that the following requisites concur, to wit:
1) The claim is presented by an employee or person employed in domestic or household service, or househelper
under the code;
2) The claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and
3) The aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
In the absence of any of the three (3) requisites, the Labor Arbiters have exclusive original jurisdiction over all claims arising from
employer-employee relations, other than claims for employee's compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits.
We hereby adopt the view taken by Mr. Justice Andres Narvasa in his Separate Opinion in the case of Briad Agro Dev. Corp., as
reconsidered, a portion of which reads:
In the resolution, therefore, of any question of jurisdiction over a money claim arising from employer-employee
relations, the first inquiry should be into whether the employment relation does indeed still exist between the claimant
and the respondent.
If the relation no longer exists, and the claimant does not seek reinstatement, the case is cognizable by the Labor
Arbiter, not by the Regional Director. On the other hand, if the employment relation still exists, or reinstatement is
sought, the next inquiry should be into the amount involved.
If the amount involved does not exceed P5,000.00, the Regional Director undeniably has jurisdiction. But even if the
amount of the claim exceeds P5,000.00, the claim is not on that account necessary removed from the Regional
Director's competence. In respect thereof, he may still exercise the visitorial and enforcement powers vested in him
by Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, supra; that is to say, he may still direct his labor regulations officers or
industrial safety engineers to inspect the employer's premises and examine his records; and if the officers should find
that there have been violations of labor standards provisions, the Regional Director may, after due notice and

hearing, order compliance by the employer therewith and issue a writ of execution to the appropriate authority for the
enforcement thereof. However, this power may not, to repeat, be exercised by him where the employer contests the
labor regulation officers' findings and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters
not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. In such an event, the case will have to be referred to the
corresponding Labor Arbiter for adjudication, since it falls within the latter's exclusive original jurisdiction.
Anent the other issue involved in the instant case, petitioner's contention that the constitutionality of Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 should
be passed upon by the National Labor Relations Commission, lacks merit. The Supreme Court is vested by the Constitution with the
power to ultimately declare a law unconstitutional. Without such declaration, the assailed legislation remains operative and can be the
source of rights and duties especially so in the case at bar when petitioner complied with Wage Order No. 5 by paying the claimants the
total amount of P163,047.50, representing the latter's minimum wage increases up to October 16, 1984, instead of questioning
immediately at that stage before paying the amount due, the validity of the order on grounds of constitutionality. The Regional Director
is plainly ,without the authority to declare an order or law unconstitutional and his duty is merely to enforce the law which stands valid,
unless otherwise declared by this Tribunal to be unconstitutional. On our part, We hereby declare the assailed Wage Orders as
constitutional, there being no provision of the 1973 Constitution (or even of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution)
violated by said Wage Orders, which Orders are without doubt for the benefit of labor.
Based on the foregoing considerations, it is our shared view that the findings of the labor regulations officers may not be deemed
uncontested as to bring the case at bar within the competence of the Regional Director, as duly authorized representative of the
Secretary of Labor, pursuant to Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended. Considering further that the aggregate claims involve an
amount in excess of P5,000.00, We find it more appropriate that the issue of petitioner hospital's liability therefor, including the proposal
of petitioner that the obligation of private respondents to the former in the aggregate amount of P507,237.57 be used to offset its
obligations to them, be ventilated and resolved, not in a summary proceeding before the Regional Director under Article 128 of the
Labor Code, as amended, but in accordance With the more formal and extensive proceeding before the Labor Arbiter. Nevertheless, it
should be emphasized that the amount of the employer's liability is not quite a factor in determining the jurisdiction of the Regional
Director. However, the power to order compliance with labor standards provisions may not be exercised where the employer contends
or questions the findings of the labor regulation officers and raises issues which cannot be determined without taking into account
evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal course of inspection, as in the case at bar.
Viewed in the light of RA 6715 and read in consonance with the case of Briad Agro Development Corp., as reconsidered, We hold that
the instant case falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter RA 6715 is in the nature of a curative statute. Curative
statutes have long been considered valid in our jurisdiction, as long as they do not affect vested rights. In this case, We do not see any
vested right that will be impaired by the application of RA 6715. Inasmuch as petitioner had already paid the claims of private
respondents in the amount of P163,047.50 pursuant to the decision rendered in the first complaint, the only claim that should be
deliberated upon by the Labor Arbiter should be limited to the second amount given by the Regional Director in the second complaint
together with the proposal to offset the obligations.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Director dated April 12, 1985, is SET ASIDE. The case is REFERRED, if the
respondents are so minded, to the Labor Arbiter for proper proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

EVELYN ONGSUCO and ANTONIA SALAYA,

Petitioners,

G . R. N o. 1 8 2 0 6 5
Present:

- versus HON. MARIANO M. MALONES, both in his

private and official capacity as Mayor of the
Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo,
Respondent.

QUISUMBING,* J.,
CARPIO,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
PERALTA, and
ABAD,** JJ.
Promulgated:
October 27, 2009

x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision [1] dated 28 November 2006, rendered by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86182, which affirmed the Decision [2] dated 15 July 2003, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39, of
Iloilo City, in Civil Case No. 25843, dismissing the special civil action for Mandamus/Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, filed by petitioners Evelyn Ongsuco and Antonia Salaya against respondent Mayor Mariano
Malones of the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo.

Petitioners are stall holders at the Maasin Public Market, which had just been newly renovated. In a letter[3] dated 6 August 1998, the Office
of the Municipal Mayor informed petitioners of a meeting scheduled on 11 August 1998 concerning the municipal public market. Revenue measures
were discussed during the said meeting, including the increase in the rentals for the market stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees in the amount
of P20,000.00,[4] payable every month.

On 17 August 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approved Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, entitled The Municipal Revised
Revenue Code. The Code contained a provision for increased rentals for the stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees in the amount of P20,000.00
and P15,000.00 for stalls located on the first and second floors of the municipal public market, respectively. The same Code authorized respondent to
enter into lease contracts over the said market stalls, [5] and incorporated a standard contract of lease for the stall holders at the municipal public
market.

Only a month later, on 18 September 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approved Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, [6] moving to
have the meeting dated 11 August 1998 declared inoperative as a public hearing, because majority of the persons affected by the imposition of the
goodwill fee failed to agree to the said measure. However, Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, of theSangguniang Bayan of Maasin was vetoed by
respondent on 30 September 1998.[7]

After Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was approved on 17 August 1998, another purported public hearing was held on 22 January 1999.[8]

On 9 June 1999, respondent wrote a letter to petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls in the newly renovated municipal
public market without any lease contract, as a consequence of which, the stalls were considered vacant and open for qualified and interested
applicants.[9]
This prompted petitioners, together with other similarly situated stall holders at the municipal public market, [10] to file before the RTC on 25
June 1999 a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
[11]

against respondent. The Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 25843.

Petitioners alleged that they were bona fide occupants of the stalls at the municipal public market, who had been religiously paying the
monthly rentals for the stalls they occupied.

Petitioners argued that public hearing was mandatory in the imposition of goodwill fees. Section 186 of the Local Government Code of
1991 provides that an ordinance levying taxes, fees, or charges shall not be enacted without any prior hearing conducted for the purpose. Municipal
Ordinance No. 98-01, imposing goodwill fees, is invalid on the ground that the conferences held on 11 August 1998 and 22 January 1999 could not
be considered public hearings. According to Article 277(b)(3) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code:
(3) The notice or notices shall specify the date or dates and venue of the public hearing or hearings. The initial public
hearing shall be held not earlier than ten (10) days from the sending out of the notice or notices, or the last day of publication,
or date of posting thereof, whichever is later. (Emphasis ours.)

The letter from the Office of the Municipal Mayor was sent to stall holders on 6 August 1998, informing the latter of the meeting to be held, as was in
fact held, on 11 August 1998, only five daysafter notice.[12]

Hence, petitioners prayed that respondent be enjoined from imposing the goodwill fees pending the determination of the reasonableness
thereof, and from barring petitioners from occupying the stalls at the municipal public market and continuing with the operation of their businesses.

Respondent, in answer, maintained that Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 is valid. He reasoned that Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 imposed
goodwill fees to raise income to pay for the loan obtained by the Municipality of Maasin for the renovation of its public market. Said ordinance is
not per se a tax or revenue measure, but involves the operation and management of an economic enterprise of the Municipality of Maasin as a local
government unit; thus, there was no mandatory requirement to hold a public hearing for the enactment thereof. And, even granting that a public
hearing was required, respondent insisted that public hearings take place on 11 August 1998 and 22 January 1999.

Respondent further averred that petitioners were illegally occupying the market stalls, and the only way petitioners could legitimize their
occupancy of said market stalls would be to execute lease contracts with the Municipality of Maasin. While respondent admitted that petitioners had
been paying rentals for their market stalls in the amount of P45.00 per month prior to the renovation of the municipal public market, respondent
asserted that no rentals were paid or collected from petitioners ever since the renovation began.

Respondent sought from the RTC an award for moral damages in the amount of not less than P500,000.00, for the social humiliation and
hurt feelings he suffered by reason of the unjustified filing by petitioners of Civil Case No. 25843; and an order for petitioners to vacate the renovated
market stalls and pay reasonable rentals from the date they began to occupy said stalls until they vacate the same.

[13]

The RTC subsequently rendered a Decision[14] on 15 July 2003 dismissing the Petition in Civil Case No. 25843.

The RTC found that petitioners could not avail themselves of the remedy of mandamus or prohibition. It reasoned that mandamus would
not lie in this case where petitioners failed to show a clear legal right to the use of the market stalls without paying the goodwill fees imposed by the
municipal government. Prohibition likewise would not apply to the present case where respondents acts, sought to be enjoined, did not involve the
exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

The RTC also dismissed the Petition in Civil Case No. 25843 on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Petitioners
failure to question the legality of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 before the Secretary of Justice, as provided under Section 187 of the Local
Government Code,[15] rendered the Petition raising the very same issue before the RTC premature.

The dispositive part of the RTC Decision dated 15 July 2003 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and finding the petition without merit, the same is, as it is hereby ordered,
dismissed. [16]

On 12 August 2003, petitioners and their co-plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration. [17] The RTC denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration in a Resolution dated 18 June 2004.[18]

While Civil Case No. 25843 was pending, respondent filed before the 12 th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of CabatuanMaasin, Iloilo City a case in behalf of the Municipality ofMaasin against petitioner Evelyn Ongsuco, entitled Municipality of Maasin v. Ongsuco, a
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer with Damages, docketed as MCTC Civil Case No. 257. On 18 June 2002, the MCTC decided in favor of
the Municipality of Maasin and ordered petitioner Ongsuco to vacate the market stalls she occupied, Stall No. 1-03 and Stall No. 1-04, and to pay
monthly rentals in the amount of P350.00 for each stall from October 2001 until she vacates the said market stalls. [19] On appeal, Branch 36 of the
RTC of Maasin, Iloilo City, promulgated a Decision, dated 29 April 2003, in a case docketed as Civil Case No. 02-27229 affirming the decision of
the MCTC. A Writ of Execution was issued by the MCTC on 8 December 2003.[20]

Petitioners, in their appeal before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 86182, challenged the dismissal of their Petition for
Prohibition/Mandamus docketed as Civil Case No. 25843 by the RTC. Petitioners explained that they did appeal the enactment of Municipal
Ordinance No. 98-01 before the Department of Justice, but their appeal was not acted upon because of their failure to attach a copy of said municipal
ordinance. Petitioners claimed that one of their fellow stall holders, Ritchelle Mondejar, wrote a letter to the Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Municipal
Treasurer of Maasin, requesting a copy of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, but received no reply. [21]

In its Decision dated 28 November 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86182, the Court of Appeals again ruled in respondents favor.

The Court of Appeals declared that the goodwill fee was a form of revenue measure, which the Municipality of Maasin was empowered to
impose under Section 186 of the Local Government Code. Petitioners failed to establish any grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent in
enforcing goodwill fees.

The Court of Appeals additionally held that even if respondent acted in grave abuse of discretion, petitioners resort to a petition for
prohibition was improper, since respondents acts in question herein did not involve the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, as
required under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Also, the filing by petitioners of the Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus before the RTC was
premature, as they failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior thereto. The appellate court did not give any weight to petitioners assertion that
they filed an appeal challenging the legality of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 before the Secretary of Justice, as no proof was presented to support
the same.

In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the instant appeal bereft of merit. The assailed decision
dated July 15, 2003 as well as the subsequent resolution dated 18 June 2004 are herebyAFFIRMED and the instant appeal is
hereby DISMISSED. [22]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration [23] of the foregoing Decision, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution[24] dated 8 February 2008.

Hence, the present Petition, where petitioners raise the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE EXHAUSTED ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE FILING THE
INSTANT CASE IN COURT;
II
WHETHER OR NOT EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE; AND
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLEE MARIANO MALONES WHO WAS THEN THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF
MAASIN, ILOILO HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.[25]

After a close scrutiny of the circumstances that gave rise to this case, the Court determines that there is no need for petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies before resorting to the courts.

The findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that petitioners Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus in Civil Case No. 25843 was
premature is anchored on Section 187 of the Local Government Code, which reads:
Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public
Hearings.The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of
this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided,
further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on
appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty
(60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the
effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally,That within
thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the
appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis ours.)

It is true that the general rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or
herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such
remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to
ones cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative
remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. However, there are several exceptions to this rule. [26]

The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue raised is a
purely legal question, well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency, would clearly constitute an

exception.[27] Resolving questions of law, which involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial
power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts the Legislature may establish. [28]

In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need to present evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised
before the RTC in Civil Case No. 25843 was whetherMunicipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its
enactment, of a public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code. This
is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.

Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly
recognizes the original jurisdiction of lower courts over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Emphases ours.)

In J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[29] Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[30] and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Santos,[31] the Court has affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve questions of constitutionality and validity of laws (deemed to include local
ordinances) in the first instance, without deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy.

Although not raised in the Petition at bar, the Court is compelled to discuss another procedural issue, specifically, the declaration by the RTC, and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that petitioners availed themselves of the wrong remedy in filing a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus before the
RTC.

Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances petitions for prohibition and mandamus
may be filed, to wit:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. (Emphases ours.)

In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person -- whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions -- who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays that judgment be rendered,

commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition. [32] On the other hand, the remedy of
mandamus lies to compel performance of a ministerial duty.[33] The petitioner for such a writ should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right
to the performance of the act, and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done. [34]

In this case, petitioners primary intention is to prevent respondent from implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, i.e., by collecting
the goodwill fees from petitioners and barring them from occupying the stalls at the municipal public market. Obviously, the writ petitioners seek is
more in the nature of prohibition (commanding desistance), rather than mandamus (compelling performance).

For a writ of prohibition, the requisites are: (1) the impugned act must be that of a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions; and (2) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [35]

The exercise of judicial function consists of the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then to
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. The term quasi-judicial function applies to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or
bodies that are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. In implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, respondent is not called upon to
adjudicate the rights of contending parties or to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial nature.

A ministerial function is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without
regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. [36]

The Court holds that respondent herein is performing a ministerial function.

It bears to emphasize that Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 enjoys the presumption of validity, unless declared otherwise. Respondent has
the duty to carry out the provisions of the ordinance under Section 444 of the Local Government Code:
Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The Municipal mayor, as the chief
executive of the municipal government, shall exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions as provided by this
Code and other laws.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality
and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the Municipal mayor shall:
xxxx
(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the municipality and the exercise of its corporate
powers provided for under Section 22 of this Code, implement all approved policies, programs, projects, services and activities of
the municipality x x x.
xxxx
(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of
development plans, program objectives sand priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources
and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
xxxx

(iii) Ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the municipality are collected, and that municipal funds are applied
in accordance with law or ordinance to the payment of expenses and settlement of obligations of the municipality; x x x.
(Emphasis ours.)

Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 imposes increased rentals and goodwill fees on stall holders at the renovated municipal public market,
leaving respondent, or the municipal treasurer acting as his alter ego, no discretion on whether or not to collect the said rentals and fees from the stall
holders, or whether or to collect the same in the amounts fixed by the ordinance.

The Court further notes that respondent already deemed petitioners stalls at the municipal public market vacated. Without such stalls,
petitioners would be unable to conduct their businesses, thus, depriving them of their means of livelihood. It is imperative on petitioners part to have
the implementation of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 by respondent stopped the soonest. As this Court has established in its previous discussion,
there is no more need for petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies, considering that the fundamental issue between them and respondent is one
of law, over which the courts have competence and jurisdiction. There is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for petitioners in the ordinary
course of law, except to seek from the courts the issuance of a writ of prohibition commanding respondent to desist from continuing to implement
what is allegedly an invalid ordinance.

This brings the Court to the substantive issue in this Petition on the validity of Municipal Ordinance N. 98-01.

Respondent maintains that the imposition of goodwill fees upon stall holders at the municipal public market is not a revenue measure that
requires a prior public hearing. Rentals and other consideration for occupancy of the stalls at the municipal public market are not matters of taxation.

Respondents argument is specious.

Article 219 of the Local Government Code provides that a local government unit exercising its power to impose taxes, fees and charges
should comply with the requirements set in Rule XXX, entitled Local Government Taxation:
Article 219. Power to Create Sources of Revenue.Consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, each LGU shall exercise
its power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, or charges, subject to the provisions of this Rule. Such
taxes, fees, or charges shall accrue exclusively to the LGU. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 221(g) of the Local Government Code of 1991 defines charges as:
Article 221. Definition of Terms.
xxxx
(g) Charges refer to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property. (Emphasis ours.)

Evidently, the revenues of a local government unit do not consist of taxes alone, but also other fees and charges. And rentals and goodwill
fees, imposed by Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 for the occupancy of the stalls at the municipal public market, fall under the definition of charges.

For the valid enactment of ordinances imposing charges, certain legal requisites must be met. Section 186 of the Local Government Code
identifies such requisites as follows:

Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges.Local government units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or
charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees or charges shall not be unjust, excessive,
oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees
or charges shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis ours.)

Section 277 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code establishes in detail the procedure for the
enactment of such an ordinance, relevant provisions of which are reproduced below:
Section 277. Publication of Tax Ordinance and Revenue Measures.x x x.
xxxx
(b) The conduct of public hearings shall be governed by the following procedure:
xxxx
(2) In addition to the requirement for publication or posting, the sanggunian concerned shall cause the sending
of written notices of the proposed ordinance, enclosing a copy thereof, to the interested or affected parties operating or doing
business within the territorial jurisdiction of the LGU concerned.
(3) The notice or notices shall specify the date or dates and venue of the public hearing or hearings. The initial public
hearing shall be held not earlier than ten (10) days from the sending out of the notice or notices, or the last day of publication,
or date of posting thereof, whichever is later;
xxxx
(c) No tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be enacted or approved in the absence of a public hearing duly
conducted in the manner provided under this Article. (Emphases ours.)

It is categorical, therefore, that a public hearing be held prior to the enactment of an ordinance levying taxes, fees, or charges; and that such
public hearing be conducted as provided under Section 277 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code.

There is no dispute herein that the notices sent to petitioners and other stall holders at the municipal public market were sent out on 6
August 1998, informing them of the supposed public hearing to be held on 11 August 1998. Even assuming that petitioners received their notice also
on 6 August 1998, the public hearing was already scheduled, and actually conducted, only five dayslater, on 11 August 1998. This contravenes
Article 277(b)(3) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code which requires that the public hearing be held no less
thanten days from the time the notices were sent out, posted, or published.

When the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin sought to correct this procedural defect through Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, dated 18
September 1998, respondent vetoed the said resolution.Although the Sangguniang Bayan may have had the power to override respondents veto, [37] it
no longer did so.

The defect in the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98 was not cured when another public hearing was held on 22 January
1999, after the questioned ordinance was passed by theSangguniang Bayan and approved by respondent on 17 August 1998. Section 186 of the
Local Government Code prescribes that the public hearing be held prior to the enactment by a local government unit of an ordinance levying taxes,
fees, and charges.

Since no public hearing had been duly conducted prior to the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, said ordinance is void and
cannot be given any effect. Consequently, a void and ineffective ordinance could not have conferred upon respondent the jurisdiction to order
petitioners stalls at the municipal public market vacant.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 28 November 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86182 is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 is DECLARED void and ineffective, and a
writ of prohibition is ISSUED commanding the Mayor of the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo, to permanently desist from enforcing the said
ordinance. Petitioners are also DECLARED as lawful occupants of the market stalls they occupied at the time they filed the Petition for
Mandamus/Prohibition docketed as Civil Case No. 25843. In the event that they were deprived of possession of the said market stalls, petitioners are
entitled to recover possession of these stalls.
SO ORDERED.