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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8018

October 26, 1955

GIL ATUN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,


vs.
EUSEBIO NUEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Doroteo L. Serrano for appellants.
Alfredo S. Rebueno for appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Albay dismissing the complaint for recovery of
a parcel of registered land upon a motion to dismiss filed by defendants after plaintiffs had closed
their evidence. The land in question is located in Legaspi City and registered in the name of
Estefania Atun, deceased aunt of plaintiffs, under Original Certificate of Title No. 11696 of the
Registry of Property of Albay. The complaint was filed on August 7, 1950.
The evidence for the plaintiffs-appellants shows that they inherited the land in question from their
widowed aunt Estefania Atun (sister of their deceased father Nicolas Atun), who died without any
issue; that they had possessed the land from 1927 to 1930, when plaintiff Gil Atun delivered the
same to Silvestra Nuez (sister of defendant-appellee Eusebio Nuez) for cultivation, for which
Silvestra paid the Atuns a part of the harvest as rental; that in 1940, Silvestra turned over the land to
defendant Eusebio Nuez, who thereafter refused to recognize plaintiffs' ownership or to deliver their
share of the produce; and that defendant Eusebio Nuez in turn sold the land to his co-defendant
Diego Belga, who took the property with the knowledge that it belonged, not to Nuez, but to
plaintiffs.
Upon a demurrer to the evidence, filed by defendants after plaintiffs had rested their case, the lower
Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the period of ten years within which plaintiffs could
have filed an action for recovery thereof under section 40 of Act 190 (computed from the time
plaintiffs lost possession of the land in 1940), had already elapsed, hence their action had
prescribed; and that furthermore, plaintiffs failed to prove their alleged ownership of the land in
question, so that the presumption that defendants, being possessors, are the lawful owners thereof,
had not been overcome. Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the
complaint having been denied, they appealed to the Court of Appeals, which forwarded the case to
us because the appeal raises question of law.
The sole issue herein is whether the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint on
the ground of prescription of action.
The dismissal is erroneous. The land in question is admittedly covered by a Torrens title in the name
of Estefania Atun, deceased aunt of plaintiffs. Section 40 of Act 496 expressly provides that no title to
registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. And this Court has repeatedly held that the right of the registered owner to
recover possession of the registered property is equally imprescriptible, since possession is a mere
consequence of ownership. (Manlapas vs. Llorente, 48 Phil., 298, 308;
Eugenio vs. Perdido, supra, p. 41; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaos, 95 Phil., 106.)
We are aware, of course, that title by adverse possession (acquisitive prescription) is distinct
from the statute of limitations (extinctive prescription) and the operation and effects of such
distinction has been explored during the discussions of this petition for review.

But we have finally agreed that, as to the lands registered under the Torrens system, ten
years' adverse possession may not be permitted to defeat the owners' right to possession
which is the necessary incident of ownership. Otherwise loss of the land by prescription
would be indirectly approved, in violation of sec. 46 of the Land Registration Act. This statute,
being a later enactment, may be said to have partially amended the Statute of Limitations
established in Act No. 190 in so far as the registered lands are concerned. (Juan Eugenio, et
al. vs. Silvina Perdido, et al., L-7083, May 19, 1955.)
And if prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally unavailing against
the latter's hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent by
operation of law (new Civil Code, Art. 777; Art. 657, old), the title or right undergoing no change by
its transmission mortis causa.
The lower Court also erred in ruling that plaintiffs-appellants have failed to show a better title than
that of defendants who are presumed to possess with just title. As the land in question still stands
registered in the name of Estefania Atun, now deceased, the present owners thereof would be her
legal heirs. It is of record that Estefania Atun died without any issue or ascendants and left as her
only surviving heirs the children of her brother Nicolas, plaintiffs herein; and the rule is settled that
the legal heirs of a deceased may file an action arising out of a right belonging to their ancestor,
without a separate judicial declaration of their status as such, provided there is no pending special
proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate (Mendoza Vda. de Bonnevie vs. Cecilia Vda.
de Pardo, 59 Phil., 486; Gov't. of P.I. vs. Serafica, 61 Phil., 93; Uy Coque vs. Sioca, 45 Phil., 430).
Pursuant to the rule that reversal on appeal of a ruling upholding a defendant's demurrer to the
evidence imports in civil cases loss of his right to submit evidence in his behalf, in order to
discourage prolonged litigations (Arroyovs. Azur, 76 Phil., 493, and cases therein cited), judgment
must be rendered according to plaintiffs' evidence, which supports their claim of ownership of the
land in question, and for damages in the amount of P500 (t. s. n., p. 21).
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed; plaintiffs-appellants Gil Atun, Camila Atun, and
Dorotea Atun are declared the lawful owners in common of the lot in question; and defendantsappellees Eusebio Nuez and Diego Belga are ordered to surrender possession thereof to the
plaintiffs, and to indemnify the latter in the amount of P500 by way of damages. Costs against
defendants-appellees in both instances. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and
Concepcion, JJ.,concur.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44837

November 23, 1938

SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffs-appellees,


vs.
CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Adriano T. de la Cruz for appellants.
Simeon Bitanga for appellees.

VILLA-REAL, J.:
This case is before us by virtue of an appeal taken by the defendants Conchita McLachlin, Lorenzo
Quitco, Jr., Sabina Quitco, Rafael Quitco and Marcela Quitco, from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros, the dispositive part of which reads:
For the foregoing considerations, the court renders judgment in this case declaring Ana
Quitco Ledesma an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, for
legal purposes, but absolving the defendants as to the prayer in the first cause of action that
the said Ana Quitco Ledesma be declared entitled to share in the properties left by the
deceased Eusebio Quitco.
As to the second cause of action, the said defendants are ordered to pay to the plaintiff
Socorro Ledesma, jointly and severally, only the sum of one thousand five hundred
pesos(P1,500), with legal interest thereon from the filing of this complaint until fully paid. No
pronouncement is made as to the costs. So ordered.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following errors allegedly committed by the trial
court in its aforesaid decision:
1. That the trial court erred in holding, that the action for the recovery of the sum of P1,500,
representing the last installment of the note Exhibit C has not yet prescribed.
2. That the trial court erred in holding that the property inherited by the defendants from their
deceased grandfather by the right of representation is subject to the debts and obligations of
their deceased father who died without any property whatsoever.
lawphi1.net

3. That the trial court erred in condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiff Socorro Ledesma the sum of P1,500.
The only facts to be considered in the determination of the legal questions raised in this appeal are
those set out in the appealed decision, which have been established at the trial, namely:

In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while
the latter was still single, of which relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born a daughter
who is the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma. In 1921, it seems hat the relation between
Socorro Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came to an end, but the latter executed a deed
(Exhibit A), acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma as his natural daughter and on
January 21, 1922, he issued in favor of the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note
(Exhibit C), of the following tenor:
P2,000. For value received I promise to pay Miss Socorro Ledesma the sum of two thousand
pesos (P2,000). Philippine currency under the following terms: Two hundred and fifty pesos
(P250) to be paid on the first day of March 1922; another two hundred and fifty pesos
(P250)to be paid on the first day of
November 1922; the remaining one thousand and
five hundred (P1,500) to be paid two years from the date of the execution of this note. San
Enrique, Occ. Negros, P. I., Jan. 21, 1922.
Subsequently, Lorenzo M. Quitco married the defendant Conchita McLachlin, with whom he
had four children, who are the other defendants. On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died
(Exhibit 5), and, still later, that is, on December 15, 1932, his father Eusebio Quitco also died,
and as the latter left real and personal properties upon his death, administration proceedings
of said properties were instituted in this court, the said case being known as the "Intestate of
the deceased Eusebio Quitco," civil case No. 6153 of this court.
Upon the institution of the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco and the appointment of
the committee on claims and appraisal, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, on August 26, 1935,
filed before said committee the aforequoted promissory note for payment, and the
commissioners, upon receipt of said promissory note, instead of passing upon it, elevated
the same to this court en consulta (Exhibit F), and as the Honorable Jose Lopez Vito,
presiding over the First Branch, returned said consulta and refrained from giving his opinion
thereon (Exhibit C), the aforesaid commissioners on claims and appraisal, alleging lack of
jurisdiction to pass upon the claim, denied he same (Exhibit H).
On
November 14, 1933 (Exhibit I), the court issued an order of declaration of heirs in
the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco, and as Ana Quitco Ledesma was not included
among the declared heirs, Socorro Ledesma, as mother of Ana Quitco Ledesma, asked for
the reconsideration of said order, a petition which the court denied. From the order denying
the said petition no appeal was taken, and in lieu thereof there was filed the complaint which
gives rise to this case.
The first question to be decided in this appeal, raised in the first assignment of alleged error, is
whether or not the action to recover the sum of P1,500, representing the last installment for the
payment of the promissory note Exhibit C, has prescribed.
According to the promissory note Exhibit C, executed by the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, on
January 21, 1922, the last installment of P1,500 should be paid two years from the date of the
execution of said promissory note, that is, on January 21, 1924. The complaint in the present case
was filed on June 26, 1934, that is, more than ten years after he expiration of the said period. The
fact that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma filed her claim, on August 26, 1933, with the committee on
claims and appraisal appointed in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, does not suspend the running of
the prescriptive period of the judicial action for the recovery of said debt, because the claim for the
unpaid balance of the amount of the promissory note should no have been presented in the intestate
of Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased not being the one who executed the same, but in the intestate
of Lorenzo M. Quitco, which should have been instituted by the said Socorro Ledesma as provided
in section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing a creditor to institute said case through the
appointment of an administrator for the purpose of collecting his credit. More than ten years having
thus elapsed from the expiration of the period for the payment of said debt of P1,500, the action for
its recovery has prescribed under section 43, No. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The first assignment of alleged error is, therefore, well-founded.


As to the second assignment of alleged error, consisting in that the trial court erred in holding that
the properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by representation are
subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving
any property, while it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a
children presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or
grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the obligations
contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the
benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from their
predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father
Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said father from whom they did
not inherit anything.
The second assignment of alleged error is also well-founded.
Being a mere sequel of the first two assignments of alleged errors, the third assignment of error is
also well-founded.
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That the filing of a claim
before the committee on claims and appraisal, appointed in the intestate of the father, for a monetary
obligation contracted by a son who died before him, does not suspend the prescriptive period of the
judicial action for the recovery of said indebtedness; (2) that the claim for the payment of an
indebtedness contracted by a deceased person cannot be filed for its collection before the
committee on claims and appraisal, appointed in the intestate of his father, and the
propertiesinherited from the latter by the children of said deceased do not answer for the payment of
the indebtedness contracted during the lifetime of said person.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendants are absolved from the complaint,
with the costs to the appellees. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4963

January 29, 1953

MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR
NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants.
Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.
Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in
the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario
and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda,
who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands
involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However,
plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario
took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and
her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to
separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a
parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property
that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision
ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in
dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.

There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former
owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that
Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late
Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise
appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With
this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he
was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria
Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to
them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that
moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became
vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question
because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and
leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot
be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor
can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio
and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of
the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status
and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the
latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were
declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil
Code).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are
declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them
may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right
should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or
event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation,
provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same
origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over
the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so
because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the
new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to
the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of
pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that
they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to
assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that
this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a
donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may
be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or
in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been
followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21993

June 21, 1966

ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners,


vs.
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III,
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents.
Lorenzo Somulong for petitioners.
Torres and Torres for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed Rodriguez, petition this Court for a writ
of certiorariand prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, for its refusal to grant their
motion to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 1331, which said Court is alleged to have taken
cognizance of without jurisdiction.
The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the order of the respondent court, dated June 13,
1963 (Petition, Annex 0), in this wise:
It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio Rodriguez,
through counsel, that this Court "has no jurisdiction to try the above-entitled case in view of

the pendency of another action for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr.
Celestino Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, namely, Sp. Proceedings No.
3907 entitled 'In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino
Rodriguez which was filed ahead of the instant case".
The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of
Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the
Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March
8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for leave of
court to allow them to examine the alleged will; that on March 11, 1963 before the Court
could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn; that on March 12, 1963, aforementioned
petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a
resident of Paraaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria
Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12, 1963
Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the
will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez
was born in Paraaque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy,
Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in
Paraaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in support thereof the case
of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja, G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955.
The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will
to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has
precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.
The Court of First Instance, as previously stated denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that a
difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over the other; that, as early
as March 7, movants were aware of the existence of the purported will of Father Rodriguez,
deposited in the Court of Bulacan, since they filed a petition to examine the same, and that movants
clearly filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose than to prevent this Court (of
Bulacan) from exercising jurisdiction over the probate proceedings". Reconsideration having been
denied, movants, now petitioners, came to this Court, relying principally on Rule 73, section 1 of the
Rules of Court, and invoking our ruling in Ongsingco vs. Tan and De Borja, L-7792, July 27, 1955.
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of
the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, as far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record.
We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963,
even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the
court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued

the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised
Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. When a will
is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction,
such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to
contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published
three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed by
the testator himself.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of
a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's
testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made
after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was
delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan
on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is
incontestable.
1wph1.t

But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will being delivered to
"the Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not have it because the
decedent was domiciled in Rizal province. We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of
residence as parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that
he retained throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Paraaque, Rizal, that
detail would not imply that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the
power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the
domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court (In re Kaw Singco,
74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676). Neither party denies
that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left personal property in Hagonoy, province of
Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of June 11, 1963, Annex "H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in
the case before us.
In the Kaw Singco case (ante) this Court ruled that:
"... If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court
over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all decisions
on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same
case will have to be commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another
province. That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt administration of justice is too
obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206,
December 31, 1942). Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, providing that the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had last resided, could not have
been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject matter,
because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney General vs. Manila Railroad
Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 confers
upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of
residence of the deceased.1 Since, however, there are many Courts of First Instance in the
Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place
where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground
that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be
settled is properly called "venue" (Rule 75, section 1.) Motion for reconsideration is denied.

The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any
other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a
case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the
same enjoins that:
The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1)
This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper venue, yet the rule grants precedence
to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without taking venue into account.
There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that their
commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to
the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the
precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule
75) was not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a race between applicants,
with the administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or
subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.
Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its
validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to the
testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property in
which the testator has not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen or is not
fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no
substitution, and no right of accretion takes place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided in this
Code.
Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as to the
nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established
action". The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of
the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.
We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate
in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate. proceedings, said court did not commit any
abuse of discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68282 November 8, 1990

RAQUEL CHAVEZ, GERARDO GIMENEZ and MANUELA BUENAVISTA VDA. DE


CHAVEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (4th Civil Cases Division), ANTONIO CHAVEZ,
ROSARIO CHAVEZ and CONCEPCION CHAVEZ, respondents.
Edmundo A. Narra for petitioners.
Jose L. Lapak for respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated March 26, 1984 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CV-64708 which (1) annulled the sale made by Manuela Buenavista
of her property in favor of the spouses Raquel Chavez and Gerardo Gimenez (Exh. 2) and the
subsequent sale by said spouses of the same property to Pepito Ferrer, and (2) declared that the
earlier deeds of sale (Exhs. A, B, C and D) signed by Manuela and her children constituted a valid
partition of the land, subject to her lifetime usufruct. The Court of Appeals thereby reversed the
decision dated December 21, 1971 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch 1.
The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner Manuel Buenavista (defendant in Civil
Case No. 1934 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte) who had six (6) children, named
Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion and Floserpina. The first three were the
plaintiffs and the last three, with their mother, were the defendants in Civil Case No. 1934.
On July 11, 1958, Presentacion Chavez, with the conformity of her mother, Manuela Buenavista,
executed a deed of sale whereby she sold her 1/6 undivided share of the land in question to her
sister, Concepcion Chavez, for P 450.
Two years later, on May 2, 1960, Floserpina Chavez, with the conformity of her mother, also sold her
1/6 undivided share of the same land to her sister, Concepcion, for the same price of P450. On May
19, 1960, Raquel, with the conformity of her mother, likewise sold her undivided 1/6 share of the
same property to Concepcion Chavez for P600. Having acquired the shares of Presentacion,
Floserpina and Raquel, Concepcion thereby became the owner of a total undivided 4/6 share of the
land in question with Antonio and Rosario as owners of the remaining 2/6 shares.
In all the documents, the following stipulation appears:
Na ang nasabing lupa o pag-aari ay ipinamana na sa amin ng aming ina, ang
nasabing Manuela Buenavista, kung kaya ito ay hatiin naming anim (6) na mga
magkakapatid, bagama't hindi pa namin naisasagawa ang paghihiwatig o partition;
ako bilang isa sa anim na magkakapatid ay may karapatan sa isang ikaanim (1/6) na
bahagi ng nasabing lupa, gayon pa man ang kasunduan sa nasabing pagkamana
namin ay samantalang nabubuhay pa ang aming ina, siya ang magkakandili at
makikinabang sa nasabing pag-aari. (p. 14, Rollo.)
meaning that the owner, Manuela Buenavista, had assigned or distributed to her children, in equal
pro-indiviso shares, her paraphernal property situated at Sitio Langas, Barrio Calangcawan Norte,
Vinzons, Camarines Norte, with an area of 4.1163 hectares more or less under Tax Declaration No.
9303 and assessed at P1,630.00. The owner, however, reserved for herself the possession of the
land and the enjoyment of the fruits during her lifetime.
Despite the transfers or assignments her children had executed with her conformity ten years earlier,
Manuela Buenavista, on August 27, 1968, signed a "Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa" of the entire
property in favor of her daughter, Raquel Chavez, and her husband, Gerardo Jimenez. On October

7, 1968, Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion filed Civil Case No. 1934 against their mother Manuela
and their sister Raquel. Thereupon, Manuela sold the entire property to Pepito Ferrer, on February 4,
1969 (Exh. F) with right to repurchase. Ferrer was later sued as an additional defendant in Civil
Case No. 1934.
After the trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court dismissing the complaint, dissolving the
preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs. The court
did not award damages.
The plaintiffs, Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
64708-R).
On March 26, 1984, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, we reverse and set aside the appealed decision and render another
one declaring the deeds of sale in favor of Raquel Chavez and Gerardo Jimenez
(Exh. 2) and the sale in favor of defendant-appellee Pepito Ferrer as null and
void ab initio, and declaring further that the documents (Exhs. A, B, C and D) are
evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between Manuela
Buenavista and her children, subject to her right of usufruct during her lifetime,
without pronouncement as to damages and costs. (p. 17, Rollo.)
On April 5, 1984, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging among others:
3. That the late Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez, one of the defendantsappellees, was found lately to have executed during her lifetime a LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT ... and there is now a pending petition for probate of said last will and
testament before the Municipal Trial Court of Vinzons, Camarines Norte;
xxx xxx xxx
6. In the case at bar, even granting that the late Manuela Buenavista's execution of
the documents referred to as Exhibits A, B, C and D are valid, nevertheless its
validity ceases from the time that she executed the Last Will and Testament . . .
because the execution of the Last Will invalidates the former act of the said Manuela
Buenavista;
7. That the Last will and Testament . . . which his now pending probate in the
Municipal Trial Court of Vinzons, Camarines Norte, will finally affect the property
hence, there is a ground for this motion for reconsideration and/or to suspend the
decision-pending final outcome of the probate of the last will and testament of the
late Manuela Buenavista. (pp. 88-89, Rollo.)
Private respondents opposed the Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the partition inter
vivos which had been implemented long before the execution of the said Last Will and Testament
could not be revoked by the later instrument; that the supposed Last Will and Testament was
executed on December 11, 1969, more than one year after the filing of the complaint for annulment
on October 9, 1968, when said Manuela Buenavista was already senile and not of disposing mind;
that while Manuela Buenavista was able to sign with her own hand the several Deeds of Sale, the
supposed Last Will and Testament bears her thumbmark only; that Manuela Buenavista had no
more property to dispose of by will on December 11, 1969, when she supposedly executed her Last
Will and Testament.
On June 28, 1984, the Appellate Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
In their petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petitioners allege:

(l) That the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) erred in declaring
valid the deeds of sale (Exhs. A, B, C and D) as a partition by an
act inter vivos considering that examining the said exhibits will reveal that it is not a
testament amounting to a will of Manuela Buenavista;
(2) That the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling against Article 1347 of the
New Civil Code. (p. 126, Rollo.)
We find those contentions not well-taken.
Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate either by an
act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitimate of the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the
partition by the parent, as provided in Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by law (Art. 1347,
par. 2, Civil Code of the Phil. by Padilla, 1987 Edition, p. 744.) Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly
gives a person two options in making a partition of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by WILL.
When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in
accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of
his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the
form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained
on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as
to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was
taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will
recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of
concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective
parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have
acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising
acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the
partition. (Hernandez vs. Andal, et al., 78 Phil. 196, 203.)
In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale executed by
Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez (Exhs. A, B, and C) in favor of
Concepcion Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between Manuela
Buenavista and her children as she not only gave her authority thereto but also signed the sales.
The Deeds of Sale (Exhs. A, B, and C) are not contracts entered into with respect to feature
inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista
who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the
property owner herself, is valid.
.... As the defendants freely participated in the partition, they are now estopped from
denying and repudiating the consequences of their own voluntary acts. It is a general
principle of law that no one may be permitted to disavow and go back upon his own
acts, or to proceed contrary thereto. (Joaquin vs. Mitsumine 34 Phil. 858.)
Where a piece of land has been included in a partition, and there is no allegation that
the inclusion was effected through improper means or without the petitioner's
knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to
bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition
according to the tenor of the partition... They cannot attack the partition collaterally ...
(Ralla vs. Judge Untalan, 172 SCRA 858, 865, citing the case of Torres vs.
Encarnacion and De Borja, No. L-4681, July 31, 1951, 89 Phil. 678.)

As well argued by counsel for the respondents in their memorandum, it would be unjust and
inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the sales she herself authorized
as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor
of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made of the property she had
received in the partition inter vivos; it would run counter to the doctrine that "no person should be
allowed to unjustly enrich herself at the expense of another."
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. No. CV64708, the same is affirmed in toto. The petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit, with costs
against the petitioners.

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