Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 (2009) 237243

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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

A hazard and operability analysis method for the prevention of misoperations

in the production of light magnesium carbonate
Feng Wang a, *, Jinji Gao a, Kai Guo b
a
b

Engineering Research Center of Chemical Technology Safety of the Ministry of Education, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Beijing 100029, China
Research Center of the Ministry of Education for High Gravity Engineering and Technology, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Beijing 100029, China

a r t i c l e i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history:
Received 13 July 2008
Received in revised form
17 December 2008
Accepted 14 January 2009

A method of preventing misoperations in the process of producing light magnesium carbonate with
a rotating packed bed (RPB) is proposed in this paper. The main problem in this process is that the
carbonization reaction and the purity of light magnesium carbonate are easily affected by misoperations,
which result in the waste of materials and energy, low quality of the product, and so on. A hazard and
operability analysis method was used to analyze misoperations in the process of producing light
magnesium carbonate. It was found that the situations caused by misoperations, such as the operation
step neglect and inversion, can be detected and arranged properly by a misoperation hazard and
operability (MO-HAZOP) analysis program according to the probability of the misoperation occurrence.
Based on the analysis results, the measures in terms of full automatic mechanism, programmed control
system, interlock mechanism can be adopted to reduce and prevent misoperations and to maintain the
normal production. The use of this method in the production of light magnesium carbonate has shown
that the occurrences of misoperations and accidents were reduced drastically, and the security and
protection system in this process was improved considerably.
2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords:
Misoperation prevention
Misoperation hazard and operability
Light magnesium carbonate
Rotating packed bed
Probability

1. Introduction
Process security is concerned with the potentially catastrophic
consequences of security threats that are not probable, but possible.
Security in chemical industry means that there is no risk or danger,
and also no doubt, anxiety, or fear. Due to the signicance of security
in many processes, systematic and effective methodologies for
process security analysis are a must (Uygun, Huang, & Lou, 2006).
Most petrochemical plants, especially batch plants, are
frequently started up from a cold and empty state. The performance
of the startup from these initial conditions will impact the whole
operation, and misoperations will result in capital or production
losses, even the explosion accidents. According to statistics from
those accidents, the vast majority of explosion accidents in chemical production processes are mainly caused by misoperations.
In chemical production processes, especially during the startup
and shutdown stages, there is easily confronted with the situations
that the operator misses an operation step or does some operation

steps out of sequence. However, on one hand, it is impossible for

the analyzers to analyze all the situations caused by misoperations,
which present a big challenge to take effective measures timely
and promptly to prevent the accidents from occurring. On the
other hand, it is inappropriate and unfair to put all the responsibility on the operators (Labovsky, Vandova, Markos, & Jelemensky,
2007).
The production of light magnesium carbonate with rotating
packed bed (RPB) is a new process, the core of which is to separate
magnesium from the dolomite slurry. However, in the production
process of light magnesium carbonate, the carbonization reaction
and the product purity are readily affected by misoperations,
leading to a large amount of extra material and energy consumptions and unpredictable equipment breakdown. The hazard and
operability (HAZOP) analysis method developed to prevent the
misoperations in the production of light magnesium carbonate is
discussed in detail in this paper and consists mainly of the
following three parts:

* Corresponding author. Engineering Research Center of Chemical Technology

Safety of the Ministry of Education, P.O. Box 130, Beijing University of Chemical
Technology, 15 Beisanhuan East Road, Beijing 100029, China. Tel.: 86 010
64433242, 86 13661368797 (Cell).
E-mail address: wangfeng991@163.com (F. Wang).

(1) Basic HAZOP analysis for the process. The signed direct graph
(SDG)-HAZOP program, a computer-aided HAZOP analysis
program, plays an important role in the basic HAZOP analysis.
(2) Misoperations analysis by the misoperation hazard and operability (MO-HAZOP) program. The MO-HAZOP program is used
mainly to analyze the operation step neglect and inversion.

0950-4230/$ see front matter 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2009.01.005

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F. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 (2009) 237243

(3) Case study. The case database comprises past problem-solving

experiences and is employed to improve the pertinence of the
analysis.
These three parts were applied in a systematic way in misoperation analysis. The concept of the misoperation probability was
introduced into the analysis process, which is a key indicator to
identify misoperations in operations. With that concept, the
abnormal situations caused by misoperations can be ranked
properly according to their respective occurrence probability.
The probability can help experts focus on the urgent and serious
problems in the rst time which usually present high values of
probability and ignore small probability events. Meanwhile, a report
worksheet providing rectication guide and appropriate security
measures will be automatically generated to help the operators
avoid misoperations. The security and protection system for the
chemical production can be established to monitor the startup
process and identify mistakes when major deviations are tracked.
2. Instruction on HAZOP analysis of misoperations
2.1. Basic HAZOP analysis
HAZOP analysis is the most widely used and recognized as the
preferred process hazard analysis approach in chemical industry. In
this analysis, a multi-disciplinary team of experts examine P&ID
systematically, and all conceivable deviations from design intent in
the plant can be identied and all the possible abnormal causes and
the adverse consequences of those deviations can be determined. The
considerations of the experts are given to the following three aspects.
1) Determining whether a given operation or activity has the
potential to give rise to a hazardous situation.
2) Determining the range of hazardous events that the operation
or activity could present (Jeong, Lee, Lee, & Lim, 2008).
3) Identifying the routes by which each of these hazardous events
could be realized, that is, identifying the potential incident
scenarios.
However, sometimes the total number of permutations generated by this method is too many that it is almost impossible for
experts to identify and analyze all the abnormal situations by the
current HAZOP analysis method. For example, as shown in Table 1,
20,922,789,888,000 kinds of abnormal combinations caused by
operation step neglect and inversion should be analyzed if one unit
operation has 16 steps. To complete the analysis work, the analyzers
have to investigate all the reasons which may cause abnormal
situations, conclude all the consequences and offer safeguards to
each sequence combination. Even with the help of computers and
knowledgeable experts, there are still extremely enormous workloads and awfully uneconomical and unpractical actions.
2.2. Introduction to the MO-HAZOP program
If we dene the startup process as an event, operating one step
in the right order or in a wrong order as a factor, each event and
factor will have a probability which is expressed by the ratio of the
number of actual occurrences to the number of possible occurrences. The probability is an important indicator to distinguish
between the critical situations and the insignicant ones in the
analysis process of MO-HAZOP program. The probability of an event
is the product of the probabilities of every factor and can be
calculated by the MO-HAZOP program. The probability of each
factor, which is greater than 0 and no more than 1, can be estimated
by experts according to their experience and the following rules.

Table 1
Results of factorial 116.
Number

Factorial

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

1
2
6
24
120
720
5040
40,320
362,880
3,628,800
39,916,800
479,001,600
6,227,020,800
87,178,291,200
1,307,674,368,000
20,922,789,888,000

(1) The probability of each factor is not the same. For example,
after the rst step, the operator is more likely to start the
second step immediately, so the probability of starting the
second step immediately after the rst step is higher than those
of starting others.
(2) The probability of the factor is 1 if a step is operated in the right
sequence, and the probability is otherwise more than 0 and less
than 1 if the step is operated in a wrong sequence.
(3) The more mistakes happen in an event, the less the probability
of the event will be.
(4) The probability is affected by the complexities of the event. The
more complex the event is, the less the probability of the event
will be.
(5) The probabilities of a huge number of events are so limited that
these events might be ignored. For example, after the rst step
the operator may not start the 19th step immediately, which
means that the probability of starting the 19th step immediately after the rst step is very limited and the event can be
ignored.
Fig. 1 shows the analysis procedure of the MO-HAZOP program,
which generates the total permutations of all the operation steps
and calculates the probability of each event. The events are
arranged in terms of the probability, with high probability events
assigned as the critical situations. The probability of each event,
calculated according to the internal arithmetic of the MO-HAZOP
program, should be more than 0 and no more than 1.
Fig. 2 describes the number of situations resulting from operation step neglect and inversion for 220 steps, of which the probability is no less than 0.6. The equations representing the curves in

Input all the operation steps

Generate total permutations of all operation steps

Calculate the probability of each event

Arrange the events according to the probability

Events with high probabilities are assigned

as critical situations
Fig. 1. Flowchart of the MO-HAZOP program analysis.

F. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 (2009) 237243

Fig. 2 can be obtained from the Matlab program. In these equations,

y stands for the number of the events which exceeds a certain
probability, and x stands for the step number of the process. It can be
seen from Table 2 that if one unit operation has 5 operation steps,
there will be 17 events whose probabilities are no less than 0.8.

0:6: y 2:57208x3 26:67544x2 137:85052x233:4324

(1)

0:7 :

y 6:5206x2  45:9912x 93:5882

(2)

0:8 :

y 0:5x2 1:5x  3

(3)

0:9 :

y x

(4)

As shown in Fig. 2, the four curves exhibit that the more the
number of the situations caused by the step neglect and inversion,
the less the probability.
2.3. Easily encountered problems summarized from the
accident cases
The presentation forms of misoperations are shown in Table 3
and the categorization of reasons of the misoperations is exhibited
in Table 4. After studying these tables, the easily encountered
problems during the startup process could be identied with
priority.

239

Table 2
Combinations of unit operation with the probabilities of no less than 0.8.
ID

Sequences

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
3
2
1
1
1
3
1
1

Probability
2
2
2
1
3
1
1
3
4
1
3
3
2
2
2
2
4

3
3
4
3
2
4
3
2
2
2
1
4
4
5
1
5
3

4
5
3
4
4
3
5
5
3
4
4
2
5
3
4
4
2

5
4
5
5
5
5
4
4
5
5
5
5
3
4
5
3
5

1
0.903
0.903
0.903
0.903
0.815
0.815
0.815
0.812
0.812
0.812
0.812
0.812
0.812
0.81
0.81
0.81

 Environmental impacts to fauna/ora and damage to waterways/soil.

Table 5 shows the categories of likelihood, severity and risk and
their values. The value of likelihood and severity of each abnormal
situation should be determined by experts according to practical
situations, and then the risk of the abnormal situations can be
calculated according to the following formula.

2.4. Risk matrix

Risk Likelihoodthe possibility of occurrence of the abnormal situation

 Severitythe consequence of the abnormal situation

After the identication of misoperations, all the situations

caused by misoperations will be automatically inputted the database of the MO-HAZOP program.
Risk matrix is used as one part of the HAZOP analysis method for
the misoperation. The risk matrix is based on the following aspects:
 Mortality and degree of harm;
 Capital losses;
 Production losses;

(5)

Based on the calculation results, the risk can be classied into 3

ranks, corresponding to the classications in Fig. 3 (Guimaraes &
Lapa, 2006; Kim & Seong, 2006). According to the risk rank, safeguards can be adopted for the comparatively important and
dangerous situations.
3. The process of producing light magnesium carbonate
3.1. Introduction to the production process of light
magnesium carbonate
Light magnesium carbonate is usually produced by using dolomite as the raw material, and carbonization is one important unit
operation in the production process. In this process magnesium
reacts with CO2 to generate magnesium bicarbonate that is then
separated from the mixture as completely as possible to produce
concentrated magnesium bicarbonate solution, which will be
ltered and dried to obtain light magnesium carbonate.
3.2. The process of producing light magnesium carbonate
with the RPB

Fig. 2. Event number caused by misoperations with different step number.

The conventional method to produce light magnesium

carbonate is continuous twice carbonations (Hu, Liu, & Song, 2004).
The complexity of the production process has strict requirements to
the stability of the system at high pressure, including gas
compressor, carbonization equipment and pipelines, which
necessitate huge investment. The method of producing light
magnesium carbonate by the RPB at the atmosphere pressure

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F. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 (2009) 237243

Table 3
Presentation forms of the misoperations.

Table 4
Categorization of the reasons of the misoperations.

Aspects

Sections (4 sections)

Engineering
design;
Make plan;
Manufacture;
Installation

Operation

Maintenance

Management

Presentation forms

1. Disobey the design standards;

2. Incorrect use of the marks;
3. Modify or terminate any administrative contract
without authorization;
4. Miscalculate;
5. Select wrong materials or types;
6. Material defect;
7. Manufacture defects or installation mistakes;
8. Simulation errors;
9. Others

Abnormal reasons (37 kinds)

1. Equipment

1. The internal seal or packing is explosive and/or

ammable;
2. The material of the valve is erodible;
3. The material of the valve is corrodible;
4. There are some defects on the valve, such as sand
holes;
5. The pressure tolerance ability of equipment
descends;
6. Seal/packing failure;
7. Long time service;
8. Corrosion;
9. Excess fouling;
10. Line size from or to adjoining equipment is too
small;
11. Slowly switch;

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Follow wrong instructions;

Turn valves up or down;
Open or close valves;
Open or close the valves too early;
Open or close the valves too late;
Uncompleted operation;
Out of sequences;
Neglect operation steps;
Misoperation;
Unskillful handling;
Others

2. Medium

1.
2.
3.
4.

Maintain equipment as instructed;

Misjudgment;
Uncompleted maintenance;
Others

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

High viscosity;
Liquids with dust nes;
Corrosion/erosion;
High-temperature;
High pressure;
Flow too rapidly;
Air suspended particles;

3. Operating and
controlling

1.
2.
3.
4.

Absent without leave;

Misjudgment;
Monitoring mistakes;
Others

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Operate frequently;
Forget to close;
Fail to open;
Forget to open;
Fail to close;
Turn the valve up;
Turn the valve down;
Changes ow rate too rapidly;
Changes ow rate too slowly;
Close the valve too slowly;
Open the valve too early;
Open the valve too lately;
Close the valve too early;
Close the valve too lately;

4. System and
environment

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Bad weather;
Thermal radiation sources;
Acid rain;
Vibration;
External impact;

exhibits the advantages of short production time, low equipment

cost, and less pollution (Wang, Sun, & Guo, 2006).
Flowchart of the process of producing light magnesium
carbonate by the RPB is shown in Fig. 4, and the operation steps are
listed in Table 6.
4. Misoperation prevention in the process of producing light
magnesium carbonate with the RPB
Misoperations may be easily identied in batch processes due to
the application of the HAZOP analysis method. Meanwhile, with the
help of the security and protection system installed before the
emergency shutdown device (ESD) system, the carbonization
reaction and the purity of light magnesium carbonate may not be
inuenced by misoperations.

(dash line) means that an increase in the value of the starting node
will result in a decrease in the value of the ending node. Then,
causal relationships between these identied nodes are
determined.

4.1. HAZOP analysis of the process

4.2. MO-HAZOP analysis

Unit behavior model needed in hazard analysis is to describe the

causal inuences of variable deviations in every process unit (De
Kleer & Brown, 1984). Among many variables showing states of
a process, the interested variables in hazard analysis are temperature, pressure, ow rate, composition, level, reaction, and so on.
Fault propagation relationships can be identied and SDG model of
the process can be established by making use of these variables
(Wu, Xia, & Zhang, 2003). Fig. 5 exhibits the SDG model of the
process. A circle called node in this model stands for a variable
which has three states (high, low and no). Positive effect (solid line)
means that an increase in the value of the starting node will cause
an increase in the value of the ending node, while negative effect

Table 7 lists one part of the MO-HAZOP analysis report on the

process of producing light magnesium carbonate. Based on the
calculation of the MO-HAZOP program, all the situations caused by
misoperations are arranged properly according to the probability,
and the risk ranks match the risk matrix.
4.3. Case study
Case-based reasoning is an approach based on the knowledge
gained from the problem-solving experiences. The knowledge
accumulated from the past experience and cases are so important
that they should be used for accident diagnosing, forecasting and

F. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 (2009) 237243

241

Table 5
Category descriptions of likelihood, severity and risk rank.
Category Likelihood

Severity

Risk rank

Value

No more than No health

once in one
impacts
year.
No material or
energy losses
No
environment
pollution

Several times Minor injury

Risk control measures should be 2
in one year.
Minor material introduced within a certain period.
or energy losses
Minor
environment
pollution

Monthly.

Occurs
frequently,
e.g. weekly.

Risk control measures are in place, 1

or no risk control measures are
needed.

Moderate injury Risk control measures should be

Moderate
introduced as soon as possible.
material or
energy losses
Moderate
environment
pollution

Major
accidents/
deaths
Major material
or energy losses
Major
Environment
pollution

Fig. 4. Flowchart of the process of producing light magnesium carbonate with the RPB.

disasters preventing. The case-based reasoning creates a solution to

a new problem by relating it to the previously solved problems, by
adapting the earlier solutions to suit the new problem. It is especially useful in the elds where the domain theory is weak.
4.4. Security and protection system for the process of producing
light magnesium carbonate
4.4.1. Security and protection system
The analysis report can be utilized by the security and protection
system for the process of producing light magnesium carbonate.
The procedure diagram of the security and protection system for
the process of producing light magnesium carbonate is shown in
Fig. 6.
The security and protection system consists of four components:
(1) the real-time data acquisition and processing component; (2)
the knowledge base of diagnosis and prediction; (3) the

Table 6
Operating step of the process of producing light magnesium carbonate with the RPB.
ID

Content of each step

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Fill the tank with the dolomite slurry.

Monitor the pH value by an electrical acidometer.
Run the RPB at the speed of 1450 r min1.
Turn on the pump and the dolomite slurry is sent into RPB.
Turn on the compressor.
Open the valve of the steel container lled with CO2 gas.
Close the valve of the steel container in 75 min.

comparison and judgment diagnosis and prediction; and (4) the

intelligent decision-making component.
The real-time data acquisition and processing component is
used for data capturing and data processing. The original data,
which come from the control layer of a device system, such as
distributed control system (DCS), programmable logic controller
(PLC), or other control system, should be processed by the
component rstly.
The knowledge base of diagnosis and prediction component is
for acquiring, processing, using, and accumulating knowledge. It is
composed of the data such as the detailed information of the device
system, the results of HAZOP and MO-HAZOP analyses, and the
typical accident cases. The information of typical accident cases
includes property damage, production losses, the cause of the
accident, disposal method and so on.
The comparison and judgment diagnosis and prediction
component is used for judging whether the data acquired by the
real-time data acquisition and processing component are consistent with historical data. One important function of this component

R
Addition amount of
dolomite slurry
R

Liquid level

Mixing effect

C
Mass fraction of Mg
in dolimite slurry

Speed of the
RPB Rotor

Mass transfer
efficiency of RPB

Reaction time

Flow rate of CO2

Flow rate of
dolomite slurry

Flow rate of air

CO2-air ratio

Fig. 3. Typical risk matrix.

Fig. 5. SDG analysis model of the process of producing light magnesium carbonate
with the RPB.

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F. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 (2009) 237243

Table 7
Part of the MO-HAZOP analysis report for the process of producing light magnesium carbonate.
ID CS

EP

L S R

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 In the right order.

Consequence

4 1 1

1 2 3 4 5 7 6 No CO2 gas feeding will result in no carbonization reaction. It is impossible to close a closed valve.

0.903 3 2 2

1 2 3 5 7 4 6 No CO2 gas feeding will result in no carbonization reaction. It is impossible to close a closed valve.

0.731 2 2 1

1 3 5 2 4 6 7 Power loss.

0.731 2 2 1

1 2 3 5 6 7 4 No dolomite slurry feeding, no carbonization reaction.

0.729 2 2 1

1 3 4 5 2 6 7 The pH value is not monitored in time, and the carbonization reaction will be affected by the neglect of initial pH values.

0.729 2 2 1

1 3 5 4 2 6 7 The pH value is not monitored in time, and the carbonization reaction will be affected by the neglect of initial pH values.

0.727 2 2 1

1 3 4 2 7 5 6 No CO2 gas feeding will result in no carbonization reaction. It is impossible to close a closed valve.

0.66

2 2 1

1 3 5 2 4 7 6 No CO2 gas feeding will result in no carbonization reaction. It is impossible to close a closed valve.

0.66

2 2 1

10 1 3 4 2 6 7 5 Real reaction time is less than contact time, and then it is difcult to separate magnesium from the dolomite slurry.

0.66

2 3 2

11 1 3 4 2 7 6 5 No CO2 gas feeding will result in no carbonization reaction. It is impossible to close a closed valve.

0.658 2 2 1

12 1 3 5 2 6 4 7 CO2 gas loss.

0.658 2 2 1

13 1 3 4 5 2 7 6 The pH value is not monitored in time, and the carbonization reaction will be affected by the neglect of initial pH values.
If no CO2 gas feeding, then no carbonization reaction. It is impossible to close a closed valve.

0.658 2 2 1

14 1 3 5 4 2 7 6 No CO2 gas feeding will result in no carbonization reaction. It is impossible to close a closed valve.

0.656 2 2 1

15 1 3 6 2 4 5 7 CO2 gas loss.

0.656 2 2 1

16 1 3 4 6 2 5 7 The pH value is not monitored in time, and the carbonization reaction will be affected by the neglect of initial pH values.

0.656 2 2 1

17 1 3 6 2 5 4 7 CO2 gas loss.

0.654 2 2 1

18 1 3 6 4 2 5 7 CO2 gas loss; the pH value is not monitored in time, and the carbonization reaction will be affected by the neglect of initial pH values. 0.652 2 3 2
19 1 2 5 4 6 7 3 Operator forgets to run the RPB. The reaction rate is slow and there may be no products generated.

0.65

2 3 2

20 1 3 5 4 6 2 7 The pH value is not monitored in time, and the carbonization reaction will be affected by the neglect of initial pH values.

0.65

2 3 2

21 1 3 6 4 5 2 7 CO2 gas loss; The pH value is not monitored in time, and the carbonization reaction will be affected by the neglect of initial pH values. 0.646 2 3 2
CS-Current sequence; EP-Event probability; L-Likelihood; S-Severity; R-Risk rank.

Unknown
Disturbance

Known
Disturbance

Substance & Energy Input

Substance & Energy Output

Equipment

PLC

DCS

Other

Control Layer
Knowledge Base of
Diagnosis and Prediction
Documents of equipment and

Real-time Database
of states and
conditions

Real-time calculations
of non-monitoring
variables

its maintenance
Result of HAZOP analysis

Does the data exceed the

NO

warning limitation?

Current states and

Conditions
Next Step

Typical Cases of Faults

Pattern-Cause-Decision

YES
Warning

Causes
Safeguards

Comparison and Judgment

Diagnosis and Prediction
Intelligent Decision

Uncontrolled

Consequences
Suggestions

C ontrollable
Control Measures

Fig. 6. Security and protection system for the process of producing light magnesium carbonate with the RPB.

ESD

F. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 (2009) 237243

243

Fig. 7. pH value change vs. time in the startup process (CO2 gas was fed at 0 min).

is to judge whether the abnormal situation can be controlled and

recovered. If the situation can be controlled, the comparison and
judgment diagnosis and prediction component will send a reference message to the intelligent decision-making component.
Otherwise, the component will start the ESD.
The intelligent decision-making component receives the
message sent from the comparison and judgment diagnosis and
prediction component. This component combines the knowledge
of diagnosis-forecast knowledge base. Thus, information about the
causes of the abnormal situation, adverse consequences of the
abnormal situation, solution scheme and effective messages will be
given to assist the operators in dealing with emergency cases. The
main function of this component is to guide the operators to rectify
the abnormal situation to return to the normal operation or lead
the device system to a safe status, so that potential accidents can be
avoided.
4.4.2. One example
The following example is taken to explain the functions of the
security and protection system.
Example: If the operator forgets to open the valve of the steel
container lled with CO2 gas, there must be no CO2 gas feeding and
no carbonization reaction. The worst thing is that the industry will
suffer capital losses and production losses.
Studying on the reaction mechanism, it can be summarized that
the carbonization process is the neutralization reaction between
acid and alkali. The mechanism of carbonation reaction of dolomite
slurry with CO2 was studied by tracking the carbonation process
with pH meter. As can be seen in Fig. 7, in spite of the change of the
ow rate or mass fraction of the dolomite slurry, the pH values
always decline sharply after the feeding of the CO2 gas. The valve
can be thus controlled by a program module in terms of this rule. If
the pH value remains unchanged for 3 min after the feeding of the
CO2 gas, the valve of the CO2 container will be automatically
opened by that program module. As a conclusion, in the entire
production process the pH value is an important indicator which
should be monitored all the time.
5. Conclusions
With the help of the HAZOP analysis method, misoperations
can be easily identied and prevention measures can be taken for

the comparatively important and dangerous situations. The

introduction of probability as an indicator can help experts focus
on the urgent and serious problems and ignore small probability
events. The use of this method in the production of light
magnesium carbonate with the RPB has shown that the occurrences of misoperations and accidents were reduced drastically,
and the security and protection system in this process was
improved. The application of this method can signicantly
enhance plant safety, reduce fault-caused shutdowns and save
maintenance cost, resulting in great economical and social
benets.

Acknowledgment
This work was supported by the National Key Technologies R&D
Program, Grant No. 2006BAK01B01 & the National Natural Science
Foundation of China, Grant No. 50635010.

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