G.R. No.

79956 January 29, 1990

CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
G.R. No. 82217 January 29, 1990
LILIA YARANON and BONA BAUTISTA, assisted by their spouses, BRAULIO D. YARANON and DEMETRIO D. BAUTISTA, JR., respectively;
JAMES BRETT and SINAI C. HAMADA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary, HON. VICENTE JAYME, Secretary of Finance, HON.
GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents.
Background of the case:
In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated July 15, 1987, which created the (Cordillera Administrative
Region, is assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of' the autonomous region
in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.
Relative to the creation of autonomous regions, the constitution, in Article X, provides:
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The organic act
shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be
elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family and property
law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
FACTS:
In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr. Conrado M. Balweg, S.V.D., broke off on ideological grounds from the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm the New People's Army. (NPA).
After President Aquino was installed into office by People Power, she advocated a policy of national reconciliation. The Cordillera Peoples
Liberation Army (CPLA) heeded this call of the President. After the preliminary negotiations, President Aquino and some members of her Cabinet flew to
Mt. Data in the Mountain Province on September 13, 1986 and signed with Fr. Conrado M. Balweg (As Commander of the CPLA) and Ama Mario Yagao (as President of Cordillera Bodong Administration, the civil government of the CPLA) a ceasefire agreement that signified the cessation of hostilities
(WHEREAS No. 7, E.O. 220).
On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting as Chief Negotiator of the government], in pursuance of the September 13, 1986 agreement,
flew to the Mansion House, Baguio City, and signed with Fr. Balweg (as Chairman of the Cordillera panel) a joint agreement.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted and signed into law by the President.
Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution,
created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) , which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and
the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3]. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera
Executive Board as an implementing arm [secs. 7, 8 and 10]. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the
autonomous regional government is established and organized [sec. 17].
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was
enacted and signed into law. The Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature is reinforced
in Art. XXI of R.A. No. 6766.
ISSUES:
I Whether or not the issuance of E.O. No. 220 by the President has pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created
an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
II Whether or not CAR is a territorial and political subdivision.
III Whether or not the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.
RULING:
I The Supreme Court held in the negative. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will reveal that it does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the
Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In
short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions. The
President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the
urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created. These measures we
find in E.O. No. 220
The transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in
the Cordilleras."
The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region composed of an elective executive and legislature and special
courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction [Art. X, sec. 18]. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an
autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the
planning and implementation of programs and services.
The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They
merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the
ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220, the Congress, after it was convened, enacted Republic Act No. 6658 which created the Cordillera Regional
Consultative Commission. The President then appointed its members. The commission prepared a draft organic act which became the basis for the
deliberations of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The result was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous
region, which was signed into law on October 23, 1989. A plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to be conducted shortly, shall complete the
process outlined in the Constitution.
In the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and effect for more than two years and we find that, despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous region in
the Cordilleras is still to be created, showing the lack of basis of petitioners' assertion. Events have shown that petitioners' fear that E.O. No. 220 was a
"shortcut" for the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras was totally unfounded.
II The SC found that E.O. No. 220 did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision.

The Constitution provides in Article X:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces,
cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the
power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to
coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas.
The CAR may be considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the regional
development councils which the President may create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. These councils are "composed of local government
officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the region for
purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and
development of the units in the region." [Ibid.] In this wise, the CAR may be considered as a more sophisticated version of the regional development
council.
III The Supreme Court held that the creation of CAR did not contravene the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy for the provinces. It must be
clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government
units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority.On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative
autonomy these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive
department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X,
sec. 18].
As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in
the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy
into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,respondents.
FACTS:
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. This Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national
economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs.
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code.
It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause. The said section also authorizes the local government
units to regulate properties and businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of the general welfare.
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the
Christmas season.
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353
reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3353
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO
ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE
OPERATION OF CASINO.
Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge
succeeded.
The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games
of chance, which are detrimental to the people. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling
and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Petitioners also submit that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of
local autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen
the character of the nation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City are valid
RULING: The Supreme Court found that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy
expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se.
An ordinance to be valid must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent
PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this
misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is

that the change has been made by the Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the
decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the
objection of the local government unit concerned. Under this (petitioners) construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or
centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation,
PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime
source of government revenue through the operation of casinos.
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the
source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of
victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR
revenues are tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code but has in
fact been improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government.
On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by
harmonizing them if possible. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government
units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D.
1869.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of
the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without
which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on
the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of
the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation
themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.

This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution
strengthening the policy of local autonomy. We here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced
degree now than under our previous Constitutions.
We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local government units to
prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.
RUPERTO TAULE, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY LUIS T. SANTOS and GOVERNOR LEANDRO VERCELES, respondents.
FACTS: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members, in their capacities as
Presidents of the Association of Barangay Councils in their respective municipalities, convened,with six members in attendance for the purpose of
holding the election of its officers.
The election nevertheless proceeded with Provincial Government Operating Officer Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as presiding officer. Chosen as members of the
Board of Directors were Taule, Aquino, Avila, Jacob and Sales.
Petitioner was then elected as President of FABC
Respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,* protesting
the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification.
Petitioner Ruperto Taule as President of the FABC, filed his comment denying the alleged irregularities and denouncing said respondent Governor for
meddling or intervening in the election of FABC officers which is a purely non-partisan affair and at the same time requesting for his appointment as a
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes.
Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes and ordering a new one to be conducted as
early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government.
Petitioner, thus, seeks the reversal of the resolutions of respondent Secretary.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of
the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils;
2) Whether or not the respondent Governor has the legal personality to file an election protest;
RULING:
1 The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC.
The Sec. 110 of theLocal Government Code provides for the manner in which the katipunan ng mga barangay at all levels shall be organized.
The respondent Secretary, acting in accordance with the provision of the Local Government Code empowering him to "promulgate in detail the
implementing circulars and the rules and regulations to carry out the various administrative actions required for the initial implementation of this Code in
such a manner as will ensure the least disruption of on-going programs and projects 7 issued Department of Local Government Circular No. 89-09 on
April 7, 1989, 8 to provide the guidelines for the conduct of the elections of officers of the Katipunan ng mga Barangay at the municipal, city, provincial,
regional and national levels.
It is now the contention of petitioner that neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction upon the respondent Secretary over election contests
involving the election of officers of the FABC, the katipunan ng mga barangay at the provincial level. It is petitioner's theory that under Article IX, C,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is the Commission on Elections which has jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials is limited to appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts.
The term "election," in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes 14which do not characterize the election of officers in the Katipunan ng mga barangay.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly
elected punong barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. The authority of the COMELEC over
the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the representative of the katipunan concerned to
the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their own respective organization.
_________
There is no question that the Secretary of Local Government is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of
the Local Government Code.
Likewise, under Book IV, Title XII, Chapter 1, See. 3(2) of the Administrative Code of 1987, ** the respondent Secretary has the power to "establish and
prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local government units and on the promotion of
local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units."

The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon
themselves.
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over local governments, we hold that respondent Secretary
has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give
him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to
interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the
ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a
clear and direct interference by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to
general supervision over local governments. 27
Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments. The Local Government Code declared that "the State shall guarantee
and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." 29 To deny the Secretary of Local Government the power to review the regularity of
the elections of officers of the katipunan would be to enhance the avowed state policy of promoting the autonomy of local governments.
Moreover, although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to
merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances. Any doubt therefore as to the power of the Secretary to interfere with
local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.
Thus, the Court holds that in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest filed by respondent Governor and declaring the election of the officers of the
FABC on June 18, 1989 as null and void, the respondent Secretary acted in excess of his jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear the protest.
2 As regards the second issue raised by petitioner, the Court finds that respondent Governor has the personality to file the protest. As presiding officer of
the sagguniang panlalawigan, the respondent governor has an interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a
member of the assembly. Hence, respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC.
HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which reads:
A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE
OF THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY,
FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL TREASURY. (Rollo,
Annnex "A" p. 39)
Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income does not exceed two thousand
pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash
relief from the Municipality of Makati.
Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings,
respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof.
Two letters for reconsideration filed by petitioners Mayor Jejomar Binay, were denied by respondent in its decision for two reasons: (1) We see no
perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, and the alleged public safety, general
welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati.(2) Let it be stressed that Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby
should be for a public purpose, i.e., that the disbursement of the amount of P500.00 as burial assistance to a bereaved family of the Municipality of
Makati, or a total of P400,000.00 appropriated under the Resolution, should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the
Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under
the general welfare clause.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid
delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from
express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may
exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly
granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of
life and desirable for the safety of the people.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances
and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary
and proper.
And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well
as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and
order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."
In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under
Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of Makati." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real
needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It is broadened to deal with conditions
which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything
worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation.)
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the
promotion of the common good.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards
social justice.