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e-ISSN: 2321-5933, p-ISSN: 2321-5925.Volume 6, Issue 3. Ver. III (May.-Jun. 2015), PP 57-75
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Abstract : In Kenya, SACCOs contribute 45% of countrys GDP and to date the sector has effectively
mobilized deposits and assets totaling to kshs200 billion and 210 billion respectively. However the successes
and rapid growth of SACCOs has begun to reveal a number of basic flaws in the Products they offer. In
particular, the inherent liquidity problems of many SACCOs has led a small subset of them beginning to raise
additional voluntary but more liquid savings deposits from members and even some non-members Front Office
Savings Activities (FOSAs). Persistent poor financial performance of SACCOs has caused most Saccos not to
achieve their desired objectives of corporations and those of stakeholders like payment of good return to
shareholders on their investment i.e. dividends. This has also led to scholars, policy maker and all stakeholders
in the corporate world to extensively interrogate the practice of corporate governance in SACCO .The purpose
of this study was to establish the effect of corporate governance practices on the financial performance of
Savings and Credit Cooperatives in Kericho Municipality .Specifically the study sought to establish
corporate governance principles adopted by Saccos, assess the role of board of directors and the financial
performance of Savings and Credit Cooperatives in Kericho Municipality and to establish effect of financial
reporting on growth of SACCOs in Kericho Municipality . The study adopted the descriptive research design.
The conceptual framework of this study comprises of independent variable; corporate governance and
dependent variables financial performance. To undertake this study, a sample of 28 was drawn from a
population of 194 employees and 31 BOD among the 4 SACCOs in kericho municipality and a questionnaire
distributed to each of the SACCOs, collected and analyzed the study mainly used the primary and secondary
data that was collected by use of self administered questionnaires. The data was analyzed by use of both
descriptive and qualitative techniques. The study will be of importance to management on how various
aspects of corporate governance practices affect the operations of SACCOs, the study will also identify the
impediments that face SACCO societies in approaching various corporate governance practices that affect their
financial performance, police makers will also obtain guidance in designing appropriate practices that would
regulate the shareholders participation in affecting the financial performance of the SACCOs in Kenya. The
study would provide information to potential and current scholars with regards to the relationship between
corporate governance and financial performance. The data was presented in the form of charts, graphs and
frequency tables. Corporate governance principles adopted by most Saccos included board of directors are
elected by their members during AGM by majority. The study indicated that board of directors have great role
they play in running of the SACCOs which include proper utilization of funds, proper supervision of
management staff and the entire SACCOs and to ensure proper internal controls are in place. According to the
study level of reporting do affect level of SACCO,s growth is most high which was indicated by increase in
number of members in each year. Corporate governance has been found to be strongly positively correlated
with financial performance, implying that poor corporate governance practices are associated with poor
financial performance, and vice versa. The result will form a focal point for further research in Implementation
of corporate governance principles within the SACCOs in Kenya
Keywords : corporate governance practice, financial performance, sacco.
I.
Introduction
In Kenya, SACCOs contribute 45% of countrys GDP and to date the sector has effectively mobilized
deposits and assets totaling to kshs200 billion and 210 billion respectively.
The Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (Sacco) have continued to play a critical role in Kenyas
financial sector in terms of access, savings mobilization and wealth creation. The successes and rapid growth of
SACCOs has begun to reveal a number of basic flaws in the Products they offer. In particular, the inherent
liquidity problems of many SACCOs (they Commonly offer loans equal to three times the savings balances of
members) has led a small subset of them (179 at the last count) beginning to raise additional voluntary but more
liquid savingsdeposits from members and even some non-members through the Front Office SavingsActivity
(FOSAs). At one level, the growth of FOSA balances can be seen as a considerablesuccess for the industry since
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Dependent Variables
Intervening Variables
Figure 1:1 Conceptual framework.on the effect of corporate governance practices on financial performance of
SACCOs.
Source: self conceptualization (2013)
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Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This section summarizes the information from other researchers who have carried out their research in
the same field of study. The specific areas covered here are theoretical review, Shareholder theory, Stakeholders
theory, Agency theory, the concept of Corporate Governance, relationship between corporate governance and
financial performance, Board of directors and Financial Performance, Summary of gap in the literature review
2.1 Theoretical Literature
2.1.1 Agency Theory
Corporate governance is based on agency theory, which is the relationship between agents and
principals. Agency theory explains how best the relationship between agents and principals can be tapped for
purposes of governing a corporation to realize its goals. Interest on agency relationships became more
prominent with the emergence of the large corporation. There are entrepreneurs who have a knack for
accumulation of capital, and managers who had a surplus of ideas to effectively use that capital. Since the
owners of capital (principals) have neither the requisite expertise nor time to effectively run their enterprises,
they hand them over to agents (managers) for control and day-to-day operations, hence, the separation of
ownership from control, and the attendant agency problems. In an agency relationship, principals and agents
have clearly defined responsibilities: Principals are select and put in place governors (directors and auditors to
ensure effective governance system is implemented, while agents are responsible for the day-to-day operations
of the enterprise.
Historically, definitions of corporate governance also took into consideration the relationship between
the shareholder and the company, as per agency theory, i.e. director-agents acting on behalf of shareholderprinciples in overseeing self-serving behaviors of management. However, broader definitions of corporate
governance are now attracting greater attention (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). Indeed, effective corporate
governance is currently understood as involving a wide number of participants. The primary participants are
management, shareholders and the boards of directors, but other key players whose interests are affected by the
corporation are employees, suppliers, customers, partners and the general community. Therefore, corporate
governance, understood in these broadening social contexts, ensures that the board of directors is accountable
not only to shareholders but also to non-shareholder stakeholders, including those who have a vested interest in
seeing that the corporation is well governed. Some corporate governance scholars (Carter and Lorsch, 2004;
Leblanc and Gillies, 2005) also argue that at the heart of good corporate governance is not board structure
(which receives a lot of attention in the current regulations), but instead board process (especially consideration
of how board members work together as a group and the competencies and behaviors both at the board level and
the level of individual directors). As a result, the current scholarly discuss about the nature of corporate
governance has come to reflect this body of research.
This separation is however, linked and governed through proper agency relationship at various
levels, among others between shareholders and boards of directors, between boards and senior management,
between senior and subordinate levels of management (ISDA, 2002). In such a principal-agent relationship,
there is always inherent potential for conflicts within a firm because the economic incentives faced by the
agents are often different from those faced by the principals (ISDA, 2002). According to ISDA (2002), all
companies are exposed to agency problems, and to some extent develop action plans to deal with them. These
include establishing such measures as: controls on the actions of agents, monitoring the actions of agents,
financial incentives to encourage agents to act in the interest of the principals, and separation of risk taking
functions from control functions (ISDA, 2002).
2.1.2 Stakeholders Theory
There are two main theories of stakeholder governance: the abuse of executive power model and the
stakeholder model. Current Anglo-American corporate governance arrangements vest excessive power in the
hands of management who may abuse it to serve their own interest at the expense of shareholders and society as
a whole (Hutton, 1995). Supporters of such a view argue that the current institutional restraints on managerial
behavior, such as non-executive directors, the audit process, the threat of takeover, are simply inadequate to
prevent managers abusing corporate power. Shareholders protected by liquid asset markets are uninterested in
all but the most substantial of abuses. Incentive mechanisms, such as share options, are means through which
managers can legitimize their abnormal overpayment (viewed by some as a symptom of the breakdown of
governance (Keasey et al., 1997). The abuse of executive power is particularly embedded in the problem of
executive overpay since executive remuneration has risen far faster than average earnings and there is at best a
very weak link between compensation and management performance (Conyon et al., 1995; Gregg et al., 1993).
The only restraint on executive pay seems to be the modesty of executives themselves, and the creation of socalled independent remuneration committees by large companies is not effective. What is worse is that it
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III.
Research Methodology
a.
Research Design
The study used a descriptive research survey design, which includes surveys and fact-finding enquiries
of different kinds. According to Gall and Borg (2006), descriptive research designs portray accurately the
characteristics of a particular individual situation or group. The major purpose of description of the state of
affairs as it exists at present (Kothari, 2003). The data was collected in an attempt to describe accurately as
possible the current situation of the effect corporate governance practices on financial performance of SACCOs
in Kericho Municipality. The design used a primary research method that is the collection of primary data.
3.2 Study area
The study was conducted in Kericho Municipality. The geographical area of Kericho covered in the
studywas as defined by local authority.
3.3 Target population
A target population is that group of SACCOs from which the study is designed and generalizations of
the findings are to be made from, (Kothari 2004).The target population of the study were 4 SACCOs in Kericho
Municipality.These were
1. Ndege chai sacco
2. Kipsgis sacco
3. Kenya highland Sacco
4. Simba chai Sacco
3.3.1 Sample Size
A surveywas conducted on all the 4 SACCOs in Kericho Municipality. A sample size of 28
respondents targeting top 5 managers from each sacco and 2 board members .Self-administered Questionnaires
were sent to each SACCOs .The study mainly utilized the primary data collected by use of self-administered
questionnaire to minimize non-response. Secondary data from relevant publications was used to supplement the
primary data.
3.3.2Sampling Technique
Stratified random samplingwas usedwhich involved dividing the population into stratas then taking a
simple random sample in each group. Samplewas drawn from each subgroup which comprised all the
fourSaccos. The sample distribution of saccos in kericho municipality is as shown below.
NAME OF SACCO
Ndege chai sacco
Kenya highlands
Imalisha
Simba chai
TOTALS
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TOP 5 MANAGERS
5
5
5
5
20
BOARD MEMBERS
2
2
2
2
8
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IV.
Frequency (N)
5
6
7
4
22
Percent (%)
23
27
32
18
100
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Frequency
2
2
4
Percent
50.0
50.0
100.0
I. TABLE 4.3 BELOW, FINDINGS INDICATED THAT 75% POSITION HELD BY THE RESPONDENTS WERE BOARD
MEMBERS, WHILE 25% WAS FOSA MANAGER. THIS SHOWED THAT THE RESPONDENTS THAT WERE APPROACHED
WERE EXPERIENCED ENOUGH TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS INTHE QUESTIONNAIRES.
Table 4.3
Position held by the
respondent
Board member
Fosa Manager
Total
Frequency
Percent
3
1
4
75.0
25.0
100.0
The findings of the study were analyzed as per the research objectives.
A. 4.2.1Establish the corporate governance principles adopted by Saccos in Kericho Municipality.
In order to Establish the corporate governance principles adopted by Saccos in kericho Municipality, the
respondents were asked to What level does your Sacco adopt corporate governance practices. The responses
were agreement measured on a Likert scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being to a most High and 5 being Very low.
Table 4.4: Sacco adopt corporate governance practices
What level does your Sacco adopt corporate governance practices
Most High
Very low
Total
Frequency
Percent
3
1
4
75.0
25.0
100.0
According to table 4.4, 75 percent of the respondents on are in agreement that the level of their adoption to
corporate governance practicesis most high.
Table 4.5:- How is the board of directors elected in your Sacco
How is the board of directors elected in your Sacco
Frequency
4
0
0
4
Percent
100.0
0
0
100
All the four Sacco respondents who were interviewed agree that they elected their members during AGM by
majority this therefore implies that board of directors are elected based on their performance and services they
offer
Objective 2 Assess role of board of directors in the financial performance of Savings and Credit
Cooperatives in Kericho Municipality.
How the Sacco disclose financial statement to the members and entire public
How the Sacco disclose financial statement to the members and entire public
Frequency
During AGM only
3
During AGM and publish through
1
media
Total
4
Percent
75.0
25.0
100.0
Table 4.6
To what level does your reporting affect
growth of your Sacco
Most High
High
Medium
Low
Very Low
Total
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Frequency
4
0
0
0
0
Percent
100.0
0
0
0
0
4
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100
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The figure 1 above presents the number of members joining Sacco from the year 2007-2012
The figure 1 above presents profits attained by Saccos from the year 2004-2012.
Study reveals upward trends in terms of profits which is partly explained by role of board of directors.
V.
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