HeyJ LII (2011), pp.

374391

HOW ORIGINAL WAS SCOTUS ON THE

INCARNATION? RECONSIDERING THE
HISTORY OF THE ABSOLUTE
PREDESTINATION OF CHRIST IN LIGHT OF
ROBERT GROSSETESTE
DANIEL P. HORAN, OFM

Washington Theological Union, Washington DC, USA

I. INTRODUCTION

Many medieval philosophers and theologians addressed questions related to the necessity
of the Incarnation. There exists little variance from one to the next, each arguing that the
Incarnation is tting and necessary. However, one thinker stands out in the history of
medieval theology as an exception to the Christological rule. John Duns Scotus (c. 1266
1208) is remembered for many theological and philosophical innovations, among them his
argument for the absolute predestination of Christ. While often credited for the original
insight, Scotus is certainly not the rst to propose this view. He is the inheritor of a littleknown tradition that developed for centuries before his contribution to the school of
thought. In this article I argue that Scotus was not as original in his thought on the
Incarnation as many portray him to have been. I will explore the development of the
doctrine of the absolute predestination of Christ from its early articulation in the work of a
monastic thinker through its further elucidation at Oxford to its theological and
philosophical culmination in the work of Scotus.
Arguably, the paragon of medieval theologians who have considered the necessity of the
Incarnation is Anselm of Canterbury. His treatise Cur Deus Homo1 serves as an exemplary
centerpiece of an exploration of the necessity of the Incarnation. Anselm, motivated to
produce an original justication for the doctrine of the Incarnation, models his argument
for the Incarnations necessity on the feudal model of satisfaction.2 Concerned with
proving the rationality of the argument to both Christians and non-Christians alike,3
Anselm engages the project in Cur Deus Homo in two parts. The rst part seeks to
demonstrate that without the Incarnation human salvation is impossible. The second part
includes Anselms argument that Gods intention for the human race is salvation.4 Anselm
focuses on the role of sin and the fall of humanity as the fundamental impetus for Gods
needing to become man.5 It is precisely due to the dishonor caused to God through human
sinfulness that demands satisfaction in order to restore the most precious piece of
workmanship that is now completely ruined.6 Anselms argument concludes that neither
humanity nor anything less than God (e.g. an angel) is capable of restoring the honor of
God diminished by human sin.7 The ultimate conclusion drawn by Anselm is that the
r 2010 The Author. The Heythrop Journal r 2010 Trustees for Roman Catholic Purposes Registered. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600
Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

HOW ORIGINAL WAS SCOTUS ON THE INCARNATION?

375

Incarnation is necessary inasmuch as there is no other logical way by which humanity

could have been redeemed and Gods honor have been restored, thereby returning creation
to its rightful degree of ttingness and order.
The major presupposition underlying the argument put forth by Anselm is the facticity
of human sinfulness. What is not considered is whether or not the Incarnation would have
occurred if humanity had not sinned. This counterfactual or hypothetical approach rst
appears in the work of Rupert of Deutz (c. 1075 1129/30), a contemporary of Anselm
although two decades his junior. Rupert develops his approach to the question of the
necessity of the Incarnation in De Gloria et honore lii hominis super Mattheum,8 where he
makes a scripturally based argument for the Incarnation irrespective of humanitys fall.9
Anselm and Rupert are key gures that represent the foundation of two schools of thought
that Beraud de Saint-Maruice has termed the anthropocentric and the Christocentric
respectively.10 The anthropocentric school asserts the subordination of the Incarnation to
the fall of humanity. In other words, Christ is said to enjoy an occasional or conditional
predestination that is dependent on human sinfulness.11 The Christocentric school adheres
to the thesis that if Adam had remained faithful and not sinned the Word would have still
become incarnate.12 This position maintains the absolute predestination of Christ.
The history of theology is clear in showing that theologians have preferred Anselms
approach, or the anthropocentric school. The minority or Christocentric position, the
beginning of which is attributed to Rupert, remains seemingly unoccupied until Robert
Grosseteste (c. 1168 1253) frames a similar question. However, although Rupert is the
rst to ask the question and Grosseteste the rst to seriously develop a detailed response,13
John Duns Scotus is almost exclusively associated with this position. While there exist
numerous studies of Scotuss view on the subject and a few scholarly articles or book
chapters on Grossetestes approach, there is a noticeable absence of scholarly work that
treats both thinkers engagement with this Christological and soteriological theme.14 I will
argue that what has often been characterized as Scotuss doctrine, and thereafter closely
associated with the so-called Franciscan school,15 actually nds its origins in the work of
a secular master who became the rst lecturer to the Franciscans in England. The lack of
scholarship addressing this connection betrays a history of myopic treatment of each
medieval thinker separately without particular concern for the possible inuence of the
former on the latter.16 I suggest that foundational elements of Scotuss doctrine of the
absolute predestination of Christ can be found in arguments posited by Grosseteste,
themes upon which Scotus contributes and further develops.17
The structure of this article is fourfold. First, I will introduce the concept of the
hypothetical question as initially posited by Rupert. Then I will present Grossetestes
argument for the necessity of the Incarnation and the absolute predestination of Christ.
Following the presentation of Grossetestes approach, I will explore Scotuss development
of the same theme in light of Grossetestes system. Finally, having examined the arguments
of both Grosseteste and Scotus, I will propose some concluding remarks and highlight the
manner of possible inuence between the two Oxford thinkers.

II. FORMULATING THE NASCENT DOCTRINE

The Classic Argument: Patristic and Other Authorities

Like most Christological questions, theories about the motive for and purpose of the
Incarnation are often rooted in soteriological concerns. The driving force behind inquiry

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DANIEL P. HORAN

into the nature of the Incarnation for more than a thousand years was to more clearly
understand the reason for John 1:14, And the Word became esh [NRSV]. Robert
Grosseteste is generally accurate when he writes that, if his memory serves him correctly,
none of the Fathers nor other authorities had grappled with this hypothetical question, the
study of which he was about to embark on.18 These Fathers and other authorities were
primarily concerned with the necessity of the Incarnation from the perspective of Christs
atoning sacrice. Their arguments followed a similar track. First, there was recognition of
the need for human redemption. This view arose from the axiomatic presupposition of
human sinfulness. Second, the manner by which humanity could be redeemed was
considered. This often took the form of some examination of whether or not human
beings, angelic beings or anything else could redeem fallen man. The conclusion was
always that God alone is capable of humanitys redemption. The nal theological exercise
in this regard was to investigate the way in which God redeems humanity. It is here that
each author sought to establish the necessity and rationale of the Incarnation.19 The
primary concern for these Fathers and authorities was the elucidation of how the Word
incarnate redeems fallen humanity.20
For these antecedent authorities there was also a general assumption that the
Incarnation implied no contradiction, but that there was a general ttingness to the union
of God and man.21 Arguments of this sort were founded on scriptural texts that support
this view such as Ephesians 2:410 and John 3:16. It was revelation that provided the
theological impetus to delve into the soteriological signicance and implications of the
necessity of the Incarnation. Beyond the soteriological concern answered in this approach,
the Incarnations ttingness also relates to the notion that human sin leaves Gods plan for
creation frustrated and disordered.22 Only God can re-order and restore creation to its
rightful place. In other words, it is satisfaction that is sought by God. This view of
restoration and need for satisfaction necessitates a God-man to complete this task. The
explanation of the argument is summarized well by John Galvin when he wrote, To forget
or ignore the debt [caused by human sin] is . . . impossible, for divine mercy is inseparable
from divine justice, and in any case ignoring the debt would leave the proper order
disturbed. At the same time, since human dignity and freedom must be respected,
satisfaction must be offered by a member of the human race.23 This, as Anselm will come
to conclude, means that a human being must repay the debt, but, apart from the God-man
of the Incarnation, no human being is capable of repaying the debt.24 Therefore the
Incarnation is tting and necessary.
Reconsidering the Classic Argument: Rupert of Deutz
It seems clear that Grosseteste (and perhaps Scotus after him) was unaware of Ruperts
position at the time of his own inquiry.25 Because of the apparent gap in inuence between
the work of Rupert and Grosseteste, one could easily begin such an analysis of the early
Oxford thinkers arguments without any mention of Rupert. However, given that Rupert
is credited as the originator of the hypothetical query, it is important to be familiar with his
approach in order to better understand the similarities and differences with those thinkers
that follow.
According to John Van Engen, at rst Rupert was very much a man of his time, at least
theologically.26 Concerned with traditional questions of salvation and predestination, in
many ways Rupert looked like the early medieval thinkers and their predecessors who, for
centuries, had struggled with questions of Divine Will and fallen humanity. In this regard,
one might initially place Rupert in a category that includes authors such as Augustine or

HOW ORIGINAL WAS SCOTUS ON THE INCARNATION?

377

the Carolingian reformers. However, the inner compulsion to develop a clear and
comprehensible argument that elucidated Gods plan for salvation would lead Rupert into
uncharted territory and on an original theological path. Van Engen draws a parallel
between Rupert and Anselm. Whereas each ultimately reached different (if not opposite)
conclusions, Van Engen stresses the degree of originality expressed in both thinkers given
the theological milieu of their age.27 Anselm will maintain that it was because of human sin
that the Incarnation was necessary, but present his argument in a magisterially original
way. Rupert will argue the opposite position, arguing for the necessity of the Incarnation
by way of a counterfactual proposition. If Anselm represents the anthropocentric school
par excellence, then Rupert can be viewed as the founder of the Christocentric school.
Around 1127 Rudolph of St. Trond requested that Rupert address disputed questions
on the Trinity, the proper exegesis of Genesis 49:10, and the necessity of the Incarnation.28
It seems that Rupert, in response to Rudolphs request, wrote De gloricatione Trinitatis,
in which Rupert addresses the rst two questions and makes explicit reference to
Rudolphs commission. It also appears as though Rudolphs commission inspired Rupert
to devote the last book (XIII) of his De gloria et honore Filii hominis Super Mattheum to
reconsidering the cause and necessity of the Incarnation.29 It is in this text that Rupert
develops his original insight on the theme.
In addition to the denial of the Incarnation by the Jews,30 Rupert was motivated by two
problems he saw in the previous work on the Incarnation. His rst problem with earlier
expositions was that many authorities believed that to demonstrate the necessity of the
Incarnation one inevitably concludes that God must have willed evil.31 The second
problem is that if God did not will evil, then the Incarnation represented something of a
plan B (nouum concilium), which seemingly contradicts the nature of an omnipotent and
immutable God.32 These two concerns, while they play a prominent role in the
development of his thought in De gloria et honore, appear to have been of interest to
Rupert earlier in his career as well.33 In De gloria et honore Rupert sought to rebut these
two positions. Ruperts response is that God intended all along to have the second person
of the Trinity assume a concrete, earthly role in the divine plan for His chosen people.34
This was not an alternate plan or the result of God having willed evil, but a reection of
Gods foreordained plan to rejoice among men as their incarnate King.35
With a view that accommodated the foreordination of the Incarnation from all eternity,
Ruperts position offered an alternative to the previously held views that Rupert found so
problematic. If the Word was predestined to become incarnate, then where did humanity
t into the picture? The theodicy question remained present in this response. Ruperts
reply was that anything new was not that of Gods Will as expressed in a revised or
alternate plan, rather it was attributable to humanity and the devil.36 As such, Rupert
posited that the Incarnation was foreordained and necessary, but that Christs sacricial
atonement was not. In other words, the manner in which Christ suffered and died was the
direct result of the Fall. In this sense Rupert recongures the question to include the
Incarnation as the absolute focal point of Gods plan and an explanation for the glory
and honor that Christ was raised to as the result of the sacricial atonement.37
Rupert is the rst to stand aside from the crowd of authorities that had for so
long argued for the necessity and ttingness of the Incarnation on account of the axiomatic
condition of human fallenness. He is able to phrase a question that, to this point, had
gone unasked: Would God have become incarnate if humanity had not fallen in sin?38
His answer, rooted in his reading of scripture and destined to go unnoticed for centuries,
is yes.

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DANIEL P. HORAN

III. ROBERT GROSSETESTE

Scriptural Foundations for a Speculative Approach

Robert Grosseteste, in addition to being chancellor of the University of Oxford, bishop of
the diocese of Lincoln and the rst theological instructor of the Franciscan friars in
England, is perhaps best remembered as a biblical exegete.39 As true as that
characterization is, it remains insufcient and supercial since he was so much more.40
His interests were wide ranging and his intellectual output reects his multifaceted mind
and career. As a magister in sacra pagina it would be expected that the study and teaching
of scripture would have occupied much of his time. Grosseteste is known for his adherence
to the Bible as a teaching text in the classroom and the presence of scripture throughout his
written corpus is ubiquitous.41 It makes sense, then, that scripture would be the starting
point for Grossetestes exploration of the necessity of the Incarnation. Although
Grosseteste begins with scripture, he is quickly forced to sidestep a normal exegetical
path because his trajectory leads him into uncharted theological territory. Likewise,
Grossetestes investigation requires that he forego the standard appeal to authoritative
sources, if only because no one else to the best of Grossetestes knowledge had ever
explored this avenue.
In this way we can begin to outline the movement from his exegetical task to his more
speculative inquiry. James Ginther has observed that the work of Grosseteste up to and
beyond his appointment as Bishop of Lincoln presents an epistemological context fecund
with possibility for speculative theological work.42 Ginther also notes that it was precisely
the responsibility of the speculative theologian to provide a rational account of what was
gained from the study of scripture.43 It is both as a scriptural exegete and speculative
theologian that Grosseteste explores the question of the necessity of the Incarnation.
Grossetestes treatment of the necessity of the Incarnation is found prominently in three
texts: De Cessatione Legalium, Exiit Edictum (a Christmas homily), and Hexaemeron.44
Additionally, recent scholarship has examined the Christological and Trinitarian
implications of Grossetestes Expositio in Epistolam Sancti Pauli ad Galatas,45 including
the initial development of his understanding of the necessity of the Incarnation. All four of
these texts are developed within a scriptural context. In De Cessatione Legalium,
Grosseteste deals with the relationship between the Law of the Old Testament and the
promise or fulllment of that Law in Christ. In Exiit Edictum, he takes up the Incarnation,
echoing the thoughts put forward in De Cessatione Legalium. The Hexaemeron is a
completed commentary on Genesis 1 2:16, and, according to most Grosseteste scholars,
the high point of his scriptural work.46 Finally, the Expositio on Galatians, estimated to
have been written before De Cessatione Legalium,47 also provides some inchoate
reections on the Incarnation. Ginther shows that Grosseteste argues his thesis from
scripture in ve ways.
The rst way is through Grossetestes presentation of the necessity of the Incarnation as
a promised blessing. This blessing is rst promised to Abraham in Genesis 12:3 and
expounded in Genesis 18:1718 where we read that it will come about from the seed of
Abraham.48 From this passage, Grosseteste performs some exegesis that results in four
premises that relate to the Incarnation. These include the unfulllment of the promise in
Abraham himself, the blessing in one offspring (in semine) not many (in seminibus), the
grandiose scope implied in the blessing compared to other Old Testament promises, and
God as the only one capable of fullling such a promise of liberation and glory, thereby
requiring the Incarnation.49

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379

The second way is through the recognition that the promised blessing, if one insists that
it does not mandate God in Gods self, would at least require the very best of humanity
(optimus hominum), which would be the most acceptable to God.50 Grosseteste connects
the promised blessing with the optimus hominum as the God-man.51 The third way is
through an interpretation of Jacobs prophesy in Genesis 49:10. Here Grosseteste asserts
that the one for whom the tribes of Israel were awaiting (expectatio gentium) is none other
than the God-man in the Incarnation.52
The fourth way is in Grossetestes exegesis of the fourth song of the suffering servant in
Isaiah 52:1353:12. While Grosseteste had, up to this point, been faithful to his desire to
argue for the necessity of the Incarnation from Old Testament scripture alone, here he
departs and makes reference to several Gospel and other New Testament passages.53 This
is due to his effort to intimately link the description found in Isaiah with the description of
the life of Jesus found in the New Testament. The nal way is perhaps the weakest of all
ve. Grosseteste puts forth an argument centered on the timing of Christs advent.54 The
argument appears to be made in order to strengthen the earlier points, namely the
expectatio gentium of Genesis 49.55
While scripture provides the impetus for inquiry and the context for Grossetestes initial
presentation of the necessity of the Incarnation, he quickly discovers it necessary to move
beyond the Sacred Page, a move beyond what has already been well established.56 Having
found previous commentators and patristic authorities lacking in sufcient material to
draw upon, Grosseteste engages the hypothetical question by way of reason. This
speculative exercise remained a cautious one for Grosseteste because he was weary of too
strongly asserting an answer unsupported by revelation or authoritative theologians.
According to one scholar, Grosseteste would always maintain a clear distinction between
his endorsement of the previously asserted primacy of Christ (that doctrine presented by
earlier authorities and scripture) and the answer to the hypothetical question of whether
the Word would have become incarnate had Adam not sinned.57
Grossetestes Argument for the Absolute Predestination of Christ
Having inquired as to whether or not the Incarnation would have taken place regardless of
sin,58 responding in the afrmative, Grosseteste presents his case to defend his afrmative
hypothesis. The arguments he develops number nineteen in total.59 The history of the
secondary literature that has sought to classify and organize these arguments differs in
approach and style from author to author. McEvoy and Ginther have both adopted an
approach that combines the arguments to present ve general themes, although each
authors presentation includes some variation.60 Unger, on the other hand, presents ten
arguments from the angle of absolute reasons for the Incarnation in the present order, in
contrast to arguments exclusive to the hypothetical order.61 Given the limited scope and
necessary constraints of this article, we will follow McEvoys organizational pattern,
drawing on other authors when necessary.

i. The Goodness of God

The rst argument stems from the notion of Gods goodness.62 Grosseteste makes
reference to the fact that God is a greater good than can even be thought, a concept
gleaned from Anselms Proslogion.63 Ginther observes that, in addition to the Anselmian
concept of highest good, Grosseteste applies the Pseudo-Dyionysian understanding of

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DANIEL P. HORAN

self-diffusive goodness to the argument. This combination results in Grossetestes

assertion that God created the universe in such a way that it was capable of receiving
Gods goodness.64 Not only is creation capable of such reception, but God intends the
perfection of creation through its participation in Gods innite power, wisdom and
goodness.65 The realization of this intention is found in Gods supreme generosity and
goodness. God does not withhold any good the universe is capable of receiving. In other
words, God will communicate to creation as much good as it has potential to receive.66
According to Ginther, Grossetestes project here is to transform the metaphysical
statements concerning Gods goodness and creation into a Christological statement
highlighting the Incarnation as the highest and primary example of creations reception of
Gods goodness.67 What, for creation, could be a greater good than the union of the divine
and human? Being that creation is obviously capable of receiving the God-man since it
already has God must have always intended for creations reception of the Incarnation.68
Furthermore, Grosseteste moves beyond the argument in terms of the present absolute
order to consider the consequences of this line of thought for his hypothetical inquiry. In
doing so, Grosseteste concludes that sin could not have possibly been the reason for the
Incarnation alone. Unger highlighted this point well when he wrote:
That the capacity for a hypostatic union with human nature did not come from the sin of man,
Robert demonstrates from the fact that both guilt and punishment are defects of essences and not
essences themselves, and so they cannot be the cause of the capacity for union, which is something
positive, in fact, it is the greatest positive good.69

Because the Incarnation is the highest good creation is able to receive, a lower good or in
the absolute present order, a privation such as sin could not be its cause. Therefore, the
Incarnation must have been destined from all time to occur.

ii. Impossibility of Sin as Cause of the Incarnation

Following from the last argument, that sin cannot be the cause of the highest good creation
is able to receive, we move to consider in greater detail why Grosseteste believed this to be
true. The central feature of this argument is made in consideration of the hypostatic union.
Drawing on Peter Lombard, Grosseteste examines the mode of union between God and
humanity as is present in the Incarnation. Lombards contribution to Grossetestes
approach comes from his synthesis of the views of Augustine and John Damascene that the
Word of God was united to the carni through the intellectum.70 If one also considers that
the union of soul and body in humanity was stronger in the prelapsarian state, it makes no
sense that in its weaker state caused by sin, could be found grounds for the possibility of
the Incarnation. Grosseteste goes so far as to say that the difference between the
prelapsarian and absolute present order state of union in humanity is like the difference
between life and death.71 Grossetestes understanding of sin as a privation, not a reality,
plays an important role in adjudicating the rationality of any argument that posits sin as
the reason for the Incarnation. Given both the weaker state of the human union of soul
and body due to the Fall and sins privative quality, it is impossible that sin made human
nature more capable of being united to the Word of God, and thus could not be the cause
of such a good as the Incarnation.72

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381

iii. Redemption and Justication as Independent Needs

This argument begins with the demarcation of the need and purpose of human redemption
and justication. In sum, Grosseteste nds the implications of an atonement or
satisfaction theology of the Incarnation repugnant, especially in light of the apparent
insult to Gods dignity contained in the argument. This becomes clear when one considers
that the humanity of Christ is reduced to a purely functional level, required solely for
redemptive suffering, if sin were the primary cause of the Incarnation. As such, the
Incarnation would play an incongruously small role in the divine plan.73 Another way to
think of it is that Christ would serve as the cosmic pawn of God the Fathers justication of
humanity. Grosseteste argues that, God-made-man is the proportionate cause of
justication, and the Incarnation would have been needed even though man had never
fallen from original justice.74 Ginther points out that for most medieval theologians the
concept of justication was associated with the process of salvation. However, in
Groessetestes case the process of salvation was tied up with the notion of sanctication. In
this way, justication had nothing to do with sin, so that Adam and Eve would have
required the Incarnation regardless of the fall.75 Justication would have always required
the Incarnation, according to Grosseteste, because humanity was always (that is, even
before sin) destined for sanctity.
The necessity of the Incarnation in this case relates to the status of humanitys adopted
sonship.76 While Grosseteste speculates that we would have been adopted as children of the
Father regardless of the fall (an idea drawn from Paul77), he notes that we are indeed sons of
God in the absolute present order because we have become brothers of Christ. Additionally,
because of Christs assumption of our humanity, we have become ones that share in his
divinity.78 This leads Grosseteste to conclude that if humanity had not sinned, either God
would have become Incarnate anyway (for justication and adoption of humanity) or
humankind would have been deprived of attaining complete happiness.79 Grosseteste takes
this argument to its natural extreme end when he asserts that angels, like the innocent Adam,
are in need of justication by the grace of Christ, and in doing so concludes that the Son
must have been absolutely predestined for Incarnation prior to sin.80

iv. Christ as Head of the Church

This argument is made from a position of ttingness with respect to the establishment of
the Church and its sacraments. Grosseteste presupposes Christ as head of the Church.
Christs primacy in this regard is frequently stressed throughout Grossetestes work. He
draws heavily on the Letter to the Ephesians, especially Ephesians 1:22 and 5:23, to
illustrate the centrality and primacy of Christ in relationship to the Church. Christ as head
is elaborated on in the Hexaemeron where Grosseteste again draws on Ephesians and cites
1 Corinthians 11:3 to highlight the revelation of this fact in scripture.81 Grosseteste sees
some practical implications of this revelation for the Church in the absolute present order.
His primary concern is that of the sacraments. Using the examples of marriage and the
Eucharist, he argues that the dignity of these institutions could not rely on the fall of
humanity.82 This is even more the case when one examines the metaphor of marriage
between Christ and the Church. Grosseteste held that God intended Christ and His
Church even before the fall of Adam was in His mind. [Therefore] the absolute existence of
the Church and Christ did not depend on the fall of man.83 Considering the hypothetical

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DANIEL P. HORAN

implication of this position, it would be absurd to presume that the union of Christ to the
Church and the establishment of the sacraments (marriage, which Grosseteste argues,
existed before Adam and Eve sinned) were part of the contingent order. The only logical
end to this argument is the absolute predestination of the Word to become Incarnate.

v. The Unity of All Creation

This nal argument comes from Grossetestes understanding that creation is essentially
united. For everything that is united or one, there must be a unifying principle.
Additionally, the unifying principle must be greater than the parts that compose the one.84
This is important for Grosseteste because it attests, yet again, to the necessity of the
Incarnation. He reaches this position through a brief exploration of the possibility that the
unifying principle could be anything other than the incarnate God-man. First he considers
whether or not it could be an angel or a purely spiritual being. This does not work,
Grosseteste believes, because, although the angel shares intelligence and rationality with
the human rational soul, it has nothing more than a generic unity with material creation.85
Next, Grosseteste considers the human being. While the human being, according to
Grosseteste, contains within its bodily self all of the material world in a microcosmic way
and is at the same time united to the rational soul, there is an absence of a direct sharing
with its creator. Additionally, the human being cannot be the unifying principle because it
shares equally among its species the dignity of the created. For this reason, the unifying
principle certainly could not be another creature because that creature would necessarily
fall below the dignity of humankind. Finally, Grosseteste considers God in Gods self.
While God is in fact the principle of all things, Gods transcendence places God beyond
participation in any species or genus directly.86 The only thing remaining that could serve
as the absolute unifying principle is the union of the God-man in the Incarnation.87
Ginther is quick to remind us that this nal argument contains elements of Grossetestes
adaptation of the whole-Christ (Christus integer88) motif, which serves as his subject of
theology.89 It is in the Incarnation that all is brought to completion (in complementum
circulare), because it is in the union of God and humanity that the unifying principle of all
reality exists. The circle of completion can also be understood with regard to human
generation. For what was once linear (Adam begot children onward) now becomes
circular (Christ begot Adam).90 This complementum circulare notion highlights the concept
that Christ is both the rst and the last.91 Since Christ is the rstborn of every creature (1
Corinthians 1:15) and at the same time the nis of all creation, it is rather impossible to
envision an alternate universe in which the Incarnation was not both necessary and
predestined from all eternity. The Incarnation was necessary to unify all parts of creation
and to complete the capacity for fulllment God intended for the universe.
Grosseteste Concludes With Hesitancy
Grossetestes interest in the hypothetical question of whether the Incarnation would have
happened even if humanity had not sinned, although without patristic or authoritative
backing, was rooted in his reading of scripture.92 However we might understand his line of
rational reasoning as originating in revelation, Grosseteste was hesitant to assert too
strongly his conclusions by way of hypothesizing. Perhaps this is why the Bishop of
Lincoln was so attentive to distinguishing the hypothetical inquiry from those arguments
related to the absolute present order. That said, Grosseteste willingly acknowledges that

HOW ORIGINAL WAS SCOTUS ON THE INCARNATION?

383

the arguments put forth are tting, persuasive and efcacious.93 It will not be until John
Duns Scotus that such an approach is again taken up in earnest.

IV. JOHN DUNS SCOTUS IN LIGHT OF GROSSETESTE

Introduction to the Subtle Doctors Argument

It is with precision and force not found in Rupert or Grossetestes treatment of the
Incarnation that John Duns Scotus explores the subject. The complexity of his thought
rightly earned him the title Doctor Subtlitis, but his work on the necessity of the
Incarnation and the absolute predestination of Christ is not nearly as daunting as some
might fear, especially compared to his other work. That said, his system of thought in this
regard is rigorous and his assertions strong. While the limited space and scope of this
article prohibits a full representation or detailed summary of Scotuss approach, the likes
of that presented above for Grosseteste, it is important to have a solid basis for
understanding Scotuss argument. Detailed studies of Scotuss view on the Incarnation are
numerous and accessible.94 Our primary concern here is the manner in which his approach
is similar to and different from his intellectual predecessor, Robert Grosseteste.
The core presentation of Scotuss argument for the predestination of Christ is found in
his Ordinatio.95 It is here that he asks the question of whether or not Christ was predestined
to be the Son of God?96 Scotuss primary argument stems from an understanding of
predestination to glory.97 In the rst instance the predestination of Christ to glory, and in
the second, humanity. From here Scotus constructs his argument for the ttingness of the
predestination of Christ in contradistinction to the opposing view, namely that of the
Anselmian or anthropocentric school, which he sees as absurd (absurdius). Scotus rejects
redemption as the primary reason for the Incarnation and asserts that Christ had been
destined from all eternity to be the King and center of creation.98
Problems with Appropriate Predecessor Attribution in Scotus Studies
Before moving on to explore the ways in which Scotuss work is similar to and different from
those who traveled this path before him, it might be helpful to review the noticeable absence
of appropriate attribution to Scotuss intellectual predecessors in the history of theology.
There are but a few studies that acknowledge the diversity and richness of the development
of the doctrine of the absolute predestination of Christ. Most scholars make passing remarks
that imply that there was indeed a tradition, if only a minority one, that predated Scotus.
Usually, these authors make a brief reference to Rupert or some other minor theologian,
without considering the more proximate connection and likely inuential work of
Grosseteste.99 On the rare occasion that a connection is inferred between Grosseteste and
Scotus, it is almost always a scholar of Grosseteste anticipating the Subtle Doctors future
work. Of all the available literature, only one author names both Rupert of Deutz and
Robert Grosseteste as having a possible inuence on Scotuss own project.100 Unfortunately,
the treatment the author gives to both is limited. Scotuss predecessors are simply two more
names in a long list of other medieval thinkers that seem to have, at one point or another in
their respective work, implied the predestination of Christ.
Points of Continuity with the Antecedent Christocentric Arguments
Perhaps the most signicant parallel found between Scotuss argument and that of
Grossetestes is the repugnance both thinkers had in reaction to the possibility that sin

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DANIEL P. HORAN

could be named as the cause of the Incarnation. This is expressed in three signicant ways,
each exhibiting a possible thread of continuity from Grosseteste to Scotus.
The rst thread of continuity in both thinkers work on the absolute predestination of
Christ is found in the argument from goodness. Scotus argues that it is unlikely that the
highest good in all of creation (i.e. the Incarnation) is something that was caused by a
contingent event (i.e. Adams sin), something of a far inferior goodness.101 Present in this
part of Scotuss argument are both of Grossetestes rst two arguments as outlined above.
Scotuss use of the highest good (summum bonum102) to refer to the Incarnation reects
Grossetestes adaptation of Anselms denition found in the Proslogion. Also present in
Scotuss argument is the notion of the capacity of creation to receive such a good, thereby
suggesting the Incarnations necessity and preordination.103
Additionally present in this part of Scotuss argument is the idea of the impossibility
of sin as the fundamental cause for the Incarnation. Grosseteste and Scotus differ in
their particular articulation of this feature of the argument. For Scotus, the nature of
sin is not as important as it belongs to some category of goodness below that of the
summum bonum. Grosseteste, on the other hand, sees sin as a privation or a defective
essence. Both thinkers reach the same conclusion that the Incarnation could not have been
caused by sin.
The second thread of continuity found in both Grosseteste and Scotus is the treatment
of the themes of justication and redemption. Neither thinker denies the redemptive role
of the Incarnation. To do so would certainly to be at odds with essential doctrinal
teaching. However, both Grosseteste and Scotus make an effort to separate the two needs
in order to highlight the preordination of the Word to become incarnate. Scotuss
approach is found within his core argument about the predestination to glory. Stating that
Christs human nature was rst predestined to glory, and so rightly ordered to such, Scotus
then asserts that humanity and other creatures are likewise ordered to glory.104 Since the
end is rst ordained prior to the means, glory is foreordained before the Incarnation, and
subsequently before human glory. In other words, because from all eternity creation was
predestined to glory, justication was always part of Gods plan. Scotus maintains that the
God-man would not have come as redeemer had Adam not sinned, but would have always
come as the means to the foreordained glory of creation.105 As we have seen above,
Grosseteste had already made a similar distinction between redemption and justication.
His understanding of justication as the predestination to sanctity aligns closely with
Scotuss own view of foreordained glory. The need for redemption, in both Grosseteste
and Scotus, was in fact caused by Adams sin, however that predestined act is subsequent
to the justifying or sanctifying act of bringing creation to its ordered glory in the
Incarnation. This is summarized, by Mary Beth Ingham as the union of human nature
with the Word of God would take place in time prior to the achievement of nal glory, but
the Incarnation could be in light of the glory, not in light of any sin which might be
committed prior to the Incarnation.106
The nal thread of continuity is found in the centrality of Christ in the divine plan.
While Grosseteste is concerned with the unity of all creation, Scotus is less overt in
discussing notions aligned with a theory of recapitulation. That said, Scotus is concerned
with a teleological conception of creation that consists of a graced and glorious end.107
Both authors draw on Ephesians 1:314 in articulating their respective developments on
the role of Christ in the economy of salvation. Several scholars have noted the so-called
Incarnational thrust that appears operative throughout the entire corpus of the Subtle
Doctor.108 Scotuss theology of creation and subsequent anthropology is richly indebted

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385

to his view of a Christocentric conception of the universe. Grosseteste, likewise, nds

Christ as the God-man as the only logical principle of unity in creation.109
Points of Originality and Departure from Predecessors
It is important to note one primary difference between Scotus and the two predecessors we
have considered above. Scotus does not begin his effort, nor is he primarily concerned,
with an alternate or hypothetical order. Rather, Scotuss approach begins with the
Incarnation as factual premise. This is not to suggest that Scotuss position bears no
impact on a hypothetical reformulation of the question, but this is not his intention.
Because he is concerned with the absolute present order, the development of his argument
takes a different shape than that of his predecessors. Additionally, one can see a variation
in Scotuss reliance on scripture for his doctrine of the absolute predestination of Christ.
While it is true that he invokes some New Testament passages, unlike his predecessors it is
exceptional rather than the rule. It is in this way that Scotus is often viewed as highly
philosophical, in that he selected to approach the subject from a rigorously rational angle.
As Richard Cross succinctly points out, Scotus argues that natural reason will allow us to
gain some insight into what Gods decision-making process must be like, and he concludes
that Christ would have become incarnate irrespective of the Fall of Adam.110 It is through
natural reason, not revelation, that Scotus believes we are able to delve into the question of
the Incarnation and it is with reason that he makes his case.
Another signicant point of departure Scotus makes from predecessors is the manner in
which his doctrine of the absolute predestination of Christ ts into his whole system.111
Scotuss emphasis of the primacy of the will over the intellect, clearly articulated and
applied elsewhere in his corpus, is made manifest in the argument he puts forth for the
necessity of the Incarnation and the absolute predestination of Christ. It is love that serves
as the centerpiece of his theological investigation and his work on the Incarnation is no
exception. In his Reportatio Parisiensia, Scotus outlines his distinction related to love as
the core of Gods action:
I argue in this way: First, God loves himself; in the second place, he loves himself in other, and this
is pure love; in the third place, he wants to be loved by another who can love him to the highest
degree, inasmuch as that is possible to a being outside himself; and nally, he foresees the
[hypostatic] union of that nature which ought to love him to the highest degree even if man had not
fallen.112

While not explicitly articulated in the Ordinatio in a comparable sense, Scotuss vision
found in the Reportatio nevertheless underlies his exploration of the question about
Christs predestination.113 For Scotus, the Incarnation could never be conceived as simply
a redemptive exercise of God, but it was always intended to facilitate a higher perfection,
namely divine love. The union of God with humanity, and by extension all of creation, is
the highest sign of Gods unconditional and preordained love. Scotus suggests that this is
veriable inasmuch as we see it transmitted to us by revelation.114

V. CONCLUSION

As we have explored the development of the concept of the absolute predestination of

Christ and the necessity of the Incarnation from Rupert of Deutz through Robert
Grosseteste to John Duns Scotus, we have seen several themes consistently emerge in the

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DANIEL P. HORAN

individual treatments of the subject by each thinker. It is certainly fair to suggest that each
of these medieval scholars adopted, adapted and contributed to the program of inquiry
that seriously reconsidered the afore-held position on the necessity of the Incarnation as
magisterially presented in the work of Anselm of Canterbury. Namely, that the
Incarnation served a purpose related primarily to Gods redemptive act in accord with
the requisite satisfaction needed to amend the broken relationship between God and
humanity (and the rest of creation). Rupert, Grosseteste and Scotus all posited a thesis to
the contrary. God, each thinker asserts, predestined the Word to become incarnate before
the Fall of Adam.
I suggest that there is indeed a common thread that unites all three thinkers in their
effort to elucidate the Christocentric thesis to which they adhere. This unitive and
inuential connection is present in two ways. The rst is through the macro-perspectival
consideration of all three thinkers. In this way I see a ow from a revelation-based
hypothetical inquiry toward a more philosophical-rational approach. Rupert, with biblical
underpinnings guiding his critique of the anthropocentric school, initiates the revelationbased hypothetical inquiry. Here we see his use of the New Testament epistolary within a
commentary on Matthew to frame his investigation into the possibility of the Incarnation
irrespective of the Fall. Grosseteste, while probably unfamiliar with Ruperts work, picks
up close to where Rupert nished. His De Cessatione Legalium is largely concerned with
the way in which the Incarnation was foretold in the Old Testament. However interested
Grosseteste was in remaining close to his predecessors in their authoritative presentations
and scripture alone, he quickly found himself in the realm of the hypothetical and rational
examination of the present order. It is at this point that Grosseteste can be seen as the
bridge between the work of Rupert with his nascent formulation of the doctrine of the
absolute predestination of Christ and Scotuss later work in the philosophical-rational
realm of the same question. Grosseteste, unsure of what to make of his conclusions based
on reason and not scripture or previous authorities, leaves his work unasserted in the
manner Scotus will be famous for. Perhaps it is in part for this reason that Grosseteste goes
largely unnoticed in the history of the Christocentric school of the necessity of the
Incarnation. Scotus comes along and, seemingly uninterested with the hypothetic order,
remains committed to responding to the now Anselmian-Thomistic approach with a
forceful assertion of Christs absolute predestination from all eternity from a rigorously
philosophical-rational angle.
The second way that I see continuity of thought in the development of this
Christocentric doctrine is in the more specic consideration of Grossetestes inuence
on Scotus. There are clear historical indications that Scotus was familiar with Grossetestes
work.115 Given that Grosseteste was the rst lecturer to the very same Franciscan
community that Scotus would later join, and given that much of Grossetestes unique
theological work is believed to have been developed during or around the time of this
lectorship,116 it appears more than likely that Grossetestes work either directly in written
form or passed down orally by way of later Franciscan lectors at the Oxford studium
would have inuenced the young Scotus. Is it possible that Scotus read Grossetestes
Hexaemeron and De Cessatione Legalium? Or even his Christmas sermon, Exiit Edictum?
It would appear probable, especially because of evidence that suggests Grosseteste was
read by his contemporaries in Paris.117
So, how original was Scotus on the Incarnation? It appears that he was about as original
as any of the other thinkers were who contributed to the development of the doctrine of the
absolute predestination of Christ during the 12th, 13th and early 14th centuries. Scotus

HOW ORIGINAL WAS SCOTUS ON THE INCARNATION?

387

certainly approached the question with a disciplined and rigorous method that had not
been applied to the subject before. However, the nearly ubiquitous attribution of the
doctrine to Scotus alone is, as I hope to have demonstrated above, a false characterization
that does injustice to the other contributors that laid the initial foundation upon which
Scotus would later build. Additionally, the connection between Grosseteste and Scotus is
one that deserves further consideration. While the limited nature of this article has
prohibited a detailed analysis of the Subtle Doctors argument alongside Grossetestes
approach that might sufciently conclude a dependent relationship, my hope is that this
article has shed some light on an area of medieval scholarship left unexplored, hereby
providing a schema for future elucidation of the history of the absolute predestination of
Christ.

Notes
1 See Anselm of Canterbury, Why God Became Man [Cur Deus Homo], in Anselm of Canterbury: The Major
Works, eds. Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 260356 [hereafter cited as
Anselm of Canterbury followed by page number]. The critical edition of Anselms works is the Anselmi Opera Omnia,
eds. F.S. Schmitt and R.W. Southern, 6 vols. (Rome and Edinburgh, 19381968). Cur Deus Homo is located in vol. 2.
2 For more see Anthony Kenny, Medieval Philosophy, A New History of Western Philosophy, vol. 2 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2005), 43; and G. R. Evans, Anselm of Canterbury, in The Medieval Theologians: An Introduction to
Theology in the Medieval Period, ed. G. R. Evans (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), p. 99.
It should be noted that while most Anselmian scholars uphold this concept of debitum and satisfaction, there exists a
strong tradition that contests the inuence of feudal society and legislation on Anselms soteriological impulse in Cur
Deus Homo. For more see Richard Campbell, The Conceptual Roots of Anselms Soteriology, in Anselm: Aosta, Bec
and Canterbury, eds. D. E. Luscombe and G. R. Evans (London: Shefeld Academic Press, 1996), pp. 256263.
3 The rst book of Cur Deus Homo is developed in such a way as to appeal, from Anselms perspective, to all with
an open mind and by reason alone. See G. R. Evans, Cur Deus Homo: The Nature of St. Anselms Appeal to Reason,
Studia Theologica 31 (1977): pp. 3350; Stephen Gersch, John Scottus Eriugena and Anselm of Canterbury, in
Medieval Philosophy, Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. 3, ed. John Marenbon (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 123;
and Evans, Anselm of Canterbury, p. 99.
4 John Galvin, Jesus Christ, in Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives, vol. 1, eds. Francis Schussler
Fiorenza and John Galvin (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1991), p. 277.
5 Cur Deus Homo bk. 1, chaps. 14 (Anselm of Canterbury, pp. 265270).
6 Cur Deus Homo bk. 1, chap. 4 (Anselm of Canterbury, p. 270).
7 Evans, Anselm of Canterbury, p. 99.
8 See Rupert of Deutz, De Gloria et honore lii hominis super Mattheum, in Corpus Christianorum Continuatio
Mediaevalis (Hereafter cited as CCCM), vol. 29.
9 The argument for Christ as the climax of creation comes from Hebrews 2:10, See De Gloria, 13 (CCCM 29:410
and 415).
10 Beraud de Saint-Maurice, John Duns Scotus: A Teacher For Our Times, trans. Columban Duffy (St.
Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Press, 1955), pp. 241242.
11 Saint-Maurice, John Duns Scotus, p. 242.
12 Saint-Maurice, John Duns Scotus, pp. 249250.
13 Jame McEvoy, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 26.
14 Edwin Chr. van Driel has noted few exceptions to this trend. See van Driel, Incarnation Anyway: Arguments for
Supralapsarian Christology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). For more on partial examinations of the
history of the supralapsarian Christology, see Father Chrysostome, La Redemption est-elle le motif de lincarnation?
La france Franciscain 14 (1931), pp. 113167; J.M. Bissen, La tradition sur la predestination absolue de Jesus-Christ du
VIIe au XIVe siecles, La France Franciscain 22 (1939), pp. 934; J. F. Bonnefoy, La Question hypothetique Utrum si
Adam non peccesset . . . au XIIIe siecle, Revista Esponola de Teologi 14 (1954), pp. 327368; and M. Muckshoff, Die
mariologische Pradestination um Denken der franziskanishen Theologie, Franziskanische Studien 39 (1957), pp. 290
361.
While van Driel is primarily concerned with the supralapsarian Christologies of Scheiermacher, Dorner and Barth,
his recently published dissertation includes an insightful appendix containing a bibliographic survey that highlights the
history of the supralapsarian Christology from Rupert to modern thinkers. See van Driel, Incarnation Anyway, pp.
171175.
15 See for example, Peter Dillard, A Minor Matter? The Franciscan Thesis and Philosophical Theology, Heythrop
Journal 50 (2009), pp. 890900; Richard Rohr, The Franciscan Opinion, in Stricken By God? Nonviolent Identification

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DANIEL P. HORAN

and the Victory of Christ, ed. Brad Jersak and Michael Hardin (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmanns, 2007), pp. 206
213; and cf. Daniel Horan, Revisiting the Incarnation: Why the Franciscan Thesis is not so Franciscan and Why it
does not Really Matter, The Cord 59 (2009), pp. 371390.
16 Most scholars have neglected to note Robert Grossetestes work on this subject altogether, tracing the
development of the doctrine from Rupert to Scotus directly. See Jaroslav Pelikan, Reformation of Church and Dogma
(13001700), The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, vol. 4 (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1984), p. 27. Another example is found in Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1938; rev. ed. 1996), p. 333. Both Pelikan and Berkhof credit Rupert with the origin of the question and note
the afnity between his position and that of John Duns Scotus without any mention of Grosseteste. For more, see the
section of this article titled Problems with Appropriate Predecessor Attribution in Scotus Studies, below.
17 See Allan Wolter, John Duns Scotus on the Primacy and Personality of Christ, in Franciscan Christology, ed.
Damian McElrath (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Press, 1980; 1994), p. 141; and Hermann Schwamm, Das
gottliche Vorherwissen bei Duns Skotus und seinen ersten Anhangern (Innsbruck, 1934), 1, as cited in Pelikan,
Reformation of Church and Dogma, pp. 2930. The solidity of Scotuss argument for the predestination of Christ rests in
his development and understanding of divine foreknowledge and future contingents, a move not made by Rupert or
Grosseteste.
18 Robert Grosseteste, De Cessatione Legalium, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi VII, eds. Richard Dales and
Edward King (London: The British Academy, 1986); hereafter cited as De Cessatione Legalium followed by part,
chapter and paragraph number with edition pages in parenthesis. Verumtamen, an Deus esset homo etiam si non esset
lapsus homo non determinant aligui de sacris expositoribus in libris suis quos ego adhuc inspexerim, nisi fallat me
memoria mea. De Cessatione Legalium III.1.2 (ABMA, p. 119).
19 R. W. Southern, St. Anselm and His Biographer: A Study of Monastic Life and Thought 1059 c. 1130 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1963; 2009), pp. 8891.
20 Concerning the Patristic view of the motive for the Incarnation, James McEvoy puts it this way: Whatever they
say is to be understood in terms of the historical status of man, namely his fallenness and need of redemption, as made
known to him by revelation. James McEvoy, The Absolute Predestination of Christ in the Theology of Robert
Grosseteste, in Sapientiae Doctrina  Melanges de theologie et de literature medievales offerts a Dom Hildebrand
Bascour O.S.B., Recherches de Theologie ancienne et medievale n1 special 1(Leuven: Peeters, 1980), p. 220.
21 McEvoy, The Absolute Predestination of Christ, p. 219.
22 Galvin, Jesus Christ, p. 278.
23 Galvin, Jesus Christ, p. 278.
24 Cur Deus Homo bk. 1, chap. 25 (Anselm of Canterbury, pp. 313315) and bk. 2, chap. 6 (Anselm of Canterbury,
pp. 319320).
25 This is generally held to be true with some qualied caution given the inability to prove or disprove Grossetestes
awareness of or familiarity with Ruperts work. James McEvoy believes that is was unlikely Grosseteste knew of
Ruperts work; see McEvoy, The Absolute Predestination of Christ in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, p. 222;
and James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 129. Dominic Unger holds an
opposing view, suggesting Grosseteste clearly seems to have used Rupert of Deutz; see Unger Dominic, Robert
Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln (1235 1253) on the Reasons for the Incarnation, Franciscan Studies 16 (1956), p. 26.
26 John H. Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 183.
27 Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, pp. 182183.
28 Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, p. 354.
29 Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, p. 355.
30 Rupert enjoyed a degree of interaction with Jewish thinkers to a degree that other theologians of the time may not
have. It is precisely the Jewish denial that motivates Rudolph of St. Trod and the Abbot Cuno, Ruperts two
commissioners, to request Ruperts investigation into the doctrine.
31 Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, p. 355; and Rupert of Deutz, De Gloria, 13 (CCCM 29:412): Secundum istam
sapientiam sarculi consequens uisum est nonnullis etiam ecclesiasticis, quod Deus uoluerit malum ipsum eri, propter
quod oporteret Dei Filium hominem factum, ut iam dictum est, etiam mori, ne si aliter dicerent, uiderentur
consequenter debere fateri, quod Deus omnipotens non sit.
32 Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, p. 355.
33 These themes appear in his Commentary on Genesis and his Commentary on John (c. 11141116). See Van Engen,
Rupert of Deutz, p. 355. For a more detailed study concerning the presence of this theme throughout the corpus of
Rupert, see Rhabanus Haacke, Rupert von Deutz zur Frage: Cur Deus Homo, in Corona Gratiarum: Miscellanae
Patristica, Histroica et Liturgica Elgio Dekkers O.S.B. (Brugge: Sint Pietersabdij, 1975), pp. 143159.
34 Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, p. 356.
35 Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, p. 356.
36 Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, p. 356357. Also see De Gloria, 13 (CCCM 29:417).
37 Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, p. 357. Rupert draws on the Ephesians 3:811, Hebrews 2:910 and Hebrews 4:16 to
develop this view.
38 De Gloria, 13 (CCCM 29:415): Hic primum illud quaerere libet utrum iste Filius Dei, de quo hic sermo est, etiam
si peccatum propter quod omnes morimur non intercessisset homo eret, an non.
39 See Beryl Smalley, The Biblical Scholar, in Robert Grosseteste: Scholar and Bishop, ed. Daniel Callus (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1955), pp. 7097; James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000),

HOW ORIGINAL WAS SCOTUS ON THE INCARNATION?

389

pp. 96112; James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste: The Man and His Legacy, in Editing Robert Grosseteste:
Papers Given at the Thirty-Sixth Annual Conference on Editorial Problems, eds. Evelyn Mackie and Joseph
Goering (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), pp. 79; James Ginther, Robert Grosseteste and the
Theologians Task, in Robert Grosseteste and the Beginnings of a British Theological Tradition, ed. Maura OCarroll
(Rome: Istituto Storico Dei Cappuccini, 2003), pp. 239240; and James Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page: A Study of
the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, ca. 1229/30 1235 (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), esp. pp. 6472.
40 For more on the life and work of Robert Grosseteste, see McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, pp. 3145; Richard
Southern, Robert Grosseteste: The Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); and
James McEvoy, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste, pp. 350.
41 McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, pp. 9697 and Daniel Horan, Light and Love: Robert Grosseteste and John Duns
Scotus on the How and Why of Creation, The Cord 57 (2007), pp. 248249.
42 Ginther, Robert Grosseteste and the Theologians Task, p. 252.
43 Ginther, Robert Grosseteste and the Theologians Task, p. 254.
44 These texts are rst transcribed and studied in this context in Unger, Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln, pp.
136. Subsequent critical editions of De cessatione legalium (for the critical edition of De cessatione legalium see n. 15
above) and Hexaemeron have been published. See Robert Grosseteste, Hexaemeron, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi
VII, eds. Richard Dales and Servus Geiben (London: The British Academy, 1982); an English translation of the
Hexaemeron was published by C. F. J. Martin, Robert Grosseteste: On The Six Days of Creation (Oxford: The British
Academy, 1996), hereafter cited as Hexaemeron followed by part and chapter numbers with translation edition page
number in parenthesis.
45 See Ian Levy, Trinity and Christology in Robert Grossetestes Expositio of Galatians, Communio 26 (Winter
1999), pp. 875891. The critical edition of the Expositio is, Robert Grosseteste, Expositio in epistolam sancti Pauli ad
Galatas, ed. James McEvoy, in Opera Inedita Robert Grosseteste, vol. 1 (CCCM 130).
46 McEvoy calls it a splendid work of erudition that uses no less than thirty-six authors and over a hundred titles.
McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, p. 107.
47 Levy, Trinity and Christology in Robert Grossetestes Expositio of Galatians, p. 877.
48 Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, p. 124.
49 De Cessatione Legalium II.1.2II.1.5 (ABMA, pp. 7678).
50 Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, p. 125.
51 De Cessatione Legalium II.2.1II.2.2 (ABMA, pp. 7879).
52 De Cessatione Legalium II.3.1II.3.5 (ABMA, pp. 8283). This is further emphasized in a representation of the
biblical genealogy of Jesus in II.3.5-II.3.12 (ABMA, pp. 8488).
53 See Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, 125126 and De Cessatione Legalium II.4.1II.6.5 (ABMA, pp. 90102)
54 Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, p. 127.
55 De Cessatione Legalium II.7.2II.9.1 (ABMA, pp. 103115).
56 Most scholars agree that this is the point at which Grossetestes concurrent trajectory that aligns with previous
expositors ends. In examining the biblical reasons for the Incarnations necessity, even from the exclusive perspective of
Old Testament texts, Grosseteste does not break new ground. For more see Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page,
p. 127; and McEvoy, The Absolute Predestination of Christ in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, pp. 212213.
57 McEvoy, The Absolute Predestination of Christ in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, p. 223.
58 Grosseteste repeats, an Deus esset homo etiam si non esset lapsus homo, throughout De Cessatione Legalium.
See De Cessatione Legalium III.1.2 and passim (ABMA, pp. 119ff).
59 McEvoy, The Absolute Predestination of Christ in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, p. 213; and McEvoy,
Robert Grosseteste, p. 127.
60 See McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, p. 128; and Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, pp. 128137.
61 Unger, Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln, 2627. Unger is careful to note that, while his primary objective is
to present those arguments he sees directly relating to the present order, he is at the same time suggesting that these
arguments have value for the hypothetical problem (p. 27).
62 De Cessatione Legalium III.1.3III.1.4 (ABMA, p. 120).
63 Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, p. 130. Also see Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion, in Anselm of Canterbury:
The Major Works, eds. Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 82104.
64 Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, p. 130. Interestingly, the Pseudo-Dionysian approach is also found in the socalled summa of Alexander of Hales. See Summa Fratris Alexandri, 4 vols. (Quaracchi: Collegium Sancti
Bonaventurae, 19241948) 3.1.1.2.2. [23] (4:4142).
65 McEvoy, The Absolute Predestination of Christ in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, p. 214.
66 Unger, Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln, p. 28.
67 Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, p. 130. This is also taken up in McEvoy, The Absolute Predestination of
Christ in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, p. 214.
68 De Cessatione Legalium III.1.9 (ABMA, pp. 122123).
69 Unger, Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln, pp. 2829. The section of the text he is referring to can be found
in his transcription (5) and the critical edition: De Cessatione Legalium III.1.6 (ABMA, p. 121).
70 Peter Lombard, Sententiae, ed. Ignatius Brady, 2 vols. Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4 and 5 (Quaracchi:
Collegium Sancti Bonaventurae, 19711981), 3.2.2 (2:29): Assumpsit igitur Dei Filius carnem et animam, sed carnem
mediante anima; unitum est carni per medium intellectum Verbum Dei.

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DANIEL P. HORAN

71 De Cessatione Legalium III.1.5III.1.7 (ABMA, pp. 120121).

72 Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, 130.
73 McEvoy, The Absolute Predestination of Christ in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, p. 214.
74 McEvoy, The Absolute Predestination of Christ in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, p. 214. For the direct
source, see De Cessatione Legalium III.1.10III.1.15 (ABMA, pp. 123125).
75 Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, p. 133.
76 De Cessatione Legalium III.1.17 (ABMA, p. 126).
77 Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, p. 134.
78 McEvoy, The Absolute Predestination of Christ in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, pp. 214215. Unger
also reects on this aspect of Grossetestes approach, observing the role of Christ as Universal Mediator; see Unger,
Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln, pp. 2930.
79 McEvoy, The Absolute Predestination of Christ in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, 215. For the direct
source, see De Cessatione Legalium III.1.23III.1.26 (ABMA, pp. 128129). See also Ungers ninth argument in
Unger, Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln, p. 33.
80 Unger, Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln, pp. 3031 and pp. 3435. Grosseteste also draws on Ephesians
1:310 in De Cessatione Legalium to emphasize this point.
81 Hexaemeron I.9.1 (ABMA [1996], p. 68).
82 De Cessatione Legalium III.1.18III.1.21 (ABMA, pp. 126128).
83 Unger, Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln, p. 32.
84 Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, p. 136.
85 McEvoy, The Absolute Predestination of Christ in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, p. 216.
86 McEvoy, The Absolute Predestination of Christ in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, p. 216; and Ginther,
Master of the Sacred Page, p. 137.
87 It is important to note, however briey here, that Grossteste also considered an In-spirited union of a potential
God-angel, but quickly nds that unsatisfactory because there is such a union there is no accounting for the material
world, which is left outside of the capitulation. See Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, p. 136; Unger, Robert
Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln, p. 33; and Richard Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), pp. 3946.
This argument is best summed up in Grossetestes presentation in De Cessatione Legalium III.1.27III.1.28 (ABMA,
pp. 130131). It is also found in Hexaemeron IX.8.2IX.8.3 (ABMA [1996], pp. 282283).
88 totus is also used in place of integer.
89 See Hexaemeron I.1.1 (ABMA [1996], pp. 4748). Ginther explores this concept at length in chapter 3 of his
monograph and briey in his earlier essay. See Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, pp. 3351; and Ginther, Robert
Grosseteste and the Theologians Task, pp. 249252.
90 De Cessatione Legalium III.1.29 (ABMA, pp. 131132).
91 Unger, Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln, p. 27.
92 For example, Psalm 8:31, Colossians 1:1520, and Ephesians 1:314.
93 Unger, Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln, pp. 3536.
94 For a fuller treatment of Scotuss work on the Incarnation see Bernardino Bonansea, Man and his Approach to
God in John Duns Scotus (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), pp. 4450; Mary Beth Ingham, Scotus for
Dunces: An Introduction to the Subtle Doctor (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Press, 2003), pp. 7483;
Marilyn McCord Adams, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation in some Fourteenth-Century Franciscans, in Essays
Honoring Allan B. Wolter, eds. William Frank and Girard Etzkorn (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Press,
1985), pp. 2158; Allan Wolter, John Duns Scotus on the Primacy and Personality of Christ, pp. 139182; Richard
Cross, Duns Scotus (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 127134; Saint-Maurice, John Duns Scotus, pp.
239274; Allan Wolter, Introduction, in Four Questions on Mary, ed. and trans. Allan Wolter (St. Bonaventure, NY:
Franciscan Institute Press, 2001), pp. 118; Mary Beth Ingham, John Duns Scotus: An Integrated Vision, in The
History of Franciscan Theology, ed. Kenan Osborne (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Press, 1994), pp. 219
226; Juan Iammaroone, Cristolog a: Elementos fundamentals de la cristolog a de Juan Duns Escoto, in Manual de
Teologa Franciscana, eds. Jose Antonio Merino and Francisco Mart nex Fresneda (Madrid: Biblioteca De Autores
Cristianos, 2003), pp. 173179; Karl Balic, Duns Skotus Lehre uber Christi Pradestination im Lichte der neuesten
Forschungen, Wissencshaft und Weisheit 3 (1936), pp. 1935; Werner Dettloff, Die Geistigkeit des hl. Franziskus in
der Christologie des Johannes Duns Scotus, Wissenschaft und Weisheit 22 (1959), pp. 1728; Agathon Kandler, Die
Heilsdynamik im Christusbild des Johannes Duns Scotus, Wissencshaft und Weisheit 27 (1964), pp. 175196; Johannes
Schlageter, Das Menschsein Jesu Christi in seiner zentralen Bedeutung fur Schopfund und Geshichte bei Johannes
Duns Scotus und heute, Wissenschaft und Weisheit 47 (1984), pp. 2336; Maria Burger, Personalitat im Horizont
absoluter Pradestination: Untersuchungen zur Christologie des Johannes Duns Scotus und ihrer Rezeption in modernen
theologischen Ansatzen (Munster: Aschendorff, 1994); Allan Wolter, Duns Scotus on the Predestination of Christ, The
Cord 5 (December 1955), pp. 366372; Antonie Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus (Edinburgh: Edinurgh
University Press, 2006); Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation (New York: Oxford University Press,
2002); and the magisterial second part of Juniper Carol, Why Jesus Christ? Thomistic, Scotistic and Conciliatory
Perspectives (Manassas, VA: Trinity Communications, 1986), pp. 120479.
95 The critical editions of Scotuss work are: Opera Omnia, ed. C. Balic et al (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis
Vaticanis, 1950 ), this edition includes Ordinatio 12.3; and Opera Omnia, ed. Luke Wadding, editio nova (Paris: Apus

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391

Ludovicum Vives, Bibliopolam Editorem, 1894), this edition includes Ordinatio 2.44.5. This source will be cited as
Ordinatio followed by book, distinction and question number with respective edition volume and page number with
column notation in parenthesis.
Mary Beth Ingham makes reference to Scotuss Reportatio, stating that it is in this version of Scotuss work that the
Subtle Doctor explicitly states that the Incarnation would have occurred regardless of Adams Sin. She does not cite a
reference to an edition. See Ingham John Duns Scotus, 220. Carol provides the Latin text from this Reportatio: Sed
non obstante isto, Christus fuisset homo, tamen non passibilis, in Why Jesus Christ? p. 128.
96 Ordinatio III.7.3 (14:348b): Tertium quaero: utrum Christus praedestiunatus sit esse Filius Dei.
97 Ordinatio III.7.3 (14:349a349b).
98 Wolter, John Dun Scotus, p. 140.
99 For a sampling see Cross, Duns Scotus, p. 129; Iammarrone, Cristolog a, pp. 171172; Ingham, John Duns
Scotus, p. 220; Wolter, Duns Scotus on the Predestination of Christ, p. 367; and Dorothea Sharp, Franciscan
Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), pp. 279282.
100 Carol, Why Jesus Christ? pp. 255270. Less explicitly, van Driel alludes to the continuity in van Direl,
Incarnation Anyway, pp. 170172.
101 Ordinatio III.7.3 (14:355a): nec est verisimile tam summum bonum in entibus esse tantum occasionatum
propter minus bonum solum.
102 Scotus uses the term summum opus Dei nearly synonymously in the Reportatio Parisiensia.
103 This comes from my interpretation of Scotuss premise that ordinate willing necessitates the foreordination of
an end before something else. Ordinatio III.7.3 (14:354b355a): universaliter enim ordinate volens prius videtur velle
hoc quod est ni propinquius, et ita sicut prius vult gloriam alicui guem gratiam, ita etiam inter praedestinatos, quibus
vult gloriam, ordinate prius videtur velle gloriam illi, quem vult esse proximum ni, et ita huic animae prius vult
gloriam quam clicui alteri animae velit gloriam, et prius cuilibet alteria gloriam et gratiam quam praevideat illi opposita
istorum habituum.
104 See Cross, Duns Scotus, p. 128 and pp. 101103; and Ordinatio III.7.3 (14:349a).
105 Ingham, John Duns Scotus, p. 221. For more on Scotuss doctrine of human predestination to glory, see
Bernardino Bonansea, The Divine Will in the Teaching of Duns Scotus, Antonianum 56 (1981), pp. 327335.
106 Ingham, John Duns Scotus, p. 222. See also, Ordinatio III.19.unic. (14:709a728b).
107 Ingham, John Duns Scotus, p. 226.
108 For a sampling see Ingham, John Duns Scotus, pp. 226230; Saint-Maurice, John Duns Scotus, pp. 253275;
Wolter, Four Questions on Mary, pp. 118; Bonansea, Man and His Approach to God, pp. 1150; et al.
109 Unger summarizes this point well with the phrase Christ is the raison detre of all creation, in Robert
Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln, p. 26.
110 Cross, Duns Scotus, p. 128.
111 I should pause to note that there is a faint sense of anticipation of this theme in Grossetestes work. It appears to
have been transmitted most strongly in his Christmas Sermon, Exiit Edictum, where he speaks of God in the
Augustinian sense of the highest love and the ratio amoris as the motive for the willing of the Incarnation. See Unger,
Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln, p. 27.
112 Reportatio Parisiensia III.7.4.5 (23:303b), trans. in Bonansea, Man and His Approach to God, p. 48.
113 For example, see Ordinatio III.7.3 (14:349a349b).
114 Ingham, Scotus for Dunces, p. 76.
115 See C. R. Harris, Duns Scotus; Vol. 1: The Place of Duns Scotus in Medieval Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1927), pp. 117119; Carol, Why Jesus Christ? pp. 269270; and Unger, Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln, pp. 35
36.
116 See Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, esp. pp. 124; Ginther, Robert Grosseteste and the Theologians Task,
pp. 239263; James McEvoy, Robertus Grossatesta Lincolneiensis: An Essay in Historiography, Medieval and
Modern, in Robert Grosseteste and the Beginnings of a British Theological Tradition (Rome: Istituto Storico Dei
Cappuccini, 2003), pp. 2199; Michael Robson, Robert Grosseteste and the Greyfriars in the Diocese of Lincoln, in
Robert Grosseteste and the Beginnings of a British Theological Tradition, pp. 289318; and Maura OCarroll, Robert
Grosseteste, the English Friars and Lateran IV, in Robert Grosseteste and the Beginnings of a British Theological
Tradition, pp. 319338.
117 See Conclusion in Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, pp. 189192.