3 Overall Considerations

COURSE
FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING

OVERALL CONSIDERATIONS
FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

AGENDA
Overall layout
What is the overall Objective
What is important to know/establish
Fire and Explosion Key parameters

Hazard Gradient
API 14 J key requirements
Inherently Safer Design
Examples of Design
Future expansions

OVERALL LAYOUT
What are we trying to achieve ?
Safe and Operable Design
General Sound Principle in Facility Layout:

The principle of inherent safety shall be applied to both the field
and facility layout to minimise the likelihood of major initiating
events and the escalation of any subsequent consequences

OVERALL LAYOUT
ISO 13702 Control and Mitigation of Fires and Explosions
on Offshore Production Installations
OBJECTIVES
Principal Objective of Standard, in order of priority:
Safety of personnel
Protection of Environment
Protection of Assets;
Minimization of financial consequences of fires and explosions

WHAT DO WE NEED TO KNOW
What are the hazards and risk
levels
Complexity
Amount and type of equipment
What is the exposure to

personnel
Future requirements

WHAT DO WE NEED TO KNOW
1. Purpose and
required equipment
Unmanned versus
Manned
Pressures and
Inventories
Accommodation
Helideck
Wellheads
Number and types of

equipment
2. Offloading / Tie-in
FSO / SAL / SPM or

Pipeline
Risers
3. Local conditions
Wind & Current
Minimize risk of gas towards

ignition sources
(accommodation etc)
Optimize natural ventilation

INHERENTLY SAFER RISK ASSESSMENT
Hazards
Causes
Event
Consequence
Wells
Blowout
Majorfireorenvironmentaldamage
Siteaccident
delays,reputationdamage
Hydrocarbonrelease
HighTechnology
structures
Heavylifts
Poordesign,corrosion,errosion,fail
tomaintainreservoirbarriers
Contractorcommitmenttosafetyat
site
Corrosion,erosion,longterm
deterioration
Corrosion,erosion,longterm
deterioration,sabotage
Weather,geologicalactivity,
miscalculationduetonovelty
Designofcranageorslinging
Transportofgoods
Humanerror
Collapse,lossof
stability
Shipcollision
Transportofpeople
Humanerrorormachanicalfailure
Helicopteraccident
Fire,explosion,gascloudormajor
environmentaldamage
Majorfire,gascloudormajor
environmentaldamage
Possibleescallationtomultiplecasualties
ormajorenvironmentaldamage
Multiplecasualtieswithfire,explosionor
environmentaldamage
Possibleescallationtomultiplecasualties
ormajorenvironmentaldamage
Multiplecasualties
Humanerror,
sabotage
Decommisioning
Maloperation,badmaintenance,fail
tocontrolchange,wilfuldamage
Notthoughtthroughatoriginaldesign
Hydrocarbonrelease
Construction
Hydrocarbon
Processing
Pipeline
Pipelinefailure
Droppedobjects
EVENT
Collapse
Fire,explosion,gascloudorenvironmental
damage
Multiplecasualties

JET FIRE
Rule of thumb
Flame size: Fl=18.5Q0.41
Fl: flame length (m)
Q: release rate (kg/s)
Q0 C D A P0 Z where Z
Ignited gas
blowout in Algeria
M
RT0
1
1
Pressure and release area are the driving force

Flame length in m
Pressure
Hole size
barg
mm
1
37.5
0.3
1.8
7.1
15
0.7
4.7
18.3
45
1.2
7.6
29.3
60
1.4
8.7
33.4

EXPLOSION
In order for a vapour cloud explosion to occur in a hydrocarbon facility, four
conditions have to be present:
1.
A significant release of flammable material
2.
Flammable material shall be sufficiently mixed with the

surrounding air
3.
Ignition source
4.
Some confinement, congestion or turbulence in the

released area
Congestion: Pipework, cable trays, etc.

EXPLOSION - BUNCEFIELD
December 11, 2005 a number of explosions occurred at Buncefield
Oil Storage Depot, Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire.
At least one of the initial explosions was of massive proportions and
there was a large fire, which engulfed a high proportion of the site.
The fire burned for several days, destroying most of the site and
emitting large clouds of black smoke into the atmosphere.
10

Significant damage occurred to both commercial and
residential properties in the vicinity and a large area around
the site was evacuated on emergency service advice.
Over 40 people were injured; fortunately there were no
fatalities.
11

Significant damage occurred to both commercial and
residential properties in the vicinity and a large area around
the site was evacuated on emergency service advice.
Over 40 people were injured; fortunately there were no
fatalities.
12

13

14

15

16

HAZARD GRADIENT
17

HAZARD GRADIENT
Prevailing Wind Direction
Risk
Pressure
Inventory
Leak freq.
Distance
18

HAZARD GRADIENT
Risers
Separation
Accommodation
Risk
Pressure
Utility
Compression
Wellhead
Inventory
Distance
19

HAZARD GRADIENT
Accommodation
Fuel gas
Glycol contactor
Oil Separation
Gas
compression
Power turbines
Water injection
Utility
Chemical injection
Turret
20

HAZARD GRADIENT
Accommodation
Fuel gas
Glycol contactor
Gas
compression
Power turbines
Accommodation
Accommodation
Utility
Chemical
injection
Oil Separation
Water injection
Turret
Pipe rack
Turret
HP Comp
LP Comp
Separation
Benefits
Segregate Acc from HP
sources.
Avoid having to pass HP
sources during escape.
Reduce length of high
pressure piping.
Segregate Acc and high
release freq. equip/system
(Compression).
21

HAZARD GRADIENT
22

HAZARD GRADIENT
More details will follow

23

API 14 J KEY REQUIREMENTS
Take account of prevailing wind; Gas &
Accommodation
Smoke, oil on sea

Isolated from fuel sources greatest
Protected from
External Fires,
Explosion and Noise
extend possible - Considered an Ignition

Source (Cat.)
Fire wall or adequate spacing
Minimize windows facing production
HVAC with F&G
Provide quick and easy escape at least
two independent routes
24

25

Provide protection for personnel for an
amount of time consistent with the
platform evacuation philosophy.
Muster Area
Offshore survival gear

Lifeboats, rafts or capsules for all
personnel
Commonly designated temporary

Mustering areas are the living
quarters, control room, or lifeboat
station areas
At least two independent routes to the

sea
26

Lifeboats
Optimum location for escape
100% capacity incl. Visitors*
* Some operators: 100% plus one

additional boat
27

Source of fuel
Protected against ignition sources
Unfired Process Area
Not to be placed directly above or below

ignition sources
Liquid like to run downwards
Gas likely to rise upwards
Can be located next to wellheads
To be protected against dropped objects
28

Source of ignition
Remote or protected from area that is
source of fuel including vertical
separation
Fired Process Area
29

Source of ignition
Machinery area
Remotely located or otherwise protected

from:
Wellheads
Unfired Equipment
Risers and pipelines
If no fuel is present it is similar to LQ
and be located in proximity
Combustion engine driven machinery
have both ignition source as well as fuel.
To be separated from:
Wellheads
Risers
Hydrocarbon storage
LQ
30

Source of ignition
Emits radiation and permissible distance
shall be accessed
Flare & Vent
Potential for burning rain

Platform
Support Vessels
Source of fuel
Radiation as for flare if ignited
31

API 521 Requirements will follow
32

Accessible for drill rig
Separated and protected from:
Sources of ignition
Large inventories of Hydrocarbon
Wellhead areas
Large inventories of MeOH

Dropped Objects
Risers and Pipelines
Maximum separation to
Accommodation
33

Separated from ignition sources
Protected from ship impact
Protected from dropped objects
Riser & Pipelines
Not be placed under living quarters*

Riser ESDV to be located as close as
possible to incoming point of platform
Protect Riser ESDV**
Prevent liquid accumulation under or
near riser ESDV
*) Unless special precautions have been

**) Consider fire protection
34

Separated from ignition sources
Oriented / Facing outbound
Separated from highly travelled
personnel routes
Launcher & Receivers
Separated from material handling areas
35

INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN
What do we mean by Inherently Safer Design
Inherently Safer Design can be translated into;

What you do not have can not harm you
as well as
Personnel that are not exposed does not get harmed
36

INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN PRINCIPLES
Fewer hazards
Fewer causes
Reduced severity
Fewer / reduced consequences
37

IP & UKOOA Guidance for safer design
Projects should aim to minimise the exposure of personnel to
hazards by adopting inherently safer designs.
Modification projects should aim to offset any increase in risks
on existing installations by seeking reduction in other areas.
Simplify installations
Reduce equipment levels, including safety equipment
Improve material choices and strength levels
Decrease maintenance, repair and inspection for the lifetime of
the installation
38

BP Guidance on Practice for Concept Selection for inherently safer ..
Historically, projects may have been driven by BU
management and economic
teams to minimised capital expenditures (Capex) regardless of
the detrimental effects on operational expenditures (Opex),
personnel safety, and environmental consequences
Graham Dalzell
Risk equal OPEX^2

Nothing is Safety Critical
39

Sound principles in Facility Layout:
Provide space around individual items or groups of equipment to
enable safe operation, inspection and maintenance;
Orientate equipment to minimise the potential for escalation in
case of a release e.g. Pig trap end enclosures orientated away
from process equipment.
40

Wet Gas Receiver Crude Oil Receiver

Gas Slug catcher
Test separator
41

Sound Principles in Facility Layout
Provide a means for removal of equipment and transportation to
laydown area/warehouse, and, if offshore, to/from facility to
support vessel;
Provide separation and segregation of hazards in the layout
design, thereby reducing the possibility of escalation during an
accidental event;
Locate identified ignition sources with due consideration of the
effects of wind for all credible gas release scenarios, in order to
prevent immediate or delayed ignition;
42

43

Design plant layouts to provide natural ventilation to assist with
gas dispersion in the event of a release, or where found not to be
adequate provide mechanical ventilation1;
Design to avoid congestion and confinement so limiting explosive
overpressure;
Provide containment for liquid spills and releases;
44

45

Provide sufficient separation between areas containing
hydrocarbons and safe areas by separation distance for onshore
plants, Floating Production, Storage and Offloading System
(FPSOs) and bridge-linked platforms, and/or fire and blast
barriers for production platforms.
Accommodations offshore shall be located on separate platforms
at a safe distance from wells, hydrocarbon carrying risers and
process equipment. Where this is not feasible (e.g. due to water
depth), mitigation measures shall be provided in the design such
as fire and blast walls and the proposed design shall be
demonstrated to have as a minimum a tolerable level of risk;
46

47

Provide escape routes with redundancy and protection (as
needed) to enable all personnel to escape to a safe location
during an incident;
Hydrocarbon containing risers shall be preferably located inside
the jacket structure or if not possible shall be provided with
suitable protection against boat impact.
All jacket structures shall be provided with structural members to
avoid the possibility for a vessel to pass beneath the jacket
structure
48

UKOOA
49

50

51

Dominant release sites:

Pipe work
Valves
Instruments
72%
Dead legs
52

Leak frequency for the 15 highest ranking equipment types (leaks/system year)
HSR 2002
Dual fuel turbines and recip.

compressors highest ranking as
indicated by system leaks.
Failure in equipment such as:
o Instruments
o Valves
o Flanges
o Piping
are not shown by figure (due to
low individual frequency) but are
important due to the high
numbers of these.
Power from shore ?
53

Can we use fewer wells
Horizontal multizone wells
Less rotating equipment
Minimize number of pumps and compressors Do we need spares ?
Less Processing
Export multiphase to shore
Export Wet gas
Export at lower pressure
54

Fired heater
Hot work during production
55

56

57

58
DA Wellhead

HA Location
59

60

61

A short bridge between
Gorm B and Gorm F was
initially proposed in the
design of Gorm F to
avoid the need for a
crane on Gorm F.
Short bridge on Gorm in

the order of 5 - 10
meters.
Later in the design it

was decided to include
the crane anyway but
the bridge was not
extended.
Placing Gorm E next to
accommodation is
questionable.
62

Location of turbine air intakes and exhaust piping shall be
considered carefully. A gas cloud reaching a turbine has a very
high probability of ignition.
63

PROVISION FOR FUTURE EXPANSION
Additional wells (extra row)
Additional process or WI module
Additional produced water handling / treatment facilities
Other facilities, increased environmental requirements
Additional risers / in- & outgoing pipelines
Structure prepared for future bridge connection(s)
Additional accommodation accommodation module prepared for
extension
Prepare at early stage in design an Expansion Strategy and

include provisions
64
THANK YOU
65

3 Overall Considerations

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COURSE

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

Fire and Explosion Key parameters

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

Safe and Operable Design

General Sound Principle in Facility Layout:

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

What is the exposure to

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

Number and types of

FSO / SAL / SPM or

Wind & Current

Minimize risk of gas towards

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

Pressure and release area are the driving force

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

A significant release of flammable material

Flammable material shall be sufficiently mixed with the

Some confinement, congestion or turbulence in the

Congestion: Pipework, cable trays, etc.

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

Prevailing Wind Direction

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

More details will follow

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

Smoke, oil on sea

extend possible - Considered an Ignition

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

Offshore survival gear

Commonly designated temporary

At least two independent routes to the

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

* Some operators: 100% plus one

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

Unfired Process Area

Not to be placed directly above or below

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

Fired Process Area

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

Remotely located or otherwise protected

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

Flare & Vent

Potential for burning rain

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

API 521 Requirements will follow

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

Large inventories of MeOH

FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE