Developing Board Strategic Capability in Sport Organisation S: The National-Reg Ional Governing Relationship

Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254
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Sport Management Review

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/smr
Developing board strategic capability in sport organisations:

The nationalregional governing relationship
Lesley Ferkins *, David Shilbury
Sport Management Program, School of Management & Marketing, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood, Victoria 3125, Australia
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Article history:
Received 2 May 2009
Received in revised form 12 November 2009
Accepted 20 January 2010
It is well established that the strategic function is a central role of the non-prot sport
board. Little is known, however, about board strategic capability in any context. This study
investigated how boards of national sport organisations might develop their strategic
capability. Interpretive action research focusing on the case of Tennis New Zealand
(TNZ) found that the boards strategic role is signicantly impacted by its interorganisational relationships. In particular, the boards ability to enact its strategic
priorities could be enhanced by creating a more collaborative partnership with its regional
entities and engaging in a power-sharing approach that seeks to develop regional
capability.
2010 Sport Management Association of Australia and New Zealand. Published by
Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Sport
Board processes
Governance
Inter-organisational relationships
Power-sharing
Board strategic capability
Action research
1. Introduction
Those who lead sport are facing increasing scrutiny which has inevitably resulted in questions of governance practice. The
transition of many sports from predominantly volunteer administered organisations anchored in an amateur ethos, to
professionally managed entities catering to a more sophisticated market place has created unique challenges for the
governance of sport (Cuskelly, Taylor, Hoye, & Darcy, 2006; Schulz & Auld, 2006; Shilbury, 2001). The question remains,
however, as to the options available to national sport organisations for identifying suitable structures and processes of
governance that combine the essence of good business practice within the leisure framework in which sporting
organisations operate.
Hoye and Cuskelly (2007) noted . . . there is no universally agreed denition of sport governance (p. 9). They drew on
denitions cited by Sport and Recreation New Zealand (2006) and the Australian Sports Commission (2005) to dene sport
governance in noting that it involves concepts of direction, control and regulation. Explicit denitions offered by authors are
also limited and the terms board and governance are often used interchangeably. In the corporate setting, Tricker (1984)
captured a meaning of governance which has remained relevant for todays environment observing that it involves the
creation, use and limitation of powers to direct, control and regulate activities within an organisation. In essence, governance
is the responsibility for the functioning and overall direction of the organisation and is a necessary and institutionalised
component of all sporting codes from club level to national bodies, government agencies, sport service organisations and
professional teams around the world (Kikulis, 2000).
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 3 925 17407; fax: +61 3 925 17083.
E-mail address: lesley.ferkins@deakin.edu.au (L. Ferkins).
1441-3523/$ see front matter 2010 Sport Management Association of Australia and New Zealand. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.smr.2010.01.009
236
L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254
This present study seeks to advance our understanding of governance by investigating how boards of NSOs can develop
their strategic capability. The strategic role of the board, while recognised as a key function, is a fuzzy concept for many. van
der Walt and Ingley (2003) found that . . . little empirical or theoretical research has been conducted on the boards role in
strategic decisions and strategic outcomes (p. 17). Stiles (2001) agreed, stating that, Unpacking this concept is . . . rare in
the empirical literature (p. 629). While this study targets the specic board grouping, it also encompasses aspects that are
seen to impact directly on the boards ability to be strategic. The broader governance system such as the structure of the
sport, member organisations, people and processes were therefore part of this investigation. Henry and Lee (2004) made the
distinction between the work of the board in sport organisations, which they term corporate governance, and the interaction
of organisations and groups working across the sport as systemic governance. In both instances, there are obvious gaps in
the body of empirical knowledge on the governance of sport, as it applies to board strategic capability by virtue of this
emerging discipline and the small volume of active researchers in the eld (Ferkins, Shilbury, & McDonald, 2005; Ferkins,
Shilbury, & McDonald, 2009). This lack of academic interest is not necessarily reective of the intensifying interest from
practitioners.
National sport organisations (NSOs) in New Zealand were chosen as the population for this study. The nature and form of
NSOs have been well developed in sport organisation theory (Babiak, 2007; Inglis, 1997a, 1997b; Kikulis, Slack, & Hinings,
1995; OBrien & Slack, 2003). NSOs are the national representatives of their sport. These organisations are responsible for
maintaining the rules and organisation of a particular sporting code and have traditionally worked with state, regional
associations and clubs of the same code to deliver services to their members. NSOs in New Zealand have evolved, like their
Australian and Canadian counterparts, from small and independent member-based associations with volunteer executives
to organisations with paid staff and administrative ofces. While the role of an NSO has come to encompass the governance
of the sporting code at all levels, there exists within that jurisdiction, multiple separate legal entities (i.e., national, state/
region, club/local). Each entity is most typically an incorporated organisation and has its own constitution and governing
committee. This together yet separate structure has created a tension in the way these entities have interfaced in the
delivery of sporting opportunities (Sport & Recreation New Zealand, 2006). As is demonstrated by this study, this has proved
to be a major stumbling block in the national boards ability to enact its strategic priorities.
In order to best address the research question and to enable the research process to directly benet the participating sport
body, action research was used as the research method. This highly collaborative approach to research (where the research
subjects become research partners) is designed to create change and to provide rich empirical data from which new and
improved methods of governance practice are promoted. The use of action research in this setting is rare, but has the
potential to facilitate a deep level of understanding found to be missing in governance research to date (Leblanc, 2004;
Parker, 2008).
The action research programme developed in collaboration with Tennis New Zealand, as reported in this paper, drew on
relevant theories to inform the intervention as it unfolded. Relevant theories included stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984),
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and supporting theoretical constructs including inter-organisational
relationships (Thibault & Harvey, 1997), aspects of board power (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995), and board strategic capability
(van der Walt & Ingley, 2003). Although these theories emerged during the action research programme, they are introduced
in the rst half of this paper to provide context for the ensuing results and discussion presented in the second half of this
paper. The second half of the paper describes the action research approach used and specically the four phases of the
research programme. Each phase is then used to tell the story that emerged from the intervention designed in
collaboration with Tennis New Zealand.
2. Theoretical background
2.1. Stakeholder and resource dependence theory
The tenets of stakeholder theory are considered central to the strategic management of organisations encompassing
governance and board strategic function (Freeman, 1984; Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008; Stoney, 2001). Proponents of
stakeholder theory argue that organisations need to take into account the range of individuals and groups affected by the
work of the organisation (Stoney, 2001). Sternberg (1997) distinguished between the original meaning of the concept,
claimed to be rst used in the 1960s, and the contemporary meaning, in stating: Originally, stakeholders were identied as
those without whom an organisation could not survive, those in whom the organisation had a stake. Now, in contrast,
stakeholders are more commonly identied as those who have a stake in an organisation (p. 3).
There is much debate however, regarding the extent to which boards should be representative of their stakeholders
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Stoney, 2001; Sternberg, 1997). In the corporate context, Sternberg (1997) argued there is little
place for such a philosophy. Stakeholder theory is indeed intrinsically incompatible with all substantive objectives, and
undermines both private property and accountability (p. 3). In contrast, Stoney (2001) considered stakeholder theory to be
relevant for corporate and non-prot organisations alike in claiming . . . from blue chip companies to the Royal Society of
Arts (RSA) the stakeholder concept is being embraced and actively promoted as an inclusive philosophy and framework for
sustainable development (p. 604). The issue of stakeholder representation and the extent to which the board assimilates the
views of individuals and groups affected by the work of the organisation arose during the course of this action research
project and, as later discussed, helped explain and untangle events as they unfolded.
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Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) is considered by some to be the dominant theoretical approach
used to guide research efforts focused on non-prot boards of directors (Brown, 2005; Miller-Millesen, 2003). The theory is
founded on the notion that organisations are open systems and do not operate in a vacuum, rather, they rely on other
organisations for resources and must adapt to changing external circumstances (Scott, 2003). Indeed, Pfeffer and Salancik
(1978) argued that the ability to acquire and maintain resources is essential to organisational survival. In relation to the
governance of non-prot organisations, Cornforth (2003) asserted that organisations enter into inter-organisational
relationships (IORs) in order to obtain the resources and information they need for their ongoing development. Cornforth
also considered that . . . the main function of the board . . . is to maintain good relations with key external stakeholders in
order to ensure the ow of resources (p. 8). For the present research, resource dependency theory highlighted the boards
boundary-spanning responsibility and offered insight into ways in which board power and inuence had the capacity to
affect inter-organisational relationships.
2.2. Inter-organisational relationships
Governance authors in a generic sense do not make the connection between inter-organisational relationships (IORs) and
board strategic capability (e.g., Brown, 2005; Cornforth, 2003; Stiles, 2001). Scholars writing about the governance of sport
have more to say about the signicance of IORs and their impact on the governance function (e.g., Mitchell, Crosset, & Barr,
1999). Hoye and Cuskelly (2007) in particular make the connection between IORs and the execution of the governance
function for national sport organisations. However, they also noted Federated networks within non-prot sport have not
been studied extensively and Studies of federated networks and IORs within the wider non-prot sector are also limited
(p. 52). In particular, these studies, do not specically link national and regional sport organisation relationship issues to the
boards ability to function strategically and as such perhaps miss the opportunity to inform the governing relationships
between national and regional sporting bodies.
An increasing number of studies are emerging that consider why sport organisations enter into partnership relationships
across non-prot, government, and private sectors (Babiak & Thibault, 2009; Shaw & Allen, 2006). Babiak (2007) claimed that
in order to deal with changing environmental factors the practice of collaborating, coordinating, developing partnerships,
and co-operation between organisations, have become central principles for the strategic management of organisations. In
investigating IORs within the sport setting, she dened the concept as, A voluntary, close, long term, planned strategic
action between two or more organisations with the objective of serving mutually benecial purposes in a problem domain
(p. 339). This denition had relevance for the present study and the connections made between the governing role of Tennis
New Zealand and the governing relationship with its regional entities.
2.3. Board power
Power has been used as a construct to explain the relationship between senior professional staff (executive) and the
board in non-prot and sport settings (Hoye, 2006). It has also been used to understand the level of inuence exerted by
chairmen and non-executive directors in the corporate setting (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995, 1998). In considering how
board members shape the content and process of corporate strategy (among other aspects), Pettigrew and McNulty
(1995) designed the tripartite model of power and inuence. Using this model (see Fig. 1) in a governance study of the
top 50 United Kingdom nancial institutions, Pettigrew and McNulty found that the power and inuence of board
members . . . is shaped by the simultaneous and interactive effects of a set of structural and contextual factors,
positions and skill in mobilizing a constellation of power sources and skill and will in converting potential power into
actual inuence (p. 845).
Fig. 1. The tripartite analysis of power and inuence. Source: Pettigrew & McNulty (1995, p. 845).
238
In translating this model into a sport organisation context, there is much evidence to suggest that changing structural
aspects such as board composition, voting and selection, altered, in large part, by changing contextual forces, such as how
bureaucratisation and professionalisation have impacted on the strategic role of the board (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2003; Shilbury,
2001). Countering this, there is a small body of work around institutionalisation of sport organisations which suggests that
conservative forces such as history and tradition have slowed the change process (Kikulis, 2000; Kikulis et al., 1995). Kikulis
stated that In NSOs . . . the volunteer board is a deep structure and core practice that demonstrates traditionality (2000, p.
308). In relation to the present study, this aspect of the model raised issues relating to structural and contextual factors and
their inuence on the strategic functioning of the Tennis New Zealand board.
The second part of the model, that explored the sources of power available to board members of sport organisations,
probes aspects such as legitimate power sources, the situational nature of power and stakeholder representation. These
aspects are all potentially important sources of power for boards of member benet organisations (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2003). A
useful extension of the Hoye and Cuskelly (2003) study, which considered aspects of board performance and patterns of
power, would be to consider how power sources (or lack of) impact on the boards strategic capability.
The nal part of the Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) model is the will and skill of individual members. At board levels
where personalities may be large and individuals can be selected for personal qualities, then willingness to intervene and
skill in matching behavior to the requirements of the situation can all be fateful for inuence and impact (p. 853). Again,
there is much empirical evidence to suggest that the strategic capability of a sport board is directly affected by the ability of
individual members (Hoye & Auld, 2001; Shilbury, 2001). In a national sport organisation setting, an exploration of how the
will and skill of individual board members might impact on the boards overall ability to think and act strategically is, as yet,
undeveloped.
An important feature of the model is its emphasis on the relationship between the three aspects. The reality of power and
inuence in and around the boardroom requires the simultaneous, dynamic, and complementary analysis of context, and
will and skill in creating and using a constellation of power sources (p. 853). Pettigrew and McNulty (1995, 1998) argued
that each aspect changes and inuences the other. Conceptualising the strategic capability of the board in terms of this threepart holistic model of power and inuence offered both a theoretically sound and empirically valid way of understanding
what both enables and constrains board member strategic contribution.
2.4. Board strategic capability
In one of the few studies focusing on the boards strategic role in the non-prot setting, Edwards and Cornforth (2003)
identied two primary problems in explaining board strategic contribution. The rst is the blurring of the boundary between
operational detail and strategic focus. The boards . . . understanding of strategic issues may come from exposure to
operational detail . . . (p. 78). In essence, they argued that operational detail may be a necessary element of strategic decision
making. The second concern noted by Edwards and Cornforth (2003) is the distinction between policy and strategy. They
emphasised that strategy relates to how organisations position themselves competitively, while policy is . . . about giving
substance to collective values (p. 78). They considered that the boundary has become blurred in practice within the public
and non-prot setting and that . . . the discourse of strategy has become predominant (p. 79). In summary, the authors
considered that strategic contribution is a contested term: how boards interpret it depends on perceptions about the very
purpose of quasi-autonomous public and non-prot organisations (p. 79). For the purposes of their research they
articulated strategic contribution as board . . . assessment of the organisations overall resource and capability strengths and
weaknesses, their relative performance and their options and priorities for future development . . . (p. 79).
Work in the non-prot arena has also advanced support for the widely held assumption that a focus on strategic
organisational development will enhance organisation effectiveness (Brown, 2005). Indeed, the Carver model, although
criticised for its arbitrary distinctions between the role of paid staff and board members (Leland, 1999), strongly advocates
for board members to focus their energies on strategic activities such as policy development. Work by Inglis and Weaver
(2000) on prioritising strategic activities on the board agenda provided an insight into how particular actions can inuence
the level of strategic contribution by the board. Moreover, Hoye and Inglis (2003) presented an overview of non-prot
governance models and considered how these models could be adapted for the context of leisure organisations. In doing so,
they noted the association between governance models, organisation effectiveness and strategic expectations. More studies
of this kind are needed in order to increase the empirical knowledge-base around how to build strategic capability.
In the for-prot setting, again there are few studies that have specically investigated the strategic function of the board.
Although there is much support in the scholarly literature for a focus on strategic contribution as a central function of the
board, it remains under-researched (Heracleous, 2001; Leblanc, 2004; Lorsch & Clark, 2008; Nadler, 2004; van der Walt &
Ingley, 2003). Heracleous (2001) argued that accepted best practice in corporate governance has failed to nd a convincing
relationship between best practice and organisation performance. In doing do, he draws attention to . . . the need for an
explicit focus on the strategic role of the board of directors, by scholars, practitioners, and regulators, if meaningful
relationships between corporate governance and organization performance are to be established (p. 165). Furthermore,
there are an increasing number of studies that have identied a lack of strategic involvement on behalf of the board (Ingley &
Van der Walt, 2001; Kerr & Werther, 2008; Siciliano, 2008; Stiles, 2001). Stiles (2001), for example, found that boards in the
for-prot setting fail to realise their potential in the strategic decision making process. While the size, resource imperatives
and purpose for existence of sport organisations may differ, the central arguments found in the for-prot governance
239
literature are universal. That is, there is concern about the intensity of investigation and the latent role of the board,
regarding its responsibility for strategic development.
In laying out this theoretical background, helpful questions become evident for the governance of sport organisations.
What do we know about the strategic contribution of the board in sport organisations? What might be preventing sport
boards from realising their potential in strategic decision making? With much evidence to suggest there needs to be a greater
strategic focus, the present study concentrated on one primary research question: how can boards of national sport
organisations develop their strategic capability?
3. Method
In summarising the method used for the study, this section rst introduces the research paradigm, explains the action
research method and provides a rationale for the approach chosen. It then justies the choice of research sites, the
participants involved and the techniques used to generate and analyse data. Research validity is also addressed.
3.1. Research paradigm and action research method
This study was undertaken within the framework of an interpretive research paradigm (Guba, 1990). The paradigm
stresses the constructed and evolving nature of social reality and seeks to understand social reality through the eyes of those
being studied (Devine & Heath, 1999). There are few studies that have utilised the interpretive paradigm to study governance
in any setting (corporate, non-prot or sport). Indeed the advancement of dominant theories of corporate governance has
been driven by quantitative and positivistic approaches (Heracleous, 2001; Leblanc, 2004). McNulty and Pettigrew (1999)
noted there is much known about board structure and composition in a quantitative sense and much less known about board
process and behaviour. Behaviour in UK boardrooms is not nearly as transparent as the structure and composition of UK
boards (p. 47). There is still less understood about the behaviour of boards where knowledge has been constructed from a
qualitative and interpretive paradigm.
Most often aligned with the interpretative paradigm and qualitative methods, the term action research creates the
expectation that those involved will be researching a particular situation with the intention of taking action that will make a
difference. Signicantly, for this study, action research sought to combine practical transformation (Huxham & Vangen,
2003, p. 384) and the advancement of knowledge. The basic premise of action research is that change and research are not
mutually exclusive, that is, a simultaneous focus on improving practice and developing theory is possible (Coghlan &
Brannick, 2001). The work of Heron and Reason (2001), Cardno (2003) and Coghlan and Brannick (2001) framed the action
research approach adopted for this study, chosen for the potential to create positive change and advancement for sport
organisations.
3.2. Research sites and participants
In selecting a research site, Stake (2003) argued that the primary basis for selection should be the potential to learn about
the phenomena. Purposeful sampling was therefore used to select a case organisation that would rst and foremost offer the
opportunity to learn about board strategic capability within the sport setting. Seven NSO research sites were deliberately
selected by the researchers whose criteria also encompassed a willingness and ability to engage with the action research
process, logistical considerations (e.g., proximity and access), and high experience levels of the phenomena under study
(Pettigrew, 1990; Reason & Bradbury, 2001). The selected research sites were also considered case studies. Merriam (2002)
noted that a qualitative case study is a holistic and intensive analysis of a social unit, single instance, or phenomenon. Use of
the case study approach assisted the researchers to understand the specic organisation context including the factors that
might be impacting on the boards ability to develop its strategic capability.
Three case study organisations were selected from a list of seven possible sites. This paper reports on the experience of
one NSO case study, Tennis New Zealand (TNZ). While the researchers were known to personnel within TNZ through general
networks, they did not hold any insider position within the organisation. Discussion was therefore rst initiated with the
CEO and thereafter the primary research participants consisted of the CEO, seven board members including the chairperson
and an additional three members of a board sub-committee. The eldwork component of the study spanned 18 months,
beginning in July 2005 and concluding in January 2007.
3.3. Data generation and analysis: action research phases
The data generation and analysis process was guided by a model specically developed for the present study and derived
from an amalgam of previous action research conceptualisations (Cardno, 2003; Coghlan & Brannick, 2001; Heron & Reason,
2001). As presented in Fig. 2, four main phases were used for the study. Within these phases, a range of data generation and
analysis techniques were employed, namely, document analysis, participant observation, focus groups, interviews, reective
journaling memorandums, theming, writing and member checking. The lead researcher also acted as facilitator in numerous
board meeting settings, drawing out data, testing and reecting on conclusions with research participants. All board
meetings, focus groups and interviews were video or audio taped, producing 20 tapes, comprising over 1200 hours of data for
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Fig. 2. Action research model for developing strategic capability.
the TNZ case study. For the purposes of this paper, quotations used from the TNZ case data have been coded as 3, denoting
TNZ board members and 4 denoting the board sub-committee, followed by the letters ranging am. This allows data to
be cross-referenced back to individual participants, and demonstrates diligence in the data generation and analysis process.
The rst action research phase, Context Analysis, involved reconnaissance work where background data on the
organisation and its environment was collected. This involved both interviews and document analysis. Phase two, Issue
Identication, concentrated on exploring a focal area for the study. This was done in collaboration with the researchers and
the research participants. A broad question, derived from a gap in the literature, and informal discussion with board
members and other governance practitioners was established by the researchers. This was used as the starting point for
collaboration in each of the phases and guided the subsequent interventions. Phase three, Intervention and Action,
encompassed a collaborative approach (between researchers and participants) to designing an intervention that would help
develop board strategic capability. In this phase, the planned strategies were put into action and were subject to purposeful
monitoring and reection to inform further action. As portrayed in Fig. 2, a second action step was also undertaken as part of
this phase. Phase four, Evaluation of Intervention and Action, involved the researchers and participants critically reecting
on the outcomes of the planned action in relation to the research question. Exploring change and learning was a central
component of this phase.
The action research model developed for and employed by the present study also integrated the notion of meta learning
(Coghlan & Brannick, 2001). This involved the inclusion of mini-cycles placed around the outside of the square to promote
a strategic view of the cycles and phases that were undertaken (see Fig. 2). This strategic view promoted simultaneous
consideration of content (what was happening); process (how it was happening); and premise (why it was happening). As
Coghlan and Brannick noted, it is the dynamic of these learning phases that . . . enables action research to be more than
everyday problem solving (p. 19). In essence, it is . . . learning about learning, in other words meta learning (p. 19).
3.4. Research validity
Validity of the action research process was achieved on a number of different levels. Specically, the research participants
regularly checked conclusions and written summaries to verify the ndings (Tolich & Davidson, 1999). This also involved
checking that the goals of the research were being met as well as verifying that data recorded, matched participant reality
241
(Coghlan & Brannick, 2001). Triangulation was also used to protect the validity of the study (McTaggart, 1998). As well as
multiple methods of data collection, information from multiple sources was also gathered in order to generate layers of data.
Such sources included ofcial documents (e.g., strategic plans, internal reports, annual reports, board minutes), paid fulltime CEOs, and volunteer board members and co-opted sub-committee members. This information was used to analyse
consistencies and inconsistencies in establishing a representation of critical events.
In addition to considering research validity, it is useful to briey note the inherent limitations of using an action research
method to address the research question. In order to achieve change and formalised knowledge development, action
research is by nature a highly complex and contextualised research method (Coghlan & Brannick, 2001). This study was no
exception. A challenge of this particular study was therefore the numerous distractions from the central question and the
challenge in merging the agendas of the researcher and research participants. More denitive and generalised outcomes
could have been derived had a different method been used. A rich insight into the complexities in enacting what was
considered to be good practice was the pay-off achieved via this method.
4. Results and discussion
This section presents a summary of what occurred during each phase of the action research process as well as highlighting
insights discovered and changes that occurred for TNZ. Relevant literature is integrated into the discussion and tentative
conclusions are established in relation to board strategic capability.
4.1. Phase one and two: Context Analysis and Issue Identication
The reconnaissance work for TNZ spanned four months from July to October 2005 and consisted of meetings with the CEO,
members of the board sub-committee (Maiden Committee) board advisors, and board members. The researchers rst
Maiden Committee meeting (18 October, 2005) also formed part of the reconnaissance phase. In addition, a review of TNZ
documents was undertaken to establish the environment within which the study would take place. This reconnaissance
work canvassed background information on the organisation, board function and a proposal to re-design the governance
structure of the sport.
At the time the eldwork commenced there were seven staff members including the CEO working for Tennis New Zealand
(TNZ). In terms of playing numbers, there were approximately 43,792 registered tennis players, 477 afliated clubs, 66
unafliated clubs, 25 regional associations, 28 sub-associations and six special interest afliates such as the veterans
association, and the International Tennis Club of New Zealand. Of concern for the organisation were estimates of
participation gures showing a much higher number of people participating than registered as members. The Sport and
Recreation New Zealand (2005) survey conducted for the period 20002001 determined there were 317,900 adults taking
part in tennis, the second highest individual adult participation sport in New Zealand behind golf.
In terms of high performance, New Zealand tennis players have produced mixed results at the international level with a
small number of players achieving top 20 world rankings. Since the mid-1990s, (and to the time of this research)
international performance has waned, however, with players competing overseas struggling to make the top 100 in world
rankings. Financially, TNZs turnover was more than $1,400,000. While its reserves position was sound, the organisation
recorded a decit over the previous four years (20022005) ranging between $70,481 in 2005 and $410,026 in 2006.
During the time of the research project, the board comprised six males over 40 years of age and one female in her mid-30s.
There was a mix of lawyers and business people and six of the seven members of the current board had been together since
May 2004. As stipulated by the constitution, the term of ofce was a maximum of three years at which time the incumbent
must retire and be re-elected if they wished to continue. Board members were also restricted from holding ofce as an
elected regional or afliated association member or from being a staff member. This governance structure replaced a 10member board of management, voted out at the October 1999 AGM. In an early interview with the CEO he noted that he was
not sure the previous management committee . . . fully realised the implications of such a change (personal
communication, 12 July, 2005). In particular, there was concern that the board, in effect, was 100% appointed and he
indicated that the regions felt a certain disconnection between the national board and regional perspectives as a
consequence.
The CEO involved in this study was appointed in January 2004 as part of a move to become more strategically focused. As a
board member for TNZ prior to his appointment, the CEO played a major part in preparing the strategic plan spanning the
period 20042007. The CEO was previously a company director for a large New Zealand exporter. He had been involved in
tennis most of his life and was in his late 50s at the time of this research.
A health check on the state of tennis in New Zealand, carried out by TNZ revealed concerning trends in participation,
Most areas are experiencing the same problems of declining senior numbers, resulting in diminishing interclub
competitions, declining volunteer numbers, crippling nancial losses and a lack of funds to carry out basic maintenance
requirements (Tennis New Zealand, 2004a, p. 3). According to Sport and Recreation New Zealand (2005) statistics the
number of registered tennis players in 1985 was 63,500, declining to 54,000 in 1990 and further declining to present levels.
The health-check report also noted that 70% of clubs have fewer than 100 members. This health-check report alongside a
number of previous internal reports about the state of tennis in New Zealand provided the catalyst for the board to initiate
action around major structural change. In particular, the CEO noted in a presentation to the international club in 2004 that
242
the current structure of the NSO composed of 25 associations is convoluted and unnecessarily complex. Tennis New Zealand
is hamstrung by associations and associations are the same. There is little convergence or alignment of goals (Tennis New
Zealand, 2004a, p. 4). Signicantly, the CEO also noted the sport in its current form is ungovernable.
At the AGM on 23 July, 2005 a motion proposed by the board to restructure TNZ in the form of a regional model (that is,
reduce the number of associations, currently numbering 25), was carried. It was also agreed that the board establish a
committee to undertake further consultation on the specic nature of an appropriate regional model and to formulate
detailed recommendations to the board of TNZ (Tennis New Zealand, 2005a). The committee chaired by Sir Colin Maiden
came to be known as the Maiden Committee. Sir Colin had previously been Vice Chancellor of the University of Auckland and
was a commercial director and member of the International Tennis Club of New Zealand. The committee also comprised
seven other members including two TNZ board members, four nominees from the regional associations and one high prole
former player. Additionally, the committee had the powers to recruit independent appointees to add expertise and
knowledge.
While the current governance structure of tennis in New Zealand appeared to be the primary issue for the national board in
terms of its strategic capability, the individual interviews with board members revealed additional insights into the boards
perception of its strategic function. These perceptions included the composition of the national board and the emphasis on a
skills-based board as distinct from regional representation. One board member conceded that, Down the road, the governance
structure (of the national board) may need to change (3a, 31 August, 2005). Another noted . . . the skills based board throws
open the composition issue of representation versus appointed (3f, 1 September, 2005). This issue was to become an important
aspect of the overall change process.
When the researchers approached TNZ, the organisation was already engaged in a major change process. The boards
desire to transform the relationship with the regional associations was the major item on its agenda. Although heavily
engaged in this change process, throughout the CEO was very open and prepared to support the research by making himself
available as requested. After ve meetings/contact with TNZ personnel, the developing picture for the researcher was one
of a sport grappling with a decline in on-court performance, participation and national inuence with its regional
stakeholders.
In the researchers opinion (drawn from the reconnaissance phase including individual interviews, 18 August1
September, 2005), board personnel appeared to be highly capable, concerned for the wellbeing and future of the organisation
and skilled in governance processes and practices. The organisation had undergone a Sport and Recreation New Zealand (the
government agency for sport and recreation also known as SPARC) capability review and had recently implemented a
number of actions to further improve governance processes. The interviews indicated that board members were committed
to a change in the regional relationship and in the words of one board member: If TNZ can get to the stage where there is a
framework where TNZ can assume responsibility for the sport, then weve done our job (3g, 1 September, 2005). Another
priority for several board members was a re-design and regional roll-out of the high performance programme potentially
threatened by the current regional structure.
4.2. The emerging issue for Tennis New Zealand
After careful consideration of the internal reports and the Maiden Committee terms of reference, the researchers decided
that involvement in this process would contribute to seeking answers to the research question. Data collected thus far
indicated to the researchers that the national board was struggling to enact its strategic priorities because of the nature of the
relationship with its regional entities. Currently, there is no vehicle for TNZ to do this to create a high performance
pathway (3c, 30 August, 2005). It appeared that structural change was part of the strategy to redene the nationalregional
relationship and allow greater governance of the sport from a national perspective. Another board member stated that TNZ
has to achieve an effective merger of regional interests . . . Quite how it will manifest itself is uncertain (3b, 1 September,
2005).
A previous internal report found that Tennis in New Zealand is ungovernable because it has been demonstrably unable
to confront a raft of inter-related problems already identied. The response to successive reports over 12 years, all calling for
signicant change, has been ineffectual (Tennis New Zealand, 2004b, p. 6). In particular, the report goes on to state that The
ambiguity about the relationship between Tennis NZ and major associations also means there is no agreed agenda for the
sport. The duplication inherent in 25 associations is a confusing and possibly wasteful use of resources (p. 7). In other words,
the ability of the TNZ board to strategically lead the sport appears to be hamstrung by the current regional governing
structure. Working with TNZ to assist in effecting structural change and tracking the results of this process so that
governance theory can be advanced, therefore, became a key aim for the researchers.
In framing the issue, which would lead to action designed to develop strategic capability, the researchers acknowledged
the following conditions: the national board appeared to have personnel who were strategic thinkers and had a sound
understanding of the sport and its environmental inuences, the board had been involved in designing and articulating its
strategic priorities and the processes that encouraged a strategic focus appeared to be in place during board meetings. The
issue arose in the enacting of TNZs strategic priorities through its regional network. In the opinion of the TNZ board and
management, this was caused by an unwieldy regional structure, too many regional entities and within some regional
associations, an imbalance in power and inuence that meant the national body was hamstrung in its desire to direct
national initiatives.
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For the purposes of this research the issue that emerged within the TNZ case study was therefore articulated as: a
national sport organisation in decline seeking to rejuvenate by further centralising its functions, and by shifting the
balance of power in favour of greater national inuence in the governing of the sport. The strategy to enable this was a
change in regional structure and reduction of the number of regional entities. This articulation of the issue was checked
with board members and the CEO prior to the researchers presenting at a conference in early 2006. It was also formally
veried by the participants during the evaluation phase, with one respondent stating: Yes I agree. The key issue is around
being more strategically focused and having the right delivery mechanisms. This interviewee further stated that I could
see straight away there was a dysfunctional structure/delivery mechanism . . . and that they would have to change the
structure and business model to allow delivery of the strategy (4c, 9 November, 2006). The next stage of the action
research process was to work with the Maiden Committee to assist them in determining the nature of the new regional
model and nationalregional relationship.
4.3. Phase three: Research Intervention and Action
The intervention and action phase spanned a 10-month period between November 2005 and August 2006. This involved
multiple iterations to maximise learning generated, and to strengthen the validity of the research process (refer Fig. 2). The
terms intervention and action have been chosen to represent the distinction between researcher-led steps (i.e.,
intervention) and participant-led steps (i.e., action). At times, both terms are used jointly denoting integration between
researcher-led intervention and participant-led action. This is done to clarify researcher and participant roles and to further
aid transparency of process and ultimately research validity.
The theoretical concepts that might explain what was occurring for TNZ and help direct the intervention and action were
twofold. The rst was drawn from Pettigrew and McNultys (1995) tripartite model of power and inuence. This related to
the proposed change in governing structure for the organisation aspired to by the board in order to further advance its
strategic priorities. In the application of this model, the authors encourage consideration of multiple elements: structure and
context, will and skill, and power sources, in order for potential power of the board to be converted into actual inuence.
While this model was designed in relation to the power and inuence of independent directors (non-executive directors)
within the corporate boardroom, the model also offers insight into the tennis context. How much would the board rely on
structural change to exert increased inuence and how much would the behavioural aspects such as relationship building
and communication with regional entities come into play? Would the legitimate power afforded by the constitution be the
source of the boards power base or would other sources of power, such as expert or referent power (i.e., a former high
prole player), be utilised? How committed were individual board members to the change process in terms of exerting their
will and skill? Indeed, would the structural change allow greater determination by the board of its strategic priorities?
Would other signicant factors, not included in the model, emerge from the research process? While some answers began to
emerge during the intervention and action phase, many of these questions were not answered until the evaluation phase of
the research process.
The second theoretical concept was connected to board composition in relation to issues of constituency representation.
At the time of the researchers involvement, the TNZ board was a fully appointed board (by an appointments board as
specied in the constitution) as distinct from an elected system. Comment was made by board members in early interviews
with the researchers regarding the issue of regional representation at national board level, signalling that a change to the
appointed model may be required. There is much debate in the literature regarding the extent to which boards should be
representative of their stakeholders (Sternberg, 1997; Stoney, 2001). Similarly, within the TNZ situation there were varying
views regarding the appropriateness of a representative board for TNZ. The presence of this issue within TNZ restructuring
deliberations provided an opportunity for the researcher to expose practitioners to aspects of this theoretical debate.
Similarly, it also presented an opportunity for the researchers to draw from the empirical evidence to inform the theoretical
conversation.
4.4. First major intervention and action step: agreement on regional centres
The research intervention for TNZ emerged from the desire by the board to expose the Maiden Committee to the
experience of other sports and theories of practice that might inform decision making. As explained by one board member
. . . we are keen to keep leading practice in front of the Maiden Committee (3f, 20 December, 2005). The CEO considered the
researchers role as providing . . . academic independence (20 December, 2006) to help provide answers to what, at times,
would be a highly political debate. While the research intervention was a small part in a broader course of change for tennis
in New Zealand, it allowed the researcher to become involved in the larger process and gain access to data that would
contribute to the overall research question.
It was agreed between researchers and research participants that a range of case studies detailing the experience of other
sports would be prepared by the researchers. In total, three case studies detailing changes to regional governing structures
for Squash New Zealand, New Zealand Soccer and New Zealand Cricket were prepared. A matrix comparing the regional
governing structures of nine other sports was also prepared as well as a matrix setting out the membership categories and
voting systems of seven other national sport organisations. This information was included in the Maiden Committee agenda
papers for 29 November, 20 December, 2005 and 9 February, 2006 meetings.
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A review of literature on governing models in Australia and New Zealand sport and other non-prot organisations
(Shilbury, Ferkins, & Sherry, 2004) was also forwarded to committee members. The researchers worked closely with the
committee project manager in determining the type of information required. The project manager would pose questions
such as How have other sports managed their new structures to bring in everyone? What sort of committees and advisory
groups have they established? How do the new relationships between the national and regional levels work? (2 December,
2005). In an attempt to address these questions the researchers included a section within each case study that summarised
the lessons learnt for each sport as per their documentation.
In a summary of the rst round of information prepared for the 29 November, 2005 Maiden Committee meeting, the
researchers highlighted key lessons from other sports as well as conclusions from the literature regarding governing
structures and change processes (e.g., Kikulis, 2000; Shilbury et al., 2004; Skinner, Stewart, & Edwards, 1999). Summary
points included:
That regional/state delivery structures appeared to be the number one issue facing NSOs in New Zealand and Australia.
For some sports, it was considered an opportunity to build regional capability and for others it was considered necessary to
dismantle the existing delivery mechanism and to re-build as a centralised model.
The overall trend was to reduce the number of regional/state associations.
Two NSOs in Australia had changed to a unitary model.
In New Zealand, many NSOs had reduced the number retaining between 6 and 12 regional entities. One NSO had added a
layer.
Many had found the implications of change very signicant and in particular had realised the need to re-orientate the NSO
as a service organisation.
Committee members were attentive to the implications of a restructure in terms of the additional service role for the
NSO. Im particularly interested in the lessons from soccer where you say the national body needs to play a proactive role in
supporting the implementation of the federations. This is the greatest weakness to date, of the federation structure (4f, 29
November, 2005).
After the research was discussed and the results of an a survey of regional associations was tabled, the Maiden Committee
chairperson decided to . . . lead from the chin (29 November, 2005) and present his recommendations regarding a proposed
regional model that could then be open to debate by the committee. I think we have to move forward in the interests of tennis
its a great sport and weve just got to do better. We just cant stay where we are otherwise we will continue to decline (29
November, 2005). The chairperson then distributed a set of written recommendations that after some amendments from other
committee members became the Maiden Committee recommendations to the TNZ board. Of the 11 recommendations, the
central point was to reduce the number of regional associations from 25 to 6, creating regional centres.
After a short period of silence in the meeting where it appeared the reaction was uncertain, there were expressions of
strong support for the recommendations from other Maiden Committee members. Of particular signicance was the
endorsement received from members who were from regional associations and at times had expressed concern at the
proposed restructure. Of the eight voting members, four held positions within regional associations. One such member was
rst to respond: I would like to endorse in general terms the proposed recommendations from the chair . . . There is a clear
message that we must consult with our stakeholders and that the role of TNZ must be clearly dened (4d, 29 November,
2005).
A further regional respondent stated: What youve come out with is certainly xs (regions) views. We do want to see
the number of regions reduced and we do want to see the role of Tennis New Zealand claried (4e, 29 November, 2005).
Another commented about the positive nature of the six regional centres because . . . it places signicant responsibility back
on the regions (4c). One of the members, who also sat on the TNZ board, stated: I support it. It goes a long way to achieving
what we want in terms of national leadership (4f).
Following some discussion regarding the detail of the recommendations the chairperson then proposed that . . . these
recommendations be given to the Tennis New Zealand board and that they are also sent to the regions along with the results
of the survey (29 November, 2005). In response to this another member commented: I need a bit more detail as to how the
smaller regions might join with the larger regions. I think this should be included in what we send to the regions (4i). In
concluding, and further justifying his choice to promote six regions, the chairperson stated: I looked at all options including
the unitary model and having three regions, and after the survey I decided that the unitary model is just not on at the
moment and probably not appropriate at the moment.
4.5. Second major action step: constitutional recommendations
Once a recommendation was agreed by the Maiden Committee to designate six associations as regional centres, the next
step was to agree on draft constitutions that would set the framework for the proposed model. It was intended that both the
national and regional constitutions would change as a consequence of the change in governing structure. Two key issues
from this action were particularly relevant for the research project: the decision regarding the make up of the TNZ board in
terms of appointed positions versus elected positions; and the wording regarding regional autonomy and the regional
centres.
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The debate as to the composition of the TNZ board was an intriguing one. The committee members were working from a
draft constitution prepared by a sports lawyer who formed part of the professional services team for the Maiden Committee.
The solicitor had provided an opinion advising the committee to adopt a hybrid board with a mix of three elected and ve
appointed directors. She noted that some all-appointed boards have trouble understanding the sport at a practical level and
all-elected boards often result in inadequate skills around the table.
The solicitor also advised that TNZ directors should not be ofce holders of regional associations in order to reduce the
potential for conict of interest. The chairperson asked the lead researcher for her opinion on this in terms of conclusions
from the literature. The researcher agreed that current good practice was a hybrid board. There was initial agreement on the
ve appointed; three elected split but members were not in favour of excluding regional ofcer holders. Im not so sure
about that I think we need the best people for the job. It doesnt matter where they come from they should act in the best
interests of TNZ (4a, 20 December, 2005). It was agreed that nominees for the elected positions could hold regional
positions. However, a clause was added into the nal constitution explicitly allowing this provided the rules regarding
conict of interest and duties of the board were noted and applied.
The second major issue of particular interest for the study was the debate regarding the powers of TNZ and the desire by
some regional personnel to maintain full regional autonomy. This issue was raised to varying degrees of intensity throughout
the Maiden Committee deliberations but came to a head at the 9 February meeting. The issue was prefaced by the
following exchange: I think my major concern from an x (association) point of view is (4m, 9 February, 2006). Another
member interjected before the rst speaker could nish in stating: Youre here as a representative of a committee of Tennis
New Zealand acting with a hat on as a Tennis New Zealand representative so take your Tennis New Zealand hat off and put
your x (association) hat on and tell us what you think (4a).
The ensuing debate revealed the tension in attempting to align national and regional interests. The original speaker
continued stating that I think the associations are going to want to preserve their autonomy. I think this is a key intention of
this constitution and I think its going to be very important (4m). Another member disagreed. The whole idea is to
strengthen Tennis New Zealand so that tennis in New Zealand does better . . . And so there will be some constraints not
totally autonomous regions so that the strategies are aligned (4a). In response, the association-based speaker explained: I
would suggest that its important to recognise that the members control TNZ ultimately. There is an ownership issue there.
Because the current structure is ownership by the clubs who own the regions and the regions effectively own TNZ (4m, 9
February, 2006). In response, the chair asked for the views of other members regarding what had been said. One regionally
based member said he was strongly in favour of greater direction from TNZ (4i). The debate moved to the next clause in the
constitution for discussion. The issue did not appear to be resolved at this time.
As illustrated by the exchange detailed above, it appeared there was a clear difference of opinion regarding the level
of autonomy for regional centres. From a national perspective, regional autonomy had and would potentially inhibit the
ability of the TNZ board to enact its strategic priorities and to effectively govern the sport. From a regional perspective,
national control threatened independence and the regions ability to effectively govern their region. Complicating this
was the issue of ownership which potentially held different meanings for the different parties. Who owns TNZ?
Certainly, based on the previous quotation the regional person considered TNZ was owned by the associations and
therefore should be owned by the six new regions. From a national perspective, the researchers gleaned that ownership
was not at issue. Rather, the challenge was about how to work more effectively with regional entities to deliver national
strategic priorities. In so doing, TNZ would be discharging its governing duties. Shilbury (2001) stated that . . . sporting
organizations exist in an ownership vacuum (p. 260). Is it possible that the notion of governance was being confused
with ownership?
Shilbury (2001) also pointed out in relation to sport organisations that . . . there is usually no one individual or
individuals who legally own the rm and, as a consequence, control is often a blurred concept (p. 260). He goes on to say
that, Ownership of sport organizations and many non-prots is a collective phenomenon and therefore more closely aligned
with stewardship theory which posits shared, cooperative and collective behaviours . . . (p. 260). The challenge that
appeared to be present within this debate was how to overcome the regional concerns regarding loss of autonomy in order to
create a structure that encouraged cooperative and collective behaviour. The new structure would need to preserve the
duciary responsibilities that regional entities held for tennis within their jurisdiction while at the same time allow
collective decision making that could advance national aims.
Were issues of ownership and control also at the heart of the debate regarding national board composition and the need
to allow an election process? Certainly, the preservation of regional inuence on the TNZ board was an important element.
Was ensuring regional inuence at the national board table a way of protecting owner inuence or was it a mechanism to
include a stakeholder perspective? A stewardship theory of governance advocates behaviour and decision making that is
collectivistic and has . . . higher utility than individualistic, self-serving behaviours (Davis & Schoorman, 1997, p. 25). Davis
and Schoorman explain that . . . even where the interests of the steward and the principal are not aligned, the steward
perceives greater utility in cooperative behavior and behaves accordingly . . . (p. 25). There is evidence from the Maiden
Committee discussion previously detailed that committee members considered the role of the TNZ board was to act as
stewards on behalf of the organisation. If this role was to be undertaken by including a stakeholder perspective, then the
national or collective principles could easily apply.
However, if the concept of governing was considered from an ownership perspective (i.e., the TNZ board was there to
govern on behalf of the owners) then why would the owners (i.e., regional centres) risk being disadvantaged by collective
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decisions that may not address their regional concerns? This might especially apply in a situation where the regional entities
are considered by the national body to be one of many stakeholders (e.g., sponsors, media) and not necessarily the principal
owners. From the evidence that was emerging, the two distinct points of view could be framed as:
NSO view: the regional entity exists to deliver national priorities and programmes and keep the sport alive at the regional
level.
Regional view: the national body exists to coordinate our wishes as owners of the sport. We tell them what to do and what
the strategic priorities are.
In order to unravel the issues and for the restructuring process to achieve the stated aims of creating a regional structure
that was best for tennis in New Zealand, the issue of ownership and how it was perceived by the different entities would need
to be better understood.
4.6. Monitoring the TNZ intervention and action steps
The nal outcome for the Maiden Committee was a set of recommendations to the TNZ board regarding six new regional
centres. The committee also provided a recommended national constitution and a regional template to the TNZ board. These
constitutions made no mention of the word control or ownership within the objects or powers and responsibilities with
the exception of a clause regarding control of money. Instead terms such as promote, develop, enhance and protect
were used in both draft constitutions. In contrast, the former TNZ constitution and, for example, Tennis North Harbours
constitution both contained multiple citings of the word control within the objects. The rst object in the TNZ constitution
was To foster, control and develop the sport of Tennis . . . (Tennis New Zealand, 2005b, p. 2). Similarly, control featured in
the rst object of the Tennis North Harbour constitution.
The nal report also contained an introduction, background on the case for change, a transition timeframe and detail
regarding the implementation process including the respective responsibilities of TNZ and the regional centres. The nal
report of the Maiden Committee to TNZ also noted that it did not achieve a consensus of opinion on some key issues. The
most controversial issues in concluding this report were voting powers of proposed regions, and whether or not members of
clubs, and individual clubs, should be members of Tennis NZ. The committee was divided on both of these issues (4a, 17
February, 2006).
Both issues appeared to be a manifestation of the differing perspectives on control and ownership between regional and
national personnel. In particular, the desire by national personnel to engage directly with individual players and club
members was motivated by the desire by TNZ to maintain an . . . accurate national database for sponsorship and other
purposes, and its ability to obtain personal information and revenue from a growing number of casual players (4a, 17
February, 2006). From a regional perspective the opposition to this direct line to clubs and individual players was based on
the view that they considered clubs and players to be within their jurisdiction and should remain under regional control (4m,
9 February, 2007). In the nal report, two voting options were proposed for consideration, representing the differing
opinions. In addition, the regional centres remained as the exclusive members of TNZ (plus afliates and life members, etc.).
As presently written, the proposed constitution of Tennis NZ gives the power to effect both these objectives (i.e., a national
database and revenue from casual players) without the members of clubs, and clubs, being members of Tennis NZ (4a, 17
February, 2006).
In terms of monitoring the recommendations by the Maiden Committee, the next opportunity was the special general
meeting (SGM) followed by the AGM scheduled for 12 August, 2006. It was intended that the motions proposing changes to
the TNZ constitution and structure would be put forward. Leading up to this meeting, there were a number of further changes
proposed by two of the major associations, primarily relating to issues of regional autonomy.
The motion to replace the existing TNZ constitution with a new constitution mandating six geographical areas, known as
regional centres, was approved unanimously by the members of TNZ at the SGM on 12 August, 2006. Despite the controversy
relating to regional autonomy and TNZ board authority, this was arguably the most signicant change to the national body
since it was established and as such a major achievement for all concerned.
4.7. Phase four: Evaluation of Intervention and Action
The formal evaluation phase took place over a three-month period between October 2006 and December 2006. The
process of how change and learning within the TNZ setting might be evaluated was discussed with some of the research
participants. Based on their advice, and direction from authors of action research literature (Cardno, 2003; Coghlan &
Brannick, 2001), the researchers decided to undertake the majority of interviews individually. An interview prompt sheet
was designed by revising the key issues previously identied, reviewing the major steps and questions of the intervention
and action phase and relating these to the overall research question.
The researchers chose ve major areas of questioning. First, the researchers veried their articulation of the issue with the
research participants about which there was full agreement. Second, a series of questions were posed to reveal the perceived
strengths and weaknesses of the change process. Third, there were questions relating to the role and impact of the
researchers involvement and, fourth, there were questions about the impact of the change. Final summary questions were
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asked of the participants to identify the most signicant change for them and what they considered to be their primary
learning. This format has been condensed into three sections as set out below.
Participants were interviewed between 29 October and 7 December, 2006. In total, 11 people were consulted. Ten people
were interviewed face-to-face and one person provided written comment because of geographical distance. Those consulted
were the TNZ CEO, TNZ board chairperson, Maiden Committee chairperson, one other TNZ board member not part of the
Maiden Committee plus 8 of the 12 members and advisers involved in the Maiden Committee (not counting the researchers).
A total of ve of the eight TNZ board members were included. For reasons of convenience on behalf of the participants, two
(4d and 4g) were interviewed together. The researcher noted a particular willingness to engage in the evaluation phase on
behalf of the tennis participants. Many interviews lasted at least 1.5 hours and some up to 3 hours. The researchers also
detected a sense of excitement and curiosity in evaluating the change process. Participants appeared willing to throw
around tentative research conclusions and theoretical constructs relevant to their experience. In some instances, the
evaluative interview process appeared to take on a cathartic quality and participants appeared to relish the opportunity to
express their personal views and reect on their experience.
4.8. Evaluating the process of change
Perspectives were drawn from regional and national ofce holders as well as independent committee members on the
strengths and weaknesses of the process of change. A participant on the national board stated that I think the process
worked really well. The one . . . negative is not being able to get to other business. Its affected where we are at in high
performance (3c, 8 November, 2006). Another noted that We had full blown legal, nancial and research support [for the
Maiden Committee]. The project advisory support and resources were a major positive (4f, 28 November, 2006). Several
considered the appointment of Sir Colin Maiden as chairperson of the committee to be a major milestone and a positive
aspect of the process. I believe the committee worked well under a highly skilled chair, and its recommendations were, on
the whole, . . . exactly what would have progressively overcome the problems tennis has faced in the past few decades (4i, 9
November, 2006). Representative of a number of views, another respondent stated Sir Colins appointment was a milestone.
It was the rst time someone has stepped up to lead this issue. His ability to cut to the chase and lead it was a key to the
process (4j, 27 November, 2006).
There was also a consistent view that a major challenge of the Maiden Committee process was the requirement to
determine constitutional detail. It broke down when the detail was asked for. The detail is where the stumbling block was.
However, at the end of the day Im pleased the general thrust [of the Maiden Committee recommendations] has been
executed (4a, 6 December, 2006). A different respondent noted The Maiden Committee was given a brief far beyond what it
could do (4b, 29 November, 2006). Another theme relating to the perceived strengths of the process was involvement from
the government agency, SPARC. A tipping point was SPARC placing a lot of pressure on sports to get their act together (4b,
29 November, 2006). Similarly, a second participant stated, SPARCs money helped sway thinking. SPARC became a leverage
point (3a, 29 October, 2006).
Finally, there were several comments from both TNZ board members and outsiders regarding the national board function
during the process. One non-TNZ board member stated There was healthy debate and team contribution. The chair, who
was a facilitator, drew on different strengths at different times (4j, 27 November, 2006). In recognising the way the national
board operated as an agent in the process of change, this participant went on to say The board were leading the decision
making and the CEO was providing his views. All board members were committed to the outcome. Similarly, a TNZ board
member stated, I was able to air my point of view there was no criticism of me or of each other (3c, 8 November, 2006).
This board member went on to pose the question How can this culture be developed at regional level? We need to include
people, to involve people, provide feedback and be available. In respect to this aspect, a non-TNZ board member also
commented that There was common sense and motivation from the board of TNZ to effect change (4b, 29 November,
2006).
4.9. Impact of intervention and structural reform
In order to gauge a better understanding of the impact of the research intervention as dened earlier, the lead researcher
queried her role with participants. There was a sense from most that the information provided was indeed useful background
for decision making. Everyone valued it at the time and found it useful to understand and benchmark against (4c, 9
November, 2006) was one comment, for example. Another participant noted that It provided a landscape gave some
context kind of like a peep out the window. It also offered, of course, an independent perspective which served to educate
people about the topic (4j, 27 November, 2006). This participant also considered that . . . it would have been better if you
were able to talk to it more there were some important lessons in there. Other participants also noted the educative value
of the information. We wanted . . . to know more about what others had done (4a, 6 December, 2006). A further participant
noted, Your comments gave us a good method of approach it was very helpful to have some independent input we
needed to have a balance (4h, 10 November, 2006).
A signicant portion of the interview time was spent determining the perceived impact and outcomes of the structural
reform. There was little disparity in comments between national and regional ofce holders. The lead researcher asked
questions relating to both the impact of the change in structure as well as the impact of the process of change. With regard to
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the former, a regional ofce holder stated, I feel more condent. There is now a more efcient business model. There is a
much more eet of foot structure and for communication, this has got to be better (4c, 9 November, 2006). Another
regional ofce holder asked and answered the question Has the structural change allowed for the outcomes desired? Yes . . .
Now that we have six regions, four of which have been challenged to lift the bar up. I want six strong regions (4d, 7
December, 2006).
A similar sentiment was expressed from a national point of view: With the six regions, everyone now has the chance of
being more equal (3a, 29 October, 2006). Also from a national point of view, one participant commented that, The
restructure is a new drawing board. We have established a dened relationship with the regions and the MOUs
[Memorandums of Understanding] have claried issues (3c, 8 November, 2006). The participant went on to explain: Im
getting feedback from people regarding communication with TNZ . . . Theres been an acceptance of responsibility of issues
and solutions. TNZ has stood up and accepted responsibility. People dont feel like they are in a vacuum any more.
Another national ofce holder described a similar outcome stating, We have a better culture and awareness of the need
for change and the cost of not seeing it through. We are more aligned. Weve come through a tough negotiation process and
weve still kept those relationships intact (4f, 28 November, 2006). Similarly, another participant considered that the . . .
biggest achievement was engaging with each other. Whats decided on paper wont succeed if they dont continue to engage.
The process was effective in the end because they got a result that everyone was happy with (4j, 27 November, 2006). The
participant went on to say, Now there are clear boundaries and expectations regarding how the organisations can work
together. A regional ofce holder concurred. There is more accountability and an opportunity for greater focus (4d, 7
December, 2006).
As part of the questioning process regarding the impact of change, the researcher specically probed the issues of
regional autonomy, ownership and national control. Again, there was remarkable consensus regarding the collection
of national and regional views relating to this issue. The general view was that the new constitution had indeed retained
regional autonomy and had not granted any further powers to the national body and that this was a workable outcome for
most parties. A regional respondent stated that There is no real change from a legal perspective. The regions havent lost any
ability to make autonomous decisions and I dont think TNZ has gained any greater inuence (4c, 9 November, 2006).
Another participant commented, As it [the constitution] is written now, TNZ doesnt have enough power to dictate
anything (4a, 6 December, 2006). Also in reference to the respective powers within the new constitution, a national ofce
holder said, Lets get to the starting line and at least we know we are in the race. And over time, as there is more trust and
communication, we can develop it (4g, 7 December, 2006). The respondent also rmly stated, It is wrong for the national
body to have the mentality that it owns the sport. A regional respondent also explained, There is room for autonomy to be
exercised at regional level (4d, 7 December, 2006).
Another TNZ board member also articulated this point of view by explaining, You cant come in and dominate. We need
to have a collaborative approach to integrating the strategy into the programmes and to draw on the expertise within the
regions (3c, 8 November, 2006). Another national board member described their point of view by using a metaphor relating
to the Americas Cup yacht race. Dean Barker steers the boat but he gets his information from and consults with nine others
regarding which way to go. Its TNZ who is steering but there are six regional entities who can now be involved in decisionmaking (4g, 7 December, 2006).
Some concern was expressed relating to the potential lack of constitutional power on behalf of TNZ. In terms of structure,
theyve made a leap, however, I do have some concerns that the regions could become more entrenched (4j, 27 November,
2006). Another participant stated that in order to move forward . . . it will require a lot of good will . . .. A three year review
will be terribly important (4a, 6 December, 2006). Similarly, a further respondent explained that, We have a constitution
that is a vanilla product without teeth from an authority point of view. I sense its swung a little too far back to the
regions in terms of power (4c, 9 November, 2006).
In contrast to the idea that the regions had not relinquished any of their powers, a regional ofce holder considered that
We made concessions to allow TNZ to govern and inuence more. From a regional point of view there was some mistrust of
TNZ previously (4d, 7 December, 2006). This respondent went on to say, however, Im quietly condent that over the next
ve, six, seven years that given new leaders and successors, I believe we could naturally move to a model with more control
at the top.
Overall, the researchers gleaned a sense of enthusiasm and optimism from respondents that surprised them. The process
of change had demanded signicant energy, was drawn out and difcult. However, the evaluation interviews clearly showed
a shift away from the them and us attitude that had pervaded the sport at the commencement of the Maiden Committee
process. The researchers noted a much greater willingness on the part of key national and regional personnel to work
together. Somehow, the structural change had facilitated a shift in the perception of collaboration within the sport. This
perception is summed up by the comment from a regional ofce holder, For me, its been a demonstration of team work and
a willingness to consult (4d, 7 December, 2006).
These comments contrast sharply with those made a year earlier regarding the level of mistrust and noted difculty in the
relationship between the national and regional entities. Indeed, there was reference to a . . . misunderstanding, suspicion
and fear (4h, 10 November, 2006) that appeared to characterise the relationship, within the evaluation interview as an
historical state. What springs to mind was some of the emotion and perception like hijack, asset grab, unitary model
(4g, 7 December, 2006) was a statement made in reference to how the relationship was previously perceived. TNZ were
saying one thing verbally but constitutionally said a different thing from a regional point of view (4d, 7 December, 2006).
249
Even as late as April 2006, there was still a large measure of concern regarding the nature of communication between
national and regional entities. What we want with TNZ is far greater communication and cooperation (4e, 29 April, 2006).
There is signicant evidence within the evaluation interviews that the boards desire to transform the relationship with
the regional associations was in fact achieved. As alluded to earlier, the structural change as difcult as it was to achieve was
the rst part of a strategy to redene the nationalregional relationship and allow greater governance of the sport from a
national perspective. Clearly, the national boards ability to govern, lead and inuence appears to now be dependent on
forging newly dened collaborative relationships. In the absence of constitutional power a truly collaborative partnership
will be essential. Interestingly, there was not a hint of disappointment from national board members that they had
effectively conceded constitutional power. Rather, there was excitement at the sea change that had reportedly taken place.
There was a sense that the national board was indeed on the cusp of creating an environment where it could enact the
strategic priorities designed with the regions as distinct from for the regions. With six regions providing greater equity in
terms of playing numbers and voting power across regional centres and a sense of team work, which contrasted sharply with
previous descriptions of the relationship, it was understandable why this optimism existed. Having noted this shift, however,
there was also a sense that there was a lot more work to be done regarding the level of national and regional collaboration to
allow the sport to move forward.
4.10. Learning about board strategic capability
There were several standout messages in terms of how the structural change might impact on the boards ability to enact
its strategic priorities. The rst was concerned with how the agreed change in nationalregional relationships might enable
the organisation to work in a more collaborative way. In the model we came up with, the regions will all participate in the
strategic plan. Having agreed on it, why couldnt it then be implemented? (4a, 6 December, 2006). It also appeared that most
participants considered that the new structure of six regional entities would facilitate this enhanced relationship. The second
point, also acknowledged by most participants, related to the imperative now placed on the quality of the nationalregional
relationship because of the lack of constitution powers afforded to the national body in the new constitution. We still dont
have the ability to enforce board decisions at regional level was a comment made by a national ofce holder in regard to
board strategic capability (4h, 10 November, 2006). That participant went on to say, however, that board leadership was
something that they believed people wanted to see . . . we have greater trust for this now. These points were captured in the
following statement:
The ability to deliver strategies across the sport is not about words in a constitution. Its through relationships . . . Why
go through the process because its the process that has allowed them to get to this point of communication. It was
part of a process to create new and improved ways of working together. (4j, 27 November, 2006)
Several other participants also raised the notion of improved opportunity for national body leadership as distinct from
greater control in the delivery of strategic priorities. In particular, there was a sense of an enhanced relationship regarding
this. Weve tapped into the goodwill of members. The most signicant change for me has been a change in the culture and
attitude (4f, 28 November, 2006). This national board member also went on to say, . . . there is an element of openness and
transparency. The signs are there but weve got a lot of work to do . . .. Other participants who held more of an independent
role on the Maiden Committee also echoed this sentiment. Trust and condence have improved. Everyone has aired their
dirty linen and there is a sense of moving on (4j, 27 November, 2006). The . . . in-ghting hopefully has gone. We might have
turned a corner in working together (4b, 2 November, 2006).
Another perspective on an improved leadership relationship related to the view that in driving the process of change, the
national body had rstly engaged the regions in a way that had not been previously achieved and secondly encouraged the
regions to consider a national view of the sport and its declining performance. There was an acceptance by the tennis
community for change (3c, 8 November, 2006). This national board member also went on to say,
I think its been led really well because everyone has been encouraged to keep their eye on the big picture. There was a
negative culture that wasnt necessarily collaborative it was focussed on individual concerns. I can see now how we
can break down that barrier. I can see a change in culture. Regional people are interacting with national. People look at
TNZ differently we are not seen as the bad guy because we were the ones who instigated the change. It has opened
up the organisation people are more positive. (3c, 8 November, 2006)
Another stated, I think there was learning for the membership regarding their contribution they have a responsibility
to make a contribution that if they wanted to have their say, they needed to give it when asked (4j, 27 November, 2006). In
relation to the national bodys initiation of the changes, a regional ofce holder stated that it, . . . seemed to galvanise people
into taking a personal stake in the change process (4c, 9 November, 2006). Another commented that it . . . forced the hand of
associations to become involved (4b, 29 November, 2006). When asked about the most signicant change a national ofce
holder noted that, . . . we have created an environment where TNZ can lead nationally where there are KPIs [key
performance indicators] and a focus on outcomes (4g, 7 December, 2006).
Further learning regarding national board strategic capability was expressed in terms of a greater appreciation for other
points of view. I learned the importance of . . . understanding where your stakeholders are coming from. Understanding
where you have common ground and where you differ, for example, autonomy and ownership (4f, 28 November, 2006).
250
Similarly, another participant noted that, People learned about other points of view. The process cleared the air in a lot of
areas (4b, 29 November, 2006). Everyone has quite a different thinking approach and way of looking at it in a change
situation (4c, 9 November, 2006). Another participant considered there was learning regarding . . . where others were
coming from (4b, 29 November, 2006).
The sentiments noted above further demonstrate how the process of change has created a positive shift in the
relationship between national and regional entities. This shift, perhaps an unwitting one, has established an environment
within which greater national board leadership can be achieved. As noted by one board member in an initial interview with
the researcher, TNZ has to achieve an effective merger of regional interests . . . Quite how it will manifest itself is uncertain
(3b, 1 September, 2005). The notion that TNZ would not gain greater constitutional power and the regional entities would
retain their autonomy in an environment that allows the merger of national and regional interests, was a situation none of
the research participants had previously articulated. While the desired sequence of events as described below is yet to play
out, there are strong indications from participants that it could be achieved. While there is legal autonomy [for the
regions], the constitutions will be aligned. TNZ can say heres our idea and we can debate it and have something agreed
once agreed, the national body can co-ordinate it (4h, 10 November, 2006).
There appears to have been signicant learning from the TNZ experience for the participants generally and for the board
members in relation to their strategic role. As noted in the evaluation interviews, the learning appears to have come from a
greater understanding of the role of regional entities and their desire to remain autonomous with an ownership stake in the
national body. The learning regarding the strategic role of the board concentrated on the importance of engaging with
regional personnel to build a relationship so that the national board could assume leadership of the sport.
5. Synthesis
A number of theoretical constructs such as stakeholder theory, resource dependence theory and Pettigrew and McNultys
(1995) tripartite model of power and inuence are useful concepts that help further explain the TNZ experience. Similarly,
learning from the TNZ experience contributes to the development of new ways of considering nationalregional
relationships within a non-prot sport setting from a theoretical perspective. This section therefore explores what meaning
can be drawn from this experience in terms of developing board strategic capability and how this might extend current
theoretical thinking.
5.1. Assimilating board strategic capability within a network theory of governance
The primary issue facing TNZ was the boards ability to enact strategic priorities via an effective regional delivery
mechanism. In this case, the TNZ board implemented a major regional restructure, signicantly reducing the number of
regional associations from 25 to 6. This was designed to create a better governing structure for the sport. An important
consideration was the relationship between the national body and its regional stakeholders. Normative theories of
governance incorporate the signicance of the external environment on the organisation and its strategic direction
(Cornforth, 2003). Furthermore, because the board inuences strategy and can play a part in inuencing the ow of resources
between organisations (e.g., government funding and sponsorship), theories such as resource dependence and IORs have
been highlighted as valid theoretical perspectives to help understand board function (Cornforth, 2003; Hoye & Cuskelly,
2007).
Findings from this study pinpoint the vital role of the board in leading IORs between the national body and its owners, the
regional entities. In particular, the research has established the connection between board strategic capability and regional
IORs. Tolbert and Hall (2009) argued that it has long been recognised that organisations operate in an environment with
other organisations. Less recognized is the fact that organizations vary in their awareness of the eld around them.
Awareness refers to both the recognition of other organizations and the recognition by organizational representatives that
their organization is interdependent with other organizations . . . (Tolbert & Hall, 2009, p. 223).
The outcomes from the TNZ experience suggest that a greater awareness of the interdependence between the two entities
has emerged and, in particular, greater clarication of the power dynamics and issues of ownership. As constitutional
owners of the TNZ, some of the regional entities chose to exert their power in challenging the original proposal for
structural change. As the national and regional organisations worked through their differences a greater level of awareness
and appreciation of the respective roles began to emerge. Illustrated within the evaluation interviews exists a collective
sense of the need for greater collaboration and an acknowledgement that the changes that took place have created a better
environment for a more constructive IOR and, as a consequence, a better governing environment.
Another key outcome from the tennis experience was that an effective strategic governing environment may be able to be
created, not from the national body exerting greater control over its regional entities, but rather from creating an
environment that seeks to work with the regional bodies in a power-sharing situation. The resource dependence perspective
is founded on Emersons (1962) theory of power dependence. Emerson proposed that social power was not an attribute of an
actor, instead it was a consequence of the relationship between two parties in that the power of A over B is based on Bs
dependence on A. In the tennis study, the actors found the power dynamic involved a dependence on resources held by the
national body as well as a dependence on the resources held by some of the larger regional entities. This interdependence, to
a certain extent, is explained by Sternbergs (1997) explanation of the evolutionary nature of stakeholder theory.
251
To what extent the regional entities are dependent on the national body was not examined. Neither was the level of
national body dependence on the regional entities explored within this study. However, lessons from the restructuring
process within tennis would suggest that elements of both stakeholder theory and resources dependence theory are relevant
and may become increasingly relevant for boards seeking to enact their strategic priorities through a regional network. In
considering governance primarily within a professional sporting context, Henry and Lee (2004) argued that, . . . the topdown system, has given way to a complex web of interrelationships between stakeholders in which different groups exert
power in different ways and in different contexts by drawing on alliances with other stakeholders (p. 28). The complex web
to which the authors refer encompasses such elements as media partners and alternative competition owners are used to
describe a fully professional sporting environment. However, the national boards ability to effect strategic change is
dependent on a network of interrelationships with the regional entities, and is a valuable conceptualisation for the present
study. Furthermore, Henry and Lee (2004), in describing a particular form of governance termed systemic governance,
noted three major policy implications of a network environment:
First, it is clear that in such a context, signicant policy change can only be achieved by negotiation and/or trade-off
between various parties in the network. Second, governing bodies of sport in such contexts no longer govern, or wholly
control their sport, or at least if they do, they do so by virtue of their ability to negotiate outcomes rather than by
dictating those outcomes to passive recipients of their message. Third, this has implications not only for the
organisations but also for the skills required of the people who work within them. The skills are much more those of
negotiation and mutual adjustment than of rational, ordered planning and control. (p. 29)
Although the context for the present study is different from the one Henry and Lee described, the notion that policy and,
by implication, strategy can be heavily inuenced by the environment of a federated network is signicant for this study. In
particular, the move away from the proposed top-down, controlling central body to a power-sharing situation with
members of the federated network was an important shift for TNZ and has implications for the role and composition of their
board. In order for the TNZ board to have the power and inuence to effect strategic change, it needed to acknowledge the
relative power and inuence of the regional entities and establish a governing environment that prioritised regional
collaboration. The tripartite model representing through a hierarchical relationship was no longer appropriate. Instead, a
networked model that places the NSO in the centre, around which the regional entities exist, is a more apt depiction of the
governing relationship (see Fig. 3).
Represented in diagrammatic form in Fig. 3A, it is easy to see how 25 regional entities were too many in number for the
national body to maintain meaningful relationships. Reduced to six, the capacity to establish a meaningful governing
environment, where strategic outcomes for the sport are negotiated and collectively agreed, is far greater. A further
Fig. 3. Hierarchical vs. networked governing models. (A) Traditional hierarchical model of TNZs governing relationship with regional entities. (B)
Networked model of TNZs governing relationship with regional entities.
252
dimension to Fig. 3B is added by engaging some of the discourse of cooperative inquiry and action research. Such discourse
could be employed within the federated network to represent the desired philosophical approach and means of
communication between the parties. As illustrated in Fig. 3A, the traditional style of communication is represented by the
triangular structure and emphasises telling, controlling, requesting comment and consulting. As depicted by the
network model in Fig. 3B, the mode of interaction is now represented by terms such as collaboration, partnership,
participation, co-ownership, power-sharing and empowerment.
There is much in common with the tenets of collaborative inquiry and the type of model proposed to encapsulate the new
type of relationship for TNZ and its regional entities. As Heron (2001) noted, cooperative inquiry . . . empowers autonomy
and co-operation among people over and against any kind of controlling, authoritarian social process (p. 333). The following
observation by one of the tennis participants also captured this sentiment. You cant come in and dominate. We need to
have a collaborative approach to integrating the strategy into the programmes and to draw on the expertise within the
regions (3c, 8 November, 2006).
Working from a philosophy founded on co-operation and power-sharing, the network model could also help facilitate a
collaborative approach that could occur between the regional entities. As depicted in Fig. 3B, the lines of communication
appear between the regional centres as well as between the national body and regional entities. Additionally, the six
afliated associations are placed within the TNZ circle acknowledging the national role played by such associations (i.e.,
professional tennis coaches, Aotearoa Maori tennis, umpires, International Club, seniors and wheelchair associations).
Finally, to complete the model the tennis clubs are also represented as part of the network and are attached to each of the six
regional centres. This network model (B) contrasts sharply with the traditional hierarchical model (A) within which the clubs
form the base of the triangle and the national body, the apex.
There are also implications for the composition of the TNZ board in moving to a network model of governance, designed to
enhance board strategic capability. By moving away from a 100% independent board to a hybrid model comprised of a mix
of independent and elected positions from the regions, the composition was seen to be encouraging regional input. At the
same time, the constitutional rhetoric encouraged a skills-based board whose role is to consider the greater good of the sport.
A hybrid board with, an emphasis on skills such as strategic thinking, within the centre of a network model complements the
proposed relationship with the regional centres. Hoye and Cuskelly (2007) noted, The right to govern nonprot sport
organizations rests with those individual and member associations with a stake in the way the organization is governed (p.
87). As revealed in the evaluation interviews, participants conceded there was a need to have greater regional knowledge and
understanding on the national board by incorporating regionally elected positions.
In terms of the Pettigrew and McNulty (1995, 1998) model of power and inuence, a source of TNZ board power was
weakened by a perception that it was comprised of independently appointed members who carried no mandate from the
regional owners. With the inclusion of elected positions from the regions, the perception of such a mandate was reinstated.
In terms of the network model, the inclusion of regionally elected positions was a demonstration of the power-sharing ethos
illustrated in Fig. 3B. In many respects, the national board was powerless in terms of its ability to enact its strategic priorities
through the regional delivery mechanism. The change in governing structure and more signicantly the change in
relationship toward a more collaborative approach have created greater opportunity for agreement and alignment in the
development and implementation of strategy.
The three elements of the Pettigrew and McNulty (1995, 1998) model have provided a useful reference point to examine
the dynamics at play within the tennis example. The structure and context factors have helped illuminate how power and
inuence can be impacted by a structure and context that was not conducive to a power-sharing situation. The will and skill
element provided a useful reminder that board power and inuence is derived from people who not only have the skills to
effect such a change as experienced by tennis, but also the intent to see it through the challenging change process. Pettigrew
and McNulty (1998) argued that structural and relational treatments of power are interdependent. That is to say, the
interaction of all three elements (structure and context, will and skill, power sources) is what enables a board to convert its
potential power and inuence into actual power and inuence. The application of Pettigrew and McNultys (1995, 1998)
model to the tennis situation illustrates the appropriateness of such a model for the NSO context.
The connection made between IORs and board strategic capability is pertinent to the theoretical outcomes of this study.
Mitchell et al. (1999) and Dickson, Arnold, and Chalip (2005) number among the few studies that have considered IORs in the
context of federated networks in sport. There are also a limited number of studies in the wider non-prot sector that consider
the relationships between regional and national associations (refer Grossman & Rangan, 2001). These studies do not address,
however, the impact of the IOR on the national boards ability to execute its strategic function. The overall argument
presented as a result of the present study therefore promotes the signicance of the federated network on board strategic
capability, specically in relation to the boards ability to enact its strategy.
6. Conclusion
The researchers set out to investigate how boards of national sport organisations could develop their strategic capability.
A major nding of this study has been the notion that board strategic capability is signicantly impacted by the interorganisational relationships. More specically, this nding established the idea that a board of an NSO could improve its
strategic capability by creating a more collaborative partnership with its regional entities by engaging in a power-sharing
approach that seeks to develop regional capability.
253
Implications for governance practitioners include the notion that regional relationships are integral to the overall
governing performance. Sport organisations can consider the implications of this study in terms of the potential gains in
partnering with their regional entities to further develop capability. An instrument, derived from Fig. 3B could be designed as
a practical means to assess the quality of the regional relationship from both a national and regional perspective. Such an
instrument could target how collaborative the relationship is and to what extent the regional entities are involved in the
overall strategic governing role of the national body.
In terms of further research, a longitudinal study that tracks the outcomes of the newly established nationalregional
relationships over several years is needed. In particular, such a study could look for what is working and the ongoing
difculties experienced as a consequence of this approach in order to overcome such challenges. Overall, further work is
needed on how national boards can enact their strategic priorities through regional and local networks. The issue of interorganisational relationships and governing structures found to be pertinent in this study is an under-researched area in sport
and non-prot organisations alike. Researchers who, for example, seek out alternative models and work with organisations
to determine improved approaches could profoundly inuence the design of future sport systems. The ndings from the
present study also indicate that a multi-paradigm approach, in theoretical terms, is needed for a more robust understanding
of board strategic function.
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Developing Board Strategic Capability in Sport Organisation S: The National-Reg Ional Governing Relationship

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Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

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Sport Management Review

Developing board strategic capability in sport organisations:

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

Fig. 2. Action research model for developing strategic capability.

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254

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