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Analysis
August 27, 2013 | 1225 Print Text Size
The USS San Jacinto cruiser fires a Tomahawk cruise missile toward Iraq in 2003. (MARK
WILSON/Getty Images)
Summary
The United States and its allies have a few options if they proceed with an intervention in Syria, a
prospect that seems increasingly likely. A limited punitive strike on critical targets meant to
discourage future use of chemical weapons would be the simplest operation. Another option would
be to target the Syrian regime's chemical weapons delivery systems and storage facilities, but this
option would require significantly more resources than the limited strike, and the risk of mission
creep would be high.
Another problem with targeting the regime's chemical weapons is that such weapons are notoriously
difficult to destroy. Therefore, the West could elect to deploy ground forces to secure the chemical
weapons and ensure their destruction. Such a mission would be tantamount to a full-scale invasion,
and thus we believe it is very unlikely.
Analysis
In general, the larger and more complex the operation, the more time it will take, the more of a
leading role the United States will have to assume and the more obvious the force buildup will be.
would also be necessary. The Syrian air defense network has suffered several blows during the civil
war but remains dense and dangerous.
Many more Tomahawk-equipped vessels would be required for the initial campaign to take out air
defenses as well as the follow-on strikes, and U.S. Navy carriers with tactical aviation assets,
especially electronic warfare aircraft such as the EA-18G Growler, would need to be deployed.
Indeed, electronic warfare would figure prominently in such a campaign, from jamming to cyber
attacks. At least one super carrier would be needed, but more could be deployed depending on the
number of tactical aviation squadrons sent by the U.S. Air Force and allied countries.
Without short-range basing from countries such as Cyprus, Turkey, Jordan or Greece, operations by
tactical fixed-wing aircraft would be greatly complicated because of the limited combat radius of
those aircraft. The deployment of combat search and rescue elements would also necessitate
forward bases (or aircraft carriers) close to Syria. In total, at least 400 Tomahawk missiles would
likely be needed for the operation before a comprehensive fixed-wing campaign could commence -more than twice the number fired during the intervention in Libya. Such a campaign would require
a variety of munitions, including anti-radiation missiles, cruise missiles, penetrating bombs, air-toair missiles, gravity bombs and air-to-ground tactical missiles.
Notably, several variables can shape the nature of the conflict. There are hundreds if not thousands
of different orders of battle that can be deployed based on wide-ranging factors, such as the allies'
commitments, available basing, cost, commanders' preferences and enemy resilience. For example,
something as simple as whether Turkey joins the mission dramatically alters the scenario,
immediately bringing 200 or more tactical fighters to the operation (by the simple fact of their being
within range and Turkey being vulnerable to retaliation and operating accordingly).
weapons. The al Assad regime is suspected of having VX, sarin, tabun and mustard gas, and it
purportedly can produce a few hundred tons of chemical agents per year.
Several major storage and production sites are believed to be located near Homs, Hama, Eastern
Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia and Palmyra. An additional 45-50 smaller facilities are believed to be
spread across the country. While the United States and other Western allies have proved that they
have active intelligence and surveillance of numerous sites, it would be nearly impossible for the
entire stockpile to be accounted for at any one time, and it can assumed that all locations are not
known.
Chemical weapons are difficult to destroy completely. The most common method is incineration at
very high temperatures over a sustained period of time in a contained system. Munitions used by the
military almost never reproduce these effects, especially the ones designed to penetrate a hardened
structure. Another problem is the sheer volume of material. Estimates put Syrian stockpiles in the
hundreds of tons of various types.
The most likely result of strikes on hardened facilities holding chemical weapons is the destruction
of some of the material and the release of some into the atmosphere while the rest remains protect
by the collapsed structure in rubble. In other words, a strike would succeed in destroying the
material only partially while potentially causing collateral damage (many of the facilities are near
populated areas) and only temporarily denying the regime the use of any remaining stockpiles.
Assets Required
Securing all of Syria's chemical weapons would necessitate a comprehensive suppression of enemy
air defenses campaign. This first step would require strategic and tactical air assets combined with
naval platforms, similar to the steps taken to eliminate the chemical weapons delivery capability.
However, the difference is that securing the weapons would also require ground forces to be
deployed in the country.
Securing even a few chemical weapons manufacturing or storage facilities would require the
deployment of numerous detachments of special operations forces. Such a deployment would likely
be preceded by the seizure of a Syrian airfield, which would serve as a temporary base for the
operations. After the initial campaign to suppress the regime's air defenses, all threats within the
vicinity of the airfield would be targeted and special operations forces would be flown in for either
a combat drop or air landing. From there, the airfield would be used as a temporary bridgehead to
launch several smaller operations aimed at grabbing specific sites.
The benefit of such an operation is that it would quickly put highly trained assets on the ground in
moderate numbers with no buildup necessary in neighboring countries, meaning that tactical
surprise could be achieved. Once the bridgehead is established, it would then be used as an air
bridge to bring in reinforcements such as the 82nd Airborne Division. Absolute dominance of the
airspace would have to be maintained during such an operation.
Chemical weapons are difficult to comprehensively eradicate; in about four decades the United
States has destroyed only about half of its stockpiles. Units seizing chemical weapons sites could
not simply strap C4 explosive blocks to them for the same reason that cruise missile strikes would
not work: little is destroyed and much of it would just be flung around, risking unintended
contamination and only temporarily denying the material to the enemy.
A comprehensive scenario that entails the seizure of all known stockpiles and roots out any missed
supplies would essentially entail a full-scale invasion of Syria. The U.S. military reportedly
estimates that it would need 75,000 troops to secure the entire network of Syrian chemical weapons.
This is probably a low estimate. This option would be very complex and multifaceted. Again, a
requisite suppression of enemy air defenses campaign would have to take place so the United States
could dominate the airspace. Ground forces would have to be bought into theater in numbers,
primarily in Jordan or Turkey. An amphibious component involving U.S. Marines could be utilized
to establish beachheads on the Syrian coast. Special operations forces could also be tapped in
conjunction with the 82nd Airborne Division to seize critical airfields to open up further fronts or
capture time-sensitive targets deep in the Syrian core.
This would take a lot of time. Similar buildups for Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom took months.
There would be little to no strategic or tactical surprise, and the United States and its allies would
rely on raw firepower and rapid movement. This would be a full combined arms operation, where
air and naval assets would facilitate the movement of ground forces.
This is the option with the greatest potential for bogging down forces in an occupation. Chemical
weapons are hard to deal with and require time to destroy and longer still to move elsewhere and
destroy. Either way, a standing army will find itself in Syria for at least a few months. Any form of
mission creep into nation re-stabilization or building extends the timeline indefinitely. Even if the
invasion went well, as it did in Iraq, the occupation period creates an opening for guerrilla or
insurgent warfare waged by the fallen regime, Islamist extremists, disenfranchised rebels or all of
the above.
Read more: Syria: A Comprehensive Look at the Options for Intervention | Stratfor