THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON
G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002
FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). The antecedent facts of his conviction are as follows:
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship,
M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999,
the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Diesmo,
received a complaint from passenger Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one
of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of
the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later
found at the economy section. The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher
Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to
cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was
then escorted by 2 security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The
accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by
the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs
containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be shabu, the security
personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the
accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for
assistance.
But the accused countered this by saying that the Samsonite suitcase containing the
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu was forcibly opened and searched without his
consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is
inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE: WON the conviction was valid

HELD: YES
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution. Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose
between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the
search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against transgression
committed by the government or its agent. The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the
State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel
security personnel. It was only after they found shabu inside the suitcase that they called
the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the
contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence,
the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure
performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the
police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and
order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not
discharge any governmental function.
NOTE: In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated
drug;
(2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. To overcome
this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In

this case, the accused points to a certain Alican Alex Macapudi as the owner of the
contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim. No witnesses were presented to
prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person named Alex Macap[u]di
who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he does exist, he has friends, fellow
businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and support the claim of the accused.
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the keystone
of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will take more
than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its
owner and has no knowledge or intent to possess the same.

http://www.academia.edu/8780675/CASE_DIGEST_Drug_Residue

G.R. Nos. 144506-07. April 11, 2002

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERRY TING UY
FACTS:
Appellant Jerry Ting Uy, a Taiwanese national, was arrested in a buy-bust operation. Marked
money bills were retrieved from him, and three plastic bags of shabu were confiscated found
underneath the drivers seat. He was charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. However, he
contended that he was a victim of frame-up and that the evidence seized in the warrantless arrest
is inadmissible.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence seized in the warrantless arrest is inadmissible.
HELD:
No. Clearly, the search made by the police officers in the instant case was incidental to a lawful
arrest. Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
Undoubtedly, appellant was lawfully arrested, caught as he was in flagrante delicto as a result of
a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers.
The Constitution generally proscribes searches and seizures without judicial warrant. Any
evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding
(Sections 2 and 3(2), Article III). The rule is not absolute, however. Searches and seizures may be
made without warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) the search was incident to a lawful arrest; (2) the search is of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) the search concerns violation of customs laws; (4) the seizure of evidence in plain
view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures (People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 [1999]).
A buy-bust operation is vastly different from an ordinary arrest. In lawful arrests in the course of
a buy-bust operation, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to
conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the accused but also in the permissible
area within his reach, i.e., that point which is within the effective control of the person arrested,
or that which may furnish him the means of committing violence or of escaping (People vs.
Cueno, 298 SCRA 621 [1998]). In other words, a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest

may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under
his immediate control.
Sharica filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against her
husband Steven and her parents-in-law, spouses Pecto Yan and Ramona Yan before the RTC. She alleged
that Steven, in conspiracy with her parents-in-law, were causing verbal, psychological and economic
abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
However, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner,
they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Are parents-in-law covered by R.A. No. 9262?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The SC ruled that while RA 9262 provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to
crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular
matter.
The principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because
of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general
provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
"Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert
to achieve a criminal design is shown, fellester.blogspot.com the act of one is the act of all the conspirators,
and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals."
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law and that this intent must be effectuated by the
courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for
liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent,
meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius finds no
application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an ancillary rule of statutory
construction. It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means
of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the
plainly indicated purpose of the legislature. (Tan vs. Tan, G.R. No. 168852, September 30, 2008)

People vs. Cabalquinto

G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006
(Criminal Law, Republic Act 7610, Republic Act 9262)

FACTS
Cabalquinto was accused of raping his eight-year old daughter seven times. He was found guilty of by the
Regional Trial Court for rape on two counts and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. The victim
testified that her father had raped her seven times since her mother left for abroad. A medical certificate
and the testimony of the mother further supported the charge. But the defense pointed out some
inconsistencies between the testimony of the victim and her mother on certain circumstances of the
alleged rape events. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and also ordered payment
of damages.
ISSUE
Is Cabalquinto guilty of rape?
RULING
Affirmed.
Supreme Court meticulously and painstakingly examined the records as well as the transcripts of
stenographic notes and found no cause to overturn the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals.
The mothers testimony that she witnessed the act of rape corroborates the victim-daughters account.
The inconsistency between the testimony of AAA and her mother pertains merely to a circumstance that is
of little consequence to the question of whether rape was actually committed. Whether the victim cried out
or not does not discount rape. It should be emphasized that the victim was only eight years old when she
was raped. A child of her tender years cannot be expected to be able to recount the details of her torment
with exactitude.
Carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is rape as defined under Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, and is qualified when the offender is a parent of the victim, in which case, the death penalty
shall be imposed as provided under the Death Penalty Law. In this case, the qualifying circumstances of
the victims minority and her relationship with the accused as the latters daughter were properly alleged
in the Informations, proven during trial and not refuted by Cabalquinto. However, in view of Republic Act
No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole should instead be imposed.
The accused is sentenced, in each of the criminal cases reviewed, to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count,
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count.
Moral damages, separate and distinct from the civil indemnity, are automatically granted in rape cases.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed to deter fathers with aberrant sexual behaviors from
sexually abusing their daughters.
NOTA BENE
What was notable in this case was the Supreme Courts pronouncement, in relation to Republic Act 7610
(Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act) and Republic Act
9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004), on the confidential nature a rape
trial. According to the Court, these laws uniformly seek to respect the dignity and protect the privacy of
women and their children. The Court thus withheld the real name of the victim, and used fictitious initials
instead to represent her.

PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No. 135981, January 15

2004.
People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein.
During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed
and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that
every time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever
beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the
killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was
able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The
information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by
beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying
that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of
his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine
her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts
reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme
Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial
court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome
plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the battered woman syndrome, Dra. Dayan and Dr.
Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme
Court as part of the records.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the battered woman syndrome as constituting self
defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the
battered woman syndrome.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without
concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with
men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it
occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence,
which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the
tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman
syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least
two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering
episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual
fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to
save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily
immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the

former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of selfdefense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly
established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant
failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar
pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of
the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.
Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on
ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus,
the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful
aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present
case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between
the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw
from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased
his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in
favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as
passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the
batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her
psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power
without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally
produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is
committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by
a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following
requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of
mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of
time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the
killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a
quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be
said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order
to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and
deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any
defense that might be put up by the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation.
The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact
that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid
emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of
her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence
of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty
hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from
custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other
lawful cause.
NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx.
Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur
any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"

Criminal Law- People vs. Genosa

THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ART. 11 (1), AND ART 14 (16) OF THE R.P.C

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Genosa

G.R.No. 135981 15January2004

FACTS OF THE CASE:

That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15November1995, attacked and wounded his husband, which
ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant she did not provoke her husband when she got
home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened
that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In
fact, The Appelant had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from
eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.

The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5)
times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The Apellant said that the
reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his
recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.

The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from Battered
Woman Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then found

guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while
asleep.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense, and can she be held
liable for the aggravating circumstance of treachery?

No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant has been
shown to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to
kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She had
already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During
that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the
danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat
on her life or safety.

Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression does not
warrant complete or incomplete self-defense.

No, There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make.

The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from
mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Besides, equally
axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned
and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.

In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the appellant intentionally chose a
specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory

act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her
only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the absence of any convincing
proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in
order to ensure its execution, the doubt should be resolved in her favor.

HELD:

The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two
(2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense,
her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

ADDENDUM:

When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self defense be appreciated?

Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical
assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a
predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can
defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.' Still, impending danger
(based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of
deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required
imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be
appreciated.

People v. Genosa
G.R. No. 135981, 29 September 2000

FACTS:
Marivic Genosa was convicted of Parricide for killing his legitimate husband Ben
Genosa and with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, she was meted the penalty of
death. The case was elevated to the SC for automatic review.

Appellant subsequently filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for her examination
by expert psychologists and psychiatrist and the reception of latter's reports to prove her
claim of self-defense on the theory of battered woman syndrome.
The SC remanded the case to the trial court for the reception of expert
psychological/psychiatric opinion on the plea of battered woman syndrome.
Marivic Genosa was examined by Dra. Natividad A. Dayan, a clinical psychologist,
who testified that Marivic "fits the profile of a battered woman" and by Dr. Alfredo Parajillo, a
psychiatrist, who "explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relieves the beating or
trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually beaten at that time" and that at the
time Marivic killed her husband, her "mental condition was that she was "re-experiencing
the trauma.' That the "re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just
come in flashes x x x."
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not appelant acted in self-defense.
2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.
HELD:
1) The SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense
arising from battered woman syndrome, to wit:
a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least
two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.
b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life.
c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable--not necessarily
immediate and actual--grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence
perpetrated by the former against the latter.
2) The SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel or
argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant's
aggression.

Olivares VS. CA

GR 163866

FACTS:
Isidro Olivares was charged with violation of RA 7610 for touching the breast and kissing the lips of
Cristina Elitiong, a 16-year old high school student employed by the former in making sampaguita

garlands during weekends. The trial court found him guilty; affirmed by the CA. Petitioner now
alleges that his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was
violated for failure to allege in the information the essential elements of the offense for which he is
being charged.
Issue: WON Olivares can be charged with violation of RA 7610.
Held:
Yes.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 are as follows:

1.

The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2.
The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
3.

The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

The first element obtains in this case. It was established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner
kissed Cristina and touched her breasts with lewd designs as inferred from the nature of the acts
themselves and the environmental circumstances. The second element, i.e., that the act is performed
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, is likewise present.
Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct
under the coercion or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused because she
was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct. Furthermore, it is
inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred only once. As expressly provided in Section 3 (b) of
R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is
captioned as Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse because Congress really intended to cover
a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not
necessarily for money or profit. The law covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of
sexual abuse.
As to the contention that the minority of Cristina was not properly alleged in the information, the SC
ruled that: Petitioner was furnished a copy of the Complaint which was mentioned in the information,
hence he was adequately informed of the age of the complainant.

Amployo vs. People

GR 157718

Facts:
Alvin Amployo was charged with violation of RA 7610 for touching, mashing and playing the
breasts of Kristine Joy Mosguera, an 8 year old Grade 3 pupil without her consent. Amployo
contends that the element of lewd design was not established since: (1) the incident happened at 7am,
in a street near the school with people around; (2) the breast of an 8 year old is still very much
underdeveloped; and (3) suppose h intentionally touched her breast, it was merely to satisfy a silly
whim. He also argues that the resultant crime is only acts of lasciviousness under Art 336 RPC and
not child abuse under RA 7610 as the elements thereof had not been proved.
Issues:
WON lewd design was established; WON Amployo violated RA 7610.
Held:
*Before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor below 12
years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in
addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610.The first element
is lewd design.
The term lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene;[12] it is characterized by or
intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is
necessarily a mental process the existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such
intention,i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence
of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental
circumstances. What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a
precise definition.
Lewd design was established. Amployo cannot take refuge in his version of the story as he has
conveniently left out details which indubitably prove the presence of lewd design. It would have
been easy to entertain the possibility that what happened was merely an accident if it only happened
once. Such is not the case, however, as the very same petitioner did the very same act to the very
same victim in the past.
*The first element of RA 7610 obtains. petitioners act of purposely touching Kristine Joys breasts
(sometimes under her shirt) amounts to lascivious conduct.
The second element is likewise present. As we observed in People v. Larin,[24] Section 5 of Rep.
Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in
which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation. As case law has
it, intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. As to the third element, there is no dispute that
Kristine Joy is a minor, as she was only eight years old at the time of the incident in question.

People vs. Abadies

July 11, 2002

Facts:
Jose Abadies was charged with four counts of violation of RA 7610 for committing acts of
lasciviousness upon her 17 year old daughter, Rosalie, by kissing, mashing her breasts and touching
her private parts. Trial Court found him guilty. Abadies asserts that he was impliedly pardoned by
Rosalie in not immediately telling her mother about the incidents.
Issue: WON ABadies is guilty of violating RA 7610.
Held:
Yes.
Complainants failure to disclose about her misfortune to her mother does not destroy her
credibility. Complainant explained that she did not tell her mother about her ordeal because she was
afraid of the accused. Thus, although accusedwas not armed nor did he threaten complainant, his
moral ascendancy over her is a sufficient substitute for the use of force or intimidation as required by
Art336 RPC (elements of acts of lasciviousness).
As to the implied pardon, such will not hold. The supposed pardon cannot be implied from the fact
that the complainant did not immediately reveal to her mother her defloration. It was her fear of
accused which restrained complainant from reporting the incidents to her mother. Moreover, Article
344 of the RPC and Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that the
pardon must be express and cannot be based on hazy deduction.

People vs. Jimenez

GR 137790-91

Facts:
Jaime Jimenez was charged with two counts of lascivious acts against his 12 year old daughter Joana
by inserting his finger to her private part, thereby violating RA 7610. The RTC found Jimenez guilty
and sentenced him on each count to reclusion perpetua, among others. Jimenez now argues that the
penalty should not have been increasd from reclusion temporal (medium) to reclusion perpetua
(maximum) considering that both criminal prosecutions failed to allege the special circumstance of
relationship of the victim and the accused.
Issue:
WON the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of reclusion temporal is proper.
Held:
Yes.
Under R.A. No. 7610, 31, however, relationship is not a qualifying but only an ordinary generic
aggravating circumstances and, therefore, although it was not alleged in the information can
nevertheless be taken into account in fixing the penalty for the crime because it was
proven. Accused-appellant fails to distinguish a generic aggravating circumstance from a qualifying
circumstance. A generic aggravating circumstance provides for the imposition of the prescribed
penalty in its maximum period, while a qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the crime.
It is clear from the provisions of RA 7610 Sec. 31 that the nature of the crime does not change
when the circumstance of relationship is present. The law simply provides that the penalty
prescribed should be imposed in its maximum period when such circumstance is present, thus
making the circumstance of relationship merely a generic aggravating circumstance. The trial court,
therefore, correctly sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count of lascivious conduct committed against his daughter.