Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FELICIANO, J.:
On 7 July 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City
Court of Roxas City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 7362,
charging private respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of
estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code. The information charged that the accused had allegedly
issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods
or merchandise purchased, knowing that she did not have
sufficient funds to cover the check, which check therefore
subsequently bounced.
The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the
presentation of its evidence. However, in an Order dated 2
December 1976, the City Court dismissed the information upon
the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged was beyond the court's authority to impose. The judge
held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of
the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime. At the time of the alleged commission
NARVASA, J.:
Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, effective August 14,
1981, grants to Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts 1 "(e)xclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of
not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more
than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses
or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or
amount thereof. 2
The proviso altered and superseded the long standing doctrine
first laid down in a 1911 case 3 that an inferior court had no
NARVASA, C.J.:p
Whether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the Metropolitan Trial
Court or other first level court which has exclusive original
jurisdiction over criminal actions of libel, is the issue raised by
the People of the Philippines, as petitioner in the special civil
action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus at bar. The fairly
simple facts from which the issue has arisen are hereunder
briefly narrated.
On January 30, 1995 an information for libel was filed against
Isah V. Red in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case
thereby initiated was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-60134
and raffled to Branch 82.
Red filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that
the RTC had no jurisdiction of the offense. The Judge found
merit in the motion and by an Order dated March 29, 1995,
remanded the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City "for proper action/disposition in the premises." His Honor
declared that "(u)nder Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, which took
taking cognizance of and proceeding with Criminal Case No. 4300548, which it is commanded to remand to the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper
disposition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
under Check No. 497664; and Allotment Advice No. F2-778494-415 in the amount ofP110,000.00 under Check No. 497679.
Forthwith, petitioner Mayor Felix Sarigumba secured a cash
advance chargeable against the CDF of Congressman Ramiro
and submitted to the Municipal Treasurer Voucher Nos. 9411422 and 9412-445 in the total amount of P330,000.00. The
particulars contained in the said vouchers read: "to cash advance
the CDF for payment of snacks during assembly meeting for
peace and order meeting of 33 barangays of Tudela, Misamis
Occidental."
Petitioner Sarigumba, thereafter, gave P9,500.00 to each of the
barangay captains through two members of his staff, Loreta
Salinasal and Crosita Singidas. As per his agreement with the
barangay captains, each of the latter was to give P500.00 to the
Association of Barangay Captains (ABC) which would serve as
contributions for projects. The barangay captains thought that
the amount given to each of them was a "cash gift" or
"pahalipay" from Congressman Ramiro.2
Petitioner Sarigumba later liquidated his cash advance
of P220,000.00 via Liquidation Voucher No. 9412-478, stating
therein that the said amount was used as follows:
(1) "For the liquidation of cash advance amounting TWO
HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS, to furnish to
various barangays of Tudela under check #497664 for meals
and snacks during peace and order meeting as per supporting
papers hereto attached in the total amount of P220,000."3
order assembly was held, during which the attendees signed their
attendance in the record book. He also admitted that he received
the P10,000.00 from the petitioner-mayor through Mrs.
Salinasal, and it was up for him to spend it.1awphi1.nt
Equally damaging to the petitioners is the admission of Juan
Gumilos of Barangay Gala that he received theP10,000.00 from
Mrs. Salinasal with no mention as to its purpose. Eduardo Rara
of Barangay Gumbil was as candid when he stated that he
received the P10,000.00 from Mrs. Salinasal and learned that it
was a "cash gift" coming from Congressman Ramiro. Nido
Madrazo of Barangay Maikay likewise stated that he received
theP10,000.00 from Mrs. Salinasal with no mention as to its
purpose. It was somehow conveyed to him that the money was
for his own use, and that it was up to him how to spend it.
Feliciano Sumader of Barangay Mitugas also admitted that he
received P10,000.00 which he shared with his councilmen. He
also bought a battery charger for a hand-held radio, aerial
antennae, battery pack, and also spent some for the Lupong
Tagapayapa. He had no receipts to prove his claim.
Cosme Sarabia of Barangay Nailon alleged that he received
the P10,000.00 from Mrs. Salinasal which he believed was a
"cash gift" promised to him by Congressman Ramiro. Luther
Limbaga of Barangay Silongon declared that he received
the P10,000.00 from the petitioner-mayors secretary, and that he
believed it was a "cash gift" to encourage him to vote for
Emeterio Valmoria who was then running as ABC president. He
added that he gave P150.00 each to seven (7) CVOs from
December 1994 to July 1995, meals and snacks for the assembly
and the SOT. Sabino Dagondon of Barangay Taguima averred
February 5, 2004
Conformably with R.A. No. 7975 and the ruling of the Supreme
Court in Republic v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. No. 180208, March
11, 1994:
(1) The City Prosecutor is hereby ordered to file a Re-Amended
Information alleging that the offense charged was committed by
the Accused in the performance of his duties/functions or in
relation to his office, within fifteen (15) days from receipt
hereof;
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On August 9, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
received the Letter-Complaint1 dated August 1, 2002 filed by
complainant Dante M. Quindoza against Judge Emmanuel G.
Banzon, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Mariveles, Bataan. Complainant charges respondent with gross
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion in connection
with respondents disposition of Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325,
02-7326, and 02-7332, all entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Dante Quindoza, et al." for Qualified Trespass to Dwelling and
Light Coercion.
The antecedents follow.
On May 8 and 22, 2002 respectively, complainant ordered the
disconnection of the water and electrical service of the housing
unit illegally occupied by Renato Caralipio (Caralipio), 2 and the
the BEZ or any of its employees and officers. The Court grants
the inhibition sought with respect to the pending cases, including
the cases mentioned by respondent in his Manifestation dated
September 24, 2004.
Considering the animosity generated by this administrative
complaint between complainant and respondent judge, it would
be in the best interest of justice to remove any doubt that may be
cast upon respondent judges ability to resolve said cases with
impartiality. However, there is no basis for respondents
inhibition from hearing any other case involving the BEZ or any
of its officers and employees.
However, with regard to cases still to be filed the recusal sought
is premature and therefore should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Court orders respondent Judge Emmanuel
G. Banzon, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court,
Mariveles, Bataan, to pay a FINE in the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. He is also ordered to inhibit himself from hearing
Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325, 02-7326, 02-7332, and 03-7760,
03-7761, 03-7762, 03-7763, 03-7764, 03-7765, 03-7766 and 037781 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mariveles, Bataan
involving complainant Dante M. Quindoza.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
is over public officials and employees with rank and salary grade
27 and above.
The petitioner contends that, at the time the offense charged was
allegedly committed, he was already occupying the position
of Sangguniang Panlungsod Member I with SG 25. Hence,
under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, amending Rep. Act No.
7975, it is the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan that has
jurisdiction over the offense lodged against him. He asserts that
under Adm. Order No. 270,12 Dapitan City is only a component
city, and the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod are
classified as Sangguniang Panlungsod Members I with SG 25.
Thus, Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, and retained by Section 4 of
Rep. Act No. 8249, does not apply to him.
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27"
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.
With respect to the first category, i.e., officials of the executive
branch with SG 27 or higher, Rep. Act No. 7975
further specifically included the following officials as falling
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and
all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;
The specific inclusion of the foregoing officials constitutes an
exception to the general qualification relating to officials of the
executive branch as "occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." In other
words, violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 committed by officials in
the executive branch with SG 27 or higher, and the officials
specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No.
7975,regardless of their salary grades, likewise fall within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Had it been the intention of Congress to confine the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to violations of Rep. Act No.
3019 only to officials in the executive branch with SG 27 or
higher, then it could just have ended paragraph (1) of Section 4
a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No.
7975, with the phrase "officials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989." Or the category in
paragraph (5) of the same provision relating to "[a]ll other
national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and up under
the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989" would have
sufficed. Instead, under paragraph (1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, Congress
included specific officials, without any reference as to their
which
shall
remain
with
the
Category
New
Title
Position Grade
16.
FOREIGN
SERVICE
RELATIONS
Foreign Service
2533
Class II27
2328
26
Class I29
2430
II
28
City Mayor
2834
City Mayor
II
30
Local Executives
2431
Sangguniang Members
II
2632
25
II
27
35
26
IV
29
Prosecutor
III
28
Prosecutor
II
27
Prosecutor
26
motion
to
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion
to quash based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and
the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.24
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave
abuse of discretion.
The
jurisdiction
of
the
set by P.D. No. 1606, as
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
Sandiganbayan
amended, not
is
by
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved
on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or
corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. 31 Pursuant to
Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the
said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.32
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over
which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of
R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the
has
jurisdiction
over
This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called
upon to define a public officer. InKhan, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the
definition of a public officer.39The 1987 Constitution does not
define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and
concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the
benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and
Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our
political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it
exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or
impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64).
There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an
office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
regent
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does
not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student regent.
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
Petitioner
is a public officer.
UP
student
charged
public
was
office,
committed
according
that
should
candor,
fairness
Austria-Martinez,
Corona*,
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an
element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality
arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the
fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of
the commission of the crime.
Incidentally, this might serve as a warning against disqualifying
a lawyer legislator on the basis of what is alleged and not on the
nature of the offense itself. Were the petitioners' proposition
sustained, the result would be that in every case in which the
accused is a public officer or employee, the prosecution could at
will keep a member of Congress from entering an appearance as
attorney for the defense. The prosecutor could do this by the
simple expedient of making the necessary averments, even
though, as a matter of fact, there was no evidence that the office
held by the defendant had anything to do with the offense.
By the same token, the fact that, as alleged, the defendants made
use of firearms which they were authorized to carry or possess
by reason of their positions, could not supply the required
connection between the office and the crime. Firearms however
and wherever obtained are not an ingredient of murder or
homicide. The crime in question, for example, could have been
committed by the defendants in the same or like manner and
with the same case if they had been private individuals and fired
with unlicensed weapons. Murders or homicides by private
persons with guns, licensed or unlicensed are the general rule
and by public officers the exception.
Tested by its consequence, the petitioners contention on this
point is, like the contention discussed in the preceding
some evidence for the prosecution therein and not permitting the
same to propound certain questions, be set aside; that said
respondent Judge be ordered to admit the aforementioned
evidence and permit said questions; and that Senator Roseller
Lim be declared, contrary to another ruling made by respondent
Judge, disqualified by the Constitution from appearing as
counsel for the accused in said criminal case. Soon, after the
filing of the petition, we issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for, without bond.
In their respective answers, respondents alleged, in substance,
that the ruling complained of are in conformity with law.
Respondents Leroy S. Brown, Mayor of Basilan City, Detective
Joaquin
R.
Pollisco,
Patrolman
Graciano
Lacerna
(alias Dodong) and Mohamad Hasbi, Special Policemen
Dionisio Dinglasa, Moro Yakan, Hadjaratil, Moro Alo and
several John Does, are charged, in said Criminal Case No. 672,
with murder. It is alleged in the information therein that, during
May and June, 1958, in the sitio of Tipo-Tipo, district of
Lamitan, City of Basilan, Mayor Brown "organized groups of
police patrol and civilian commandoes", consisting of regular
and special policemen, whom he "armed with pistols and high
power guns", and then "established a camp", called sub-police
headquarters hereinafter referred to as sub-station at TipoTipo, Lamitan, which was placed under his command, orders,
direct supervision and control, and in which his codefendants
were stationed; that the criminal complaints were entertained in
said sub-station, in which defendant Pollisco acted as
investigating officer and exercised authority to order the
apprehension of persons and their detention in the camp, for
Antonio, PAF, found nine (9) detainees in the Tipo-Tipo substation. This was part of the chain of evidence of the prosecution
to prove that persons used to be detained in the aforementioned
sub-station by the main respondents herein, without either a
warrant of arrest or a complaint filed in court.
2. Exhibit C Letter of Atty. Doroteo de Guzman to the officer
in charge of the sub-station, dated June 4, 1958, inquiring as to
the whereabouts of Awalin Tebag, who, according to the letter,
was arrested in his house, by policemen, on June 4, 1958. Capt.
Sarrosa took possession of this letter in the course of his
aforementioned investigation.
3. Exhibits G, G-1, G-2 and G-3 These are the transcript of
the testimony of Tebag's mother, before the City Fiscal of
Basilan City, when she asked an autopsy of the body of her son.
4. Exhibits J to V Consisting of the following, namely: a
sketch of the sub-station; pictures of several huts therein,
indicating their relative positions and distances; a picture
depicting how the body of Tebag was taken from a camarin in
the sub-station; a picture showing how Patrolman Hasbiwas shot
by a companion, at this request; and a picture, Exhibit T,
demonstrating how Mayor Brown allegedly gave the Japanese
rifle, Exhibit Y, to Hasbi, to be planted beside Tebag's body.
Although referred to by Yakan Carnain, Arit, Lianson, Kona
Amenola, and Asidin, in the course of their testimony as
witnesses for the prosecution, these exhibits were not admitted
in evidence, which were presented to show how they were able
Acting upon the inducement of spouses Jeanette YansonDumancas and Charles Dumancas, under the direction
cooperation and undue influence, exerted by P/Col. Nicolas M.
Torres, taking advantage of his position as Station Commander
of the Philippine National Police, Bacolod City Station, with the
direct participation and cooperation of Police Inspector Adonis
C. Abeto, other police officers Vicente Canuday, Jr., Jose
Pahayupan, Mario Lamis, civilian (police) agents Rolando R.
Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, Jaime
Gargallano, also taking advantage of their respective positions,
and Dominador Geroche, concurring and affirming in the said
criminal design, with the use of motor vehicle abduct, kidnap
and detain one RUFINO GARGAR, JR. (Criminal Case No. 9415562 and DANILO LUMANGYAO (Criminal Case No. 9415563), shortly thereafter at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening
of August 7, 1992, failing in their aforesaid common purpose to
extort money and in furtherance of said conspiracy, with evident
premeditation and treachery nocturnity and the use of motor
vehicle, did then and there shot and kill the said victims, while
being handcuffed and blindfolded; that accused Cesar Pecha and
Edgar Hilado, with knowledge that the said Gargar [and
Lumangyao, in Crim. Case No. 94-15563 were victims] of
violence, did then and there secretly bury the corpses in a
makeshift shallow grave for the purpose of concealing the crime
of murder in order to prevent its discovery for a fee of P500.00
each; aforesaid act or acts has caused damage and prejudice to
the heirs of said victims, to wit:
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and
all officers of higher rank;
Sec. 17 Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be
filed with the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence
or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the
same court within the province or city. If the accused is arrested
in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is
pending, bail may be filed also with any regional trial court of
said place, or, if no judge thereof is available, with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal
circuit trial judge therein.
(b) Whenever the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the
accused seeks to be released on recognizance, the application
therefor may be filed only in the particular court where the case
is pending, whether for preliminary investigation, trial, on
appeal.
(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may
apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality
where he is held.
In the instant case, the motions for bail filed by the said accusedrespondents with the Regional Trial Court where the cases
against them are pending were denied sometime in February,
1994
In Enrile vs. Salazar, 38 as reiterated in Galvez vs. Court of
Appeals, 39 this Court said: "Only after that remedy [petition to
be admitted to bail] was denied by the trial court should the
review jurisdiction of this Court [be] invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate
relief was also available there."
Separate Opinions
In the present case, even if the criminal cases were then within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offenses having been
committed in relation to the accuseds' office, as earlier
discussed, yet, the cases were not filed in said court. Since the
cases now fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
under the express provisions of Rep. Act No. 7975, they can
remain in said regional trial court.
On the issue of whether accused Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas
should be granted bail, I agree with Mr. Justice Santiago M.
Kapunan that the Court should exercise its discretion, disregard
technicalities and rule on the motion for bail filed with this
Court.
Accused Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas should, in my view, be
released on bail for the following reasons:
1. The spouses Dumancas were included in the informations as
accused merely because they were the ones who complained to
the police that the two (2) victims had swindled them. There is
no showing that the spouses knew, much less instigated, the
kidnapping and murder of the victims. Of note is a portion of the
testimony of the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator
turned state witness, Moises Grandeza, where he declared that
Jeanette Dumancas told accused Dominador Geroche to bring
the two (2) swindling suspects to the police station and that she
would call a certain Atty. Geocadin so the proper cases could be
filed against them. Such statements of Dumancas indicate lack
of any criminal intent unless the contrary is later proven during
the trial.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
While I agree with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. that the two (2) informations subject of the present
petition should remain in the Regional Trial Court, I arrive at
this conclusion based solely on the provisions of Rep. Act No.
7975.
It is my considered opinion, unlike the majority, that the accused
PNP personnel committed the crime alleged in the two (2)
informations in relation to their office. The wording of the two
(2) informations clearly shows that P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres
used his authority over his subordinate officers when he ordered
them to arrest the two (2) swindling suspects/victims in
connection with the complaint of the Dumancas spouses. This
act of Torres is undoubtedly "intimately connected" with his
position as Station Commander of the PNP, Bacolod Station. In
turn, the other accused PNP personnel who detained the two (2)
victims were performing their functions as law enforcers under
orders from their direct superior. Under such circumstances, the
two (2) informations would have been properly filed with the
Sandiganbayan since the law in force at the time was P.D. No.
1606 which gave the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over offenses
I N F O R M AT I O N
G.R. No. L-64548 July 7, 1986
ROLANDO P. BARTOLOME, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-64559 July 7, 1986
ELINO CORONEL Y SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
Jesus L. Santos Law Office for petitioner in L-64548.
Prudencio Cruz for petitioner in L-64559.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Before us is a decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting the
4548 and G.R. No. 64559 of the crime petitioners in G. R. No. 6
of Falsification of a Public Document, as defined and penalized
under Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code.
The charge in this case reads in full as follows:
CONTRARY TO LAW.
A.
BUENVIAJE
We hold that the proceedings in the court a quo are nun and
void ab initio. The Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the
case.
Title VII, Book Two, of the Revised Penal Code defines and
penalizes a wide range of offenses committed by public officers,
from knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204
to abuses against chastity in Article 245, but falsification of an
official document is not included. This is punished in Article 171
under Title IV, Book Two, on Crimes against Public Interest.
several persons 'with the intent to kill and did kill one Claudio
Ragasa and inflict physical injuries on three others.
From the allegations of the information it does not appear that
the official positions of the accused were connected with the
offenses charged. In fact, the attorneys for the prosecution stated
that the motives for the cranes were 'personal with political
character.' It does not even appear, nor is there assertion, that the
crimes were committed by the defendants in fine of duty or in
the performance of their official functions.
Judged by the context of section 17 of Article VI, supra, and the
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, the relation
between the crime and the office contemplated by the
Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fan
into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such
that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the
office. In other words, the office must be a constituent element
of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the
crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven,
of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of
human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a
private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same
except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took
advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event
the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an
element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality
arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the
fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of
the commission of the crime.
Montilla must be read with People v. Montejo 3 which laid down
the exception to the basic rule. In this case, a city mayor and
several members of the police were also accused of murder They
retained as their counsel Sen. Roseller Lim who was also
challenged on the basis of the same Article VI, Section 17, of the
1935 Constitution. The legislator was disqualified because, as
the Court put it, there was on the face of the information an
intimate connection between the commission of the offense and
the discharge of public office that made the crime an offense
committed in relation to the office of the accused.
With respect to the question whether or not Senator Roseller Lim
may appear as counsel for the main respondents herein, as
defendants in said criminal case, the Constitution provides that
no Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall
'appear as counsel ... in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed
in relation of his office ... (Art. VI Sec. 17, Const. of the Phil.).
The issue, therefore, is whether the defendants in Criminal case
No. 672 are accused of an offense committed in relation' to their
office.
A mere perusal of the amended information therein readily
elicits an affirmative answer. It is alleged in said amended
information that 'Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as
such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian
commandoes consisting of regular policemen and ... special