1.

ISIDRA VDA. DE VICTORIA v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

467 SCRA 78 (2005)
Every lawyer pledges to act with candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
The Supreme Court granted petitioner Mario Victoria (Victoria) an extended period to file
the petition, conditioned, however, on the timeliness of the filing of the Motion for Extension of
Time to FilePetition for Review on Certiorari. It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for
extension of time must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended. Where
a motion for extension of time is filed beyond the period of appeal, the same is of no effect since
there would no longer be any period to extend, and the judgment or order to be appealed from
the will have become final and executory.
In the case at bar, an examination of the records reveals that the reglementary period to appeal
had in fact expired almost 10 months prior to the filing of Victorias motion for extension of time
on April 10, 2001. The Registry Return Receipt of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dismissing the CA Certiorari Petition shows that the same was received by counsel for Victorias
agent on June 5, 2000. Hence, Victoria had only until June 20, 2000 within which to file an
appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration.
In the same Decision, the Court noted that Victoria, with the aid of his counsel, Atty. Abdul Basar
(Atty. Basar), made misleading statements in his Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review on Certiorari and in his subsequent Petition respecting the timeliness of
his appeal and the status of the Resolutions of the CA.
Consequently, the SC ordered Victoria and Atty. Basar, to show cause, within 10 days from
receipt of the Decision, why they should not be held in contempt of court and disciplinarily dealt
with for violation of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Atty. Basar can be held liable in contempt of court and for misconduct
HELD:
As part of his or her oath, every lawyer pledges to act with candor, fairness and good faith to
the court. Thus, a lawyer is honor bound to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair
play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in his relations with his client, the opposing part
and his counsel, and the court before which he pleads his clients cause.
Moreover, the Code of Professional Responsibility obligates lawyers to observe the rules of
procedure and not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
It is, therefore, lamentable that Atty. Basar, by misrepresenting the timeliness of an appeal from
a final and executor Resolution of the Court of Appeals, chose to disregard the fundamental
tenets of the legal profession. In fact, from his explanation, he was well aware that the
reglementary period for appeal from the Decision of the RTC had already lapsed, but he
nevertheless persisted in filing a petition for review on certiorari.
2. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs. CA and POTENCIANO L.GALANIDA
G.R. No. 144412 (2003)
A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.
Private respondent is an employee of petitioner, hired as an accountant-bookkeeper and
eventually promoted as an assistant manager which included his transfer to several branches
nine times. His appointment was covered by a Notice of Personnel Action which provides as
one of the conditions of employment the provision on petitioners right to transfer employees on
as a regular appointment as the need arises in the interest of maintaining smoothand
uninterrupted service to the public.
Effecting a rotation/movement of officers assigned in the Cebu home base, petitioner listed
respondent as second in the order of priority of assistant managers to be assigned outside of
Cebu City. However, private respondent refused to be transferred to Bacolod City in a letter by
reason of parental obligations, expenses, and the anguish that would result if he is away from his

family. He thereafter filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for constructive dismissal.
Subsequently, petitioner informed private respondent that he was to report to the Tagbilaran
City Branch, however, private respondent again refused.
As a result, petitioner warned and required him to follow the said orders; otherwise, he shall be
penalized under the companys discipline policy. Furthermore, private respondent was required
to explain and defend himself. The latter replied stating that whether he be suspended or
dismissed, it would all the more establish and fortify his complaint pending before the NLRC and
further charges petitioner with discrimination and favoritism in ordering his transfer.
He further alleges that the managements discriminatory act of transferring only the long staying
accountants of Cebu in the guise of its exercise of management prerogative when in truth and in
fact, the ulterior motive is to accommodate some new officers who happen to enjoy favorable
connection with management. As a result, petitioner, through a Memo, informed private
respondent that Allied Bank is terminating him. The reasons given for the dismissal were: (1)
continued refusal to be transferred from the Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his refusal to
report for workdespite the denial of his application for additional vacation leave.
The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner had abused its management prerogative in ordering
private respondents transfer and the refusal by the latter did not amount to insubordination. In
ruling, the Labor Arbiter misquoted this Courts decision in Dosch v. NLRC, thus:
As a general rule, the right to transfer or reassign an employee is recognized as an employers
exclusive right and the prerogative of management (Abbott Laboratories vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA
713 [1987]).
The exercise of this right, is not however, absolute. It has certain limitations. Thus, in Helmut
Dosch vs. NLRC, et al. 123 SCRA 296 (1983), the Supreme Court, ruled:
While it may be true that the right to transfer or reassign an employee is an employers
exclusive right and the prerogative of management, such right is not absolute. The right of an
employer to freely select or discharge his employee is limited by the paramount police power
xxx for the relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual but impressed with
public interest. xxx And neither capital nor labor shall act oppressively against each other.
Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited
reason for said refusal, such (sic) as that of being away from the family.[10] (Underscoring
supplied by the Labor Arbiter)
The NLRC likewise ruled that: (1) petitioner terminated the private respondent without just
cause considering family considerations; (2)the transfer is a demotion since the Bacolod and
Tagbilaran branches were smaller than the Jakosalem branch, a regional office, and because the
bank wanted him, an assistant manager, to replace an assistant accountant in the Tagbilaran
branch; (3) the termination was illegal for lack of due process as no hearing appears to have been
conducted and that petitioner failed to send a termination notice and i nstead issued a Memo
merely stating a notice of termination would be issued, but petitioner did not issue any notice;
and (4) petitioner dismissed private respondent in bad faith, tantamount to an unfair labor
practice as the dismissal undermined the latters right to security of tenure and equal protection
of the laws.
Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied in its Resolution of 24
December 1998. Dissatisfied, Allied Bank filed a petition for review questioning the Decision and
Resolution of the NLRC before the Court of Appeals.
Citing Dosch v. NLRC, the Court of Appeals held that Galanidas refusal to comply with the
transfer orders did not warrant his dismissal. The appellate court ruled that the transfer from a
regional office to the smaller Bacolod or Tagbilaran branches was effectively a demotion. The

appellate court agreed that Allied Bank did not afford Galanida procedural due process because
there was no hearing and no notice of termination. The Memo merely stated that the bank
would issue a notice of termination but there was no such notice. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the ruling of the NLRC in its Decision of 27 April 2000.
Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied in its Resolution
of 8 August 2000.
On 26 April 2001, Allied Bank appealed the appellate courts decision and resolution to the
Supreme Court.
In sum, Allied Bank argues that the transfer of Galanida was a valid exercise of its management
prerogative. Allied Bank contends that Galanidas continued refusal to obey the transfer orders
constituted willful disobedience or insubordination, which is a just cause for termination under
the Labor Code.
On the other hand, Galanida defended his right to refuse the transfer order. The
memorandum for Galanida filed with this Court, prepared by Atty. Loreto M.
Durano, again misquoted the Courts ruling in Dosch v. NLRC, thus:
xxx His [Galanidas] refusal to transfer falls well within the ruling of the Supreme Court in
Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et. al., 123 SCRA 296 (1983) quoted as follows:
xxx
Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited
reason for said refusal, such as that of being away from the family.
ISSUE:
Whether under the facts presented there is legal basis in petitioners exercise of its management
prerogative.
HELD:
The memorandum prepared by Atty. Durano and, worse, the assailed Decision of the Labor
Arbiter, both misquoted the Supreme Courts ruling in Dosch v. NLRC. The Court held in Dosch:
We cannot agree to Northwests submission that petitioner was guilty of disobedience and
insubordination which respondent Commission sustained. The only piece of evidence on which
Northwest bases the charge of contumacious refusal is petitioners letter dated August 28, 1975
to R.C. Jenkins wherein petitioner acknowledged receipt of the formers memorandum dated
August 18, 1975, appreciated his promotion to Director of International Sales but at the same
time regretted that at this time for personal reasons and reasons of my family, I am unable to
accept the transfer from the Philippines and thereafter expressed his preference to remain in his
position, saying: I would, therefore, prefer to remain in my position of Manager-Philippines
until such time that my services in that capacity are no longer required by Northwest Airlines.
From this evidence, We cannot discern even the slightest hint of defiance, much less imply
insubordination on the part of petitioner.
The phrase [r]efusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered
insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that of being
away from the family does not appear anywhere in the Dosch decision. Galanidas
counsel lifted the erroneous phrase from one of the italicized lines in the syllabus
of Dosch found in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).

The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial reports of Supreme Court decisions or resolutions is
not the work of the Court, nor does it state this Courts decision. The syllabus is simply the work
of the reporter who gives his understanding of the decision. The reporter writes the syllabus for
the convenience of lawyers in reading the reports. A syllabus is not a part of the courts decision.
A counsel should not cite a syllabus in place of the carefully considered text in the decision of the
Court.
In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante and Atty. Durano began by quoting from Dosch, but
substituted a portion of the decision with a head note from the SCRA syllabus, which they even
underscored. In short, they deliberately made the quote from the SCRA syllabus appear as the
words of the Supreme Court. We admonish them for what is at the least patent carelessness, if
not an outright attempt to mislead the parties and the courts taking cognizance of this case.
Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a
lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or
authority. It is the duty of all officers of the court to cite the rulings and decisions of the
Supreme Court accurately.
The Court AFFIRMED the Decision of 27 April 2000 of the CA upholding the Decision of 18
September 1998 of the NLRC with the following MODIFICATIONS: 1) The awards of separation
pay, moral damages and exemplary damages are hereby deleted for lack of basis; 2) Reducing
the award of back wages to cover only the period from 1 September 1994 to 4 October 1994; and
3) Awarding nominal damages to private respondent for P10,000.
The case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this Decision, of the back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, due to
Potenciano L. Galanida for the time his dismissal was ineffectual from 1 September 1994 until 4
October 1994.
Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty. Loreto M. Durano are ADMONISHED to be
more careful in citing the decisions of the Supreme Court in the future.
3. SAMAR MINING COMPANY V. FRANSISCO ARNADO
24 SCRA 402
Duty to Assist in the Administration of Justice
In 1958, Rufino Abuyen won a labor case against Samar Mining Company. Abuyen was awarded
compensation plus hospitalization expenses for a disease he incurred while working for Samar
Mining. The decision was rendered by Pompeyo Tan, a labor lawyer duly appointed by Francisco
Arnado, a regional administrator of the Department of Labor. In 1961, Samar Minings lawyer,
Atty. Benedicto Arcinas, filed an action for certiorari before CFI Cebu contending that Tan has
no authority or jurisdiction over said case because he was a mere labor lawyer who had no
authority to render the award being complained of. CFI Cebu dismissed the petition of Arcinas.
Meanwhile, in the same year, the Supreme Court made a ruling in the case of Caltex v.
Villanueva (L-15658, August 21, 1961) that duly appointed hearing officers by regional
administrators of the labor department may issue awards. Notwithstanding this ruling, Arcinas
still filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal has merit.
HELD:
No. It is obvious that the purpose of the filing is just to delay and prolong the litigation in the
hope of draining the resources of the poorer party and of compelling it to submit out of sheer
exhaustion. The conduct of Atty. Arcinas is hardly compatible with the duty of the Bar to assist
in the Administration of Justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same. The Supreme Court ordered
Samar Mining and Atty. Arcinas to shoulder the litigation costs of this case jointly and severally.

4. ROSALINA BIASCAN vs. ATTY. MARCIAL F. LOPEZ

409 SCRA 1
wala ko mahanap na digest pero maikli lang naman pala yung original
5. ATTY. IRENEO L. TORRES AND MRS. NATIVIDAD CELESTINO v. ATTY. JOSE
CONCEPCION JAVIER
A.M. No. 5910 (2005)
Inclusion of derogatory statements actuated by his giving vent to ill-feelings stated in
the pleading is not covered by the absolute immunity or privileged communication.

petition for audit of all funds of the University of the East Faculty Association (UEFA),
as counsel for the therein petitioners UEFA then Treasurer Rosamarie Laman, and his
wife-former UEFA President Eleonor Javier, before the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR), Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) against herein complainants
Atty. Torres did not in his Answer confront the issues thereof but instead mock[ed]
his wife and fabricat[ed] and distort[ed] realities by including malicious, libelous and
impertinent statements and accusations against his wife which exasperated him.
Not wanting to allow his wife to be maligned by Atty. Torres, respondent admits
having responded with a counter-attack in his Reply to Respondents (Torres and
Marquez) Answer/Comment[19] wherein he stated:
What kind of a lawyer is this Atty. Torres? The undersigned feels that Atty. Torres just
cannot kick the habit of injecting immaterial, irrelevant, and impertinent matters in
his pleadings. More than that, he lies through his teeth. The undersigned thinks that
if he has any common sense at all he should shut up about his accusation that Prof.
Javier spent more than half a million pesos for negotiation expensesshe obtained
only P2-increase in union members salary, etc. because of the pendency of the
damage suit against him on this score. He easily forgets the sad chapter of his life as a
practitioner when he lost out to Prof. Javier in the petition for audit (Case No. NCROD-M-9401-004) which he filed to gain pogi points prior to the UEFA election in
1994

Atty. Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino charged Atty. Jose Concepcion Javier for
malpractice, gross misconduct in office as an attorney and/or violation of the lawyers
oath for employing statements and remarks on his pleadings which are false,
unsubstantiated, with malicious imputation, abusive, offensive and improper with
the character of an attorney as a quasi-judicial officer.
Atty. Javier professes that he was angry while he was preparing his pleadings considering that
his wife was included to the burglary exposed in the present case. Also, he invokes that
those statements he made are privileged communication, it forming part of a judicial proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Javier is administratively liable for the alleged offensive statements he
made in his pleadings
HELD:
It is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for reasons of public policy, utterances
made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings,
petitions and motions, are absolutely privileged so long as they are pertinent and
relevant to the subject inquiry, however false or malicious they may be. A matter,
however, to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the

subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy or
impropriety. That matter alleged in a pleading need not be in every case material to the issues
presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so
pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in
the course of the trial.
Clearly, Atty. Javiers primordial reason for the offensive remark stated in his pleadings was his
emotional reaction in view of the fact that herein Complainant was in a legal dispute with his
wife. This excuse cannot be sustained; that the Atty. Javier is representing his wife is not at all an
excuse.
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language must be dignified
and choice of language is important in the preparation of pleadings. In the assertion
of his clients rights, a lawyer even one gifted with superior intellect is enjoined to rein up
his temper.
Thus, the inclusion of the derogatory statements by respondent was actuated by his giving vent
to his ill-feelings towards Atty. Torres, a purpose to which the mantle of absolute immunity does
not extend.
6. SPS. LETICIA TIONGCO & JOSE TIONGCO VS HON. SEVERINO AGUILAR
FACTS:
It must at once be noted that Atty. Tiongco did not at all show cause why he should not be dealt
with administratively for violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in view
of his unfounded and malicious insinuation that this Court did not at all read the
petition in this case before it concluded that the petition failed to sufficiently
show that the respondent court had committed a grave abuse of discretion.
Moreover, while he tried to justify as true his descriptions of the respondent judge as a
"liar," "thief." perfidious," and "blasphemer" he did not offer any excuse for his
use of the rest of the intemperate words enumerated in the resolution. Worse, feeling
obviously frustrated at the incompleteness of the Court's enumeration of the intemperate words
or phrases, he volunteered to point out that in addition to those so enumerated, he also called
the respondent judge a "robber," "rotten manipulator," "abettor" of graft and
corruption, and "cross-eyed."
Atty. Tiongco's Compliance is unsatisfactory and is entirely unacceptable for the following
reasons: first, he impliedly admitted the falsity of his insinuation that this Court did not read
the petition' second, except as to the words "liar," "thief," "perfidious'" and "blasphemer," he
failed to address squarely the other intemperate words and phrases enumerated in the resolution
of 26 September 1994, which failure amounts to an admission of their intemperateness; third,
he did not indicate the circumstances upon which his defense of truth lies; and, fourth, he
miserably failed to show the relevance of the harsh words and phrase to his petition.
We do not then hesitate to rule that by falsely and maliciously insinuating that this Court did not
at all read the petition in this case, Atty. Tiongco not only exhibited his gross disrespect to
and contempt for this Court and exposed his plot to discredit the Members of the
First Division of the Court and put them to public contempt or ridicule; he, as well,
charged them with the violation of their solemn duty to render justice, thereby creating or
promoting distrust in judicial administration which could have the effect of "encouraging
discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation on
which rests the bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for
protection and relief" (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 [1953]).

Consequently, Atty. Tiongco has made a strong case for a serious violation of Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which reads as follows:
CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS.
This duty is closely entwined with his vow in the lawyer's oath "to conduct himself as a lawyer
with all good fidelity to the courts"; his duty under Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
"[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers"; and his
duty under the first canon of the Canons Professional Ethics "to maintain towards the courts
a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance."

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their client's rights, lawyers even those
gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of
expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every
right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but
freedom with responsibility.
HELD:
That Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in making the
false and malicious insinuation against this Court, particularly the Members of the
First Division, and the scurrilous characterizations of the respondent judge is, indeed, all too
obvious. Such could only come from anger, if not hate, after he was not given what he wanted.
Anger or hate could only come from one who "seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he
considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own
opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his views" (Montecillo
vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234, 238 [1974]). When such anger or hate is coupled with haughtiness or
arrogance as when he even pointed out other intemperate words in his petition which this Court
failed to incorporate in the resolution of 26 September 1994, and with seething sarcasm as when
he prays that this Court "forebear[s] from turning . . . [him] into a martyr to his principles" and
ends up his Compliance with the "RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES AND UNDYING LOVE"
(Constitution Preamble, 66th word), "nothing more can extenuate his liability for gross
violation of Canon 11 of the Code of professional Responsibility and his other duties entwined
therewith as earlier adverted to.
WHEREFORE, for such violation, ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO is hereby ordered to pay a Fine of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) and WARNED that the commission of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more money.

7. PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Attorney Alan F. Paguia, as counsel for Estrada, averred that the respondent justices have
violated Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct by attending the EDSA 2 Rally
and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to
the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain

personal views on political questions. But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge
shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for
political office or participate in other partisan political activities.
Also, petitioner contended that the justices have prejudged a case that would assail the
legality of the act taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in
Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of
justice and due process.
According to Atty. Paguia, during the hearing of his Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon on 11 June
2003, the three justices of the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest
their bias and partiality against his client. Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita
V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and disrespectful language when she
blurted out, Magmumukha naman kaming gago, and Justice Teresita LeonardoDe Castro characterized the motion as insignificant even before the prosecution could
file its comments or opposition thereto, remarking in open court that to grant Estradas
motion would result in chaos and disorder. Prompted by the alleged bias and partial
attitude of the Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for
their disqualification.
The petitioner also asked the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of
Chief Justice Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:
a. going to EDSA 2;
b. authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President on the ground of
permanent disability even without proof of compliance with the corresponding constitutional
conditions, e.g., written declaration by either the President or majority of his cabinet; and
c. actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of permanent disability.
In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum
shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters pending before the
Sandiganbayan.
Subsequently, the court ruled that the instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be
DISMISSED for gross insufficiency in substance and for utter lack of merit. The
Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion, an indispensable
requirement to warrant recourse to the extraordinary relief of petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, the Court strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on
pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist from further making, directly or indirectly,
similar submissions to this Court or to its Members.
Unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist
on end. In fact, on the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote
to say - What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estradas right to due
process of law? It renders the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and
void. The rudiments of fair play were not observed.
There was no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada filed his petition, Chief
Justice Davide and his fellow justices had already committed to the other party - GMA - with a

judgment already made and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. After the justices had authorized the proclamation of GMA as
president, can they be expected to voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own act?
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Paguia committed a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Held:
Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can
enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto, 82
Phil 595.) However, Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of
his clients case within the judicial forum.
Indeed, he has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print media.
Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the
bar from making such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the
fires of public dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the administration of
justice.
It should be clear that the phrase partisan political activities, in its statutory context, relates to
acts designed to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who have
filed certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election.
The taking of an oath of office by any incoming President of the Republic before the Chief Justice
of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the Highest Magistrate. The assailed
presence of other justices of the Court at such an event could be no different from their
appearance in such other official functions as attending the Annual State of the Nation Address
by the President of the Philippines before the Legislative Department.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor
allow the erosion of our peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been
privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.

8. Earth Minerals Exploration, Inc vs. Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino

Macaraig Jr. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MALACAANG, MANILA, BUREAU OF
MINES DIRECTOR BENJAMIN A. GONZALES, AND PHILZEA MINING AND DEV.
CORP., respondents
FACTS:
Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. (Zambales Chromite, for short) is the exclusive owner of ten
(10) patentable chromite mining claims located in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Zambales. On
September 11, 1980, Zambales Chromite, as claim-owner, on one hand, and Philzea Mining
and Development Corporation as operator, on the other, entered into a "Contract of
Development, Exploitation and Productive Operation" on the ten (10) patentable mining claims
(Annex "C", Rollo, p. 120). During the lifetime of such contract, Earth Minerals
Exploration, Inc. submitted a Letter of Intent on June 30, 1984 to Zambales
Chromite whereby the former proposed and the latter agreed to operate the same
mining area subject of the earlier agreement between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining.
On August 10, 1984, Zambales Chromite and Earth Minerals concretized their aforementioned
Letter of Intent when they entered into an "Operating Agreement" for the latter to operate the
same mining area. Consequently, the same mining property of Zambales Chromite became the
subject of different agreements with two separate and distinct operators. On November 29, 1984,
petitioner Earth Minerals filed with the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences a
petition for cancellation of the contract between Zambales Chromite and Philzea
Mining, pursuant t Section 7, P.D. 1281.
In its petition, Earth Minerals alleged, among others, that Philzea Mining
committed grave and serious violations of the latter's contract with Zambales
Chromite among which are: failure to produce the agreed volume of chromite ores; failure to
pay ad valorem taxes; failure to put up assay buildings and offices, all resulting in the nonproductivity and non-development of the mining area.
On December 10, 1984, Philzea Mining filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that
Earth Minerals is not the proper party in interest and that the petition lacks
cause of action. The motion to dismiss was, however, denied by the BMGS in an order dated
January 24, 1985 holding that "there appears some color of right" on Earth Minerals to initiate
the petition for cancellation (Annex "G", Rollo, p. 120).

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer

should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers
and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing
sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and
authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking
to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.

A motion for reconsideration was filed but the same was denied by the BMGS in an
order dated March 4, 1985. Thereafter, Philzea Mining elevated the case to then Ministry
(now Department) of Natural Resources (MNR, for short) which in its order of April
23, 1985 dismissed the appeal for the reason that the order of the BMGS was an interlocutory
order that could not be the proper subject of an appeal.

The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful
of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen
not to at all take heed.

On May 2, 1985, Philzea Mining appealed to the Office of the President the order of
MNR dated April 23, 1985. During the pendency thereof, Earth Minerals filed with the MNR a
motion for execution of the MNR order of April 23, 1985.

WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the

practice of law, effective upon his receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an
officer of the Court.

On May 30, 1985, the MNR issued an order directing the BMGS to conduct the necessary
investigation in order to hasten the development of the mining claims in question. In compliance
therewith, the BMGS on June 7, 1985, ordered the private respondent Philzea Mining to
file its answer to Earth Mineral's petition for rescission. Philzea Mining moved to
reconsider but the motion was denied.

Philzea Mining did not submit its answer. Accordingly, the BMGS resolved the
petition for rescission on the basis of documents submitted ex parte by herein
petitioner. Finding that Philzea Mining grossly violated the terms and conditions of
the mining contract between Philzea Mining and Zambales Chromite, the BMGS rendered a
decision on July 23,1985, cancelling said mining contract, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

respondent on November 11, 1985 and since the notice of appeal dated November 15,1985 was
filed on November 18, 1985, the appeal was taken beyond the five-day reglementary period.

Aggrieved by the decision of the BMGS, Philzea Mining, aside from filing a notice of appeal to
the MNR on July 29, 1985, also filed a petition for certiorari with the then Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) on July 30,1985, to annul or set aside the decision of the
BMGS.

In the case under consideration, as the next working day after November 16, 1985 was November
18, 1985 a Monday, it is evident that the private respondent's appeal was filed on time.

On November 4, 1985, the Office of the President promulgated a decision dismissing

the appeal of Philzea Mining from the decision of the MNR dated April 23, 1985, on the
ground that an order denying a motion for reconsideration is interlocutory in nature and cannot
be the subject of an appeal.
On November 7, 1985, the MNR on the other hand, issued another order this time
dismissing the appeal of Philzea Mining from the decision of the BMGS dated July
23, 1985.
On November 18, 1985 Philzea Mining appealed the aforementioned November 7,
1985 decision of the MNR to the Office of the President.
Meanwhile, on December 26,1985, the then Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the
petition filed by Philzea Mining in AC-G.R. Sp. No. 06715.
Back to the appeal of Philzea Mining to the Office of the President, the disputed decision dated
June 27, 1986 was issued by the then Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., the
dispositive portion of which reads:
A motion for reconsideration dated July 12,1986 (Annex "U", Rollo, p. 190) was filed by
petitioner Earth Minerals which, however, was denied by the then Deputy Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig in his resolution dated May 5, 1987, which reads in part:
Wherefore, the instant motion for reconsideration by appellee Earth Minerals is hereby denied
for lack of merit and the Decision of this Office dated June 27, 1986 is hereby reiterated.
ISSUE:
(a) whether or not the appeal of the private respondent Philzea Mining from the decision of the
MNR dated November 7,1985 to the Office of the President was made out of time
(b) whether or not the petitioner Earth Minerals is the proper party to seek cancellation of the
operating agreement between Philzea Mining and Zambales Chromite.
HELD:
In the resolution of the Court dated July 1989, the Court resolved: (a) to give due course to the
petition and (b) to require the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda
The petitioner contends that the last day to appeal the decision of the MNR dated November 7,
1985 fell on November 16, 1985, that is five (5) days from the date of its receipt by the private

Public respondent counters that the ground invoked by the petitioner is too technical in view of
the fact that November 16, 1985 was a Saturday and the following day (November 17, 1985) was a
Sunday.

Be that as it may, the private respondent's appeal within the reglementary period to
the Office of the President does not help them much in the instant case.
The public respondent argues that the petitioner Earth Minerals is not the proper party to file
the petition for cancellation of the contract between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining
citing Article 1311 of the Civil Code which provides that a contract takes effect only between the
parties, their assigns and heirs.
The contention is untenable.
Indeed, a contract takes effect only between the parties who made it, and also their assigns and
heirs, except in cases where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law (Article 1311, New Civil
Code). Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, in an
action upon that contract, the real parties in interest, either as plaintiff or as defendant must be
parties to said contract. In relation thereto, Article 1397 of the Civil Code lays the general rule
that an action for the annulment of contracts can only be maintained by those who are bound
either principally or subsidiarily by virtue thereof. The rule, however, admits of an exception.
The Court, in Teves v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (23 SCRA 1141 [1968]) held
that a person who is not obliged principally or subsidiarily in a contract may
exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with
respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show the detriment which could
positively result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention.
Petitioner Earth Minerals seeks the cancellation of the contract between Zambales
Chromite and Philzea Mining, not as a party to the contract but because his rights
are prejudiced by the said contract. The prejudice and detriment to the rights and interest
of petitioner stems from the continued existence of the contract between Zambales Chromite and
private respondent Philzea Mining. Unless and until the contract between Zambales Chromite
and Philzea Mining is cancelled, petitioner's contract with the former involving the same mining
area cannot be in effect and it cannot perform its own obligations and derive benefits under its
contract. The Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences in his order denying Philzea Mining's motion
to dismiss the petition for cancellation of the operating agreement between Philzea Mining and
Zambales Chromite stated:
From the documentary evidence submitted by the petitioner, i.e., the Letter of Intent and
Operating Agreement between Zambales Chromite and Earth Minerals, it may be gleaned that,
at least, there appears some color of right on the part of petitioner to request for
cancellation/rescission of the contract dated September 11, 1980 between Zambales Chromite
and Philzea Mining.

Moreover, the record amply shows that the decision of the Director of Mines as affirmed by the
Minister of Natural Resources was supported by substantial evidence. As found by the Bureau of
Mines in its decision dated July 23, 1985, the violations committed by Philzea Mining were not
only violations of its operating agreement with Zambales Chromite but of mining laws as well.
In affirming the abovementioned decision, the Minister of Natural Resources made the following
statements:
Moreover, the appellant by filing a Manifestation on October 1, 1985 wherein it prayed that the
decision appealed from be reviewed motu propio by this Office, is an implied admission that it
has no justification whether in fact or in law, for its appeal; otherwise, it could have specified
them in the appeal memorandum that it is bound by law to file. (p. 142, Rollo)
In such cases, the Court has uniformly held that, it is sufficient that administrative findings of
fact are supported by evidence (Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 [1940]). Still in later cases, the
Court continued that such finding will not be disturbed so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant (Police Commission v. Lood,
162 SCRA 762 [1984]; Atlas Consolidated v. Factoran, Jr., supra).
The decision, therefore, of the Deputy Executive Secretary reversing the decisions of the Minister
of Natural Resources and Director of Mines cannot be sustained. This is in line with the
pronouncement of the Court that the factual findings of the Secretary should be respected in the
absence of any illegality, error of law, fraud or imposition, none of which was proved by the
public and private respondents (Heirs of Santiago Pastoral v. Secretary of Public Works and
Highways, 162 SCRA 619 [1988]).
Regarding the issue of forum shopping, the records show that on July 29, 1985, after Philzea
Mining had filed its notice of appeal to MNR from the July 23, 1985 decision of the
BMGS, it also filed a petition for certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court
on July 30, 1985, praying for the annulment of the same July 23, 1985 decision of the
BMGS. When the MNR rendered its November 7, 1985 decision affirming the July 23, 1985
decision of the BMGS, private respondent Philzea Mining, notwithstanding the
pendency of its petition for certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court, filed
its notice of appeal to the Office of the President from the said decision of the MNR
stating therein that its appeal was "without prejudice to the pending petition with
the Intermediate Appellate Court docketed as AC-G.R. Sp. No. 06715" (Rollo, p. 80).
The foregoing facts show a case of forum shopping.
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum,
a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another.
The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with
litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is
pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in
anticipation of an unfavorable court ruling
One last point, the motion to dismiss filed by Philzea before this Court on September 5,
1989, on the ground that the petition has become moot and academic in view of the
expiration on August 10, 1989 of the five (5) year term contract between Zambales
Chromite and Earth Minerals executed by August 10, 1984 should be denied.
The contract between Zambales Chromite and Earth Minerals provides, inter alia:

A. During the existence of this agreement, Earth Minerals is free to look for, and negotiate with,
an interested party who is financially capable of operating the CLAIMS on a much bigger scale . .
and in connection therewith, may assign this agreement in favor of said party; . . . .
In view of such provision, Earth Minerals and Zambales Chromite jointly entered into a "Mining
Agreement", dated June 16, 1988, with Acoje Mining Co., Inc., the salient provisions of which
reads:
ZCMC and EMEI jointly desire to protect Acoje from any and all claims (present or
future) against it (Acoje) with respect the title and/or possession of the
PROPERTIES and this protection against all claims of third parties or entities
during the life of this Mining Agreement is one of the main considerations why
Acoje agreed to enter into this Agreement.
The mining agreement between Zambales Chromite and Earth Minerals, on one hand, and Acoje
Mining, on the other, expressly recognizes the pendency of the case at bar, so that herein
petitioner Earth Minerals has the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion, and during
the effectivity of such Mining Agreement, both Earth Minerals and Zambales Chromite
are under obligation to assure peaceful possession of the mining properties from
the claims of third parties.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is
hereby GRANTED; (b) the decision and resolution of the Deputy Executive Secretary
are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE; and (c) the orders of the Bureau of Mines and
Geo-Sciences and Minister of Natural Resources are hereby REINSTATED.

9. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. & Pfizer (Phil.), Inc. G.R. No. 167715, 17
November 2010
Facts:
Pfizer is the registered owner of a patent pertaining to Sulbactam Ampicillin. It is marketed
under the brand name Unasyn. Sometime in January and February 2003, Pfizer discovered
that Pharmawealth submitted bids for the supply of Sulbactam Ampicillin to
several hospitals without the Pfizers consent. Pfizer then demanded that the hospitals
cease and desist from accepting such bids. Pfizer also demanded that Pharmawealth immediately
withdraw its bids to supply Sulbactam Ampicillin. Pharmawealth and the hospitals ignored the
demands.
Pfizer then filed a complaint for patent infringement with a prayer for permanent
injunction and forfeiture of the infringing products. A preliminary injunction effective
for 90 days was granted by the IPOs Bureau of Legal Affairs (IPO-BLA). Upon expiration, a
motion for extension filed by Pfizer was denied. Pfizer filed a Special Civil Action for
Certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the denial.
While the case was pending in the CA, Pfizer filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati (RTC) a complaint for infringement and unfair competition, with a prayer
for injunction. The RTC issued a temporary restraining order, and then a preliminary
injunction.

Pharmawealth filed a motion to dismiss the case in the CA, on the ground of forum
shopping. Nevertheless, the CA issued a temporary restraining order. Pharmawealth again filed
a motion to dismiss, alleging that the patent, the main basis of the case, had already lapsed, thus
making the case moot, and that the CA had no jurisdiction to review the order of the IPO-BLA
because this was granted to the Director General. The CA denied all the motions. Pharmawealth
filed a petition for review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.

rights allegedly violated and the acts allegedly violative of such rights are identical,
regardless of whether the patents on which the complaints were based are different. In both
cases, the ultimate objective of Pfizer was to ask for damages and to permanently
prevent Pharmawealth from selling the contested products. Relevantly, the
Supreme Court has decided that the filing of two actions with the same objective,
as in this instance, constitutes forum shopping.

Issues:

Owing to the substantial identity of parties, reliefs and issues in the IPO and RTC cases, a
decision in one case will necessarily amount to res judicata in the other action.

a) Can an injunctive relief be issued based on an action of patent infringement when the patent
allegedly infringed has already lapsed?
b) What tribunal has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Director of Legal Affairs of the
Intellectual Property Office?
c) Is there forum shopping when a party files two actions with two seemingly different causes of
action and yet pray for the same relief?
Held:
a) No. The provision of R.A. 165, from which the Pfizers patent was based, clearly states that
"[the] patentee shall have the exclusive right to make, use and sell the patented machine, article
or product, and to use the patented process for the purpose of industry or commerce, throughout
the territory of the Philippines for the term of the patent; and such making, using, or selling by
any person without the authorization of the patentee constitutes infringement of the patent."
Clearly, the patentees exclusive rights exist only during the term of the patent. Since the patent
was registered on 16 July 1987, it expired, in accordance with the provisions of R.A. 165, after 17
years, or 16 July 2004. Thus, after 16 July 2004, Pfizer no longer possessed the exclusive right to
make, use, and sell the products covered by their patent. The CA was wrong in issuing a
temporary restraining order after the cut-off date.
b) According to IP Code, the Director General of the IPO exercises exclusive jurisdiction over
decisions of the IPO-BLA. The question in the CA concerns an interlocutory order, and not a
decision. Since the IP Code and the Rules and Regulations are bereft of any remedy regarding
interlocutory orders of the IPO-BLA, the only remedy available to Pfizer is to apply the Rules and
Regulations suppletorily. Under the Rules, a petition for certiorari to the CA is the proper
remedy. This is consistent with the Rules of Court. Thus, the CA had jurisdiction.
c) Yes. Forum shopping is defined as the act of a party against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly
favorable) opinion in another forum (other than by appeal or the special civil
action of certiorari), or the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition.
The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties that
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for,
the reliefs being founded on the same facts; (c) identity of the two preceding particulars, such
that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. This instance meets these elements.
The parties are clearly identical. In both the complaints in the BLA-IPO and RTC, the

10. Bildner and Ilusorio vs. Ilusorio, et. al.

ERLINDA I. BILDNER and MAXIMO K. ILUSORIO, Petitioners, vs. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO,
RAMON K. ILUSORIO, MARIETTA K. ILUSORIO, SHEREEN K. ILUSORIO, CECILIA A.
BISUA, and ATTY. MANUEL R. SINGSON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 157384
June 5, 2009
FACTS:
A complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action against respondent was filed by
petitioners for alleged gross misconduct, among other offenses. Said disbarment case arises
from a case presided by Judge Antonio Reyes where respondent attempted to influence
the outcome of the case as can be inferred from his acts evidenced by the following
documents, to wit: (1) the transcript of the stenographic notes of the May 31, 2000 hearing in the
sala of Judge Reyes when the judge made it of record that respondent offered Atty.Oscar
Sevilla P500,000 to be given to Judge Reyes for a favorable decision; (2) the
affidavit of Judge Reyes alleged that respondent, as soon as the case started, visited
him about three times in his office, and made more than a dozen calls to his
Manila and Baguio residences, some of which were even made late evenings; and (3) the
affidavit of Atty. Sevilla confirmed that he was approached by the respondent to
convince the judge, his close family friend, to rule in Atty. Singsons favor.
ISSUE:
WON respondent should be administratively disciplined or disbarred from the practice of law for
the alleged misconduct in attempting to bribe Judge Antonio Reyes.
RULING:
The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judgeor a judge evincing a
willingnessto discuss, in private, a matter related to a case pending in that judges sala cannot
be over-emphasized. The fact that Atty. Singson did talk on different occasions to Judge Reyes,
initially through a mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, leads us to conclude that Atty. Singson was
indeed trying to influence the judge to rule in his clients favor. This conduct is not
acceptable in the legal profession. Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins it:
Canon 13. A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the
court.
While the alleged attempted bribery may perhaps not be supported by evidence other than Judge
Reyes statements, there is nevertheless enough proof to hold Atty. Singson liable for unethical
behavior of attempting to influence a judge, itself a transgression of considerable gravity.