Perfecto v Meer 85 Phil 552

GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER [G.R. No. L-2348. February 27,
1950.]
Facts: In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice
Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this
Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted
this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the
assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that
imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Issue: Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a
diminution thereof?
Held: Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold
that salaries of judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the
Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be
indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the
Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial
officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing
official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been
transplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional
Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of the
judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax
on judicial salaries really impairs them. This is not proclaiming a general
tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying
gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties.
Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. Andon incomes other than
their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is
charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish
their official stipend that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement
of the fundamental charter. Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of
the Constitution if they did not perceive and block encroachments upon
their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of
judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges personal and therefore
waivable but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action
imposed in the public interest (Evans vs. Gore).
Nitafan v CIR 152 SCRA 284
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [GR L-78780, 23 July 1987]
FACTS:1. Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano
Jr., were duly appointed and qualified Judges of the RTC National Capital
Judicial Region.
2. Petitioners seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, (CIR
and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court) from making
any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

3. Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or

compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decreased or diminution of
their salaries, contrary to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:Is a deduction of withholding tax a diminuition of the salaries of
Judges/Justices?
HELD: The SC hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the
ruling in PERFECTO VS. MEER (88 Phil 552) and ENDENCIA VS. DAVID (93
Phil 696), that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt
from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a
diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court
hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are property
subject to general income tax applicable to all income earners and that
the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall
within the constitution protection against decrease of their salaries
during their continuance in office. The debates, interpellations and
opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until
it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of
the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the
salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that
intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect.
The ruling that the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is
a diminution thereof, and so violates the
Constitution in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must
be deemed discarded

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO vs. SATURNINO

DAVIDG.R. No. L-6355-56August 31, 1953 Facts
Saturnino David, then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of
Justice Pastor Endencias and Justice Fernando Jugos salary pursuant to
Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that SEC. 13. No salary wherever
received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby
declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law. According to the brief of the Solicitor General on
behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, the decision in the case
of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress,
because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic
Act No.590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what
he considers the pertinent discussionin the Lower House of House Bill No.
1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.
Issue(s)
Does the imposition of an income tax upon the salaries of Justice Endencia
and Justice Jugo and other members of the Supreme Court and all judges

of inferior courts amount to a diminution? Is Section 13 of Republic Act

No. 590 constitutional?
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of imposition of income tax upon the salaries of the judges,
in a rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and held under
the doctrine laid down by the court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85
Phil 552, Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg held that the collection of income
taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was in
violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so o r d e re d
t h e re f u n d o f s a i d t a xe s . O n t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r S e c t i o n 1 3
o f Re p u b l i c A c t N o. 5 9 0 i s constitutional, the court believes
that this is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment
of the meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in offi ce, found in section 9, Article VIII of
the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. By legislative
fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress
says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of
compensation. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof
by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defi ned
and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The rule
is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory
act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to
give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative defi nition of a
word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used
elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial
function in defining a term. The court reiterates the doctrine laid down in
the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of
income tax on the salary of a judicial offi cer is a diminution thereof
and so violates the Constitution. Further, the court holds that
the interpretation and application of the Constitution and
of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the
judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not
legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not
violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts
in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to
a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court
of the land. Thus the court holds that judgment is affirmed, that Section
13, Republic Act 590 in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a
judicial officer
shall b e c o n s i d e re d n o t t o b e a d i m i n u t i o n o f h i s c o m p e n s a t
i o n fi xe d b y t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o r b y l a w , constitutes and invasion
of the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this sense, the court is
of the opinion that said section is null and void, it being a transgression of
the fundamental principles underlying the separation of powers. In the
light of the issue on imposing income tax on judges salaries, dissenting
opinion of court cited that judges are also citizens and thus their salaries
are subjected to the Income Tax Law prevailing. The debates,

interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional

provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission
disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in
adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable.
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of
the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
eff ect. Hence, court affi rms judgment as in Perfecto vs. Meer on
the issue of imposing income tax on judgessalaries