alawi vs alauya

Sophia Alawi was (complainant) a sales representative of E. B. Villarosa

& Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari
M. Alauya (respondent) is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. Through complainant's agency,
respondent executed a contract for the purchase on installments of one of
the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm, and in connection
therewith, a housing loan was also granted to respondent by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya sent strongly-worded letters to the
president and VP of Villarosa, as well as to the NHMFC, detailing in acerbic
language Alawis supposed fraudulent and deceitful acts. He claimed that his
consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation,
deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar
letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
In all of these letters, Alauya referred to himself as Attorney Ashary M.
Alauya.
Because of the letters, Alawi filed a complaint against Alauya before
the SC, alleging that he imputed malicious and libelous charges against her
w/ no solid ground, and that he usurped the title attorney.
According to complainant, only regular members of the Philippine Bar
may properly use the title "attorney". Alauya justified his use of the title,
"attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim,
adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often
mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal " or the Maranao term "consial",
connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not
consider himself a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use the title of
Attorney
Ruling:
He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine
bar. This Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the
Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may
only practice law before Shari'a courts (B.M. No.681). While one who has
been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they
give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an

"attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained

the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Respondent says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or
"counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are pejorative connotations
to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The
ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title
of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

In Re: Garcia 2 SCRA 985

Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his
verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in
Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he was approved, selected and
qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central
University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating
as "Licenciado en derecho"; and thereafter he was allowed to practice the law
profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic
Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain, he is
entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to
the required bar examinations.
Issue:
Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the
Philippine Bar.
Rulin:
The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on
Academic Degrees and Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain
cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said treaty was intended to govern
Filipino citizens desiring to practice thair profession in Spain, and the citizens
of Spain desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a
Filipino citizen desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is
therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the
privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the
Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the applicant are
made expressly subject to the laws and regulations on the contracting state
in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could not
have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission
to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive
Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being
reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.

Cayetano vs. Monsod201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possesrequired qualification
of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987
constitutionprovides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and sixCommissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
atleast thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any electiveposition in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
bemembers of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
Issue:
Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the appointment of Monsod is in
accordance with the requirement of law as having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. Monsods past work experiences as
alawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer negotiator of contracts and alawyer-legislator of both the rich and the
poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that hehas been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases and litigation in court; itembraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social
proceedings and othersimilar work which involves the determination by a
legal mind the legal effects of facts and conditions
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it

embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident toactions

and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them inmatters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body,
the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim inbankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and
in matters of estateand guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court,which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required
qualification of having engaged in the practiceof law for at least ten years is
incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist,
alawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELECchairman,
The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
does In the view of theforegoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

People vs. Villanueva

14 SCRA 109
Facts:
In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the
municipality of Alaminos in Laguna. In said case, the private offended party
asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to prosecute said case. Apparently, Fule
was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the opposed the appearance
of Fule as counsel for the offended party as he said that according to the
Rules of Court when an attorney had been appointed to the position of
Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of
law, he ceased to engage in private law practice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.
RULING:
No. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace
Court as ah agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he
was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional
capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of Sail Pablo he had no control or
intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the
municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases

coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and
not by the City Attorney of San Pablo. As such, there could be no possible
conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule us Assistant City Attorney
of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. Furthermore, the
isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice,
within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an
isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. Thus, the appearance as
counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in
the private practice of law. And, it has never been refuted that City Attorney
Fule had been given permission by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of
Justice, to represent the complaint in the case at bar who is a relative.
Decision affirmed.

PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION VS. CELEDONIO AGRAVA

FACTS:
A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction
against CeledonioAgrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent
Office. On May 27, 1957, respondentDirector issued a circular announcing
that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of
determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before
thePhilippines Patent Office. The petitioner contends that one who has passed
the bar examinationsand is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in
the Philippines and who is in goodstanding, is duly qualified to practice before
the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondentDirectors holding an
examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violationof
the law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases
does not involveentirely or purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technicalknowledge and training as a matter of
actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed
the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore,
hestressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that
his right has been questioned formally.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not members of the bar should first take and pass an
examination conducted by the Patent Office before being allowed to practice
law in said office;

2. Whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the

preparation of applications or patents, etc. constitutes practice of law or is
included in the practice of law.
HELD:
1. No, members of the Bar need not take and pass an examination
before bein allowed to practice law in the Patent Office. The Court held that
under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by the
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession
before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said
office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and
application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the
presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions
of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals
from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
2. The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such
appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants,
oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for
patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent
cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the
interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as
the existence of facts to beestablished in accordance with the law of
evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connectedwith
the law and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of the
legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any
party may appeal to the SupremeCourt from any final order or decision of the
director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office involved
exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then
logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather
to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

IN RE: ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ

5 SCRA 661
FACTS:
Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one
Filemon Samaco in 1956. He was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion of the penalty, he was granted a
conditional pardon by the President. He was released on the condition that he

shall not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a
disbarment case against Gutierrez, pursuant to section 5 of Rule 127, wherein
a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime
insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he
was granted pardon.
HELD:
Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional,
and as such, It merely remitted his sentence. It does not reach the offense
itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder
without regard to the pardon (which he invoked in defense). The crime was
actually qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed
in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (Gutierrez being
municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree
of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the
profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure
up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of
a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of
academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral
character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after
admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk
of suspension or removal.

WELLINGTON REYES vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA

246 SCRA 64
FACTS:
On March 30, 1971, complainant reported to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of extortion by respondent, an
Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa
filed by complainant's business rival. According to complainant, he had given
respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other
occasions. As another "pay-off" was scheduled to happen later that day, the
NBI set up an entrapment against respondent.
When the meeting took place, complainant handed to respondent the
marked money which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then
apprehended respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry

Division for examination. Respondent's hands were found positive of the

yellow florescent powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent
was thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the
NBI where he was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked.
Respondent declined to give a sworn statement to explain his side of the
case, invoking his right against self-incrimination.
On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the
filing of administrative charges and the institution of disbarment proceedings
against him.
In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted
that complainant surreptitiously planted the marked money in his pocket
without his knowledge and consent.
In connection with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he had filed a
criminal complaint for incriminatory machination, perjury and attempted
corruption of a public official against complainant with the City Fiscal of
Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extortion committed by Atty. Salavador Gaa shall
be considered as a ground for disbarment.
HELD:
YES. The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as
a public official, which also constitutes a violation of hisoath as a lawyer. The
lawyers oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]) imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no
man for money or malice. The lawyers oath is a source of his obligations and
its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary
action. Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such
a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]). The respondent is
DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of
Attorneys.

Fernandez vs Grecia
A.M. No. 3694. June 17, 1993
FACTS:
A certain Fe Linda Aves was admitted, examined and diagnosed by Dr.
Fernandez, Dr. Ongtengco, Jr., and Dr. Bartolome of having a mild preeclampsia on December 20, 1990. Five days later, he was discharged to
celebrate Christmas with her family. Unfortunately on December 26, 1990,

the said patient died with her unborn chil. Damaso Aves, husband, then filed
a damage suit against the hospital and he impleaded the attending doctors
which included Fernandez. Aves hired respondent Atty. Benjamin Grecia to
represent him.
Grecia requested St. Luke to surrender before the court the medical
records of Linda Aves. St. Luke complied and the medical records were
delivered to the Clerk of Court. In the morning of July 16, 1991, Grecia went
to the office of the clerk of court to borrow the said medical records. While
Grecia was examining the said medical records, he tore in front of the Clerk
and one office staff two pages from the medical records and then handed it
back to the Clerk. The Clerk was stunned as she watched Grecia walk away.
She then reported the incident to the judge. The judge immediately took
action and the torn pages were eventually recovered as it turned out that
Grecia handed the torn pages to someone else.
On August 20, 1991, St. Lukes filed this disbarment case against
Grecia, charging respondent with dishonesty and grave misconduct in
connection with the theft of the said pages which was material evidence in
the damage suit filed by his clients against the aforenamed doctors and St.
Lukes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Grecia should be disbarred
HELD:
Yes. On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the
Court is convinced that the charge against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is
true. By stealing two pages from Linda Aves medical chart and passing them
on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Rules of Professional
Responsibility which provide that: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct;" as well as Canon 7 thereof, which
provide that "A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar."
By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has
demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his
moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of
lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR.
In Marcelo v. Javier this Court held that: "a lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court, or an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage the
business of others in the capacity of an attorney, or for conduct which tends
to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable
opinion of the public."

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave

misconduct, dishonesty, and grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer. His
license to practice law in the Philippines is hereby CANCELLED and the Bar
Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

CO vs. BERNARDINO
A.C. No. 3919 January 28, 1998
FACTS:
Socorro T. Co alleged that in as she was following up the documents for
her shipment at the Bureau of Customs, she was approached by respondent,
Atty. Godofredo N. Bernardino, introducing himself as someone holding
various positions in the Bureau of Customs. Respondent offered to help
complainant and promised to give her some business at the Bureau. They
became friends and a month after, respondent succeeded in borrowing from
complainant P120,000.00 with the promise to pay the amount in full the
following month, broadly hinting that he could use his influence at the Bureau
of Customs to assist her. To ensure payment, respondent issued to
complainant several postdated checks. However, the checks covering were
dishonored for insufficiency of funds and closure of account. Respondent told
complainant that he would be able to pay her if she would lend him an
additional amount of P75,000.00 to be paid a month after to be secured by a
chattel mortgage on his Datsun car.
As complainant agreed respondent handed her three (3) copies of a
deed of chattel mortgage and six (6) copies of the deed of sale of his car with
the assurance that he would turn over its registration certificate and official
receipt. The agreement was not consummated as respondent later sold the
same car to another. Despite several chances given him to settle his
obligation respondent chose to evade complainant so that she was
constrained to write him a final demand letter preceding the filing of several
criminal complaints against him for violation of BP Blg. 22. Complainant also
filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman.
By way of defense, respondent averred that he gave the checks to
complainant Co by way of rediscounting and that these were fully paid when
he delivered five cellular phones to her.
ISSUE:
Whether a lawyer may be sanctioned for misconduct in his private
capacity
RULING:
Yes. While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship

between complainant and respondent as the transaction between them did

not require the professional legal services of respondent, nevertheless
respondent's abject conduct merits condemnation from this Court. As a
general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its
officers for misconduct committed in his private capacity. But this is a general
rule with many exceptions: The nature of the office, the trust relation which
exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney,
and the statutory rules prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly
require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. So it is
held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty
in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy
of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. Finally,
reference is made to Rule 1.01, Chapter 1, which requires that "a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." "Conduct,"
as used in this Rule, is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the
performance of professional duties. In the case at bar, it is glaringly clear that
the procurement of personal loans through insinuations of his power as an
influence peddler in the Bureau of Customs, the issuance of a series of bad
checks and the taking undue advantage of his position in the aforesaid
government office constitute conduct in gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED FOR ONE (1) YEAR from the
practice of law with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will
merit a more severe penalty.