In Compliance with the

Requirements in
Special Proceedings

ESCHEAT, GUARDIANSHIP AND

TRUSTEES CASES
(Rule 91 to 98)

Submitted to:
Dean Gemy Lito Festin

Submitted by:
Elliana S. Bagay
Roxanne G. Domingo
Mc Anthony M. Liggayu
Karen Grace D. Lumberio
Andres Viacrusis
October 8, 2014

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Table of Contents
Part I. DOCTRINES

Page Number

ESCHEAT
RP vs. CA. 6
(G.R. No. 143483 January 31, 2002)
RCBC vs. Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa 6
(G.R. No. 192413 June 13, 2012)

GUARDIANSHIP
Venue
Appointment of Guardians
Cecilio C. Hernandez, et. al. vs. Jovita San Juan-Santos 7
(G.R. No. 166470 August 7, 2009)
People vs. Isidro Flores y Lagua..7
(G.R. No. 188315 August 25, 2010)
Nilo Oropesa vs. Cirilo Oropesa 9
(G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012)

Selling and Encumbering Property of Ward

Jose Uy, et. al. vs.CA 10
(G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000)
Nelson Cabales and Rito Cabales vs.CA .11
(G.R. No. 162421 August 31, 2007)
Napoleon D. Neri, et.al. vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy . 13
(Gr. No. 194366, October 10, 2012)

General powers and duties of guardians

Termination of Guardianship
Eduardo T. Abad vs. Leonardo Biason and Gabriel A. Magno................... 13
(G.R. No. 191993 December 5, 2012)

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TRUSTEE
Gertrudes F. Cuaycong, et. al. vs. Luis D. Cuaycong, et. al 14
(G.R. No. L-21616 December 11, 1967)

Part II. CASE DIGEST

ESCHEAT
RP vs. CA .17
(G.R. No. 143483 January 31, 2002)
RCBC vs. Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa 19
(G.R. No. 192413 June 13, 2012)

GUARDIANSHIP
Venue
Appointment of Guardians
Cecilio C. Hernandez, et. al. vs. Jovita San Juan-Santos 23
(G.R. No. 166470 August 7, 2009)
People vs. Isidro Flores y Lagua 25
(G.R. No. 188315 August 25, 2010)
Nilo Oropesa vs. Cirilo Oropesa. 27
(G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012)

Selling and Encumbering Property of Ward

Jose Uy, et. al. vs.CA29
(G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000)
Nelson Cabales and Rito Cabales vs.CA31
(G.R. No. 162421 August 31, 2007)
Napoleon D. Neri, et.al. vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy 33
(Gr. No. 194366, October 10, 2012)

General powers and duties of guardians

Termination of Guardianship
Eduardo T. Abad vs. Leonardo Biason and Gabriel A. Magno.................... 36

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(G.R. No. 191993 December 5, 2012)

TRUSTEE
Gertrudes F. Cuaycong, et. al. vs. Luis D. Cuaycong, et. al .. 39
(G.R. No. L-21616 December 11, 1967)

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PART I
DOCTRINES

Behold my servant, whom I uphold,

My chosen, in whom my soul delights;
I have put my Spirit upon him;
He will bring forth justice to the nations.
He will not cry aloud or lift up his voice,
Or make it heard in the street;
a bruised reed he will not break,
and a faintly burning wick he will not quench;
He will faithfully bring forth justice.
He will not grow faint or be discourage
till he has established justice in the earth;
and the coastlands wait for his law.
Thus says God, the Lord,
who created the heavens and stretched them out,
who spread out the earth and what comes from it,
who gives breath to the people on it
and spirit to those who walk in it:
I am the Lord; I have called you in righteousness;
I will take you by the hand and keep you;
I will give you as a covenant for the people,
a light for the nations,
to open the eyes that are blind,
to bring out the prisoners from the dungeon,
from the prison those who sit in darkness.

Isaiah 42: 1-7

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ESCHEAT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF PASAY CITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER
3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA H. SOLANO, assisted by her husband
ROMEO SOLANO
(G.R. No. 143483 January 31, 2002)
Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby
the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or
personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the
absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to forestall an
open "invitation to self-service by the first comers." Since escheat is one of
the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the
conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be
made. The procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is
generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which such
action must be brought.
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim
"within five years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have
possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall
be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a
claim not made shall be barred forever." The 5-year period is not a device
capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary,
it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious
in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final
judgment.
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Hi-Tri Development
Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa
(G.R. No. 192413 June 13, 2012)
Escheat proceedings refer to the judicial process in which the state, by virtue
of its sovereignty, steps in and claims abandoned, left vacant, or unclaimed
property, without there being an interested person having a legal claim
thereto. In the case of dormant accounts, the state inquires into the status,
custody, and ownership of the unclaimed balance to determine whether the
inactivity was brought about by the fact of death or absence of or
abandonment by the depositor. If after the proceedings the property remains
without a lawful owner interested to claim it, the property shall be reverted
to the state to forestall an open invitation to self-service by the first
comers. However, if interested parties have come forward and lain claim to
the property, the courts shall determine whether the credit or deposit should
pass to the claimants or be forfeited in favor of the state. We emphasize that
escheat is not a proceeding to penalize depositors for failing to deposit to or
withdraw from their accounts. It is a proceeding whereby the state compels
the surrender to it of unclaimed deposit balances when there is substantial
ground for a belief that they have been abandoned, forgotten, or without an
owner.

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GUARDIANSHIP
Venue
Appointment Guardians
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ and
NATIVIDAD CRUZ-HERNANDEZ, vs. JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS
(G.R. No. 166470 August 7, 2009)
Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may
give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted. Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such
occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude
that her intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below
normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not
necessary. The
observations
of
the
trial
judge
coupled
with
evidence establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice. Here,
the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally when
she testified before the RTC.
Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of
sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar
causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without
outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed
under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable
of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her
ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in
fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence
presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact.
As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a petition for
review. We only take cognizance of questions of fact in exceptional
circumstances, none of which is present in this case. We thus adopt the
factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA. Similarly, we see no
compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts finding as to the
propriety of respondent's appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu. We
therefore affirm her appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is
tasked to care for and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her estate as
well.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA
(G.R. No. 188315 August 25, 2010)

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Indeed, it was stipulated during the pre-trial conference that appellant is the
guardian of AAA. However, we cannot simply invoke this admission to
consider guardianship as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape.
"Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot
be subject of stipulation. The accused cannot be condemned to suffer the
extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or admissions. This
strict rule is warranted by the gravity and irreversibility of capital
punishment. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically
allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying
circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender."
The Court notes from the transcripts of the proceedings in Congress on this
particular point that the formulators were not definitive on the concept of
"guardian" as it now appears in the attendant circumstances added to the
original provisions of Article 335 of the Code. They took note of the status of
a guardian as contemplated in the law on rape but, apparently on pragmatic
considerations to be determined by the courts on an ad hoc basis, they
agreed to just state "guardian" without the qualification that he should be a
legal or judicial guardian. It was assumed, however, that he should at the
very least be a de facto guardian. Indeed, they must have been aware of
jurisprudence that the guardian envisaged in Article 335 of the Code, even
after its amendment by Republic Act No. 4111, would either be a natural
guardian, sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory guardian, or a
judicial guardian appointed by the court over the person of the ward.
They did agree, however, that the additional attendant circumstances
introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 should be considered as special
qualifying circumstances specifically applicable to the crime of rape and,
accordingly, cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances. The obvious
ratiocination is that, just like the effect of the attendant circumstances
therefore added by Republic Act No. 4111, although the crime is still
denominated as rape such circumstances have changed the nature of simple
rape by producing a qualified form thereof punishable by the higher penalty
of death.
xxxx
The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous
relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the
guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from
violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in appellant's case
or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian
of a ward or another's property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real
guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray the trust.
In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian
falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by Republic
Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the category of the "common-law

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spouse of the parent of the victim" in the same enumeration, since his
liaison is with respect to the aunt of AAA. Since both logic and fact conjointly
demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of
the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a
temporary period, we cannot impose the death penalty contemplated for a
real guardian under the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7659,
since he does not fit into that category.

NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA

(G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012)
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, we laid out the nature and purpose of
guardianship in the following wise:
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one
person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law
regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed
to further the wards well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to
preserve the wards property, as well as to render any assistance that the
ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves
immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those
responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the
prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons
who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or
other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their
property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision
reads:
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." Under this rule, the word
"incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or
who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to
read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid
intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age,
disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid,
take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should
be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence." We consider that

P a g e | 10

evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at

bar.
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his
proof of his fathers incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by
himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their fathers real and
personal properties) and their fathers former caregiver (who admitted to be
acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not include any
expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of
petitioners cause of action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to
evidence that was filed by respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing to make a
formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of
certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his fathers and his
sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment
of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way
relate to his fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The
only medical document on record is the aforementioned "Report of
Neuropsychological Screening" which was attached to the petition for
guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as
evidence. In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was
ambivalent at best, for although the report had negative findings regarding
memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that
supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed competent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of
proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where
sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary and that
observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing
persons state of mental sanity will suffice."

the
the
the
the

Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on the trial courts unfavorable
September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal role that
petitioners own documentary evidence played in disproving its case and,
likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of respondents
physical and mental state, to wit:
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which
states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and
physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the contrary, Oppositors
evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states that
Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains
that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide
solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa
possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in

P a g e | 11

memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that

oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.

Selling and Encumbering property of Ward

JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA
(G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000)
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.,
the procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the
Family Code are not applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to
take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness that
had rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the appointment of a
judicial guardian of the person or estate or both of such incompetent, under
Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier
had filed such a petition for judicial guardianship.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
"ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
for a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date
of the contract implementing such decision.
"In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)."
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code.
The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated
in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be
obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse
is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court
found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or
semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident,
without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem
infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship
proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.

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Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal property,
the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of administration
has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such
administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the
sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964
Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under
the Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the
requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated
spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be
granted.
NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES vs.COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS
FELIANO and ANUNCIACION FELIANO
(G.R. No. 162421 August 31, 2007)
As to Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as correctly held by the
Court of Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil Code state that:
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator
of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the
property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall
give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the childs
property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules
of Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is considered legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under his or her
parental authority without need of giving a bond in case the amount of the
property of the child does not exceed two thousand pesos. Corollary to this,
Rule 93, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this
case, automatically designates the parent as legal guardian of the child
without need of any judicial appointment in case the latters property does
not exceed two thousand pesos, thus:
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. When the property of the child under
parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the
mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal
guardian x x x x

P a g e | 13

Saturnina was clearly petitioner Ritos legal guardian without necessity of

court appointment considering that the amount of his property or oneseventh of subject property was P1,143.00, which is less than two thousand
pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec. 1 provides that:
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. A guardian appointed shall
have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management
of his estate, or the management of the estate only, as the case may be.
The guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall have the management of
all the estate of the ward within the Philippines, and no court other than that
in which such guardian was appointed shall have jurisdiction over the
guardianship.
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of
the minors property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs
judicial authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito,
sold the latters pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal
authority to do so.
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been
given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers;
xxxx
Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of petitioner
Rito was unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged receipt of the
proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it.
This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale
was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all
the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to
alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal
guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his
undivided share to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina
and the others sold the subject property in its entirety to respondentsspouses, they only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and
not that part which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother.
Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over
their undivided share of subject property.

P a g e | 14

Napoleon D. Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. NeriChambers, Rosa D. Neri-Millan, Douglas D. Neri, Eutropia D. IllutCockinos and Victoria D. Illut-Piala, Petitioners vs. Heirs of Hadji
Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy, Repondents.
(Gr. No. 194366, October 10, 2012)
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property
and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any
act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the
patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father or
mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does
not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such
power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the wards property
and even then only with courts prior approval secured in accordance with
the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.

General powers and duties of guardians

Termination of Guardianship
EDUARDO T. ABAD vs. LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO
(G.R. No. 191993 December 5, 2012)
The court finds Mauras motion meritorious.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without
practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to
which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the
dismissal of the petition.
In his petition, Eduardo Abad prayed for the nullification of the CA Decision
dated August 28, 2009 and Resolution dated April 19, 2010, which dismissed
his appeal from the Decision dated September 26, 2007 of the RTC and
denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively. Basically, he was
challenging Leonardo Biasons qualifications and the procedure by which the
RTC appointed him as guardian for Maura B. Abad. However, with Leonardo
Biasons demise, it has become impractical and futile to proceed with
resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-established rule that the
relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of
either the guardian or the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it
pointless to delve into the propriety of Leonardo Biasons appointment since
the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been dissolved. The
petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for
that matter, any substantial relief.

P a g e | 15

Moreover, Eduardo, in his Comment, shared Mauras belief that the petition
has lost its purpose and even consented to Mauras prayer for the dismissal
of the petition.

TRUSTEES
GERTRUDES F. CUAYCONG, ET AL. vs. LUIS D. CUAYCONG, ET AL.
(G.R. No. L-21616 December 11, 1967)
It is one of an Expressed Trust. The Supreme Court in its decision stated that
, if the intention to establish a trust is clear, the trust is express; if the
intent to establish a trust is to be taken from circumstances or other matters
indicative of such intent, then the trust is implied. From these and from the
provisions of paragraph 8 of the complaint itself, We find it clear that the
plaintiffs alleged an express trust over an immovable, especially since it is
alleged that the trustor expressly told the defendants of his intention to
establish the trust. Such a situation definitely falls under Article 1443 of the
Civil Code. In controverting the allegations of the plaintiffs that not only
paragraph 8 should be considered but the whole complaint, in which case
they argue that an implied trust should be construed to exist, the Supreme
Court refuted their argument stating that even considering the whole
complaint. The intention of the trustor to establish the alleged trust may be
seen in paragraphs 5 and 6. Article 1453 would apply if the person
conveying the property did not expressly state that he was establishing the
trust, unlike the case at bar where he was alleged to have expressed such
intent. Consequently, the lower court did not err in dismissing the complaint.

P a g e | 16

PART II
CASE DIGESTS

P a g e | 17

ESCHEAT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF

DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER 3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA
H. SOLANO, assisted by her husband ROMEO SOLANO, respondents.

P a g e | 18

G.R. No. 143483

January 31, 2002

J. Bellosillo
Facts:
For more than three decades (from 1952 to 1985) private respondent
Amada Solano served as the all-around personal domestic helper of the late
Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national. During Ms. Hankins'
lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her life, respondent
Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close
relative was available to tend to her needs.
In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms. Hankins
executed in her favor two deeds of donation involving two parcels of land
covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 of the Registry of Deeds. Private
respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were
nowhere to be found.
While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition
for the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankins before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City. During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was
filed by Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio
Regosa, but on 24 June 1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for
the reason that "they miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the
properties in question." Since it was established that there were no known
heirs and persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower
court escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of
the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the escheat proceeding is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of
succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its sovereignty,
steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who dies
intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is
claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the
first comers." Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state
may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within
which a claim to such property may be made. The procedure by which the
escheated property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and
a time limit is imposed within which such action must be brought.
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his
claim "within five years from the date of such judgment, such person shall
have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city
shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but
a claim not made shall be barred forever." The 5-year period is not a device
capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary,
it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious

P a g e | 19

in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final
judgment.

Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, Petitioner,

vs.
Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa, Respondents.
G.R. No. 192413
J. Sereno

June 13, 2012

P a g e | 20

Facts:
Respondent Luz R. Bakunawa and her husband Manuel, now deceased,
are the registered owners of six parcels of land covered by their respective
Transfer Certificate of Titles. Sometime in 1990, a certain Teresita Millan,
through her representative, offered to buy said lots for Php 6,724,085.71
with the promise that she will take care of clearing whatever preliminary
obstacles there may be to effect a completion of the sale and to which Millan
made a down payment of Php 1, 019, 514.29. However, Millan failed to clear
said obstacles so Spouses Bakunawa suggested that the contract between
them be rescinded to which Millan refused. The spouses, in order to have
their Titles back, issued a Managers Check with petitioner RCBC equivalent
to the amount deposited by Millan as down payment. While waiting for a
compromise agreement in a civil case filed by Spouses Bakunawa against
Millan, the Manager of RCBC included the amount stated in the Managers
Check when he submitted the list to the Treasury of the Republic of the
Philippines for escheat.
Issues:
I.

Whether the Decision and Order of the RTC were void for
failure to send separate notices to respondents by personal
service

II.

Whether

petitioner

had

the

obligation

to

notify

respondents immediately before it filed its Sworn Statement with

the Treasurer
III.

Whether or not the allocated funds may be escheated in

favor of the Republic

Ruling:
I.

No. The Decision and Order to the RTC are not void.

xxx insofar as banks are concerned, service of processes is made by

delivery of a copy of the complaint and summons upon the president,
cashier, or managing officer of the defendant bank. On the other hand, as
to depositors or other claimants of the unclaimed balances, service
is made by publication of a copy of the summons in a newspaper of
general circulation in the locality where the institution is situated. A notice
about the forthcoming escheat proceedings must also be issued and
published, directing and requiring all persons who may claim any interest
in the unclaimed balances to appear before the court and show cause why
the dormant accounts should not be deposited with the Treasurer.
Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the
issuance of individual notices upon respondents was a jurisdictional
requirement, and that failure to effect personal service on them rendered

P a g e | 21

the Decision and the Order of the RTC void for want of jurisdiction.
Escheat proceedings are actions in rem, whereby an action is brought
against the thing itself instead of the person. Thus, an action may be
instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the
depositors or other claimants. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the
court over the res. Consequently, a judgment of escheat is conclusive
upon persons notified by advertisement, as publication is considered a
general and constructive notice to all persons interested.
II.

Yes. Petitioner has the obligation to notify respondents immediately

before it files its Sworn Statement with the Treasurer.

xxx the law sets a detailed system for notifying depositors of unclaimed
balances. This notification is meant to inform them that their deposit
could be escheated if left unclaimed. Accordingly, before filing a sworn
statement, banks and other similar institutions are under obligation to
communicate with owners of dormant accounts. The purpose of this initial
notice is for a bank to determine whether an inactive account has indeed
been unclaimed, abandoned, forgotten, or left without an owner. If the
depositor simply does not wish to touch the funds in the meantime, but
still asserts ownership and dominion over the dormant account, then the
bank is no longer obligated to include the account in its sworn
statement. It is not the intent of the law to force depositors into
unnecessary litigation and defense of their rights, as the state is only
interested in escheating balances that have been abandoned and left
without an owner.
In case the bank complies with the provisions of the law and
the unclaimed balances are eventually escheated to the Republic, the
bank shall not thereafter be liable to any person for the same and any
action which may be brought by any person against in any bank xxx for
unclaimed balances so deposited xxx shall be defended by the Solicitor
General without cost to such bank. Otherwise, should it fail to comply
with the legally outlined procedure to the prejudice of the depositor, the
bank may not raise the defense provided under Section 5 of Act No.
3936, as amended.
III.

No. The allocated funds may not be escheated in favour of the

Republic.

xxx the mere issuance of a managers check does not ipso facto work
as an automatic transfer of funds to the account of the payee. In case the
procurer of the managers or cashiers check retains custody of the
instrument, does not tender it to the intended payee, or fails to make an
effective delivery, we find the following provision on undelivered
instruments under the Negotiable Instruments Law applicable xxx
It is undisputed that there was no effective delivery of the check,
rendering the instrument incomplete. In addition, we have already settled

P a g e | 22

that respondents retained ownership of the funds. As it is obvious from

their foregoing actions that they have not abandoned their claim over the
fund, we rule that the allocated deposit, subject of the Managers Check,
should be excluded from the escheat proceedings.

P a g e | 23

GUARDIANSHIP

Venue
Appointment Guardians
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ- and
NATIVIDAD CRUZ-HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, Respondent.

P a g e | 24

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 166470

August 7, 2009

CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-SAGUN and

TERESA C. HERNANDEZ-VILLA ABRILLE, Petitioners,
vs.
JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 169217
J. Corona
Facts:
Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14,
1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Her
maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan, took care of her when Maria died. She
subsequently became the sole testate heir of her uncle when she started
living with her fathers new family. Felix continued to exercise actual
administration of Lulus properties until her half-siblings namely: Cecilio C.
Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa
Abrille took over upon their fathers death. During such period of informal
administration, they undertook various "projects" involving her real
properties so she sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, Jovita
San Juan-Santos on September 1988. She was appalled that Lulu was
severely overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. She was afflicted with
tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes due to her poor hygiene. She filed a
petition for guardianship in the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal
alleging that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her
estate because she was of weak mind. The trial court declared Lulu an
incompetent and appointed Jovita as guardian over the person and property
of Lulu on a P1 million bond which the appellate court affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not Lulu is incompetent.
Ruling:
We find the petition to be without merit.
Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness
may give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is
sufficiently acquainted. Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with
her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and
conclude that her intelligence level was below average and her mental stage
below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence.

not

Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is

necessary. The observations of the trial judge coupled with

P a g e | 25

evidence establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice. Here,
the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally when
she testified before the RTC.
Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of
sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar
causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without
outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed
under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable
of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her
ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in
fact an incompetent would require a re-examination of the evidence
presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact.
As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a petition
for review. We only take cognizance of questions of fact in exceptional
circumstances, none of which is present in this case. We thus adopt the
factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA. Similarly, we see no
compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts finding as to the
propriety of respondent's appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu. We
therefore affirm her appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is
tasked to care for and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her estate as
well.

P a g e | 26

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 188315

August 25, 2010

J. Perez
Facts:
AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB, since she was just a few
months old. BBB is married to appellant, who was working abroad for six
years. Appellant came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was
working as a restaurant supervisor from 4:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. for six days
a week. In February 1999 at around 9:30 p.m., AAA, then 11 years old, felt
and saw appellant touch her thighs. Appellant again touched AAA from her
legs up to her breast the next day. AAA tried to resist but appellant
threatened that he will kill her and BBB. Two weeks after the incident,
appellant slowly parted AAAs legs and inserted his penis into AAAs vagina.
The same occurrence was repeated at least three (3) times a week at
around the same time until October 15, 2002. The Regional Trial Court and
Court of Appeals held that appellant was guilty of rape.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is the guardian of AAA.
Ruling:
We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the qualifying
circumstance of relationship.
Indeed, it was stipulated during the pre-trial conference that appellant
is the guardian of AAA. However, we cannot simply invoke this admission to
consider guardianship as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape.
"Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot
be subject of stipulation. The accused cannot be condemned to suffer the
extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or admissions. This
strict rule is warranted by the gravity and irreversibility of capital
punishment. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically
allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying
circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender."
The Court notes from the transcripts of the proceedings in Congress on
this particular point that the formulators were not definitive on the concept
of "guardian" as it now appears in the attendant circumstances added to the
original provisions of Article 335 of the Code. They took note of the status of
a guardian as contemplated in the law on rape but, apparently on pragmatic
considerations to be determined by the courts on an ad hoc basis, they
agreed to just state "guardian" without the qualification that he should be a
legal or judicial guardian. It was assumed, however, that he should at the
very least be a de facto guardian. Indeed, they must have been aware of
jurisprudence that the guardian envisaged in Article 335 of the Code, even

P a g e | 27

after its amendment by Republic Act No. 4111, would either be a natural
guardian, sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory guardian, or a
judicial guardian appointed by the court over the person of the ward.
They did agree, however, that the additional attendant circumstances
introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 should be considered as special
qualifying circumstances specifically applicable to the crime of rape and,
accordingly, cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances. The obvious
ratiocination is that, just like the effect of the attendant circumstances
therefore added by Republic Act No. 4111, although the crime is still
denominated as rape such circumstances have changed the nature of simple
rape by producing a qualified form thereof punishable by the higher penalty
of death.
xxxx
The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the
consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which
impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally
deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in
appellant's case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a
mere custodian of a ward or another's property. The fiduciary powers
granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray
the trust.
In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the
guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by
Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the category of the
"common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" in the same enumeration,
since his liaison is with respect to the aunt of AAA. Since both logic and fact
conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere
caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of
authority for a temporary period, we cannot impose the death penalty
contemplated for a real guardian under the amendments introduced by
Republic Act No. 7659, since he does not fit into that category.

P a g e | 28

NILO OROPESA, Petitioner, vs. CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 184528

April 25, 2012

J. Leonardo-De Castro
Facts:
On January 23, 2004, petitioner Nilo Oropesa filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Paranaque City a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez
to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, respondent
Cirilo Oropesa on the ground that the latter has been afflicted with several
maladies and has been sickly for over ten years already making his
judgment and memory impaired. The trial court ordered the conduct of a
social study case to which the respondent refused to adhere with. The
respondent filed his oppositions to the application and later on, when
petitioner failed to present his formal offer of evidence, respondent moved
for the omnibus dismissal of the case to which the trial court acceded to. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of the trial court finding the
application for appointment as guardian bereft of merit. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Cirilo Oropesa is considered an incompetent person
as defined under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
The court finds the petition bereft of merit.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, we laid out the nature and purpose of
guardianship in the following wise:
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in
which one person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward"
whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A
guardianship is designed to further the wards well-being, not that of the
guardian. It is intended to preserve the wards property, as well as to
render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been
stated that while custody involves immediate care and control,
guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in
loco parentis as well.

In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian

if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.

P a g e | 29

A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that

persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak
mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and
their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision
reads:
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." Under this rule, the
word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who
are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even
though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind,
but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,
cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their
property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.

We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent

should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence." We consider
that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case
at bar.
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary
evidence, his proof of his fathers incompetence consisted purely of
testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in
their fathers real and personal properties) and their fathers former
caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction). These
testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were
insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioners cause of action and
instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by
respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing to
make a formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised
mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his
fathers and his sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts
showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which
do not in any way relate to his fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions
for himself. The only medical document on record is the aforementioned
"Report of Neuropsychological Screening" which was attached to the petition
for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as
evidence. In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was
ambivalent at best, for although the report had negative findings regarding
memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that
supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed competent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of
the proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where the
sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary and that the

P a g e | 30

observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the

persons state of mental sanity will suffice."
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on the trial courts unfavorable
September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal role that
petitioners own documentary evidence played in disproving its case and,
likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of respondents
physical and mental state, to wit:
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert
which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental,
emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the contrary,
Oppositors evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which
states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the
domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can
provide solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen.
Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired
abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the
Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.

Selling and Encumbering Property of Ward

JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L.
JARDELEZA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. 109557

November 29, 2000

J. Pardo

Facts:
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s suffered a stroke on March 25, 1991 which
left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Upon learning
that one piece of real property belonging to his father was about to be sold,
Teodoro Jardeleza, on June 6, 1991, filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4689, in
the matter of the guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. On June 6, 1991.
He averred that the present physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Jardeleza,
Sr. prevented him from competently administering his properties. He further
prayed that Letters of Guardianship be issued in favor of his mother, Gilda
Ledesma Jardeleza. In contrast, Gilda L. Jardeleza filed a petition for the
declaration of incapacity of her husband, assumption of sole powers of
administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the same
several days later. The trial court authorized Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume
sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties and sell Lot No.
4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo. Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition;

P a g e | 31

however, the court issued an Order approving the deed of absolute sale. The
appellate court reversed the lower courts ruling.
Issue: Whether or not Gilda L. Jardeleza may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to
Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr.
was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to
illness that had rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the
appointment of a judicial guardian of the person or estate or both of such
incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Indeed,
petitioner earlier had filed such a petition for judicial guardianship.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
"ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
"In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties,
the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by
the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
(165a)."
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under
the Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family
Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or
separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or
cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the nonconsenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this
case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who
was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke,
cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a
diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial
guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.

P a g e | 32

Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under

the Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal
property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of
administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the
Rules of Court.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such
administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the
sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964
Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure
under the Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial court did not even
observe the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the
incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition
should not be granted.

NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and ANUNCIACION
FELIANO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 162421

August 31, 2007

C.J. Puno
Facts:
Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966. He left a 5,714-square meter
parcel of land in Sogod, Southern Leyte to his surviving wife Saturnina and
five children namely: Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and Rito.
Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject property to Dr. Cayetano
Corrompido for P2,000.00, with right to repurchase within eight years. They

P a g e | 33

later redeemed the property when Saturnina paid for the share of her
deceased son, Alberto. They subsequently sold the same parcel of land to
spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for P8,000.00. They agreed that
Nelson, Albertos son, will only receive the difference of P176.34 upon
reaching the age of 21. The 24-year old Rito, on the other hand,
acknowledged the receipt of P1,143.00 from Jesus Feliano on July 24, 1986.
Upon Saturninas death, Nelson and Rito initiated a complaint for redemption
of the subject land plus damages contending that they could not have sold
their respective shares in subject property when they were minors. The trial
court ruled against them, but the appellate court modified the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the sale executed by the legal guardian Saturnina
Cabales is valid.
Ruling:
The petition is denied.
As to Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as correctly held by
the Court of Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil Code state that:
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental
authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court
of First Instance.
Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of
the childs property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians
under the Rules of Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is considered
legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under his or her
parental authority without need of giving a bond in case the amount of the
property of the child does not exceed two thousand pesos. Corollary to this,
Rule 93, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this
case, automatically designates the parent as legal guardian of the child
without need of any judicial appointment in case the latters property does
not exceed two thousand pesos, thus:
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. When the property of the child under
parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the
mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal
guardian x x x x
Saturnina was clearly petitioner Ritos legal guardian without necessity
of court appointment considering that the amount of his property or oneseventh of subject property was P1,143.00, which is less than two thousand
pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec. 1 provides that:

P a g e | 34

Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. A guardian appointed shall

have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management
of his estate, or the management of the estate only, as the case may be.
The guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall have the management of
all the estate of the ward within the Philippines, and no court other than that
in which such guardian was appointed shall have jurisdiction over the
guardianship.
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of
administration of the minors property. It does not include the power of
alienation which needs judicial authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal
guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latters pro-indiviso share in subject
land, she did not have the legal authority to do so.
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been
given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers;
xxxx
Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of
petitioner Rito was unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged receipt
of the proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively
ratified it. This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to
him.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of
sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and
all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to
alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal
guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his
undivided share to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina
and the others sold the subject property in its entirety to respondentsspouses, they only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and
not that part which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother.
Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over
their undivided share of subject property.

Napoleon D. Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. NeriChambers, Rosa D. Neri-Millan, Douglas D. Neri, Eutropia D. IllutCockinos and Victoria D. Illut-Piala, Petitioners

P a g e | 35

vs.
Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy, Repondents.
Gr. No. 194366, October 10, 2012
Perlas-Bernabe, J.:
Facts:
When Anunciacion Neri died intestate in 1977, she was survived by her
second husband Enrique Neri and her two children from her first marriage
and five children from the second marriage. Throughout the second
marriage, Anunciacion and Enrique acquired several homestead which then
became the subject of an Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Deed of
Sale purporting to transfer titles to Spouses Uy, who are now represented by
their heirs. Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of their
two minor children, Rosa and Douglas, and the other three children
(Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda) executed the said settlement with deed of
sale the validity of which was later questioned in an action for annulment
filed by the children including those who were allegedly deprived of their
legitime. The trial court ruled that indeed, the Extra-judicial Settlement with
Deed of Sale was void as it deprives some of the heirs of their legitime. The
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling.
Issues:
I.

Whether Enrique has the capacity to dispose or alienate the

share of his minor children in the latters share in the estate
considering the fact that he was their natural guardian.

II.

Whether in a consequent affidavit executed by Rosa (one of the

minors) confirming the Exttra-judicial settlement of Estate with
Deed of Sale constitutes her ratification to said agreement.

Ruling:
I.

No. Enrique does not have the capacity to dispose or alienate the
share of his minor children in the latters share in the estate
even if he is their natural guardian.

With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the
execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father,
Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the
laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of
administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in
the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of
the execution of the settlement and sale, provide:

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ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental
authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court
of First Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of
the childs property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians
under the Rules of Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. When the property of the child under
parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or
the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his
legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian
of the childs property, with the duties and obligations of guardians
under these Rules, and shall file the petition required by Section 2
hereof. For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another
suitable persons.
II.

Yes. The affidavit executed by Rosa is a ratification on her part.

Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives
sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his
sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly
made, which amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized,
and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification. Once
ratified, expressly or impliedly such as when the person knowingly received
benefits from it, the contract is cleansed from all its defects from the
moment it was constituted, as it has a retroactive effect.
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of
the estate with absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and Rosas
Manifestation before the RTC dated July 11, 1997,they stated:
"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father,
Enrique Neri concurred in and conformed to by us and our other two
sisters and brother (the other plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji Yusop Uy
and his spouse Hadja Julpa Uy on July 7, 1979, we both confirmed that
the same was voluntary and freely made by all of us and therefore the
sale was absolutely valid and enforceable as far as we all plaintiffs in
this case are concerned;" (Underscoring supplied)
In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit, Napoleon and Rosa also alleged:

P a g e | 37

"That we are surprised that our names are included in this case since
we do not have any intention to file a case against Hadji Yusop Uy and
Julpha Ibrahim Uy and their family and we respect and acknowledge
the validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
Deed of Sale dated July 7, 1979;" (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the foregoing statements constituted ratification of the settlement of
the estate and the subsequent sale, thus, purging all the defects existing at
the time of its execution and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosas 1/16
share in the estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is not
true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.

P a g e | 38

General powers and duties of guardians

Termination of Guardianship
EDUARDO T. ABAD, Petitioner,
vs.
LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191993

December 5, 2012

J. Reyes
Facts:
Eduardo Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the person and
properties of Maura B. Abad on March 19, 2007. He averred that Maura, who
is single, more than ninety years old and a resident of Rizal Street,
Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, is in dire need of a guardian who will look
after her and her business affairs. On June 14, 2007, Leonardo Biason filed a
Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the Petition alleging he was a nephew
of Maura who was not notified of the pendency of the petition for the
appointment of the latters guardian. He vehemently opposed the
appointment of Eduardo as Mauras guardian because he cannot perform his
duties when he resides in Quezon City and Maura maintains her abode in
Mangaldan, Pangasinan. He further prayed that he be appointed as Mauras
guardian, since he was previously granted by the latter with a power of
attorney to manage her properties. Leonardo died during the pendency of
the petition so Maura filed a Manifestation and Motion prayed that the
petition be dismissed and the guardianship be terminated.
Issue: Whether or not the guardianship is terminated due to Leonardo
Biasons death.
Ruling:
The court finds Mauras motion meritorious.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would
be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual
substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would
be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
In his petition, Eduardo Abad prayed for the nullification of the CA
Decision dated August 28, 2009 and Resolution dated April 19, 2010, which
dismissed his appeal from the Decision dated September 26, 2007 of the
RTC and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively. Basically, he
was challenging Leonardo Biasons qualifications and the procedure by which

P a g e | 39

the RTC appointed him as guardian for Maura B. Abad. However, with
Leonardo Biasons demise, it has become impractical and futile to proceed
with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-established rule that the
relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of
either the guardian or the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it
pointless to delve into the propriety of Leonardo Biasons appointment since
the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been dissolved. The
petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for
that matter, any substantial relief.
Moreover, Eduardo, in his Comment, shared Mauras belief that the
petition has lost its purpose and even consented to Mauras prayer for the
dismissal of the petition.

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TRUSTEES

P a g e | 41

GERTRUDES F. CUAYCONG, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
LUIS D. CUAYCONG, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-21616

December 11, 1967

J. Bengzon
Facts:
Eduardo Cuaycong, married to Clotilde de Leon, died on June 21, 1936
without issue but with three brothers and a sister surviving him: Lino, Justo,
Meliton and Basilisa. Upon his death, his properties were distributed to his
heirs as he willed except two haciendas in Victorias, Negros Occidental,
devoted to sugar and other crops the Haciendas Sta. Cruz and Pusod both
known as Hacienda Bacayan. Hacienda Bacayan is comprised of eight lots, all
of which are titled in the name of Luis D. Cuaycong, son of Justo Cuaycong.
Lino Cuaycong died on May 4, 1937.
The surviving children of Lino Cuaycong and the surviving children of
Anastacio: as well as the children of deceased Praxedes Cuaycong Betia,
filed as pauper litigants, a suit against Justo, Luis and Benjamin Cuaycong 1
for conveyance of inheritance and accounting, before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental (Civil Case No. 6314), alleging Eduardo
Cuaycong had an understanding with his father Justo and Luis Cuaycong to
partition the said property to his siblings and his wife Clotilde.
Luis D. Cuaycong moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of
unenforceability of the claim under the statute of frauds, no cause of action
(Rule 8, Sec. 1 [f] of the Rules of Court), and bar of causes of action by the
statute of limitations.
The Court of First Instance ruled that the trust alleged, particularly in
paragraph 8 of the complaint, refers to an immovable which under Article
1443 of the Civil Code may not be proved by parole evidence. Plaintiffs were
given 10 days to file an amended complaint mentioning or alleging therein
the written evidence of the alleged trust, otherwise the case would be
dismissed. The court decreed that since there was no amended complaint
filed, thus, no enforceable claim, it was useless to declare Benjamin
Cuaycong in default.
Plaintiff thereafter manifested that the claim is based on an implied

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trust as shown by paragraph 8 of the complaint. They added that there being
no written instrument of trust, they could not amend the complaint to
include such instrument. The court dismissed the case for failure to amend
the complaint; it further refused to reconsider its order denying the motion
to declare Benjamin Cuaycong in default, stating that such a default
declaration would be of no purpose.
Failing in their efforts to have the dismissal reconsidered, plaintiffs
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or Not the trust established in the case is one of Express or
Implied.
Ruling:
It is one of an Expressed Trust. The Supreme Court in its decision
stated that , if the intention to establish a trust is clear, the trust is express;
if the intent to establish a trust is to be taken from circumstances or other
matters indicative of such intent, then the trust is implied. From these and
from the provisions of paragraph 8 of the complaint itself, We find it clear
that the plaintiffs alleged an express trust over an immovable, especially
since it is alleged that the trustor expressly told the defendants of his
intention to establish the trust. Such a situation definitely falls under Article
1443 of the Civil Code. In controverting the allegations of the plaintiffs that
not only paragraph 8 should be considered but the whole complaint, in which
case they argue that an implied trust should be construed to exist, the
Supreme Court refuted their argument stating that even considering the
whole complaint. The intention of the trustor to establish the alleged trust
may be seen in paragraphs 5 and 6. Article 1453 would apply if the person
conveying the property did not expressly state that he was establishing the
trust, unlike the case at bar where he was alleged to have expressed such
intent. Consequently, the lower court did not err in dismissing the complaint.