Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2008-2009
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
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PERSONS
& FAMILY
RELATIONS
Professor E. A. Pangalangan
Caveat lector.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Intersection of Modern
Constitutional Developments and
Traditional Family Law
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution
Sec 12, Art II
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government.
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relations
Indivisible and inherent
Can exist without capacity to
act
II. CIVIL
PERSONALITY
effects
Conditional and voidable
Requires both (1) intelligence
and (2) will.
Capacity is always presumed
KINDS OF PERSONS
STATUS the legal condition or class to which one belongs
in society; the legal or juridical position of the individual in
the society; determines the nature and number of his rights
and obligation
KINDS OF STATUS
A. as a member of society
- resident or non-resident - alien or non-citizen
B. as a member of family
- single, married or divorced
- parent or child; brother or sister
- legitimate, illegitimate or adopted
C. as himself
- age
- sex
- mental condition
- occupation (not a status because not inherent)
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATUS
1. inalienable
2. imprescriptible
3. cant be renounced
4. cant be subject to compromise
5. rights arise from it cannot be exercised by creditors
NATURAL
- human beings
- products of procreation
JURIDICAL
- artificial, abstract
- product of legal fiction
Natural Persons
CC, Art 40 Birth determines personality; but the conceived
shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to
it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article.
PERSONALITY v CAPACITY
(These two concepts are intimately related but not identical)
Personality is:
is product of capacity in law
external manifestation of capacity
synonymous to juridical capacity
Generally, cannot be limited
Specifically, may suffer limitations because its merely
the result of capacity to act
GELUZ v CA (1961)
2 SCRA 801
- Nita Villanueva had three abortions with Dr. Antonio Geluz
which Oscar Lazo, the husband, is not aware of
- Husband filed for damages of P3000 by virtue of Art 2206
which CA sustained
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Both under 15
Both over 60
Under 15 and over 60
Between 15 60
Under 15/over 60 & bet
older
younger
younger
male or if same sex, older
between the 15 and 60
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Juridical Persons
Kinds of Juridical Persons (CC, Art 44) and laws governing
them (CC, Art 45)
1) state and its political subdivisions governed by the laws
creating or recognizing them
2) other corporations, institutions and entities for public
interest created by laws governed by the laws creating
or recognizing them
3) corporations, partnerships and associations for private
interest or purpose to which the law grants juridical
personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member stock or non-stock
governed by the provisions of this Code concerning
partnership
4.
2. Restrictions
CC, Art 6 Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
CC, Art 38 Minority, insanity/imbecility, state of being deafmute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restriction on
capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person
from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts
of from property relations.
A. Minority
RA 6809 - Lowers the age of majority from 21 to 18
Contracts
Art 1327 (1) unemancipated minors cannot give consent to
contract no more concept of unemancipated minors because age of emancipation =
majority
Art 1390 (1) if one is incapable of contract, valid unless
courts says otherwise VOIDABLE
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Periods of responsibility
absolute irresponsibility
conditional responsibility
of discernment is 15-18
(a) manner of committing
(b) conduct of the offender
-- for mitigated responsibility, penalty is one degree lower
Crimes
B. Insanity
Contracts
Art 1327 (2) insane/demented cannot give consent to
contract
Art 1328 (1) contracted in a lucid interval is valid, but
burden to prove lucid interval on prosecution
Art 1399
restitution not obliged if not benefited
Crime
Art 12(1)
not exempt from criminal liability if lucid
interval
PRESUMPTION OF SANITY
a) circumstantial evidence is sufficient
b) insanity must prove to precede the act
Art 1327
Art 807
Art 820
D. Prodigality
Art 92 (2), RC
E. Civil Interdiction
Art 34, RPC Civil interdiction. Civil interdiction shall
deprive the offender during the time of his
sentence of the rights of parental authority, or
guardianship, either as to the person or
property of any ward, of marital authority, of
the right to manage his property and of the
right to dispose of such property by any act or
any conveyance inter vivos.
Art 54, CC
or
of
of
to
F. Family Relations
Art 37, FC
Art 87, FC
Art 215, FC
incestuous marriage
donation inter vivos not allowed bet spouses
disqualified to testify against each other unless
indispensable to crime against him/another
grand/parent
Art 1109, CC prescription does not run between husband
and wife, parent and child (minority or
insanity), guardian and ward
Art 1490, CC spouses cannot sell property to each other
unless:
(a) separation of property in marriage
settlement
(b) judicial separation of property
G. Absence
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III. PRE-MARITAL
CONTROVERSY
Breach of promise to marry
CC Art 19
Every person must, in exercise of rights and
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone else
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
CC Art 20
Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter
for the same.
CC Art 21
Any person who willfully causes loss o injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for damage.
CC Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter.
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COMMIT TO MEMORY!!!
LOVING v VIRGINIA (1967)
388 US 1, 12
Mildred Loving (of African and Native American
descent) marries Richard Perry Loving (a Caucasian) in
violation of Virginias Racial Integrity Act which is an
anti-miscegenation statute that prohibits Whites from
marrying into other races
Interesting phrase: Almighty God created the races
white, black, yellow, Malay and red and he placed them
on separate continents. And but for the interference
with his arrangement there would be no cause for such
marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows
that he did not intend for the races to mix.
The statute fuels White Supremacy because only
Whites are forbidden to intermarry, other races can
marry anyone
ISSUE: WON the statute is unconstitutional for violation of
both the equal protection and due process clauses of 14th
Amendment
HELD: Yes. The freedom to marry has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the
basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence
and survival. Decisions SC and CA of Virginia are reversed.
ZABLOCKI v REDHAIL (1978)
434 US 374, 384
Thomas Zablocki was denied marriage license because
of non-support to prior children. Even if he marries
outside their state, it will still not be valid.
The state interest of this statute was to protect the
welfare of out of custody children and prevent
incurrence of new obligation by the illegitimate parent.
The parent must first prove that he can sustain his two
families and should undergo counseling.
ISSUE: WON statute is unconstitutional for violation of equal
protection and due process clauses
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A. Marriage Models
CHARACTERISTICS OF MARRIAGE
1. civil (independent of any religion)
2. institute of public order and policy
3. natural (organic perpetuation of man)
PRINCIPAL EFFECTS OF A VALID MARRIAGE
1. emancipation from parental authority
2. personal and economic relations between spouses
3. personal and economic relations between parent &
child
4. family relationship
5. legitimacy of sexual union and family
6. modification of criminal liability
7. incapacity to make donations to each other
8. disqualification to testify against each other
MARRIAGE
ORDINARY CONTRACTS
Only between man and
May be same sex
woman
Specified duties and rights of Have the force of law
spouses
between them
May not be subject to
Can be terminated at the
stipulation or terminated
agreement of parties
Breech of obligation not
Breach of contract gives rise
actionable
to action for damages
*In both marriage and ordinary contracts, partys consent is
necessary
TERMS OF A TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE CONTRACT
(1) husband as head of family name and domicile
(2) husband responsible for support
(3) wife responsible for domestic and childcare services
GRAHAM v GRAHAM (1940) (pronounced as /grahm/)
33 F. Supp. 936
James Sebastian Graham, plaintiff sues his former wife,
Margrethe, defendant, to recover what he was allegedly
entitled by a written agreement wherein defendant
agreed to pay the plaintiff a certain some of money.
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B. Requisites of Marriage
1. ESSENTIAL REQUISITES intrinsic (Art 2)
A. Legal capacity
a.
b.
c.
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Art 19
Art 20
Art 21
Art 22
Art 23
Art 24
Art 25
Art 26
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the case that respondent judge was liable for misconduct for
solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license. It also
said that the respondent judges claim of good intentions
could never justify violation of the law.
PEOPLE v BORROMEO (1984)
133 SCRA 106
Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
parricide, claiming that he should only be charged with
homicide since he and his partner were not legally
married, there being no marriage contract executed
during their church wedding.
ISSUE:
WON the absence of a marriage contract is
sufficient to render a marriage void.
HELD: The Court ruled in the negative, for the fact that no
record of the marriage existed in the registry is not enough
to invalidate the marriage. For as long as all the requisites
for the marriage were present in the celebration
thereof, the marriage subsists. Presumption is always
for the validity of the marriage.
- Also, during the trial, Elias Borromeo admitted that he was
married to the victim. The Court took cognizance of this fact
and articulated that there was no better proof of marriage
than the admission of one of the parties of the existence of
such marriage. Furthermore, the accused and victim have
lived together as husband and wife and even had one child.
Since the presumption of law is in favor of the marriage, all
evidence points to Elias Borromeo's conviction of parricide.
SEGUISABAL v CABRERA (1981)
106 SCRA 67
Judge Cabrera charged with gross ignorance of the law
for having solemnized the marriage of Jaime Sayson
and Marlyn Jagonoy without a marriage license.
Judge's story: Contracting parties and their families
came to him bearing a marriage contract. Their request
to have the marriage officiated was of such urgency
that the judge conceded after making them promise to
deliver the marriage license that same afternoon.
Unfortunately, no marriage license was delivered.
About a year later, Marlyn Jagonoy went to see the
judge, telling him she needed proof of her marriage to
Jaime Sayson in order to secure the benefits accorded
to Jaime's family after his death as a soldier.
The judge gave a copy of the marriage contract to
Jagonoy and told her to present the same to the local
civil registrar and to have them issue her a marriage
license.
Local civil registrar naturally refused to issue said
license ("for the reason that the parties have not
attended the Family Planning seminar")
HELD: Absent the formal requisite of a marriage license, the
marriage was void. Judge should not have solemnized the
marriage without first securing said license. Despite the
assertions of good faith, the judge was fined an equivalent
of his three months salary.
ALCANTARA v ALCANTARA (2007)
531 SCRA 446
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C. Ceremony
3. PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE
a.
b.
c.
d.
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Age essential
requisite
Solemnizing Officer
formal requisite
Marriage License
formal requisite
Legal impediment
essential requisite
Consent essential
requisite
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PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
-
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3. EFFECTS OF NULLITY
*For provisions refer to the table in the appendix
NIAL v BADAYOG (2000)
328 SCRA 122
Nial and Badayog were married in 1974.
Nial shot his wife Bellones in 1985, causing her death
(why didnt they convict him of parricide???). After a
year and a half, Ninal contracted a second marriage
with Badayog without a marriage license. They
executed an affidavit stating they have cohabited for at
least five years.
Ninal died in 1997. His children with Bellones seek a
declaration of nullity of Ninal's marriage with Badayog.
It is assumed that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect the children's
successional rights.
HELD: Nial and Badayog's marriage is void for lack of
marriage license. They are not exempt from acquiring a
marriage license because their five-year cohabitation was
not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in
the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the
law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of
the marriage contract. Of the five years that they had
cohabited, only 20 months were without any legal
impediment.
Other than for purposes of remarriage (see Article 40 of
the Family Code), no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case.
* This is weird Nial should have been disqualified to marry
Badayog because of Art 38 Par 9 (kills own or other wife
with the intention to marry another or the victims spouse)
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B. Voidable Marriages
-
For Par 4:
Violence use of serious or irresistible force to wrest
consent (Art 1335, CC)
Undue influence improper advantage of power over
the will of the other, depriving the latter of
reasonable freedom of choice, threat to enforce a
legal claim does not invalidate consent to a marriage
Reverential fear fear of causing distress,
disappointment or anger on part of the victim
For Par 5:
IMPOTENCY is different from STERILITY. Impotency
cannot harden up, so no sex is possible. Sterility, on the
other hand, is characterized by low spermatozoa count.
However, the fact that intercourse is possible, there
remains a possibility, no matter how low or tiny, for the
husband to sire a child.
Old age is not a ground because one who marries an
old person should have been prepared for the others
impotence.
DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION: If wife
remains a virgin after three years of living together, the
presumption of impotency commences unless proven
otherwise.
FC, Art 46 What do you mean by fraud in Art 45 (3)?
Concealment of:
1. final conviction of moral turpitude
2. pregnancy by man other than husband
3. STD
4. Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism
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yrs at the time of the 2nd marriage. The date that should be
considered therefore, is Jan 1918, when Arthur left and was
never heard from again. Therefore, when the 2nd marriage
was celebrated, Arthur was already absent for more than 9
yrs. Also, the fact that their marriage doesnt appear in the
register does not affect the validity of the marriage.
Furthermore, the court also pointed out that ME and even
AJ herself believed Arthur was dead, as evidenced by her
treating FH as her step father.
YU v YU (2006)
484 SCRA 485
Custody of child pending annulment case
Eric Jonathan Yu files for an annulment case in Pasig
RTC for wifes psychological incapacity
Caroline Yu seeks custody of their child, Bianca, in
Pasay RTC litis pendentia (pending case)
Pasig RTC has jurisdiction because of Art 49 (incidents
of a pending decree shall be specified by court wherein
the declaration for nullity was filed)
Custody goes to father because mother is unfit
TAMANO v ORTIZ (1998)
291 SCRA 584
1958
Senator Mamintal Abudul Jabar Tamano married
Haja Putri Zorayda Tamano in civil rites.
1993
Tamano married Estrelita Tamano in civil rites too
1994
Tamano died
- Zorayda and son filed for the declaration of nullity because
of bigamy
- Misrepresentations of Tamano as divorced (they never
divorced) and Estrelita as single (annulment was not final
and executory for non-compliance with Art 53) indicates
lack of intention to invoke Muslim practice of polygamy
- Estrelita contends that RTC has no jurisdiction because
they were Muslims, hence jurisdiction belongs to Sharia
Courts
HELD: Sharia Courts have jurisdiction only over marriages
solemnized in Muslim rites. Law is silent as to marriages
performed both civilly and Muslim. On the other hand,
exclusive jurisdiction of all kinds of marriage (civil and
Muslim) belongs to RTC. Besides, they did not perform
wedding ceremony in accordance to Muslim customs.
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VI. LEGAL
SEPARATION
A. Grounds for Legal Separation
FC, Art 57
1.
Repeated physical violence against
a.
petitioner
b.
petitioners child
c.
common child of petitioner and respondent
2.
Moral or physical pressure to convert religious or
political beliefs
3.
Attempt to corrupt or induce (a) petitioner, (b)
petitioners child and (c) common child of petitioner and
respondent into prostitution or connivance in such a
practice
4.
Respondents final judgment of conviction for more than
six years, even if pardoned
5.
Habitual alcoholism, drug addiction
6.
Lesbianism or homosexuality
7.
Bigamous marriage, here or abroad
8.
Sexual infidelity or perversion
9.
Attempt at the life of the petitioner
10.
Abandonment without justifiable cause for one year
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Art 61 a)
b)
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Rosario did not return them but instead filed for civil
case for custody grant, because he is already living with
another woman and the kids want to stay with her
RTC orders her to return the kids to him within 24
hours
F. Reconciliation
-
Art 63 1)
2)
VII. DIVORCES
Is there divorce in the Philippines?
A. Foreign Divorces
FC, Art 15 Nationality theory applies in the Philippines.
Philippine laws follow Filipinos anywhere they go.
FC, Art 26 Marriages valid where celebrated are valid
everywhere except when
1) one is below 18
2) bigamous, not under Art 41
3) mistake as to identity of other party
4) void under 53 for non-compliance
5) psychological incapacity
6) incestuous
7) public policy
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B. Muslim Divorces
-
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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VIII. DE FACTO
SEPARATION
FC, Art 100 The separation in fact between husband and wife
shall not affect the regime of ACP except that:
1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses
to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the
2.
3.
right to be supported
When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of
the other is required by law, judicial authorization
shall be obtained in a summary proceeding
In the absence of sufficient community property, the
separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the support of the family. The spouse
present shall, upon proper petition in a summary
proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer
or encumber any specific separate property of the
other spouse sand use the fruits or proceeds thereof
to satisfy the latters share
FC, Art 127 The separation in fact between husband and wife
shall not affect the regime of CPG except that:
1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses
to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the
right to be supported
2. When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of
the other is required by law, judicial authorization
shall be obtained in a summary proceeding
3. In the absence of sufficient community property, the
separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the support of the family. The spouse
present shall, upon proper petition in a summary
proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer
or encumber any specific separate property of the
other spouse sand use the fruits or proceeds thereof
to satisfy the latters share
FC, Art 239 When a husband and wife are separated in fact,
or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks
judicial authorization for a transaction where the
consent of the other spouses is required by law but such
consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified
petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts.
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying
the transaction and if none shall describe in detail the said
transaction and state the reason why the required consent
thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly
executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by
the court.
FC, Art 242 Upon filing of the petition, the court shall notify
the other spouse, whose consent to the transaction is required,
of said petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the
petition should not be granted, on or before the date set in the
said notice for the initial conference. The notice shall be
accompanied by a copy of the petition and shall be served at
the last known address of the spouse concerned.
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FC, Art 68 The husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity and render
mutual help and support.
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(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical
harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical
harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent
physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her
child to engage in conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to desist from or desist from
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the
woman's or her child's freedom of movement or
conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This
shall include, but not limited to, the following acts
committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or
conduct:
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on
oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or
decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child
to engage in any sexual activity which does not
constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical
harm, or through intimidation directed against the
woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be
limited to, the following acts:
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but
not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
and denial of financial support or custody of minor
children of access to the woman's child/children.
Sec 26 Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. Victimsurvivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from
battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil
liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for
justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal
Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was
suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of the
commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert
psychiatrists/ psychologists.
Sec 28 Custody of children. The woman victim of violence shall
be entitled to the custody and support of her child/children.
Children below seven (7) years old older but with mental or
physical disabilities shall automatically be given to the mother,
with right to support, unless the court finds compelling reasons
to order otherwise.
A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome shall
not be disqualified from having custody of her children. In no
case shall custody of minor children be given to the perpetrator
of a woman who is suffering from battered woman syndrome.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
-
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2.
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ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON their separation is justified - YES. They were
having a stormy life prior to the separation due to the
frequent fights. Isabelo ordered her to leave the house
and threatened to ill-treat her if she returned. Priscas
situation is embarrassing for her mother. Highly
possible that Alejo caused Priscas pregnancy.
Compelling them to cohabit could lead to further
quarrels.
2. WON transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo are
illegal - NO. Failed to prove that property was
community property. Documentary evidences even
show that it was acquired by him before their marriage.
3. WON Cipriana is entitled to P500 monthly maintenance
= NO. Thats too much. P50 is enough.
ATILANO v CHUA CHING BENG (1958)
103 Phil. 255
Pilar Atilano (plaintiff-appellee), 19 years old, married Chua
Ching Beng (defendant-appellant) on May 1951. They lived
in Manila with the parents of the Ching Beng. In October of
that year, the couple went back to Zamboanga for a
vacation in Pilars parents. She stayed behind, telling the
defendant that she would go back to him later. On
September 1953, however, she filed a complaint of support
against her husband, alleging estrangement since October
1952, incessant bickering and his inability to provide a home
for them without his parents.
Defendant did not disclaim obligation to support; however,
he expressed his desire to fulfil his obligation if she returns
to Manila and lives with him in a domicile separate from his
parents. As the husband, he claims the right to fix the
FC, Art 70 The spouses are jointly responsible for the support
of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal
obligations shall be paid from the community property and in
the absence thereof, form the income or fruits of their separate
properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or
fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate
properties.
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CC, Art 111 The husband is responsible for the support of the
wife and the rest of the family. These expenses shall be met
first from the conjugal property, then from the husband's
capital, and lastly from the wife's paraphernal property. In case
there is a separation of property, by stipulation in the marriage
settlements, the husband and wife shall contribute
proportionately to the family expenses.
FC, Art 200 When the obligation to give support falls upon two
or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided
between them in proportion to the resources of each.
However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances,
the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support
provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim form the
other obligors the share due from them.
When two or more recipients at the same time claim support
from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should
the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the
order established in the preceding Article shall be followed,
unless the concurrent obliges should be the spouse and a child
subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be
preferred.
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CC, Art 115 The wife manages the affairs of the household.
She may purchase things necessary for the support of the
family, and the conjugal partnership shall be bound thereby.
She may borrow money for this purpose, if the husband fails to
deliver the proper sum. The purchase of jewelry and precious
objects is voidable, unless the transaction has been expressly or
tacitly approved by the husband, or unless the price paid is
from her paraphernal property.
YOUNG v HECTOR ()
740 So. 2d 1153
E. Exercise of Profession
FC, Art 73 Either spouse may exercise any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent
of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious
and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
1. the objection is proper
2. benefit has accrued to the family prior to the
objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to
the objection, the resulting obligation shall be
enforced against the separate property of the spouse
who has not obtained consent
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of
creditors who acted in good faith.
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6.
RA 7192
Women in Development and Nation-building Act
AN ACT PROMOTING THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN AS
FULL AND EQUAL PARTNERS OF MEN IN DEVELOPMENT
AND NATION BUILDING AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be cited as the "Women in
F. Use of Surname
CC, Art 370 A married woman may use:
1.
2.
3.
ISSUES:
Page 47 of 151
1.
2.
HELD:
1. Yes. If appellant revealed his true situation, appellee
would never have agreed to be with appellant. Esthers
loss of employment in the Girl Scouts Davao Council
was ultimately a result of Silvas deception and she
should be indemnified therefor. His concealment of his
real status was not mere dolo but actual fraud. He
should then stand solely liable for any and all damages
arising therefrom. Moreover, Esther acted in good
faith since Silva formerly introduced her as Mrs. Silva,
sent her letters thus addressed which implied authority
to use his name.
2. Yes. In the face of evidence, it is safe to conclude that
no marriage had really taken place. It is not proper for
Esther to continue representing herself as the wife of
Saturnino considering that at the time, he was still
married to Priscilla Isabel. And as per Art 370 CC, a
married woman is authorized to use husbands
surname, impliedly, it also excludes others from doing
likewise.
TOLENTINO v CA (1988)
162 SCRA 66
Private respondent Consuelo David Arturo Tolentino
(yes, the one who annotated the law) in 1931.
Marriage was dissolved and terminated in 1943
pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation by
a decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of
desertion and abandonment by the wife for at least 3
continuous years.
Arturo Tolentino married Pilar Adorable but she died
soon after the marriage.
Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945
and they have 3 children. Constancia Tolentino is the
present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino.
Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino
after the divorce and up to the time that the complaint
was filed. Her usage of the surname Tolentino was
authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino (brothers
and sisters).
RTC: Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of
the surname of Tolentino
CA: reversed RTC
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners cause of action has already
prescribed
2. WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo
David from using the surname of her former husband
from whom she was divorced.
HELD:
1. Yes
Art 1150 CC The time for prescription of all kinds of
actions, when there in no special provision which
ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they
may be brought.
2.
-
Page 48 of 151
Page 49 of 151
X. PROPERTY
RELATIONS
BETWEEN SPOUSES
MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT is an agreement entered
into before marriage and, in consideration thereof, between
an intended husband and wife, by which the enjoyment or
devolution of property is regulated. A contract entered into
by those who are to be united in marriage, in order to
establish the conditions of their conjugal partnership with
respect to present and future property.
A. General Provisions
FC, Art 74 The property relations between husband and wife
shall be governed in the following order:
1. by marriage settlements executed before the marriage
2. by the provisions of this Code
3. by the local customs
FC, Art 75 The future spouses may, in the marriage
settlements, agree upon the regime of ACP, CPG, complete
separation of property or any other regime. In the absence of
marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is
void, the system of absolute community property as
established in this Code shall govern.
Art 67
Art 128
Art 135
Art 136
Page 50 of 151
ORDINARY DONATIONS
Express acceptance necessary
Cannot be made by minors
No limit to donation of present
property provided legitimes are
not impaired
Grounds for revocation are
found in law on donations
Page 51 of 151
Page 52 of 151
DONATIONS OF
present property takes effect upon
celebration of marriage
future property takes effect upon death (by
will or mortis causa)
Page 53 of 151
4. Void donations
WHAT ARE VOID DONATIONS
1. between spouses during marriage
2. direct or indirect (e.g. stepchild or child of the
other spouse and a person whom the spouses is
presumptive heir at the time of donation)
REASONS FOR PROHIBITION
1. donation inter vivos is dictated by principle of unity
of personality of spouses during marriage
2. prevent weaker spouses from being abused by
stronger spouse, whether by abuse of affection or
threats of violence
3. protect creditors
4. prevent indirect modification of the marriage
settlement
PROHIBITION IS ALSO APPLICABLE TO
1. common-law marriages
2. parties living in a state of adultery or concubinage
* Reasons: possibility of undue influence and that if ruled
otherwise, those living in guilt would be better off than
those in legal union
NAZARENO v BIROG (1947)
45 OG 11 Supp 268
Andrea Rodriguez Juan Aben Alberta Aben
Daughter Alberta Mariano Meleno Nazareno
Bonifacio Nazareno (plaintiff)
When Juan Aben died, Andrea got married to Cirilo
Braganza. Andrea and her second husband Cirilo had
no offspring.
Cirilo executed a deed of donation of land to his then sixyear old step-grandson Bonifacio. The donation was
accepted in the same deed by Alberta and Mariano, parents
of Bonifacio. Cirilo continued to possess and enjoy the land.
Beginning in 1930, Cirilo sold portions of the land:
1930
71 ares and 30 centares to Birog for 1,
100 (paid)
1933
2 hectares to Birog for 2, 200 (initially
with remaining balance of 300, later paid
275, wrote promissory note for 25)
1934
1 hectare and 70 ares to Ariola for 1, 600
(balance of 600, promissory note for that
sum payable at end of Feb or March
1935)
These two buyers immediately took possession of the land
and cultivated them. Cirilo died on Dec.1934 and since
Ariola had not paid by Feb1935, plaintiff wrote him a letter
demanding the payment. Pedro Braganza (brother of Cirilo)
collected balance of 25 from Birog in March 1935).
ISSUE: WON plaintiff, Nazareno, may recover title and
possession of a parcel of land described here?
HELD: NO. Not only did he lose ownership of the two
portions of the land that the Birogs and Ariolas possess, he
Page 54 of 151
ISSUES:
1. WON the testimony of Shirley Eillenger with respect to
the forgery of the deed of donation should be given
credence.
NO. The court agreed with the trial and appellate courts
decision that Eillengers testimony is vague and incredible
and incapable of impugning the validity of the public
document. Forgery should be proven by clear and
convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the burden
of proving the same. Not only is Shirley Eillengers testimony
difficult to believe, it shows is had been rehearsed as she
anticipated the questions of petitioners counsel. Petitioners
should have presented handwriting experts to support their
claim that Georges signature on the deed of donation was
indeed a forgery.
2.
Page 55 of 151
TAXES &
EXPENSES
2 incurred by:
- administratorspouse,
- both spouses, or
- by one spouse
with the
consent of the
other
4 including minor or
major repairs upon
community
property
1 of spouse,
3 incurred by one
without the
consent of the
other to the extent
that family may
have been benefited
(E.g. failed business
which was initially
ok)
5 mere
preservation of
separate property
used by the family
6 commence or
complete education
(professional or
vocational) e.g.
language, speech
power, leadership,
law, culinary
- by either spouse
SUPPORT
common children,
legitimate children
- For illegit:
exclusive/ separate
OR ACP advance,
subject to
reimbursement
upon liquidation
Page 56 of 151
7 antenuptial debts
of either spouse
insofar as benefited
the family (no
consent of other
spouse needed)
10 litigation
between spouses,
unless groundless
8 value
donated/promised
to children for
commencement
and completion of
education
- no age limit
9 antenuptial debts,
that do not benefit
family, for support
of illegitimate
children or
crime/quasi-delict
in case of
insufficiency of
separate property,
deductible for his
share upon
liquidation
* Example of ante-nuptial debt in Par 9: amortization of
conjugal dwelling or family vehicle
* Difference between Par 1 and Par 2
* Difference between Par 4 and Par 5
FC, Art 95 Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any
game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of
gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be
borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the
community but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the
community property.
not take
and the
husband
shall his
* Okay, you say that its not totally unfair because she can
go to Court and assert her views. But is that sufficient
remedy for the wife? Unless you really want to escalate the
fight, resorting to judicial settlement is like raging a war. It
will only turn minor agreements into major brawl. Plus the
cost of lawsuit, it just makes matters worse!
FC, Art 97 Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her
interest in the community property.
Page 57 of 151
5. Dissolution
FC, Art 99 The ACP terminates
1. death of either spouse (Art 103)
2. legal separation (Art 63 & 64)
3. annulled or declared void (Art 50 to 52)
4. judicial separation of property during the marriage
(Art 134 to 138)
NET PROFIT
Page 58 of 151
o
o
Page 59 of 151
FC, Art 107 The rules applied in Art 88 and 89 also apply to
CPG.
Page 60 of 151
2. Exclusive Property
FC, Art 109 The following shall be exclusive property of each
spouse:
(BY SUBSTITUTION)
3.
4.
FC, Art 114 If the donation are onerous, the amount of the
charges shall be borne by the exclusive property of the
donee-spouse, whenever they have been advanced by the
CPG.
Page 61 of 151
Page 62 of 151
JOCSON v CA (1989)
170 SCRA 333
Emilio Jocson Alejandra Poblete Moises Jocson &
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Agustina is married to
Ernesto Vasquez. The mother Alejandra died intestate,
and so did the father Emilio in 1972.
June 20, 1973: Moises filed complaint, assailing validity
of 3 documents executed by Emilio (their father) during
his lifetime. He prays that the following be declared null
and void and that the properties involved be partitioned
between him andhis sister:
1. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968 wherein
Emilio sold to Agustina 6 parcels of land in Naic,
Cavite for P10,000.00. Deed included Emilios
manifestation that the lands were sold at a low
price because it was his loving, helpful and
thoughtful daughter who bought the property. He
says his son possesses such qualities too. He
further claims that the sale did not violate any law
and that he did not touch his wifes properties. He
acknowledged receipt of payment.
2. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968, selling 2 rice
mills and a camalig in Naic, Cavite to Agustina for
P5,000.00. Emilio acknowledged receipt too.
3. Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Adjudication
with Sale executed March 9, 1969 wherein Emilio
and Agustina, excluding Moises, extrajudicially
partitioned unsettled estate of Alejandra dividing
such into 3. Emilio sold his share to Agustina.
All documents were executed before a notary public.
Nos. 1 and 2 were registered with the Register of
Deeds. Old certificates were cancelled and new
certificates issued in the name of Agustina.
Moises allegations:
1. #1 is null and void because his fathers consent
was obtained by fraud, deceit, undue pressure,
influence and other illegal machinations. He also
alleges that property was sold for a simulated price
considering that his sister had no work or livelihood
of her own. Also, he claims that the contract is
fictitious, simulated and fabricated.
2. Same allegations re #2 and #3 with additional
allegation that he was deliberately excluded and
they intended to defraud him of his legitimate
share. He also claims that defendants were
employed in their parents business and they must
have used business earnings or simulated
consideration in order to purchase the properties.
3. No real sale between dad and daughter living
under same roof.
4. Dad didnt need money since sold properties were
all income-producitng.
5. #1 and #2 are unliquidated conjugal properties
that Emilio cant validly sell.
6. #3: he only questions sale of dads share to sister
but not extrajudicial partition.
RTC decided in favor of petitioner.
Documents were simulated and fictitious because: 1)
no proof that Agustina did pay for the properties, 2)
prices were grossly inadequate tantamount to lack of
consideration at all, 3) improbability of sale considering
circumstances. Designed to exclude Moises.
Page 63 of 151
Page 64 of 151
Page 65 of 151
ONEROUS TITLE
TEST: origin of the money invested in the purchase,
e.g. if it came from the conjugal fund, the property
acquired is conjugal
SPECIAL RULES ON LIFE INSURANCE:
If the beneficiary is the insured himself or his estate
o If the premiums were paid with the conjugal funds,
the proceeds are conjugal
o If the premiums were paid with separate funds,
proceeds are separate
o If the premiums were paid partly with conjugal
funds, and partly with separate funds, the
proceeds will be partly conjugal and party separate
If the beneficiary is the other spouse
o If one spouse gets insurance, assigned as
beneficiary himself and the other spouse: Proceeds
belong to the other spouse even if the premiums
are paid out of conjugal funds but he/she should
also reimburse half to the conjugal partnership
o If spouses are insured, the surviving spouse gets
the proceed with no obligation to reimburse
(considered reciprocal donations)
o If the insurance comes from a third person,
exclusive property of the beneficiary-spouse
Reconcile this provision with Art 114 which says that
onerous titles are separate property even if CPG funds
were used, subject to reimbursement.
LABOR, INDUSTRY, WORK OR PROFESSION OF
EITHER OR BOTH OF THE SPOUSES
includes all income whether in form of wages, pensions
or retirement pay, honoraria, salaries, commission,
bonuses, back pays, practice of profession, income
from business even if capital comes from the exclusive
properties of one of the spouses
teachers gratuity under special law is not conjugal
because it is remuneratory
FRUITS FROM COMMON AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY
Only net income or fruits of exclusive property of the
spouses become conjugal. Expenses for production,
administration and preservation should be taken from
Page 66 of 151
ISSUES:
1. WON the deed of sale was null and void on grounds
that the property is conjugal property, which means
Julia is prohibited from selling such without consent of
spouse.
2. WON issue of estoppel can be raised against Ponciano.
HELD:
1. YES. Property is conjugal following the presumption
found in Art 160 CC, which states that all property of
the marriage must be presumed to belong to the
CP unless it be proved that it pertains to
exclusive property of spouses. This presumption is
strong as stated in Art 153, CC, which provides that
such presumption must be overcome by one who
contends otherwise. The only character that they could
come up with to rebut the presumption is Julias
testimony, which is contrary to Aranetas records as
well as info on mortgage contracts (which are favorable
to her husband).
Page 67 of 151
ISSUES:
1. WON Villanueva had right over Lot 13-C
improvements thereon by virtue of Victorias will.
2. WON improvements on said lot was conjugal.
and
HELD:
1. NO, Victoria died 2 yrs ahead of her husband. She
never inherited any part of Lot 13-C which she could
bequeath by will to anybody.
Moreover, even if
Modestos acquisition by succession of Lot 13-C took
place during the marriage, the lot would still be
regarded as his own exclusive, private property
because it was acquired during the marriage by
lucrative title.
2. NO. If improvements on Lot 13-C were conjugal,
Villanueva may have acquired a right over them by
succession. However, proof as regards when the
improvements were made on the exclusive
property and the source of funds used was not
presented. Therefore, the presumption that it belongs
exclusively to the husband stands.
Page 68 of 151
Page 69 of 151
Exclusive principal
If the land is worth 5 M
d. Rules on Improvement
FC, Art 120 The ownership of improvements, whether for
utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the
spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the
acts or efforts of either or both spouses shall pertain to
the conjugal partnership or to the original owner-spouse,
subject to the following rules:
When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal
partnership and any resulting increase in value are more
than the value of the property at the time of the improvement,
the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to
the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the
value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the
improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in
ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall
be vested upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at
the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Cost of
improvement
Resulting increase in
value of the
improved principal
property
Value of the
principal property
at the time of the
improvement
10.5 M (2 M + 5 M)
3.5 M
10.5 M
5.5 M
Principal property and improvement
belongs to owner-spouse
10.5 M
2M
ISSUE:
1. WON the construction of a conjugal house on the
exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the
land the character of a conjugal property - YES
2. WON the sale of the land together with the house &
improvements
thereon
was
valid under the
circumstances surrounding the transaction.
HELD:
1. Under Art 158 CC, the land and building belong to the
CPG but CPG is indebted to the husband for the value
of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a
creditor to the conjugal partnership for the value
of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Conversion of
land from exclusive to conjugal property should be
deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings
were first constructed thereon; thus, the land and
house are conjugal property and could not have
been sold to Daguines without Mercedes
consent.
2. The contract of sale is null and void for being contrary
to morals and public policy. Under the law, spouses are
prohibited from selling property to each other, subject
to certain exceptions. This prohibition also applies to
common-law relationships.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Page 70 of 151
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
been benefited
all taxes, liens, charges and expenses including major or minor
repairs upon the conjugal partnership property
all taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the
marriage upon the separate property of either spouse
expenses to enable their spouse to commence or complete a
professional , vocational or other activity for self-improvement
ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have
redounded to the benefit of the family
value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor
of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose
of commencing or completing a professional or vocational
course or other activity for self-improvement
expenses of litigation between spouses unless the suit is found
to be groundless
2.
FC, Art 123 Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any
game of change, or in betting, sweepstakes or any other kind
of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be
borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the
CPG.
Page 71 of 151
the first promissory note had set it. However, the second
promissory note acknowledged the debt and even promised
to pay the same thus, the right to prescription was
effectively and expressly renounced.
In Villaroel v. Estrada the debt barred by prescription
cannot be enforced by the creditor. But a new contract
recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be
valid and enforceable.
Prescription only bars the remedy, which is the
payment of the debt, but it does not bar the debt itself.
The new promise made by Confesor constitutes a new
cause of action.
CFI claims the second promissory note is not binding
pursuant to Art 166 NCC: unless wife is spendthrift, serving
civil interdiction or confined in leprosarium, the husband
cannot alienate or encumber real property of the CP without
her consent. Thus, the CFI held that in signing the new
promissory note alone, Confesor cannot thereby bind his
wife. HOWEVER, Art 165 CC states that the husband is the
administrator of CP. Thus, all debts and obligations
which he contracts for the benefit of the CP are
chargeable to the CP. He, Confesor, signed the second
promissory note for the benefit of the CP, thus, CP is liable
for obligation.
LUZON SURETY v DE GARCIA (1969)
30 SCRA 111
Ladislao Chavez (as principal) and petitioner Luzon
Surety Co., Inc. (as surety) executed a surety bond in
favor of PNB to guaranty a crop loan granted to
Ladislao Chavez in the sum of P9,000. Vicente Garcia,
Ladislao Chavez and Ramon B. Lacson, as guarantors,
signed an indemnity agreement wherein they bound
themselves, jointly and severally, to indemnify Luzon
Surety Co., Inc. against any and all damages, losses,
costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges and expenses
of whatsoever kind and nature which it may incur.
PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez and
Luzon Surety to recover the amount of P4,577.95, in
interest, attorneys fees, and costs of the suit.
A third party complaint against Ladislao Chavez, Ramon
Lacson and Vicente Garcia was instituted by Luzon
Surety.
A writ of execution against Vicente Garcia for the
satisfaction of the claim of petitioner in the sum of
P8,839.97. Then a writ of garnishment was issued
levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcia
spouses, from their sugar plantation registered in their
names.
Garciasfiled a suit for injunction and the TC ruled in
their favor.
ISSUE: WON the CPG, in the absence of any showing of
benefits received, can be held liable on an indemnity
agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a 3rd
party in favor of a surety agreement. -NO
HELD: A CP under Art 161 is liable only for such debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
CP. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal
property, however, only obligations incurred by the him that
Page 72 of 151
2.
Page 73 of 151
Page 74 of 151
ISSUES:
1. WON the sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is valid NO
2. WON Gimena and her children can ask for an
annulment of contract - NO
3. WON petitioners have acquired the land by acquisitive
prescription - NO
4. WON the right of action of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is
barred by the statute of limitations - NO
HELD:
1) WON the sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is valid. NO
Page 75 of 151
ISSUE:
1. Whether Judies execution of Deed of Transfer of Right
for the Guiangs was void or merely voidable
2. WON Gilda ratified the said contract when she entered
into the amicable settlement with the Guiangs.
HELD:
1. The deed was void. The property was acquired during
the marriage of Judie and Gilda Corpuz. When Judie
offered to sell the remaining half, Gildas consent was
totally lacking, contrary to the claim of the Guiangs
invoking Art 1390(2) CC that it was only vitiated hence
merely voidable. The case at bar falls under Art 124,
FC which states xxx the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void.
2. No, void contracts cannot be ratified. The entry into
amicable settlement would not have any effect in the
contract since it was void.
**FC applied in this case since the sale was done in 1990
RELUCIO v LOPEZ (2002)
373 SCRA 578
Imelda Relucio, the mistress of Alberto Lopez, assails
the appointment of Albertos legitimate wifes (Angelina
Mejia Lopez) as the sole administratix of conjugal
partnership of properties, forfeiture, etc.
Alberto allegedly abandoned Angela and their four
children and had maintained illicit relationship with the
petitioner, Relucio. In the course of their cohabitation,
they have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of
stockholdings
in
Lopez-owned
or
controlled
corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots,
houses, apartments and properties through the actual
contribution of money, property, industry of Alberto and
Relucio
Angela, the wife and the four children did not benefit
from the said properties
Alberto has also sold, disposed of, transferred assigned,
cancelled, removed, stashed away and alienated their
conjugal properties from Angela, hence the petition to
become the administratix of the said partnership
Angela prays that Alberto do the following:
o Account their conjugal partnership property
o Give support to respondent and her children
o Turn over his share in the co-ownership with
petitioner (Relucio)
o Dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute
community property with respondent
Page 76 of 151
FC, Art 127 The separation in fact between husband and wife
shall not affect the regime of CPG except that:
1. spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to
live therein, without just cause, shall not have the
right to be supported
2. consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other
is required by law, judicial authorization shall be
obtained in a summary proceeding
3. absence or insufficient community property, the
separate property shall be solidarily liable for
the support of the family. The spouse present shall,
upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be
given judicial authority to administer or encumber
any specific separate property of the other spouse
sand use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the
latters share
Page 77 of 151
Page 78 of 151
civil interdiction
judicially declared an absentee
loss of parental authority by court decree (Art 228
and 229)
5.
6.
Page 79 of 151
Page 80 of 151
ISSUES:
1. WON separation of husband from his wife constitutes
abandonment in law that would justify the separation of
conjugal partnership property - NO
2. WON the husbands failure and/or refusal to inform his
wife of the state of their business is an abuse of his
powers of administration of the CP as to warrant a
division of matrimonial assets - NO
HELD:
1) There was only mere physical separation and not
real abandonment. Abandonment contemplated by the
law must be of physical estrangement, moral and
FINANCIAL desertion. Based on how abandonment was
used in Art 178, in order for desertion of one spouse to
constitute abandonment, there must be absolute
cessation of marital relations and duties and rights
with intention of perpetual separation. To abandon is
to forsake entirely. Emphasis is on its finality, hence it
means giving up absolutely and with intent never again to
resume or claim ones rights or interests.
- Here, Severino did not seem to have the intention to leave
his family permanently since he continued to give support
despite his absence which thus negates any intent not to
return and resume his marital duties and rights.
- Since separation in fact between spouses does not affect
the CP except if the husband abandons his wife without just
cause, (Art 178, CC) claims of the Estrella of concubinage
on part of Severino must be regarded as efforts at
bolstering her claim of abandonment which shall justify,
under the law, a judicial separation of conjugal assets.
There is no strong corroborated evidence that demonstrates
the existence of illicit relations between Nenita and
Severino. Neither has he been mismanaging funds since he
actually increased the value of their assets by over a million
pesos.
2) For abuse to exist, it is not enough that the husband
perform acts prejudicial to his wife or commit acts
injurious to the partnership. There must be an act
willfully performed and with utter disregard of the
partnership by the husband that would be prejudicial to the
wife, evidenced by the repetition of deliberate acts and/or
omissions. It is not condoning the husbands separation
Page 81 of 151
Vasquez de Arroyo).
Page 82 of 151
FC, Art 139 The petition for separation of property and final
judgment granting the same shall be recorded in the proper
local civil registries and registries of property.
FC, Art 141 The spouses may, in the same proceedings where
separation of property was decreed, file a motion in court for a
decree reviving the property regime that existed
between them before the separation of property in any
of the following instances:
1. civil interdiction terminates
2. absentee spouse reappears
3. when the court is satisfied that the spouse granted
the power of administration in the marriage
settlements will not again abuse that power,
authorizes the resumption of said administration
4. when the spouse who has left the conjugal home
without a decree of legal separation resumes
common life with the other
5. when parental authority is judicially restored to the
spouse previously deprived thereof
6. when the spouses who have been separated in fact
for a least one year, reconcile and resume common
life
7. when after voluntary dissolution of the ACP or CPG
has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of
the spouses, they agree to the revival of the former
property regime. No voluntary separation of property
may thereafter be granted.
The revival of the former property regime shall be
governed by Art 67.
Page 83 of 151
FC, Art 146 Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in
proportion to their income, or in case of insufficiency or
default thereof, to the current market value of their
separate properties.
The liability of the spouses to the creditors for family expenses
shall, however, be solidary.
* Compared with Art 98 and Art 125, this Article does not
provide for donations by reason of charity or occasion of
family rejoicing or family distress.
Page 84 of 151
ISSUES:
1. WON the preliminary injunction could be granted in
favor of Teresita
2. WON Teresita can claim that she co-owned the house
with Isidro by the fact that they were common-law
spouses
HELD:
1. Injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the court,
in the exercise of which appellate courts will not
interfere except in a clear case of abuse. Although
Teresita presented loans that she had contracted during
the period when said house was under construction as
proof of ownership, evidence was wanting which would
correlate such loans to the construction work. Thus,
assertion that the North Forbes Park house is
petitioner's exclusive property is unsupported and may
not be permitted to override the prima facie
presumption that house, having been constructed on
Isidros lot at his instance, and during his marriage with
Josefina, is part of the estate that should be under the
control of the Virginia
2. Before a common-law spouse can claim co-ownership
of their spouses properties, there must be a clear
showing that the common-law spouse had,
during cohabitation, really contributed to the
acquisition of the property involved.
JUANIZA v JOSE (1979)
89 SCRA 306
Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but
had been cohabiting with defendant-appelant Rosalia
Arroyo for 16 yrs.
Jose was the registered owner and operator of a
passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision
with a freight train resulting in the death of 7 and
physical injuries to 5 of its passengers.
ISSUES:
1. WON Art 144 is applicable in a case where one of the
parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to
marry - NO
2. WON Rosalia, who is not a registered owner of the jeep
can be held solidarily liable for damages with the
registered owner - NO
HELD:
1. It has been consistently ruled that the co-ownership
contemplated in Art 144, requires that the man and
woman living together must not be incapacitated to
contract marriage. Since Jose is legally married to
Socorro, there is an impediment for him to contract
marriage with Rosalia. Thus, Rosalia cannot be a coowner of the jeep. The jeep belongs to the CP of Jose
and Socorro. There is therefore no basis for the liability
of Rosalia for damages arising from the death of and
physical injuries suffered by the passengers.
2. Rosalia, who is not the registered owner can neither be
liable for damages caused by its operation, because
only the registered owner is responsible.
VDA DE CONSUEGRA v GSIS (1971)
37 SCRA 315
Jose Consuguera contracted 2 marriages. 1st marriage
was with Rosario Diaz where they had 2 children. 2nd
marriage was with Basilia Berdin with 7 children. Later
he died. Both marriages were contracted in good faith.
As a member of GSIS, he was entitled to both a
retirement insurance and life insurance. The life
insurance was paid to Berdin and her children who
were the designated beneficiaries named in the policy.
The retirement policy did not designate a beneficiary.
Hence, the petition.
GSIS: to Rosario (8/16) and to Basilia (1/16
between Basilia and their seven children).
CFI: Same with GSIS.
ISSUE: WON Basilia is entitled to the proceeds of the
retirement benefits because she was just the second wife.
HELD: Yes. The marriage was contracted in good faith and
so it is just and fair for them to receive it. Not just because
the retirement does not name a beneficiary, means that it
should follow what was written in the life insurance benefits.
Page 85 of 151
3.
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2. Support
FC, Art 194 Support = everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing medical attendance, education
and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred
to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or
training for some professional, trade or vocation, even beyond
age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going
to and from school, or to and from place of work.
ACP/CPG
ACP/CPG
ACP/CPG (because they are still
legitimate!)
CPG: separate property of the
parent-spouse, but if the same is
insufficient, the CPG if financially
capable (read: all legal obligations
of the community are covered).
The support paid to the child shall
be deducted from the share of the
parent-spouse at the time of
liquidation of the partnership
Page 90 of 151
FC, Art 200 When the obligation to give support falls upon two
or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided
between them in proportion to the resources of each.
In case of urgent need and by special circumstances, judge
may order only one of them to furnish support, without
prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share
due from them.
If two recipients claim support at the same time from one
obligor, follow order in Art 199 UNLESS child vs. spouse
wherein the child will be preferred.
Page 91 of 151
HELD:
1. YES. As early as 1975, Lea already requested or plead for
support from her husband, which was no less a demand.
2. YES. Pursuant to Art 207 FC, Daban can rightfully exact
reimbursement. Failure on the part of the father is
established. It is also necessary to avoid unjust enrichment.
CA and RTC affirmed.
3. Funerals
CC, Art 305 Duty and right to make funeral arrangement
shall be in accordance with the order established for
support. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of
brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of
ascendants, the paternal shall have better right.
CC, Art 306 Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social
position of the deceased.
Page 92 of 151
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FC, Art 157 The actual value of family home shall not
exceed P300,000 in urban (including chartered cities and
municipalities) and P200,000 in rural, as may fixed by law.
FC, Art 159 Family home shall continue despite the death of
one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a
minor beneficiary. Heirs cannot partition unless court finds a
compelling reason. Rule shall regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home.
FC, Art 162 The provisions of this Chapter shall also govern
existing family residences insofar as said provision are
applicable.
Page 94 of 151
TANEO v CA (1999)
304 SCRA 308
Pablito Taneo filed an action against the conveyance of
his land to private respondent. The money judgment of
RTC was affirmed by CA.
Taneo alleges that the lands in question are exempt
from execution for being a family home (extrajudicially
constituted by his father as early as 1964).
ISSUE: WON the family home is exempt from execution
HELD: NO. Art 153 does not apply to family homes occupied
prior to the effectivity of FC and exempted from obligations
incurred prior to that same date (Aug 3, 1988). Art 162 is
not retroactive considering that the debt preceded the FC
(1964). Also, a family home should be erected on the
land owned by the members of the family (owned by
Plutarco Vacalares).
VERSOLA v MADOLARIA (2006)
497 SCRA 385
Dr. Ong Oh granted P1M loan to Dolores Ledesma
Ledesma sold her house and lot located in Tandang
Sora to spouses Eduardo and Elsa Versola for P2.5M.
Spouses paid Ledesma P1M as downpayment with
remaining balance in monthly installments
Spouses Versola applied for a 2M loan with Asiarust
Bank in order to raise the full amount that Ledesma
demanded
However, the spouses were not able to get the loan
because Asiatrust Bank discovered a notice of levy on
execution was annotated on the title in connection with
Ledesmas obligation to a certain Miladays Jewels, Inc.,
in the amount of P214,284. Because of this annotated
encumbrance, Asiatrust did not register said Real Estate
Mortgage and refused to release the P2M loan of
petitioners.
Dr. Ong Oh filed Complaint after the trial, the RTC and
CA ordered spouses Versola to pay Dr. Ong Oh 1.5M
with legal interest
Dr. Ong Oh filed a Motion for Execution and because of
this, the sheriff sold at public auction the property of
spouses Versola.
Spouses Versola failed to redeem said property, thus a
Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale was issued in favor of Dr.
Ong Oh.
Dr. Ong Oh filed and Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of
Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of
spouses
Spouses Versola opposed said motion on the ground
that the property sold is the family home of petitioners
which according to them is exempt from execution
pursuant to Art. 155 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: WON petitioners timely raised and proved that their
property is exempt from execution?
HELD: NO
Court finds that petitioners assertion for exemption is a
mere afterthought.
It was only after almost two years from the time of the
execution of sale and after the Sheriffs Final Deed of
Page 95 of 151
ISSUE:
WON a family home can be partition at the death of the
head of the household notwithstanding the presence of a
minor beneficiary (Art 154 and 159)
HELD: YES. The minor beneficiaries of a family home
contemplated in Art 159 must not only actually
reside in the home but must also be dependent on
the head of the family for legal support. Although a
grandson is included in the family relationship required of
beneficiaries stipulated in Art 154, the grandson cannot be
viewed as dependent on his grandparents for support
because his ascendants of nearest degree, the
parents are capable of providing him support. The law
imposes primary obligation of child support to parents, in
default of which the grandparents take place.
ARRIOLA v ARRIOLA (2008)
GR No. 177703
Fidel Arriola had two marriages. After his death, his
sons John Nabor Arriola (respondent son with the first
wife) and Anthony Ronald Arriola (petitioner son with
the second wife, Vilma) wanted to partition his estate
through public auction.
Petitioner refused to include in the auction the house
standing on the subject land because he says that it is
their family home.
ISSUE: WON the land on which the house stands may be
included in the public auction
HELD: NO. Although the subject house is covered by the
judgment of partition postulated by the CA, suspensive
proscription imposed by FC Art 159 shall be observed. Since
Fidel built the house out of his exclusive properties and
stayed there for 20 years, by operation of FC Art 153 the
house is automatically constituted as family home. FC
Art 152 extends the scope of family home not only to
the dwelling structure but also on the lot on which it
stands. Petitioners and respondents should not touch the
house until 10 years has lapsed (2013). All other lands
outside the family home are subject to immediate partition
through public auction.
1.
2.
By nature
a. Legitimate
b. Illegitimate
By adoption
a. BIOLOGICAL - NATURAL
PERIDO v PERIDO (1975)
63 SCRA 97
-
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2. Impugned Legitimacy
FC, Art 166 Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on
the following grounds:
1. physical impossibility for the husband to have sex
with wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the child
because of:
a. physical incapacity (impotence)
b. living separately
c. serious illness
2. biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been that of the husband, except in the
instance provided in Par 2 Art 164
3. conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification of either parent was
obtained
through
mistake,
fraud,
violence,
intimidation or undue influence
BLOOD TYPE
Fathers
blood type
AB
O, A
A, B
O, A
O, A
O, B
O, A, B,
AB
O, B
AB
A, B
O, A, B,
AB
A, B, AB
A, B, AB
O, B
A, B, AB
A, B, AB
A, B, AB
Page 99 of 151
ISSUE:
WON Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate
child of Mejias and Anahaw
WON Mejias may institute an action that would
bastardize her child without giving her husband, the
legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard
2.
Illustration:
1st
300 days
Termination
2nd marriage
2nd
180 days
2 Jan 1988
3 Feb 1988
4 Feb 1989
-- This is vague to
birthday
fact of registration
discovery of birth
me. -_-
Proofs by Petitioner
1. birth record stating that
she is the legitimate child
of Proceso and Esperanza
2. testimony of Proceso that
she is his child
3. testimony of Benita
Lastimosa (alleged bio
mother) that she is not
her child
4. marriage contract where
Esperanza was the mother
5. Deed of Sale when Violeta
was still a minor and
represented by her
mother Esperanza
6. Deed of Absolute Sale
where Proceso
represented her as father
ISSUES:
1. WON TC and CA finding that Violeta is not born of
Esperanza Cabatbat is concluding on SC
2. WON complaint is an action to impugn legitimacy
and Art 263 CC (action to impugn legitimacy) can
be applied
HELD:
1.
2.
B. Proof of Filiation
1. How to prove filiation
FC, Art 172 The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following:
2.
document
Faustina
Bibiano
Pedro
PETITIONERS
EVIDENCE
Handwritten note
alledgedly written by
Bibiano to the 18 yo
Raymundo with a
complimentary ending
Dolores
Raymundo
su padre
Typewritten letters to
Atty. Faustino alleging
his personal
circumstance; as well as
typewritten
autobiography asserting
that his father is a
surgeon Bibiano Baas
RESPONDENTS EVIDENCE
C O U R T
S A Y S
1.
DE ASIS v CA (1999)
303 SCRA 176
Vircel Andres, mother and legal guardian of her son
Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for
support and maintenance against the alleged father
Manuel de Asis. Manueld denied filiation. Vircel agreed
to compromise that she would not pursue the case if
Manuel will withdraw his counterclaim. After six years,
Vircel filed an action for support and maintenance of
her son.
HELD: The right to support cannot be the subject of
compromise. The action for support cannot be barred by res
judicata. The ratio behind the prohibition against waving the
right to future support is the need to maintain ones
existence. Paternity and filiation (or lack of it) must be
judicially established and it is for the court to declare its
existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or
agreement of the parties. The agreement entered into by
the petitioner and respondents mother for the dismissal of
the complaint for maintenance and support, which is in the
nature of a compromise, cannot be countenanced. The right
to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted
to a third person as per Art 301 CC. Also, future support
cannot be the subject of a compromise as in Art 2035.
** Legitime of a legitimate child: half of the parents estate
divided by the number of legitimate children.
C. Illegitimate Children
Generally, illegitimate children are those born of parents
who are not united by a valid marriage.
Under the CC, there were three main groups of illegitimate
children:
1. Natural children
2. Natural children by legal fiction
3. Spurious children
o adulterous
o incestuous
o sacrilegious born of persons who are
disqualified to marry by reason of religious
profession
o manceres those born of prostitutes
Under our law, there is no disqualification to marry on the
ground of religious profession. And we also have no law
which automatically classifies children of prostitutes as
illegitimate.
FC abolished all distinctions between illegitimate children
such that there are only two categories of children today:
legitimate and illegitimate.
However, an informal distinction between two groups of
illegitimate children was established:
1.
2.
1. Proof of filiation
FC, Art 175 Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. (Art 172)
The action must be brought within the same period
specified in Art 173 (lifetime of the child, will not be
extinguished by death of either parties), except when
the action is based on the second paragraph of Art 172,
in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
Why must the action be brought during the lifetime
of the putative parent in Par 2? Since there might still
be a question as to whether the child is really the
illegitimate child of the alleged parent or not, the latter must
be given an opportunity to contest the action, and this he or
she can only do if the action is filed during his or her
lifetime.
Maam Beth asks: How would illegitimate children know
they are illegitimate if they have always been living with the
family? The only time theyd learn they do are not entitled
to their parents estate is when they die. Only Sempio-Diy
knows that rule, mortals dont!
COMPARED WITH THE CC PROVISION ON PROVING
ILLEGITIMATE FILIATION: Art 285 provided for exceptions
in the prescription for recognition of natural children, FC
removed this provision in Par 2, Art 175. (Uyguangco v CA)
1. If the father or the mother died during the minority
of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority.
2. If after the death of the father or of the mother a
document should appear of which nothing had
been heard and in which either or both parents
recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within 4 years
from the finding of the document.
HOW TO BRING ACTION TO CLAIM FILIATION
1. File a separate action
2. Intervene in the settlement of estate of his/her
alleged parent
LEUTERIO v CA (1991)
197 SCRA 369
Ma. Alicia Leuterio claims that she is the natural
daughter of Pablo Leuterio and Ana Maglangque, who
was the servant of the former.
Alicia claims that she was conceived at the time when
her parents were not disqualified to marry each other
2.
3.
HELD:
1. No. The suit was filed prior to the effectivity of FC,
thus CC provisions still apply. Art 285 CC governs the
case and not Art 175 Par 2 FC.
2. YES. If FC prevails over CC in the choice of which
should govern, it would prejudice Antonias right
which was vested upon her by virtue of Art. 285,
through the above-mentioned suit for recognition.
3. NO. Since CC still governs the case, trial court never
lost its original jurisdiction.
What is your understanding of a vested right? It is not
defined in Art 256 FC because it should be on a case to case
basis, taking into account all the circumstances and facts.
Subsequent change of law should not affect the available
cause of action.
JISON v CA (1998)
286 SCRA 495
Monina Jison alleged that she is the illegitimate
daughter of Francisco Jison. Francisco denied paternity.
While married to Lilia Jison, Francisco impregnated the
nanny of his eldest daughter, Esperanza Amolar. The
child was born and enjoyed the continuous and implied
recognition as an illegitimate child.
Francisco spent for her education until she became a
CPA and eventually worked as Central Bank examiner.
It was her father who paid for the burial expenses for
her mothers death. And it was through filiation with
her father that she previously was able to seek
employment at Miller & Cruz in Bacolod City.
She was able to name the members of the Jison
household as well as the staff in her fathers office.
She also claimed knowing the 3 children of Francisco
and Lilia. The last time she saw her father was when
she sought his blessings to get married.
In sum, Moninas evidence and testimonies showed that
a. she was close with Franciscos relatives
b. she received P15 as monthly allowance from her
father coursed through accountants of his office
c. her filiation was known in the Jison office &
household
d. her allowance was not recorded in the books but in
a separate cash book because it had to be hidden
from Mrs Jison and children
e. that she even asked for a Christmas gift from her
godfather, Don Vicente, father of Mrs Jison
When Monina wanted to go to Spain, her father
negotiated that in exchange for the expenses, she
would sign a document that denies her being a
daughter.
HELD: Monina proved her filiation. She has open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
Her witnesses (she had 11) established her claims.
However, Monina cannot rely on her birth certificate in the
Local Registrar where Francisco is named as her father.
9.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes
private respondents from claiming their
successional rights
2. WON private respondents are barred by
prescription from proving their filiation
HELD:
1. No. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its
terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to
abandon a right. The document does not state with clarity
the purpose for its execution. Parents and guardians may
not also repudiate the inheritance of their wards without
judicial approval. Not having been judicially authorized, the
Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and
will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights
as heirs of the deceased. It must also be emphasized that
waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Private respondents could not have possible waived their
successional rights because they are yet to prove their
status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the
deceased.
2. A ruling in the same would be premature considering
respondents have yet to present evidences to prove their
filiation. It is the duty of the trial court.
AGUSTIN v CA (2005)
460 SCRA 315
Arnel Agustin had an extramarital affair with Fe
Prollamante which produced the child named Martin.
Arnel suggested to have the pregnancy aborted which
Fe refused.
Arnel allegedly took care of all the medical bills in
Martins birth and even signed his birth certificate as
the father. However, in the long run, Arnel failed to
give sustenance despite his adequate financial capacity.
Fe, afflicted with leukemia, sues Arnel for support. They
also moved for DNA testing to prove their cause of
action.
ISSUES:
1. WON complaint for support can be converted to a
petition for recognition
2. WON DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a
proceeding
for
support
without
violating
2.
Guillermo
Josefa
Felisa
Ramon Osorio
Nazario
Edilberta
Jose
Jacoba
Gorgonio
Luis
2.
3.
TONOG v CA (2002)
376 SCRA 523
Petitioner Dinah Tonog, a nursing student begot a child
with a physician Edgar Daguimol. The child named
Gardin Faith Tonog and the mother resided with the
Daguimols parents. Then, Dina left for the US to work
and the child was left in the care of paternal
grandparents and her father.
Daguimol applied for legal guardianship of the child,
which was subsequently granted.
Dina instituted action for remand of custody
ISSUE: WON Dina can claim custody of the child on TYP and
Art 176 FC
HELD: The custody case is not yet concluded, meaning the
court can only rule on temporary custody. The CA did not
err in allowing Edgar to retain in the meantime parental
custody over Gardin. A child should not be wrenched from
her familiar surroundings and thrust into a strange
environment away from the people and places to which she
had apparently formed an attachment. Gardin Faith is
already 12 years old, her choice should also be given
weight. However, the decision should not be taken against
the fitness of the mother or the preference or the father.
DE GUZMAN v PEREZ (2006)
496 SCRA 474
Petitioner Roberto and private respondent Shirley
became sweethearts while STUDYING LAW in UST.
Their studies were interrupted when Shirley became
pregnant and gave birth to Robby. The two,
nonetheless, never got married.
Roberto married another woman later on. He never
provided any financial support for Robby except in two
instances (1992 & 1993) when he sent money for the
schooling and when he gave P7000.00 for the kids
hospitalization expenses.
Shirley, at one instance, demanded support for Robbys
education since she was suffering some financial
problems. Roberto did not give anything despite his
fabulous wealth. He managed the De Guzman
corporations, has five luxurious cars, owns a house in
Ayala Heights Quezon City and regularly travels abroad
with his family.
Shirley then filed criminal complaint for abandonment
against Roberto.
Respondents evidence: Notarized copy of the Gen Info
Sheet of RNCD Development Corporation showed that
Roberto owned P750,000 worth of paid-up corporate
shares.
The city prosecutor of Lipa found probable cause to
charge petitioner with neglect of child under Art 59(4)
of PD 603 in relation to Sec 10(a) of RA 7610
Roberto filed a petition for review with the Sec of
Justice who then affirmed City Prosecutors resolution
Petitioners claims: (1) He is financially incapable as all
the alleged properties belong to his father. His share
was also in reality his dads; (2) Robby is not a
neglected child since his education was provided by
Shirley and her relatives
facilitate the reunion between him and his mother, once she
successfully petitions him.
Petitioners Contention: Is should be tried as an adversarial
proceeding and not a summary proceeding. *To this the
respondent has already complied with such requirement by
posting it in a newspaper of general circulation, no opposing
petitions were put forward.
D. Legitimated Children
FC, Art 177 Only when conceived and born outside of
the wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.
LEGITIMATION remedy by means of which illegitimate
children are considered legitimate, it being supposed that
they were born in lawful wedlock.
LEGITIMATED CHILDREN illegitimate children who are
considered legitimate because of the subsequent marriage
of their parents
In legitimation, the law makes legal what exists by nature,
while in adoption, the law creates by fiction a relation that
did not in fact exist by nature.
REQUISITES FOR LEGITIMATION
1. child was conceived AND born out of wedlock
2. the parents were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other at the time of
conception
CHILDREN WHO CANNOT BE LEGITIMATED
1. adulterous
2. incestuous
3. of marriages against public policy
4. of bigamous marriages but can be ADOPTED to
elevate their status
Why cant children of adulterous relationships
cannot be legitimated?
1. rational of legitimation would be destroyed
2. unfair to legitimate children in terms of
successional rights
3. problem of public scandal
4. will destroy the sanctity of marriage
5. very scandalous, especially if the parents marry
years after the birth of the child
6. it is tantamount to tolerating what would have
been a wrong act, it would seem to be more
beneficial to the erring spouse
FC, Art 178 Legitimation shall take place by subsequent
valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a
voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation.
Samuel Bischoff
Wertmuller
Felisa Castro
Leona Castro
FC, Art 181 The legitimation of children who died before the
celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants.
Frederick von
Kauffman
Elena
Federico
Ernesto
Leontina Elizabeth
Carmen Maria
Esther
ISSUES:
1. WON Leona is a recognized natural child of Samuel
2. WON the divorce between Fred and Leona is valid
3. WON Leontina should be considered as a legitimate
daughter of Fred and Leona (being born before the
divorce decree, hence while their marriage is
subsisting)
4. WON the Mory and the Kaufmann children are entitled
to their share in the estate.
5. WON the probate of a will affects the rights of forced
heirs who dont appear to contest the probate.
HELD:
1. Yes. Prior to her first marriage, she was in an
uninterrupted enjoyment of de facto status of natural
child & treated as such by Samuel.
Document presented by Fr. Ferrero admissible since
hes the custodian of church records. Original document
not needed since they have shown that diligent search
was made to find it, to no avail. Thus, secondary
evidence presented by the priest is sufficient.
Applicable provision: Law 11 of Toro which became Law
1, Title 5, Book 10 of the Novisima Recopilacion which
provides that recognition could be established by proof
of acts on part of the parent unequivocally recognizing
the status of his child. This is different from CC Art 131
provision which provides that acknowledgment must be
made in the record of birth, by will or in other public
instrument. Regardless of what provision is applied, its
sufficiently shown that Leona was recognized.
Anas contention that only kids born of persons free to
marry may possess status of recognized natural child.
There being no evidence to show Felisa Castros status
at the time Leona was born, she will be presumed
single or widow. Court cannot entertain contrary
presumption that Felisas guilty of adultery.
As a recognized natural daughter, had she survived her
dad, she would have been his forced heir (CC Art 807
(3) & 939) and entitled to 1/3 of the inheritance (CC Art
842).
2.
4.
5.
XIII. ADOPTION
ADOPTION is a juridical act which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation.
PURPOSE OF ADOPTION
Originally: mainly for the benefit of the adopter,
who are usually people who had no children, so
that they may experience the joys of parenthood
Modern view: for the benefit of the children to be
adopted
o It has both social and moral purpose: to
extend to the orphan or to the child of the
indigent, the incapacitated or the sick, the
protection of society in the person of the
adopter
o The adopted child remains an heir of his
parents by nature
CONSTRUCTION OF ADOPTION LAW: construed so as to
encourage the adoption of unfortunate children by persons
who can properly read and educate them
CHILD WELFARE PARAMOUNT: In determining whether
adoption shall be allowed, the welfare of the child is the
primary consideration.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Petition for adoption is done
through proceeding in rem. No court may entertain such a
petition unless it has jurisdiction over:
the subject matter of the case and over the parties
the res, which is the personal status of the person
to be adopted as well as that of the petitioners
ADOPTION AND LEGITIMATION similar in the sense that in
both of them the child is given the status of the child born
in lawful wedlock of the parents adopting or legitimizing it
Persons affected
Procedure
Carried out by
whom
Benefits
LEGITIMATION
Only natural
children
May take place by
extrajudicial act of
parents (marriage)
Only by both
parents of the
child
Child receives the
same status and
rights as a
legitimate child,
not only in relation
to the legitimizing
parents, but also
in relation to other
relatives of the
latter
ADOPTION
Strangers
(generally)
Always by judicial
decree
May be made by
one parent
Creates a
relationship only
between the child
and the adopting
parent, but not
with the relatives
of the latter
ADOPTION OF ADULTS
1. No need to adopt adults because they are old
enough to take care of themselves.
2. If the only reason someone wishes to adopt and
adult is to share his material advantages with
another, he can do so by simply giving the latter
financial assistance and leaving him something in
his will.
3. Rational of adoption: to give poor, orphaned,
abandoned little children the advantages of having
parents who would love, support, protect, rear and
educate them until they are old enough to take
care of themselves.
4. EXCEPTIONS
a. If the adult is the parent in nature
because this would raise the status of the
illegitimate child
b. If in the custody since childhood/minority,
there is the presumption that adopter
really wants to adopt the child but only
neglected to do so before the latter
reached majority.
PROCEDURE FOR ADOPTION ACCORDING TO RA 8552
(Maam Beth tabulated the procedure during lecture)
CHILD
1. Biological parent goes to
DSWD for:
a. counseling (Sec 4)
- importance of providing
relevant info on the child,
medical history and family
background
- possibility of child to be
placed for adoption
b. signs a Deed of Voluntary
Commitment or DVC**
c. give the parent 6 months
to reconsider
**but if no DVC was signed (in
cases where the child was
abandoned or left to strangers)
i. locate unknown parents
through trimedia (TV, radio or
newspaper) (Sec 5)
PROSPECTIVE ADOPTIVE
PARENTS
1.
2.
3.
4.
Inquiry
Attend adoption forum
Application
DSWD makes a case study
report home study report
(Sec 14)
5. Matching
6. Placement issuance of preadoption placement authority
(PAPA)
7. Supervised trial custody for 6
months or less adjustment
period (Sec 12)
8. Recommendation and
consent of DSWD
9. File a petition for adoption
Lawyers only come in at this
point (dahil pampagulo lang
sila)
10. Decree of adoption (Sec 13)
Art 183 (who may adopt), Art 184 (who may not
adopt), Art 185 (joint adoption of spouses) and
Art 186 (parental authority) have been amended
by Art III Sec 7, RA 8552
WHO MAY ADOPT
I. For Filipino citizens
1. of legal age
2. full capacity and legal rights
3. good moral character, no conviction for crime
involving moral turpitude
4. emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for
children
5. at least 16 years older than the adoptee UNLESS
biological parent of the adoptee or the spouses of the
adoptees parent
II. For aliens
1. qualifications for Filipino citizens
2. the country has diplomatic relations with the
Philippines
3. has been living in the Philippines for at least 3 years
prior to the filing of application
4. certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or
any appropriate government agency that he/she has
the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country
5. his/her government allows the adoptee to enter the
country as his/her adopted son/daughter
6. requirements for residency and certification of
qualification is waived for the following
a. former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative within the 4th civil degree of
consanguinity OR affinity
b. seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of
his/her Filipino spouse
c. married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the
4th degree of consanguinity OR affinity of the
Filipino spouse
III. Guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of
the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial
accountabilities
IV. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:
a. if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other
b. if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter PROVIDED that the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto
c. if the spouses are legally separated from each other
If spouses jointly adopted or one spouse adopted the
illegitimate child of the other, Joint parental authority shall be
exercised by parents.
Manuel
Ramos
Amelia Ramos
Elaine
Elma
Eugene
ISSUES:
1. WON the adoption may proceed absent the
mothers written consent
2. WON the affidavit of consent executed by the
petitioners children in Guam not in the presence of
a Philippine consular office is admissible
3. WON the petitioner is financially capable of
supporting the adoptees
HELD:
1.
2.
3.
ii.
iii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
E. Effects of Adoption
FC, Art 189 Adoption shall have the following effects:
1. For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be
a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising
from the relationship of parent and child including the
right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters;
2. The parental authority of the parents by nature over
the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the
adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of
the parent by nature of the adopted, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly
by both spouses
3. The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his
parents and other blood relatives
CC, Art 365 An adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter.
TAMARGO v CA (1992)
209 SCRA 518
Spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt
the 10 yo minor Adelberto Bundoc. Before the petition was
granted, Adelberto shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo using
an air rifle. The parents of Tamargo sued Adelbertos natural
parents for damages. The child though was acquitted for
acting without discernment. The Bundocs claim that the
Rapisuras should be the proper parties in this suit since
parental authority shifted to the adopting parent from the
moment the petition for adoption was filed.
ISSUE: Who between the adoptive parents and the
biological parents should be held liable for the damages
incurred by the child?
HELD: Adelbertos natural parents are liable for the
damages. The tortuous act of the minor occurred prior to
the adoption. Adelberto was in his natural parents actual
custody at the time of the accident. The effects of adoption
on parental authority cannot be given retroactive effect.
SAYSON v CA (1992)
205 SCRA 321
Rafaela Eleno
Mauricio
Rosario
Basilisa
Remedios
Teodoro
Teodoro Isabel
Delia (adopted)
Edmundo (adopted)
Doribel (legitimate)
ISSUES:
WON RTC acquired jurisdiction on petition for adoption
WON RTC and CA erred in granting change of given
name from Midael to Michael
HELD:
YES. Petitioner contends that since the name appearing
in the requisite notice by publication did not state the
true name of the child. Court ruled that the case at bar
was an obvious clerical error in the given name of the
child, and does not confuse any identities.
NO. The change of given name is without force and
effect. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court does not only
refer to errors concerning civil status, but even to
names as well as enumerated in item (o) of 2 of Rule
108. The local civil registrar must have been made
party to the proceeding. The notice by publication also
failed to include the matter on the change of name,
depriving the local civil registrar of notice and
opportunity to be heard.
REPUBLIC v HERNANDEZ (1996)
253 SCRA 509
Spouses Van and Regina Munson adopted an infant
who bears the name Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran in his
birth certificate. When they had him baptized, they
gave him the name Aaron Joseph, the name by which
the child is known to the family, relatives and friends.
The spouses then instituted a joinder of the petition for
adoption and the petition for a change of name.
The petitioner opposed the said action saying that there
is no legal basis for the change of the adoptees given
name.
RTC ruled in favor changing the name of the child
ratiocinating that as adoptive parents, petitioner like
other parents may feely select the first name given to
his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child
is entitled that is fixed by law.
Further, the respondents submit that change of name
may be given liberal construction since the object of
strict implementation is to prevent fraudulent acts,
while an infant has not exercised any of its rights.
ISSUES:
1. WON joinder of petition for adoption and petition
for a change of name is allowed by the law
2. WON there is lawful ground for the adoptees
change of name
HELD:
1. No. In order for two petitions may be joined in one
proceeding, the causes of action must: (a) not violate
the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties
and (b) arise out of the same contract, transaction or
relation between the parties, or are for demands for
money or are of the same nature and character.
There is no conceptual unity between petition for
adoption and petition for change of name. The two
actions are different and unrelated from each
F. Rescission
FC, Art 191 If the adopted is a minor or otherwise
incapacitated, the adoption may be judicially rescinded upon
petition of any person authorized by the court or proper
government instrumentality acting on his behalf, on the same
grounds prescribed for loss or suspension of parental authority.
If the adopted is at least 18 years of age, he may petition for
judicial rescission of the adoption on the same grounds
prescribed for disinheriting an ascendant.
FC, Art 192 The adopters may petition the court for the
judicial rescission of the adoption in any of the following cases:
1. If the adopted has committed any act constituting a
ground for disinheriting a descendant
2. When the adopted has abandoned the home of the
adopters during minority for at least one year, or by
some other acts has definitely repudiated the adoption
** Under CC, PD 603 and FC, both the adopted child and
the adopter can ask for the judicial rescission. However, RA
8552 only allows rescission by the adoptee.
Art VI Sec 19, RA 8662
GROUNDS FOR RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
1.
2.
3.
4.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
EFFECTS OF RESCISSION
FC, Art 193 If the adopted minor has not reached the age of
majority at the time of the judicial rescission of the adoption,
the court in the same proceeding shall reinstate the parental
authority of the parents by nature, unless the latter are
disqualified or incapacitated, in which case the court shall
appoint a guardian over the person and property of the minor.
If the adopted person is physically or mentally handicapped,
the court shall appoint in the same proceeding a guardian over
his person or property or both.
Judicial rescission of the adoption shall extinguish all reciprocal
rights and obligations between the adopters and the adopted
arising from the relationship of parent and child. The adopted
shall likewise lose the right to use the surnames of the adopters
and shall resume his surname prior to the adoption.
The court shall accordingly order the amendment of the records
in the proper registries.
3.
4.
5.
H. Adoption decree
REYES v SOTERO (2006)
482 SCRA 520
Elena Lising died intestate. Corazon Chichioco filed a
petition for issuance of letter and administration and
settlement and estate as the niece of the decedent with
the collateral relatives of the decedent.
Chichioco alleged that the properties of the decedent is
with the petitioner Ana Joyce Reyes, her grand niede
and that she be appointed as the administrator of these
properties instead.
Reyes filed an opposition to the petition, claiming that
she is in fact the adopted child of the decedent and her
husband Serafin delos Santos and that the appointment
of administration is unnecessary since she is the sole
heir of Lising. As evidence, she provided the following:
o Certification from the Municipal Registrar of
Paniqui, Tralac that on the Record of Court
Decrees, Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and
Serafin delos Santos.
o Certification of the Clerk of Court of the RTCTarlac City that judgment was rendered on Dec
21, 1968 decreeing her adoption by the spouses
o Judicial form no. 43: the adoption decree which
declares her adoption
o Decree of final distribution issued by PVAO:
benefits paid to her as daughter of Serafin
delos Santos.
Chichioco filed an annulment of the adoption decree
stating that documents presented are false and
fraudulent; and that petitioner and her mother
collaborated to make it appear that petitioner is
adopted by Elena and Serafin.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner herein should prove the validity
of her adoption due to irregularities raised by private
respondent.
HELD: No. The Court ruled that the documents presented
by the petitioner sufficiently proved that she is legally
adopted by Elena and Serafin. It is presumed that these
documents are regularly issued as they are issued under the
seal of the issuing offices and signed by the proper officers.
The adoption decree is a public document that is required
by law to be properly registered in the official repository i.e.
local civreg as well as the court that rendered such
judgment. Thus these documents are prima facie evidence
of the facts therein unless proven contrary with proof of
such alleged irregularity be brought in a separate
proceeding for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree
I. Inter-country Adoption
* Governed by RA 8043 or the Inter-country Adoption Act
WHO MAY BE ADOPTED Any child:
1. has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the
Department as dependent, abandoned, or neglected
pursuant to the provisions of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code may be the subject of Inter-Country
Adoption;
2. Povided that in case of a child who is voluntarily
committed, the physical transfer of said child shall be
made not earlier than six (6) months from the date
the Deed of Voluntary Commitment was executed by
the childs biological parent/s. The prohibition against
physical transfer shall not apply to adoption by a
relative or children with special medical conditions.
WHO MAY ADOPT
Any foreign national or a Filipino citizen permanently
residing abroad who has the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under the Act may file an application if
he/she:
(a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age;
(b) is at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to
be adopted at the time of the filing of the
application, unless the applicant is the parent by
nature of the child to be adopted or is the spouse
of such parent by nature;
(c) has the capacity to act and assume all the rights
and responsibilities incident to parental authority
under his/her national law;
(d) has undergone appropriate counseling form an
accredited counselor in his/her country
(e) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
(f) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law
(g) can provide the proper care and support and give
the necessary moral values and example to the
child and, in the proper case, to all his/her other
children;
(h) comes from a country:
a. with whom the Philippines has diplomatic
relations;
b. whose government maintains a foreign
adoption agency; and
c. whose laws allow adoption; and
(i) files jointly with his/her spouse, if any, who shall
have the same qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to adopt as prescribed above.
J. Adoption issues
THE PROS AND CONS OF INTER-COUNTRY
ADOPTION ACT1
Nationalistic reasons against IA
1. International pride political pressure to upgrade
internal system of social welfare
2. An unacceptable form of international charity
3. Belief that country and heritage is special and children
would be deprived of something valuable if removed
from it
4. Waste of human resources and exploitation by Western
neighbors
Best interest of the child
1. Remain in their biological families, or at least in their
home countries
a. Deprivation of cultural identity
b. Racial discrimination
c. Unnecessary separation from family
2. IA acts as an escape valve for LDCs and a
conscience-saving mechanism for developed
countries, it works to the disadvantage of all children in
these nations
a. limited response to the needs of children by
benefiting only a few, leaving millions of
homeless children in need of assistance
b. IA reduces pressure on the nations to improve
their child and family welfare programs
3. IA is dictated by the demands of would-be parents in
developed countries, rather than the needs of the
children involved
a. incentives for child trafficking and trading
likewise increase
b. will result to increase in number of abandoned
children, it will even encourage more mothers
who want better life for their children
c. western people are adopting for their own
selfish needs, then it is not an altruistic activity
4. IA facilitates child trafficking
*Too lazy to include the rebuttals which is the second part.
Its nice though. You might want to check it out yourself.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
OVER THE PROPERTY
Years Presumption)
1. Custody
A. Determining the best interest of the child
i. GENDER AND TENDER YEARS PRESUMPTION
EX PARTE DEVINE (1981)
398 So. 2d 686
Alice Beth, an employee at the US Army at Fort
McMClellan Christoper, a school teacher Matthew
Patrick and Timothy Clark
Mr and Mrs Devine were divorced, the court awarded
the children to Mrs Devine, according to the tender
years presumption (if both parents are fit, and children
are at their tender years, under 7 years, mother will
take care of them, based on instinctive role of the
mother).
Mr Devine now challenges the constitutionality of the
tender years presumption and claiming that it is
violative of the14th amendment (equal protection)
ISSUE: WON the trial courts reliance on tender years
presumption deprived the father of his constitutional
entitlement to the equal protection of the law
HELD: Yes. The tender years presumption represents an
unconstitutional
gender-based
classification
which
discriminates between fathers and mothers in child custody
proceedings solely on the basis of sex. It creates a
presumption of fitness and suitability of one parent without
consideration of the actual capabilities of both parties. It
also imposes unnecessary legal burden on the father. (Note:
The burden of proof that the mother is unfit. Thus, the male
can only gain custody IF the female is unfit even if the
father is fit. This violates the equal protection clause.)
* Remember Moe v Dinkins, a case about the requirement
of parental consent
TEST
PROXY
MOE v DINKINS
Maturity
Age
DEVINE
Fitness
Sex/Gender
Is there a fit between the test and the proxy? No, because
even if mothers are closer than fathers during infancy, it is
not sufficient ground because as the child matures, the
difference between the parental skills of the father and the
mother decreases.
CERVANTES v FAJARDO (1989)
169 SCRA 575
Angelie Anne Cervantes is the product of common-law
relationship between Conrado Fajardo and Gina
Carreon. They offered Angelie for adoption to her sister
and brother in law, Zenaida Carreon Cervantes and
Nelson Cervantes, the petitioners in this case.
Gina executed an affidavit of consent and an
appropriate petition for adoption was filed by herein
petitioners. The petition was granted.
Petitioners received a letter from the respondents
demanding to be paid 150,000, or else, they would get
back their child. The petitioners refused.
court since the interview and the examination were done for
foreign travel and school purposes respectively, not for the
advancement of the litigation case. Also, she refuses to talk
to her in the phone and when they saw each other in court,
daughter ignored her mother and did not show any longing.
The mothers illicit affair with Reynaldos coworker seemed
to have caused emotional disturbances to Rosalind. There
is also nothing in the records which show that Reynaldo was
unfit. His assignment in the states is just temporary, and he
will be coming back home to the Philippines permanently.
CELIS v CAFUIR (1950)
86 Phil 554
When Ileana Celis gave birth to a boy, Joel, she
entrusted him to Soledad Cafuir because of her fathers
displeasure of the disgrace Ileana brought to the family
for having illicit relations with a man whom she is not
married with and because of her fathers objection of
having her son stay in the paternal home.
Ileana made two documents: 1) entrusting Soledad her
child and only Soledad can adopt the child. 2)
appointment of Soledad as the childs guardian.
Ileana only came to visit the boy every Saturday and
provided some milk, food and a little money.
She eventually married co petitioner Agustin Rivera and
then decided to get the boy back, but Soledad refused.
Ileana then filed for a writ of habeas corpus. Soledad,
in her defense, claims that the two documents enacted
by Ileana renounced her custody of and patria potestas
over her child.
ISSUE: WON Ileana had renounced her custody of the child
in favor of Soledad.
HELD: No. The first document merely entrusted her son to
soledad. Entrusted cannot convey the idea of permanent
renunciation. Also, the clause that says No one has the
right to claim for adoption except Soledad merely provides
an option for Soledad, which she didnt take. The second
document, on the other hand, merely designated Soledad as
the guardian of the child. The designation of one as the
guardian does not mean that the guardian will always
assume and discharge the duties of the office or position.
GAMBOA-HIRSCH v CA (2007)
527 SCRA 380
Agnes Gamboa-Hirsh Franklin Harvey Hirsch and a
daughter was born to them named Simon Noelle
They were married in Bacolod but the couple cannot
agree on where they would establish their conjugal
home, whether in Boracay or in Makati.
They settled in Boracay but Agnes insisted on going to
Makati. She did, and took with her Noelle with no
intention of coming back.
Husband petitions for writ of habeas corpus which CA
granted and they were given joint custody
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in giving custody to both the
parents
SANTOS v CA (1995)
242 SCRA 407
Leouel and Julia had placed their child into the care of
the latters parents ever since the child was born. The
grandparents were the ones who provided support for
the child, since Leouel cannot afford to do so. Julia then
left for the States to work. The grandparents claim that
Julia has been sending financial support to her son.
On September 1990, Leouel abducted the child from his
grandparents. The grandparents then filed for custody
of the boy, which the trial court granted.
Leouel appealed, stating that the respondents have
failed to show the he is unfit to be the father and that
the substitute parental authority granted to the boys
grandparents was inappropriate.
The respondents claim that they are financially well-off
to take care of the son, while Leouel is not. They can
provide the child with an air-conditioned room since he
is asthmatic.
Also, Julia has entrusted the boy to them. Leouels use
of trickery to abduct the child also is a sign of his
unfitness. They likewise claim that they are in the best
position to take care of the child, and this should be the
primary consideration of the court.
ISSUE: WON Leouel should be awarded proper custody
HELD: Yes. The father, Leouel was not shown to be an unfit
parent. The fact that he kidnapped his son from the latters
maternal grandparents does not render him unfit. Also,
disqualifying him as custodian because of the nature of his
work would mean depriving all soldiers of their childs
company. Only in cases of death, absence or unsuitability of
parents may substitute parental authority be exercised by
the surviving grandparents.
RIGHTS OF PARENTS
1. To keep them in their
company
2. To demand from them
respect and obedience
DUTIES OF PARENTS
All others! So in effect, parents
have more duties than rights
FC, Art 222 The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's
property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the
child so requires
FC, Art 223 The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the
individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority,
may petition the proper court of the place where the child
resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over
the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of
counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a
summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and
the child shall be heard.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the
petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or
when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order
the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt
such other measures as it may deem just and proper.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the
child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's support
and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family.
ISSUE: Who between the mother and the uncle has the
right to administer the childs property?
HELD: The mother. Art 320 and 321 of CC says that the
father, in his absence, the mother is the legal administrator
of the property of the child. There is no ambiguity in the
law, so apply it if the facts are not disputed.
LIBI v IAC (1992)
214 SCRA 816
Julie Ann Gotiong (18 yo, 1st year Commerce student at
University of San Carlos, Cebu) and Wendell Libi (1819) were sweethearts.
ISSUE: WON the parents of the Wendell are liable for the
damages
HELD: Yes. Parents are primary liable for damages caused
by minor children from quasi-delicts and criminal offenses
except when they exercised due diligence. In this case,
parents did not exercise due diligence since the son gained
access to the key of the safety deposit box where gun was
(mother just kept it in her bag, to the knowledge of the son)
and their ignorance to the nature of his job as evidence by
the picture of him with a gun given to Julie Ann. Also, the
Libis theory is untenable because they did not file a case
against the alleged malefactor of their son, there were only
two bullets used and no paraffin test was conducted
because of the hasty interment.
* Maam Beth recognizes the impulse of teen-agers to have
a life unknown from their parents. Mahirap talagang maging
magulang, if you dont know what your child is doing, youre
a bad parent and if something goes wrong youre liable for
it. If you get involved too much, youre being too intrusive
and stunts your childs growth.
LINDAIN v CA (1992)
212 SCRA 725
Dolores Luluquisin, acting as a guardian of her minor
children, sold a land registered in the name of her
children to the private respondents Apolonia Valiente
and Federico Ila for P2000.
They assert that the value can be validly sold without
written court approval because the property was less
than P2000.
Even if the sale was invalid, the petitioners right to
redeem has already prescribed because it is only
allowed until four years after reaching age of majority
ISSUE: WON judicial approval was necessary for the sale of
minors property by the mother
HELD: Yes. Sale of minor children's property executed by
the mother is void. Judicial approval is necessary because
the powers and duties as legal administrator are only
powers of possession and management; no power to
CA denies custodial rights to father and asks for selfsacrifice, saying that rotational custody is harmful to
the children, especially if they see that the father has
another family. If he really loves his children, he will
give them what is best for them, even if it means he
will not see them. Besides, illegitimate children should
be under the parental authority of the mother.
SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL
AUTHORITY
Grandparents, oldest
sibling or court appoint
guardian
Exercised in case of death,
absence or unsuitability of
parents
Subsidiarily liable for if
damages caused by act or
omission under the
supervision of people with
special parental authority
Law is silent about
prohibition of corporal
punishment
SPECIAL PARENTAL
AUTHORITY
School, administrators and
teachers
Exercised concurrently with
the exercise of parental
authority
Principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused
by act or omission of minor
under their custody,
supervision or instruction
Cannot inflict corporal
punishment on the minor
FC, Art 219 Those given the authority and responsibility under
the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising
substitute parental authority over said minor shall be
subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles
shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasidelicts.
AMADORA v CA (1988)
160 SCRA 315
Just before their highschool graduation, Pablito Daffon
shot Alfredo Amadora which resulted to his death. It
was proven that they were only at the school
auditorium to finish their project in Physics. Amadoras
parents claim for damages which RTC and CA
dismissed.
ISSUE: Who may be held liable for the damages?
HELD:
1) Not the school nor the administrators: Art 2180 only
holds school administrators of trade and art school liable,
but not academic institutions.
2) Not the teacher in charge because it was not show that
he was not required to be there at the time of the incident.
3) Not the school prefect because it was not proven that the
gun used by Daffon was the same gun he had confiscated
and did not report to authorities.
However, it was established that Art 2180 applies to all
schools, academic or non-academic. In academic schools,
teacher in charge is liable for student's misconduct. In nonacademic schools, the head is liable. Custody is not
coterminous with semester. As long as student is under the
control and influence of school and within its premises in
pursuance of legitimate right, obligation or privilege, he is
considered under school custody.
* Maam Beth thinks Amadora was incorrectly decided
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PALISOC AND AMADORA
PALISOC
during school hours, school
liable if impleaded
AMADORA
not during classhours, what
mattered was the purpose
C. Suspension or Termination of
Parental Authority
FC, Art 228 Parental authority terminates permanently:
1. Upon the death of the parents;
2. Upon the death of the child; or
3. Upon emancipation of the child
FC, Art
parental
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
FC, Art 231 The court in an action filed for the purpose in a
related case may also suspend parental authority if the parent
or the person exercising the same:
1.
2.
3.
4.
TERMINATION permanent
SUSPENSION temporary
a. ipso facto if with civil interdiction (reclusion
temporal, perpetua or death)
terminated by:
i. service of penalty
ii. amnesty or pardon
b. judicial decree
CHUA v CABANGBANG (1969)
27 SCRA 791
CFI dismisses Pacitas claim for her daughter. She was
a prostitute who had three children by three men whom
she lived with successively (Chua Ben, Sy Sia Lay and
Victor Tan Villareal).
Betty Chua, 11 yo at the time of the trial, was one of
her children and is in the custody of Flora Cabangbang.
Cabangbang and Chua had different stories as to how
Bettys custody was acquired.
FLORA: she found the child wrapped in a bundle in
their front door
PACITA: Villareal gave Betty to Flora as a payment for
his debts. She now claims custody of her child after five
years allegedly because she did not know where to look
for the child.
ISSUE: WON Pacita may regain her child
HELD: No. There was constructive abandonment and hence
she may be deprived of parental authority. She only wants
the child back so her biological fathers support would
resume (take not that this is still uncertain) and she was
even willing to withdraw her suit if the Cabangbangs would
pay her 150 K. She attests no genuine motherly longing. In
the best interest of the child, Flora Cabangbang should
retain custody.
COMPARED WITH CELIS v CAFUIR, Celis did not lose
communication with her child during the time that Cafuir
had custody of her child.
ABIERA v ORIN (1907)
8 Phil 193
Parents
Miguel
Vicenta
Mario
Petra
Juan
Sebastian
Rights of the
parents
Duties of the
parents
CC, Art 360 The Council for the Protection of Children shall look
after the welfare of children in the municipality. It shall, among
other functions:
1. foster the education of every child in the municipality
2. encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents
3. protect and assist abandoned or mistreated children and
orphans
4. take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency
5. adopt measures for the health of children
6. promote the opening and maintenance of playgrounds
CC, Art 363 In all questions on the care, custody, education and
property of children, the latters welfare shall be paramount. No
mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of
age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.
CC, Art 376 No person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.
* Repealed by RA No. 9048 Correction of clerical or
typographical error without need of judicial order
Art 11
Art 12
Art 13
Art 14
Art 15
Art 16
Art 17
Art 18
Art 19
Art 20
Art 21
Art 22
Art 23
Art 24
Art 25
Art 26
Art 27
Art 28
Art 29
Art 30
Art 31
Art 32
Art 33
Art 34
Art 35
Art 36
Art 37
Art 38
Art 39
Art 40
Art 41
Art 42
living sibling Jerry has. For Jerry only those who are able to
communicate intimately with him can help in his mental
treatment, and in most cases these are members of his
family. Tom is important to him in that he can identify
himself with him. Tom is his model, his tie with his family
thus his life is vital to his improvement at the asylum.
Considering that their parents are in their fifties, it would be
in the best interest of Jerrys welfare if Tommy were to
survive.
CONSERVATORSHIP OF VALERIE N.
aka Mildred G. v Valerie N. (1985)
707 P. 2d 760 | SC of California
Valerie N (29), is inflicted with Down Syndrome and has an
IQ of 30. She lives with her mother and her stepfather. The
mother instituted a court proceeding for appointment as
conservators and requested for additional powers to sterilize
Valerie through tubal ligation (salpingectomy).
According to the mother, sterilization was necessary
because Valerie is sexually aggressive at the sight of men
(kiss, hug, climb and sit on their laps). Though she is not
sexually active for being under close watch, she
masturbates excessively. Her mother fears the day when
she will no longer be able to look after her daughter. She
also went through unsuccessful behavior modification, tried
to ingest contraceptive pills but rejected it eventually and
would not cooperate in pelvic examination for intra-uterine
device.
Lower court granted conservatorship but not authority to
sterilize the incompetent.
ISSUE: WON conservators can give consent to sterilization
on behalf of their incompetent wards
HELD: No. Although the repeal of the statutes regarding
asexualization of mentally challenged individuals have been
declared unconstitutional for violating their due process and
equal protection rights, conservators still may not be
authorize to conduct the procedure unless all means have
been exhausted. The mother also did not provide clear and
convincing evidence as to the necessity of irreversible
sterilization. That Valerie is capable of pregnancy, that other
brands of pills were administered and that other means of
administering contraceptive pill were attempted.
JOHNSON v CALVERT (1993)
851 P. 2d 776 - SUPRA
2.
3.
2.
3.
F. Summary Procedure
REYES-TABUJARA v CA (2006)
495 SCRA 844
Ivy Joan Ernesto Carlos Iigo
The separated and custody battle ensued. Dad initially
won. Mother files a consolidated petition for writ of
habeas corpus and Anti-VAWC.
However, the presiding judge went on leave effect June
1. But the new presiding judge issued decision in favor
of the mother on May 31.
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over habeas corpus
petitions.
HELD: Yes. RA 8369 did not divest RTC jurisdiction over
such cases.
MADRINAN v MADRINAN (2007)
527 SCRA 487
Felipe Francisca three sons and a daughter
Romnick, Phillip, Francis Angelo and Krizia Ann