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Ukraine Imports Democracy

Ukraine Imports
Democracy

Michael McFaul

External Inuences on
the Orange Revolution

o external factors inuence democratization? Strangely, students of both international relations


and comparative politics have devoted little effort into answering this question. Thirty years ago, Peter Gourevitch outlined a set of arguments for why
and how to study the international causes of domestic outcomes.1 His framework had a profound effect on several literatures, but only a minor ripple in
the study of regime change.2 In Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Philippe
Schmitter asserted: [O]ne of the rmest conclusions that emerged . . . was that
transitions from authoritarian rule and immediate prospects for political democracy were largely to be explained in terms of national forces and calculations. External actors tended to play an indirect and usually marginal role.3
Michael McFaul is the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution; Director of the Center
on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law; and Professor of Political Science, all at Stanford University.
He is also a nonresident associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
For helpful comments and criticism, the author wishes to thank Petro Koshukov, Amichai Magen,
Dmytro Potekhin, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Richard Youngs, and the anonymous reviewers at International Security. For invaluable research assistance, the author thanks Tram Dinh, Daria
Khabarova, and Tatyana Krasnopevtseva. Some initial research for this article was conducted as
part of an evaluation of U.S. Agency for International Development programs in Ukraine. This article is part of a larger, collaborative project at the Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of
Law examining the external dimensions of democratization, which is supported by the Smith
Richardson Foundation.
1. Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,
International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn 1978), pp. 881912.
2. Exceptions include Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); Thomas Carothers, In the Name of
Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1991); Tony Smith, Americas Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Richard Youngs, International Democracy and the West: The Role of Governments, Civil Society, and Multinational Business
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi,
eds., American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000); Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004); John M. Owen IV, The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions, International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 375409; Jon C.
Pevehouse, Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization,
International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 515549; Laurence Whitehead, International Aspects of Democratization, in Guillermo ODonnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, eds.,
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 346; Peter Burnell, ed., Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization (London: Frank Cass, 2000); and Jeroen de Zeeuw and Krishna Kumar, eds.,
Promoting Democracy and Postconict Societies (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2006).
3. Philippe C. Schmitter, An Introduction to Southern European Transitions from Authoritarian
International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall 2007), pp. 4583
2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

45

International Security 32:2 46

As late as the early 1990s, the role of international actors was correctly described as the forgotten dimension in the study of democratic transition.4
Few studies try to measure international effects on democratic change at the
national level.5 Instead, the limited literature on evaluating democracy promotion usually begins by focusing on some component of democracy assistance
from a single Western country, such as political party assistance, rule of law
programs, or civil society development.6 This strategy has severe limitations
because tracing the causal effect of one kind of foreign assistance on one dimension of democratic development in isolation from all other variables
inuencing democratization is extremely difcult, while making impossible
evaluations of progress toward democracy at the national level.7
The relatively underdeveloped academic literature on external dimensions
of internal political change contrasts sharply with U.S. and European policymakers focus on democracy promotion, especially in the last decade as more
and more leaders have embraced the moral and security benets of democracy
as a system of government.8 Rhetorically, President George W. Bush elevated
the promotion of freedom around the world to one of his top foreign policy objectives.9 The European Union has published numerous statements of princiRule: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey, in Guillermo ODonnell, Schmitter, and Laurence
Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe (Baltimore, Md.: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 5.
4. Geoffrey Pridham, International Inuences and Democratic Transition: Problems of Theory
and Practice in Linkage Politics, in Pridham, ed., Encouraging Democracy: The International Context
of Regime Transition in Southern Europe (Leicester, U.K.: Leicester University Press, 1991), p. 18.
5. For the rst comprehensive quantitative study of the impact of U.S. Agency for International
Development democracy assistance programs, for example, see Steven E. Finkel, Anbal PrezLin, and Mitchell A. Seligson, Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Results of a Cross-National Quantitative Study, Final Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, January 2006), ver. 34.
6. See Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, Funding Civil Society: Foreign Assistance and NGO Development in
Russia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006); Sarah L. Henderson, Building Democracy
in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003); Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn, eds., The Power and Limits of NGOs (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2002); and Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, eds.,
Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 2000). Assessments of rule of law assistance are fewer. See Erik Jensen and
Thomas Heller, eds., Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law (Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004); and Thomas Carothers, ed., Promoting Rule of Law Abroad:
In Search of Knowledge (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006). The
only book on political party assistance is Thomas Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding
Political Parties in New Democracies (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2006).
7. National-level, aggregate assessments include Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad; and Thomas
Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996).
8. See Michael McFaul, Democracy Promotion as a World Value, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28,
No. 1 (Winter 200405), pp. 147163.
9. See especially George W. Bush, President Sworn-In to Second Term, January 2, 2005, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html.

Ukraine Imports Democracy 47

ples that highlight the promotion of human rights, democracy, and good
governance as strategic priorities.10 Both the United States and the European
Union spend roughly $1.5 billion a year on democracy promotion. The United
Nations, the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), and the African Union all claim to promote democracy and have programs designated to pursue that objective. While using a different discourse,
the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
also try to leverage their resources to promote good governance. Denmark,
Germany, Great Britain, Slovakia, Sweden, and Taiwan have extensive democracy promoting programs, while almost every European aid agency devotes
resources to the effort. The purposive promotion of democracy in other countries has become a major activity of states, multilateral institutions, and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), yet explanations or assessments of
these efforts remain a topic still underdeveloped in academia.
Through the examination of the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, this article offers a unique method for generating answers to this important theoretical and policy question. Rather than starting the analysis from the perspective
of donors, this article begins rst with a theory of democratization. The analytic innovation is simple: start with a theory of regime change rstthat is,
identify the set of independent variables that produces democratization (or
not)and then look for how external factors inuence the value of these
independent variables. The analytic starting point is the exact opposite of most
democracy promotion studies. This approach also assumes that domestic actors seek to pull in external resources as much as external actors seek to push
resources to local actors. Domestic efforts to import ideas and resources to
advance democracy (or impede it) are just as central to the analysis as foreign attempts to export democracy. Obviously, importers can bring in ideas
and resources only if exporters are willing to supply them, but because of foreign policy decisions in London and Brussels, congressional earmarks in
Washington, and the inertia of the worldwide democracy promotion industry, attempts to export democracy march on with or without consumers of the
promoters products. Tracing the impact of all of these democracy promotion
efforts by focusing rst on the suppliers and not the consumers is methodologically awed. With rare exception, domestic actors dominate the drama of regime change; external actors can inuence outcomes only by working with
and through these domestic actors.11

10. See especially Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (Brussels: European Union, December 12, 2003).
11. Obviously, cases of military intervention introduce foreign actors into the drama directly. As

International Security 32:2 48

After these internal factors have been assessed, the analysis zooms out to
measure to what extent external factors inuenced either the strength of
Ukraines autocratic regime or the democratic challengers. Domestic factors accounted for most of the drama of the Orange Revolution, but external
factors did play a direct, causal role in constraining some dimensions of autocratic power and enhancing some dimensions of the oppositions power. International assistance in the form of ideas and nancial resources was crucial
regarding one dimension of the Orange Revolutionexposing fraud. Yet signicant international inputs also can be identied regarding the preservation
of semi-autocracy, the fostering of an effective political opposition, the development of independent media, and the nurturing of capacity to mobilize protest after the vote.
Ukrainian democracy did not consolidate after the Orange Revolution. The
causes of the revolution can be measured independent from the longer-term
consequences of this dramatic event on democratic consolidation.12 Even if
Ukrainian democracy does slide back toward autocracy over the long run, the
Orange Revolution will still remain a dramatic case of democratic breakthrough, and maybe the most important instance of democratic breakthrough
in this decade.13
The Orange Revolution is also a critical case for measuring democracy promotion. Although the U.S. government never targeted its nancial resources at
fomenting revolution, it spent more than $18 million in election-related assistance efforts in Ukraine in the two years leading up to the 2004 presidential
vote.14 Some observers praised U.S. assistance; others lambasted the intervention; but both critics and supporters claimed to identify a causal role for external actors.15 Likewise, assessments assigned a major antidemocratic role for

the contemporary cases of Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate, however, even foreign agents with
armed forces are severely constrained in shaping local political change when they lack powerful
domestic allies.
12. Distinguishing between the causes of transition from the causes of consolidation is common in
the literatures on democratization and revolution.
13. Democracy, in other words, develops in ts and starts, and not always on a gradual path.
14. These were ofcial gures provided to the author by staff members in the Ofce of the Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, U.S. Department of State.
15. For a positive assessment of Western intervention, see Jeffrey Clark, Elections, Revolution,
and Democracy in Ukraine: Reections on a Countrys Turn to Democracy, Free Elections, and the
Modern World (Washington, D.C.: Development Associates, October 2005). For critics of the
Western, and especially U.S., intervention, see Patrick J. Buchanan, Whos in Charge of Russia
Policy? Antiwar.com, December 29, 2004, http://antiwar.com; Sergei Markov, Oranzhevaya
Revolutsiyaprimer revolutsii globalnogo soobshchestva XXI veka, in Mikhail Pogrebinskii,
Oranzhevaya Revolutsiya: Versii, Khronika, Dokumenty (Kiev: Optima, 2005), pp. 5275; Jonathan
Steele, Ukraines Postmodern Coup dEtat, Guardian, November 26, 2004; Anatol Lieven,
Ukraine and Europe: A Shotgun Wedding Is Bound to Fail, International Tribune, December 21,
2004; and Congressman [Ron Paul] accuses U.S. Government of Supporting Viktor Yushchenko,
ICPS Newsletter, No. 258 (December 20, 2004).

Ukraine Imports Democracy 49

Russia. If scholars cannot identify a causal impact of external inuences in the


Orange Revolution, they are unlikely to nd it in other cases.
The analysis proceeds as follows. The rst section provides an analytical
framework for explaining the Orange Revolution. This framework is derived
from a theory of democratization that focuses analysis on the conict and the
distribution of power between autocratic elites and democratic challengers.
The second section disaggregates the macro variables described in the rst section to develop a more precise understanding of the proximate causes of the
Orange Revolution. The third section examines the factors that weakened
the ancien rgime, including (1) competitive authoritarianism, (2) an unpopular leader, and (3) division among the armed forces. The fourth section details
the factors that strengthened the democratic opposition, including (1) a successful opposition campaign, (2) the ability to expose fraud, (3) the means to
communicate information about the falsied vote, and (4) the capability to mobilize masses to protest the fraudulent election. The fth section examines the
external dimensions that weakened the ancien rgime. The sixth similarly analyzes the external variables that strengthened the democratic opposition. The
seventh section concludes by offering a road map for future research about the
inuence of external factors on domestic regime change.

The Orange Revolution as a Case of Democratic Breakthrough


The fall 2004 presidential election triggered one of the pivotal moments in
Ukrainian history. Initially, the election resembled other fraudulent votes
in semi-authoritarian regimes.16 The incumbent president, Leonid Kuchma,
and his chosen successor, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, deployed state
resources, national media, and private funding from both Ukrainians and
Russians to defeat the opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. When this effort to win the vote fell short, Kuchmas government tried to steal the election
by adding votes to Yanukovychs tally in the second round.17 In response to
this fraud, Yushchenko called on his supporters to come to Independence
Square (or Maidan Square) in Kiev, and protest the stolen election. Eventually
hundreds of thousands answered his call. They remained in the square, with
some living in a tent city on Khreshchatyk, Kievs main thoroughfare, until the
Supreme Court annulled the second-round results on December 3, 2004, and
set a date for the rerunning of the second round for December 26, 2004. In this

16. On these regimes, see Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April 2002), pp. 5165.
17. See Andrew Wilson, Ukraines Orange Revolution (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
2005), chap. 6.

International Security 32:2 50

round, Yushchenko won 52 percent of the vote, compared with 44 percent for
Yanukovych. The victors memorialized this set of events by calling it the
Orange Revolution.18
The Orange Revolution was a unique event in Ukrainian history, but the
outcome followed a pattern of democratic breakthroughs or electoral revolutions observed earlier in Georgia in 2003, Serbia in 2000, and some would argue Slovakia in 1998 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005.19 These cases shared several
features: (1) the spark for regime change was a fraudulent national election;
(2) the challengers to the incumbents deployed extraconstitutional means to
ensure that the formal rules of the political game in the constitution were followed; (3) incumbents and challengers both claimed to possess sovereign authority over the same territory; (4) all of these revolutionary situations ended
without the massive use of violence by either the state or the opposition; and
(5) the conclusion of these electoral revolutions triggered a signicant jump in
the degree of democracy.20
Scholars have many theories of democratization.21 Seymour Martin Lipsets
ideas about modernization as the driver of democratization still command serious attention, while other structuralist analyses have focused on related but
distinct variables such as culture, economic inequality, geography, and resource endowments.22 Doing battle with these deterministic explanations of
democratization are the actor-centric theorists, who focus on the actions and
interactions of individualsand elites in particularas the driver of democratization or its absence. The transitologists divide on two issues: whether cooperation between parts of the old regime and the democratic challengers is
necessary for democratic change and whether democratization should be
viewed as a game between elites, or if societal and mass actors should be included in the analysis.23

18. On the symbolic codication of the Orange Revolution, see Laura Arzhakovska, Revolyutsiya
Duxa (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2005); and the movie Ukraiha: proriv do demokratii (Kiev:
O. Dovzhnko, Fond Rozvitku Ukrainskogo Kino/Pro TV, 2005).
19. Mark K. Beissinger, Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of
Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions, Perspective on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 2007),
pp. 259276; Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 4 (October 2006), pp. 518; Michael McFaul, Transitions
from Postcommunism, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 3 (July 2005), pp. 519; and Joshua
Tucker, Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions, Perspective on Politics (forthcoming).
20. Ukraines Freedom House scores jumped from partially free in 2004 to free in 2005.
21. Barbara Geddes, What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years? Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1 (June 1999), pp. 115144.
22. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1960).
23. Those emphasizing elites and the benets of pacts include Guillermo ODonnell and Philippe

Ukraine Imports Democracy 51

The Orange Revolution offers conrming evidence for those who emphasize
conict as a driver of democratic change and those who assign a central role to
coordinated mass action in pressing for democratic change.24 According to this
theory, democratization occurs not when the distribution of power is relatively
equal and both sides are forced to negotiate, but when societal forces acquire
enough power to either demand democracy or defend it against autocratic encroachments. The critical set of independent variables for explaining democratization, therefore, is the distribution of power between the autocratic elements
within the state and the pro-democratic elements within society. To measure
this balance of power, analysts must evaluate the unity among elites in the
state or their ability to control the state, the coercive capabilities of the regime,
and the costs of continued autocratic rule. Analysts also must gauge democratic power, including the unity of the opposition and the oppositions capacity to resist coercion or make autocracy costly, especially the societys ability
[to] coordinate their reactions to prevent violations of democratic rights.25
This framework offers a simple, powerful lens for analyzing the Orange
Revolution. Ukraines levels of economic development, literacy, and urbanization, as well as its cultural proclivities for democratic rule, geographic proximity to Europe, and dearth of oil, gas, and diamonds may all have been
necessary preconditions for the Orange Revolution to occur. But in the fall of
2004, it was real people, motivated by real ideas and empowered by real resources, who struggled with each other to produce the Orange Revolution. A
shift in the distribution of power between autocratic incumbents and democratic challengers produced democratic breakthrough. Those seeking to hold
on to power through antidemocratic means were weaker in 2004 relative to
earlier periods when they had the resources to retain power in the face of democratic challengers, while the democrats were stronger in 2004 than in earlier
periods. The 2004 presidential election and attempts by the ancien rgime to
C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies,
Vol. 4 (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); and Terry Lynn Karl, Dilemmas of
Democratization in Latin America, Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1 (October 1990), pp. 121.
Those downplaying pacts and giving greater attention to masses include Nancy Bermeo, Myths
of Moderation: Confrontation and Conict during the Democratic Transitions, Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 305322; Ruth Collier, Paths towards Democracy: The Working
Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999);
Elisabeth Jean Wood, Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Michael McFaul, The Fourth Wave of
Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World, World
Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2 (January 2002), pp. 212244.
24. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
25. Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, American
Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 245263, at p. 246.

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falsify its results gave the opposition a crucial galvanizing event to coordinate their behavior and demonstrate their power.26 The absence of either this
election date or the regimes attempt to steal the election would have severely
hindered the oppositions ability to demonstrate its power or make a credible
threat of social disorder, perhaps the critical factor in other cases of democratization.27 In response, Kuchma and his supporters, including those in
Moscow, did contemplate using coercion to stay in power. Measuring the distribution of power between state and society, however, was not an abstract exercise during the Orange Revolution; calculations about power could be made
based on concrete assessments of crowd sizes and unied will among those in
the state wielding coercive power. Democratic society was simply too powerful to repress.
This level of aggregationthe autocratic state versus the democratic
societyis useful for generating comparative theory, but it constrains the
search for causal mechanisms that could have been inuenced by external actors. The next two sections break down these variables into the more specic
components that interacted to cause the Orange Revolution.

The Components of Weakened Autocratic Power


Measuring a rulers capacity to stay in power through antidemocratic means is
extremely difcult. Before regime collapse, autocratic rulers almost always
look powerful. After collapse, they almost always look weak. Autocratic
power also must be measured in relation to the power of challengers. Some autocrats hang on for decades with very little coercive capacity and very low approval ratings because the opposition is even weaker. Nonetheless, the
trajectory of some disaggregated measures of powerdegree of autocracy,
popularity of the regime, and unity among the coercive forces in the regime
can be captured to give some approximation of the strength of the regime as a
whole.
compettitive authoritarianism
All autocratic regimes are vulnerable to collapse at some point, but which
kinds of autocracies are the most vulnerable? Some observers posit that competitive authoritarian regimes better facilitate democratization than full-blown

26. The idea of a galvanizing event as a necessary condition for societal coordination is presented
in ibid., p. 251.
27. Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, p. 4.

Ukraine Imports Democracy 53

dictatorships.28 Others argue that semi-autocracies or partial democracies impede genuine democratization to a greater degree than more rigid autocracies, because liberalized autocracies can partially diffuse societal pressures
for change and thereby avoid regime collapse more effectively than rigid
dictatorships.29
Ukraine offers conrming evidence that competitive autocracies can be
conducive to democratic breakthroughs.30 These are regimes in which the
formal rules of democracy were never suspended and competition still mattered to some degree. They are also regimes in which some political institutions and organizations had some autonomy from the autocratic regime.31
President Kuchma aspired to construct a system of managed democracy
formal democratic practices, but informal control of all political institutions
similar to President Vladimir Putins model of government in Russia.32 But
the Ukrainian president never achieved as much success as his Russian
counterpart.
Most important, Ukraines oligarchs never united in support of the ancien
rgime.33 Ukraines three largest oligarchic groups did back Kuchma and
wielded their media and nancial resources on behalf of his candidate in the
2004 election, but signicant if lesser oligarchs backed Yushchenko, as did tens
of thousands of smaller businesspeople. Ukraines economic elites were divided, not united, in the fall of 2004.
Kuchmas inept and blunt attempts to squelch opposition voicesbe it his
apparent collusion in the murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze, his jailing of
former Energy Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, or his dismissal of popular Prime
Minister Yushchenkoalso served to further weaken the state and mobilize
28. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Eastern Europe (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1996).
29. Daniel Brumberg, Liberalization versus Democracy, in Thomas Carothers and Marina
Ottaway, eds., Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 1536; and Eva Bellin, The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective, Comparative
Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2 (January 2004), pp. 139153.
30. A more nuanced hypothesis might be that competitive authoritarian regimes that emerged
from partial democracies are more vulnerable than competitive authoritarian regimes that
emerged from full-blown autocracies.
31. Levitsky and Way, The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.
32. On the model, see Lucan A. Way, Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime
Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, World
Politics, Vol. 57, No. 2 (January 2005), pp. 231261.
33. Anders slund, The Ancien Rgime: Kuchma and the Oligarchs, in slund and Michael
McFaul, eds., Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraines Democratic Breakthrough (Washington,
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), pp. 928.

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even greater opposition. On the eve of the 2004 presidential vote, threequarters of the Ukrainian voters wanted greater democratization.34 This
societal response to autocratic government most distinguishes Ukraine from
its Slavic neighbors, Belarus and Russia. The Ukraine without Kuchma campaign from December 2000 to March 2001 and the results of the March 2002
parliamentary elections demonstrated that Ukrainian society was active and
sophisticated. Especially after the electoral success of the Our Ukraine bloc in
the 2002 parliamentary vote, Ukraines opposition also had a foothold in an
important state institution.
In addition, Kuchma did not control rents generated from oil and gas sales
that could have been used to purchase the loyalty of societal challengers.
Ukraines economy began to grow in 1999 for the rst time since independence, peaking at a 12 percent increase in gross domestic product in 2004. But,
in contrast to the leadership in other resource-rich states such as Iran,
Kazakhstan, and Russia, Kuchmas regime did not control or own major segments of the Ukrainian economy. Ukrainian growth increased the nancial autonomy and independence of the regimes opponents.
Finally, Kuchma never aspired to construct full-blown autocracy. As he demonstrated in the fall of 2004, Kuchma was prepared to transgress democratic
rules to prevent the opposition from coming to power, but he also wanted to
keep up the appearance of democracy. He never canceled elections. He did not
amend the constitution so he could run for a third term, but instead took the
risky move of recruiting a successor, Viktor Yanukovych, to run in the 2004
presidential electionone who was not a Kuchma loyalist.
regime unpopularity
Given that a presidential election triggered the Orange Revolution, an unpopular regime was a necessary condition for democratic breakthrough. Although
it may seem obvious, this measure of the regimes weakness distinguishes
Ukraine from countries such as Russia, where President Putin is still popular,
or countries such as Mexico during the heyday of semi-authoritarian rule,
when the Institutional Revolutionary Party could manufacture electoral victories without major voter fraud.35
When asked on the eve of the 2004 presidential election, only 8 percent of

34. Polling data cited from Taras Kuzio, Everyday Ukrainians and the Orange Revolution, in
slund and McFaul, Revolution in Orange, p. 61.
35. Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Ukraine Imports Democracy 55

Ukrainian voters approved of Kuchmas tenure; 62 percent disapproved.36 No


factor undermined Kuchmas standing more than the murder of journalist
Georgy Gongadze, the founder of the internet publication Ukrainska Pravda.
Tapes of conversations between Kuchma and subordinates leaked to the press
strongly suggested that Kuchma ordered Gongadzes execution. Kuchma was
not running for ofce in 2004, but his handpicked presidential candidate,
Prime Minister Yanukovych, did little to inspire hope for a break with past corrupt practices. Yanukovych was a convicted felon who still maintained ties
with criminal circles in his hometown region of Donetsk. Among voters, he
was perceived as the candidate who would preserve the status quo, not
change it.
Yet, in the rerun of the second round on December 26, 2004, Yanukovych
captured 44 percent of the vote. This signicant level of support reects both
the success and limits of Yanukovychs campaign strategy, which deliberately
tried to accentuate ethnic and regional divisions within Ukraine, mobilizing
the Russian-speaking voters in the east against the Ukrainian-speaking
supporters of Yushchenko in the west.37 Yanukovych also tried to portray
Yushchenko as a U.S. lackey who would undermine the stable relationship
that Ukraine had developed with Russia under Kuchmas leadership. The
Yanukovych campaign called his opponent Bushenko and circulated posters
and leaets warning of a U.S.-orchestrated civil war in Ukraine similar to
those in Bosnia, Serbia, and Iraq should Yushchenko come to power.38
The campaign strategy worked. Yanukovych won smashing victories in the
December round of voting in the eastern regions of Donetsk (93 percent),
Luhansk (91 percent), and Crimea (81 percent), but he failed to break double
digits in the western regions of Ternopil, Ivan-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Volyn. Fostering polarization did not help Yanukovych win votes in the center of
Ukraine, including Kiev, which swung decidedly toward Yushchenko (71 percent). Given the economic boom under way throughout Ukraine in 2004, especially in Kiev, this strong popular support for change suggests a deep, genuine
rejection of the regime constructed by Kuchma in the 1990s.

36. See Razumkov Centre Sociological Survey, as reported in 2004 Presidential Elections: How
Ukrainians Saw Them, National Security and Defence, No. 10 (2004), p. 19; and Natalya Panina, ed.,
Ukrainian Society, 19942005: Sociological Monitoring (Kiev: Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences and Democratic Initiatives, 2005), p. 25.
37. Mikhail Pogrebinsky, director, Kiev Center for Political Studies and Conictology, and campaign adviser to Viktor Yanukovych, interview by author, Kiev, November 2005.
38. Wilson, Ukraines Orange Revolution, p. 95.

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unreliable coercive capacity


The post-Soviet Ukrainian state never developed the coercive capacities of a
full-blown autocracy, including the kind of intelligence services or internal security troops needed to repress popular revolt. Political arrests and even assassination happened, but massive repression never occurred. Unlike Russia in
1993, political competition in Ukraine never devolved into military conict between state institutions. In contrast to Russia and Armenia, the line between
civilian government and military service remained clear in Ukraine.
Consequently, when faced with mass social mobilization against the regime
during the Orange Revolution, President Kuchma could not invoke tradition
or call upon loyal special forces to disperse protesters. He did, however,
threaten to use force. A week into the protest, troops from the ministry of the
interior armed and mobilized, with the intention of clearing the square.39 But
Orange Revolution sympathizers from within the intelligence services warned
the opposition of the impending attack, and commanders within the regular
army pledged to protect the unarmed citizens if these interior troops marched
into the center of town.40 These defections made clear that those with the
gunsthat is, the military, the intelligence services, and policecould not
be trusted to carry out a repressive order.41 These splits helped to convince
Kuchma to call off the planned police activity, even though Yanukovych was
urging the Ukrainian president to take action.
Divided loyalties within the security forces are closely intertwined with
mass mobilization. Had only a few thousand demonstrators remained,
Kuchma might have been less reluctant to use force. To understand why there
were hundreds of thousands and sometimes a million people mobilized for
two weeks after the vote requires a closer examination of the resources that
made the Ukrainian democratic opposition powerful and effective.

Components of Increased Democratic Power


In retrospect, all revolutions seem inevitable. Beforehand, all revolutions seem
impossible. The Orange Revolution was no exception. Autocracy in Ukraine
was weak, but the democratic opposition seemed even weaker. In comparative
perspective, Ukraines civil and political society looked poorly organized,
39. Interview with Ihor Smeshko, chief of the Ukrainian Secret Service, in The Orange Revolution,
documentary lm written, directed, and produced by Steve York (Washington: York Zimmerman,
2007).
40. Yurii Lutsenko, MP and a key organizer of the Maidan protests, interview by author, Kiev, November 2005.
41. C.J. Chivers, How Top Spies in Ukraine Changed the Nations Path, New York Times, January
17, 2005.

Ukraine Imports Democracy 57

ranking well below other countries in the region.42 The boldest attempt at mobilization against the regimethe Ukraine without Kuchma campaign in
2001ended in demoralizing defeat. Everyone knew that the 2004 presidential
elections offered a major opportunity for renewed societal mobilization, but
few were optimistic about a positive outcome.43 Yet, the naysayers were wrong
this time. Several resources were critical for the success of the Orange
Revolution.
united and effective opposition
A united oppositionor at least the perception of onewas crucial for the
2004 democratic breakthrough. In the previous decade, division, disorganization, and the absence of a single, charismatic leader had crippled Ukraines
democratic forces. Ironically, Kuchma helped opposition unity when he dismissed Yushchenko as prime minister in 2001. At the time, Yushchenko cut an
image of a technocratic economist, not a revolutionary. He was a popular
prime minister with a record of achievement, an image of not being corrupt, an
appealing biography, and a handsome appearance, but his colleagues worried
that he did not have the temperament to become a national political leader.44
A critical step for forging unity was the 2002 parliamentary elections. To participate in these elections, Yushchenko created a new voting bloc, Our Ukraine,
which captured a quarter of the popular vote. Our Ukraines success in 2002
made Yushchenko the focal point of a united front for the presidential election.
Importantly, Yuliya Tymoshenko agreed not to run for president, but instead
backed Yushchenko.45
A single candidate was essential for the electoral success of Ukraines opposition. Without electoral victory, there would have been no Orange Revolution.
Whether Yushchenko was necessary for the oppositions electoral success in
2004 is impossible to know; that he was a candidate who could unite the democrats was clear.46
Beyond acknowledging the importance of unity behind one candidate, assessing the general effectiveness of the oppositions electoral campaign is
difcult. The second round of the vote essentially became a polarized ref42. See Marc Morj Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), chap. 4.
43. Wilson, Ukraines Orange Revolution, p. 123.
44. Roman Bezsmertny, Our Ukraine MP; and Alexander Moroz, MP and chairman of the Socialist
Party, interviews by author, Kiev, July 2002.
45. Yuliya Tymoshenko, interview by author, Kiev, February 2006.
46. On the misplaced emphasis on leaders in such situations, see Kurt Schock, Nonviolent Action
and Its Misconceptions: Insights for Social Scientists, PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4
(October 2003), pp. 705712.

International Security 32:2 58

erendum on the Kuchma regime. The vote was polarized along geographic
lines: the farther west one lived, the more likely one supported Yushchenko,
while the farther east one lived, the more likely one supported Yanukovych.47
Therefore, measuring the causal impact of campaign efforts in this polarized
election about the past is particularly difcult. Yushchenko won, suggesting
that he effectively used his campaign assets, such as party organization, his
personal appeal, targeted messages, and nancial resources to pay for campaign staff, leaets, and get-out-the-vote activities.48 He also stuck to his
message: criticizing Kuchmas regime rather than pushing a comprehensive
agenda of policy changes.49 His message structured the vote as a choice between two different systems of government: one that was corrupt, authoritarian, and criminal versus one that would be for the truth, for freedom, and
for our rights. Rather than appealing to concerns of individuals, Yushchenko
and his campaign asked voters to make assessments about the overall political
and economic health of their country.50 Yushchenko also tried to keep his own
speeches positive. The use of the word Tak! (Yes!) and the color orange were
carefully chosen positive symbols.51 Regrettably, however, no one collected the
kind of survey data necessary to trace the effects of the Yushchenko campaigns strategies and tactics.
One aspect of the campaign, however, can be traced: voter mobilization. The
Yushchenko campaign believed that a higher voter turnout would help its
cause and therefore devoted huge resources to get-out-the-vote efforts. In addition to party activities, the nongovernmental organization Znayu carried out
massive voter education and get-out-the-vote efforts, recognized by friends
and foes as contributors to Yushchenkos electoral success. The youth groups
Black Pora, Yellow Pora and its afliated Freedom of Choice Coalition, and
the Committee of Ukrainian Voters (known by its Ukrainian acronym CVU)
also organized extensive get-out-the-vote campaigns, while groups such as
Internews-Ukraine placed public service announcements on television educating Ukrainian voters about their electoral rights, which indirectly also in47. Razumkov Centre Sociological Survey, as reported in 2004 Presidential Elections, p. 9.
48. Tracing the effects of campaign messages and techniques is difcult even in older democracies. See Henry E. Brady and Richard Johnston, eds., Capturing Campaign Effects (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006).
49. Of course, he did have a program, including a list of presidential decrees that he promised to
enact should he be elected. These future actions, however, were not emphasized. After the election, two-thirds of the electorate reported that they had never heard about these decrees. See
Razumkov Centre Sociological Survey, as reported in 2004 Presidential Elections, p. 10.
50. Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, Sociotropic Politics: The American Case, British
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 1981), p. 132.
51. Ihor Gryniv, Our Ukraine MP and campaign manager, interview by author, Kiev, November
2005.

Ukraine Imports Democracy 59

creased voter interest. In the second round, voter turnout reached an amazing
80 percent; in the rerun of the second round (the third time Ukrainians were
asked to go to the polls that fall), turnout was still very high, 77 percent.
exposure of fraud
Another component of the oppositions success was the ability to quickly provide an accurate and independent account of the vote after polls closed. Several organizations monitored the count, but CVU played the central role in
monitoring all rounds of the 2004 presidential vote. CVU also conducted a parallel vote tabulation (PVT) in all three rounds. In addition, the Ukrainian
NGO Democratic Initiatives Foundation coordinated the National Exit Poll
conducted by four polling rms: the Kiev International Institute of Sociology
(known by its Ukrainian acronym KMIS), the SOCIS Center, the Social Monitoring Center, and the sociological service of the Razumkov Centre.52
CVU had ten years of experience, and the Democratic Initiatives Foundation
orchestrated the rst exit polls in Ukraine in the 1998 parliamentary elections.53 Compared with their efforts in earlier elections, however, these groups
also faced a much more sophisticated voter manipulator in 2004. First,
Kuchmas regime falsied the vote at the precinct level and not between the
precinct level and higher levels of counting where fraud traditionally occurs.54
A parallel vote tabulation attempts to expose fraud by sampling the actual
vote count at the precinct level. But if the precinct numbers are already fraudulent, then a PVT will simply reect the result of the falsied vote, an outcome
that CVU encountered. Because CVU gures from its PVT did not expose
fraud, the committee did not release its second-round results.55 Second, the
legitimacy of the National Exit Poll came into question when two rms in
the consortium used a different tallying method. In response to the polarized atmosphere of the 2004 vote, preelection opinion polls recorded very high
no-response rates, exceeding 70 percent in some regions and more than 50 percent nationwide. As a corrective, two consortium partners, KMIS and the
Razumkov Centre, agreed to switch from face-to-face polling to a more anony-

52. The government-sponsored Ukrainian Institute of Social Research and the Russian rm Foundation for Social Opinion (known by the Russian acronym FOM) also conducted exit polls. FOM
discontinued its exit poll in the rst round because more than 40 percent of all voters refused to reveal how they voted. See Tetiana Sylina, Exit Poll: A Long Ordeal, National Security and Defence,
No. 10 (2004), pp. 2428.
53. See http://www.dif.org.ua.
54. Yevgen Poberezhny, deputy chairman of the board of the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, interview by author, Kiev, November 2005.
55. Ihor Popov, chairman of the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, interview by author, Kiev, March
2005.

International Security 32:2 60

mous method in which they essentially placed a second ballot box outside of
the polling station into which voters could report how they voted without the
interviewer seeing. SOCIS Center and the Social Monitoring Centerallegedly
under government instructionrefused to adopt this new method. Not surprisingly, the two methods produced different results: the more anonymous
method used by KMIS and the Razumkov Centre reported higher levels of
support for Yushchenko than did the results collected by SOCIS and the
Social Monitoring Center through face-to-face interviews. The consortium dissolved before the second round. In this round, results released by KMIS and
Razumkov gave Yushchenko 53 percent of the vote compared with 44 percent
for Yanukovych.56 Ofcial results claimed that Yushchenko won 46 percent of
the vote, and Yanukovych 49 percent. This discrepancy was essential for mobilizing citizens to protect their votes.
After the PVT and exit polls yielded ambiguous results, qualitative methods
came to the rescue. Individual election monitors reported hundreds of irregular procedures.57 Turnout levels in some eastern regions were so outrageously
high, and jumped so dramatically in the last minutes of voting, that election
ofcials and analysts knew they could not be true.
This combination gave a few members of the Central Election Commission
(CEC) the courage not to certify the nal count, sending the issue to Ukraines
parliament, the Rada, which then sent the issue to the Supreme Court.58 On
December 3, 2004, the court used evidence of fraud collected by the CVU and
other NGOs to annul the ofcial results and call for a replay of the second
round later that month.
The defecting CEC members or the Supreme Court majority might have
acted differently if hundreds of thousands of protesters were not in the streets
by the time of their deliberations.59 At the same time, a necessary condition for

56. Democratic Initiatives, Final Results of the National Exit Poll 2004 for the 2nd Round of the
Presidential Election in Ukraine, November 27, 2004, mimeo.
57. On the second round of the presidential elections, see, for instance, CVU, Report of the Committee of Voters of Ukraine on Observation of Voting and Vote Tabulation on November 21, 2004,
http://www.cvu.org.ua/doc.php?lang?eng&mid?docs&id?828. On the OSCE monitoring missions report following the second round of elections, see International Election Observation Mission, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, November 22, 2004, http://
www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/11/3811_en.pdf. Election monitoring efforts of NGOs to
gather evidence of falsication were facilitated by the multiparty composition of the local election
commissions. This method of forming election commissions put Our Ukraine members and supporters in the room in most election districts when counts were taking place. This method of constituting CEC commissions was another attribute of competitive authoritarianism. Full-blown
autocracies do not allow opposition parties to participate in vote counting.
58. Roman Knyazevich, Central Election Commission member, interview by author, Kiev, March
2005.
59. Ibid.

Ukraine Imports Democracy 61

the courts decision was hard evidence that the results had been falsied in a
systematic manner. This evidence came from Our Ukraine election monitors
and commission members, CVU monitors, and members of other NGOs. The
effort to document violations and then take legal action to prosecute the offenders was much greater in this vote than in previous elections, and proved
critical to Our Ukraines case before the Supreme Court.60
independent media
Independent media were another important ingredient that created momentum for the Orange Revolution. Kuchmas failures as a president could damage the popularity and legitimacy of his regime only if his actions were
communicated to the voters. Any media reporting, think tank publication, Our
Ukraine press release, or parliamentary hearing that provided objective analysis of the Gongadze affair or exposed corruption played some role in decreasing Kuchmas popularity. Gongadzes murder critically undermined support
for the ancien rgime and sparked mass mobilization in support of regime
change. The initial wave of civic protest in 2001 failed to dislodge Kuchmas
regime, but it did help to create the permissive conditions for Our Ukraines
victory in the 2002 parliamentary vote and Yushchenkos rise in popularity.
Importantly, Ukrainska Pravda and Ukraines other independent media outlets
did not fold or practice self-censorship after Gongadzes death, but continued
to investigate and expose Kuchmas alleged crimes, often under threatening
circumstances.61
During the 2004 campaign, Kuchmas regime controlled or enjoyed the loyalty of most national media outlets. By 2004 Ukraine boasted several independent television networks, but all the major channels were owned or
controlled by oligarchs loyal to Kuchma and Yanukovych.62 Through a system
of temniki, or secret commands, Kuchmas staff directed the news coverage on
these channels, resulting in a massive asymmetry of positive television exposure for Yanukovych compared with Yushchenko.63 Russian television stations
ORT, RTR, and NTV, which enjoy considerable audiences in Ukraine, also gave
favorable coverage to Yanukovych.
Important independent outlets did remain, however, and others devel-

60. Mikhola Katarynchuk and Yuri Kliuchkovsky, Our Ukraine MPs who argued the Our Ukraine
case before the Supreme Court, interview by author, Kiev, November 2005.
61. Olena Prytula, editor, Ukrainska Pravda, interview by author, Kiev, June 2002.
62. Marta Dyczok, Was Kuchmas Censorship Effective? Mass Media in Ukraine before 2004,
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 2 (March 2006), pp. 215238.
63. For the percentages, see International Renaissance Foundation (IRF), Promotion of the Fair and
Open Election of 2004 (Kiev: IRF, January 2005), pp. 1419.

International Security 32:2 62

oped during the 2004 campaign. In 2003 a wealthy Yushchenko ally, Petro
Poroshenko, acquired the rights to a small television station and transformed it
into Channel 5. Poroshenko hired a team of professional journalists who aimed
to provide media coverage of the entire campaign and not just Yanukovych.
Channel 5 did provide positive coverage of the Yushchenko campaign, but
with roughly 8 million viewers, the stations audience was much smaller than
those of the major channels, and its signal reached only approximately 30 percent of the country.64
Regarding radio, Radio Era provided news that was not shaped by the
government. External stations such as Radio Liberty, the BBC, and Voice of
America were also important channels of independent news for those with
the ability to receive shortwave broadcastsa small fraction of the Ukrainian
population.65
Important print newspapers such as Zerkalo Nedeli, Ukrayna Moloda, Vecherny
Visty, and Silsky Visty (controlled by the Socialist Party), as well as internet
news outlets such as Ukrainska Pravda and Telekritikaa web-based forum for
discussing television coverage of the campaignalso provided sources of election news that were not controlled by the state or oligarchs tied to the state.
But all had limited circulation.66 Every region also had at least one opposition
newspaper, including such famous examples as Kafa, Hrviyna, and Vechirney
Cherkassy. In 2004 the media were skewed in favor of Yanukovych, but independent and pro-Yushchenko outlets did exist.
The impact of Ukraines independent media outlets on the election results is
difcult to measure. Their role in facilitating popular mobilization after the
vote was more obvious. Independent media played a critical role in communicating news about the falsied vote and helped mobilize and coordinate popular opposition to the regime after the vote. Channel 5 played the central role,
rst communicating the results of the exit polls and then reporting the numerous cases of electoral fraud. Channel 5 later provided live, twenty-four-hour
coverage of the events in Maidan, broadcasts that helped encourage others to
join the protests, especially when viewers saw the peaceful, festive nature of
the crowds. By the end of the demonstration, Channel 5 had catapulted from
64. Adrian Karatnycky, Ukraines Orange Revolution, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2 (March/
April 2005), pp. 3552.
65. Some FM stations, such as Radio Continent, Radio NART, and Radio Takt in Vinnytsia
rebroadcast Radio Liberty, which Liberty ofcials claimed reached 8 percent of the population. See
Olena Prytula, The Ukrainian Media Rebellion, in slund and McFaul, Revolution in Orange,
pp. 113115.
66. Internet access in 2004 was limited. Half of internet news readers lived in Kiev. Media
Sustainability Index, 2004 (Washington, D.C.: IREX, 2004), pp. 208209, 11, http://www.irex.org/
program/MSI_EUR/2004/MSI-2004-Ukraine.pdf.

Ukraine Imports Democracy 63

thirteenth place to third place in the national ratings. Its coverage also pressured other channels to stop spewing propaganda.67 By the fourth day of protests, staffs at most other stations had defected and joined the street
demonstrators. Radio Era, Radio Kiev, and Radio Gala also provided aroundthe-clock reporting from Maidan.
The Orange Revolution may have been the rst in history organized in large
measure on the web. During the critical days after the second-round vote,
Ukrainska Pravda displayed the results of the exit poll most sympathetic to
Yushchenko as well as detailed news about allegations of fraud. The website
also provided logistical information to protestors. During the second round,
Ukrainska Pravda grew to 350,000 readers and 1 million hits a day.68 Other portals also provided information that helped to make the Orange Revolution.
Maidan.org was a clearinghouse of information and coordination for protesters.
The student group Pora and Our Ukraine also maintained important websites
that blasted informational and motivational emails to supporters and observers all over the country and the world. Telekritika emerged as a popular site
for independent journalists during the campaign, and played an instrumental
role in pressuring journalists working at Kuchma-friendly outlets to withdraw
their support. As a technology of mobilization and coordination, text messaging was essential for those in Maidan Square who did not have access to the
web or email.
popular mobilization to protect the vote
To put Ukraine back on a path toward democratization, it was insufcient for
Yushchenko to win the election, to prove that the results were falsied, and
then to communicate this result to a sizable portion of Ukrainian citizens. A
nal, necessary condition for the Orange Revolutions success was mass mobilization after the election to defend the actual voting results. It happened on a
scale and for a duration that vastly exceeded the expectations of both the organizers and their foes.
The protest was not spontaneous. Months in advance of the presidential
election, Our Ukraine campaign leaders made plans to organize street demonstrations in what they believed was the likely event that the election results
would be falsied.69 At the last minute, the location of their protest changed
and some tactics of mobilization misred, such as a planned parallel vote
67. Tetyana Lebedeva, head of the board, Independent Association of Broadcasters, interview by
author, Kiev, November 2006.
68. Prytula, The Ukrainian Media Rebellion, p. 110.
69. Taras Stetskiv, MP and Our Ukraine campaign manager; and Gryniv, interviews by author,
Kiev, November 2005.

International Security 32:2 64

count to be conducted in the tents in Maidan Square. The campaigners did,


however, succeed in their central idea of calling on Yushchenko supporters to
take to and remain in the streets until the fraudulent vote was overturned. Several components produced success.
First, the regime did not impede the initial mobilization effort. After considering the streets outside the CEC as ground zero of the protest, and because of
the police contingent posted around it, Our Ukraine leaders decided instead to
make their stand in Maidan Square. The day after the second round of voting,
Our Ukraine members of parliament went to Maidan early in the morning to
build a stage, and no one tried to stop them (though MPs were assigned this
task specically because they have immunity). The quick appearance of truckloads of tents, mats, and food supplies, which had been secured weeks before,
clearly demonstrated the oppositions preplanning.70
Second, Our Ukraine leaders coordinated with Yellow Pora activists to set
up a tent city downtown. Yellow Pora started with 15 tents in what they called
their territory of freedom, but others spontaneously joined the effort, swelling the number of tents to 2,000, which housed more than 7,000 people from all
over Ukraine.71 This act immediately created a quasi-permanent presence in
downtown Kiev. Like the color orange, the tent city and Maidan became major
symbols of the revolution.
Third, Yushchenko appeared on television to call upon his supporters to
come to Kiev and occupy the square immediately after the falsied secondround results had been released. Strangely, Yushchenkos rst postelection
speech was covered on all major Ukrainian televisions stations. Later in the
process of mobilization, as already discussed, independent media outlets encouraged demonstrators to come to Kiev and also helped coordinate the massive logistics required to keep a million people fed and warm.
Fourth, Yushchenko credibly committed to sustaining the protest until the
election results were reversed or annulled when, on November 23, he took
the oath of ofce for president before 191 MPs in the Rada. At that moment,
Ukraine had two groups claiming to be the sovereign power over the same
landa classic denition of a revolutionary situation.72 This bold and controversial move meant that there could be no compromise between Presidents
Yanukovych and Yushchenkoone had to step aside. The move also inspired
the demonstrators to rally behind their president.
70. According to Stetskiv, Our Ukraine began purchasing tents and supplies a month before the
protest began. See his remarks in York, The Orange Revolution.
71. Pora, Civil Society and the Presidential Elections, Times of Change, No. 11 (November 27,
2004).
72. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), chap. 9.

Ukraine Imports Democracy 65

Fifth, NGOs that focused on get-out-the vote activities during the campaign
also played an important role in urging voters to protect their vote after election day. The Znayu information campaign devoted particular attention to educating voters about their responsibility to ensure that their vote was
accurately counted.73 Other NGOs developed and distributed similar messages during the campaign, helping indirectly to mobilize civic resistance
against fraud after ofcial second-round results were announced.
Sixth, regarding the logistics of the Maidan demonstration, Yushchenko and
his team beneted tremendously from the support of the Kiev city government
and Mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko. While initially reluctant to take sides, the
Kiev city government eventually provided logistical support for the provision
of food, water, and sanitation. They also opened more than a dozen government buildings for out-of-town protesters to use as warm shelter. Had politicians loyal to Kuchma been in charge of the capital, they could have severely
constrained the oppositions capacity to protest.
Seventh, Ukraines civil society and the middle class more broadly helped
increase the numbers in Maidan from the several thousand who planned to
show up to the million or so who spontaneously joined the protest. Our
Ukraine leaders made preparations for tens of thousands to protest a rigged
election, but they did not anticipate that their supporters would swell to more
than a million people. Providing for such large numbers required the volunteer work and donated supplies of thousands of individuals who previously
had no direct relationship with Our Ukraine.
A nal feature of the mobilizations success was nonviolence. Our Ukraine
organizers and Pora activists did not prepare for an armed conict: no guns in
Our Ukraine headquarters and no pro-Yushchenko militias waiting in the
wings. On the street, where protesters and soldiers stood eye to eye for days,
demonstrators used humor and music to defuse tension. At several moments
during the seventeen-day standoff, some political and Yellow Pora leaders,
including Tymoshenko, wanted to end the crisis by storming the presidents
ofce.74 They calculated, not without reason, that the governments armed
forces would not stop them, that Kuchma would ee, and that they
could therefore seize power with a minimum amount of violence as the
Serbian and Georgian oppositions had done in 2000 and 2003, respectively.

73. Dmytro Potekhin and Pyotr Kosuchev, Znayu leaders, interviews by author, Kiev, March 2005.
74. Vladislav Kaskiv, Yellow Pora leader and one of the advocates for seizing the building, interview by author, Kiev, March 2005; and Lutsenko, an opponent of seizing buildings, interview by
author. See also the testimonials of Our Ukraine leaders David Zhvania and Roman Bezsmertny, in
York, The Orange Revolution.

International Security 32:2 66

Yushchenko, however, categorically rejected these tactics, and no one was prepared to act against their leader.
The protesters stayed in place for more than two weeks. They achieved a
major victory on December 3, when the Supreme Court ruled that the secondround results were invalid because of systemic fraud, and therefore a rerun
must be held on December 26.

External Factors That Weakened (or Failed to Strengthen) Autocratic


Power
Most evaluations of democracy assistance focus on those programs and resources that enhance democratic institutions and democratic actors. In cases of
democratic transition or breakthrough, however, external actions and resources that constrain autocratic actors can be just as important as aid provided to democratic actors. Democratization is not always an engineering
problem, but a political struggle in which the relative power between the
forces of democratic change and forces of autocratic continuity determines the
outcome. Measuring how external factors inuence both sides of the equation
is essential to a complete assessment of international inuences on domestic
regime change.
international inputs sustaining competitive autocracy
Ukraine never became a full-blown autocracy. Western linkage, coupled with
aid to institutions that checked presidential power, helped keep it between dictatorship and democracy, a regime type that proved conducive for the Orange
Revolution. The WestCanada (a big player in Ukraine due to the large
Ukrainian migr community there), Europe, and the United States
remained a constant pull on Ukrainian government ofcials. Kuchma was a
ruthless leader who erected a corrupt and criminal regime. But he did not attempt to construct a truly repressive tyranny, because he wanted a cooperative
relationship with Europe and the United States. Strikingly, even in the face of
harsh criticism, Kuchma sent Ukrainian troops to Iraq, maintained ties to
NATO and the European Union, and unlike Slobodan Miloevib in Serbia,
avoided becoming a pariah in the West.
In contrast to Russian ofcials during the Putin era, Kuchma and his government continued to believe that Ukraine was a Western country that belonged
in Europe. The modalities of membership were tricky: Ukrainian membership
into the World Trade Organization was a high and attainable priority in the
Kuchma era (though never realized), but Ukraine was too big and too poor to
apply for European Union candidacy anytime soon, while a full place in

Ukraine Imports Democracy 67

NATO also presented difculties because a majority of Ukrainians did not


support the idea of joining. The goal of European integration or Western integration more generally, however, remained real and widely supported.
Kuchma even turned up for a NATO summit in Prague in November 2002 to
which he personally was not invited.
Kuchmas desire to be in the West created points of leverage for U.S. and
European diplomats. Rather than isolating Ukraine completely as Kuchmas
regime became more autocratic, U.S. and most other European policymakers
working on Ukraine advocated a policy of constructive if sometimes critical
engagement.75 Serious sanctions were discussed but never applied.76 After
Gongadzes murder, the Bush administration did deny Kuchma a presidential
visit to Washington, which the Ukrainian president desperately desired. At the
Prague summit attended by Bush and Kuchma, the ofcial language was
changed from English to French so that the two presidents, whose countries
names begin with the same letter in English but different letters in French,
would not sit next to each other. Kuchma understood the snub. More generally, U.S. ambassadors in Ukraine actively engaged Ukraines democratic
forces, especially after the murder of Gongadze, in a manner that Ukrainian
government ofcials called meddlesome. Yet direct contact with Kuchma
never ended, and active courtship of some of Kuchmas closest condants, including his billionaire son-in-law, Viktor Pinchuk, continued even during the
Orange Revolution. The U.S. strategy was to keep the regime leaders interested in the West, so as to raise the costs of seriously bad behavior during the
2004 presidential vote. U.S. State Department ofcials stated clearly in 2003
that the conduct of the presidential campaign and election was the primary
focus of U.S.-Ukraine relations.77
Western assistance and moral support also helped sustain pockets of pluralism within the regime and independent, opposition actors outside of the state.
Within the state, the independence of the Rada was especially critical in checking executive power. Technical assistance provided by the Indiana University
Parliamentary Development Project helped make this institution more effective. Party development efforts by the International Republican Institute (IRI)
and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) also helped ensure that Kuchmas
party did not win an overwhelming majority of seats in the parliament, as oc-

75. Carlos Pascual, U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, 200003, interview by author, Kiev, June 2002.
76. Richard Youngs, Ukraine, in Ted Piccone and Youngs, eds., Strategies for Democratic Change:
Assessing the Global Response (Washington, D.C.: Democracy Coalition Project, 2006), p. 104.
77. Ambassador John Tefft, U.S. deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs,
Ukraines Election: Next Steps, testimony before the House International Relations Committee,
108th Cong., 2d sess., December 7, 2004, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/39542.htm.

International Security 32:2 68

curred in the Russian Duma during the Putin era. IRI and NDI worked with
several parties that won representation in the Rada, and in turn helped maintain this institutions independence from the president. State Department
ofcials also went out of their way to court the Rada speaker during the crisis.
As Ambassador John Tefft testied, We welcomed Rada Speaker [Volodymyr]
Lytvyn to Washington ve days before the run-off to underscore our support
for a legislative body committed to ensuring an outcome that reected the will
of the people.78
Russian leaders and organizations, to varying extents, played the opposite
role and encouraged autocratic methods as an effective strategy for holding on
to power. Years before the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election, Putin embraced Kuchma without criticizing his antidemocratic ways. Through the provision of subsidized gas, Russia offered direct nancial support to Ukraines
government. Putins own system of growing autocratic rule provided a model
for Kuchma to emulate. Obviously, Russian ideological and nancial assistance was not sufcient to build a stable authoritarian regime in Ukraine, yet it
is equally true that the Ukrainian regime would have looked less authoritarian
and perhaps would have been even less tempted to steal the 2004 presidential
election without Russian support. Ukraines geographical proximity and
signicant Russian-speaking population facilitated the ow of ideas about the
Russian model as an alternative to the Western model of democracy.
After the second round, Putin tried to strengthen Ukraines managed democracy by quickly acknowledging Yanukovych as the winner in the presidential vote, even before the ofcial results were released. Throughout the
Orange Revolution, Putin stood rmly on the side of Yanukovych and against
reconciliation, atly denouncing the idea of rerunning the elections.79
external contributions to the regimes (un)popularity
Kuchmas own actions, monitored by independent media, drove his governments decline in popularity. Indirectly and marginally, Western reactions to
Kuchmas behavior helped magnify his image as an illegitimate and criminal
leader. Most important, U.S. and European leaders strongly denounced the
manner in which Kuchma handled the investigation into the murder of
Georgy Gongadze.80 When Oleksandr Moroz released tapes implicating

78. Ibid.
79. Daniel Williams, Putin Opposes Rerun in Ukraine: Kuchma Gets Support in Election Crisis,
Washington Post, December 3, 2004.
80. See U.S. Ambassador Stephen Pifer, U.S. deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian
affairs, testimony before the House International Relations Committee, 108th Cong., 2d sess., May
12, 2004, p. 3.

Ukraine Imports Democracy 69

Kuchma in the murder, the U.S. government granted the producer of these
tapes, Yuri Melnichenko, asylum. Miroslava Gongadze, Gongadzes widow,
and his two children also received asylum. Miroslava Gongadze eventually
took a job working for the Ukrainian division of Voice of America, a U.S. governmentfunded radio and television network. After the murder, as discussed
earlier, the Bush administration never invited Kuchma to the United States
and tried hard to marginalize him at international gatherings. The Bush administration further downgraded contacts with the Kuchma regime after it became known that the Ukrainian government had tried to sell its Kolchuga air
defense radar system to Iraq.81 Kuchma did receive some praise from the
White House for his decision to send Ukrainian troops to Iraq. The general
message coming out of Washington and the U.S. embassy in Kiev, however,
was that Kuchma and his regime were not held in high regard.
Ukraines independent media, parliament, and political opposition also
noted the Wests negative reaction to Kuchma. Media reporting, think tank
publications, Our Ukraine press releases, and parliamentary hearings that provided an objective analysis of the Gongadze affair or corruption played some
role in decreasing popular support for the Kuchma regime. Many of these critical sources received Western technical assistance or nancial support, including Ukrainska Pravda, the Razumkov Centre, and the Rada. Freedom House
provided direct assistance to Znayu and indirect assistance to Yellow Pora and
the Freedom of Choice coalition by sponsoring and helping to organize a summer camp for Yellow Pora activists and activists from other organizations. Another organization that received a grant from the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation, funded and organized
the major portion of the Znayu campaign. Indirectly, these efforts all contributed to more critical coverage of the Kuchma regime and a decline in its
popularity.
In addition, independent analysis and reporting from these sources helped
inform U.S. and European government ofcials and analysts, who in turn
inuenced their own governments perception of Kuchma.82 For instance,
Ukrainska Pravda would publish an article about corruption, which would be
read by an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in
Washington or a researcher at the German Marshall Fund (GMF) in Brussels.
In turn, he or she might speak out on television, in the op-ed pages, or in
81. Michael Wines, Report of Arms Sale by Ukraine to Iraq Causes Consternation, New York
Times, November 7, 2002.
82. This is the boomerang effect discussed in Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists
beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1998).

International Security 32:2 70

briengs to government ofcials about corruption in Ukraine, and thereby


inuence how the Bush administration or the European Union acted on
Ukraine. Such information ows also inuenced Ukraines Freedom House
scores, which in turn helped shape Western assessments of the Kuchma
regime. Ukrainian publications that had the resources to translate a portion
of their work into English, including Zerkalo Nedelya, Ukrainska Pravda, and
the Razumkov Centres journal, National Security and Defence, were especially effective in reinforcing the determination of Western nongovernmental campaigns to expose Kuchmas illegitimacy. During the nal weeks of
the campaign and during the Orange Revolution, emails sent and websites operated by the CVU, Pora, Our Ukraine, Internews-Ukraine, and several others
also helped inform the outside world about the machinations of Kuchma and
Yanukovych, inuencing the way foreign governments reacted to the falsied
results of the second round of voting.
The Kremlin did not invest major resources in trying to improve Kuchmas
international image, but Russian ofcials coordinated and sponsored various
activities aimed at helping Yanukovych win the election. At the urging of the
Kremlin, Russian businesspeople contributed to Yanukovychs campaign.83
Some reports claimed that Russian sources provided $300 million to his campaign, with the lions share coming from Gazprom.84 Several Russian public
relations consultants, including some closely tied to the Kremlin, worked directly for the Yanukovych campaign, while others participated in projects in
Ukraine designed to bolster indirectly the Yanukovych efforts.85 For instance,
in 2004 Russian public relations professionals created the Russian House in
Kiev, which organized public events to emphasize Russias pivotal role for
Ukraines economy and security. To help Yanukovych, Putin personally
traveled twice to Ukraine in the fall of 2004. A Russian-sponsored electionmonitoring group observed the Ukrainian vote and declared the rst and second rounds free and fair.
The Ukrainian prime minister and his nancial backers also hired U.S. law
rms and public relations specialists to help with the campaign, including
Barbour, Rogers, and Grifth and DBC Public Relations Experts. These
Western public relations efforts included the elding of an electoral monitoring group consisting of former members of the U.S. Congress. The impact was

83. Sergei Markov, interview by author, Moscow, September 2005.


84. These numbers are reported in Jackson Diehl, Putins Unchallenged Imperialism, Washington Post, October 25, 2004.
85. Russian public relations experts who worked for Yanukovych included Marat Gelman, Sergei
Markov, Vyacheslav Nikonov, and Gleb Pavlovksy.

Ukraine Imports Democracy 71

marginal, but the effort was real. Resources aimed at bolstering Yanukovychs
campaign came not only from Moscow but also from Washington.
external facilitators of divisions within the security sercives
Identifying a direct Western impact on division within the security forces
is difcult. Some observers have claimed that soldiers who participated in
NATOs Partnership for Peace programs were more likely to support the demonstrators than those who did not.86 To date, however, the evidence marshaled
to support this claim is far from convincing.
Western actors did contribute indirectly to keeping the peace during the
standoff between armed forces and the Orange demonstrators. Well before the
election, U.S. diplomats explicitly warned ofcials in Kuchmas government
that they would become pariahs if the vote was not free and fair. Ambassador
John Herbst called upon visiting U.S. dignitaries, such as Madeleine Albright,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Holbrooke, Henry Kissinger, and Thomas
Pickering to communicate threatening messages about the negative consequences of bad behavior should the election process become tainted.87 As a
signal of its seriousness, the U.S. government denied a visa to Ukrainian oligarch Hryhoriy Surkis to warn Kuchma and his family (including Kuchmas
billionaire son-in-law, Viktor Pinchuk) that they too could face a similar fate of
persona non grata status in the West. In the end, these threats did not prevent
Kuchma and his team from trying to steal the vote. Yet the threats and warnings against violently breaking up the peaceful demonstration did continue
throughout the standoff, including a late-night phone call from U.S. Secretary
of State Colin Powell to Kuchma (which Kuchma refused to take) on the night
when security forces were getting ready to try to clear the square. The U.S. embassy learned of these troop movements from an anti-Kuchma source within
the Ukrainian security service.88 Throughout the crisis, Pinchuk was a consistent and accessible channel of communication for U.S. government ofcials
who wanted to get a message to Kuchma. Polish President Aleksandr
Kwasniewski, who was working with a European Union delegation to help
mediate the crisis, also used his contacts with the regime to discourage the use
of force on this critical evening. Measuring the impact of these efforts, how-

86. See comments of Maj. Gen. Nicholas Krawciw at a panel discussion titled Ukraines Armed
Forces: On the Way to Join NATO? at the American Enterprise Institute event Ukraines Choice:
Europe of Russia? held in Washington, D.C., on December 10, 2004.
87. U.S. Ambassador John E. Herbst, interview by author, Kiev, November 2005. See also Celeste
A. Wallander, Ukraines Election: The Role of One International NGO (Washington, D.C.: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, March 2005).
88. Herbst, interview by author.

International Security 32:2 72

ever, is difcult. Several participants in the standoff did report that the U.S. interventions were useful in providing moral support on a very tense and critical
day.89 Nevertheless, the number of protesters on the streets was the decisive
deterrent to violence, not a phone call from Washington.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Kremlin supported Yanukovychs desire to use force to clear the streets. Some press accounts even claim that Russia
sent its own special forces to Kiev to assist in the protection of the presidential
administration building, which at one point was under threat of forceful takeover by Orange leaders.90 Press reports also claim that Putin ordered his special forces unit, Vympel, to Kiev to evacuate Kuchma and his family, as well as
remove secret documents, if the moment to ee arose.91 Denitive evidence of
Russian military involvement never materialized, and statements made subsequently by Orange Revolution leaders implied that the Russian military threat
was greatly exaggerated.92 Moscows ability to inuence the internal cohesion
and actions of Ukrainian armed forces was just as limited as the Wests.

External Factors That Strengthened Democratic Power


Ukrainians made the Orange Revolution. Ukrainians provided the leadership,
ideas, organizational capacity, and nancial resources to prevail against the
Kuchma regime in the fall of 2004 and overturn a falsied election. In the margins, however, intellectual and nancial imports from the West helped to
strengthen Ukraines democratic opposition and offset resources transferred
from Russia in an effort to weaken the challengers to the Kuchma regime.
external contributions to a united and effective opposition
Assessing the role of external actors on the formation of a united and effective
opposition in Ukraine (or anywhere else) is a challenging task because of the
nature and sensitivity of the work. The nature of the work is difcult to evaluate because the process of making an impact occurs indirectly over extended
periods of time and in parallel with local inputs. The transfer that takes place
between groups such as the International Republican Institute and the
National Democratic Institute, on the one hand, and Our Ukraine on the other,
is essentially one of ideas and know-how, the most difcult variables to trace
systematically.93 Assessing this work is sensitive because Ukrainian actors do

89. Tymoshenko and Lutsenko, interviews by author.


90. United Press International, Russian Troops in Ukraine Capital, November 24, 2004.
91. Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov, Russias Role in the Orange Revolution, in slund and
McFaul, Revolution in Orange, p. 151.
92. Ibid.
93. Because tracing causality in this sector is so difcult, few have tried. Serious attempts include

Ukraine Imports Democracy 73

not want to taint their reputations or legitimacy by reporting that Western actors contributed to their domestic success, whereas Western actors seek to
protect their partners and also maintain a claim of acting as nonpartisans. Despite these constraints on analysis, observations about the role of external actors on the development of Ukraines opposition coalition can still be made.
There is no evidence that the United States or any European government
contributed nancial resources directly to the campaign of Viktor Yushchenko
and Our Ukraine.94 Our Ukraine did receive nancial contributions from
citizens living in the United States and Canada, though the greatest source
of foreign funding for the Yushchenko campaign came from Russia.95 The
Yushchenko campaign also hired U.S. and Russian campaign consultants.96
But foreign governments or NGOs did not pay for these professional services.97 Ukrainians did.
As discussed above, the Our Ukraine campaign had greater organizational
reach than any other party in Ukraine. Our Ukraine leaders accomplished this
feat primarily on their own through years of hard work. At the same time, they
reported that the development of their organizational capacity beneted from
years of close relationships with IRI and NDI.98 Well before the formation of
the Our Ukraine bloc in 2002, IRI and NDI worked closely with many of the individuals who later assumed senior positions in the Our Ukraine organization
and campaign. After the creation of the party, IRI and NDI provided additional training assistance, though using different strategies. IRI conducted
multiparty training programs focused almost exclusively on regional party
leaders outside Kiev, while NDI provided trainers to programs organized by
Our Ukraine, a service it provided to other parties as well.99 NDI staff also foCarothers, Confronting the Weakest Link; and Sarah E. Mendelson, Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia: Between Success and Failure, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4
(Spring 2001), pp. 68106.
94. Kathryn Stevens, director, Ofce of Democracy and Governance USAID Ukraine; Chris
Holzen, resident director, Ukraine, International Republican Institute; David Dettman, resident director, Ukraine, National Democratic Institute; and Stetskivall interviews by author, Kiev, November 2005.
95. Anonymous board member of a major Russian corporation who gave funds to the
Yushchenko campaign, interview by author, Moscow, June 2005.
96. The U.S. rm Aristotle International provided some marginal campaign advice to Our
Ukraine. The Russian rm Image Kontakt, headed by Aleksei Sitnikov, also worked for
Yushchenko. Sitnikov and Dettman, interviews by author.
97. The head of NDIs ofce in Kiev, David Dettman, used to work for Aristotle International and
most certainly facilitated the initial contacts between Our Ukraine and that rm. Interestingly, in
the 2006 parliamentary election, this company worked for Kuchmas former chief of staff, Viktor
Medvedchuk. Likewise, Yanukovych and his Party of Regions dumped the Russian consultants
for the 2006 contest and hired one of the Washingtons most prominent Republican rms, Davis
Manafort, which had previously worked for Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. See Jeremy
Page, Revolution Is Reversed with a Little Spin from the West, Times (London), March 28, 2006.
98. Stetskiv and Katarynchuk, interviews by author.
99. Dettman and Holzen, interviews by author.

International Security 32:2 74

cused more of their efforts on working with Our Ukraines senior leadership in
Kiev. Measuring systematically the results of these interactions, be it NDIs engagement with senior party ofcials or IRIs regional training efforts, is beyond the scope of this study.100 That there were purposive efforts by both IRI
and NDI to strengthen Our Ukraines campaign abilities is without question.
Indirectly, both IRI and NDI also helped to increase the respectability
of Yushchenko in Washington. IRI organized a trip to Washington for
Yushchenko and his senior staff in February 2003, at which time the Ukrainian
presidential candidate met with key Bush administration ofcials and members of Congress. Signicantly, he met Senator Richard Lugar, who would
eventually play a key role in helping to impede U.S. endorsement of the
second-round result of the 2004 vote.101 Former Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, chair of NDIs board, traveled to Ukraine in February 2004 to
meet with Yushchenko and other Our Ukraine ofcials. Upon returning to
Washington, she also spoke favorably of Yushchenkos candidacy. These kinds
of contacts helped assure the Bush administration that the Ukrainian opposition was viable and worth supporting. Our Ukraine ties with other European
parties also bolstered Yushchenkos image in the West. More generally, elite
networks between Our Ukraine leaders and Western leaders nurtured Our
Ukraine allies in the West when debates erupted in Washington and European
capitals about how to respond to the Orange protesters.102
Turnout in regions supportive of Yushchenko were much higher in the
2004 election than in previous elections. Several U.S. and European organizations, including IRI, NDI, the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF, the
Ukrainian afliate of the Soros Foundation), Freedom House, InternewsUkraine, and the Eurasia Foundation contributed direct nancial assistance to
the get-out-the-vote projects organized by their Ukrainian partners.103
For years before the 2004 vote, Russian state authorities tried to weaken and
divide the Ukrainian opposition. In August 2001 Russian prosecutors charged

100. To measure the impact of these programs on party development would require surveying recipients of this technical assistance and then comparing the results to the ideational and organizational development of parties not exposed to this kind of aid. Such data do not exist.
101. Lorne Craner, president, International Republican Institute; and Steve Nix, director, FSU Programs, International Republican Institute, interviews by author, Washington, D.C., October 2005.
102. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Adrian Karatnycky, William Miller (former U.S. ambassador to
Ukraine), and Lech Walesa are examples of private citizens with close ties to Our Ukraine who
played active roles in shaping Western debates regarding the Orange Revolution.
103. Eric Boyle, regional director, Kiev regional ofce, Eurasia Foundation; Yevhen Bystrytsky, executive director, International Renaissance Foundation; Juhani Grossman, senior program ofcer,
Civic Participation in Elections in Ukraine, Freedom House; Petro Koshukov, co-director of Znayu
project; and Inna Pidluska, president, Europa XXI Foundationinterviews by author, Kiev, November 2005.

Ukraine Imports Democracy 75

Yuliya Tymoshenko with complicity in bribe-giving.104 In 2004 Russian media outlets with reach inside Ukraine described Our Ukraine as having fascists
within its coalition. These same sources also cast Yushchenko as a U.S. puppet,
controlled by his wife, an American and former Department of Defense
ofcial.
external facilitators to exposing fraud
Many of the Ukrainian activities that contributed to the exposure of campaign
fraud had signicant assistance from external actors. In fact, the Wests central
contribution to the Orange Revolution was in the form of long-term support of
voters rights groups, think tanks, youth groups, and other civil activist organizations and media organizations that would be instrumental in monitoring,
polling, conducting PVTs and exit polls, and disseminating information about
voters rights and violations of those rights.
Even with the mixed results of the PVTs, the Committee of Ukrainian Voters
still played a leading role in exposing fraud (and creating the perception of
fraud) during the second round of the presidential vote, rst through its network of 10,000 monitors (the number cited in CVU press releases), second
through the CVU-initiated legal actions that helped challenge the legitimacy of
the ofcial results, and third through the evidence of falsication gathered by
CVU ofcials and then used by the Our Ukraine lawyers before the Supreme
Court. Based on its experiences rst in the Philippines and later in other countries in postcommunist Europe, NDI provided the original idea for a Ukrainian
election monitoring organization and also substantial technical and nancial
assistance to CVU.105 In 2004 other Western donors, including most importantly the IRF, also contributed major nancial resources to CVU.106 The PVT
technology used by CVU was also imported from the United States.107
CVU was the largest and most visible NGO effort supported by Western
funds dedicated to exposing fraud, but not the only effort. At the end of its
voter education and voter mobilization campaigns, the Znayu campaign, supported nancially by the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation and Freedom House, also
turned to exposing fraud, including one leaeting campaign that threatened
Central Election Commission ofcials about the legal consequences of commit104. Jan Maksymiuk, Yuliya Tymoshenko Now Faces Criminal Charges from Russia, Ukrainian
Weekly, Vol. 69, No. 36 (September 9, 2001).
105. On this technology, see Eric C. Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
106. The gures are listed in IRF, Promotion of the Fair and Open Election of 2004.
107. Popov and Poberezhny, interviews by author. On this method for exposing fraud, see Larry
Garber and Glenn Cowan, The Virtues of Parallel Vote Tabulations, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 4,
No. 2 (April 1993), pp. 95107.

International Security 32:2 76

ting electoral fraud.108 Yellow Pora, Black Pora, Chysta Ukraina, and hundreds
of smaller NGOs also used various tactics to expose fraud. Using its small
grants program, Freedom House funded many of the NGO activities at the regional level through its Citizen Participation in Elections in Ukraine program.109 Our Ukraine also worked hard to expose fraud, rst by training its
party representatives serving on CEC commissions on the rules for vote counting and mechanisms for recording irregularities, and second by organizing a
parallel network of election monitors. NDI played a major role in training Our
Ukraine monitors.110
The Democratic Initiatives Foundations exit poll, which also played a critical role in undermining the legitimacy of the second-round ofcial results, was
also an imported technology. Its use in Ukraine was funded almost entirely by
Western donors, including the IRF, Eurasia Foundation, Counterpart, and several Western embassies.111 IRF even nanced the participation of Russian and
Polish polling experts in the exit poll project.112
In addition to Ukrainian poll watchers, the OSCE, IRI, NDI, and the U.S.Ukrainian Foundation deployed international monitoring teams to observe the
Ukrainian election. Most innovatively, NDI and Freedom House cooperated to
bring to Ukraine the European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations
(ENEMO), which comprised 1,000 observers from seventeen electoral monitoring organizations in formerly communist countries. ENEMO brought trained
electoral monitors, experienced in exposing postcommunist vote rigging
(many observers also spoke Russian) and at a fraction of the cost that it would
have taken to bring in Americans or Western Europeans. All of these international teams released critical reports about the election process, which were instrumental in generating unied U.S. and European condemnation of the
voting procedures.113
Another successful innovation in the Ukrainian observation efforts was the
presence of a special envoy, Senator Richard Lugar, who visited Ukraine during the second round of voting as a personal representative of President Bush.
An experienced foreign affairs specialist and the chair of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Lugar had the authority to make his judgments mean108. Koshukov and Potekhin, interviews by author.
109. Grossman and several Ukrainian recipients of these funds, interviews by author.
110. Vadim Galaychuk, general director, Moor and Krosondovich, and coordinator for Our
Ukraine Election Monitoring Program, interview by author, Kiev, November 2005.
111. See Democratic Initiatives Foundation, http://www.ukma.kiev.ua/pub/DI/.
112. IRF, Promotion of the Fair and Open Election of 2004.
113. Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union on Ukraine, November 22, 2004,
http://www.um.dk/en/servicemenu/News/NewsArchives2004/DeclarationByThePresidencyOf
TheEuropeanUnionOnUkraine.htm.

Ukraine Imports Democracy 77

ingful in Washington and European capitals. His press statement on the vote
was scathing: [I]t is now apparent that a concerted and forceful program of
election-day fraud and abuse was enacted with either the leadership or cooperation of governmental authorities.114 Lugars statement in turn bolstered
the negative evaluation and tone of Secretary of State Powells rst remarks on
the vote, which were much more damning than initial reactions from the
White House. Powell unequivocally declared the ofcial result illegitimate,
because it does not meet international standards and because there has not
been an investigation of the numerous and credible reports of fraud and
abuse. He went on to warn that [i]f the Ukrainian government does not act
immediately and responsibly, there will be consequences for our relationship,
for Ukraines hopes for a Euro-Atlantic integration, and for individuals responsible for perpetrating fraud.115 Our Ukraine leaders and NGO activists
reported that Powells remarks provided a major boost of inspiration for their
supporters.116 His statement also raised doubt within President Kuchmas entourage about its ability to make the ofcial results stick.
external contributions to independent media
During the 2004 presidential campaign, Internews-Ukraine subsidized and
supported a whole series of activities, including the production of public service announcements, television talk shows, press conferences around the
country, and funds to support local coverage of the national campaign and
voters rights in the print media.117 These activities occurred only at the margins because pro-Kuchma forces still dominated the national electronic media.
The survey data needed to measure the causal impact of these externally supported activities do no exist.
During the Orange Revolution, several journalistsincluding Andrei
Shevchenko and Roman Skrypin, both at Channel 5, as well as Natalia
Dmytruk, the ofcial sign-language interpreter for state-run television
assumed heroic roles in their coverage of the campaign and the civic resistance
triggered by the electoral fraud.118 At various stages in their careers, many of
these people had contact with Western donor programs, most notably USAID114. Remarks by United States Senator Richard Lugar on the Ukrainian Presidential Elections,
Kiev, November 22, 2004, http://kiev.usembassy.gov/les/041122_lugar-qa_eng.html.
115. Quoted in William Branigin, U.S. Rejects Tally, Warns Ukraine, Washington Post, November
25, 2004.
116. Lutsenko, Tymoshenko, and Pora student leaders, interviews by author.
117. Sue Folger, Ukrainian director, Internews-Ukraine, interview by author, Kiev, November
2005.
118. When translating the spoken broadcast into sign language, Dmytruk told her viewers that the
announcer was not telling the truth.

International Security 32:2 78

funded media projects.119 Ukrainska Pravda, which played a central role in the
Orange Revolution, received major support from the National Endowment for
Democracy.120 Telekritika, an internet publication sponsored by InternewsUkraine, was a useful source of information and debate during the 2004 campaign and its immediate aftermath. Discussions on Telekritika were especially
instrumental in spurring the journalists rebellion on October 28, 2004, when
forty journalists from ve different television stations declared that they
would no longer obey the Kuchma regimes secret instructions (temniki).
Maidan.organother media outlet critical for the coordination of revolutionary activitiesreceived major nancial assistance from Western donors.121
external inputs into mass mobilization
Several weeks in advance, Our Ukraine planned the rst actions of civic resistance after the second round of voting. There is no evidence that it received
any Western intellectual or nancial assistance in making these preparations.
Nor did U.S. or European government sources support its two-week operation
in Maidan Square. The assertion that demonstrators were paid a daily wage
for their efforts is a complete myth.
Less directly, external sources played a role in facilitating mass mobilization.
A model for electoral revolution already existed and had succeeded in two
postcommunist countries within the previous three yearsSerbia in 2000 and
Georgia in 2003. Serbian and Georgian activists from Otpor and Kmara helped
reinforce these demonstration effects through direct interaction with their
Ukrainian counterparts.122 In particular, Yellow Pora leaders had signicant
contacts with civic resistance activists from Slovakia, Serbia, and Georgia,
through the facilitating efforts of Freedom House and the German Marshall
Fund. For instance, Freedom House organized and funded a summer camp for
Ukrainian youth activists and invited trainers from the Serbian youth movement, Otpor, to attend. Pavol Deme, a leader of the OK 98 movement in
Slovakia, traveled to Ukraine several times in the months leading up to the Orange Revolution to train and provide support for Yellow Pora. Znayu also
119. Andrei Shevchenko, Channel 5, and Kateryna Myasnykova, executive director, Independent
Association of Broadcasters, interviews by author, Kiev, November 2005; and Natalya Ligachova,
project director and chairman of the board, Telekritika, interview by author, Kiev, February 2006.
120. Nadia Diuk, senior program ofcer, National Endowment for Democracy, interview by author, Washington, D.C., October 2005; and Olena Prytula, editor, Ukrainska Pravda, interview by
author, Kiev, March 2005.
121. Remarks by Andrij Ihnatov, board member, Maidan Inform, at a workshop on the Orange
Revolution, International Renaissance Foundation, Kiev, March 18, 2005.
122. Andriy Kohut, board member, Black Pora, interview by author, Kiev, March 2005.

Ukraine Imports Democracy 79

used trainers from Serbia and Georgia.123 It is difcult to trace exactly what
knowledge about nonviolent resistance was transferred in these interactions,
but it is without question that Ukrainian activists received inspiration from
successful civic organizers from other countries.124 Moreover, nearly all of
these civic mobilization training programs received at least partial funding
from Western sources, including the IRF, Freedom House, the U.S-Ukrainian
Foundation, GMF, NDI, the Westminster Foundation, and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, as well as grants from Western
embassies in Kiev.125 Black Pora and Yellow Pora received direct nancial assistance from several Western sources, including the Westminster Foundation,
GMF, and several Western embassies. USAID and its implementers, however,
never provided any direct assistance to these youth groups, as they were considered too radical and partisan.126
Western condemnation of the falsied election also inspired the demonstrators. When Secretary of State Powells words of condemnation were read in
Maidan Square, the crowd applauded enthusiastically. Former Solidarity
leader Lech Walesa addressed the demonstrators in Maidan, assuring them
that the West was on their side. Similarly, several Western ambassadors met
with Our Ukraine leaders during this period to express support and empathy.
The impact of these acts of solidarity is difcult to quantify, but many leaders
of the Orange Revolution subsequently testied that Western support for their
protest played a signicant role in keeping people in the streets.127
external contributions to crisis mediation
In parallel with these activities was a mediation effort between Kuchma,
Yanukovych, and Yushchenko that was facilitated by Presidents Aleksandr
Kwasniewski of Poland, Valdas Adamkus of Lithuania, and Javier Solana of
the European Union. Kwasniewski was especially inuential in pressing for
not only a negotiated but the correct solutionthat is, a reversal of the falsied
voteto the crisis; Solana followed his lead. The Bush administration deliber-

123. Potekhin, interview by author.


124. Potekhin and Kosuchev from Znayu, and Kaskiv and Yevgen Zolotarev from Yellow Pora, all
participants in these transnational meetings, interviews by author.
125. Altogether, in the year before the 2004 vote, the International Renaissance Foundation, the local Ukrainian arm of the Soros Foundation, contributed $1,653,222 to nongovernmental organizations implementing election-related projects. See IRF, Promotion of the Fair and Open Election of 2004,
p. 1. Yellow Pora received several IRF grants.
126. USAID ofcials and Pora members, interviews by author, Kiev, March and November 2005.
127. Tymoshenko, Lutsenko, Gryniv, Galaychuk, Stetskiv, Katarynchuk, and Yellow and Black
Pora activists, interviews by author.

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ately did not seek a public role in the negotiations, but stayed closely involved
behind the scenes through contacts with Kwasniewski, Adamkus, and Solana.
This international effort helped diffuse tensions between polarized enemies.
Western mediators also helped persuade Yushchenko to accept constitutional
changes that would weaken the power of the president and strengthen the
power of the parliament, a compromise that certainly made it easier for
Kuchma and Yanukovych to agree to a third round of elections. Whether the
roundtable negotiations were necessary for the breakthrough, however, is disputable. Critics of the negotiations, including Tymoshenko, have argued that
the Western-anchored mediation efforts were not central to the outcome and
actually tied the oppositions hands after the breakthrough.128 Ironically, after
the 2006 parliamentary elections, Yanukovych became prime minister again,
this time with more enhanced powers as a result of the Orange Revolution.

Conclusion
The Orange Revolution resulted from miscalculations by the ancien rgime.
President Kuchma had successfully manipulated the vote to retain power in
1999. He and his aides believed they could do the same for Yanukovych in
2004. They underestimated the oppositions ability to win the election, expose
fraud, and mobilize citizens to protect their votes through mass demonstrations. They overestimated their ability to withstand or stop the protests. The
Orange Revolution was a contentious struggle for power between a semiautocratic regime and a democratic opposition, in which the opposition had
enough powerthe necessary strategies, resources, and popular supportto
prevail. Between 2001 (the last time these two sides had clashed) and 2004, the
balance of power between autocratic incumbents and democratic challengers
had shifted in favor of the latter.
The set of necessary conditions needed to produce this favorable balance of
power was large and complex. The presence of only a few of these factors
would not have generated the same outcome. A more popular or more ruthless autocrat might have been able to outmaneuver the democratic opposition.
A less organized electoral monitoring effort might not have been able to convince people to take to the streets. Thousands on the streets, instead of tens of
thousands or hundreds of thousands, might have tempted the regime to use
force, and they might have succeeded. A myriad of factors must be in play to
produce dramatic events such as the Orange Revolution.

128. Tymoshenko, interview by author.

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Of this long list of factors, external actors played a role in inuencing only a
few. Given the extremely precarious distribution of power, however, these imported inputs from the West were consequential in tipping the balance in favor
of the democratic challengers.
Regarding policies, actions, and programs aimed at weakening the semiautocratic regime, the Ukrainian experience suggests that it is hard for outsiders to foster splits within such rgimes and also difcult for them to directly
inuence its popularity. The West played no measurable role in facilitating
splits within the security forces. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Western
criticism of Kuchma contributed to his declining popularity at home, but no
hard data exist to isolate the independent causal role of foreign rebuke. More
generally, however, the West did seem to play a role in impeding the full-scale
consolidation of autocracy. Western resources helped strengthen institutions
such as the Rada, which checked presidential power. Western long-term aid to
civil society also helped keep semi-autocracy in Ukraine from becoming a full
autocracy. Russia provided technical assistance and resources for constructing
a stronger autocracy, but these resources were insufcient. It also remains unclear if Kuchma actually wanted to develop a full-blown autocracy. In the margins, Western engagement of Kuchma, his aides, and his family members
raised the costs of completely turning away from democracy.
Regarding policies, actions, and programs targeted at strengthening the opposition, the Ukrainian experience suggests that it is difcult to inuence the
effectiveness of opposition candidates in elections. In the margins, external actors can encourage unity among the democratic opposition, but the real drivers of unity will always be local actors. Western imports were crucial in
exposing electoral fraud. The ideas and technology for uncovering fraudexit
polls, parallel vote tabulation, and poll monitorswere imported from the
United States. Funding for these activities came largely from Western sources,
and the presence of international monitors provided moral support for local
monitors. External actors also contributed to the development of independent
media in Ukraine. One of the most effective media outlets, Ukrainska Pravda,
relied almost exclusively on external nancial support. Finally, imported ideas
and resources strengthened electoral mobilization, both before and after the
vote. If nancial assistance for these mobilization activities came from U.S. and
West European sources, intellectual and inspirational input came from Serbs,
Georgians, and Slovaks. Tracing the intellectual origins of nonviolent civic resistance ideas goes back even farther. Indian and U.S. ideational inputsthat
is, the ideas and practices of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther Kingare
also present in the making of the Orange Revolution.
This article has focused specically on the precipitants of the Orange

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Revolution and the external factors that inuenced them, and not the longerterm structural factors that produced the precipitants. Pushing the causal arrow back and assessing, for instance, how external dimensions inuenced the
development of the middle class, economic growth, or civil society is a necessary next step in constructing a complete explanation of the domestic and
international causes of the Orange Revolution.
This article also has offered a new method for the study of democracy promotion, starting rst with a theory of democratization based on domestic variables and then zooming out to see how these were inuenced by international
factors. This article has deliberately recorded nonndings; some signicant domestic factors for producing the Orange Revolution had no external inuence,
even when it is possible to identify external actions designed to inuence these
domestic factors. This single case study cannot generate a new or complete
theory for external dimensions of regime change. More modestly, this article
provides a research strategy for how to isolate the causal mechanisms connecting the international to the domestic regarding democratization, with the expectation that future case studies structured in similar ways might eventually
contribute to theory development in this undertheorized eld.
Important policy lessons for those interested in democracy promotion can
also be learned from this case. First, domestic actors drive the drama of democratic change. Attempts to manufacture democracy without strong, local partners are likely to fail. Second, state-to-state constructive engagement with a
semi-autocratic regime can create the space for democratic assistance to societal actors. Think of the counterfactual. If Ukraine had no diplomatic relations
with the United States in 2004, the regime would have been less constrained in
cracking down on opposition activities and more likely to limit, if not cut off
entirely, Western democracy assistance efforts. Freedom House, IRI, and NDI
do not have ofces in Tehran today. Third, technologies and nancial support
used to expose fraud were the most effective imports for the Orange Revolution. And international norms helped. The right to a free and fair election is
now an internationally recognized norm embedded in international organizations such as the OSCE. Access to aid and technology that facilitate this right,
therefore, is harder to limit than other forms of democracy assistance such as
training for political parties or direct aid to opposition movements. Western
statements condemning electoral fraud also played a direct role in mobilizing
protest. Fourth, aid to independent mediaa frequently underfunded element
of democracy promotion programsplayed a direct and consequential role in
exposing fraud and mobilizing citizens to protect their vote. Finally, in the
margins, external actors provided ideas about how to build an effective political opposition and how to mobilize protest after the vote.

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It is also important to identify international inputs that did not play a constructive role in promoting democratic breakthrough in Ukraine. Technical
assistance to the regimethat is, aid to try to make the Kuchma government
reformdid not work. Programs that try to reform institutions from the ancien rgime should be avoided and implemented only after breakthrough. The
pull of the European Union and NATOa major factor in democratic consolidation in other postcommunist countries in Europeplayed only an abstract,
minor role in this case of breakthrough. Finally, several factors had to come together to produce the Orange Revolution. The stars must really be aligned.
In countries where all of these factors are not present, breakthrough is unlikely, and foreign assistance to try to foster breakthrough might even be
counterproductive.