MARY GRACE L.

RENON
Criminal Procedures

BL 3

TEEHANKEE, JR. VS. MADAYAG

207 SCRA 134
Facts:
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. was originally charged for the crime of frustrated murder for
shooting Hultman who was comatosed some time. In the course of the trial, Hultman died. The
prosecution sought to change the information from frustrated murder to consummated murder.
Teehankee Jr. questioned the new charge for lack of preliminary investigation thereon.
Issue:
(1) Was there an amendment of the information or substitution when the information
was changed from frustrated murder to consummated murder?
(2) Was the amendment formal or substantial?
(3) Is there a need of a preliminary investigation on the new charge?
Held:
(1) There is an amendment. What is involved here is not a variance of the nature of
different offenses charge, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same
offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This being the case, we hold that
an amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the
filing of the amended information for consummated murder is proper.
(2) Formal. An objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against
herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged
was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening
fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining
the proper penalty for the crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with
intent to kill the victim continues to be the prosecution's theory. There is no question
that whatever defense herein petitioner may adduce under the original information
for frustrated murder equally applies to the amended informationfor murder. The
accused is not prejudiced since the same defense is still available to him.
(3) No. Since it is only a formal amendment, preliminary investigation is not necessary.
The amended information could not conceivably have come as a surprise to petitioner
for the simple and obvious reason that it charges essentially the same offense as that
charged under the original information. Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if
the crime originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry
into one would elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would
reveal, a new preliminary investigation is not necessary.

MARY GRACE L. RENON

Criminal Procedures

BL 3

BUHAT VS CA
265 SCRA 701
Facts:
An information for Homicide was filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against petitioner
Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe. The information alleged that petitioner Danilo Buhat,
armed with a knife, unlawfully attacked and killed one Ramon George Yu while the said two
unknown assailants held his arms, using superior strength, inflicting x x x mortal wounds which
were x x x the direct x x x cause of his death.
Even before petitioner could be arraigned, the prosecution moved for the deferment of the
arraignment on the ground that the private complainant in the case, one Betty Yu, moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution of the City Prosecutor which ordered the filing of the
aforementioned information for homicide. Petitioner however, invoking his right to a speedy
trial, opposed the motion. Thus, petitioner was arraigned and, since petitioner pleaded not guilty,
trial ensued.
On February 3, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, finding Betty Yus appeal
meritorious, ordered the City Prosecutor of Roxas City to amend the information by upgrading
the offense charged to MURDER and implead therein additional accused Herminia Altavas,
Osmea Altavas and Renato Buhat.
Issue:
Whether or not the amendment is substantial or formal.
Held:
Formal. Abuse of superior strength having already been alleged in the original information
charging homicide, the amendment of the name of the crime to murder, constitutes a mere
formal amendment permissible even after arraignment. The real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of
the provision of the law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law which in no
way affect the legal aspects of the information, but from the actual recital of facts as alleged in
the body of the information. Petitioner in the case at bench maintains that, having already
pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide, the amendment of the crime charged in the
information from homicide to murder is a substantial amendment prejudicial to his right to be
informed of the nature of the accusation against him. He utterly fails to dispute, however, that
the original information did allege that petitioner stabbed his victim using superior strength. And
this particular allegation qualifies a killing to murder, regardless of how such a killing is technically
designated in the information filed by the public prosecutor.

MARY GRACE L. RENON

Criminal Procedures

BL 3

PEOPLE VS. UBA

99 PHIL 134
Facts:
Demetria Somod-ong filed a complaint in the Justice of the Peace Court charging the
accused Juliana and Calixta, both surnamed Uba with the crime of serious oral defamation.
Finding probable cause in the investigation conducted by it, the court elevated the case to the
Court of First Instance where the Provincial Fiscal filed the corresponding information. However,
by mistake, Pastora Somod-ong was designated the offended party, instead of Demetria. Because
of this, the trial court dismissed the case.
Issue:
Whether or not accused can be convicted of the crime of serious oral defamation.
Held:
No. A mistake in putting in the information the name of the offended party is a material
matter which necessarily affects the identification of the act charged. Trial court did not err in
dismissing the case for variance between the allegations in the complaint and the proof.

MARY GRACE L. RENON

Criminal Procedures

BL 3

TEEHANKEE, JR. VS. MADAYAG

207 SCRA 134
Facts:
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. was originally charged for the crime of frustrated murder for
shooting Hultman who was comatosed some time. In the course of the trial, Hultman died. The
prosecution sought to change the information from frustrated murder to consummated murder.
Issue:
Distinguish amendment of information from substitution of information.
Held:
The first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second paragraph
refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information
may be made before or after the defendant pleaded, but they differ in the following respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution
necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but
substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has
to be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of
information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to
plead anew to the new information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original
information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea
has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original
information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the
other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a
different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original
charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.