G.R. No. L-24101.

September 30, 1970

MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father
ULISES P. CUADRA, ET. AL. Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ALFONSO
MONFORT, Defendant-Appellant.

right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the
teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned,
it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and
which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to
anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous
propensity, or indeed any trait in the childs character which would
reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could
be attributed to her parents.

FACTS: Maria Cuadra and Maria Monfort, both minors, were

classmates in elementary. On July 9, 1962, they were assigned by
their teacher, together with three classmates, to weed the grass in
the school premises. Maria Monfort found a plastic headband. She
jokingly said aloud that she found an earthworm, clearly to frighten
Maria Cuadra and tossed the headband to Maria Cuadra. The object
hit Maria Cuadras right eye. To prevent the pain, she rubbed the
injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, her eye
became swollen and told her parents about the incident. She
underwent surgery twice (July 20 and August 4, 1962) and stayed in
the hospital for twenty-three days. Despite medical efforts, she
completely lost the eyesight of her right eye. Cuadras parents then
instituted a civil suit against the father of Maria Monfort in behalf of
their daughter. Defendant was ordered to pay for actual damages,
moral damages and attorneys fees, plus the costs of the suit.

DISSENTING: Maria Monfort is already 13 years old and should have

known that by jokingly saying aloud that she had found an
earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the
object at her, it was likely that something would happen to her
friend, as in fact, she was hurt. There is nothing in the record that
would indicate that Alfonso had properly advised his daughter to
behave properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate
and playmates, he can be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
There is nothing in the record to show that he had done anything at all
to even try to minimize the damage caused upon by his child.

Hermana R. Cerezo, petitioner, vs. David Tuazon, respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adolfo Monfort is liable for the act of his minor
child which caused damage to another.
RULING and RATIONALE: No. Article 2180 provides that the father,
in case of his incapacity or death, the mother, is responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The
basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence,
which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or
omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore
be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn
from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states that the
responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.

Facts: Around noontime of 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines

passenger bus collided with a tricycle. October 1, 1993, tricycle driver
Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, owner of
the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo, and bus driver Danilo
A. Foronda. Plaintiff alleged that he was in his proper lane when
Foronda, driver of the Country Bus, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously operate the said motor vehicle in a
negligent, careless, and imprudent manner without due regard to
traffic rules and regulations, there being a Slow Down sign near the
scene of the incident, and without taking the necessary precaution to
prevent loss of lives or injuries, his negligence, carelessness and
imprudence resulted to severe damage to the tricycle and serious
physical injuries to plaintiff thus making him unable to walk and
becoming disabled, with his thumb and middle finger on the left hand
being cut.

In the case at bar, there is nothing from which it may be

inferred that Alfonso Monfort could have prevented the damage by
the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the
exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or
the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school,
where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the

Issue: Whether or not the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
because there was no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover,

Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil action for
damages in the criminal action.

preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law
condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity
for the employees criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly
liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to
exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee.

Ruling: Instant petition for review denied. The of the Court of

is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION.

The action can be brought directly against the person responsible

for another, without including the author of the act. The action against
the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of
a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in
the sense that it cannot be instituted till after the judgment against
the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal
action; the action for responsibility of the employer is in itself a
principal action.

Ration: Mrs. Cerezos contention proceeds from the point of view of

criminal law and not of civil law, while the basis of the present action
of Tuazon is quasi-delict under the Civil Code, not delict under the
Revised Penal Code.
Because of a negligent act, an aggrieved party may choose
between the two remedies for civil liability arising from a delict under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an action for
a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An action based on
a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal
action. Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a
quasi-delict. The trial court thus found Mrs. Cerezo liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Article 2180 states in part:

Thus, there is no need in this case for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over Foronda. The trial courts acquisition of jurisdiction
over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to dispose of the present case on the
merits.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their

employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.

[G.R. No. 132266. December 21, 1999.] CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL

CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA
SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS HOSPITAL,
INC., Respondents.

Mrs. Cerezos liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict

is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. The responsibility of
two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where
there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case,
each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is
liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or
renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the
obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is
indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because
complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over
Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from
Mrs. Cerezo alone.

FACTS:
1. On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo
So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmea
Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of
traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He
was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time.
2. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant
Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux
Pick-up. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car
out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmea rotunda
he made a short cut against the flow of the traffic in proceeding to his
route
to
General
Maxilom
St.
or
to
Belvic
St.

Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent

act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer
directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that
the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not

3. In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad

collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad
stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands
Hospital
and
later
to
the
Cebu
Doctors
Hospital.

unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course
or
scope
of
his
employment.
It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in
going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning
to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his
employment in the absence of evidence of some special business
benefit to the employer.

4. On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital.

5. After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the
accident, a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was
subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the present action
for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So
Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose
Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation

To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or
was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the
time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of
28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABADs
working day had ended; his overtime work had already been
completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known
as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts,"
had no connection to petitioners business; neither had it any relation
to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for
personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks
attached to his position

6. ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the

time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle,
registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the
restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends
after having done overtime work for the petitioner.
TRIAL COURT- In favor of Spouses Vasquez and ordered ABAD and
CASTILEX to pay damages jointly and solidarily liable

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification
that petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation be absolved of any
liability for the damages caused by its employee, Jose Benjamin Abad.

CA- AFFIRMED the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX
liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not
solidary" with the former
ISSUE:

SPOUSES FERNANDO AND LOURDES VILORIA, PETITIONERS,

VS. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC., RESPONDENT.

Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death

resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a
company-issued vehicle.
HELD:

Facts: In 1997, while the spouses Viloria were in the United States,
they approached Holiday Travel, a travel agency working for

NO.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the
driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope
of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.

Continental Airlines, to purchase tickets from Newark to San Diego.

The travel agent, Margaret Mager, advised the couple that they
cannot travel by train because it is fully booked; that they must
purchase plane tickets for Continental Airlines; that if they wont

We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle
at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge
petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle

purchase plane tickets; theyll never reach their destination in time.

employee of the airline companys agent, there must be an

independent showing that the airline company was at fault or
negligent or has contributed to the negligence or tortuous conduct
committed by the employee of its agent. The mere fact that the
employee of the airline companys agent has committed a tort is not
sufficient to hold the airline company liable. There is novinculum
juris between the airline company and its agents employees and the
contractual relationship between the airline company and its agent
does not operate to create a juridical tie between the airline company
and its agents employees. Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not
make the principal vicariously liable for the tort committed by its
agents employees and the principal-agency relationshipper se does
not make the principal a party to such tort; hence, the need to prove
the principals own fault or negligence.

The couple believed Magers representations and so they purchased

two plane tickets worth $800.00.
Later however, the spouses found out that the train trip isnt fully
booked and so they purchased train tickets and went to their
destination by train instead. Then they called up Mager to request for
a refund for the plane tickets. Mager referred the couple to
Continental Airlines. As the couple are now in the Philippines, they
filed their request with Continental Airlines office in Ayala. The
spouses Viloria alleged that Mager misled them into believing that the
only way to travel was by plane and so they were fooled into buying
expensive tickets.

On the other hand, if the passengers cause of action for damages

against the airline company is based on contractual breach or culpa
contractual, it is not necessary that there be evidence of the airline
companys fault or negligence. As this Court previously stated
in China Air Lines and reiterated in Air France vs. Gillego,[24] in an
action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party
does not have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was
negligent. All that he has to prove is the existence of the contract and
the fact of its non-performance by the carrier.

Continental Airlines refused to refund the amount of the ticket and so

the spouses sued the airline company. In its defense, Continental
Airlines claimed that the ticket sold to them by Mager is nonrefundable; that, if any, they are not bound by the misrepresentations
of Mager because theres no agency existing between Continental
Airlines and Mager.

Spouses Vilorias cause of action on the basis of Magers alleged

fraudulent misrepresentation is clearly one of tort or quasi-delict,
there being no pre-existing contractual relationship between them.
Therefore, it was incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI
was equally at fault.

The trial court ruled in favor of spouses Viloria but the Court of
Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC.

Issue: whether or not the principal, Continental Airlines may be held

liable for the tort committed by its agents?

However, the records are devoid of any evidence by which CAIs

alleged liability can be substantiated. Apart from their claim that CAI
must be held liable for Magers supposed fraud because Holiday Travel
is CAIs agent, Spouses Viloria did not present evidence that CAI was a
party or had contributed to Magers complained act either by
instructing or authorizing Holiday Travel and Mager to issue the said
misrepresentation.

Ruling: In actions based on quasi-delict, a principal can only be

held liable for the tort committed by its agents employees if
it has been established by preponderance of evidence that
the principal was also at fault or negligent or that the
principal exercise control and supervision over them.
airline company is not completely exonerated from any liability for the
tort committed by its agents employees. A prior determination of the
nature of the passengers cause of action is necessary. If the
passengers cause of action against the airline company is premised
on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict for a tort committed by the

[G.R. No. L-25142. March 25, 1975.]

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and FELIX
PANGALANGAN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS,

INC., ARCHIMEDES J. BALINGIT and FERNANDO PINEDA,DefendantsAppellees.

The bus company and its driver, in their appellants brief, injected a
new factual issue which was not alleged in their complaint. They
argue that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a business conduit
of Balingit because Balingit and his wife were the controlling
stockholders. That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction
should be pierced and that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit
and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil
personality.We cannot countenance that argument in this appeal. It
was not raised in the lower court. The case has to be decided on the
basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed
that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. has a personality separate and
distinct from that of the Balingit spouses.
[G.R. No. L-29025. October 4, 1971.]
Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P.
PALISOC, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ANTONIO C, BRILLANTES and
TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner and President, respectively, of
a school of arts and trades, known under the name and style
of "Manila Technical Institute" (M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L. DAFFON
and SANTIAGO M. QUIBULUE, Defendants-Appellees.

Doctrine: The terms "employer" and "owner and manager of

establishment or enterprise" as used in Article 2180 of the Civil Code
do not include the manager of a corporation owning a truck the
reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular
accident from which the damage arose.
Facts:
Fernando Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck owned by PhiAmerican Forwarders, Inc, when it bumped the bus driven by Felix
Pangalanan which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. As a
result of this, Pangalanan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged
and cannot be used for 79 days. Among the defenses of the PhilAmerican Forwarders was that Balingit, the manager of manager of
the company, was not Pinedas employer. Balingit moved that the
complaint be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the
bus driver has no cause of action against him. The lower court
dismissed the action as to Balingit. This was appealed by the
plaintiffs.

Facts: Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son,

Dominador Palisoc, and a student in automotive mechanics at the
Manila Technical Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila, had filed on May
19, 1966, an action for damages arising from the death on March 10,
1966 of their son at the hands of a fellow student, defendant Virgilio L.
Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said Institute.Defendants, per
the trial courts decisions are:" (T)he defendant Antonio C. Brillantes,
at the time when the incident which gave rise to his action occurred
was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute; 1 the
defendant Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof; the defendant
Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased
belonged; and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of the
deceased.

Issue:
Whether the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise" used in article 2180 of the Civil Code,
formerly article 1903 of the old Code, embrace the manager of a
corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly
resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.
Held:
The Court ruled that those terms do not include the manager of a
corporation. It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that
the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the
sense of "employer." Hence, under the allegations of the complaint,
no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as
manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the
vehicular accident already mentioned because he himself may be
regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, PhilAmerican Forwarders, Inc.

(T)he deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon

were classmates, and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between
two and three oclock, they, together with another classmate
Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground
floor. At that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and
Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc
was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect
that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc
slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc

a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist blows
on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows,
but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc
stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward.
Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to him but
he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He
never regained consciousness; finally he died.

member of the schools board of directors. The school itself cannot be

held similarly liable, since it has not been properly impleaded as party
defendant.
The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the
tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in
their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils
and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child."This is expressly
provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code. 12 In the
law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of
the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of
the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of
the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students
activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary
precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and
hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that
some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence
on their fellow students.

The trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. However, it absolved from liability the
three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute, in
this wise:". . . Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article
2180 of the New Civil Code which reads:Art. 2180. . . .Lastly,
teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody."
Issue: Whether the officials of the Manila Technical Institute are liable
for the damages caused by their pupils while they are in their custody.
Held:
The Court finds the appeal, in the main, to be meritorious.
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school
officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article
2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on
his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the
other defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase
used in the cited article "so long as (the students) remain in their
custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time.
At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves
of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180,
Civil Code, by" (proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of the factual
findings of the lower courts decision, said defendants failed to prove
such exemption from liability.

CITY OF MANILA VS GENERO TEOTICO AND THE COURT OF

APPEALS
[G.R. No. L-23052. January 29, 1968.]
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF CIVIL CODE,
THOUGH A GENERAL LAW, PREVAIL OVER MANILA CHARTER, SPECIAL
LAW. Insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act
409 is a special law and the Civil Code is a general legislation; but as
regards the subject-matter of the provisions of sec. 4, Rep. Act 409
and Article 2189 of the Civil Code, the former establishes a general
rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for damages or injury
to persons or property arising from the failure of city officers to
enforce the provisions of said Act; while article 2189 of the Civil Code
constitutes a particular prescription making provinces, cities and
municipalities liable for damages for the death or injury suffered by
any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets and
other public works under the control or supervision of said municipal
governments. In other words, sec. 4 of Rep. Act 409 refers to liability
arising from negligence in general regardless of the object thereof,

The parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not

involved, since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic
incident. No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere

whereas Article 2189 of the Civil Code, governs liability due to

defective streets in particular. The Civil Code is decisive herein
because the present action is based on the alleged defective condition
of a road.

treasurer and chief of police.

Issue: (1) What would govern the present case, Section 4 of
RA 409 or Article 2189 of the NCC?
(2) Can the City of Manila be held liable to Teotico for
damages?

2. PLEADINGS; ANSWER; ALLEGATIONS NOT SET FORTH IN ANSWER,

CANNOT BE RAISED FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. The assertion that
P. Burgos Avenue is a national highway for which the City of Manila is
not liable, was made for the first time in the petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. It was not
alleged in the answer. Such assertion raised a question of fact which
had not been put in issue in the trial court and cannot, therefore, be
raised for the first time on appeal much less after the rendition of the
decision of the appellate court.

Held and Ratio: (1) Article 2189 of the NCC should be applied.
Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription
making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for
the death of, or injury suffered by, any person by reason"
specifically "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising
from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas
Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets, "in particular.
Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition
of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

3. ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT OF COURT OF APPEALS, CONCLUSIVE. The

determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control
or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of
negligence in connection with the maintenance of said road is a
question of fact a question already decided by the Court of Appeals
and the factual findings of said Court are not subject to a review by
the Supreme Court.

(2) Yes. Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for
the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or
streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over
said street or road. Even if P. Burgos avenue were, therefore, a
national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract
from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic
Act 409.

Prior Proceedings:
CFI Manila (RTC)- Sustained defendants and dismissed complaint of
Teotico
CA- Appeal made by plaintiff Teotico, decision of TC was affirmed but
City of Manila made to pay damages
SC- Appeal by certiorari, Decision of CA affirmed
Facts of the Case: Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old
Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading"
zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. As he stepped
down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell
inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or manhole on P.
Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole
breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce
his left eyelid. Teotico was taken to the Philippine General Hospital,
where his injuries were treated.

This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic

Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon
which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation
of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered
cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within
their respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely
implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917, concerning
the disposition and appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it
provides that "the construction, maintenance and improvement of
national primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and
city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers
and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the
Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such

As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the

Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint for damages against the
City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city

appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines

in annual or special appropriation Acts."

him for support. Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article
1905 of the Civil Code (Now Article 2183, NCC)

MARGARITA AFIALDA VS BASILIO HISOLE AND FRANCISCO

HISOLE

Issue: Is the owner of the animal in this case liable for the damage
caused by his animal to its caretaker?

[G.R. No. L-2075. November 29, 1949.]

Held and Ratio: NO. The NCC provides that the owner of an animal
is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for
damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be
liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under article 1902
(2183) of the same code.

SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; LIABILITY OF OWNER OF ANIMAL FOR DAMAGE CAUSED
TO ITS CARETAKER. Under article 1905 of the Civil Code, the owner
of an animal is not liable for injury caused by it to its caretaker.

In the present case, the animal was in the custody and under the
control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously,
it was the caretakers business to try to prevent the animal from
causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being
injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks
of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he
must take the consequences.

Prior Proceedings:
Lower Court- Action for damages dismissed against plaintiff for lack of
cause of action
Supreme Court- Appeal

Furthermore, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the

part of the defendants as owners of the animal that caused the
damage. But the complaint contains no allegation on those points.

Facts of the Case: Deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the

defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed
compensation; that while tending the animals he was, on March 21,
1947, gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his
injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force
majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending upon