SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 140371-72. November 27, 2006.]

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D.
SEANGIO, petitioners, vs. HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA
D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO,
SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D.
SEANGIO, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J :
p

This is a petition for certiorari 1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October
14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate
on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP.
Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v.
Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy
Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."

Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana

Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita,
Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang
inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil
siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at
mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni
Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at
siya nasa ibabaw.
IaEScC

Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang
na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na
millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking
kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng
Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong
inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak
at hindi siya makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong
saksi. 3

The facts of the cases are as follows:

On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98-90870 of the RTC, and praying for the
appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio-Santos as special administrator and guardian ad
litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased
Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and
exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent
and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public
accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the
private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners
averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be
automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc.
No. 99-93396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate
proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 because testate proceedings take
precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo's holographic will is quoted, as follows:

(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi

On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners' motion, SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396 were
consolidated. 4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings 5 primarily on
the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any
disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article
783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory
heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would
result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the
court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the

intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of
the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority of
the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private
respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a
disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply because
Segundo's will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory
heirs. 6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et
al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo
and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies.
However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply,
she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an
abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate
Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for . . . respondents to have
tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will
appears to be intrinsically void . . . would have been an exercise in futility. It would have
meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied
its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (underscoring supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 99-93396 is hereby DISMISSED without
pronouncement as to costs.

PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC

VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATOR'S
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR
SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE
TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATOR'S WILL THAT NO
PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND
EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.

Petitioners argue, as follows:

First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which
respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned may
appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published three
weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause
the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly
states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus,
there is no preterition in the decedent's will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;

aDHCEA

SO ORDERED. 7

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999
AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4
OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR
SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED
GROUND THAT THE TESTATOR'S WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE
EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF

Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with the
sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of
Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically
and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case;
and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and will
render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
CDAHaE

The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed and
written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private respondents did not
raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundo's intention of
excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect,
Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.

For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected
through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the
disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken
as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the
matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of
the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found
groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes
the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit
such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant; 8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.

Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be
considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundo's document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the
hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa 9can be clearly deduced from the terms of
the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter's property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in
the absence of Alfredo. 10

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated
in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into
account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the
testator. 12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned asKasulatan ng
Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him
in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, 13 the disinheritance
cannot be given effect. 14
With regard to the issue on preterition, 15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line
were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court's opinion, Segundo's last expression to bequeath his
estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an
heir 16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the
petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was
included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
HSEIAT

Considering that the questioned document is Segundo's holographic will, and that the law favors testacy
over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides
that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property
may be rendered nugatory. 17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be
probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21,
dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate
and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The
intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid
testate proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.
|||

(Dy Yieng Seangio v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006)

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form
and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules
of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of
the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. 11

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140975. December 8, 2000.]
OFELIA
HERNANDO
PIEDAD, respondent.

BAGUNU, petitioner, vs.

PASTORA

Ceferino Padua Law Office and Gatmaytan Law Office for petitioner.
P.C. Jose & Associates for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a collateral relative within the fifth civil
degree of the decedent. Respondent, on the other hand, is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a
collateral relative within the third civil degree of the decedent. The issue here is the applicability of the
rule on proximity among collateral relatives. Thus, the question is: Can petitioner inherit alongside
respondent?
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and
excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply.
In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or
sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts. The right of
representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group
both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference. Applying now the rule
on proximity, respondent relative within the third civil degree excludes petitioner relative within the fifth
civil degree from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP; SUCCESSION; APPRECIATION
OF THE LAW. The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody an almost complete
set of law to govern, either by will or by operation of law, the transmission of property, rights and
obligations of a person upon his death. Each article is construed incongruity with, rather than in
isolation of, the system set out by the Code.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; RULE ON PROXIMITY; APPLICATION OF RIGHT OF
REPRESENTATION. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to
the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of
representation can apply. . . . By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is,
by operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood
relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he
represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person
represented would have succeeded. . . . In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the
descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take
place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their
uncles or aunts.
SacTCA

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE TO "OTHER COLLATERAL RELATIVES WITHIN THE
FIFTH CIVIL DEGREE." The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within
the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order
of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents
and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse,
and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives,
except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts,
the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962 of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree
of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes
petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.
DECISION
VITUG, J :
p

On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special
Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H.
Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting
entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the
order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the
proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publication of the notice of
hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of
allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The trial court denied the motion,
prompting petitioner to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the
appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involved pure questions of law. Finding
merit in that argument, the appellate court dismissed the appeal, citing Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the
1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure which would require all appeals involving nothing else but
questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court.
In a well-written resolution, the Court of Appeals belabored the distinctions between questions of law
and questions of fact, thus:
"There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. There is question of fact
when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of witnesses, existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances, and
their relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation." 1

Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, speaking for the appellate court, ratiocinated that whether or not the RTC
erred in denying the intervention considering (1) that the intervenor-appellant had a prima facie interest
over the case, (2) that the jurisdiction over the person of the proper parties was not acquired in view of
the deficient publication or notice of hearing, and (3) that the proceedings had yet to be closed and
terminated, were issues which did not qualify as "questions of fact" as to place the appeal within the
jurisdiction of the appellate court; thus:

"The issues are evidently pure questions of law because their resolution are based on facts
not in dispute. Admitted are the facts that intervenor-appellant is a collateral relative within
the fifth degree of Augusto H. Piedad; that she is the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto
H. Piedad; that as such, intervenor-appellant seek to inherit from the estate of Augusto H.
Piedad; that the notice of hearing was published for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation; that there was no order of closure of proceedings that has
been issued by the intestate court; and that the intestate court has already issued an order
for the transfer of the remaining estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee.
"These facts are undisputed.
"In this case, there is no doubt nor difference that arise as to the truth or falsehood on
alleged facts. The question as to whether intervenor-appellant as a collateral relative within
the fifth civil degree, has legal interest in the intestate proceeding which would justify her
intervention; the question as to whether the publication of notice of hearing made in this
case is defective which would amount to lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the parties
and the question as to whether the proceedings has already been terminated when the
intestate court issued the order of transfer of the estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitionerappellee, in spite the absence of an order of closure of the intestate court, all call for the
application and interpretation of the proper law. There is doubt as to what law is applicable
on a certain undisputed state of facts.
aHCSTD

"The resolution of the issues raised does not require the review of the evidence, nor the
credibility of witnesses presented, nor the existence and relevance of specific surrounding
circumstances. Resolution on the issues may be had even without going to examination of
facts on record." 2

Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution of the appellate court in the instant petition for review
on certiorari.
The Court finds no reversible error in the ruling of the appellate court. But let us set aside the alleged
procedural decrepitude and take on the basic substantive issue. Specifically, can petitioner, a collateral
relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil
degree? Elsewise stated, does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among
collateral relatives?
Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal
aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first
cousin of the deceased, or a fifth degree relative of the decedent.
The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody an almost complete set of law to
govern, either by will or by operation of law, the transmission of property, rights and obligations of a
person upon his death. Each article is construed in congruity with, rather than in isolation of, the system
set out by the Code.
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and
excludes the more distant ones, except when and to the extent that the right of representation can
apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:

"ARTICLE 26. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant
ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of
article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of Article 987, paragraph
2, concerning division between the paternal and maternal lines.

By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to
the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The
representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the
latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded.
"ARTICLE 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires
the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited."
"ARTICLE 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the
one whom the person represented would have succeeded."

In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In
the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or
sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.
"ARTICLE 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but
never in the ascending.
"In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sister, whether
they be of the full or half blood."
"ARTICLE 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of the estate
shall be made per stirpes, in such manner that the representative or representatives shall
not inherit more than what the person they represent would inherit, if he were living or could
inherit."
"ARTICLE 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive,
they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts.
But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."

The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to
which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in order of preference
following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and
ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly,
the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in
the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of
proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the
degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives
direction.
"ARTICLE 966. . . .

observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit
alongside a paternal uncle, and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin
of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the
decedent, being in the fourth-degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in
succession to a fifth-degree relative.

"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to
the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees
removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his
first cousin and so forth."
SCHATc

Accordingly

ISADET

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
|||

(Bagunu v. Piedad, G.R. No. 140975, December 08, 2000)

Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes
petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato the estate of the decedent.
The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code
"ARTICLE 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood."
Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of
relationship in the collateral line."

invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only that among the other
collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED
JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA

CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS

DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF
LUISA
DELGADO
VDA.
DE
DANAO,
ANGELA
DELGADO
ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADOARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO,
GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO
DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO
CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO
ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO
CAMPO-MADARANG, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA.
DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN;
HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON,
HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ
and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely,
JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN
RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIAMIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors; 1and GUILLERMA
RUSTIA, as Intervenor, 2 respondents. 3

However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado's life. Before him was Ramon
Osorio 12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo
which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio's and Felisa
Delgado's union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants
because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule
against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. 13 If Ramon Osorio
and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate halfblood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latter's intestate estate. He and his
heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate
families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgado's intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.

CORONA, J :

Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they
assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the
date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname
Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de
Casamiento 14 stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa
Delgado), 15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his
father. 16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged
marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55, 4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set
aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision 5 dated October 24, 2002.

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and
some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo
Rustia executed an affidavit of self-adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.

DECISION
p

THE MARRIAGE OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA AND JOSEFA DELGADO

FACTS OF THE CASE

This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado. 6 The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and respondents,
are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral issues that complicate
its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups:
(1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and
nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly,
his sisters, 7 his nephews and nieces, 8 his illegitimate child, 9 and the de facto adopted child 10(ampunampunan) of the decedents.
THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa 11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from
Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and
Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa
and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
ITcCSA

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado 17 but whether a marriage in
fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and
wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the
contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado
as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate
did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the
death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were
known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition,
oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J.
Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;

3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in
the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503
(VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of
America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself
[swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919; 18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to
Josefa Delgado.

THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took
into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never
legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, 19 the
intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma,
Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and
continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father's demise. In fact, Josefa
Delgado's obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one
of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as
her parent/guardian. 20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate
estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend
that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she
cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic
writings prescribed by the new Civil Code. 21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a
petition for the adoption 22 of theirampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he
ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal
fiction." 23 The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother
Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio
Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda. 24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition
for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55. 25 This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters
of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz; 26 (2) the
heirs of Guillermo Rustia's late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina
Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the

other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative
Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was
the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the
oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.
EaCSHI

On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Rustia werenever married but had merely lived together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC
insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the
interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed
out upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda.
de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both
estates. 27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of
the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision,
are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in
the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among
themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only
surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the
said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late
Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and
effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is]
considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator
therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela
Rosa has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court
hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent
JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the
sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist
from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to
the appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of
the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to
such estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE

DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby
required to render an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in controversy
within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED. 28

On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on appeal
was not filed on time. 29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus 30 which was dismissed
by the Court of Appeals. 31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties' oral
arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors' appeal in the
interest of substantial justice. 32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the
ground that oppositors' failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a
jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance
of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision 33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under
exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of
substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court's pronouncements as to certain
matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the
party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but
were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of
late filing.
xxx xxx xxx

With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED.
Consequently, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have
been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba DelgadoEncinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among
themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion
referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the
proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as
ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as
administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the
intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants
upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from
her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed
administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates
in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to
the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the
requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual
administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of
the administrator's qualification and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia
on June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the
extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado
(Campo) affected by the said adjudication.
cIaCTS

In this instance, private respondents' intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent
and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration
proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial court's decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for
the APPROVAL of the private respondents' Record on Appeal and theCONTINUANCE of
the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Court's May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.

Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals 34 partially set aside the trial court's decision. Upon motion
for reconsideration, 35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision. 36 The dispositive portion of the
amended decision read:

Hence, this recourse.

The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
THE MARRIAGE OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA AND JOSEFA DELGADO
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to
draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions
of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable. 37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx

In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted.
Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such
that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975
referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the
contested marriage, the testimony of a witness 38 attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal
certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Seorita" or unmarried woman. 39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not
always proof that no marriage in fact took place. 40 Once the presumption of marriage arises, other
evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish
the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the
certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, 41 the passport issued to her as
Josefa D. Rustia, 42 the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to
Josefa Delgado 43 and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa
Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents
which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. 44 No clear and convincing evidence sufficient
to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.

Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners' own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to
support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and
that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen
the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate 45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest
who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained
therein, 46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had
no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this
jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society

and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation
of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume
marriage. 47
THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of
her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions
are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may
overturn them. 48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of
marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The
oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in
the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with
Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado's and Caridad Concepcion's Partida de
Casamiento 49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado). 50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of
marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa
Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood
siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed
Delgado, 51 were her natural children. 52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y
would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each
other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children
of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It
seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate
child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the
illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we
submit that succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters
are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions
between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration.
That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and
legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children
of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same
footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit,
therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be
applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the
portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the halfblood, they shall share equally. 53

10

Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis
Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each
other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and
grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in
the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. 54 Therefore, the only
collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers
and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They
have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. 55The records not being clear on this matter, it is
now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of
Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, 56 they are entitled to inherit
from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code: 57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower,
the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other one-half.

Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly
adjudicated Josefa's estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication
by an heir of the decedent's entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is
the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no
will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial
or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing
letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a
public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they
may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to
himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of
deeds. . . . (emphasis supplied)

THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA

Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child 58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such,
she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of
paternity. 59 She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia
only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code
that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no
hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted
certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or
acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.
the following cases:

60

Recognition is compulsory in any of

(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more
or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or
mother) 61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

62

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing. 63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition
through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until
the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but
a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts. 64 Furthermore,
any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and
the lifetime of the putative parent. 65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no
longer be filed. 66 In this case, intervenor Guillerma's right to claim compulsory acknowledgment
prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma's second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing,
for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in
this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father
to be his. 67 Did intervenor's report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado's
obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code?
Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo
Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenor's parent/guardian holds no weight since he
had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia
himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the SUNDAY TIMES
on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law.
What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the
handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary.
The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor's claim.
CSAaDE

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted
in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came
to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter's death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to
inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an

11

adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule
99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly
and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly
carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never
presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence. 68

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila,
Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustia's June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
intervenor Guillerma Rustia and theampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of
the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his
sisters, 69 nieces and nephews. 70

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of
Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado's
full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of
her death. Josefa Delgado's grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from
her estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the
identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her
estate.

ENTITLEMENT TO LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION

3. Guillermo Rustia's estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado's

estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita)
and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo
Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering
that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are
now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent.
Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in
the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond,
or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after
the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
the administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted
to such other person as the court may select.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo

Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de
la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia,
as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the
requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.

DTIACH

SO ORDERED.
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
|||

(Vda. De De La Rosa v. Heirs of Rustia, G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006)

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one
to be appointed. 71 The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators,
specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in
the management of the estates, 72 a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda.
de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin
of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

12

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 84240. March 25, 1992.]
OLIVIA
S.
PASCUAL
and
HERMES
S.
PASCUAL, petitioners, vs. ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL
C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA,
ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE
ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES
PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA
PASCUAL-FERNANDO,
OCTAVIO
PASCUAL-FERNANDO,
OCTAVIO
PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE
PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro
Manila, respondents.
Joaquin P. Yuseco and Reynarte D. Hipolito for petitioners.
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; ORDER OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN;
NO RIGHT TO INHERIT AB INTESTATOFROM LEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND RELATIVES OF THEIR
PARENTS; DIAZ V. IAC (150 SCRA 645) CITED. The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid
to rest in Diaz v. IAC, (150 SCRA 645) where this Court ruled that: "Article 992 of the Civil Code
provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.
They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.
Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism
and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the
family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former,
and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child
nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO RIGHT TO REPRESENT THEIR PARENTS IN THE INHERITANCE OF A
LEGITIMATE PARENT. "Article 902, 98, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights
of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The
descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may
be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be
represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The
right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the
inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate
descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which
provides that 'the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation.' Such a

conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate
parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article
982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 982 prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It
May not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception. "The rules laid
down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation'
and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to
the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestatofrom the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother." (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno,
p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHEN THE WORDS AND PHRASES OF THE STATUTE ARE
CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL; RULE. Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner
may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and
phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA
758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the
words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation.
It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous.
(Nepomuceno, et al. v. RFC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the
same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their
language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than
the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former
nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A. 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
DECISION
PARAS, J :
p

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision of the
Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and
Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C.
Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al.", which dismissed the petition
and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
cdphil

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late
Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo,
petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged
natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following:
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouse:

13

(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
(c) Children of Pedro Pascual, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:
Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the
deceased, to wit:
Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and
represented by the following:
Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Dominga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)

On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over
the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although
Paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
LibLex

"This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the aboveentitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by another
compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual as
legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual." (Rollo, p. 108).

The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the
petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate
of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113114)
and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an
order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny
this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual" (Rollo, p. 136).

On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526), and such
motion was denied.
Petitioners appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15).
On April 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the dispositive part of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.

"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 38)

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of
Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).

Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554,
for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

On December 18, 1973, Adela Soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for
Letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are
among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).

The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the
deceased.

On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her
own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres
Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that they are not among the known heirs of the
deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).

Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 and of the doctrine
laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their
illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception
(Rollo, p. 418).

After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.

14

Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly
construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).

of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued as

done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to
represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that `the grandchildren
and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation.' Such a conclusion is
erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent
of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992.
Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 982 prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother. It May not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule
and Article 992 the exception.

On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the prohibition of
Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the Civil Code, provides:
"An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child."

"The rules laid down in Article 982 that `grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by
right of representation' and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has
no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother." (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).

The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled
that:
"Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of
blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the
legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism
and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish
broken in life the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment."

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners
herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate
of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil
Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres
Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the
successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers the questions raised by the
petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
"Article 902, 98, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be
legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the
persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very
clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants

Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an
elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may
not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA
233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of
who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. RFC, 110 Phil.
42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly
but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general
rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication
(Samson v. C.A. 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
llcd

Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.

Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one
category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children
should be treated differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
|||

(Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, G.R. No. 84240, March 25, 1992)

15

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117246. August 21, 1995.]
BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA
MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL,
BASILISA
MANUEL,
EMILIA
MANUEL
and
NUMERIANA
MANUEL, petitioners, vs. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA
BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.
Eufrocino L. Bermudez for petitioners.
Marcelo C. Espinoza for Modesta Baltazar.
Nolan R. Evangelista for Estanislaoa Manuel.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; ART. 992, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES; "BARRIER"
BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE FAMILY; CONSTRUED. Article
992 of the Civil Code, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on
succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on
the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such
succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no
application, however, on testamentary dispositions. This "barrier" between the members of the
legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a noted civilist. (Desiderio Jurado,
Comments and Jurisprudence on Succession, 8th ed., 1991, pp. 423-424.) His thesis: "What is meant
by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an
illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members
of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the
legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such
brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks of
'brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces' as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate
brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and
sisters." The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain," firstly, in the early case of Grey
v. Fabie(40 O.G. [First S] No. 3, p. 196 citing 7 Manresa 110) and, then, in the relatively recent cases
of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court (150 SCRA 645) and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals. (181
SCRA 861) In Diaz, we have said: "Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized
by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is

presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully

looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child;
the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable
evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
grounds of resentment." The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several
other cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate,
the latter had no right to the former's inheritance; (Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567) that the legitimate
collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; (Cacho v. Udan, 13 SCRA
693) that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the
legitimate grandparent; (Llorente v. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Allarde v. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909) that the
natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her
natural father; (Anuran v. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29) and that an illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. (Leonardo v. Court of Appeals,
120 SCRA 890) Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no
part should be rendered inoperative (Javellana v. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042) by, but must always be construed
in relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole. (Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil 688; Araneta v.
Concepcion, 99 Phil 709)
2. ID.; ID.; ORDER OF PREFERENCE AND CONCURRENCE IN INTESTACY; GRAPHIC
PRESENTATION. We might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference and
concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz:
Order of Preference Order of Concurrence
(a) LegitimateChildren (a) LegitimateChildren
andDescendants andDescendants,
IllegitimateChildren
andDescendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(b) LegitimateParents (b) LegitimateParents
andAscendants andAscendants,Illegitimate
ChildrenandDescendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(c) IllegitimateChildren (c) IllegitimateChildren
andDescendants(inthe andDescendants and
absence of ICDs and LPAs, Surviving Spouse
the illegitimate Parents)
(d) SurvivingSpouse (d) SurvivingSpouse
and Illegitimate Parents
(e) BrothersandSisters/ (e) BrothersandSisters/
NephewsandNieces NephewsandNieces
and Surviving Spouse
(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone

16

not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.

(within the fifth civil degree)

(g) State (g) Alone

3. ID.; ID.; WHEN A WARD IS NEITHER A COMPULSORY HEIR NOR A LEGAL HEIR. A ward
(ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. (Lim
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69679, 18 October 1988)
4. ID.; DAMAGES; WHEN NOT JUSTIFIED; CASE AT BAR. An adverse result of a suit in law does
not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against
the actor. (Rubio v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488, Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 51)
DECISION
VITUG, J :

The case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was submitted to the court a
quo for summary judgment.
The trial court, in its now assailed 15th August 1994 decision, dismissed the complaint
holding that petitioners, not being heirsab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were
not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit. Petitioners were also ordered to jointly and
severally (solidarily) pay (a) respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar the sum of P5,000.00 for moral
damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for
litigation expenses and (b) Estanislaoa Manuel the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages,
P5,000.00 for exemplary damages and P500.00 for attorney's fees.

The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an illegitimate child
who died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant.
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit.
During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this
relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Several years passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and
his mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on, respectively, 06 August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04
November 1976.
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the
marriage, a donation propter nuptiasover a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 square meters, covered
by Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") No. P-20594 was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by
Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land, covered by OCT P-19902 and Transfer Certificate of
Title ("TCT") No. 41134, were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not
blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private
respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter."
On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of
Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his
land covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later,
or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land covered by OCT P20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the name of Juan Manuel). Following the
registration of the document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles
(OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled
and new titles, TCT No. 184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No. 184225, were issued in the name
of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. On 19 October 1992, Modesta executed in favor of her corespondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed onehalf (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan
Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court.

The petition before us raises the following contentions: That

"1. THE LOWER COURT (HAS) FAILED TO CONSIDER THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF
ARTICLE 994 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, AS THE CONTROLLING LAW APPLICABLE BY
VIRTUE OF THE ADMITTED FACTS, AND NOT ARTICLE 992 OF THE SAME CODE.
"2. THE LOWER COURT, IN NOT ANNULLING ALL THE ACTS OF, AND VOIDING ALL
DOCUMENTS EXECUTED BY, RESPONDENT MODESTA BALTAZAR, WHO
ARROGATED UNTO HERSELF THE RIGHTS OF AN HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF
DECEDENT JUAN MANUEL, (HAS) VIRTUALLY GRANTED SAID RESPONDENT THE
STATUS OF AN HEIR MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND PUBLIC
POLICY.
"3. TO ENFORCE ONE'S RIGHT WHEN THEY ARE VIOLATED IS NEVER A LEGAL
WRONG."

Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other
half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of
the Civil Code, providing thusly:
"ARTICLE 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be
succeeded by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate.
"If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and
nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half ."
(Emphasis supplied.)

Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the
Civil Code, which reads:
"ARTICLE 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child." (Emphasis supplied.)

17

Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules
on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the
illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in thecollateral line between
legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not
totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will
of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy
is explained by a noted civilist. 2 His thesis:
"What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as
legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the
Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the
legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as
well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot
inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks of 'brothers and
sisters, nephews and nieces' as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate
brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such
brothers and sisters." (Emphasis supplied)

The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain," firstly, in the early case
of Grey v. Fabie 3 and, then, in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate
Court 4 and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals. 5 In Diaz, we have said:
"Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father
or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the
legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish
broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment."

The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases.
Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter
had no right to the former's inheritance; 6 that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother
cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; 7 that a natural child cannot represent his natural father
in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; 8 that the natural daughter cannot
succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; 9 and
that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestatofrom the legitimate children and relatives
of his father. 10 Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no
part should be rendered inoperative 11 by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other
part as to produce a harmonious whole. 12

In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference and concurrence in
intestacy expressed in Article 978 through Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz:
Order of Preference Order of Concurrence
(a) Legitimate Children (a) Legitimate Children and
and Descendants Descendants, Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(b) Legitimate Parents (b) Legitimate Parents and
and Ascendants Ascendants, Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(c) Illegitimate Children and (c) Illegitimate Children
Descendants (in the and Descendants and
absence of ICDs and Surviving Spouse
LPAs, the Illegitimate Parents)
(d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse and
Illegitimate Parents
(e) Brothers and (e) Brothers and
Sisters/Nephews and Sisters/Nephews and
Nieces Nieces and Surviving
Spouse
(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone
(within the fifth civil degree)
(g) State (g) Alone

In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an
intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial)
adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. 13
We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well
as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed
by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" 14 in the case, had neither the
standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.
The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for moral
and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An adverse result of a suit in law
does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of
damages against the actor. 15
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch
37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well as

18

attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in favor of private respondents, which portion is hereby
DELETED. No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Acting C.J., Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.

|||

(Manuel v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 117246, August 21, 1995)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121027. July 31, 1997.]
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO,respondents.

Benjamin P. Quitoriano for petitioners.

Ramoso Law Office for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; FILIATION; LEGITIMACY; GENERAL PRESUMPTION THAT
CHILDREN BORN IN WEDLOCK ARE LEGITIMATE; ISSUE THEREOF CANNOT BE ATTACKED
COLLATERALLY. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. The
issue whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly
controverted in the present action for re-conveyance. This is aside from the further consideration that
private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The
presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF. The burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners
who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who is disputing the
same. The presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the burden of
persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy. And in order to destroy the presumption, the party against
whom it operates must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the contrary. Where there is an
entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, and unless or until it is rebutted, it has been held that
a presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and support a finding or decision. Perforce, a presumption
must be followed if it is uncontroverted. This is based on the theory that a presumption is prima
facie proof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima facie by the legal
presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved. Indubitably, when private respondent
opted not to present countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer
to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONIES; EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE;
DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE; CONDITIONS. The primary proof to be considered in
ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison
to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime categorically declared that the former is

Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as
an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the
following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related
to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence
other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not before
the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversy has arisen thereon.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENCY DISCUSSED. American jurisprudence has it that a distinction
must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself,
or by other declarations of said declarant, and when men It must be supported by evidence aliunde.
The general rule is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both
claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of
the declarant's estate, the relationship of the proved by the declaration itself. There must be some
independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the
declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate
of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of
some other member of the family.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIRES NO FURTHER EVIDENCE IN CASE AT BAR. The present case
is one instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are
claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient
proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof,
the reason being that such declarant is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such
evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure
by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent. Where the subject of the declaration
is the declarant's own relationship to another person. it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the
admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The
preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.
6. ID.; ID.; RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY; DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE; INSUFFICIENCY ADMITTED
WHEN NOT TIMELY OBJECTED. While the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not
strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that the
same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection
thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made
at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence, otherwise, the objection shall
be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waived. The
proper time is when from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the
presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be inferred. Thus, a failure to
except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the
law. That objection to a question put to a witness must be made at the time the question is asked. An
objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of incompetency, taken after the testimony has

19

been given, is too late. Thus, for instance, failure to object to parol evidence given on the stand, where
the party is in a position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto.
7. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT ON DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE. Private respondent may
no longer be allowed to present evidence by reason of the mandate under Section I of revised Rule 38
of the Rules of Court which provides that "if the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is
reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence."

(3) whether or not defendant (herein private respondent) must reconvey the reserved
participation of the plaintiffs to the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller under Section 4, Rule
74 of the Rules of Court which was duly annotated on the title of the defendant;
(4) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to damages, moral and exemplary, plus attorney'
s fees for the willful and malicious refusal of defendant to reconvey the participation of
plaintiffs in the estate of Teodora Dezoller, despite demands and knowing fully well that
plaintiffs are the niece and nephew of said deceased; and

DECISION
REGALADO, J :
p

The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the judgment rendered by respondent Court of
Appeals on June 30, 1995 1 which affirmed the Order of December 3, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, granting herein private respondent's Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence
filed in Civil Case No. Q-88-1054 pending therein.
The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against
herein private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the
aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-88-1054, over a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon located
at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by the spouses Martin
Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller
are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of
petitioners' father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any
ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein
petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin,
executed on September 15, 1986 an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement 2 adjudicating unto himself,
allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66886, as
a consequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued in the name of Martin
Guerrero. On January 2, 1988, Martin Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora
Domingo and thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter's name.
Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance on November 2, 1988, claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in
question by right of representation.
cdtai

At the pre-trial conference, the following issues were presented by both parties for resolution:
(1) whether or not the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) are the nephew and niece of the late
Teodora Dezoller;
(2) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit by right of representation from the
estate of the late Teodora Dezoller;

(5) whether or not the subject property now in litigation can be considered as conjugal
property of the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. 3

During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with the
following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners' filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit:
a family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed
records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes
Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and
Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and
place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga
attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage
certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero. 4 Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a
written offer of these exhibits to which a Comment 5 was filed by herein private respondent.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the ground that petitioners
failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article
172 of the Family Code. It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison
regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is self-serving, uncorroborated and
incompetent, and that it falls short of the quantum of proof required under Article 172 of the Family
Code to establish filiation. Also, the certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan, Negros Occidental is merely proof of the alleged destruction of the records referred to
therein, and the joint affidavit executed by Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar certifying to the date, place
of birth and parentage of herein petitioners is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were
never presented for cross-examination. 6
On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing
the complaint for reconveyance. 7
In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence
presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are
all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
We find for petitioners.
The bone of contention in private respondent's demurrer to evidence is whether or not herein petitioners
failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code to establish legitimacy

20

and filiation. There are two points for consideration before us: first is the issue on petitioner's legitimacy,
and second is the question regarding their filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken separately and
independently of each other, are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It is
important to note, however, that the rulings of both lower courts in the case are basically premised on
the erroneous assumption that, in the first place, the issue of legitimacy may be validly controverted in
an action for reconveyance, and, in the second place, that herein petitioners have the onus probandi to
prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation. We disagree on both counts.
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the
universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. 8 And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot
be attacked collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
"The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . . actually fixes a civil status for the
child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of
the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper
parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly
impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335) which
provides: 'The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made
by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.'
This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this
view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought
only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the presumption,
therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law
is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a
long time. It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such
child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring
during the period of the conception of the child, may still be easily available.
xxx xxx xxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he
should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and
economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to
contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none even his heirs can impugn
legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory." 9

The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller
cannot be properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from
the further consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of
herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and
until it is rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden of proof rests not on
herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who
is disputing the same. This fact alone should have been sufficient cause for the trial court to exercise
appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to evidence. It would have delimited the
issues for resolution, as well as the time and effort necessitated thereby.
cdtai

Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor the presumption exists does
not have to introduce evidence to establish that fact, and in any litigation where that fact is put in issue,
the party denying it must bear the burden of proof to overthrow the presumption. 10 The presumption of
legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the party
claiming illegitimacy. 11 And in order to destroy the presumption, the party against whom it operates must
adduce substantial and credible evidence to the contrary. 12
Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, 13 and unless or until it is rebutted, it
has been held that a presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and support a finding or
decision. 14 Perforce, a presumption must be followed if it is uncontroverted. This is based on the theory
that a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima
facie by the legal presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved. 15
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence to overcome the
presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth
of such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the evidential rule that presumptions like judicial
notice and admissions, relieve the proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and
such facts are thereby considered as duly proved.
II. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding petitioner's relationship with Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero, whose estate is the subject of the present controversy, requires a more intensive and
extensive examination.
Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison,
the baptismal, death and marriage certificates, the various certifications from the civil registrar, a family
picture, and several joint affidavits executed by third persons all of which she identified and explained in
the course and as part of her testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is
the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or
sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. 16 Such a statement is
considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule,
under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is

21

the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and
(4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the
suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis is
the third element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently
corroborate the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of
petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such
declaration.
American jurisprudence has it that a distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the
declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and
when it must be supported by evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus:
"One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through, but not from,
the declarant and to establish the admissibility of a declaration regarding claimant's
pedigree, he may not do so by declarant's own statements as to declarant' s relationship to
the particular family. The reason is that declarant's declaration of his own relationship is of a
self-serving nature. Accordingly there must be precedent proof from other sources that
declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a member of the particular family; otherwise the
requirement to admissibility that declarant's relationship to the common family must appear
is not met. But when the party claiming seeks to establish relationship in order to claim
directly from the declarant or the declarant's estate, the situation and the policy of the law
applicable are quite different. In such case the declaration of the decedent, whose estate is
in controversy, that he was related to the one who claims his estate, is admissible without
other proof of the fact of relationship. While the nature of the declaration is then disserving,
that is not the real ground for its admission. Such declarations do not derive their evidential
value from that consideration, although it is a useful, if not an artificial, aid in determining the
class to which the declarations belong. The distinction we have noted is sufficiently
apparent; in the one case the declarations are self-serving, in the other they are competent
from reasons of necessity." 17 (Emphasis ours.)

The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common
to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the
relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There
must be some independent proof of this fact. 18 As an exception, the requirement that there be other
proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to
reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to
the property of some other member of the family. 19
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general
requirement on evidence aliundemay be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of
the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner
Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding
the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being that such declaration is
rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of

justice. 20 More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute
that declaration made by the decedent.
cdtai

From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent's
declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one case, 21 where the subject of the declaration is the
declarant's own relationship to another person, it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the
admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The
preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For while the
documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility,
we are however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of private
respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in
evidence. 22 It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible
document is offered in evidence, 23 otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, 24 since the right
to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. 25
As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al., 26 it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that
a protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time,
otherwise it will be deemed to have been waived. The proper time is when from the question addressed
to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of
the evidence is, or may be inferred.
Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a waiver of the
provisions of the law. That objection to a question put to a witness must be made at the time the
question is asked. An objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of incompetency, taken
after the testimony has been given, is too late. 27 Thus, for instance, failure to object to parol evidence
given on the stand, where the party is in a position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto. 28
The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private respondent unreservedly cross-examined
petitioners, as the lone witness, on the documentary evidence that were offered. At no time was the
issue of the supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the possible basis for objection thereto, ever raised.
Instead, private respondent's counsel elicited answers from the witness on the circumstances and
regularity of her obtention of said documents: The observations later made by private respondent in her
comment to petitioners' offer of exhibits, although the grounds therefor were already apparent at the
time these documents were being adduced in evidence during the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison
but which objections were not timely raised therein, may no longer serve to rectify the legal
consequences which resulted therefrom. Hence, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these
documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of herein private respondent's failure to
object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein
asserted. 29
Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S) wherein it is indicated that the parents of Teodora
Dezoller are Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, as well as the Certificates of Baptism of Teodora
Dezoller 30 (Exhibit H) and Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit J) which both reflect the names of their parents

22

as Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, to show that Hermogenes Dezoller is the brother of Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero; and the Death Certificate of Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries wherein
were made by petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison as his daughter, together with the Joint Affidavits of
Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar (Exhibits N and P), to prove that herein petitioners are the children of
Hermogenes Dezoller these can be deemed to have sufficiently established the relationship between
the declarant and herein petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule that a prima facie showing is
sufficient and that only slight proof of the relationship is required. 31 Finally, it may not be amiss to
consider as in the nature of circumstantial evidence the fact that both the declarant and the claimants,
who are the subject of the declaration, bear the surname Dezoller. 32

Torres, Jr., J ., is on leave.

|||

(Tison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997)

III. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which the estate of the
decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:
"Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they
shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if
they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."
"Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate
children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall
inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and
nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001."
"Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower,
the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half."

Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was automatically
reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying
the aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally divided between the widower
and herein petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could
only validly alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein private
respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4)
and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.
cdrep

All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the demurrer to plaintiffs' evidence should have
been, as it is hereby, denied. Nonetheless, private respondent may no longer be allowed to present
evidence by reason of the mandate under Section 1 of revised Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which
provides that "if the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence." 33
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent are declared co-owners of the subject
property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourth (3/4) share therein, respectively.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ ., concur.

23

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116775. January 22, 1998.]
HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE, namely, ROSELYN URIARTE, MADRILYN
and LOURDES URIARTE, and FELOMINA BUNIEL URIARTE, and HEIRS OF
PRIMITIVA ARNALDO and HEIRS OF GREGORIO ARNALDO, represented
herein
by
FELISA
ARNALDO
SULLANO
and
LUPECINO
ARNALDO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BENEDICTO
ESTRADA, respondents.
Amado A. Caballero for petitioners.
Antonia C. Buenaflor for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondent brought in the Regional Trial Court an action for partition of the land left by Justa
Arnaldo-Sering who died intestate and without issue, claiming to be the sole surviving heir of decedent.
Private respondent contended that petitioners could claim only one-half of the land which the decedent
had inherited from her parents. However, the petitioners claimed that the land was originally owned by
their great granduncle, Ambrocio Arnaldo, who allegedly bequeathed the land to his nephews Domingo
Arnaldo, uncle of the decedent, and Juan Arnaldo, father of the decedent. Petitioners contended that
private respondent did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio
Arnaldo. The trial court sustained petitioners' contention. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that private respondent is the nephew of the
decedent, being the son of Agatonica Arreza, half-sister of the decedent, and is therefore a third degree
relative of the decedent. On the other hand, the petitioners are the sons and daughters of decedent's
cousins and are therefore fifth degree relatives of the decedent. Applying Article 962 of the Civil Code
which provides that the nearest excludes the farthest, the Court of Appeals held that the private
respondent is the lawful heir of the decedent. Hence, this petition. Petitioners are questioning private
respondent's filiation contending that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in holding that
private respondent is the son of Agatonica Arreza, who was the half-sister of the decedent. Petitioners
also make much of the fact that private respondent is not an Arnaldo, and is therefore not qualified to
share in the estate of the decedent.
The Supreme Court found that petition to be without merit. It is well-settled that questions not taken up
during the trial of a case cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. With more reason should such a
question be disallowed when raised for the first time on appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court also
held that petitioners misappreciate the relationship between the decedent and private respondent. A
nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse
survive the decedent. That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone
does not disqualify him from being his aunt's heir. The determination of whether the relationship is of the
full or half-blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.
SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEALS; ISSUES NOT RAISED DURING THE TRIAL CANNOT BE
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. It is well-settled, however, that questions not taken up
during the trial of a case cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. With more reason, therefore,
should such a question be disallowed when raised for the first time on appeal to this Court.
2. CIVIL LAW; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; A NEPHEW IS A COLLATERAL RELATIVE WHO MAY
INHERIT IF NO DESCENDANT, ASCENDANT, OR SPOUSE SURVIVE THE DECEDENT.
Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As already stated,
private respondent is the son of Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's nephews. A
nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse
survive the decedent.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; BEING A HALF-BLOOD RELATIVE, NOT A DISQUALIFICATION FROM BEING HIS
AUNT'S HEIR. That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not
disqualify him from being his aunt's heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, "The
determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the
extent of the share of the survivors."
EDHCSI

DECISION
MENDOZA, J :
p

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, as well as the appellate court's
resolution denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. At issue is the right of the parties to a 2.7
hectare piece of land in Sungkit, Madrid, Surigao del Sur, which Justa Arnaldo-Sering left upon her
death on March 31, 1989.
cdasia

The parties and their relationship to Justa Arnaldo-Sering are as follows:

Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza, whose parents were Pedro
Arreza and Ursula Tubil. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she
had another daughter, the decedent Justa. 2 Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the nephew
of Justa by her half sister Agatonica.
Petitioners, referred to in this case as the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the widow and daughters of
Pascasio Uriarte. Pascasio was one of the sons of Primitiva Arnaldo and Conrado Uriarte. His mother,
Primitiva Uriarte, was the daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and Catalina Azarcon. Domingo Arnaldo and
Justa's father, Juan Arnaldo, were brothers. 3 Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the
fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte.
cdtai

The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her brother Gregorio. 4 The children of
Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte, aside from Pascasio, are Josefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and
Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte. The children of Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitiva's brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are
Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa. These other petitioners are thus grandchildren and
relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva
Arnaldo.

24

Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial Court for the partition of
the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by Justa
as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares
by purchase. 5 Private respondent claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the
latter died without issue. He complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land as
Justa's tenant, refused to give him (private respondent) his share of the harvest. 6 He contended that
Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land
which Justa had inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. 7

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another is hereby
entered

Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs. 8 In their answer, the
heirs denied they were mere tenants of Justa 9 but the latter's heirs entitled to her entire land.

For this purpose, the court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the partition in
accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, 10 their
great granduncle. It was alleged bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocio's nephews, in a
holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1908. 11Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the land and
Juan, one-third. 12 The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession and that in her
lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the harvest
from it. 13 They alleged that private respondent did not have any right to the property because he was not
an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo,14 the original owner of the property.

SO ORDERED. 17

cdt

The trial court sustained petitioner's contention. In its decision rendered on November 8, 1991 it ruled:
As earlier stated, the land of Ambrosio Arnaldo which he left to his two nephews, Domingo
and Juan Arnaldo, was only .5481 hectares, divided as follows: two-thirds or 3,654 square
meters to Domingo, and one-third or 1,827 square meters to Juan. The area increased to
2.7588 hectares from .5481 hectares because the adjacent lot of about two hectares was
acquired by Justa Arnaldo Sering, daughter of Juan Arnaldo, after the latter's death. The
entire 2.7588 hectares was covered by tax declaration in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering.
The latter however died intestate and without issue. Her nearest surviving relatives are the
children of her uncle Domingo Arnaldo, to whom her entire estate passed on after her death
by operation of law, to the exclusion of all other relatives. Thus, the rights to the succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 277, Civil Code). 15

Accordingly, the court ordered:

aisadc

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and the intervenors
[herein petitioners] and against the plaintiff [private respondent], declaring the defendants
and the intervenors, together with the other heirs of the late Domingo Arnaldo, as entitled to
the entire parcel of land described in Tax Declaration No. 124 and subsequent revising tax
declarations in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering. No cost.
SO ORDERED. 16

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. Contrary to the trial court's finding, the appellate court found
that the 0.5 hectares had been acquired by Justa's parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, during their
marriage. As the nephew of Justa by her half-sister Agatonica, private respondent was held to be
entitled to share in the estate of Justa. In the dispositive portion of its decision the appellate court
ordered:

Ordering the partition of the property described in the second amended complaint in the
following manner:
(1) .2500 hectare as the share of defendants-intervenors, and
(2) 2.58 hectare as the share of the plaintiff.

cdasia

Hence, this petition by the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, the heirs of Primitiva Uriarte, and the heirs of
Gregorio Arnaldo. Petitioners allege:
cdtai

I THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

TANTAMOUNT TO LACK AND/OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS THE SON OF AGATONA ARREZA, THE
HALF SISTER OF JUSTA ARNALDO SERING;
II THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PREFERRED TECHNICALITY OVER
SUBSTANTIALITY WHEN IT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL LEFT BY THE DECEASED
AMBROCIO ARNALDO CANNOT PASS REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY;
III THE PRAYERS FOR RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND DAMAGES IS MERITORIOUS;
cdt

IV AND THE INSTANT PETITION IS IMPRESSED WITH MERIT AND SHOULD HAVE
BEEN GRANTED. 18

After due consideration of the petition, we find it to be without merit. As already stated, Justa left a piece
of land consisting 2.7 hectares. Half of this land (0.5 hectares), as the Court of Appeals found, formerly
was conjugal property of her parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. The rest, consisting of 2.2
hectares, was acquired by Justa after the death of her parents. Accordingly, the division of Justa's
property should be as follows as private respondent contends:
A The first hectare should be divided into two parts, the share of Juan Arnaldo
which will accrue to petitioners and the second half which pertains to
Ursula Tubil, which will accrue to private respondent.
aisadc

B As to the second portion of the area of the land in question which as already
stated was consolidated with the hectare originally belonging to the
conjugal partnership of Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, the same shall
accrue to private respondent, who is the son of Agatonica Arreza, and
who is only three degrees from Justa Arnaldo, whereas petitioners

cdta

25

who are the children of Primitiva Arnaldo and Gregorio Arnaldo, are
five degrees removed from Justa Arnaldo. 19

The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.

ART. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or
persons, excluding the progenitor.

The issue in this case is who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justa's
estate as her nearest relatives within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code.

aisadc

In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus the child is one
degree removed from the parent, two from the grandfather, and three from the
great-grandparent.

As a preliminary matter, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
holding that private respondent is the son of Agatonica Arreza, who was the half-sister of Justa Arnaldo.
Petitioners are raising this issue only now. It is well-settled, however, that questions not taken up during
the trial of a case cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. With more reason, therefore, should
such a question be disallowed when raised for the first time on appeal to this Court. 20

In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent
is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person
is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother
of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth.

It is noteworthy that, in their brief before the Court of Appeals, 21 petitioners admitted that private
respondent is Justa's nephew, his mother, Agatonica, being Justa's half-sister. Apparently they are now
questioning private respondent's filiation because, as explained by the Court of Appeals, private
respondent is the nearest relative of Justa and, therefore, the only one entitled to her estate.

In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a third
degree relative of Justa.
cdta

On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and daughters of Justa's
cousin. They are thus fifth degree relatives of Justa.

cdasia

Indeed, given the fact that 0.5 hectares of the land in question belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Justa's parents, Justa was entitled to 0.125 hectares of the half hectare land as her father's (Juan
Arnaldo's) share in the conjugal property, while petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125 hectares. In
addition, Justa inherited her mother's (Ursula Tubil's) share consisting of 0.25 hectares. Plus the 2.2
hectares which belonged to her in her own right, Justa owned a total of 2.575 or 2.58 hectares of the
2.7-hectare land. This 2.58-hectare land was inherited by private respondent Benedicto Estrada as
Justa's nearest surviving relative. As the Court of Appeals held:

Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is the lawful heir of
Justa. The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment. 22

Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private respondent is not an Arnaldo, his mother
being Ursula's daughter not by Juan Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza. They claim that this being the case,
private respondent is not an heir of Justa and thus not qualified to share in her estate.
cdasia

Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of Article
1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of Article 987, paragraph 2,
concerning division between paternal and maternal lines.

Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As already stated,
private respondent is the son of Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's nephew. A nephew
is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the
decedent. 23 The private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not
disqualify him from being his aunt's heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, "The
determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half-blood is important only to determine the
extent of the share of the survivors." 24

The manner of determining the proximity of relationship are provided by Articles 963 - 966 of
the Civil Code. They provide:

Because of the conclusion we have thus reached, the third and fourth grounds of the petition for renew
must fail.

ART. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations.

Each generation forms a degree.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is LIFTED,
and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, In every inheritance, the relative nearest in
degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly
takes place.

cdtai

cdtai

ART. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or
collateral.

SO ORDERED.

aisadc

A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and
descendants.

Regalado, Puno and Martinez, JJ ., concur.

|||

(Heirs of Uriarte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116775, January 22, 1998)

A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who
are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.
ART. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.

cdt

The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him.

26

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117740. October 30, 1998.]
CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HONORIA EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD, MARIAN H. ABAD and
ROSEMARIE S. ABAD, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; WHEN A CHILD SHALL BE PRESUMED LEGITIMATE,
ALTHOUGH THE MOTHER MAY HAVE DECLARED AGAINST ITS LEGITIMACY; CASE AT BAR. It
is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to Jose
Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria Nina, prior to the birth
of Cecilia and Marian. But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners
claim that the latter died sometime in 1971. The date of Jose Libunao's death is important, for if he was
still alive in 1971, and given that he was legally married to Honoria Empaynado, the presumption would
be that Cecilia and Marian are not Ricardo Abad's children with the latter, but of Jose Libunao and
Honoria Empaynado. Article 256, the applicable provision of the Civil Code, provides: Art. 256. The
child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
cdasia

2. ID.; SUCCESSION; COLLATERAL RELATIVES; WHEN PRECLUDED FROM INHERITING FROM

THE DECEDENT; CASE AT BAR. With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate
children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother. The
applicable provisions are: Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the
illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Art. 1003. If there are no . . .
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased in accordance with the following articles. As to petitioners' claim that the properties in the
name of Ricardo Abad actually belong to their mother Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the
appellate court ruled that the evidence presented by private respondents proved that said properties in
truth belong to Ricardo Abad. As stated earlier, the findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great
weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, it being in a better position to examine the real evidence,
as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case. In fact, petitioners
seem to accept this conclusion, their contention being that they are entitled to the subject estate
whether the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by Lucila de Mesa.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION; REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULE
ON CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT; CASE AT BAR.
As to Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged
communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The rule on confidential
communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or
treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient

existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the
advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the physician while professionally
attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty;
and e) the disclosure of the information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient. Petitioners
do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert, however, that the finding as
to Ricardo Abad's "sterility" does not blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners conveniently
forget that Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most
assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone,
without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient
to blacken the reputation of any patient. We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And the
same remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad. As stated by the
trial court: In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed out
that: "The privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in established
precedents. It is an established rule that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy
intended to be promoted thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal of secrecy, from the
communications and disclosures which a patient should make to his physician. After one has gone to
his grave, the living are not permitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light
communications and disclosures made under the seal of the statute."
4. ID.; APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT; RULINGS THEREOF, BINDING UPON AND MAY NOT BE
REVERSED BY A LOWER COURT. In its decision dated October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and
Cesar de Mesa Tioseco on the ground that the same was filed out of time. This affirmance is erroneous,
for on July 9, 1985, this Court had already ruled that the same was not filed out of time. Well-settled is
the dictum that the rulings of the Supreme Court are binding upon and may not be reversed by a lower
court.
CTIEac

DECISION
ROMERO, J :
p

Before us is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 19,
1994, finding private respondents as the heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad as well as annulling petitioners'
extrajudicial partition of the decedent's estate.
The facts are as follows:
On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad, before the
then Court of First Instance of Manila. In their petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 86792,
petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a
bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972,
petitioners amended their petition by alleging that the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530,
53671, and 64021, listed therein as belonging to the decedent, were actually only administered by the
latter, the true owner being their late mother, Lucila de Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the trial court
appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.
LLphil

27

Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late
mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots covered by TCT Nos.
13530, 53671, and 64021. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the above-mentioned
TCTs in the name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores
de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No 108484 in the
name of Carolina Abad Gonzales. The three promptly executed real estate mortgages over the real
properties in favor of Mrs. Josefina Viola, the wife of their counsel, Escolastico Viola.
On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad
Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition in Special
Proceedings No. 86792. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria Empaynado had been the commonlaw wife of Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his death, or from 1943 to 1971, and that during
this period, their union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad
Empaynado. Private respondents also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly
fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman, Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to
the surviving children to the exclusion of collateral relatives, private respondents charged petitioners
with deliberately concealing the existence of said three children in order to deprive the latter of their
rights to the estate of Ricardo Abad.
On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to withdraw their first motion and, in lieu thereof,
filed a motion for reconsideration praying that Cecilia Abad be appointed administrator instead of Cesar
Tioseco. The trial court denied private respondents' motion to remove Cesar Tioseco as administrator,
but allowed them to appear in the proceedings to establish their right as alleged heirs of Ricardo Abad.
Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had managed to cancel TCT Nos. 13530, 53671,
and 64021 through the stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mother's estate Accordingly, on
October 4, 1973, private respondents filed a motion to annul the extra-judicial partition executed by
petitioners, as well as TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484, the Torrens titles issued in substitution
of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 and the real estate mortgages constituted by the latter on said
properties.
After due trial, the lower court, on November 2, 1973, rendered the following judgment:

prLL

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) Declaring Cecilia E Abad, Marian E. Abad and Rosemarie S. Abad acknowledged
natural children of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad;
(2) Declaring said acknowledged natural children, namely: Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad,
and Rosemarie S. Abad the only surviving legal heirs of the deceased Ricardo
M. Abad and as such entitled to succeed to the entire estate of said deceased,
subject to the rights of Honoria Empaynado, if any, as co-owner of any of the
property of said estate that may have been acquired thru her joint efforts with the
deceased during the period they lived together as husband and wife;

from participating in the administration and settlement of the estate of Ricardo

Abad;
(4) Appointing Honoria Empaynado as the administratrix in this intestacy with a bond of
THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS; and
(5) Ordering Cesar Tioseco to surrender to the new administratrix all property or properties,
monies and such papers that came into his possession by virtue of his
appointment as administrator, which appointment is hereby revoked. 1

The trial court, likewise, found in favor of private respondents with respect to the latter's motion for
annulment of certain documents. On November 19, 1974, it rendered the following judgment:
LLpr

WHEREFORE, this Court finds oppositors' Motion for Annulment, dated October 4, 1973 to
be meritorious and accordingly
1. Declares that the six (6) parcels of land described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021,
all registered in the name of Ricardo Abad, as replaced by TCT No. 108482 in
the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de
Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina de Mesa AbadGonzales, and the residential house situated at 2432 Opalo Street, San Andres
Subdivision, Manila, to be the properties of the late Ricardo Abad;
2. Declares the deed of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Lucila de
Mesa, executed on May 2, 1972 (Doc. No. 445, Page No. 86, Book No. VII,
Series of 1972 of the notarial book of Faustino S. Cruz) by petitioners and
Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, to be inexistent and void from the beginning;
3. Declares as null and void the cancellation of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 and
issuance in lieu thereof, of TCT Nos. 108482, 108483 and 108484;
4. Orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 108482 of Dolores de Mesa
Abad; TCT No. 108483 of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco; and TCT No. 108484 of
Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales and in lieu thereof, restore and/or issue the
corresponding certificate of title in the name of Ricardo Abad;
5. Declares as inexistent and void from the beginning the three (3) real estate mortgages
executed on July 7, 1972 executed by (a) petitioner Dolores de Mesa Abad,
identified as Doc. No. 145, Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972; (b)
petitioner Cesar de Mesa Tioseco, identified as Doc. No. 146, Page 31, Book
No. XX, Series of 1972; and (c) Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, identified as
Doc. No. 144, Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972, all of the notarial book
of Ricardo P. Yap of Manila, in favor of Mrs. Josefina C. Viola, and orders the
Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration or annotation thereof from
the back of the torrens title of Ricardo Abad; and
6. Orders Atty. Escolastico R. Viola and his law associate and wife, Josefina C. Viola, to
surrender to the new administratrix, Honoria Empaynado, TCT Nos. 108482,
108483, and 108484 within five (5) days from receipt hereof
cdll

SO ORDERED. 2
(3) Denying the petition of decedent's collateral relatives, namely: Dolores M. Abad, Cesar
M. Tioseco and Carolina M. Abad to be declared as heirs and excluding them

28

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 1973 decision was denied by the trial court.
Their notice of appeal was likewise denied on the ground that the same had been filed out of time.
Because of this ruling, petitioners instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with the Court of
Appeals, docketed there as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-03268-R. On November 2, 1974, the appellate court
granted petitioners' petition and ordered the lower court to give due course to the latter's appeal. The
trial court, however, again dismissed petitioners' appeal on the ground that their record on appeal was
filed out of time.
Likewise, on January 4, 1975, petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the November 19, 1974 ruling of
the trial court. On March 21, 1975, this appeal was similarly denied on the ground that it had been filed
out of time.
Due to the dismissal of their two appeals, petitioners again instituted certiorari and mandamus
proceedings with the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-04352. The appellate
court affirmed the dismissal of the two appeals, prompting petitioners to appeal to the Supreme Court.
On July 9, 1985, this Court directed the trial court to give due course to petitioners' appeal from the
order of November 2, 1973 declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad, and the
order dated November 19, 1974, annulling certain documents pertaining to the intestate estate of
deceased.
The two appeals were accordingly elevated by the trial court to the appellate court. On October 19,
1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit.
The orders of the court a quo in SP No. 86792, to wit:
1. Order dated November 2, 1973, declaring in substance that Cecilia, Marian and
Rosemarie, all surnamed Abad as the acknowledged natural children and the
only surviving heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad;
dctai

2. Order dated November 19, 1974, declaring in substance that the six (6) parcels of land
described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 are the properties of Ricardo
Abad; that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of the deceased Lucila de
Mesa executed on May 2, 1972 is inexistent and void from the beginning; the
cancellation of the aforementioned TCTs is null and void; the Register of Deeds
be ordered to restore and/or issue the corresponding Certificates of Title in the
name of Ricardo Abad; and
3. Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de
Mesa Tioseco from the latter Order, for being filed out of time, are all
AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against petitioner-appellants.
SO ORDERED. 3

Petitioners now seek to annul the foregoing judgment on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENTS CECILIA E. ABAD, MARIAN E. ABAD AND ROSEMARIE S. ABAD ARE THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN OF THE DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.

II. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE SUBJECT ESTATE WHETHER THE SAME IS OWNED BY
THE DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD OR BY LUCILA DE MESA, THE MOTHER OF
PETITIONERS AND RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abad's filiation, submit the startling theory that
the husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian Abad were
born in 1948 and 1954, respectively.
It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to
Jose Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria Nina, prior to the
birth of Cecilia and Marian. But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943,
petitioners claim that the latter died sometime in 1971.
The date of Jose Libunao's death is important, for if he was still alive in 1971, and given that he was
legally married to Honoria Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and Marian are not
Ricardo Abad's children with the latter, but of Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado. Article 256, the
applicable provision of the Civil Code, provides:
cdasia

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. 4

To bolster their theory, petitioners presented in evidence the application for enrollment at Mapua
Institute of Technology of Angelita Libunao, accomplished in 1956, which states:
Father's Name : Jose Libunao
Occupation : engineer (mining)
Mother's Name : Honoria Empaynado 5

as well as Cesar Libunao's 1958 application for enrollment at the Mapua Institute of Technology,
which states:
Father's Name : Jose Libunao
Occupation : none
Mother's Name : Honoria Empaynado 6

Petitioners claim that had Jose Libunao been dead during the time when said applications were
accomplished, the enrollment forms of his children would have stated so. These not being the case,
they conclude that Jose Libunao must have still been alive in 1956 and 1958.
Additionally, petitioners presented the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos 7 stating
that to their knowledge Jose Libunao had died in 1971, leaving as his widow, Honoria Empaynado, and
that the former had been interred at the Loyola Memorial Park.

29

Lastly, petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, 8 Ricardo Abad's physician, declaring that
in 1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the latter
had become sterile as a consequence thereof.
With these pieces of evidence, petitioners claim that Cecilia and Marian Abad are not the illegitimate
children of Ricardo Abad, but rather the legitimate children of the spouses Jose Libunao and Honoria
Empaynado.
cdll

At the outset, it must be noted that petitioners are disputing the veracity of the trial court's finding of
facts. It is a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. 9 Petitioners,
however, argue that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not binding on this Court when there
appears in the record of the case some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked, or the significance of which has been misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the
result of the case. 10
This Court finds no justifiable reason to apply this exception to the case at bar.
First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say the
least, far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrollment form that one's parent is "deceased" is
not necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was being accomplished.
Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as to the supposed death of
Jose Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the latter's death at that time, being merely
secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunao's death certificate would have been the best evidence as to
when the latter died. Petitioners have, however, inexplicably failed to present the same, although there
is no showing that said death certificate has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of
Jose Libunao's death. More telling, while the records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain
Jose Bautista Libunao was indeed buried there in 1971, this person appears to be different from
Honoria Empaynado's first husband, the latter's name being JoseSantos Libunao. Even the name of the
wife is different. Jose Bautista Libunao's wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos
Libunao was Honoria Empaynado.

As to Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged
communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 11 The rule on confidential
communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or
treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient
existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the
advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the physician while professionally
attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty;
and e) the disclosure of the information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient. 12
Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert, however, that the
finding as to Ricardo Abad's "sterility" does not blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners
conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact

which most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium,
sterility alone, without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease,
would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient. We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in
evidence. And the same remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad.
As stated by the trial court:
In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed out
that: "The privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in
established precedents. It is an established rule that the purpose of the law would be
thwarted and the policy intended to be promoted thereby would be defeated, if death
removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and disclosures which a patient
should make to his physician. After one has gone to his grave, the living are not permitted to
impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light communications and
disclosures made under the seal of the statute.
cdphil

Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish their claim by
the quantum of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the evidence presented by private
respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad.
We quote with approval the trial court's decision, thus:
In his individual statements of income and assets for the calendar years 1958 and 1970, and
in all his individual income tax returns for the years 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970,
he has declared therein as his legitimate wife, Honoria Empaynado; and as his legitimate
dependent children, Cecilia, Marian (except in Exh. 12) and Rosemarie Abad (Exhs. 12 to
19; TSN, February 26, 1973, pp. 33-44).
xxx xxx xxx
In December 1959, Ricardo Abad insured his daughters Cecilia, then eleven (11) years old,
and Marian, then (5) years old, on [a] twenty (20) year-endowment plan with the Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd. and paid for their premiums (Exh. 34 and 34-A; 34-B to C; 35, 35-A to
D; TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 7-20).
In 1966, he and his daughter Cecilia Abad opened a trust fund account of P100,000.00 with
the People's Bank and Trust Company which was renewed until (sic) 1971, payable to either
of them in the event of death (Exhs. 36-A; 36-E). On January 5, 1971, Ricardo Abad opened
a trust fund of P100,000.00 with the same bank, payable to his daughter Marian (Exh. 37-A).
On January 4, 1971, Ricardo Abad and his sister Dolores Abad had (sic) agreed to stipulate
in their PBTC Trust Agreement that the 9% income of their P100,000.00 trust fund shall (sic)
be paid monthly to the account reserved for Cecilia, under PBTC Savings Account No.
49053 in the name of Ricardo Abad and/or Cecilia Abad (Exh. 38) where the income of the
trust fund intended for Cecilia was also deposited monthly (TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 2136). Ricardo Abad had also deposited (money) with the Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank
in the name of his daughter Marian, represented by him, as father, under Savings Account
17348 which has (sic) a balance of P34,812.28 as of June 30, 1972. (Exh. 60-B). . .

With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are
precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother. The applicable provisions are:
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.

30

Art. 1003. If there are no . . . illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles. (Emphasis supplied)

Narvasa, C .J ., Kapunan, Purisima and Pardo, JJ ., concur.

As to petitioners' claim that the properties in the name of Ricardo Abad actually belong to their mother
Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the appellate court ruled that the evidence presented by private
respondents proved that said properties in truth belong to Ricardo Abad. As stated earlier, the findings
of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, it being in a
better position to examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying in the case. 13 In fact, petitioners seem to accept this conclusion, their contention being that
they are entitled to the subject estate whether the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by Lucila de
Mesa.
Digressing from the main issue, in its decision dated October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de
Mesa Tioseco on the ground that the same was filed out of time. This affirmance is erroneous, for on
July 9, 1985, this Court had already ruled that the same was not filed out of time. Well-settled is the
dictum that the rulings of the Supreme Court are binding upon and may not be reversed by a lower
court.
cdphil

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30184 dated October 19, 1994 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the affirmance of the Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad
and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco for being filed out of time is SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

31