G.R. No.

L-21223
August 31, 1966
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. (As Employer) et. al, petitioners and
appellants, vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondent and appellee.
Ponente: BARRERA, J.:
FACTS:
The Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., a domestic corporation, has been employing
Japanese technicians under a pre-arranged contract of employment from April 28,
1957, to October 26, 1958. In connection with the employment of these aliens, it
sent an inquiry to the Social Security System (SSS) whether these employees are
subject to compulsory coverage under the System, which inquiry was answered by
the First Deputy Administrator of the SSS that aliens who are employed in the
Philippines shall be compulsory covered. On October 7, 1958, the Assistant General
Manager of the corporation, on its behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the Japanese
technicians, filed a claim with the SSS for the refund of the premiums paid to the
System, on the ground of termination of the members' employment. This claim was
denied, they filed a petition with the Social Security Commission for the return or
refund of the premiums, in the total sum of P2,520.00, paid by the employer
corporation and the 6 Japanese employees, plus attorneys' fees. The Commission
denied the petition for the reason that, although under the original provisions of
Section 3 (d) of Rule I of the Rules and Regulations of the SSS, alien-employees (who
are employed temporarily) and their employers are entitled to a rebate of a
proportionate amount of their respective contributions upon the employees'
departure from the Philippines, said rule was amended by eliminating that portion
granting a return of the premium contributions. This amendment became effective
on January 14, 1958, or before the employment of the subject aliens terminated.
The rights of covered employees who are separated from employment, under the
present Rules, are covered by Rule IX which allows a return of the premiums only if
they have been members for at least 2 years. The Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the SSS, pursuant to the rule-making authority granted in Section
4(a) of Republic Act 1161, was duly approved by the President on July 18, 1957, and
published in the Official Gazette on September 15, 1957.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellants are bound by the amended Rules requiring membership
for two years before refund of the premium contributions may be allowed.
RULING
It may be argued, however, that while the amendment to the Rules may have been
lawfully made by the Commission and duly approved by the President on January
14, 1958, such amendment was only published in the November 1958 issue of the
Official Gazette, and after appellants' employment had already ceased. Suffice it to
say, in this regard, that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the date of publication of
laws in the Official Gazette is material for the purpose of determining their
effectivity, only if the statutes themselves do not so provide.
In the present case, the original Rules and Regulations of the SSS specifically
provide that any amendment thereto subsequently adopted by the Commission,
shall take effect on the date of its approval by the President. Consequently, the
delayed publication of the amended rules in the Official Gazette did not affect the
date of their effectivity, which is January 14, 1958, when they were approved by the
President. It follows that when the Japanese technicians were separated from
employment in October, 1958, the rule governing refund of premiums is Rule IX of
the amended Rules and Regulations, which requires membership for 2 years before
such refund of premiums may be allowed.

G.R. No. L-25035

February 26, 1968

EDWARDA S. VDA. DE GENUINO, petitioner, vs.

THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS (Fifth Regional District, Branch III,
Angeles City), et. al, respondents.

Ponente: BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Facts:
Eduarda S. Vda. de Genuino is the judicial administratrix of the estate of the
deceased Jacinto Genuino, Jr., which were lands in Mandili and Mapaniqui, Candaba,
Pampanga, all devoted to rice production. On May 25, 1964, the share tenants of
said lands filed complaints against Genuino before the Court of Agrarian Relations of
Angeles City, Pampanga which the purpose was the conversion of the tenancy
relationship from share tenancy to leasehold tenancy pursuant to Section 4 of R.A
3844,which amended by R.A 1199, section 14. The nominal average produce for the
past three agricultural years, less expenses, was alleged in the complaints.
Genuino, denied the alleged normal average produce and as an affirmative defense,
questioned the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 34 of Republic Act 3844.
The Court of Agrarian Relations denied defendant's prayer for dismissal on the
ground that the issue of constitutionality of Sections 4 and 34 of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code, will not directly affect the tenants' rights even if said sections
were declared unconstitutional, Section 14 of Republic Act 1199, providing also for
change from sharehold to leasehold tenancy, which was already held constitutional
by the Supreme Court, would still apply. As to the limitation in Section 34 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code of the maximum rental, it ruled that the limitation
was not really burdensome, for the decrease of 5% of the owner's share, is offset by
the advantages he gets under the law. A reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Agrarian Relations and hence, this petition for review before us.

Issue:
a. Whether or not the abolition of the share tenancy and the compulsion on the
landowner and/or tenant to enter into the leasehold system is
unconstitutional on the ground that the freedom of contract is violated and
that it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
b. Whether or not said legislation may be justified by the right of the state to
exercise its police powers.

Ruling:

a. As the Court of Agrarian Relations correctly held then that even if the
challenged provisions of the Agricultural Land Reform Code be declared
unconstitutional, the provisions of Republic Act 1199, as amended, would
apply. Section 14, which grants this option to choose the leasehold
relationship to the tenant and binding to the landowner, is as earlier pointed
out, constitutional. Consequently, regardless of the Land Reform Code,
petitioner must give in to the desired change of system.
b. Individual rights to contract and to property, had to give way to police power
exercised for public welfare. In the case at bar, the exercise of such a power
was the result of the intention of Congress to do away with the share tenancy
completely. Police power is broad enough to be exercised on the basis of the
economic need for the public welfare. And, we do not see why public welfare
when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to
prevail through the state's exercise of its police power.

G.R. No. L-22008

November 3, 1924

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

JULIO POMAR, defendant-appellant

Ponente: JOHNSON, J.:

Facts:
Pomar being the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco
factory pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a woman by the
name of Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted vacation leave, by reason of her
pregnancy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously fail and refuse to
pay to said woman the sum of eighty pesos (P80), Philippine currency, to which she
was entitled as her regular wages corresponding to thirty days before and thirty
days after her delivery and confinement, despite and over the demands made by
her. The defendant demurred, alleging that the facts therein contained did not
constitute an offense. The demurrer was overruled, whereupon the defendant
answered and admitted at the trial all of the allegations contained in the complaint,
and contended that the provisions of Act No. 3071, upon which the complaint was
based were illegal, unconstitutional and void.
Upon a consideration of the facts charged in the complaint and admitted by the
defendant, the CFI, found the defendant guilty of the alleged offense described in
the complaint, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50, in accordance with the
provisions of section 15 of said Act, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. The defendant appealed, and now makes the
following assignments of error: That the court erred in overruling the demurrer; in
convicting him of the crime charged in the information; and in not declaring section
13 of Act No. 3071, unconstitutional. Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature
of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its supposed police power, with the
praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in
"place of labor of any description," etc. The question presented for decision by the
appeal is whether said Act has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise
of the police power of the state.

Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071 are a
reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state.

Rulings:

In determining whether a particular law promulgated under the police power of the
state is, in fact, within said power, it becomes necessary first, to determine what
that power is, its limits and scope. A definition of the police power of the state must
depend upon the particular law and the particular facts to which it is to be applied.
Section 13 (Act No. 3071) creates a term or condition in every contract made by
every person, firm, or corporation with any woman who may, during the course of
her employment, become pregnant. Clearly, the law has deprived the right to enter
into contracts of employment upon such terms as he and the employee may agree
upon. Said section deprived of their liberty to contract. The constitution of the
Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen his liberty and one of his liberties is
the liberty to contract.

Police power is subject to and is controlled by the paramount authority of the

constitution of the state, and will not be permitted to violate rights secured or
guaranteed by that instrument or interfere with the execution of the powers. This
power is a growing and expanding, but that power cannot grow faster than the
fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the
people's law the constitution.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court are fully persuaded, under the facts and
the law, that the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine
Legislature, are unconstitutional and void.

The sentence of the lower court is revoked, the complaint is hereby dismissed, and
the defendant is hereby discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio.
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
Ponente: LAUREL, J.:

Facts:
The National Traffic Commission recommend to the Director of the Public Works and
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications pursuant to
the Commonwealth Act No. 548 that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along hi-ways for a period of one year from the date of the opening of
the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of
Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a
consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places mentioned in the resolution to the detriment not only of
their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issue:

a. Whether or not the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents

pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an
unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to
personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
b. Whether or not the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people?
Ruling:
a. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In
enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public
convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of
traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of
the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State.
To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over
authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies
in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of
insuring its preserving.
b. No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic
forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of
all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures
legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus
populi est suprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection
that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective
of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing
about the greatest good to the greatest number.

G.R. No. L-43098 March 30, 1981

MARIANO R. BASA, petitioner, vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(Department of Justice), respondents.

Ponente: MAKASIAR, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner herein was appointed Municipal Judge Ill 194-1. He suffered his first heart attack in July,
1969. Here tired from the service in October, 1969 and was awarded, in October 1970, by the
Workmen's Compensation Commission, permanent and total disability benefits and reimbursement,
of medical expenses incurred.
After approximately six years from the date of his retirement, or in 1975, petitioner suffered a second
heart attack. He incurred further medical expenses consisting of hospitalization and physician's fees
in the amount of P19,880. Respondent Commission denied his claim for further reimbursement.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner should be entitled to reimbursement for the subsequent medical and
hospitalization expenses that he had incurred?
Rulings:
Petitioner's case therefore comes within the ambit of the 1980 precedents-setting decision of the
Supreme Court En Banc, where it sustained the right of an ailing employee under Section 13 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, to continuous medical treatment and therefore
reimbursement for subsequent medical expenses incurred even after he is declared permanently
disabled. Section 13 imposes upon the employer the obligation 'to provide the employee with such
services, appliances and supplies as the nature of his disability and the process of his recovery may
require; and that which will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical
capacity.
An employee, whether temporarily or permanently disabled, is entitled (1) to continuous hospital,
medical and/or surgical services to relieve the painful effects of his disability; (2) to relief from or
alleviation of the humiliating effects of his injury, like plastic surgery after the first operation that may
leave an ugly scar or deformity; (3) to be provided with such facilities, supplies or equipment that will
restore the normal use of his senses, faculties, or limbs, such as improved models of wheelchairs,
crutches, artificial limbs or hearing or visual aids; and (4) to rehabilitation of his morale and spirit by
eliminating the psychological effects of the trauma caused by the ailment or injury so that he can
join, and be accepted by, the mainstream of society and lead a normal life.
After the disability benefits have been paid, the disabled employee may remain to be the main
support of his family. Denial to him of further hospital, medical or surgical services would be
aggravating the economic distress his family is suffering.
In this case of petitioner who served the government as municipal judge from 1947 to 1969, risking
his health and life, and who prays for a second reimbursement of his medical expenses. The
government or the court that does not lift a hand to rescue the ailing employee and his family from
such abject penury cannot rightly claim to be an agency of social justice, much less pretend to be
compassionate.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION IS HEREBY REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE AND THE RESPONDENT DEPARTMENT (NOW MINISTRY) OF JUSTICE IS
HEREBY ORDERED TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF NINETEEN THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED EIGHTY (P19,880.00) PESOS AS REIMBURSEMENT FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES.