Cases On Public Land Act

G.R. No.
73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER
CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a
judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of
the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in
favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land
measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from
Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as
amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial
court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr.
Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance
with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23,
1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr.
Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the
provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the
provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was

ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on
October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both
members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural
minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935
is applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or
sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the
Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the
Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to
generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano
Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the
present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were
granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October
29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time
immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant
to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute
ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land
occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the
alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced
more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of
improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during
its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on
September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be

registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela,
have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality
when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from
the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on
November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the
Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during
their special session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except
as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand.
Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been
commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution
had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since
section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except
by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the
1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased
the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree
registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership
for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in
subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted
findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the
Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this
Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme
purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of
the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through
their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time
immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by
reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of
the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there
any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is
disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any
provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article
XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not
the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be
confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981
when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the
prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the
public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands
at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they
were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the
negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands,
the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs.
Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that
case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60%
of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947
two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been
possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-ininterest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War
in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots.
The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the
application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not
qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco
appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held
that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land
only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino
citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land
and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for

its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot
be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition
makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable
agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect
title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain
as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial
confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not
make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to
alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured
under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b)
'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of
Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of
cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2thru Susi in 1925 3 down
to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the
doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable
public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed
what is the better and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident
from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It
was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to

those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we
do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in
registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer
would have recommended an application under the foregoing
decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind
of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were
in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove'
(acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might
be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation.
There are indications that registration was expected from all but
none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made,
was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in
more categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession,
personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of
the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly
since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land
under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant,
but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a
certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient,
under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal

fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant
of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and
had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin
Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands
disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or
control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned,
likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de
Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of
Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi
doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which
the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's
case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more
than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-ininterest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is
no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent.
....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified
in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public
domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to

dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of
considering possession of public land which is of the character and
duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant
from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the
possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be
little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether
the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time;
and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize
a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the
land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion
already affected by operation of law from the moment the required
period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "...
(T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but
none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained
would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to
which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on
October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also
be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition,
there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that
matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later)

prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public"
land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors,
until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate
proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious
question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also
being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to
prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public
land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called
"incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was
that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance
that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the
1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the
public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law
came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and
proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that
the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no
retroactive application to the sales application of Binan
Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested
right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution
took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated
by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public
agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four
hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine
of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights.
'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by
the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal
ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except
in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase
the land in question had become fixed and established and was
no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for
the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said
land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a
patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of
that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
919).<re||an1w> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted
by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another
accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than
procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the
right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there
being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is
unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels,
under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in
themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the
letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successorin-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional
mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that
the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer
deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the
line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a
possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30
years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land
subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was
acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable
title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's
holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person,
Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under
section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial
and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application
on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of
the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation
of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error not having filed the application for registration in the name
of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it
is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the
land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition
against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the
name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural
persons) with the end result of their application being granted,
because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided
in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the
rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their
names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the

Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See
Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by
considering the applications for confirmation as amended to
conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for
formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by
conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and
who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both
admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own
private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of
title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to
the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of
title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names,
deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in
empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and
speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application
of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the
dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively
recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only
reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of
which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many
past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well
as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad
Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner
therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for
confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article
XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the
main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as
essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment
of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed,
without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and,
therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting
opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is
herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the
correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case
of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases
cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established
doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession
of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public
Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under
the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the
period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally
and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and
becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference
for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited
established doctrine and precedents and discarding
the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the
recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification
of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors
"shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure
established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the
statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a
right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the
public domainand had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of
Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case
of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral
family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which
reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the
Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and
regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as
well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean
when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it,
as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and
related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the
aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was
consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision
was promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such
acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or
by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a
certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain
and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and
acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As
stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere
formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly
held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public
policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such
conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully
acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973
Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title
to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for
the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land
from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935
Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations
holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later
1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the
erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the
Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial,

respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in
1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the
welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of
Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the
townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the
land of the Infiels had beenipso jure converted into private land and
they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to
be established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and
issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly
transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the
filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly
reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the
settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered
lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously
occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and
grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact.
Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have
originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively
extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957,
then to December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976
and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply
thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of
procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis
mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be
served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as

amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the
original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for
formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive
presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter
duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino
corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting
the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so
acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority
ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court
would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant
was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural personstransferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an
insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy,
although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us
in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of
being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By
legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that
the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application
under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume
suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now
retired, while concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect
dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of
substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be
registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time
they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already
private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of
the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title.
Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is
inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications
to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open
possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period,
tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural
persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can
actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required
statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot
do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the
required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a
legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow
the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of
their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land.
But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance
of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are
already private lands because ofacquisitive prescription by the
corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to
consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural
persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their
title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully
transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes
the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the
corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and
have the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural
persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in
the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of
complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file
the application for confirmation of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:

claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for
have performed are the conditions essential to a Government
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed
one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such
lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional
provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for
the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public
domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799;
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1).
It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as
follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of
title over the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to
ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be
allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus
avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should
first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title
to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a
dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA
799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on
the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of
their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
error in not having filed the application for registration in the
name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of
the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being
refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners
and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their indisputable
acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive
presumption therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost
of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years
dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory
provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates
of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the
constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits
corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That
interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be
justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify,
destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State
Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507;
United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73
Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the
assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective
law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain
thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle
that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret
the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it
efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or
provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed,
nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a

statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will
give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former
construction is preferred. One part of a statute may not be
construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect.
Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the
enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the
meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words
used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied,
where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity.
Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is
necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by
implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456,
143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a
public policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in
the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction
which would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs.
Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and,
therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting
opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is
herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the
correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case

of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases
cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established
doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession
of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public
Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under
the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the
period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally
and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and
becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference
for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited
established doctrine and precedents and discarding
the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the
recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification
of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors
"shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure
established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the
statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a
right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the
public domainand had become private property, at least by

Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case
of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral
family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which
reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the
Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and
regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as
well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean
when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it,
as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and
related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the
aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was
consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision
was promulgated).<re||an1w> We reaffirm the established
doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands
takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a
prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of
the public domain and becomes private property, which may be
lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as
respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application
for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly
held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public
policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such
conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully

acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973
Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title
to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for
the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land
from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935
Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations
holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later
1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the
erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the
Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial,
respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in
1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the
welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of
Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the
townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the
land of the Infiels had beenipso jure converted into private land and
they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to
be established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and
issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly
transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the
filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly
reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the
settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered
lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously
occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and
grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact.
Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have
originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively
extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957,
then to December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976
and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply
thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of
procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis
mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be
served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the
original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for
formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive
presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter
duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino
corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting
the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so
acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority
ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court
would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant
was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural personstransferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an
insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy,
although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us
in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of
being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By
legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that
the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application
under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume
suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now

retired, while concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect
dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of
substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be
registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time
they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already
private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of
the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title.
Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is
inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications
to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open
possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period,
tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural
persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can
actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required
statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot
do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the
required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a
legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow
the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of
their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land.
But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance
of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are
already private lands because ofacquisitive prescription by the
corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to
consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural
persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their
title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully
transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes
the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the
corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and

have the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural
persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in
the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of
complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file
the application for confirmation of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for
have performed are the conditions essential to a Government
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:

SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed
one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such
lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional
provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for
the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public
domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799;
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1).
It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as
follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of
title over the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to
ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be
allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus
avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should
first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title
to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a
dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA
799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on

the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of
their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
error in not having filed the application for registration in the
name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of
the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being
refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners
and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their indisputable
acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive
presumption therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost
of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years
dispose of it here and now." (Emphasis supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory
provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates
of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the
constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits
corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That
interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be
justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify,
destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State
Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507;
United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73
Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the
assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective
law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain
thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle
that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret
the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it
efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or
provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed,
nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a
statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will
give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former
construction is preferred. One part of a statute may not be
construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect.
Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the
enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the
meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words
used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied,
where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity.
Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is
necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by
implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456,
143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a
public policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in
the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction
which would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs.
Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
G.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch XV, and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
respondent-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:p
This case involves the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the
Constitution that "no private coporation or associaiton may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed on
ethousand hectares in area". * That prohibition is not found in the 1935
Constitution.
The Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation organized under
Philippine laws, more than sixty percent of whose capital stock is
owned by Filipino citizens, in its application filed on December 1, 1976
in the Makati branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, prayed for
the confirmation of its title to two lots with a total area of one hundred
sixty-five square meters, located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value
of P3,270 (LRC Case No. N-9485, LRC No. N-50801).
The Republic of the Philippines opposed theh application on the
grounds that the applicant, as a private corporation,is disqualified to
hold alienable public lands and that the applicant and its prredecessorsin-interest have not been in the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application (pp. 65-66, Rollo).
After the trial had commenced, the Province of rizal and the
Municipality of Tanay filed a joint opposition to the application on the
ground that one of the lots, Lot No. 1165 of the Tanay cadastre, would
be needed for the widening and improvement of Jose Abad Santos and
E.Quirino Streetsin the town of Tanay.
The land was possessed by Olimpia ramos before the Pacific war which
broke out in 1941. On July 3, 1947, Ramos sold the land to the spouses
Rafael Piguing and MInerva Inocencio (Exh. K). The Piguing sapouses
constructed a house therereon. Because the Meralco had installed the
"anchor guy" of its steel post on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the
lot to the Meralco on August 13, 1976.
The said land was included in the1968 cadastral survey made in Tanacy
by the Bureau of Lands, Plan AP-04-000902 (Exh. F and H) and was
divided into two lots, Lots Nos. 1164 and 1165, so as to segregate Lot
No. 1165 which would be used to widen the two street serving as the
land's eastern and southern boundaries.
The land was declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and taxes had
been paid thereon up to 1977. It is residential in character as
distinguished from a strictly agricultural land. It is not included in any
military reservation. Since 1927, it has formed part of the alienable
portion of the public domain.
After trial, the lowre court rendered a decision dismissing the
application because in its opinion the Meralco is not qualified to apply
for the registration of the said land since under section 48(b) of the
Public Land Law only Filipino citizens or natural persons can apply for
judicial confirmationof their imperfect titles to public land. The Meralco
is a juridical person. The trial court assumed that the land which it seeks
to register is public land.
From that decision, the Meralco appealed to this Court under Republic
Act No. 5440.
In contends that the said land, after having been possessed in the
concept of owner by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more
than thirty years, had become private land in the hands of the latter,
and, therefore, the constitutional prohibition, banning a private
corporation from acquiring alienable public land, is not applicable to
the said land.
The Meralco further contends that it has invoke section 48(b) of the
Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the Piguing spouses who, as
Filipino citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of their imperfect
title to the land.
In reply to these contentions, the Solicitor General counters that the
said land is not private land because the Meralco and its predecessorsin-interest have no composition title from the Spanish government nor
possessory information title or any other means for the acquisition of
public lands such as grants or patents (Republic vs. Court of Appeals
and De Jesus, L-40912, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 146, 157; Director
of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594, November 28, 1975, and Alinsunurin vs.
Director of Lands, L-28144, November 28, 1975; 68 SCRA 177; 195; Lee
Hong Hok vs. David, L-30389, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 372, 378-9;
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals and Raymundo, L-29575, April
30, 1971, 38 SCRA 634, 639; Padilla vs. Reyes and Director of Lands, 60
Phil. 967, 969; Heirs of Datu Pendatun vs. Director of Lands, 59 Phil.
600, 603).
The Public Land Law provides:
CHAPTER VIII. Judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles.
xxx xxx xxx

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As
amended by Republic Act No. 1942, approved on June 22,
1957.)
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 49. No person claiming title to lands of the public
domain not in possession of the qualifications specified in
the last preceding section may apply for the benefits of this
chapter.
We hold that, as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is
still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance
of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section
48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical
person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b),

Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be
dismissed.
This conclusion is supported by the rule announced in Oh Cho vs.
Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, 892, which rule is a compendious or
quintessential precis of a pervasive principle of public land law and land
registration law, that"all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-ininterest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or
that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest."
(Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U. S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil.
935 and 7 Phil. 132).
The Meralco relies on the ruling in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands,
48 Phil. 424, that "an open, continuous, adverse and public possession
of a land of the public domain from time immemorial by a private
individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective
title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be public" and
becomes private property.
That ruling is based on the Cario case which is about the possession of
land by an Igorot and his ancestors since time immemorial or even
before the Spanish conquest. The land involved in the Susi case was
possessed before 1880 or since a period of time "beyond the reach of
memory". That is not the situation in this case. The Meralco does not
pretend that the Piguing spouses and their predecessor had been in
possession of the land since time immemorial.
In the Susi case, this Court applied section 45(b) of Act No. 2874 which
corresponds to what is now section 48(b). It was held that the long
possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since July
26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had
complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
was thus entitled to a certificate of title.
On the other hand, in Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, 510-11, it was held
that while occupants of public land, who have applied for the
confirmation of their title, "teian asimismo a su favor la presuncion juris
et de jure de que habian cumplido con todas las condiciones necesarias
para la concesion del titulo; pero hasta que el titulo se expida no tenian
el concepto juridico de ser los verdaderos dueos del terreno in este
dejo de pertenecer a los terrenos publico del Estado susceptibles de
enajenacion."
That means that until the certificate of title is issued, a pice of land,
over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed, remains public
land. For that reason in the Uy Un case, it was held that if that land was
attached by a judgment creditor of the applicant, while his application
for confirmation of his imperfect title was pending in the Bureau of
Lands, the levy and execution sald of the land were void.
For that same reason, lands over which an imperfect title is sought to
be confirmed are governed by the Public Land Law. Such lands would
not be covered by the Public Land Law if they were already private
lands. The occupants' right to the said lands is characterized in the Uy
Un case, not as ownership in fee simple, but asderecho dominical
incoativo.
The Meralco in its concluding argument contends that if the Piguing
spouses could ask for the confirmation of their imperfect title to the
said lands, then why should the Meralco, as their transferee, be denied
the same right to register the said land in its name, there being no legal
prohibition for the Piguing spouses from selling the land to the
Meralco? This Court is disposing of that same contention in the Oh Cho

case said:
The benefits provided in the Public Land Act (meaning the
confirmation of an imperfect title under section 48[b]) for
applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest are or
constitute a grant or concession by the State; and before
they could acquire any right under such benefits, the
applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest should
comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such
benefits.
The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of
the land of which they had been in possession at least since
July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessorsin-interest (meaning the Piguing spouses in the instant case)
failed to do.
They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to
title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right,
if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which,
tacked to that of their predecessors-in-interest, may be
availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration
but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified. (75
Phil. 890, 893.)
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no
distinction between (on one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as
to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand)
alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has an
imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make
any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable
public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section

48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is
public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20
SCRA 641, 644).
The lower court;s judgment dismissing Meralco's application is
affirmed. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J.: concurring:
I concur in the result. I am of the opinion that the lots which are sought
to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the
time they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are
already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation
of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain is inapplicable. However, the petitioner is relying on Sec. 48 of
the Public Land Act for the confirmation of its title and Mr. Justice
Aquino is correct in holding that said provision cannot be availed by
juridical entities.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the ruling of the Court that Meralco "as a juridical person" is
disqualified to apply for its registration under Section 48(b).. 1 I dissent
insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such

jurisdictional defect, under the particular circumstances of this case, as
an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by
analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach
followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, 2where the legal question
raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case,
was resolved. By legal fiction 3 and in the exercise of our equitable
jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solutionwould be to decide the
matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the
Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability.
DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:
Justice Teehankee cites in his dissenting opinion the case of herico vs.
Dar, 1 the decision in which I am the ponente, as reiterating a
supposedly well-established doctrine that lands of the public domain
which, by reason of possession and cultivation for such a length of time,
a grant by the State to the occupant is presumed, and the land thereby
ceases to form part of the public domain, but is segregated therefrom
as to be no longer subject to the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose under the public lands laws or statutes. He would thus consider
said land as no longer public land but "private" lands and therefore, not
within the prohibition of the New Constitution against corporations
from acquiring public lands which provides that "no private corporation
or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease not to exceed one thousand hectares."2
I cannot subscribe to the view that the land as above described has
become private land, even before title thereto, which is, as of this
stage, said to be still "an incomplete or imperfect title," has been fully
vested on the occupant, through the prescribed procedure known as
judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title. 3 This is the only
legal method by which full and absolute title to the land may be
granted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure such
judicial title, only the courts can be resorted to. The Director of Lands
has lost authority over the land, insofar as its disposition is concerned.
His authority is limited to another form of disposition of public land,
referred to as administrative legalization, resulting in the issuance of
free patents, also based on possession, in which case, as in the issuance
of homestead and sales patents, the land involved is undoubtedly
public land. The possessor of a piece of public land would have the
option to acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation or
administrative legalization. The difference is that in the latter case, the
area disposable to a citizen-applicant by the Director of Lands is limited
to 24 hectares. There is no limit to the area subject to judicial
confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title, except possibly the limit
fixed for a State grant under old Spanish laws and decrees, which
certainly is much larger than that set for free patents.
It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of the land subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete and
imperfect title that some statements are found in many cases, such as
those cited by Justice Teehankee, to the effect that such land has
ceased to be a public land. What these statements, however, really
mean is that the land referred to no longer forms part of the mass of
public domain still disposable by the Director of Lands, under the
authority granted him by the public land statutes. It, however, would
not follow that the land covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act
has itself become private land. The fact that its disposition is provided
for in the aforecited Act which deals with "public land" gives rise to the
very strong implication, if not a positive conclusion, that the land
referred to is still public land. Only when the court adjudicates the land
to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become
privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may
declare it public land, depending on the evidence.
The discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still

public or already private land is, however, entirely pointless, or an idle
exercise, if We consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the
Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides
that 'save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." As
previously stated, by express provisions of the Constitution, no
domain except by lease, not to exceed, 1,000 hectares in area.4 Hence,
even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land,
the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia
which admittedly are "corporations or association" within the meaning
of the aforecited provision of the New Constitution. This observation
should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in question
is public or private land. Although it may further be observed that
supposing a corporation has been in possession of a piece of public land
from the very beginning, may it apply for judicial confirmation of the
land in question to acquire title to its owner after possessing the land
for the requisite length of time? The answer is believed obvious it
may not. If its possession is not from the beginning but has commenced
only upon the transfer to it by the prior possessor, may the corporation
apply? The answer is just as obvious with more reason, it may not.
This separate opinion should have had no need to be written because
the majority opinion written by Justice Aquino is already well-reasoned
out and supported by applicable authorities. I was impelled to write it
only because in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee, the case
of Herico vs. Dar (supra) which is my ponenciawas cited in support of
his position. This separate opinion then is more to show and explain
that whatever has been stated by me in the Dar case should be
interpreted in the light of what I have said in this separate opinion,
which I believe, does not strengthen Justice Teehankee's position a bit.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

Involved in these two cases are the applications of petitioner Meralco,
a nationalized domestic corporation, in the first case and respondent
Iglesia in Cristo, a religious corporation sole, in the second case (both
admittedly Filipino corporations qualified to hold and
own private lands), for judicial confirmation of their titles to small
parcels of land, residential in character as distinguished from strictly
agricultural land, acquired by them by purchase or exchange from
private persons publicly recognized as the private owners (who have
been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the lands under a bona fide claim of ownership for at
least thirty [30] years immediately preceding the filing of the
applications).
This dissent is based on the failure of the majority to adhere to
established doctrine since the 1909 case of Carioand the 1925 case
of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico, infra, pursuant to the Public
Land Act, as amended, that where a possessor has held the open,
exclusive and unchallenged possession of alienable public land for the
statutory period provided by law (30 years now under amendatory Rep.
Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957), the law itself mandates that
the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title" and "by legal fiction [the land] has already ceased to
be of the public domain and has become private property." Accordingly,
the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution and of the Public Land Act
against private corporation holding lands of the public domain has no
applicability in the present cases. What Meralco and Iglesia have
acquired from their predecessors-in-interest had already ceased to be
of the public domain and had become private property at the time of
the sale to them and therefore their applicatins for confirmation of title
by virtue of their predecessors-in-interest' vested right and title may be

duly granted.
The land covered by the Meralco application of November 26, 1976
consists of two (1) small lots with a total area of 165 square meters
located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270.00. This land
was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before World Warr II which broke out
in the Pacific in 1941. Olimpia Ramos sold the land on July 3, 1947 to
the spouses Rafael Piguing and Minerva Inocencio who constructed a
house thereon. But because the Meralco had instealled the "anchor
guy" of its stell posts on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the land to
the Meralco on August 13, 1976. The land had been declared for realty
tax purposes since 1945 and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. It
is residential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land.
It is likewise established that it is not included in any military
reservation and that since 1927 it had been certified as part of the
alienable or disposable portion of the public domain.
The land covered by the Iglesia application of September 3, 1977
likewise consists of two (2) small lots located in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel,
Bulacan with a total area of 313 square meters and with an assessed
value of P1,350.00. The land was acquired by the Iglesia on January 9,
1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot owned by the Iglesia with
an area of 247 square meters. The land was already possessed by Perez
in 1933. Admittedly also it is not included in any military reservation
and is inside an area which was certified since 1927 as part of the
alienable or disposable portion of the public domain. A chapel of the
Iglesia stands on the said land. It had beenduly declared for realty tax
purposes in the name of the Iglesia and realty taxes were regularly
paid thereon.
Respondent judge in the Meralco case sustained the Republic's
opposition and dismissed the application, holding that under both the
provisions of the new Constitution and the Public Land Act, Meralco,
being a corporation and not a natural person, is not qualified to apply

for the registration of title over the public land.
On the other hand, in the Iglesia case, the Republic presented no
evidence in support of its opposition but expressly "submitted the case
for decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant."
Respondent judge in the case accordingly granted the application for
registration of the land in the name of the Iglesia, holding that it had
been "satisfactorily established that applicant ]Iglesia] and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, public and
adverse possession of the land . . . under a bona fide claim of
ownership for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the
application" and is therefore entitled to the registration applied for
under the Public Land Act, as amended.
Both decisions are now with the Court for review. I hold that both
applications for registration should be granted by virtue of the
prevailing principle as enunciated since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon
and Director of Lands 1 and reaffirmed in a long line of cases down to
the 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar 2 that the lands in question ceased, ipso
jure, or by operation of law, to be lands of the public domain upon
completion of the statutory period of open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious and unchallenged possession thereof by the applicants'
predecessors-in-interest who were qualified natural persons and
entitled to registration by right of acquisitive prescription under the
provisions of the Public Land Act, and that accordingly the judgment in
the Meralco case should be reversed and a new judgment entered
granting Meralco's application, while the judgment in the Iglesia case
should stand affirmed.
The principal issue at bar may thus be stated:
It is expressly provided in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942,
approved on June 22, 1957) that citizens of the Philippines who are
natural persons who have occupied lands of the public domain but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed may apply to the
corresponding court of first instance for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of the certificate of title therefor under the Land
Registration Act in cases where they "by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter." 3 In such cases, is the land ipso jure or by operation of law
converted into private land upon completion of the 30th year of
continuous and unchallenged occupation of the land such that
thereafter as such private land, it may be duly transferred to and
owned by private corporations or does such land, as held by
respondent judge in the Meralco case, remain part of the public
domain and does not become private land until after actual judicial
confirmation proceedings and the formal court order for the issuance
of the certificate of title?
1. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court since the 1925
case of Susi vs. Razon (and a long line of cases, infra). It is established
doctrine as first held therein that an open, continuous, adverse and
public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided
in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894
in Susi under the old law) by a private individual personally and through
his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby
the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private
property.
(At that time in 1925 in the Susi case, such possession was
required "from July 26, 1894" as then provided for in section 45(b) of
the old Public Land Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926; whereas at
present, as provided for in the corresponding section 48, par.(b) of the
later and subsisting Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957, in force
since 1957, the period of open and unchallenged possession was
reduced to "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, equivalent to the period of
acquisitive prescription. This is admitted in the main opinion of Mr.
Justice Aquino, wherein it is stated that "(I)n the Susi case, this Court
applied section 45 (b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what
is now section 48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 gave rise to
the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a
certificate of title." 4 The text of the corresponding section 48(b), as
amended by Rep. Act 1942 referred to is reproduced verbatim in Mr.
Justice Aquino's opinion 5 and quotes the reduced statutory period of
open and unchallenged possession of "at leastthirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application.")
Accordingly, the Court held that Susi, as the rightful possessor of the
public land for the statutory period, acquired the same by operation of
law as a grant from the Government, "not only a right to a grant," and
the land thereby "already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property at least by presumption" as expressly
provided in the Act. Therefore, any supposed sale by the Director of
Lands of the same land to another person was void and of no effect
and Susi as the rightful possessor could recover the land as his private
propertyfrom the supposed vendee who did not acquire any right
thereto since it had ceased to be land of the public domain. The Court
thus specifically held therein, as applied to the specific facts of the case,
that:
. . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris
et de jure, established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant
by the Government were complied with for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an
agricultural land of the public domain, openly continuously, exclusively
and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to
said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi
had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant,
but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of
title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of
section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal function, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at
least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to
Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he
had no longer any title or control, and the sake thus made was void and
of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right." 6
2. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by
this Court in a long unbroken line of cases, as follows:
In Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 7 the Court held that "(I)n the case of Susi
vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424, it was observed that where all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied
with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and
publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926
(carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the

possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not
only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that said grant
may be sanctioned by the courts an application therefor being
sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874
(reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141)." and
"(C)onsidering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on
a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already
barred by the statute of limitations, which apparently is predicated on
the theory that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned on
the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the
decree, which theory does not apply here because the property
involved is allegedly private in natural and has ceased to be part of the
public domain, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in
dismissing the case outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove
his claim."
In Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 8 the Court stressed that by force of
possession, the land in question became private property on the
strength of the Susi doctrine.
In Manarpaac vs. Cabanatan, 9 the Court quoted with favor the text of
the above-quoted ruling of Susi, and itsratio decidendi thus:
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question
being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot
maintain an action to recover possession thereof.
If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in
dispute, had already become, operation of law, private
property, there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his
title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover
the possession thereof and hold it.
In Miguel vs. Court of Appeals, 10 the Court again held that where
possession has been continuous, uninterrupted, open, adverse and in
the concept of an owner, there is a presumption juris et de jure that all
necessary conditions for a grant by the State have been complied with
and he would have been by force of lawentitled to the registration of
his title to the land (citing Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil.
485 and Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424).
In the latest 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar, 11 the Court once more
reiterated the Susi doctrine that "(A)nother obvious error of the
respondent Court is in holding that after one year from the issuance of
the Torrens Title, the same can no longer be reopened to be declared
and void, and has become absolute and indefeasible. . . . Secondly,
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent
court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by
himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land
has vested on petitioner as to segregate the land from the mass of
public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land
Act as by free patent. This is as provided in Republic Act No. 1942,
which took effect on June 22, 1957, amending Section 48-b of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provides: . . . As interpreted in
several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing
provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired,
by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases
to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere
title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent."
3. In fine, since under the Court's settled doctrine, the acquisitive

prescription of alienable or disposable public lands provided for now in
section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act takes place by operation of
law and the public land is converted to and becomes private
property upon a showing of open and unchallenged possession
underbona fide claim of ownership by the applicants' predecessors-ininterest for the statutory period of thirty yearsimmediately preceding
the filing of the application and "it is not necessary that a certificate of
court" which right is expressly backed up by the conclusive
presumption or presumption juris et de jure of the statute that the
possessor has "performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant," the applicant Meralco cannot be said to be barred as a
corporation from filing the application for registration of the private
property duly acquired by it.
4. It should be noted that respondent judge's decision in the Meralco
case expressly finds as established facts that the Meralco's
predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied as owners the
land in question for at least over 35 years; Olimpia Ramos having
possessed the same since the last world war in 1941 and then having
sold the same on July 3, 1947 to the Piguing spouses who built a house
thereon and continuously possessed the same until they sold the same
in turn to the Meralco on August 13, 1976, 12 Meralco's predecessorsin-interest had therefore acquired by operation of the Public Land Act a
Government grant to the property, as well as acquired ownership
thereof by right of acquisitive prescription over the land which thereby
became private property. The very definition of prescription as a mode
of acquiring ownership as set forth in Art. 1106 of the Civil Code
provides that "By prescription one acquires ownership and other real
rights through lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions
laid down by law." The law does not provide that one acquires
ownership of a land by prescription only after his title thereto is
judicially confirmed. To this same effect is the ruling in Cario vs. Insular
Government13, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court speaking through
Justice Holmes held that
It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5 attributes title
to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time
and we do not overlook the argument that this means may
prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an application
under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not
calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the
notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he
had read every word of it. The words"may
prove" (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other
provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do
so in any litigation. There are indications that registration
was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The
effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title,
but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law.
To the same effect is the Court's ruling in Legarda and Prieto vs.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, that "an owner does not obtain title by virtue of
certificate but rather obtains his certificate by virtue of the fact that he
has a fee simple title."
5. Since the public land because private property upon completion of
the 30th year of continuous, exclusive, and unchallenged possession of
the applicant Meralco's predecessors-in-interest, particularly the
Piguing spouses who sold the private land to the Meralco, there is no
justification for denying the Meralco's application for registration of its
duly acquired title to the land. Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had
acquired ownership of the land by acquisitive prescription as provided
by the Public Land Act and by the Civil Code. The land became private
property and Meralco duly acquired it by right of purchase. To deny
Meralco's application to register the property because it is not a natural
person is unjustified because neither the new constitutional ban under
the 1973 Constitution against private corporations owning lands of the
public domain or the Public Land Act's limitation on the right of
application for confirmation of imperfect title to lands of the public
domain can be invoked any longer as the land had long ceased to be
public land but had become private property. Meralco's application in
effect seeks confirmation of the acquisition of ownership of the land
which had become private property of its predecessors-in-interest, the
Piguing spouses who thru their open and unchallenged possession of
the land for over thirty years acquired title thereto by acquisitive
prescription and by conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act
itself. There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle to such title being
transferred to the Meralco by right of purchase and traditio for it is
not claimed that there is any legal prohibition against the Piguing
spouses transferring the ownership of the land to others (whether
natural persons or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco, even
before the formal issuance of the certificate of title to them.
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their
title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of
court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having
filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses
as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no
prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and
neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled
with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors
(as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being
granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in

their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals as
the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and
adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all
these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of
Davao 14)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence,
i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons
are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they
had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public
Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both
admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private
lands) and granting the application for confirmation of title to the
private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
7. All that has been said here applies of course with equal force to the
Iglesia case, save that as already stated at the beginning hereof, the
Iglesia application was granted because the Republic presented no
evidence in support of its opposition and respondent judge held in
effect that the property had ceased to be land of the public domain and
had become private property, the title to which could be duly issued in
the name of the Iglesia as the transferee of its predecessors-in-interest.
8. It should bear emphasis that what are involved here are small parcels
of land, of 165 square meters in the Meralco case used for installation
of an "anchor guy" for its steel posts in connection with its tasks as a
nationalized domestic corporation to furnish electrical service to the
consumer public, and of 313 square meters in the Iglesia case used as
the site of its church built thereon to minister to the religious needs of
its members. In no way, may the letter, intent and spirit of the
prohibition of the 1973 Constitution against corporations "holding
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area" (which is beamed against the undue control

and exploitation of our public lands and natural resources by
corporations, Filipino and foreign-controlled) be deemed violated or
disregarded by the granting of the applications at bar. The two
corporations in truth and in fact do not hold the small parcels of land at
bar for their own use or benefit but for the sole use and benefit of the
public.
9. With reference to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice De
Castro wherein he would blunt the "supposedly (sic) well-established
doctrine" (at page 1) from the 1909 case of Cario and the 1925 case
of Susidown to the 1980 case of Herico (supra, at pages 5 to 11) and
support the contrary pronouncement in Mr. Justice Aquino's main
opinion that "as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is
48(b) [of the Public Land Act]" (at page 5), suffice it to cite his own
pronouncement in Herico (reiterating the well-established and
prevailing doctrine which this Court has not overturned, as it cannot
overturn the mandate of the statute that the unchallenged possessor
for at least 30 years is "conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant") wherein Mr. Justice De
Castro categorically reiterated for the Court that "As interpretated in
several cases . . . the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The and, therefore, ceases
In only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or

confusion, that Mr. Justice De Castro's seemingly querulous statement
that "the discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still
public oralready private land, is, however, entirely pointless or an idle
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain'" (at
page 2) that "hence, even if the land involved in the present case is
considered private land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by
the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are 'corporations or
associations' within the meaning of the aforecited provisions of the
New Constitution. This observation should end all arguments of the
issue of whether the land in question is public or private land" (idem)
might mislead one to the wrong conclusion that corporations with 60%
Filipino ownership may not own private lands when the express
provisions of Art. XIV, section 9 15 and section 14 as quoted by himself
as well as the counterpart provisions of the 1935 Constitution have
always expressly permitted Filipino-owned corporations to own private
lands, and the only change effected in the 1973 Constitution is section
11 which now prohibits even such Filipino corporations to own or hold
lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares
in area.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote for reversal of respondent court's judgment in the
Meralco case and for the entry of a new judgment granting Meralco's
application and for affirmance of judgment in the second case granting
the Iglesia application.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J.: concurring:
I concur in the result. I am of the opinion that the lots which are sought
to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the
time they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are
already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation
of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private
domain is inapplicable. However, the petitioner is relying on Sec. 48 of
the Public Land Act for the confirmation of its title and Mr. Justice
Aquino is correct in holding that said provision cannot be availed by
juridical entities.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the ruling of the Court that Meralco "as a juridical person" is
disqualified to apply for its registration under Section 48(b).. 1 I dissent
insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such
jurisdictional defect, under the particular circumstances of this case, as
an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by
analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach
followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, 2where the legal question
raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case,
was resolved. By legal fiction 3 and in the exercise of our equitable
jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solutionwould be to decide the
matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the
Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability.
DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:
Justice Teehankee cites in his dissenting opinion the case of herico vs.
Dar, 1 the decision in which I am the ponente, as reiterating a
supposedly well-established doctrine that lands of the public domain
which, by reason of possession and cultivation for such a length of time,
a grant by the State to the occupant is presumed, and the land thereby
ceases to form part of the public domain, but is segregated therefrom
as to be no longer subject to the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose under the public lands laws or statutes. He would thus consider
said land as no longer public land but "private" lands and therefore, not
within the prohibition of the New Constitution against corporations
from acquiring public lands which provides that "no private corporation
or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease not to exceed one thousand hectares."2
I cannot subscribe to the view that the land as above described has
become private land, even before title thereto, which is, as of this
stage, said to be still "an incomplete or imperfect title," has been fully
vested on the occupant, through the prescribed procedure known as
judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title. 3 This is the only
legal method by which full and absolute title to the land may be
granted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure such
judicial title, only the courts can be resorted to. The Director of Lands
has lost authority over the land, insofar as its disposition is concerned.
His authority is limited to another form of disposition of public land,
referred to as administrative legalization, resulting in the issuance of
free patents, also based on possession, in which case, as in the issuance
of homestead and sales patents, the land involved is undoubtedly
public land. The possessor of a piece of public land would have the
option to acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation or
administrative legalization. The difference is that in the latter case, the
area disposable to a citizen-applicant by the Director of Lands is limited
to 24 hectares. There is no limit to the area subject to judicial
confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title, except possibly the limit
fixed for a State grant under old Spanish laws and decrees, which
certainly is much larger than that set for free patents.
It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of the land subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete and
imperfect title that some statements are found in many cases, such as
those cited by Justice Teehankee, to the effect that such land has
ceased to be a public land. What these statements, however, really
mean is that the land referred to no longer forms part of the mass of
public domain still disposable by the Director of Lands, under the
authority granted him by the public land statutes. It, however, would
not follow that the land covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act
has itself become private land. The fact that its disposition is provided
for in the aforecited Act which deals with "public land" gives rise to the
very strong implication, if not a positive conclusion, that the land
referred to is still public land. Only when the court adjudicates the land
to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become
privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may
declare it public land, depending on the evidence.
The discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still
public or already private land is, however, entirely pointless, or an idle
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." As
previously stated, by express provisions of the Constitution, no
domain except by lease, not to exceed, 1,000 hectares in area.4 Hence,
even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land,
the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia
which admittedly are "corporations or association" within the meaning
of the aforecited provision of the New Constitution. This observation

should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in question
is public or private land. Although it may further be observed that
supposing a corporation has been in possession of a piece of public land
from the very beginning, may it apply for judicial confirmation of the
land in question to acquire title to its owner after possessing the land
for the requisite length of time? The answer is believed obvious it
may not. If its possession is not from the beginning but has commenced
only upon the transfer to it by the prior possessor, may the corporation
apply? The answer is just as obvious with more reason, it may not.
This separate opinion should have had no need to be written because
the majority opinion written by Justice Aquino is already well-reasoned
out and supported by applicable authorities. I was impelled to write it
only because in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee, the case
of Herico vs. Dar (supra) which is my ponenciawas cited in support of
his position. This separate opinion then is more to show and explain
that whatever has been stated by me in the Dar case should be
interpreted in the light of what I have said in this separate opinion,
which I believe, does not strengthen Justice Teehankee's position a bit.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
Involved in these two cases are the applications of petitioner Meralco,
a nationalized domestic corporation, in the first case and respondent
Iglesia in Cristo, a religious corporation sole, in the second case (both
admittedly Filipino corporations qualified to hold and
own private lands), for judicial confirmation of their titles to small
parcels of land, residential in character as distinguished from strictly
agricultural land, acquired by them by purchase or exchange from
private persons publicly recognized as the private owners (who have
been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the lands under a bona fide claim of ownership for at
least thirty [30] years immediately preceding the filing of the

applications).
This dissent is based on the failure of the majority to adhere to
established doctrine since the 1909 case of Carioand the 1925 case
of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico, infra, pursuant to the Public
Land Act, as amended, that where a possessor has held the open,
exclusive and unchallenged possession of alienable public land for the
statutory period provided by law (30 years now under amendatory Rep.
Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957), the law itself mandates that
the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title" and "by legal fiction [the land] has already ceased to
be of the public domain and has become private property." Accordingly,
the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution and of the Public Land Act
against private corporation holding lands of the public domain has no
applicability in the present cases. What Meralco and Iglesia have
acquired from their predecessors-in-interest had already ceased to be
of the public domain and had become private property at the time of
the sale to them and therefore their applicatins for confirmation of title
by virtue of their predecessors-in-interest' vested right and title may be
duly granted.
The land covered by the Meralco application of November 26, 1976
consists of two (1) small lots with a total area of 165 square meters
located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270.00. This land
was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before World Warr II which broke out
in the Pacific in 1941. Olimpia Ramos sold the land on July 3, 1947 to
the spouses Rafael Piguing and Minerva Inocencio who constructed a
house thereon. But because the Meralco had instealled the "anchor
guy" of its stell posts on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the land to
the Meralco on August 13, 1976. The land had been declared for realty
tax purposes since 1945 and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. It
is residential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land.

It is likewise established that it is not included in any military
reservation and that since 1927 it had been certified as part of the
alienable or disposable portion of the public domain.
The land covered by the Iglesia application of September 3, 1977
likewise consists of two (2) small lots located in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel,
Bulacan with a total area of 313 square meters and with an assessed
value of P1,350.00. The land was acquired by the Iglesia on January 9,
1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot owned by the Iglesia with
an area of 247 square meters. The land was already possessed by Perez
in 1933. Admittedly also it is not included in any military reservation
and is inside an area which was certified since 1927 as part of the
alienable or disposable portion of the public domain. A chapel of the
Iglesia stands on the said land. It had beenduly declared for realty tax
purposes in the name of the Iglesia and realty taxes were regularly
paid thereon.
Respondent judge in the Meralco case sustained the Republic's
opposition and dismissed the application, holding that under both the
provisions of the new Constitution and the Public Land Act, Meralco,
being a corporation and not a natural person, is not qualified to apply
for the registration of title over the public land.
On the other hand, in the Iglesia case, the Republic presented no
evidence in support of its opposition but expressly "submitted the case
for decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant."
Respondent judge in the case accordingly granted the application for
registration of the land in the name of the Iglesia, holding that it had
been "satisfactorily established that applicant ]Iglesia] and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, public and
adverse possession of the land . . . under a bona fide claim of
ownership for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the
application" and is therefore entitled to the registration applied for

under the Public Land Act, as amended.
Both decisions are now with the Court for review. I hold that both
applications for registration should be granted by virtue of the
prevailing principle as enunciated since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon
and Director of Lands 1 and reaffirmed in a long line of cases down to
the 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar 2 that the lands in question ceased, ipso
jure, or by operation of law, to be lands of the public domain upon
completion of the statutory period of open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious and unchallenged possession thereof by the applicants'
predecessors-in-interest who were qualified natural persons and
entitled to registration by right of acquisitive prescription under the
provisions of the Public Land Act, and that accordingly the judgment in
the Meralco case should be reversed and a new judgment entered
granting Meralco's application, while the judgment in the Iglesia case
should stand affirmed.
The principal issue at bar may thus be stated:
It is expressly provided in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942,
approved on June 22, 1957) that citizens of the Philippines who are
natural persons who have occupied lands of the public domain but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed may apply to the
corresponding court of first instance for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of the certificate of title therefor under the Land
Registration Act in cases where they "by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall

be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter." 3 In such cases, is the land ipso jure or by operation of law
converted into private land upon completion of the 30th year of
continuous and unchallenged occupation of the land such that
thereafter as such private land, it may be duly transferred to and
owned by private corporations or does such land, as held by
respondent judge in the Meralco case, remain part of the public
domain and does not become private land until after actual judicial
confirmation proceedings and the formal court order for the issuance
of the certificate of title?
1. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court since the 1925
case of Susi vs. Razon (and a long line of cases, infra). It is established
doctrine as first held therein that an open, continuous, adverse and
public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided
in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894
in Susi under the old law) by a private individual personally and through
his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby
the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private
property.
(At that time in 1925 in the Susi case, such possession was
required "from July 26, 1894" as then provided for in section 45(b) of
the old Public Land Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926; whereas at
present, as provided for in the corresponding section 48, par.(b) of the
later and subsisting Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957, in force
since 1957, the period of open and unchallenged possession was
reduced to "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, equivalent to the period of
acquisitive prescription. This is admitted in the main opinion of Mr.
Justice Aquino, wherein it is stated that "(I)n the Susi case, this Court
applied section 45 (b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what

is now section 48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 gave rise to
the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a
certificate of title." 4 The text of the corresponding section 48(b), as
amended by Rep. Act 1942 referred to is reproduced verbatim in Mr.
Justice Aquino's opinion 5 and quotes the reduced statutory period of
open and unchallenged possession of "at leastthirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application.")
Accordingly, the Court held that Susi, as the rightful possessor of the
public land for the statutory period, acquired the same by operation of
law as a grant from the Government, "not only a right to a grant," and
the land thereby "already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property at least by presumption" as expressly
provided in the Act. Therefore, any supposed sale by the Director of
Lands of the same land to another person was void and of no effect
and Susi as the rightful possessor could recover the land as his private
propertyfrom the supposed vendee who did not acquire any right
thereto since it had ceased to be land of the public domain. The Court
thus specifically held therein, as applied to the specific facts of the case,
that:
. . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris
et de jure, established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
by the Government were complied with for he has been in actual and
agricultural land of the public domain, openly continuously, exclusively
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi
had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant,

but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of
courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of
section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal function, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at
least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to
Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he
had no longer any title or control, and the sake thus made was void and
of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right." 6
2. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by
this Court in a long unbroken line of cases, as follows:
In Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 7 the Court held that "(I)n the case of Susi
vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424, it was observed that where all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied
with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and
publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926
(carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the
possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not
only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that said grant
may be sanctioned by the courts an application therefor being
sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874
(reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141)." and
"(C)onsidering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on
a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already
barred by the statute of limitations, which apparently is predicated on
the theory that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned on
the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the
decree, which theory does not apply here because the property
involved is allegedly private in natural and has ceased to be part of the
public domain, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in
dismissing the case outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove
his claim."
In Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 8 the Court stressed that by force of
possession, the land in question became private property on the
strength of the Susi doctrine.
In Manarpaac vs. Cabanatan, 9 the Court quoted with favor the text of
the above-quoted ruling of Susi, and itsratio decidendi thus:
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question
being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot
maintain an action to recover possession thereof.
If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in
dispute, had already become, operation of law, private
property, there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his
title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover
the possession thereof and hold it.
In Miguel vs. Court of Appeals, 10 the Court again held that where
possession has been continuous, uninterrupted, open, adverse and in
the concept of an owner, there is a presumption juris et de jure that all
necessary conditions for a grant by the State have been complied with
and he would have been by force of lawentitled to the registration of
his title to the land (citing Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil.
485 and Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424).
In the latest 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar, 11 the Court once more
reiterated the Susi doctrine that "(A)nother obvious error of the
respondent Court is in holding that after one year from the issuance of
the Torrens Title, the same can no longer be reopened to be declared
and void, and has become absolute and indefeasible. . . . Secondly,
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent
court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by
himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land
has vested on petitioner as to segregate the land from the mass of
public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land
Act as by free patent. This is as provided in Republic Act No. 1942,
which took effect on June 22, 1957, amending Section 48-b of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provides: . . . As interpreted in
several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing
provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired,
by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases
3. In fine, since under the Court's settled doctrine, the acquisitive
prescription of alienable or disposable public lands provided for now in
section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act takes place by operation of
law and the public land is converted to and becomes private
property upon a showing of open and unchallenged possession
underbona fide claim of ownership by the applicants' predecessors-ininterest for the statutory period of thirty yearsimmediately preceding
the filing of the application and "it is not necessary that a certificate of
court" which right is expressly backed up by the conclusive
presumption or presumption juris et de jure of the statute that the
possessor has "performed all the conditions essential to a Government

grant," the applicant Meralco cannot be said to be barred as a
corporation from filing the application for registration of the private
property duly acquired by it.
4. It should be noted that respondent judge's decision in the Meralco
case expressly finds as established facts that the Meralco's
predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied as owners the
land in question for at least over 35 years; Olimpia Ramos having
possessed the same since the last world war in 1941 and then having
sold the same on July 3, 1947 to the Piguing spouses who built a house
thereon and continuously possessed the same until they sold the same
in turn to the Meralco on August 13, 1976, 12 Meralco's predecessorsin-interest had therefore acquired by operation of the Public Land Act a
Government grant to the property, as well as acquired ownership
thereof by right of acquisitive prescription over the land which thereby
became private property. The very definition of prescription as a mode
of acquiring ownership as set forth in Art. 1106 of the Civil Code
provides that "By prescription one acquires ownership and other real
rights through lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions
laid down by law." The law does not provide that one acquires
ownership of a land by prescription only after his title thereto is
judicially confirmed. To this same effect is the ruling in Cario vs. Insular
Government13, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court speaking through
Justice Holmes held that
It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5 attributes title
to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time
and we do not overlook the argument that this means may
prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an application
under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not
calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the
notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he

had read every word of it. The words"may
prove" (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other
provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do
so in any litigation. There are indications that registration
was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The
effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title,
but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law.
To the same effect is the Court's ruling in Legarda and Prieto vs.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, that "an owner does not obtain title by virtue of
certificate but rather obtains his certificate by virtue of the fact that he
has a fee simple title."
5. Since the public land because private property upon completion of
the 30th year of continuous, exclusive, and unchallenged possession of
the applicant Meralco's predecessors-in-interest, particularly the
Piguing spouses who sold the private land to the Meralco, there is no
justification for denying the Meralco's application for registration of its
duly acquired title to the land. Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had
acquired ownership of the land by acquisitive prescription as provided
by the Public Land Act and by the Civil Code. The land became private
property and Meralco duly acquired it by right of purchase. To deny
Meralco's application to register the property because it is not a natural
person is unjustified because neither the new constitutional ban under
the 1973 Constitution against private corporations owning lands of the
public domain or the Public Land Act's limitation on the right of
application for confirmation of imperfect title to lands of the public
domain can be invoked any longer as the land had long ceased to be
public land but had become private property. Meralco's application in
effect seeks confirmation of the acquisition of ownership of the land
which had become private property of its predecessors-in-interest, the

Piguing spouses who thru their open and unchallenged possession of
the land for over thirty years acquired title thereto by acquisitive
prescription and by conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act
itself. There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle to such title being
transferred to the Meralco by right of purchase and traditio for it is
not claimed that there is any legal prohibition against the Piguing
spouses transferring the ownership of the land to others (whether
natural persons or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco, even
before the formal issuance of the certificate of title to them.
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their
title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of
court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having
filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses
as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no
prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and
neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled
with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors
(as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being
granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in
their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals as
the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and
adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all
these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of
Davao 14)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence,
i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons
are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they
had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public
Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both
admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private
lands) and granting the application for confirmation of title to the
private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
7. All that has been said here applies of course with equal force to the
Iglesia case, save that as already stated at the beginning hereof, the
Iglesia application was granted because the Republic presented no
evidence in support of its opposition and respondent judge held in
effect that the property had ceased to be land of the public domain and
had become private property, the title to which could be duly issued in
the name of the Iglesia as the transferee of its predecessors-in-interest.
8. It should bear emphasis that what are involved here are small parcels
of land, of 165 square meters in the Meralco case used for installation
of an "anchor guy" for its steel posts in connection with its tasks as a
nationalized domestic corporation to furnish electrical service to the
consumer public, and of 313 square meters in the Iglesia case used as
the site of its church built thereon to minister to the religious needs of
its members. In no way, may the letter, intent and spirit of the
prohibition of the 1973 Constitution against corporations "holding
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area" (which is beamed against the undue control
and exploitation of our public lands and natural resources by
corporations, Filipino and foreign-controlled) be deemed violated or
disregarded by the granting of the applications at bar. The two
corporations in truth and in fact do not hold the small parcels of land at
bar for their own use or benefit but for the sole use and benefit of the
public.
9. With reference to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice De
Castro wherein he would blunt the "supposedly (sic) well-established
doctrine" (at page 1) from the 1909 case of Cario and the 1925 case
of Susidown to the 1980 case of Herico (supra, at pages 5 to 11) and
support the contrary pronouncement in Mr. Justice Aquino's main
opinion that "as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is
48(b) [of the Public Land Act]" (at page 5), suffice it to cite his own
pronouncement in Herico (reiterating the well-established and
prevailing doctrine which this Court has not overturned, as it cannot
overturn the mandate of the statute that the unchallenged possessor
for at least 30 years is "conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant") wherein Mr. Justice De
Castro categorically reiterated for the Court that "As interpretated in
several cases . . . the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The and, therefore, ceases
In only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or
confusion, that Mr. Justice De Castro's seemingly querulous statement
that "the discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still
public oralready private land, is, however, entirely pointless or an idle
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain'" (at
page 2) that "hence, even if the land involved in the present case is
considered private land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by
the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are 'corporations or

associations' within the meaning of the aforecited provisions of the
New Constitution. This observation should end all arguments of the
issue of whether the land in question is public or private land" (idem)
might mislead one to the wrong conclusion that corporations with 60%
Filipino ownership may not own private lands when the express
provisions of Art. XIV, section 9 15 and section 14 as quoted by himself
as well as the counterpart provisions of the 1935 Constitution have
always expressly permitted Filipino-owned corporations to own private
lands, and the only change effected in the 1973 Constitution is section
11 which now prohibits even such Filipino corporations to own or hold
lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares
in area.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote for reversal of respondent court's judgment in the
Meralco case and for the entry of a new judgment granting Meralco's
application and for affirmance of judgment in the second case granting
the Iglesia application.
G.R. No. L-24066
December 9, 1925
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.
Monico R. Mercado for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the
Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole
and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the second
paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director
of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a
private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title
issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay
plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and
every allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that
the land in question was a property of the Government of the United
States under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands
before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with
law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff
entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the
Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs
against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took
this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The
holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the
plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question
is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to
recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the sale
made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that
the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the Province of
Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and (3)
the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.
F
A
C
T
S
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold
the land in question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio
Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the
same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession thereof for about
eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia
and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for
the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before
the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its
price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the
firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he
had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of
the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and
then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public,
without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance,
except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an
action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the
possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the
evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor
of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint
(Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land
in question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of
Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having
learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto

on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for twentyfive years (Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative
investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin
Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the
register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper
certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said document, Angela
Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he
refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer
in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real
property (Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions
raised by the appellant in his assignments of error.lawphi1.net
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in
possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and
publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880,
that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry
case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to
Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession
thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the
purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession
thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years.
And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made
said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can
hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the
period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory.
These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Cario vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands (212 U. S., 4491), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi,
there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in

paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that
all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession,
personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the
public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July
26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon
applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of
Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public
domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the
Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any
title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
Contention of the director of Lands
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the
public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to
recover possession thereof.lawphi1.net
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had
already become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff,
there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the
right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it.
For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment
appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without
special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and

Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-17597
February 7, 1922
E. W. McDANIEL, petitioner,
vs.
Honorable GALICANO APACIBLE, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources of the Philippine Islands, and
JUAN CUISIA, respondents.
Ross & Lawrence for petitioner.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for respondents.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court for the writ
of prohibition. Its purpose is to prohibit the respondent Honorable
Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
from granting a lease of a parcel of petroleum land located in the
municipality of San Narciso, of the Province of Tayabas, Philippine
Islands, which parcel of land is particularly described in paragraph 6 of
the petition. To the petition the respondent Galicano Apacible
demurred. The respondent Juan Cuisia neither demurred nor answered.
The facts upon which the petition is based are admitted and may be
stated as follows:
1. That on or about the 7th day of June, 1916, the petitioner
entered upon and located, in accordance with the provisions of
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, as well as the provisions of Act No.
624 of the Philippine Commission, three petroleum placer mineral
claims, each of an area of 64 hectares, on an unoccupied public
land in the municipality of San Narciso, Province of Tayabas,
Philippine Islands;
2. That on or about the 15th day of July, 1916, the plaintiff
recorded in the office of the mining recorder in the municipality of
Lucena, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, notices of location

of the aforesaid three placer claims under the names of "Maglihi
No. 1," "Maglihi No. 2," and "Maglihi No. 3;"
3. That the plaintiff, at all times since the 7th day of June, 1916,
has remained in open and continuous possession of said three
mineral placer claims;
4. That plaintiff, in the year 1917 and in each year thereafter,
performed not less than two hundred pesos (P200) worth of labor
on each of the said three mineral claims;
5. That in the year 1918 plaintiff drilled five wells on the said three
mineral claims, and by means of such wells in the said year (1918)
made discoveries of petroleum on each of the said three claims;
6. That on or about the 18th day of June, 1921, the respondent
Juan Cuisia made application to the respondent Galicano
Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, under
the provisions of Act No. 2932 of the Philippine Legislature, for a
lease of a parcel of petroleum land in the municipality of San
Narciso, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, which said parcel
of land included within its boundaries the three said mineral
claims "Maglihi No. 1," "Maglihi No. 2," and "Maglihi No. 3," which
said three mineral placer claims had therefore been located as
above indicated and held by the plaintiff as above described;
7. That upon the filing of the said application for lease, as
described in the paragraph immediately preceding, by the said
Juan Cuisia, the petitioner herein protested in writing to the
respondent Galicano Apacible against the inclusion in the said
lease of the said three mineral claims "Maglihi No. 1," "Maglihi
No. 2," and "Maglihi No. 3," located and held by him as above
recited;
8. That the respondent Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources, did on or about the 9th day of
March, 1921, deny petitioner's said protest; and
9. That the plaintiff is informed and believed, and upon that
information and belief averred, that the respondent Galicano
Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, under
and by virtue of the supposed authority of Act No. 2932, is about
to grant the application for the said lease of the respondent Juan
Cuisia, and to place him (Juan Cuisia) in possession of the said
three mineral claims located and held by the petitioner.
Upon the foregoing facts the petitioner contends that said Act No.
2932, in so far as it purports to declare open to lease, lands containing
petroleum oil on which mineral claims have been validly
located and held, and upon which discoveries of petroleum oil have
been made, is void and unconstitutional, in that it deprives the
petitioner of his property without due process of law and without
compensation, and that the defendant Galicano Apacible, as Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, is without jurisdiction to lease to
the respondent Juan Cuisia the following mineral claims "Maglihi No.
1," "Maglihi No. 2," and "Maglihi No. 3," and prays that the writ of
prohibition be issued out of this court, directing and prohibiting the
respondent Galicano Apacible to desist from issuing the lease of the
mineral placer claims herein mentioned.
The respondent Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, in support of his demurrer, contends: (a) That the
acts complained of are in conformity with the authority given by Act
No. 2932; (b) that the petitioner has no vested right in the three
mineral claims; and (c) that the demurrer puts squarely in issue the
constitutionality of Act No. 2932.
Act No. 2932 was approved on the 31st day of August, 1920. Section 1
provides that "all public lands containing petroleum or other mineral
oils and gas, on which no patent, at the date this Act takes effect, has
been issued, are hereby withdrawn from sale and are declared to be
free and open to exploration, location and lease," etc. Said section
further provides, "that parties having heretofore filed claims for any
lands containing said minerals, shall be given preference to lease their
respective claims, provided they file a petition to that effect within six
months from the date of the approval of this Act."
Section 2 provides that "all such lands (public lands) may be leased by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in the manner and
subject to the rules prescribed by the Council of State."
It will be noted from the provisions of said Act No. 2932 that "all public
lands containing petroleum, etc., on which no patent, at the date this
Act takes effect (August 31, 1920), has been issued, are hereby
withdrawn from sale and are declared to be free and open to
exploration, location, and lease," with a preference, however, in favor
of those who had therefore filed claims for such lands. It will be further
noted, from the provisions of said Act, that "all public lands containing
petroleum, etc., are hereby withdrawn from sale and are declared to be
free and open to exploration, location and lease," without any
preference to any claim or right which citizens of the Philippine Islands
or the United States had therefore acquired in any public lands, and
that the only right left to them is one of "preference," and that even
the preference was limited for a period of six months from the 31st day
of August, 1920.
The petitioner contends, that, having located and held, and having
discovered petroleum oil upon the said claims prior to the 31st day of
August, 1920, he had acquired a property right in his three claims; and
that said Act No. 2932 had deprived him of that right without due
process of law, in contravention of paragraph 1 of section 3 of Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916, and that said Act was therefore
unconstitutional and void. In support of the contention the petitioner
cites many authorities.
Mr. Lindlay, one of the highest authorities on Mining Law, has discussed
extensively the question now before us. (Lindlay on Mines, vol. I,
sections 322, 539.)
The general rule is that a perfected, valid appropriation of public
mineral lands operates as a withdrawal of the tract from the body of
the public domain, and so long as such appropriation remains valid and
subsisting, the land covered thereby is deemed private property. A
mining claim perfected under the law is property in the highest sense,
which may be sold and conveyed and will pass by descent. It has the
effect of a grant (patent) by the United States of the right of present
and exclusive possession of the lands located. And even though the
locator may obtain a patent to such lands, his patent adds but little to
his security. (18 Ruling Case Law, p. 1152 and cases cited.)
The owner of a perfected valid appropriation of public mineral lands is
entitled to the exclusive possession and enjoyment against every one,
including the Government itself. Where there is a valid and perfected
location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the
public domain and the property of the locator.
It was said by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, "The
Government itself cannot abridge the rights of the miner to a perfected
valid location of public mineral land. The Government may not destroy
the locator's right by withdrawing the land from entry or placing it in a
state of reservation." (Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U.S., 279; Sullivan vs. Iron
Silver Mining Co., 143 U.S., 431.)
A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and kept up in
accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the United States, has
the effect of a grant by the United States of the present and exclusive
possession of the lands located, and this exclusive right of possession
and enjoyment continues during the entire life of the location. There is
no provision for, no suggestion of, a prior termination thereof. (Gwillim
vs. Donnellan, 115 U.S., 45; Clipper Mining Co. vs. Eli Mining and Land
Co., 194 U.S., 220.)
There is no pretense in the present case that the petitioner has not
complied with all the requirements of the law in making the location of
the mineral placer claims in question, or that the claims in question
were ever abandoned or forfeited by him. The respondents may claim,
however, that inasmuch as a patent has not been issued to the
petitioner, he has acquired no property right in said mineral claims. But
the Supreme Court of the United States, in the cases of Union Oil Co. vs.
Smith (249 U.S., 337), and St. Louis Mining and Milling Co. vs. Montana
Mining Co. (171 U.S., 650), held that even without a patent, the
possessory right of a locator after discovery of minerals upon the claim
is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the
paramount title to the land is in the United States. There is no conflict
in the rulings of the Court upon that question. With one voice they
affirm that when the right to a patent exists, the full equitable title has
passed to the purchaser or to the locator with all the benefits,
immunities, and burdens of ownership, and that no third party can
acquire from the Government any interest as against him. (Manuel vs.
Wulff, 152 U.S., 504, and cases cited.)
Even without a patent, the possessory right of a qualified locator after
discovery of minerals upon the claim is a property right in the fullest
sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is in
the Government, and it is capable of transfer by conveyance,
inheritance, or devise. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U.S., 337; Forbes vs.
Jarcey, 94 U.S., 762; Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U.S., 279; Del Monte Mining
Co. vs. Last Chance Mining Co., 171 U.S., 55; Elver vs. Wood, 208 U.S.,
226, 232.)
Actual and continuous occupation of a valid mining location, based
upon discovery, is not essential to the preservation of the possessory
right. The right is lost only by abandonment as by nonperformance of
the annual labor required. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U.S., 337;
Farrell vs. Lockhart, 210 U.S., 142; Bradford vs. Morrison, 212 U.S.,
389.)
The discovery of minerals in the ground by one who has a valid mineral
location perfects his claim and his location not only against third
person, but also against the Government. A mining claim perfected
under the law is property in the highest sense of that term, which may
be sold and conveyed, and will pass by descent, and is not therefore
subject to the disposal of the Government. (Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U.S.,
279, 283; Sullivan vs. Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U.S., 431; Consolidated
Mutual Oil Co. vs. United States, 245 Fed. Rep., 521; Van Ness vs.
Rooney, 160 Cal., 131, 136, 137.)
The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the
lands located, and perfected his location in accordance with law, the
power of the United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive
right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone,
the lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from
lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations of
public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected
locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public
lands afterward included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation
does not affect the validity of the former location. By such location and
perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even
as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U.S., 337; Van
Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131; 27 Cyc., 546.)
From all of the foregoing arguments and authorities we must conclude

that, inasmuch as the petitioner had located, held and perfected his
location of the mineral lands in question, and had actually discovered
petroleum oil therein, he had acquired a property right in said claims;
that said Act No. 2932, which deprives him of such right, without due
process of law, is in conflict with section 3 of the Jones Law, and is
therefore unconstitutional and void. Therefore the demurrer herein is
hereby overruled, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that, unless the
respondents answer the petition herein within a period of five days
from notice hereof, that a final judgment be entered, granting the
remedy prayed for in the petition. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and
Romualdez, JJ., concur.
March 6, 1907
Mining case
G.R. No. 2940

JOSE FIANZA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
J. F. REAVIS, defendant-appellant.
Coudert Brothers for appellant.
Kinney, Odlin & Laurence for appellees.
WILLARD, J.:
The plaintiffs brought this action in the court below to enjoin the
defendant from interfering with two gold mines alleged to be the
property of the plaintiffs. A temporary injunction was granted as
prayed for in the complaint; the case was tried in the court below and
the injunction made perpetual. The defendant moved for a new a trial,
which was denied, and he has brought the case here by bill of
exceptions. the court below found, among other things, substantially as
follows: Facts
More than fifty years prior to the commencement of this suit one
Toctoc, an Igorot, and the grandfather of Jose Fianza, one of the
plaintiffs, was in the sole and exclusive possession of certain mineral
lands containing gold quarts, situated in Antamoc, in the jurisdiction of
Itogon, in the province of Benguet. These lands, being the same in
dispute in this case, were of irregular boundaries and contained about
183,000 square meters, and were situated on the slope of the
mountain or hill called Antamoc Mountain, and were divided into
two parts by a small arroyo called Antamoc, the mine on one side being
known as Antamoc and on the other as Ampasit. The two mines
were connected and formed one tract.
These lands or mines during the lifetime of Toctoc were opened and
developed mines and worked from year to year after the style and
manner of Igorot miners and their customs of mining; the said Toctoc
claiming the ownership of said mines, and his title and ownership
thereto were generally known and recognized by the people of the

community and the vicinity,
Toctoc had no paper title to said mines under the Spanish Government.
No title or concession was ever granted to Toctoc or his heirs and
successors, and the plaintiffs have no such paper title thereto.
On the death of Toctoc his son, Dominguez, succeeded him in the
possession and ownership of said mines, in all respects as his father had
held and claimed them, and continued to so hold and claim and work
them to the exclusion of any and all others, and without dispute,
interference, or interruption until the date of his death, which occurred
about ten years prior to the commencement of this suit. Upon the
death of Dominguez, the plaintiff, Jose Fianza, and his coplaintiffs, as
heirs at law of the said Toctoc and Dominguez, came into the
possession of said mines under like claims of title and ownership,
possessing, working, and claiming them as owners, to the exclusion of
any and all other claimants, and without interference or adverse claims
of any kind, and continued to do so up to the date of the
commencement of this suit, except as stated thereafter in said decision.
The court further found that as in the case of Toctoc and Dominguez,
the ownership of these heirs and claimants to these mines was well
known and understood among the natives and residents generally of
the province, including the Spanish officials, and generally recognized
and their possession respected. For more than fifty years these mines
were held and worked in this Igorot family, and at the time of the
American occupation were well-known, discovered, improved, and
developed mines, and had produced gold for many years, and were still
producing gold. During all the time covered by the disputes that have
arisen between the parties to this suit, some of the parties have been
living upon and next to the lands in dispute, and holding possession
thereof and working the same for themselves and their coclaimants.
Three of the plaintiffs were there living in possession of said mines prior
to the arrival of the defendant Reavis. They have continued since that
time to so live upon and possess the same up to the date of the
commencement of the suit, and without interruption, save by the acts
of the defendant Reavis as therein after stated in said decision.
The court further found that in the month of March, 1901, the
defendant Reavis entered upon the lands embraced in and next to the
mines of the plaintiffs and upon the alleged information that said mines
of the plaintiffs had been located under the Spanish Mining Law by one
Hans Holman in the year 1896, and that the said lands and mines were
abandoned by the said Holman and were vacant mineral and public
lands, proceeded to stake and locate three claims under the mining
laws in force in the United States, and including the mines of the
plaintiffs, which claims were named by the said Reavis the Otek, the
Texas, and the Clayton. Immediately after this act of Reavis, the
plaintiff, Fianza, for himself and his coplaintiffs, protested against the
placing by Reavis of the stakes upon his mines, and made a formal
protest to H. P. Whitmarsh, then governor of Benguet. In May, 1902,
the plaintiff, Fianza, again made a formal protest to William F. Pack,
then governor of the Province of Benguet, of the trespass and
usurpation of Reavis upon the mines in question. A hearing was had
before the governor, in which Reavis took part, and it was agreed
between the plaintiffs and Reavis that Reavis would not interfere with
the actual possession of the plaintiffs and their working of the mines,
and that the plaintiffs should not prevent Reavis from coming upon the
land from time to time for the purpose of doing assessment work, and
that this should continue until the question in dispute between them
could be submitted to the Court of First Instance for decision. A few
days after this, and before July 1, 1902, the plaintiffs caused the
boundaries of their claims and mines to be distinctly marked by
substantial posts and monuments. These posts were placed by the
plaintiffs prior to the locations under which the defendant Reavis now
claims. Prior to July 1, 1902, Fianza placed upon a building standing
upon the property in question a wooden sign with a printed notice

thereon stating that they were his mines. A few days thereafter Reavis
removed the sign and broke it up. On the 10th day of October, 1902,
Reavis made and caused to be recorded in the office of the provincial
secretary of Benguet three several declarations for claims or mines
named by him Otek, Clayton, and Texas, covering the same
ground as his three previous attempts to locate under the United States
mining laws.
Reavis having presented evidence to show that Vicente Carrera in the
year 1896, and Hans Holman in the same year, denounced these mines
in accordance with the Spanish mining laws, the court found that
neither of these alleged denouncements were in fact made at any time,
and that no denouncement, location, or entry upon the lands in
question had ever been made by any person under the Spanish mining
laws in force in these Islands.
The court further found that Reavis entered upon the mines in the year
1901 and staked out his three claims in the honest, though mistaken,
belief that the same were included in an abandoned and forfeited
Spanish grant of Holmans, and that at the time of his entry thereon
and the setting of his stakes he had no actual knowledge that the
Igorots, who were then living upon the lands, claimed the ownership of
said mines, but that within a few days after this entry he received
notice of the plaintiffs claim of ownership and before he had expended
any considerable amount of either time, labor, or money thereon.
When he made his locations and filed the declarations, under which he
now claims, he had full knowledge of the claims of the ownership of the
plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs were at that date, and for a long time
prior thereto, and before the passing and approval of the act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, had been in the actual possession and working
of said mines.
Up to the month of May, 1902, Reavis was not in the actual and
continuous possession of the lands embraced in his attempted
locations and his only possession was when he entered thereon from
time to time to do assessment and development work, and his
possession for such purposes was maintained by threats and
intimidation and against the protest of the plaintiffs.
In the year 1901 the plaintiffs took from the said mines gold of the
weight of 40 silver pesos; in the year 1902, the weight of 70 silver
pesos; and in the year 1903, the weight of 90 silver pesos.
The above statement of facts found by the court below is not complete,
but it is sufficient, we think, for the purposes of this decision.
The first defense to the action is, according to the brief of the
appellant, that the land sued for is not described in the complaint with
sufficient certainty or definiteness to support a judgment for the
plaintiff.
During the trial in the court below, the complaint was, by leave of the
court and against the objection and exception of the defendant,
amended so that the first paragraph should read as follows:
First. For many years, the number of which is unknown to your orators,
they and their ancestors have owned, possessed, and worked two gold
mines lying in the barrio of Antamoc, in the township of Itogon,
Province of Benguet, the description of which mines appears in
plaintiffs Exhibit C, which is hereby made a part of this complaint, the
boundaries of which mines are marked by posts set in the ground, which
boundaries are all well known to all of your orators neighbors, said
mines being well developed, open mines called Antamoc and
Ampasit.
Exhibit C which is thus made a part of the complaint is a plan made by a
surveyor. It gives the courses and distances of the boundary lines, the
boundaries by reference to natural objects, and the relation of such
objects by distances to lines of the survey. According to the brief of the

defendant, the land described in this plan is 1,542 feet on one side,
1,075 feet on the second side, 887 feet on another side, and 742 feet
on the fourth side, and there can be no doubt that the tract of land
described in this Exhibit C can be accurately located upon the ground.
There is, therefore, no doubt that the description contained in the
amended complaint is sufficient.
The real objection is that the court erred in allowing the amendment. In
view of the provisions of sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil
Procedure relating to amendments, this objection can not be sustained.
The second defense, according to the appellants brief, is that the
record does not disclose how or in what way the land claimed by
plaintiffs conflicts with defendants locations.
More or less evidence was offered to show where the defendants
claims were. It is apparent that all or nearly all of the defendants
Otek is outside of the land claimed by the plaintiffs. It is also proven
that some if not all of the other two locations are within the land
claimed by the plaintiffs. We do not see how it is important to
determine exactly the location of the defendants claims. The location
of the plaintiffs land is determined with accuracy and the judgment of
the court below prohibits the defendant from interfering with that welldefined and well-ascertained tract of land, and there can be no trouble
in enforcing that judgment so far as the description of the property is
concerned.
The third defense, according to the appellants brief, is that the
plaintiffs have never possessed or mined any particular tract of ground
under claim of ownership to the exclusion of all others.
It will be noticed that the court below found to the contrary of what is
stated in this defense. We can not reverse the judgment unless it
appears that this and other findings of fact, made by the court below,
are plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence. (De La
Rama vs. De La Rama, 201 U S., 303.) We are entirely satisfied that no
such conclusion can be reached and we are also satisfied that the
evidence not only is not contrary to the findings, but that the latter are
supported by the preponderance of proof.
So much stress is laid upon this point by the appellant that it seems
necessary to consider in some detail the evidence. The appellant upon
this point claims, first, that there never were any mines, as that word is
properly understood, on the land in question, but merely slight
excavations which were abandoned practically as soon as made, and,
second, that plaintiffs have not, in any event, been in the continuous
possession of the mines.
Upon the first question, as to whether these were real mines or not, it
appears from the record that on the 31st of January, 1901, and before
Reavis ever appeared in Antamoc, Fianza, one of the plaintiffs, made
written declarations relatives a las dos partidas de Minas de Oro, que
radican en Antamoc, de esta jurisdiccion, las cuales venian disfrutando
desde mas de veintedos aos, habiendolas recibido como herencia, de
sus antepasados. These declarations were made for the purposes of
taxation, and on the 11th of February, 1901, he paid the taxes on this
and other property, as he did also in 1902 and 1903.
That these were certain, definite, and well-known mines is proved by
the evidence of the defendants witnesses. Vicente Carrera, who said
that he had denounced the mines, testified: I denounced the mines
which are situated at the eastern part of the houses named Antamoc
and I also denounced the mines situated on the western part of the
houses which were called Ampasit.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What work, if any, did you ever do on that ground after you
denounced them?
A. Nothing, because they were not ceded to us, with the

exception of the road we made which goes to the mines. . . . We had to
build a road from the main trail to the mouth of the mine.
He testified also that he bought gold from Dominguez, and when asked
where Dominguez got this gold he said:
A. I dont know, but I think he got it from Antamoc, because I
know the nature of the fineness of the gold from these mines.
Q. And then the people were already working these mines you
denounced?
A. Yes. . . .
Q. Do you know who, according to public rumor was the owner
of those mines?
A. Public rumor among the Igorots was that they were the mines
and property of Dominguez.
Robiera, another witness for the defendant testified:
I have seen the excavations from a distance. From a distance I saw
where dirt had been thrown up out of the excavations, but I never have
been up to the mines.
Francisco Valencio, another witness for the defendant, testified:
Q. How many times did you see Fianza and his father go up to
these mines in Antamoc?
A. I saw his father going up there often.
Q. How often did you see Fianza going up to the mines?
A. Sometimes I saw him in the mines at Antamoc.
Hans Holman, another witness for the defendant, on whose adverse
claim to this same property the defendant relies to defeat the
prescription alleged by the plaintiffs, shows the existence of welldefined mines. He testified:
A. We denounced that mine and the papers which we made out
were burnt up in thecomandancia during the Spanish Government. We
commenced the denouncement of that mine in 1896.
H. P. Whitmarsh, a witness for the defendant, testified:
A. Yes. The first trip I made up to the Trinidad I went over to
Antamoc. I went there to get information about the mines and the
country. I was a newspaper reporter then. . . .
Q. Did you have any talk with him (Fianza) in reference to mines
in Antamoc?
A. All about the mines in the vicinity. He advised me to go over
to Antamoc to look at them.
J. E. Kelly, a witness for the defendant, testified that he became
acquainted with the property now claimed by Reavis in January, 1901,
when he first arrived in Benguet; that having learned that Holman had
an interest therein he went to Manila to see him in March or April of
the same year with a view to purchasing his Antamoc holdings.
Holman then told him that he had a mine there.
Reavis knew of Holmans claim, and before he did anything at all upon
the property went to see him and was told by Holman that he, Holman,
had a certain number of meters there and that anyone could tell him
where the property was. Reavis made no further investigation, and a
few days thereafter, and in March, 1901, made his first entry upon the
land. The following question was asked Reavis by his counsel:
Q. What induced you to locate upon land which had been
pointed out to you as Holmans grant?
A. Because I had learned previously that there were no grants in
this part of the country, and thinking that Mr. Holman had not complied
with any of the laws and didnt intend to, I thought I would go into it
and see what chance I had with it.
Commenting apparently upon this answer, the court below in its
decision said:
He went to Antamoc to stake out land for himself that he believed was
then claimed by another in the vernacular of the miner, to jump Hans
Holmans claim. He was not prospecting for a mine and for hidden
minerals; he went to locate a mine already discovered and mineral
uncovered and worked for more than a half a century. He found honest
American miners and prospectors already there with claims staked all
about the land that they believed was claimed by another and for the
protection of which the opened, developed, and worked mine the rumor
of an owner was amply sufficient to protect it from invasion and
trespass.
Reavis was asked this question:
Q. How long did you prospect at Antamoc before you discovered
a mine?
A. About half an hour or an hour; I discovered that it was a
mineral country.
William Knouber, another witness for the defendant, testified that
while a soldier in the American Army at Bautista he became acquainted
with a Spaniard, Teodoro Miguel, who had been in Benguet. He brought
Miguel to Manila and afterwards took him to Baguio and was at
Antamoc on the 9th of January, 1900. He was asked this question:
Q. Did you make any inquires as to whether or not there were
any mining claims in Antamoc?
A. Yes, sir. That is mostly what I went there for.
xxx xxx xxx
A. The Spaniard and I went down to Itogon. We looked for the

president or someone that knew of this mine or property, who it
belonged to, and who was supposed to own it. This man Fianza said he
knew the property and knew it belonged to Mr. Holman. . . . Of course
we couldnt do anything, so when I went back to Manila I went to see
Mr. Holman about it and he showed me maps and papers of the
different pieces of property.
Knouber testified that he went out to the property with Fianza, who
pointed out Holmans stakes, and that he then saw men digging upon
the land included within the stakes.
That this claim of Holmans is the same land now claimed by the
plaintiffs is proved by the testimony of Holman himself. Exhibit C having
been shown him, he stated:
Q. Is this paper, plaintiffs Exhibit C, the plan of the ground you
located?
A. It is.
Q. How do you know this is the same land you denounced?
A. I went there myself.
Q. By what mark do you recognize that as the same land?
A. It is the same upon which I placed stakes.
Q. Were your stakes placed in the same position as the stakes
indicated on this map?
A. Yes.
Fianza testified that he pointed out to the surveyor the boundaries
indicated by the posts and designated on the plan, and added that they
were the same boundaries which were shown to him by his father.
It is, thereafter, well established by the evidence that Holmans claim

related to well-known mines and that these are the same mines which
are now claimed by the plaintiffs. Nearly every witness interested in
mining presented by the defense, upon arrival in Benguet went at once
to Antamoc and made inquiries about this precise mines, and Kelly,
Reavis himself, and Knouber saw Holman, apparently for the purpose of
making some contract with him in reference thereto.
The defendant relies very much upon the testimony of certain
American miners who at the time of the trial had been in the country
about three years, and who undertook to testify as to the mining
customs of the Igorots, saying that they mined one day in one place and
that if they found no gold they mined somewhere else, and that they
never made any claim to the exclusive ownership of any tract of land.
All of these witnesses had mining claims similar to that of Reavis. The
claim of Clyde adjoins that of Reavis. It is to be observed that in their
testimony they made no reference to this particular tract of land. They
did not say that, as to this particular tract of land, there never had been
any claim made by an Igorot to exclusive ownership. But in no event
could this general testimony overcome the positive testimony of the
plaintiffs witnesses, many having been presented who testified that
the land was worked exclusively by Fianza and his ancestors, and that
other people were kept off.
Fianzas statement, quoted by the appellant, to the effect that our
custom is if we do not find gold in 1 fathom or 2 fathoms, we make
another place until we do find something is entirely consistent with his
claim to the exclusive ownership of this property. The fact that he and
his ancestors moved around and dug holes in different places upon this
property appears from the evidence. The witnesses testified that on the
property there were a great many excavations.
The property in question being certain well-known and well-defined
mines, the next question is, Did the plaintiffs and their ancestors have
The plaintiffs and their prdecessors
the exclusive possession and control of the same? The testimony of the
plaintiffs witnesses is positive and direct that Toctoc and Dominguez
worked these mines and that no one else did, and that since the death
of Dominguez, Fianza has worked them in the same way. The defendant
claims, however, that this possession had been interrupted. The first
interruption relied upon, apparently, is what was done by Vicente
Carrera in 1896, but it is apparent from the testimony of Carrera,
already quoted, that whatever he might have done in relation to filing
papers in the government office at Baguio, he never did anything upon
the land itself. The building of his trail, 1 meter wide, up to the mines
could in no sense be called an interruption of the possession of Fianza
and his associates. It was a mere casual trespass.
Neither did the claim of Holman interrupt this possession of the
plaintiffs. He never obtained any concession from the Government.
None of the acts required by the law, then in force, were done by him
except perhaps the presentation of one paper in the office at Baguio,
and the payment of certain fees. Under the said laws, these acts could
not in any way interrupt the possession then held by Fianza. If in
pursuance of this attempt he had actually entered upon the land and
had ousted Fianza and kept the possession himself, it might be claimed
that there had been an interruption of the latters possession, but his
own evidence shows that nothing of that kind was ever done. The only
thing which he did do was to survey the land and place stakes thereon.
This act was not an interruption of the possession of Fianza.
(Balpiedad vs. Insular Government,[[1]] 4 Off. Gaz., 390.) Just what
Holman did appears from his own testimony. He said:
Q. Did you buy these gold mines from the Igorots or anyone
else?
A. No; I only denounced them to the Spanish Government.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What is the reason you didnt continue your denuncia?
A. I was afraid. I left that mine because I am not a miner.

Q. Was it in 1898 or 1899 when you suit the mines then?
A. No, I didnt work the mines. I didnt care to. I only bought the
gold.
Q. Did you ever hire any work done on these mines?
A. No; no one.
Q. Did anyone pay for the work for you?
A. They worked for me. I didnt pay for their work, but the gold.
Q. In what capacity did you make contracts with the Igorots to
work those mines?
A. I didnt make any contracts.
Q. Didnt I understand you to say that you made contracts with
certain Igorots to mine there and they gave you a certain part of the
gold as owner of the mine?
A. No.
Q. Did you have any contracts with Igorots at all?
A. No.
Q. I mean after you denounced the mines of Antamoc?
A. Yes; I told the Igorots that were working there that they must
give the gold to me and not sell to any other one. That was the contract.
It is very clear that these acts constituted no interruption of the
possession of Fianza. And so Fianzas possession continued up to the
time of Reavis. Reavis entered upon the land and staked the claims in
March, 1901. Fianza at once protested to Governor Whitmarsh.
Governor Whitmarsh testified that Fianza came and said that some
American had taken up property which he claimed and he wanted me

to throw the American off. I told him, as far as I knew, there was no law
under which he could do anything at that time and I advised him to put
the matter off until something more definite was provided. At that time
I was the governor under the Civil Government and very little was done
under the laws.
Whitmarsh having refused to do anything, when Governor Pack arrived,
Fianza, in 1902, made a written protest to him. Reavis was summoned
before the governor, a hearing was had, and an agreement was made
as stated in the findings of the court.
On the 9th of May, 1902, Fianzas claim was taken by Wagner, who
testified that he found there old stakes, evidently those of Holmans,
and Wagner then made out for Fianza a written claim to the mines,
which was filed in Baguio. Fianza posted a notice on the property,
which Reavis tore down and broke to pieces. While Reavis says in
several places that none of the Igorots made any protest, yet having
testified that he did not know the Igorot language, he was asked:
Q. Then, if you couldnt understand him, you didnt know
whether he ever protested to you about the Igorot mines which you
claim?
A. I think he did. Yes.
That Fianza and his associates were in possession of the mines in 1901,
1902, and 1903 is proved by the fact that during those years they took
therefrom gold to the amount indicated in the findings of the court in
that respect. We have not been able to find any evidence to the effect
that Reavis took any gold at all from this property during those years.
The work that Reavis did was evidently that which he thought was
required by the law. Most of it appears from the evidence to have been
done on the claim called Otek, which is outside of the boundaries of
the plaintiffs claim. The fact that some of the Igorots worked for Reavis
is not important, because that work might have been and probably was
done upon the claim Otek, upon which was situated Reavis house,
and where, as said before, the principal part of his work was done.
A great many witnesses for the defendant testified that they had talked
with Fianza and that he did not make any claim to this land, and said
that it was Holmans. Evidence of these admissions is not sufficient to
show that the findings of the court below as to plaintiffs ownership is
plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Fianza denied
the making of such admissions. Most of the witnesses did not speak or
understand Igorot, and under such circumstances no great weight can
be given to such alleged admissions. For example, Reavis testified:
Q. If you dont know his language and he doesnt know yours,
how, then, could you understand him?
A. I believe that a man can understand a word or two. It would
seem to me that he could explain it by saying vamoose or something
like that and I could understand it.
The essential findings of fact made by the court below being sustained
by the evidence, it remains to consider what, in view of such facts, are
the legal rights of the parties.
Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant ever acquired any title to this
property by virtue of the provisions of the Spanish law. It was,
therefore, at the time the Islands were ceded to the United States,
public property, and these lands are public lands to which the
provisions of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, are applicable. (32 U.
S. Stat. L., 691.) Section 45 of that act is as follows:
SEC. 45. That where such person or association, they and their grantors
have held and worked their claims for a period equal to the time
prescribed by the statute of limitations of the Philippine Islands,
evidence of such possession and working of the claims for such period
shall be sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto under this act,
in the absence of any adverse claim; but nothing in this act shall be
deemed to impair any lien which may have attached in any way
whatever prior to the issuance of a patent.
This is the provision of law upon which the court below decided the
case in favor of the plaintiffs. This view of that court must, in our
opinion, be sustained. The statute of limitations of the Philippine
Islands in force on July 1, 1902, was ten years. According to the
evidence and the findings, the plaintiffs had held and worked these
claims for more than that length of time prior to the 1st of July, 1902.
They had for more than forty years prior to that date been in the
possession thereof. That possession had been open, notorious,
continuous, and under a claim of ownership.
That possession has not been interrupted. It is certain that neither
Carrera nor Holman nor Reavis ever dispossessed the plaintiffs. They
remained in possession and worked these mines during all the years
1901, 1902, and 1903 while Reavis was in Antamoc. Whatever he did
upon the land was done while the plaintiffs still remained in the actual
possession thereof. As before stated, the court found that Reaviss only
possession was when he entered on the land from time to time to do
assessment and development work, and his possession for such
purposes was maintained by threats and intimidation, and against the
protests of the plaintiffs.
It is claimed by the appellant that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the
benefit of this section 45 because they made no location of the
property ten years before the passing of the act. We do not understand
that such a location is required by the terms of that section. In the case
of Belk vs. Meagher (104 U. S., 279) the court said, at page 287:
Under the provisions of the Revised Statutes relied on, Belk could not
get a patent for the claim he attempted to locate unless he secured
what is here made the equivalent of a valid location by actually holding
and working for the requisite time.
Whether the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, took effect in these Islands
at the time it was signed by the President (Gardner vs. The Collector, 6
Wall., 499) or when it was promulgated, it is not necessary to
determine, for in either case the rights of the plaintiffs were fixed by
that act before Reavis, in October, 1902, took any proceedings
thereunder. When the act took effect the plaintiffs became entitled to
a patent thereto from the Government.
It is suggested by the defendant that section 45 does not apply because
it relates to cases in which there is no adverse claim, and that in the
present case there exist the adverse claim of Reavis. It is evident that if
a person is otherwise entitled to a tract of land in accordance with the
provisions of said section 45, his right can not be taken away by the
mere fact that some other person makes a claim adverse to his. If such
were the construction to be placed upon the section, its object might
be entirely defeated, for in every case adverse claims, entirely
unfounded, could be presented for that purpose only. It is plain that
that provision in section 45 indicates merely that the proceedings for
the delivery of the patent shall be delayed until the validity of the
adverse claim is determined in the courts of justice. When locations are
regularly made under the act and adverse claims are filed thereto,
section 39 provides that all proceedings shall be stayed until the
controversy shall have been settled or decided by a court of competent
jurisdiction or the adverse claim waived. The provisions of section 39
undoubtedly are in this respect applicable to such adverse claim as is
mentioned in section 45.
It appears from the evidence and the findings of the court that some
time in the spring of 1901 four or five American miners living in
Benguet undertook to establish the Antamoc mining district, and to
appoint a mining recorder. With this mining recorder Reavis filed
certain locations on a part of the property in question. These steps
were taken and these proceedings were had in accordance with what
the organizers of this district thought to be the laws in force in the
United States in regard to mines. These laws were not in force in the
Philippine Islands at that time and the proceedings of the persons who
thus organized the Antamoc mining district were entirely null and
Antamoc mining district- null and void
avoid.
Location- invalid
The locations made by Reavis in accordance with the act of Congress of

July 1, 1902, were not made until October of that year. They were
made after the rights of the plaintiffs had become vested in accordance
with the provisions of said section 45, and therefore such locations can
not prejudice the plaintiffs. The court below held that even these
locations were invalid, in accordance with the said act. It is not
necessary, however, to determine this question.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
This was an action begun in the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Benguet by the plaintiffs for the purpose of enjoining, restricting,
and inhibiting the defendant from entering upon two certain gold
mines lying and being in the barrio of Antamoc, in the township of
Itogon, Province of Benguet; no certain description of said mines could
be given at the time of the commencement of the action according to
the complaint of the plaintiffs.
Upon the filing of the complaint the court granted a temporary
injunction to prevent the defendant from entering upon this indefinite,
unlocated, indescribable tract or parcel of land. By computation it was
found that this indefinite, unlocated parallelogram contained about
70,000 square meters. After the beginning of the trial of said cause, the
plaintiff caused a survey of the alleged mines to be made by one
Balpiedad; the result of said survey is represented in Exhibit C,
presented in evidence by the plaintiffs, which represents the

parallelogram or mines to be in the following form:
(insert map from original file here)
This exhibit or survey, showing the limits of said land in question, was
not completed or offered in evidence until after practically all of the
witnesses for the plaintiffs had been examined. After the admission of
the said exhibit, the plaintiffs asked that they be allowed to amend
their pleadings to conform to said exhibit, which request was granted.
The court in its decision found that the land included in the said
Exhibit C was the land in dispute, was of irregular boundaries,
contained about 183,000 square meters, was situated on the slope of a
mountain called Antamoc Mountain, and under the statute of
limitations, act of Congress of July 1, 1902, that the Government of the
Philippine Islands holds the title in trust for the plaintiffs, thereby
holding that the title to this indefinite, irregular tract of land,
somewhere on the mountain, poorly described, was being held by the
Government of the Philippine Islands for the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs alleged, in their petition, that they, their fathers, and his
father and his grandfather had worked said mines for many years.
We have, therefore, the following conditions:
(1) That the plaintiffs, their fathers and grandfathers had been in
possession of land for many years, the exact number being unknown, of
a parcel of lands or mines, which at the beginning of the action could
not be definitely described.
(2) That in the attempt to describe it, it was designated as a
parallelogram containing about 70,000 square meters.
(3) That the lower court at the beginning of the action enjoined the
defendant from entering upon the tract of land not located nor
described, and admittedly a tract which could not be definitely located
nor described.
(4) That the lower court, at the conclusion of the trial, made such
temporary injunction perpetual after it had been clearly proved that the
land reffered to in the first injunction was not the same land which the
plaintiff claimed in said Exhibit C.
(5) That the plaintiffs, at the beginning of the action, were not the
owners of the said tract of land, but that the same belonged to the
Government of the Philippine Islands and was being held in trust by said
Government for the plaintiffs.
(6) That they were unable to definitely locate the lines of said mines
until after the beginning of the trial of said cause, and when it was
definitely described it was not a parallelogram, and contained nearly
three times as much area as that described in the petition of the
plaintiffs. It would seem but reasonable to believe that if the plaintiffs,
their fathers and grandfathers had been in the possession of a definite,
well-known tract or parcel of land for so many years, to the exclusion of
all other persons whomsoever, its limits might in some way have been
definitely described, or at least it might have been described in a way to
have included more than one-third of a tract of land which they, their
fathers and grandfathers had occupied for many years to the exclusion
of all other persons.
We assert in the beginning that these facts engender suspicion of the
exclusive right of the plaintiffs to any well-defined tract of land. We are
also of the opinion that until it is proved (a) that the plaintiffs have an
absolute and exclusive right to a particular tract of land; and (b) that
said tract of land has well-defined metes and bounds, the court had no
right or authority to issue an injunction prohibiting or restraining the
defendant from entering thereon. The court had no authority to issue
an injunction to prevent the defendant from entering upon any parcel
of land until that parcel of land was well-defined by metes and bounds,
for otherwise the defendant would be unable to know when, or how, or
in what manner he would be violating such injunction.
It will be noted that upon the filing of the petition of the plaintiffs
herein, when the petition upon its face alleged that no particular
description of the mines in question could be given, the court enjoined
the defendant from entering thereon. Entering upon what lands? Lands
somewhere in the Province of Benguet somewhere on the mountain
called Antamoc. This temporary injunction, at the conclusion of the
trial, was made perpetual.
After the decision was rendered, the defendant, through his attorneys,
made a motion for a new trial, basing the same upon the following
reasons:
1. That the findings of fact were openly and manifestly against the
weight of the evidence.
2. That the evidence was insufficient to justify the decision.
3. That the decision and judgment of the court were against the law.
This motion for a new trial was denied.
This motion being based expressly upon the provisions of paragraph 3
of section 497 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, we are justified
in examining the evidence for the purpose of ascertaining whether or
not the conclusions of the lower court were justified by such evidence.
We, therefore, purpose to examine the evidence adduced during the
trial of said cause upon each of the respective questions of fact
presented, and allow the record to speak for itself.
Findings
Our first proposition is, that neither the plaintiffs nor their predecessors
occupied any definite piece or parcel of land or mines in the Province of
Benguet or elsewhere for any period, to the exclusion of all other
persons; that the plaintiffs and their predecessors were Igorots; that
they lived in tribes much as the American Indians did; that they never
asserted their rights to any well-defined parcel of land nor occupied any
well-defined parcel of land to the exclusion of other persons, either
strangers or members of the particular tribe. Upon this proposition we

refer to the record for the answer.
The petition alleges that the said mines are in the barrio of Antamoc.
What is Antamoc?
Madarang (Igorot) said (Rec., p. 18) : The whole mountain is known as
Antamoc.
Bisguey (Igorot and one of the plaintiffs), in answer to the question,
What is Antamoc? said (Rec., p. 21) :
It is a barrio, and is a place called Antamoc.
On page 22, the same witness, in reply to the question, Are
the barrios of Tecop, Ampasit, andAntamoc situated in the mountain
called Antamoc? said, Yes, sir.
Emigdio Octaviano said (Rec., p. 27) : He knew the place called
Antamoc.
Mateo Cario (Igorot) said (Rec., p. 27) : That Antamoc was a
mountain and that there are places called Ampasit, Antamoc, Niug, and
Loacan.
From the foregoing testimony of the witnesses, all of whom resided in
the vicinity of the land in question, it appears clearly that Antamoc was
a mountain; therefore any description of a parcel of land described
simply as being in Antamoc would certainly be too indefinite and
uncertain upon which to grant an injunction to prevent trespass upon
such undefined parcel of land.
With the reference to the exact location of said mines in said mountain,
we have the following proof in the record:
Jose Fianza (Igorot and one of the plaintiffs), in answer to the question,
Where were those mines? said (Rec., p.2), They were in Antamoc
and Ampasit.
The same witness further said (Rec., p. 7) that Wagner (Governors

Packs clerk) put in the stakes where his (Fianzas) claims were.
With reference to the specific and exact location of the land in
question, the said Wagner (Rec., p.65) testified as follows:
Q. Who indicated to you the place where the posts you have
referred to, should be put?
A. Fianza.
Q. Did he name these posts to you as the boundary or
boundaries of his claim or claims?
A. If I remember correctly it was the boundaries of his claim a
single claim. I asked him when he first started out if that was his
boundary and he told me yes. Now, whether he was including any one
claim or claims I can not say.
Q. To the best of your recollection were these dimensions the
correct ones as shown by Fianza?
A. Approximately, yes.
Wagner further stated that the claims pointed out to him by Fianza, and
as staked out by him, were approximately 15,000 feet by 600 feet.
(Rec., p. 65.)
As to the posts on the claim placed by Wagner, he (Wagner) made the
following statement (Rec., p. 64) :
From the post No. 1 or 2, I dont remember which, we proceeded to the
post on the north center part of the claim, thence to the post on the
northeastern corner, and thence to the post on the southern corner.
Wagner further says (Rec., p.67), in answer to the question as to the
particular posts he (Wagner) placed upon said claims:
Q. There were four posts there then?
A. Yes, sir.
As to this Wagner survey, therefore, from the record the following facts
appear:
The said survey was made on the 9th of May, 1902; it was of the mines
as claimed by Fianza; said claim was marked by four posts and the claim
was approximately 15,000 feet by 600 feet.
It further appears from the testimony of Wagner that he changed his
plans after the survey was made (Rec., p.68), which plan, it will be
noted, was not made a part of the record.
Madarong (Igorot), in speaking of the specific location of the mines in
question, said (Rec., p. 16), That Dominguez (father of one of the
plaintiffs) had mines in Itogon and in Antamoc; and (Rec., p. 18) That
the whole mountain was considered mineral land.
Bisguey (Igorot and one of the plaintiffs) said (Rec., p. 20), referring to
the exact location of the mines in question, That his father, Toto,
owned mines in Antamoc, without any further or definite description.
Picarte (Igorot) said (Rec., p. 25) That he knew by reference that
Dominguez claimed to be the owner of some mines called Antamoc and
Ampasit.
It will be noted that this is merely hearsay.
Emigdio Octaviano said (Rec., p. 27) that He knew the place called
Antamoc and that there were mines there; and that (Rec., p. 28) he had
heard from a man called Caballes that Dominguez claimed said mines;
and that (Rec., p. 29) he did not know anything as to their extent.
Juan Cario (Igorot) in reply to the question (Rec., p. 34), Do you know
whether these mines were the private property of Dominguez or
whether he only held them for the people? answered, I only
heard that Dominguez was the owner of these mines and I never heard
that he had any associates in the mines with him. Hearsay again.
The same witness further said that the holes were in the mountain
called Antamoc and that Dominguez had holes in three places in the
mountain called Antamoc.
Chap-Day, Balbadines, Miampis, Lorenzo, Pasio, Tongapel, Tongay,
Cateb, and Bitabio, all Igorots, testified (Rec., pp. 40, 43, 45, 50, 52, 53,
55, 56, and 57) that Dominguez had mines in Antamoc, without giving
any further description.
Amey (Igorot), one of the plaintiffs, said (Rec., p.47) that her father,
Toto, had mines in Antamoc. without any further description.
It will be noted that none of these witnesses, except Wagner, (and he
simply placed the stakes according to the direction of Fianza, one of the
plaintiffs), in any way attempted to more definitely describe the lands in
question than to say that they were in the mountain of Antamoc. It is
contented that even Wagners description does not definitely locate
any land. He does not state that said tract was on one side or the other
of said mountain. His description has neither starting point nor end.
Fianza, one of the plaintiffs, with reference to the definite location of
the mines in question, testified as follows (Rec., p.7):
Q. Did Mr. Wagner measure the claim?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did he put in the stakes?
A. Yes, sir; he placed those pine stakes or posts.
Q. Did you go with Mr. Wagner?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you show him where your claims are?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And he put the stakes in as you showed us this morning here

and marked the place?
A. Yes, sir.
It will be remembered that Wagner placed four stakes only.
Bearing in mind that the measurements, made by Wagner, being made
on the 9th of May, 1902, and that said posts included a parcel or tract
of land in the form of a parallologram, 15,000 by 600 feet somewhere
in a mountain, without beginning or end; that the preliminary
injunction was granted by the court on the 18th day of January, 1904,
to prevent the plaintiff from entering upon this unknown tract of land,
a description of which could not at that time be made, and that the
Balpiedad survey (Exhibit C) was made February 10, 1904, we quote the
testimony of the said Balpiedad for the purpose of ascertaining
whether or not the and claimed by Fianza at the time that Wagner
made a survey of the same was the same land which he (Fianza)
claimed about two years later, at the time the said Balpiedad made his
survey.
The witness, Balpiedad, testified, as follows (Rec., p. 73):
Q. Have you made a plan showing the measurements and
boundaries of the mines claimed by Jose Fianza, in the barrio of
Antamoc?
A. Yes; I made a sketch plan, except I have not run out the
boundary lines, they being direct lines from post to post.
Q. When did you make this measurement?
A. During the month of February. . . . It was on the 10th of
February, 1904.
Q. I present you a plan marked plaintiffs Exhibit C, and ask
you if it is the plan you have referred to?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who showed you the lands and measurements and corners to
make this measurement and plan?
A. Jose Fianza.
Q. How many posts did you find there?
A. Fourteen posts in addition to some posts that were inside and
outside posts of Mr. Reavis which do not appear in the plan.
The COURT (p. 74):
Q. How many of these posts did you find on the boundary line?
A. Fourteen posts.
Q. How many of these posts were marked in any way?
A. Some of the posts that I saw were marked with the name of
Jose Fianza.
Q. How many had his name?
A. I know there was one.
Q. How did the lines pass through the posts did you run a line
from one post to another?
A Yes, sir; the line ran exactly from one corner post to the other,
to the interim posts made solely for a line.
Q. How many of these posts (Rec., p. 83) which refer to did you
place there?
A. I did not place a single post.
Q. They were already there when you got there, were they?
A. Yes, sir; according to what Fianza said they had been there a
long time for some time.
It will be noted that prior to the Wagner survey (May 9, 1902),
according to the testimony of Fianza,no attempt had ever been made
by him or by his predecessors in any way to definitely marked out the
mines which the plaintiffs claim. It must be remembered also that
Wagner placed four posts including a parcel of land in the form of a

parallelogram.
Balpiedad, at the time of his survey (February 10, 1904) found fourteen
posts, and the form of the parcel of land included in his survey is seen
by reference to Exhibit C, which is not a parallelogram. He found
fourteen posts instead of four. By reference to the testimony of Fianza
and Balpiedad it will be seen that these two witnesses attempted to
make it appear that the survey, made by the latter, was simply a
measurement from post to post set by Wagner. The testimony can not
be believed for the reasons:
(a) That Wagner placed but four posts and Balpiedads measurement
included fourteen posts; and
(b) That in said Exhibit C, presented by the plaintiff, it will be noticed in
the lower right hand corner of the same that one of the posts placed by
Wagner was within and not on the lines of the boundaries of the land
surveyed by Balpiedad. This latter fact alone would seem to be proof
positive that the landwhich Fianza, one of the plaintiffs, claimed in May,
1902, was not the same land claimed by him in February, 1904.
The fact is further demonstrated by the appearance of the fourteen
posts represented in Exhibit C, and the one post in the lower right hand
corner of said Exhibit C, that between the months of May, 1902, and
February, 1904, the plaintiffs had made up their minds to include a
different and larger portion of the said mountain of Antamoc.
It is apparent also from this same testimony that in the interim the four
posts placed by Wagner had been increased in number by some
interest party so as to include nearly three times the original claim, as
well as to change the configuration of the land claimed by the plaintiffs.
One can not read the record in this case without reaching the
conclusion that Fianza is in fact the only one of the plaintiffs who has
any interest in the land in question, or without reaching the conclusion
that he is a sort of a chief of that particular tribe of Igorots. From his
testimony he is put in theposition of claiming in May, 1902, without

any opposition or interference from anyone, a particular tract of land in
the form of a parallelogram, and in February, 1904, two years later,
of claiming another and larger portion of land in a different form. Is this
testimony and this claim conformable to the claim of the plaintiffs that
they, their fathers and grandfathers had been in possession of a
distinct, well-defined parcel or tract of land anywhere, to the exclusion
of all other persons?
The claim by the plaintiff Fianza, and by Balpiedad that the posts
marking the perimeter of the lands in Exhibit C marked by the
boundaries of the land originally claimed by Fianza, is in direct conflict
with the testimony of Wagner.
With reference to these posts we have the testimony also a Reavis, the
defendant, who had lived in the vicinity of Antamoc from the month of
February, 1901. He said (Rec., p. 90) in answer to a question with
reference to the time when the fourteen posts were placed upon the
land represented by Exhibit C:
They represent stakes set in the ground after the injunction was served
on me in this case.
Q. Do you know who put them there?
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
Fianza told me that he put them there.

This was after the injunction was served upon you?
Yes, sir.
Was there any survey made on that land? If so, when?
A. A short time after the posts were put there Fianza came there
with a Filipino surveyor and had him to go round these posts. It is the
same surveyor who made the plat on the paper.
Q. Were these the stakes referred to by a witnesses as the
fourteen stakes pointed out to you by Wagner, Lawrence, and Fianza;
were those stakes there before the injunction was issued?
A. Not that I saw.

Q. Where you around the land so as to see them if they had
been there?
A Yes, sir.
Q. So when Wagner placed these posts there in 10-2, did you see
them up to three days ago when they went to them?
A. They were not there.
Q. Did you see any stakes that Wagner testified to as having
been placed there by him on the 9th of May, 1902?
A. Yes, sir; when we went over there I saw them, about three
days ago.
Q. How many did he show you that he had placed there?
A. He showed me than he was positive of having placed there.
This testimony, together with that of Fianza, Balpiedad, and Wagner,
seems to make it clear beyond peradventure of doubt that the land
claimed in Exhibit C is not the land which Fianza pointed out to Wagner
as his land in the month of May, 1902.
It will be remembered that all of the witnesses of the plaintiffs who
attempted in any way to designate a particular tract of land gave their
testimony before the Balpiedad survey was offered in evidence, and
none of them made a more definite or special description of the land in
question than to say that the said land was in the mountain of
Antamoc. The only testimony, therefore, which attempts in any way to
describe the particular land in question is that of Fianza, Balpiedad, and
Wagner, and it must be remembered that Wagner and Balpiedad each
received whatever information they had concerning the identity of the
land in question from Fianza himself.
Referring again to the testimony of Fianza and to the fourteen posts as

marking the perimeter of the land in question, he testified (Rec., p. 84)
that such boundaries are the same as the land which his father owned.
This same witness also stated (Rec., p. 7) that the four posts place by
Wagner on the 9th of May, 1902, marked the perimeter of his claim.
Neither will it be forgotten that according to the finding of the court
Balpiedad survey included nearly three times the area which the
Wagner plan included. The Wagner plan was a parallelogram; the
Balpiedad plan is octagonal in form, four of whose dimensions are
1,542, 1,075, 8,887, and 742 feet, one side being without any
dimension whatsoever. These surveys represented entirely different
tracts of land, both sworn to by the plaintiff Fianza as representing his
mines. Which of these contradictory statements must the court accept?
When it appeared during the trial of the said cause that the tract of
land marked by Wagner and that surveyed by Balpiedad were different
tracts of land, the attorney for the defendant attempted to ascertain
which of the two tracts the plaintiff Fianza actually claimed and to that
end asked the following question:
Q. What mines do you claim? That which you claim by this
suit (Wagners plan) or that which was measured by Balpiedad?
Apparently, in view of the conflict between the lands pointed out by
Fianza to Wagner and the lands pointed out to Balpiedad, a perfectly
proper question, and one which, had the plaintiff been permitted to
answer, might have made clear this conflict. However, the attorney for
the plaintiff objected to the question and the court refused to allow
Fianza to answer the same.
The trial court and the majority opinion in this court for some reason
have accepted the Balpiedad plan as representing the mines claimed by
the plaintiffs. The fact is to be clearly borne in mind that allof plaintiffs
witnesses, with the exception of Fianza, who pretended to testify as to
the mine claimed by Dominguez and Fianza, testified before the
Balpiedad plan was presented. Aside from the fact that their
declarations refer to mines in Antamoc, such declaration could not,
under any theory of the case,serve to identify the tract described in the
Balpiedad survey.
As to Fianza himself he pretended to identify the land claimed by his
father with the Balpiedad survey. We have already noted that there is a
hopeless conflict in his statements, as he identifies in one place the
Wagner plan and in another place the Balpiedad plan as being the land
claimed. And, moreover, in view of the testimony of Wagner and
Reavis, we are of the opinion that Fianzadeliberately perjured
himself (Rec., p. 85) in testifying that the posts appearing on the
Balpiedad plan were placed there by Wagner. He admitted to Reavis
that he had placed the posts there himself.
We feel justified in the conclusion, therefore, that the only testimony in
the whole record identifying the lands claimed by the plaintiffs with the
land decreed by the court is the following question and answer, asked
of Fianza (Rec., p. 84):
Q. Where the boundaries that you showed Balpiedad the same
that were the boundaries of the land when your father owned it?
A. Yes, sir; the boundaries were the same that my father showed
me.
If it is true that the father of Fianza had shown the boundaries of the
Balpiedad plan to him and these were the real boundaries of his claim,
why did not he, Fianza, point out these same boundaries to Wagner in
May, 1902, nearly two years prior to the Balpiedad survey?
It results, therefore, that the decision is rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs upon the testimony of one witness, whose declarations are
conflicting and who has deliberately perjured himself.
It is contended further that even accepting Exhibit C as representing the
lands in question, even then the demarcation of the tract of land is not
sufficient upon which to issue an injunction to prevent trespass. There is

nothing in the description of the lands marked in Exhibit C by which
even a surveyor might go upon that part of the world and locate it
exactly, so as to be able to say all comers: This is the particular tract of
land of the defendant and all others are enjoined from entering
thereon.
It is contended that Exhibit C does not constitute a sufficient
description to locate this property. The plan itself is not accompanied
by a technical description of any kind; the only description appears in
the testimony of Balpiedad (Rec., p. 74-78). The vital point in any plan is
the starting point. the only evidence of record showing the starting
point of this plan is as follows (Rec., 74):
Q. Where did you commence the measurements?
A. We followed the Ampasit road and started from the post we
found near the road, within a distance of ten meters of the side of the
road towards the summit of the mountain.
Q. Can you describe more specifically the point of departure?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Well, describe it, then.
A. This post is held in place by stones piled about its base, and if
it has not been removed there is another longer post, which Fianza
placed there so that it would be seen from a distance.
No surveyor, much less a layman, could locate with certainty the
starting point from this description.
It appears further that the notes from which the plan (Exhibit C) was
made and testimony given were not the original notes. The following
appears of record (Rec., p. 80):
Q. Why did you destroy the date which you made in this
particular case when it was your custom to keep all data within your
trunk?
A. Because they were not exact and besides they were all
transferred to this paper and therefore I tore them up.
From this it expressly appears by the testimony of Balpiedad, that the
notes which he made on the ground at the time of the survey were not
exact and that these (inexact notes) were all transferred to this paper.
We must conclude, then, that even Exhibit C, according to the
testimony of Balpiedad himself (Rec., p. 84), is not a correct plan. Both
the trial court and the majority opinion of this court found that the
tract owned by Fianza is of irregular boundaries and contains about
183,000 square meters. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the record
giving even approximately the ares of Exhibit C.
We are of the opinion that the foregoing excerpts from the record
clearly show that the plaintiffs failed to prove that they occupied for
any period any well-defined, ascertainable tract of land in the mountain
of Antamoc, to the exclusion of all other persons. The testimony of all
of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, except Fianza himself, refer to the
land in question simply as the mines of Antamoc. Several witnesses
testified that Antamoc was a mountain and that the whole mountain
was knows as Antamoc and that all the land in said mountain was
mineral land.
It being clearly established, therefore, that Antamoc is a mountain and
is mineral land, a declaration that Dominguez or Fianza claimed mines
in Antamoc, no more identifies the location of such mines with the
particular mines now claimed by the plaintiffs than would a declaration,
that John Doc claimed mines in the mountains of China or in the gold
fields of Colorado, authorize said John Doe to claim title to a
particular mine within such district, or to receive the aid of the strong
arm of the law to prevent all comers from entering upon any particular
square foot of said land. There might be some reason for so holding if
the particular tract of land claimed constituted the only mines in

Antamoc; it appears, however, that the whole mountain of Antamoc is
mineral bearing, and that there are many mines there. Evidence that
the plaintiffs claim mines in Antamoc is absolutely no proof of
ownership of any particular tract within the limits of said mountain. If
the plaintiffs can claim the lands described in Exhibit C today, to the
exclusion of all other persons whomsoever, then they can, under the
same proof, contest the right of any other mine now open or hereafter
to be opened in said mountain.
It appears from the testimony that Clyde and other American miners
also located claims in Antamoc; some of them adjoining the alleged
lands in dispute, while many witnesses testified that there are Igorot
excavations over the whole of Antamoc mountain. It is believed that if
the plaintiff Fianza can claim this particular tract of land in question
that he can then successfully contest the right of any locater of a mine
in the mountain of Antamoc, for the reason that the testimony of all of
the witnesses was that Fianza had mines in Antamoc, with no further or
more definite description.
The majority opinion (p. 14), in referring that the testimony of the
American minders as to the mining customs of the Igorots, says:
In no event could this general testimony overcome the positive
testimony of plaintiffs witnesses, man having been presented who
testified that the land was worked exclusively by Fianza and his
ancestors and that other people were kept off.
We have examined the record in vain to find even a shred of evidence
supporting this statement. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the
record, which we have found, to show that Fianza and his
predecessors ever kept anybody off of this alleged tract of land or of
any other in the mountain of Antamoc. Aside from the fact that these
witnesses did not identify and land claimed in this suit, they did not
state that Dominguez claimed the exclusive right to the land in
Antamoc, or that he kept other people off . They made their statements
no stronger than that whether such mines were in one part or another
part of said mountain. The only evidence in the whole record which
purports to identify the land claimed by the plaintiffs and their
predecessors with that surveyed by Wagner and Balpiedad is the
testimony of one witness, Fianza, an interested part, and it has been
shown that he perjured himself.
Upon the question of the exclusive occupation by the plaintiffs of any
particular tract of land, it is confidently asserted that the plaintiff,
Fianza, never attempted to exclude anyone from the use and
occupation of any portion not only of the small tract of land here in
question but of any part of said mountain of Antamoc. We will allow the
record to support this statement:
Reavis testified:
Q. How long have you lived in Antamoc?
A. Since February, 1901.
Q. When did you arrive in the Philippine Islands?
A. In 1900; I believe in December.
Q. What experience have you had as a prospector?
A. Now about ten year or a little more.
Q. In what part of the United States did you prospect?
A. In New Mexico principally, Arizona, Colorado, and along the
Rio Grande River in Texas.
Q. When did you arrive in this Province of Benguet?
A. I believe on the 1st of December 1900 that is, in Baguio.
Q. Did you go to Antamoc?
A. Yes, sir.
Q Did you do any prospecting?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where?
A. I commenced and went to Bataan creek and I prospected the
country all about.
Q. When did you arrive at Antamoc?
A. February, 1901.
Q. What, if anything, did you do there in reference to
prospecting?
A. I went over the country, broke up rocks, and looked up in the
gulches.
Q. Where?
A. All over the Antamoc Mountain and in the river and all about.
Q. Did you make any location?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where?
A. In Antamoc.
Q. What if anything, did you do after locating claims at
Antamoc.
A. I located other claims, put up stakes, made out location
papers, got them recorded by the recorder, Clyde, who lived in
Antamoc.
Q. How was he made recorder?
A. By election of the miners.
Q. Where?
A. In Antamoc what they called the Antamoc district.
Q. Now, Mr. Ravies, what claims were located by you in March,
1901; what where the names of the locations?
A. Arizona, Texas, Mexico, New Mexico, Otec, and Apex.
Q. State to the court just what you did when you went to
Antamoc in the early part of 1901.
A. We went to Antamoc and found ground which to my
judgment was mineral; I put up my stakes; as I said before, I had them
put in record and proceeded to do my assessment work as we would
have done in the United States according to our rules.
Q. Was there anyone about the place when you located?
A. Yes, sir; Igorots and some Americans on the river.
Q. Did you make any injury in regard to the land around there?
A. I learned when we went to the creek that it was all located on the
west side of the creek and down to the bank on the south side of the
river and the prospectors all believe that the other side of the river was
the ground and land owned by Mr. Holman.
Q. What inquiries, if any, did you make of the natives that were
there?
A. I made no inquiries of any of them, because I could not speak
the language, but they told me voluntarily that mountain belonged to
Mr. Holman.
Q. Referring to what mountain?
A. Antamoc Mountain.
Q. Have you been in possession of the ground located by you in

March, 1901, since that time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have your performed work thereon since that time
continually?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. State whether or not you employed natives to assist in the
development?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many?
A. All of the natives that were living around me at the time.
Q. Was there any objection made by any one to your possession
and developing these claims?
A. None at all.
Q. When was the first objection, if any, made to your possessing
and developing these claims?
A. The firs objection coming directly to me was when I got a
paper from Governor Pack to come into Baguio in 1902.
Q. At any time prior to that date did the plaintiff Fianza or any
of the other plaintiffs in any manner object to you possession of said
claims or to your development of them?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did the plaintiff, Fianza, or any of the other plaintiffs ever
inform you or give you any information that they claimed any part of
the claims which you had located and were in possession of?
A. They did not.
Q. What stakes, if any, were upon the claims, when you located
them?
A. I found one small stake with H. Holman, registered 1896,
written in blue pencil on it.
Q. Did you find any other stakes?
A. I did not. The Igorot who showed me that one took me over to
show me the others and when we got to where he said they were, they
were gone. He said that the fire had burned them up.
Q. Did you make a sufficient investigation of that ground to be
able to state as to whether there were any other posts on that ground
located by you?
A. I have been over the ground more thoroughly than and Igorot
in all his lives and I never say any stakes.
Q. These stakes were placed there by Holman?
A. Yes, sir; from what the Igorot showed me it would indicate
that the post I had come to was the southwest corner post of Holmans
claim.
William Knauber, upon the question of the claim of Fianza to any
particular tract of land in Antamoc, says:
Q. What is your occupation?
A. Engineer.
Q. Did you follow your occupation as a land engineer?
A. Yes, sir; but in Colorado I was minning most of the time.
Q. How many years experience have you had in minning?
A. Five years.
Q. Where you ever in Benguet Province before?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. When?
A. January, February, and March, 1900.
Q. For what purpose?
A. Mining and prospecting.
Q. Do know the mining district of Antamoc?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where you there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When.
A. On the 9th day of January, 1900, at the Antamoc mining
claims.
Q. Did you do any prospecting?
A. Not to amount to anything; I was just looking around; that
was all.
Q. Did you make any inquiries as to whether or not there were
any mining claims in Antamoc?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How did you make the inquiries?
A. From the president of Itogon.
Q. Do you remember the president by name?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you know him by sight?

A. If I should see him.
Q. I will get you to look at Jose Fianza and get you to state if he
was the president of Itogon?
A. Yes, sir; he is the man; he was supposed to be the president;
he went with us to the mining property.
Q. Who was with you at the time you were at Antamoc inquiring
for claims?
A. It was a Spaniard by the name of Teodoro Miguel. He had
lived around in this country for nine years.
Q. What was said and done there [referring to the time when
Fianza went with the witness to the mining property]?
A. The Spaniards and I went to Itogon; we looked for the
president or some one who knew about this mining property; who it
belonged to, and who was supposed to own it. This man Fianza said he
knew the property and knew it belonged to Mr. Holman. I asked him
where it was and if he would go with us; so we went up there with
Fianza; I asked Fianza to show us Mr. Holmans stakes or lines; then he
said; Go over there further, and he pointed over the ravine and we
went across the river and up to the top of the hill where the slide was
and from up there be showed us the stake and pointed to other
different points down the river; one was up near the river and another
off a ways from the ravine which runs up the slide, as he pointed north
of northeast to the different stakes there; then I asked him if Mr.
Holman was supposed to own all this property as a mining claim and he
said yeas; it was all Mr. Holmans property.
Q. Do you remember the date of that conversation?
A. On the 9th of January, 1900.
Q. This property was at Antamoc?

A. Yes, sir; from the top of the hill above the slide.
Q. Did Fianza in that conversation make an claim to that
property to you?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did he make any claim to you of any mining claims?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did the Igorot Fianza tell you that he had mining property in
that part of Antamoc?
A. No, sir.
Q. What was the reason for going up there, then?
A. To show us the property that belonged to Holman.
Q. Did you pay him anything for going up there?
A. No, sir.
Antonio Robiera testifying with reference to the ownership of the
mines in Antamoc, said (p. 113):
Q. Where do you live?
A. La Trinidad. [This is a town located a few miles from Baguio in
the Province of Benguet.]
Q. How long have you lived in Trinidad?
A. Since 1890.
Q. What is your nationality?
A. Spanish.
Q. Are you acquainted with the Antamoc mining district?

A. Yes, sir; I have been there several times (p. 115).
Q. During any of your trips to the Antamoc mines or during your
residence in Benguet Province, did you ever hear of Fianza owning any
mines or claiming to own any mines?
A. No, sir.
Q. State if you know what was the general understanding
among the inhabitants of Benguet Province as to the ownership of the
mines at Antamoc?
A. I never heard any rumors about the ownership of those
mines.
Q. State whether or not it was generally understood in this
province that any persons was free to go to these mines and obtain gold
from them upon his own account.
A. I did not hear that the mines were worked by anyone in
particular, but what I do know is that everyone went there and worked
and got gold that is, everyone who wanted to.
Continuing upon the same question, Francisco Velancio testified as
follows:
That he was 76 years old and had lived in the Province of Benguet since
1880; that he was secretary of the province.
Q. Do you know Fianza?
A. Yes, I know him.
Q. Did you ever lived in Antamoc?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When were you living in Antamoc?
A. Since 1894.
Q. Do you know whether there are many mines in Antamoc?
A. Yes, sir; there are.
Q. Did you ever hear or know of Fianza claiming to be the owner
of any mines at Antamoc during Spanish times?
A. I never heard.
Q. Who worked in those mines during Spanish times?
A. The Igorots who lived there and any other Igorots who
wanted to work there.
Q. Could any Igorot who wanted to work there in those mines to
take out gold for his own use do so?
A. Some Igorots from Tublay and Kaybayan also go there to get
gold; I think they come because I never heard that anyone prohibited
them from doing so.
Q. During Spanish times did any one person claim to own these
mines?
A. I never observed any one person prohibiting it.
Q. Do you know Mr. Hans Holman?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did he make any claim to any mines in Antamoc?
A. I have been told so by him; yes, sir.
Q. When.
A. Before the arrival of the Americans.
Q. State whether or not any papers were prepared by you for

Mr. Holman relating to any mining claims before the Americans arrived
here.
A. Some papers Mr. Holman wanted me to give Fianza for
signature.
Q. Did you sign any papers for Mr. Holman?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were these papers taken to Fianza for his signature?
A. Yes, sir; Mr. Holman took these papers himself to get Fianzas
signature.
Q. Did you see this papers after he had taken them to Fianzas
signature?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what those papers were about?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. State if you know what the said papers related to.
A. It related to mines.
Q. Do you know what mines it related to?
A. The Antamoc mines.
Q. Did you buy any gold in Antamoc when you were living there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know whether the mines in Antamoc had any
particular owners during Spanish times or not?
A. I never heard of any owners of those mines.
Q. Did you ever hear of Fianza being the owner of or claiming to

be the owner of those mines during Spanish times?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you ever hear of Fianzas father, Dominguez, claiming to
be the owner of these mines during Spanish times?
A. No, sir; no one that I know of.
Q. Did you buy gold of the Antamoc mines?
A. Yes, sir; I bought gold.
Q. From whom did you buy gold?
A. I can not fix the names of the Igorots who sold me gold; if any
Igorot wanted to pa me 5 or 10 cents in gold. I exchanged salt and
clothing with them for their gold.
Q. Did they get that gold from the mines of Antamoc?
A. Some Igorots get it from that mine and sometimes they got it
from the rivers.
Q. Did you buy any gold from the father of Fianza?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you buy any gold from Fianza?
A. No, sir.
Q. What office have you held since 1894 under the Government?
A. I was secretary in Atoc in 1894, 95, and 96.
Q. Where you ever secretary of Baguio?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When?
A. In 1898.
Holman testified upon this question as follows:
Q. How long did you lived in the Philippine Islands?
A. Ten years.
Q. Did you ever live in Benguet Province?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did you go to Benguet Province?
A. In 1895.
Q. Do you know the Antamoc mining district in this province?
A. We denounced that mine; the papers which we made out
were burned up in thecomandancia during the Spanish government; we
commenced the document of that mine in 1896.
Q. What property did you denounce and how much of it and
where in Antamoc?
A. One hundred and twenty square meters is what we
denounced.
Q. What part of Antamoc Mountain did your claim cover?
A. On the side of the mountain, on the steep slope where there
many holes.
Q. Do you know where the barrio of Antamoc is?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know where the barrio of Ampasit is?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Do you know the place on the side of the hill called the slide?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Did your claim include the whole of that slide?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Do you know the plaintiff Fianza?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long you have known him?
A. It has been ten years.
Q. Do you know whether or not he knew that you had
commenced denunciation proceedings in regard to that mine at
Antamoc?
A. Yes sir; because he himself signed the papers saying it was
mine.
Q. When did he signed the papers?
A. I dont remember what date it was, because my father has
taken the papers away with him; the witness who was just on the stand
also signed the same here in the old tribunal in the room corresponding
to this one.
Q. Did Fianza pretend to be the owner of those mines at the
time?
A. No, sir; he never did say that; whoever liked could gold from
that mine; anyone could get gold from that mine; when I arrived there
he did not complain; he only said they were mine (Holmans). You may
go to Itogon and to Antamoc and everyone everywhere will tell you that
they are mine.
Q. I hand you plaintiffs Exhibit C. which purports to be plan of
the mine claimed in this suit by Fianza at Antamoc, which purports
include the place referred to by you as the slide. State to what extent
your denunciation took this in.
A. All above the river [placing his hand on the map]. The stakes
are there yet if have not been torn down. The same people there at
Antamoc put them there.
Q. Did you put up any stakes of any kind?
A. We changed these stakes in 1898; I went there three times.; I
went there in 1902; we have measured these mines three times and we
took Herman, the engineer, with us; it is possible he has the plan with
him.
Q. Did Igorots generally know that you had denounced mines at
Antomoc?
A. I should say so because they themselves say so.
Q. Do you know when the engineer Herman measured your
claimed?
A. I dont remember the year, but it was a long time ago.
Q. Who helped you to lay off these mines?
A. Herman.
Q. How many excavations did you find in the mine when you
went there?
A. I think five or six holes.
Q. When you were there the first time, was it, that Fianza signed
the papers stating that you were the owner of the mines individually?
A. No sir afterwards.
Q. How long after was it that Fianza signed these papers?
A. In 1897.
Q. Did any other Igorot sign that paper or a similar paper
besides?
A. Two chiefs rich men.
Q. Who else signed the documents?
A. Jose Cario, A coup; I dont remember the others.
Q. Is this paper, plaintiffs Exhibit C, the plan of the ground you
located?
A. It is.
Q. How do you know it is the same land that you denounced?
A. I went there myself.
Q. By what mark do you recognize that as the same land?
A. It is the same on which I placed stakes.
Q. Were your stakes placed in the same places as the stakes
indicated on this map?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you remember Mr. Reavis going to you before he made a
location in the Antamoc property and asking you whether or not you
had claims on that property?
A. Yes, sir; I remember.
Q. What did you tell him?
A. Take care, whether you want to work or not, If you like to
work, you work; I dont care about the mines.
Q. Did you put the stakes on the Antamoc Mountain yourself or

did an official do this for you?
A. No, sir; I myself with the Igorots of Antamoc.
H. Clay Clyde, in testifying as to the exclusive use by the plaintiff of the
land in question, said:
Q. When did you first go to the Antamoc mining district?
A. July, 1900.
Q. For what purpose?
A. To prospect.
Q. Did you prospect generally over the Antamoc district?
A. Yes, sir; I looked around quite a bit. The Igorots told me that I
belonged to Mr. Holman, so I looked around and as they had all the
land I came back to my camp; and afterwards in December of the same
year I went there to look it over again and I made some locations in
January, 1901.
Q. [Handing witness paper marked for identification "J."]
Assuming this to be an approximately accurate diagram of the Antamoc
mining district, state whether or not you saw a post with a cows head
on it near the junction of the trails leading to Gamoc, Itogon, and
Baguio.
A. Yes, sir; I saw that stake there.
Q. When did you first see that?
A. The first time I went there in July, 1900.
Q. State whether or not you saw any other mark in the way of a
tree with some stones in the branches of it.
A. The Igorots showed me that mark in December, 1900; it was

a tree on the side of the hill, perhaps a little south of east from my
house. I marked my house with the letter C.
Q. What did the Igorot say they presented?
A. He said it represented the limits of Holmans claim and
pointed off in the direction eastward toward another stake, so I never
interfered upon that ground.
Q. At the time the Igorot pointed out these marks to you, he
stated that they were Holmans claims. Did you believe it belonged to
Holman?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that the reason you didnt locate claims there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know where the claims of the defendant Reavis were
located?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. State whether or not the claims claimed by the defendant
Reavis were within the boundaries of the ground described to you by
the Igorot as being the claim of Holman?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did you first know the plaintiff Fianza claimed any
mining laws came out.
A. About the latter part of June or July, 1902, just before the
mining property in the vicinity?
Q. Were you in the neighborhood of these mines prior to that
time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you hear any Igorot or any person say or intimate that
Fianza had any claims there?
A. No; I never heard of anyone.
Q. Do you know whether or not the defendant Reavies has been
in possession of the mining claim staked out by him, as testified to by
you, in March, 1901?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Has he worked these mines since then?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Does he live on any of them?
A. Yes, sir.
Perry Iams testified upon the same question as follows:
Q. When did you first visit the district when the Americans
attempted to organize what is known as the Antamoc mining district?
A. The latter part of December, 1900.
Q. Do you know where the defendant Reavis has located claims
there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you prospect over that country?
A. I went over the country but I did not prospect it.
Q. Why not?
A. The secretary of the barrio there, when we went over the first
time, told me that the property there belonged to Mr. Holman, so I
didnt waste any time prospecting there.
Q. Did you make any attempt to find out what property Holman
claimed there?
A. Yes, sir; I asked the secretary to show me the extent of
Holmans claim and he sent an Igorot with me to show me the stakes
which Holman had placed up there.
Q. Do you know what the ground was pointed out to you as
being claimed by Holman at the time?
A. Yes, sir; I remember very distinctly that ground.
Q. Point out to the court the ground that was pointed out to you
as being Holmans claim, with reference to the claim as now held and
claimed by the defendant Reavis.
A. Well, Mr. Reaviess claim would be inside the lines that they
claimed belonged to Mr. Holman at the time.
Q. The whole of his claim be inside?
A. Yes, sir; all of his claim would be inside the lines.
Q. Did you see any work done there south of the river, near the
junction of the trails that run to Gamoc, Itogon, and Baguio?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What kind of a post did you see there?
A. The post was 7 or 8 feet high, with a cows head fixed onto it.
Q. Was there any other sign seen by you?
A. Yes, sir; a tree north of there, or a little west of north, and

locked up in the branches of the tree were some stones, and they told
me it was the other corner of Mr. Holmans ground.
Q. Who called your attention to these points?
A. The Igorot who had showed to me Mr. Holmans claim.
Q. Did he indicate any other point?
A. He showed me there stakes and then pointed to where the
other corner was.
Q. Do you know when Mr. Reavis located there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When?
A. I think he located his first claim there in March, 1901?
Q. Do you know whether or not he staked that out in 1901?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How do you know?
A. I saw his stakes there.
Q. Did any Igorot, during the time you were there, ever claim
any mining property?
A. No, sir.
Q. When did you first learn that Fianza claimed any mining
property in that district?
A. I dont remember the exact date; it was quite a long time after
I had been living at Antamoc about a year after before I knew he
ever claimed any mining land there.
Q. Was Mr. Reavis in possession of mining claims there many

months before you heard of Fianza claiming any interest in that
property?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. During the time did you see any Igorots working for Mr.
Reavis?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long did you work for him (Mr. Reavis)?
A. About two weeks.
Q. What kind of work were you doing for Mr. Reavis?
A. Driving tunnels.
Q. Where?
A. On his claim in Antamoc.
Q. Can you state whether or not that the work was done on the
same property which he now claims?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did anyone object to you did Mr. Reavis or any of his other
employees working on said claim?
A. No, sir.
Q. You were working during the daytime?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where you living at that time?
A. In Antamoc.
Q. Where was Mr. Reavis living at that time?
A. On his claim in the same house he is living in now.

Fred Steuber testified upon the same question as follows:
Q. Have you been down to the Antamoc district?
A. I came there in October, 1901.
Q. What did you do there in 1901?
A. I was working for Mr. Reavis in the mine at the gold mines.
Q. Where was Mr. Reavis mining at the time?
A. Antamoc.
Q. How long did you work for him?
A. About three months.
Q. Where there any other persons working for him while you
were working for him?
A. Yes, sir; Igorots.
Q. Do you know the claims he is now claiming?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that the same ground that you were working in 1901?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. During the time you were working for Mr. Reavis did anyone
object to his working those claims?
A. No, sir; not to my knowledge.
Q. During that time did you hear any Igorot claiming any part of
those mines or claims?
A. From what I understood from the Igorots there, they said that
Mr. Reavis was foolish to work those mines as they belonged to
Holman; I did not know Holman at the time; I did not hear them say
that they belonged to any Igorots there.
Nelson Peterson, testifying upon the same question, said:
Q. Are you acquainted with the district known as the Antamoc
mining district?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did you go there?
A. In the year 1901, in February.
Q. What were you doing there?
A. Prospecting; locating claims.
Q. While you were prospecting there was any mention made of
any property interests there?
A. Yes, sir; I understood that Holman had some property
interests there.
Q. Do you know whether Mr. Reavis has any mining claims at
the present time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. State where the property is which was pointed out to you as
Holmans property, with reference to the claims owned by Reavis.
A. It covers practically the same property.
Q. Do you know where Reavis lives?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Does he live on any part of the claims he stacked out in the

early part of 1901?
A. Yes, sir.
H. P. Whitmarsh testified upon the same question as follows:
Q. What official position, if any, did you ever occupy in the
Province of Benguet?
A. First governor under American occupation.
Q. Were you Benguet Province before you were appointed
governor?
A. Yes, sir; nearly a year before.
Q. State as near as you can when you first came to Baguio?
A. The later part of December, 1899, or the beginning of
January, 1900.
Q. Do you know the district known as the Antamoc mining
district?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you ever go there?
A. Yes, sir; I went there to get information about the mines of
the country.
Q. Do you know the plaintiff Fianza?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. State whether or not you saw him when you first came to this
province.
A. I stayed with him in Antamoc when I first went there.
Q. What position did he occupy at that time?

A. I understood he was president.
Q. Did you ever talk with him in reference to the mines in
Antamoc
A. All about the mines in the vicinity; he advised me to go to
Antamoc to look at them.
Q. What did he say in reference to the Antamoc mines?
A. He said that Holman owned the place where they were.
Q. Did Fianza at that time tell you that he owned any part of
that mine?
A. No. sir.
Q. Did you go to him for the purpose of obtaining information
regarding these miens?
A. I asked him about them the time I came back to Itogon; I
went there first and then came back and stayed with Fianza and then he
told me that Holman had denounced some claims there.
Q. Did you hear any other person say that Holman had held
mining property there or had denounced some claims?
A. His father wrote me about it and some Igorot whom I met in
Antamoc pointed out the hill of Antamoc as belonging to Holman, and
Holman told me so himself.
Q. Did they point out that hill on your first trip there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the defendant Reavis?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you remember when he first came to Baguio?

A. Yes, sir; in the fall of 1900.
Q. Have you any personal knowledge of his locating any mines
at Antamoc?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know when they were located?
A. In the beginning of 1901.
Q. When did you first learn of Fianza making claim to mines in
Antamoc?
A. When he came to the tribunal and spoke of it.
Q. When was that?
A. As I remember some time about June or July, 1901, I should
say while I was governor.
Q. After you had seen the stakes pointed out to you by Mr.
Reavis as his claim?
A. Yes, sir.
J. E. Kelly testified upon the same question as follows:
Q. What is your occupation?
A. Mining.
Q. How long have you resided at Bua?
A. Three years.
Q. Have you been engaged in the occupation of mining during
all that time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did you first enter the Province of Benguet?

A. About January, 1901.
Q. For what purpose did you go there at that time?
A. To mine.
Q. And to what particular parts of the province did you go?
A. Pretty much all over the province.
Q. Are you familiar with the district known as Antamoc?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you visit that district on that trip in January, 1901?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you become familiar with the mining conditions at
Antamoc at that time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you familiar with the property that is now claimed by J. F. Reavis
under the mining location staked by him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you become familiar with the property in January, 1901?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you state what was the condition of that property when
you first became familiar with it ?
A. When I first became familiar with it there were some natives
working there who were, as I was told, working for Holman; that is, the
gold they recovered was to be turned over to Holman and they were to
receive so much per ounce for every ounce they recovered.
Q. Do you know Mr. Holman?

A. I know his father.
Q. When did you become acquainted with his father?
A. In March or April, 1901.
Q. In relation to what matter did you become acquainted with
him?
A. I went to see Mr. Holman with a view to purchasing his
Antamoc holdings.
Q. What, if anything, transpired at that conference with
Holman?
A. I asked him with referrence to his holdings in the Antamoc
district, and he told me that he had a mine there that his brother had
been looking after for him no, not his brother, his son rather. I asked
him if the property was for sale and he said that it was; when I asked
him what the price was I dont remember now just what figure he did
place on it, but it was out of the question and I told him I couldnt
consider it. Some time later he sent for me and gave me a more
reasonable price. I question him then in regard to the title; he told me
that he had secured his first papers on the mines and would have had
the final papers had it not been for the Spanish-American war. He also
showed me the report made by Mr. Herman, the German mining
engineer, who was in Manila at that time. In this report Herman advised
Holman to raise $100,000 gold for prospecting purposes on the
Antamoc mines. I learned that the property had been restaked by the
Americans, after that, so I dropped it and had nothing more to do with
it.
Q. Are you familiar with the location of the lands concerning
which you negotiated with Mr. Holman? Do you know what mines they
were that he was offering you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what they are? Do you know just where they
lie? that is what I mean by being familiar with their location.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where do they lie with reference to the mining lands which
are claimed by Mr. Reavis?
A. Practically the same ground.
Q. So far as you know, then, Mr. Holman was the undisputed
owner of the mines in question?
A. Yes, sir; so far as I learned in the district.
Q. Do you know Jose Fianza?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long have you known him?
A. Three years,
Q. Did you meet him during your trip in January, 1901?
A. No, sir. I did not.
Q. When did you first meet him?
A. I may have met him later on in January, 1901- no; I met him
in November, 1902.
Q. Then Fianza was not in possession of the Antamoc mines in
January, 1901?
A. Not that I ever heard of; I never knew anything of it.
Q. When you met Jose Fianza, between that time and the
present time, have you discussed mining matters in the province of
Benguet with him?
A. Not anything further than that Mr. Fianza, when Governor
Pack sent his private secretary to locate this claim of Reavis, they came
to my place. They went down and located the ground, staked it out, and
returned to Baguio to the recorders office to have it recorded. Fianza,
on his way home, came by my place and stopped and offered me the
claim that he had just located or did not offer it to me; he told me it
was for sale for $25,000.
Q. Was that the first time that you knew of Fianza having a
claim on any mine at Antamoc?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When was this, with reference to the location of Reaviss
claim? Was it before or after?
A. I should judge it was a year or such a matter after.
Q You are positive it was after and before?
A I am very positive
Q. Had you known Fianza previous to this time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Had ever claimed to be the owner of these Antamoc mines to
this time?
A. Never.
It is confidently contended that a careful reading of the testimony of
the witnesses quoted above will justify the following propositions:
First. That the plaintiff Fianza prior to the commencement of this action
did not claim or pretended to claim the exclusive right to occupy any
particular tract or parcel of land in the mountain of Antamoc.
Second. That he made no effort to prevent the working and occupation
by alone mine in said mountain.
Third. That Holman took possession of a well-defined tract of land in
said mountain, covering the present claims of the defendant, in the year
1896, without any objection or protest from the plaintiff Fianza or any
of the other coplaintiffs.
Fourth. That the defendant, Reavis, found the lands or claims now in
question unoccupied by anyone in the early part of the year 1901, and
that he took possession of the same peaceably, without protest or
objection from the plaintiffs or any one of them.
Fifth. That neither the plaintiff Fianza nor any of the other plaintiffs
attempted to occupy the particular tract or parcel of land in question or
any other tract of parcel of land in the mountain of Antamoc for mining
purposes, or for any other purposes, to the exclusion of all
other persons.
The defendant did not dispossess the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were not
in possession of the particular tract or parcel of land at the time the
defendant took possession. The lower court, upon this question, made
the following finding of fact (bill of exception, p. 33): The court finds
that the defendant, John F. Reavis, entered upon the mines owned and
claimed by the plaintiffs in the year 1901, and staked out his three
claims therefrom, under the honest belief that the game was included in
an abandoned, forfeited Spanish grant of one Hans Holman, and that at
that time of his first entry thereon, and the setting of his stakes he had
no actual knowledge that the Igorots, who were then living upon the
lands, claimed the ownership of said mines.
The lower court makes the further finding of fact in reference to the
entry of the defendant upon the lands in question (bill of exceptions, p.
24): In the month of March, 1901, the defendant entered upon the
lands embraced in and next to the mines of the said plaintiff, upon the
information that said mines of the plaintiffs, had been located under the
Spanish Mining Law by one Hans Holman, in the year 1896, and that
this mine and mines were abandoned by said Hans Holman, and that
they were vacant mineral and mining lands, proceeded to stake and
located these claims under the mining laws in force in the United
States.
The lower court makes the statement that the plaintiff immediately
protested to the defendant against his occupation of said mines. It is
confidentially asserted that there is not a single word of proof in the
record to support this finding of fact. The defendant states in his
testimony that the plaintiff never made a protest to him personally in
reference to his occupancy of the said mines. The plaintiff, Fianza,
states in more than one instance that he protested to other; he does
not state that he made a protest to the defendant. The lower court in
its decision (bill of exceptions, p. 25) attempts to make it appear that in
May, 1902, the defendant, by an agreement entered into before the
governor of the Province of Benguet, recognized the rights of the
plaintiff to the possession of said lands. The attorney for the plaintiffs,
however, in this court makes no such contention. He says: The
agreement of May, 1902, did not, and was not intended to , affect the
rights of either party. A reading of the agreement entered into
between the parties hereto before said governor fully justifies the
statement of the attorney for the plaintiffs.
Notwithstanding the conclusions of the lower court, that the plaintiff
had occupied the particular tract of land to the exclusion of all others
for so many years, it finds (bill of exceptions, p. 36) that the plaintiffs
in this case, during the entire time of the occupancy of these Islands by
Spain and up to the date of the transfer of sovereignty to the United
States (April 11, 1899), did not gain, nor could they gain under the laws
then in force, and right, title, or interest to the mines in question nor
the minerals therein by virtue of their possession, and the working of
the same. The doctrine of prescription as against the Crown of Spain

never applied to the mineral lands of the Philippine Islands.
It is clear, therefore, that any right of the plaintiff herein must have its
origin in legislation had subsequent to the American occupation. The
plaintiff had done nothing at any time up to the time of the conclusion
of this action in the court below to comply with the act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, which act was extended to the Philippine Islands on
August 14, 1902, while upon the other hand, the defendant, honestly
and in good faith, took peaceable possession of the lands which he
claims, and attempted and did comply with the rules and regulations
applicable to mineral lands in the United States, and immediately upon
the promulgation of the act of Congress took all of the steps required in
said act to locate and record his claims.
It is insisted that one who claims mineral land under the act of Congress
in force in these Islands must define the site of the ground with such
certainty as may be necessary to prevent mistake on the part of the
Government and on the part of citizens who may be asking a like
benefit. This requirement placed upon all persons claiming mineral
lands is but a reasonable and necessary requirement in order to justify
administer the law, and therefore a description of the location of
mineral lands which is indefinite and uncertain, for the purposes of
holding a particular tract of land, is void. (Faxon vs.Bernard, 4 Fed. Rep.,
702,)
The lower court in its decision (bill of exceptions, p. 19) admitted that
the description of the lands in question was so indefinite and uncertain
that the court could not determine the exact nature of the conflict of
lines and boundaries. If the court, while it had the witnesses in its
presence, could not be determine the exact nature of the conflict of
lines and boundaries of the lands in dispute, how can it justify its
perpetual injunction which it granted against the defendant to prevent
him from entering upon and lands? The court further says, in discussing
the question of the title to the lands (bill of exceptions, p. 34:: and
definite in all respects,, save one; that one exceptions relates to the
exact boundary lines of the opposing claimants in reference to the their

relations with each other. It is submitted, therefore, that the evidence
produced during the trial in said cause was not sufficient to show that
the plaintiff had occupied a definite, well-defined tract of land to the
exclusion of all others.
The plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of the extraordinary,
equitable remedy of the injunction until he had proved that he was the
owner of, or entitled to the possession, of, a well defined tract of land
or mine, marked certain lines and limits. He must first show that he had
a right of the possession of the said tract, not only against the
Government of the Philippine Islands but was well against the
defendant (Gwillim vs. Donnellan, 115, U.S., 45.)
It is admitted that the defendant, some time after the promulgation of
the act of Congress in these Islands, attempted to comply with the
requirements thereof, in locating and recording his claims and that the
plaintiffs did nothing toward complying with the said law. It is also
admitted that the plaintiffs, at the time of the transfer of Spanish
sovereignty over the Philippine Islands to the United States, had no
right, title, nor interest in the lands in question. Bearing these facts in
mind, it is contended that the mere naked possession of a mining claim
upon public land is not sufficient to hold such claim as against
subsequent location, made in the pursuance of the law, and kept alive
by a compliance therewith.
In the present case the plaintiffs attempted to stand upon the bare
possession, without a location or record against the defendant, who
had a location and record. Under such circumstances there is no
presumption of title in favor of the party in possession; but, if there
was, he who shows a valid location as against naked possession has the
better right. (Noyes vs. Black, 4 Montana, 534, 2 Pac. Rep., 769;
Hopkins vs. Noyes, 2 Pac. Rep., 280; Le Landle vs. McDonald, 13 Pac.
Rep., 349.)
The case of Belk vs. Meagher (104 U.S., 279) is cited by the majority
opinion to support the doctrine laid down in its decision. A careful
reading of that decision supports rather the contention of the

defendant. The court in that case said: Under the provisions of the
Revised Status relied on, Belk could get a patent for the claim
attempted to locate unless he secured what is here made the
equivalent of a valid location by actually holding and working for the
requisite time. If he actually held possession and worked the claim long
enough and kept all others out his right to a patent would be complete.
He had no grant of any right of possession. His ultimate right to a
patent depended entirely on his keeping himself in and all others out,
and if he was not actually in, he was in law, out. In the same case the
court continues: A peaceful adverse entry, coupled with a right to hold
the possession, which was thereby acquired, operated as an ouster
which broke the continuity of his (Belks) holding and deprived him of
that title he might have got if he had kept for the requisite length of
time. He had made no such location as prevented the lands from being,
in law, vacant. Others had the right to enter for the purpose of taking
them up if it could be done peaceably and without force.
The following facts are admitted in the present case: First, that the
plaintiffs up to the time of the trial of said cause in the lower court,
even though the law had been in force in these Islands for nearly two
years, had made no attempt to definitely located or record their claims;
second, that the defendant entered upon the lands he claims peaceably
and without opposition; third, that the defendant continued in
possession of said land until the injunction was granted by the lower
court; fourth, that immediately upon being informed of the
requirements under the said act of Congress he complied therewith;
fifth, that about eighteen months prior to the date of the said act of
Congress the defendant had located the mines in question and
performed the work upon them as required by the statutes of the
United States.
Our next proposition is, that it was not the custom of the Igorots, a
mountain tribe occupying the hills of the Province of Benguet, to
occupy any parcel or tract of land, either of mining or for farming
purposes, to the exclusion of other members of the same tribe. The

majority opinion says that the plaintiff had worked the particular mines
in question for fifty years or more. There is no better proof of the fact
that this statement is false than the fact that no excavations were found
upon the said land at the time the defendant went there, which a half a
dozen men might not have made in one days operation.
As to the custom of the Igorots to move from one place to plane and
not to abide permanently in or occupy any particular place, we desire
to record the answer. Fianza himself (record, p.4) states: The
excavations were not the same; there were many different classes of
excavations some of 1 fathom depth and some 2 fathoms deep. Our
custom is if we do not find gold in 1 fathom or 2 fathoms, we work
another place until we do find some.
Mateo Cario (Igorot) (record, p. 40) said that the Igorots moved the
holes to find the veins.
Reavis (record, p. 34) stated that the character of the mining done by
the Igorots was what is called in the United States gophering.
Clyde (record, p. 147) said: The custom among the Igorots was to dig
little holes and follow up little stringers where they could see a little
free gold, and then they would put rocks on rocks and grind them out
and sell it for what they could go for it. They never located an claims to
property. They would go into the ground and work as long as any gold
and was there and then another Igorot would come along and find a
little gold and he would continue and an of them that came along
would work at any place they wanted to; they never claimed ownership
for any length of time; they would work in one place and may be for
one week; they would work in one place a week and the next place
they might be working would be a mile from there in another entirely
different place.
Iams (record, p. 158) said as to the custom of the Igorots: As near as I
could find out the Igorot miners mine wherever they can find any gold,
regardless of any claims; they never claim any mining property. From
what I have seen there they hunt for rich stringers; when they find one
they follow it and work it out like we call gophering in the United
States.
Fred Stenber (record, p. 165) said: There were some small holes all
over the country.
Kelly said (record, pp. 6, 7, and 8), in answering to the question. What
would you say concerning the custom of the Igorots with reference to
the ascertain of exclusive property right over mining claims?
Igorots go to mining, as a rule, every year, after the rainy season, and
maybe a certain Igorot will mine on one river this year and the next
year he will be off on some other stream or on some other quartz lode,
just the same; he will find a small little stringer, as we call them, where
you can see some free gold. He will work that out until he gets tired of
it and then he will go to some other place and another one; maybe
some other Igorot will come along and go into the one that he has left
and work that a while in that way and then run over the whole country
and work in a little hole here and a little hole there, and they work it
until they are tired of it and then go to some place else.
Q. While an Igorot is working his discovery of a pocket, or
stringer as you term, it, for how great a distance does he exclude other
Igorots from working?
A. Well, very often he allows several of them to go in with him
and he gives them an equal interest in what they recover; he will allow
several of his friends to go in and help him to work and give them all
equal interest in what they recover.
Q. In the same pocket?
A. Yes, sir; he dont exclude then at all; he just claims the little
hole he is in, 2 by 4, just big enough to crawl in.
Q. And when you speak of admitting other persons on equal

shares with him, you mean admit them to the same little hole in which
he is working?
A. Yes, sir; the same place.
Q. Now, for how long does he claim ownership of that particular
hole or pocket?
A. Well, it depends a good deal on how far this little streak of
pay, as they call it, will extend; maybe they will work a month and
maybe a week.
Q. Then I understand you to say he claims it only during such
time as he is working it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. He does not exercise any claim of ownership over it after he
has ceased work?
A. No. sir.
Q. Have you known Jose Fianza to have conducted any mining
operations upon these Antomoc mines?
A. No, sir; I have not any more than the natives who recover
gold any place in the district; that are supposed to take it to Fianza.
Q. Take it him for what purpose?
A. To pay their indebtedness or to sell it to him for whatever he
had a mind to pay for it. I have been told by some of the oldest Igorots
in that district that Fianza at one time used to pay a medio peso for
what was considered an ounce of gold.
Q. By virtue of what did this arrangement exist?
A. As near as I can learn he is the high chief of the barrio (or

tribe) and they all looked up to him as such.
Q. Did it exist because of any ownership or claim of ownership
on the part of Fianza of these or any particular mines?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Robiera, a Spaniard who had lived in the Province of Benguet for ten or
twelve years, testified as to this custom as follows:
Q. Do you know that custom that was in vogue in Spanish times
with referrence to mining in Antamoc mining district?
A. The custom that they had for working those mines was that
any Igorot who wanted to went there and worked and then sold the
gold, but I never heard or knew of anyone claiming to be the owner of
the mines.
Q. State to the court how you learned that custom.
A. I learned it by going over it selling goods; I saw that all the
Igorots sold me gold and that it was the custom of everyone who
wanted to go there and get out gold from those mines.
Francisco Valencio, who had lived in the Province of Benguet for many
years and had been an official there under the Spanish Government,
testified as to the custom of the Igorots as follows:
Q. Who worked in those mines during Spanish times?
A. The Igorots who lived there and any other Igorots who
wanted to work there.
Q. Could any Igorots who wanted to work there in those mines,
to take out gold for his own use, do so?
A. Some Igorots from Tublay and Kaybayan also go there to get

gold. I think they could because I never heard that anyone prohibited
them from so doing.
Q. During Spanish times they did any person claim to own these
mines?
A. I never observed any one person prohibiting any other person
from working there.
The foregoing excerpts from the record from the testimony of men who
had been in the district, who had studied the conditioned there, and
became acquainted with the customs of the Igorots certainly justify the
conclusions that the Igorots never occupied a mine anywhere to the
exclusion of all of any other persons.
The majority opinion (p. 14) attempts to discredit the testimony of
these witnesses, particularly the American miners, by the following
statement: All these witnesses had mining claims similar to that of
Reavis.
Notwithstanding this attempt to discredit these witnesses, whose
testimony was not attacked during the trial of said cause, it will be
observed that this custom is corroborated by Fianza himself, by Juan
Cario, Mateo Cario, Robiera and Francisco Valencio, who were not
American miners and who have no reason to misstate the facts by
reason of personal interest.
The majority opinion, in an effort evidently to reflect upon the registry
and honest purpose of the defendant, Reavis, in taking up this
particular land, refers to the miners. This imputation as to the honesty
of the defendant is not justified by the record. It is confidently believed
that one can not read the testimony of the defendant himself without
reaching the conclusion that he is stating the truth.
It is admitted (p. 18 of the majority opinion) that the plaintiff never
acquired any title to the property in question by virtue of the provisions
of the Spanish law, and that said property was, at the time of the
Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States, public property and
that these lands are public lands to which the provisions of the act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, are applicable; the right of the plaintiff,
therefore, if he has any; is not of prescription only. Section 45 of said
act of Congress provides that where such person or association, they
and their grantors, have held and worked their claims for a period equal
to the time prescribed by the statute of limitations in the Philippine
Islands, evidence of such possession and working of the claims for such
period shall be sufficient to establish the right to a patent thereto
under this act, in the absence of any adverse claim. This provision of the
act of Congress makes applicable to mining claims the statute of
prescription in force in the Philippine Islands at that time.
The statute of prescription in force in the Philippine Islands on the 1st
of July, 1902, are sections 38, 40, and 41, of the Code of Procedure in
Civil Actions, known as Act No. 190 of the Philippine Commission. It is
very questionable the whether the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of
the period of prescription provided for in these sections. Said section
38 expressly provides that this chapter shall not apply to actions has
already commenced or to cases wherein the right of action has already
accrued, but the statute in force when the action or right of action
accrued shall be applicable to such cases.
Section 40 provides that the period of prescription as to real property
shall be ten years, or, in other words, that an action for the recovery of
title to or possession of real property or a case thereunder can only be
brought within ten years after the cause of such action accrues. The
plaintiff claim that he and his ancestors have been in possession of such
land for fifty or more years. If that be true, had not the cause of action
in favor of the plaintiff already accrued before the date of the act of
Congress or the when said act of the Philippine Commission went into
fore? If, then, the cause of action had actually already accrued prior to
the date of these respective acts, the question is, Does said provisions
of the act of the Commission apply to the plaintiff or must he rely upon
the prescriptive rights given them, existing in the Philippine Islands

prior to that date? We make no finding upon the answer to this
question for the reason that we believe that even granting that the
provisions of said act of the Philippine Commission are applicable to the
claims of the plaintiff here, has not shown his right to the possession of
said land under said act of the Philippine Commission.
Said section 40 provides that ten years actual adverse possession by
any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any
land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy . . . shall
vest in that actual occupant or possessor of such land, a full and
complete title; but order to constitute such title by prescription or
adverse possession, the possession by the claimant . . . must have
beenactual, open, public, continuos, under a claim of titles exclusive of
any other right and adverse to all other claimants. We contend that
the testimony adduced in this case and quoted above clearly
demonstrated that the plaintiff had not been in the actual, open,
public, continuos possession, under a claim of title adverse to all other
claimants not only not for ten years, but for no period at all. We call
attention to the testimony quoted above relating to the actual
possession of said property in support of this statement.
The majority opinion treats the provisions of this prescriptive law as
though an actual dispossession of the property was necessary to
interrupt the running of the statute in their favor. The provisions of the
law provide, however, in addition to the fact that the possession must
have been actual, that it shall have been open and public, exclusive of
any other right and adverse to all other claimants whatsoever. The
actual and continuos possession of the plaintiff was interrupted
certainly by Holman six or eight years before the commencement of the
action of the plaintiff; and by the defendant more than two years
before the commencement of his action; if not also by Francisco
Valencio ten or twelve years before the beginning of the action by the
plaintiff.
One of the conditions of prescriptive title under section 41 is that the

claim to title must be a public. A large majority of the witnesses both
for the plaintiffs and the defendant testified that they understood and
believed the mines in question, at the time Reavis took possession of
the same, belonged to Holman. The trial court even found that Reavis
located his claims believing the land belonged to Holman. This belief
was so strong in the minds of some of the witnesses who were
attempting to locate mines in the Province of Benguet (Knouber,
Reavis, and Kelly) that they visited Holman and negotiated with him for
the purchase of said mines. Why did they do this? Because it was a
matter of public rumor and public knowledge in Antamoc and vicinity
that the mines at that time belonged to Holman and not to Fianza. The
record also discloses that Fianza himself told some of the American
miners, who went into said province, that said mines belonged to
Holman.
We respectively submit as a proposition of law, even admitting that the
plaintiffs had actual possession of a well-defined, described parcel of
land in the mountain of Antamoc, that such actual possession had been
interrupted on at least three different occasions prior to the
commencement of their action and that such interruption of the actual
possession, though it was unlawful, had the effect of stopping the
running of the statute of prescription in favor of the plaintiffs. If the
possessor of land permits his possession to be interrupted, although
unlawfully, his possession can not be called continuos for the purpose
of applying the provisions of said section 41.
The majority opinion (p. 11) quotes the following from the opinion of
the trial court:
He (Reavis) went to Antamoc to stake out land for mines that the
believed was claimed by another in the vernacular of the miner, to
jump Hans Holmans claim. He was not prospecting for a mine and for
hidden minerals; he went to locate a mine already discovered and
mineral uncovered and worked for more than half a century. He found
honest American prospectors already there with claims stated at all

about the land that they believed was claimed by another, for the
protection of which opened, developed, and worked mine the rumor of
an owner was amply sufficient to protect it from invasion and trespass.
This statement has the effect:
(1) To convict Reavis of bad faith and to hold him up to the scorn of
honest men by saying that he jumped a claim which had therefore
been respected by all honest American miners; and
(2) To show that what he did was to locate an open, developed mine.
The statements in the above quotation are absolutely false and do an
injustice to an honest American miner and should be corrected. It
appears from the record that Reavis, after being told by the Igorots that
this mine belonged to Holman, went to Holman to see him about such
claims. This act of the defendant demonstrates that he acted in
absolute good faith.
The statement in the majority opinion to the effect that the ownership
of these claimants (plaintiffs) to these mines was well known and
understood generally among the natives and residents of the Province
of Benguet, including the Spanish officials, is absolutely unsupported by
a scintilla of evidence in the record. There is not a word of evidence in
the record that the Spanish officials ever recognized or understood that
Fianza or his ancestors were the owners of any mines whatsoever.
It is alleged that the plaintiff Fianza claimed the possession of the
particular parcel of land in question by a statement made on the 31st of
January, 1901, for the purposes of taxation before the secretary of the
pueblo, which shows that he was then in possession of said land. This
statement is found in Exhibit A of the plaintiffs. An examination of this
statement of the plaintiffs neither shows that he was in possession of
said land nor the location of the same. His statement there is just as
indefinite and uncertain, relating to the specific tract of land, as his

statement made before the court during the trial of said cause.
The record fully shows that the defendant, Reavis, early in the year
1901, took possession without protest of the land which he claims and
which is definitely described in the record, under the custom and in
conformity with the laws of the United States relating to mines,
recorded his claims, performed work upon said mines, and continued in
possession of the same up to and including the time when he received
notice of the provisions of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902; that
immediately upon receiving notice of the provisions of said act he
complied with the conditions thereof with reference to making
affidavits and filing a record of his claims and staking the same out
marking them out-so that any person traveling in that part of the
mountain might become aware of the exact location of his claims. The
plaintiffs, even at the time of the commencement of their action
(1904), had taken not steps to comply with the said act of Congress.
The record shows that until the time the injunction was granted in this
case by the lower court the defendant had performed work upon his
respective claims in conformity with the provisions of said act of
Congress; that he had done everything required of him by the law; that
the plaintiffs had done nothing to comply with the provisions of the
said act of Congress. It is not denied that the defendant had complied
with the provisions of the said act of Congress.
We agree with the majority opinion that this court can not reverse the
decision of the lower court until it appears that the finding made by the
trial court is plainly and manifestly against the weight of evidence.
We agree with this doctrine, but firmly submit that there is nothing in
the record, beyond the declaration of Fianza himself, which shows that
the plaintiffs ever occupied the particular tract of ground now
claimed, while there is absolutely no evidence of any character to show
that they occupiedany land to the exclusion of all other persons. The
evidence is all to the contrary.
The court finds that the plaintiffs and their ancestors have been
working these mines for generations. Fianza, have been working these
miens for generations. Fianza, himself, testified that if they did not find
gold in 1 or 2 fathoms they made another place until they did find
something.
The lower court attempted to defeat the claim of the defendant by the
statement that the defendant had not complied with the act of
Congress providing for the location and operation of mineral claims
within the Philippine Islands. It is asserted that the evidence adduced
during the trial of the cause does not support this finding of fact, but,
even granting that the defendant did not comply with every detail of
the act of Congress with exactness, it was not in the mouth of the
plaintiff to raise this objection, for the reason that he had made no
attempt to comply with the law himself. Furthermore, section 29 of the
said act provides that failure on the part of a locator of mineral claims
to comply with any of the foregoing provisions of said section shall not
be deemed to invalidate such location if upon the facts it shall appear
that such locater has actually discovered mineral in place upon such
location, and that there has been, upon his part, a bona fide attempt to
comply with the provisions of this act, and if the no-observance of the
formalities hereinbefore referred to is not of a character calculated to
mislead other persons desiring to locate claims in the vicinity,
One can not read the record of what the defendant did in his attempt
to locate and record his claim without reaching the conclusion that
there has been, upon his part, a bona fide attempt to comply with the
provision of the act, and that , if there was a failure, which is not
admitted, such failure is not of a character calculated to mislead other
persons desiring to locate claims in the vicinity.
From all the foregoing statement of facts, and from through
examination of the evidence adduced at the trial of said cause, we
reach the following conclusions:
First. That the lands claimed by the plaintiffs are not described in their
complaint with sufficient certainty or definiteness to support a
judgment in their favor, nor to justify the court in granting an injunction
to prevent the defendant from entering upon the lands which they
claim.
Second. that the evidence adduced at the trial of the cause does not
disclose how or in what manner the lands claimed by the plaintiffs
conflict with the lands occupied by the defendant.
Third. That the evidence adduced does not show that the plaintiffs or
any one of them have ever possessed or mined any particular tract of
land under claim of ownership to the exclusion of all others.
Fourth. That the possession of the plaintiffs has not been actual, open,
public, continuous, uninterrupted, under claim of title exclusive of any
other right, and adverse to all other claims.
Fifth. That the evidence does not disclose that the possession off the
plaintiffs, if any exclusive possession at all proved, is that possession,
nor does it constitute that exclusive holding and working contemplated
by section 45 of the Philippine Bill or by the statutes of prescription in
force in the Philippine Islands.
Sixth. That the evidence does not disclose that possession of the mines
claimed by the plaintiffs was continuous and exclusive of all other
persons, and that such possession had been uninterrupted, without
interference or adverse claim of any kind.
Seventh. That the evidence does not disclose that the plaintiffs made
any protest against the occupation of said land to the defendant, to
Holman, or to Valencio.
Eighth. that the evidence does not disclose that the plaintiffs ever made
any attempt, prior to the commencement of this action in this court
below, to definitely mark the boundaries of the land included in Exhibit
C.
Ninth. that there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record which shows
that the said lands are held in trust by the Government of the Philippine
Islands for the plaintiffs.
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed.
TRACEY, J., dissenting:
Since the writing of the two principal opinion in this case, and since the
signing of the prevailing opinion by a majority of the court, but before it
was filed or the decision was entered thereon, the Philippine
Commission in Act No. 1596 apparently did away with the rule in the De
la Rama case and made it our duty to review the evidence and retry the
questions of facts, even where the judgment of the Court of First
Instance is not plainly and manifestly against the weight of the
evidence.
Read anew, without regard to the findings of the trial judge, except in
so far as they are founded upon his view of the witnesses, I do not think
that all the testimony before us establishes such a holding and working
of any property identified with that described in the complaint, as
constitutes a possession thereof under section 45 of the act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, entitling the plaintiff to a patent thereon. The plaintiff
occupying the property claimed by him, immediately prior to the
commencement to the action, had in his power to describe in detail the
condition of the workings on the land and narrate his own acts in
relation thereto. Upon him rested the burden of proof on this
important point, so hotly contested at the trial, and on him, rather than
on his adversary, should fall the consequences of the lack of decisive
and satisfactory evidence in relation to it.
For this reason only I feel constrained to dissent from the opinion of the
majority.
December 13, 1923

G.R. No. L-20875
VICENTE ABAOAG, ET AL., applicants-appellants,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL., opponents-appellees.
Turner and Rheberg for appellants.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Director of Lands.
, J.:
From the record it appears that in the year 1884 a number of Bagos
or Igorots or non-Christians, numbering at that time about thirty, were
invited by the gobernadorcillo and principalia of the then town of
Alava, now the municipality of Sison, of the Province of Pangasinan, and
a tract of land which in the present complaint is alleged to have a
superficial area of 77 hectares, 40 ares, and 50 centiares, in order that
they might cultivate the same and increase the population of the said
municipality; that said Bagos entered upon said land, took possession
of it and have continued to live upon the same and have cultivated it
since that date; that the appellants herein are some of the original
thirty who entered upon the land, and the others are their legitimate
descendants.
On or about the 28th day of February, 1919, said appellants presented
a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan to
have said parcel of land registered under the Torrens system.
Accompanying said petition there was an official plan prepared by the
Bureau of Lands presented (Exhibit A). Various oppositions were
presented to the registration of said parcel of land. Finally a judgment
by default was entered and the cause was set down for trial. During the
trial, for reasons which it is unnecessary to state here, it was discovered
that it was necessary to present a new plan and a new technical
description of the land, and the petitioners were ordered to present an
amended plan of the land.
In compliance with that order of the court, a new plan was presented
(Exhibit A-1) and finally the cause was set down for hearing and a
number of witnesses were presented by the petitioners to prove their
right to have said parcel of land, as described in the amended petition
and plan, registered under the Torrens system in their names.
Immediately after the close of the presentation of proof by the
petitioners, the oppositors presented a motion to dismiss the petition
upon the ground that the petitioners had not presented proof sufficient
to show that they are entitled to the registration of the land in
question, which motion, after extensive argument pro and con, was
granted, and the petition was dismissed without any pronouncement as
to costs. From that decision the petitioners, after having presented a
motion for a new trial and an exception duly presented to the
overruling of said motion, appealed.
In addition to the facts above stated, the record shows that at the time
of the delivery of said parcel of land to the petitioners, it was
unoccupied and unimproved public land; that since their entry upon
the possession of the land in the year 1884, they and their ancestors
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the same, believing in good faith that they were the
owners; that the petitioners had cleared, improved, and cultivated the
land and have constructed and maintained their homes thereon,
exercising every requisite act of ownership, for a period of more than
thirty-nine years, in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation, without any interruption whatsoever; that
the land in question was never partitioned among the petitioners
because it was the custom of the Bagos, Igorots, or non-Christians to
occupy and possess their land in common; that the petitioners
believed, and had a right to believe, from the fact that the land was
given by the gobernadorcillo and principalia of the municipality, that
they thereby became the owners, to the exclusion of all others, and are
now justified in their petition to have the said land registered under the
Torrens system in their names, as the owners in fee simple, pro

indiviso.
No suggestion is made that the gobernadorcillo and the principalia of
the town of Alava, now municipality of Sison, were not authorized in
1884, as representatives of the then existing Government, to give and
to deliver the land in question to the petitioners and their ancestors for
the purposes for which the land was so given. Neither was it denied
that the land in question is agricultural land. No pretension is made that
the land in question might not be registered under the Torrens system
had the petitioners invoked the benefits of the public land law. No
contention is made on the part of the petitioners that they were ever
given a paper title to the land. Their contention is simply that they were
given the land; that they accepted the same; that they lived upon the
land, and cultivated it, and improved it, and occupied it to the exclusion
of all others for a period of about thirty-nine years, and that therefore
they are entitled to have the same registration under the Torrens
system; that they have occupied and cultivated the same for a period
sufficient to give them title and to have the same registered under the
Torrens system.
The present case is not altogether unlike the case of Cario vs. Insular
Government (7 Phil., 132), which was decided by this court in 1906,
went to the Supreme court of the United States and was there decided
in 1909 (212 U.S. 449 1). In the course of that decision, Mr. Justice
Holmes, speaking for the court, said: The acquisition of the Philippines
was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands occupied by the
inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, providing that
property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the
inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years cannot be
deprived of it for failure to comply with certain ceremonies prescribed
either by the acts of the Philippine Commission or by the Spanish law.
We hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare every native,
who had not a paper title, a trespasser and to set the claims of all the
wilder tribes afloat. Whatever the law upon these points may be, every
presumption is and ought to be against the government in the case like
the present. Mr. Justice Holmes adds: If there is doubt or ambiguity in
the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the
doubt.
If we were to look into the Royal Decrees of Spain, as the attorney for
the appellants has done, we will find that Spain did not assume to
convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers of
the land which they occupy, or even into tenants at will. (Book 4, Title
12, Law 14 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias.) In the Royal
Cedula of October 15, 1754, we find the following: Where such
possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient
if they shall show that ancient possession as a valid title by
prescription. We may add that every presumption of ownership under
the public land laws of the Philippine Islands is in favor of one actually
occupying the land for many years, and against the Government which
seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of
subsequently enacted registration land act.
In view of the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Cario vs. Insular Government, we are forced to
the conclusion that the lower court committed the errors complained
of by the appellants in dismissing the petition. As was said by this court
in the case of Rodriguez vs. Director of Lands (31 Phil., 272, 279): . . .
only under exceptional circumstances should an application for registry
in the court of land registration be dismissed over the objection of the
applicant, and without giving him an opportunity by the grant of new
trial, or otherwise . . . to submit additional evidence in support of his
claim of title, when there are strong or reasonable grounds to believe
that he is the owner of all or any part of the land described in his
application. This is specially true when the only ground for the dismissal
of the application is the lack of formal or perhaps even substantial
proof as to the chain to title upon which applicant relies, etc.
Without a further detailed discussion of the assignments of error of the

appellants, we are of the opinion, and so decide that the judgment
entered in the court below, dismissing the petition of the applicants,
should be reversed and the record remanded to the court a quo, with
permission on the part of the petitioners to make such amendment to
their petition as they may deem wise and necessary and to present
such additional evidence as they may desire; and that the oppositors be
permitted to present whatever evidence they may have in opposition,
with the understanding that the evidence which has heretofore been
adduced shall stand as a part of the evidence of the main trial. And
without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 2869
March 25, 1907
MATEO CARIO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.
Coudert Brothers for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
Mateo Cario, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed
his petition in the Court of Land Registration praying that there be
granted to him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are,
and 13 centares, and situated in the town of Baguio, Province of
Benguet, together with a house erected thereon and constructed of
wood and roofed with rimo, and bounded as follows: On the north, in
lines running 1,048 metes and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa
Cario, H. Phelps Whitmarsh, and Calsi; on the east, in lines running
991 meters and 50 decimeters with the land of Kuidno, Esteban
Gonzales, and of the Civil Government; on the south, in lines of 115
meters and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca; and on the west, in
lines running 982 meters and 20 decimeters, with the lands of Sisco
Cario and Mayengmeng.
By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of
Antonio Rebollo and Vicente Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard
together for the reason that the latter petition claimed a small portion
of land included in the parcel set out in the former petition.
The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions,
alleging that the whole parcel of land is public property of the
Government and that the same was never acquired in any manner or
through any title of egresionfrom the State.
After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of
Land Registration rendered its judgment in these terms:
Therefore the court finds that Cario and his predecessors have
not possessed exclusively and adversely any part of the said
property prior to the date on which Cario constructed the house
now there that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and
Cario held possession for some years afterwards of but a part of
the property to which he claims title. Both petitions are dismissed
and the property in question is adjudged to be public land. (Bill of
exceptions, p. 15.)
The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision
of the court below are the following:
From the testimony given by Cario as well as from that of several
of the witnesses for the Government it is deduced, that in or
about the year 1884 Cario erected and utilized as a domicile a
house on the property situated to the north of that property now
in question, property which, according to the plan attached
toexpediente No. 561, appears to be property belonging to
Facts
Donaldson Sim; that during the year 1893 Cario sold said house
to one Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same to Donaldson
Sim, moving to and living on the adjoining property, which
appears on the plan aforesaid to be the property of H. Phelps
Whitmarsh, a place where the father and the grandfather of his
wife, that is to say, Ortega and Minse, had lived . . ..
In or about the years 1898 Cario abandoned the property of
Whitmarsh and located on the property described in the plan
attached to expediente No. 561, having constructed a house
thereon in which he now lives, and which house is situated in the
center of the property, as is indicated on the plan; and since
which time he has undoubtedly occupied some portion of the

property now claimed by him. (Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)
1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration
of all of the superficial extension of the land described in the petition
and as appears on the plan filed herein, such extension containing 40
hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, inasmuch as the documentary
evidence accompanying the petition is conclusive proof against the
petitioners; this documentary proof consists of a possessory
information under date of March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th
day of the same month and year; and, according to such possessory
information, the land therein described contains an extension of only
28 hectares limited by "the country road to the barrio of Pias," a road
appearing on the plan now presented and cutting the land, as might be
said, in half, or running through its center from north to south, a
considerable extension of land remaining on the other side of the said
road, the west side, and which could not have been included in the
possessory information mentioned.
2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which
mention is made in said possessory information, and upon which is
situated the house now actually occupied by the petitioner, all of which
is set forth as argument as to the possession in the judgment, is "used
for pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class called public lands.
3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of
common origin, presumptively belonged to the State during its
sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such
land by private persons, it was necessary that the possession of the
same pass from the State. And there is no evidence or proof of title
ofegresion of this land from the domain of the Spanish Government,
nor is there any possessory information equivalent to title
by composicion or under agreement. 4, The possessory information
filed herein is not the title to property authorized in substitution for
that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13, 1894, this being
the last law or legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to
the present subject-matter of common lands: First, for the reason that
the land referred to herein is not covered nor does it come within any
one of the three conditions required by article 19 of the said royal
decree, to wit, that the land has been in an uninterrupted state of
cultivation during a period of six years last past; or that the same has
been possessed without interruption during a period of twelve years
and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the information
and during the three years immediately preceding such information; or
that such land had been possessed openly without interruption during
a period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding the land had not been
cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to the testimony given by the two
witnesses to the possessory information for the following reason:
Second, because the possessory information authorized by said royal
decree or last legal disposition of the Spanish Government, as title or
for the purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right, equivalent to that
of adjustment with the Spanish Government and required and
necessary at all times until the publication of said royal decree was
limited in time to one year, in accordance with article 21, which is as
follows: " A period of one year, not to be extended, is allowed to verify
the possessory informations which are referred to in articles 19 and 20.
After the expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators and
persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the
land together with full possession reverts to the state, or, as the case
may be, to the community, and the said possessors and cultivators or
their assigns would simply have rights under universal or general title of
average in the event that the land is sold within a period of five years
immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not included
under this chapter can only acquire by time the ownership and title to
unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with common law."
5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained

to Cario, if it be certain that he was the true possessor of the land in
question, was the right of average in case the Government or State
could have sold the same within the period of five years immediately
following for example, if the denouncement of purchase had been
carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other person, as appears from the
record of the trial of the case. Aside from this right, in such event, his
possession as attested in the possessory information herein could not,
in accordance with common law, go to show any right of ownership
until after the expiration of twenty years from the expiration of twenty
years from the verification and registry of the same in conformity with
the provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage Law and other conditions
prescribe by this law.
6. The right of possession in accordance with common law that is to
say, civil law remains at all times subordinate to the Spanish
administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be of force when
pertaining to royaltransferable or alienable lands, which condition and
the determination thereof is reversed to the government, which
classified and designated the royal alienable lands for the purpose of
distinguishing them from those lands strictly public, and from forestry
lands which could at no time pass to private ownership nor be acquired
through time even after the said royal decree of February 13, 1894.
7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new
method of dealing with lands and particularly as to the classification
and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or common lands then
appropriated, which were thenceforth merely called public lands, the
alienation of which was reserved to the Government, in accordance
with section 12 and 13 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902,1 and in
conformity with other laws enacted under this act of Congress by the
Philippine Commission prescribing rules for the execution thereof, one
of which is Act No. 648,2 herein mentioned by the petitioner, in
connection with Act No. 627,3 which appears to be the law upon which
the petition herein is founded.
8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the
provisions contained in Act No. 190, as a basis for obtaining the right of
ownership. "The petitioners claims title under the period of
prescription of ten years established by that act, as well as by reason of
his occupancy and use thereof from time immemorial." (Allegation 1.)
But said act admits such prescription for the purpose of obtaining title
and ownership to lands "not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in
extent." (Sec. 6 of said act.) The land claimed by Cario is 40 hectares in
extent, if we take into consideration his petition, or an extension of 28
hectares, according to the possessory information, the only thing that
can be considered. Therefore, it follows that the judgment denying the
petition herein and now appealed from was strictly in accordance with
the law invoked herein.
9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory
information, one part of same, according to the testimony of Cario,
belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is not determined.
From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not been
determined in the trial of this case on which judgment might be based
in the event that the judgment and title be declared in favor of the
petitioner, Mateo Cario. And we should not lose sight of the fact that,
considering the intention of Congress in granting ownership and title to
16 hectares, that Mateo Cario and his children have already exceeded
such amount in various acquirements of lands, all of which is shown in
different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration,
donations or gifts of land that could only have been made efficacious as
to the conveyance thereof with the assistance of these new laws.
By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below
did not err:
Ruling
1. In finding that Mateo Cario and those from whom he claims

his right had not possessed and claimed as owners the lands in
question since time immemorial;
2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the
petitioner, but that, on the contrary, it was the property of the
Government. (Allegation 21.)
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of

this instance against the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days
from the notification of this decision let judgment be entered in
accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded
to the court from whence it came for proper action. So ordered.
Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
G.R. No. L-68533 May 23, 1986

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,
vs.
MARIANO FUNTILAR, MAGDALENA FUNTILAR, HEIRS OF FELIPE
ROCETE and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Civil Cases
Division), respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the respondent court which
affirmed the adjudication by the land registration court of a parcel of
land in Mulanay, Quezon in favor of the private respondents.
In 1972, Mariano Funtilar, Magdalena Funtilar, and the Heirs of Felipe
Rocete applied for the registration of a parcel of land described in PSU215779, with an area of 226,773 square meters.
Unrebutted testimonial evidence established that the land was part of
the property originally belonging to one Candida Fernandez whose
ownership and possession began sometime during her lifetime and
extended until 1936 when she died. (Tsn., August 6, 1976, Testimony of
Florencio Marquez, Exhibit "U"). The present applicants are the
grandchildren of Candida Fernandez. In 1936, after the death of
Candida Fernandez, her real property was declared in the name of the
"Heirs of Candida Fernandez under Tax Declaration No. 9622, with an
area of thirty (30) hectares.
Subsequently, sometime in 1940 or 1941, the parcel of land was
forfeited in favor of the government for failure to pay real estate taxes.
However, the same was redeemed in 1942 by Vitaliano Aguirre, one of
the three children of Candida Fernandez, who was then the
administrator of the property. A final deed of sale (Exhibit "N") was

executed by the Provincial Treasurer of Tayabas in 1944 in favor of
Vitaliano Aguirre. It had been agreed among the heirs that the property
would first be held by Vitaliano in trust for the others until such time
that partition among them was effected. The evidence shows
Vitaliano's public and continuous possession.
The heirs of Candida Fernandez later partitioned the property among
themselves. The particular lot now disputed in this petition was
adjudicated in favor of the applicants-respondents. Shortly after the
partition, in 1948, the new owners declared their share for taxation
purposes. Tax Declaration 91 for that year indicated the land as 12
hectares. This declaration was followed by another one, Tax
Declaration No. 2021, in 1958.
In 1965, the private respondents caused a survey of their property to
be made. The property was found to actually contain an area of
22.6773 hectares. This corrected area was reflected in subsequent tax
declarations. The last one submitted in evidence is dated 1974.
An ocular inspection conducted by the trial court found more than one
hundred (100) coconut trees with ages over thirty (30) years old, out of
a total of more or less one thousand four hundred (1,400) coconut
trees on the land.
The Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development filed an
opposition alleging that neither applicants nor their predecessor-ininterest possessed sufficient title to the land, not having acquired the
same under any of the recognized Spanish titles under the Royal Decree
of February 13, 1894; that neither applicants, nor their predecessors
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land for at least thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is a portion of
the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
Donaciano Pumarada, with three others also filed an opposition

alleging that they have registrable title on account of their possession
since time immemorial.
Rafael M. Morales filed a separate opposition, alleging that there was
no actual survey of the land applied for; and that he is entitled to
registration on account of his occupation and that of his predecessor.
The spouses Dominador Lacson and Esperanza Lacson likewise filed
their opposition with respect to "the portion of land embraced by
points 22 to 24 to 25 to 26 to 27 and by a straight line drawn between
point 27 to point 23 of Plan Psu-215779" in answer to which the
applicants-respondents agreed to relinquish or quitclaim whatever
right, title, and interest they might have over the above specified
portion in favor of oppositors Lacson. In view thereof, the oppositor
spouses withdrew their opposition in the land registration case.
On November 26, 1982, the trial court rendered its decision
adjudicating the land to applicants as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, the applicants,
namely MARIANO FUNTILAR, MAGDALENA FUNTILAR and
the HEIRS OF FELIPE ROCETE are hereby declared owners
proindiviso of the parcel of land described according to Plan
Psu-215779, with an area of 22.6773 square meters, subject
to the claim of oppositors Dominador Lacson and Esperanza
Lacson as per agreement with the applicants and when the
decision becomes final and executory, let a final decree be
issued for the issuance of title as provided by Act 496.
The Government alone, represented by the Director of
Lands and Director of Forest Development, filed its appeal
with the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court. The
decision now under review dated August 24, 1984 states:
xxx xxx xxx

According to the government oppositors, the land in
question was certified as alienable and disposable only on
September 3, 1953, They, therefore, conclude that herein
applicants could not have been in possession of said land for
more than 30 years. There is no evidence presented by the
government, however, that said land in question was part of
the forest zone. For that matter, during the hearing, the
Director of Forestry and the Director of Lands manifested in
writing that they have no evidence in support of their
opposition. They have not presented plans or sketches to
show that the land in question is part of the communal
forest.
Under the foregoing circumstances, We do not find any
merit in the appeal of the Government. It has been ruled on
this issue that the Director of Forestry has the burden of
proving that a piece of land belongs to the forest zone
(Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; de Villa vs.
Director of Lands, CA-G.R. No. 5847-R, June 13, 1952).
... It has been ruled that the inclusion of portions of said
lands within the reservations declared by the Director of
Forestry in 1928 cannot affect the vested rights of applicants
and her predecessors who have been continuously
occupying and profiting from the land since time
immemorial (Ankron vs. Government of the Phil., 40 Phil. 15;
Llana vs. Director of Forestry, CA-G.R. No. 4887-R, Sept. 23,
1950). Applicants have established by preponderance of
evidence that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, adverse and public possession of
the land in question for over 30 years introducing
improvements thereon.
As we have stated in previous decisions, the registration of

public lands for private titles after satisfying the
requirements of open, adverse and public possession will be
more beneficial to the country as it will promote
development of Idle lands.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error thereof, decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
Hence, this petition
The petitioners contend that in affirming the decision of the lower
court, the Intermediate Appellate Court committed the following
errors:
I
1. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE IdENTITY OF THE LAND
SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.
2. IN NOT HOLDING THAT APPLICANTS. RESPONDENTS HAVE
NOT MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF POSSESSION FOR AT
LEAST THIRTY (30) YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
FILING OF THEIR APPLICATION IN 1972 AS TO ENTITLE THEM
TO REGISTRATION.
3. IN NOT DECLARING APPLICANTS RESPONDENTS ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO REGISTRATION.
4. IN NOT FINDING THAT APPLICANTS RESPONDENTS HAVE
FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND
IS PUBLIC LAND
The petitioners have come to us for a review on questions of fact
property within the province of the trial courts to resolve. (Santos
vs.Aranzanso 116 SCRA 1). This case furnishes occasion for us to

reiterate the general principle that only legal questions, not factual
issues, Should be raised in the Supreme Court (Magpantay vs. Court of
Appeals, 116 SCRA 236) and that findings of fact of the Intermediate
Appellate Court should not be disturbed absent any showing of grave
error or abuse of discretion. Since the factual findings of the
respondent court are fully substantiated by evidence on record (
Regalano vs. Northwest Finance Corporation, 117 SCRA 45), we decide
not to disturb them.
The first issue raised refers to identity.
Petitioners allege that the identity of the land sought to be registered
has not been established. We sustain the contrary finding. Survey Plan
Psu-215779 of the property, showing its boundaries and total area,
clearly Identifies and delineates the extent of the land. The petitioners
cite the insufficiency of such a survey to identify the land. The
petitioners overlook the fact that no survey would at all be possible
where the Identity of the land is not first properly established. More
importantly, without such Identification, no opposition, even its own, to
the application for registration could be interposed. Encroachment on
or adverse possession of property could not be justly claimed.
The petitioners cite differences in the description of the land
boundaries, as well as in the land area stated in the tax declarations
submitted in evidence by applicants-respondents. They allege that
these do not refer to one and the same property.
A careful examination of the record shows a misinterpretation of the
evidence as to the Identification of the land. Tax Declaration Nos. 91
and 2021 in 1948 describe a twelve-hectare property bounded as
follows: "N-Mocboc Brook; E-Campacat Mt. ; S-Emilio Aguirre; WMocboc Brook and Briccio Morales. Tax Declaration Nos. 3757 and
2662 in 1964 and 1974 speak of a 22.6773-hectare land bounded" N-
Mariano Funtilar, et al.; "E-Heirs of Donaciano Pumarada; S-Emilio

Aguirre; W-Emilio Aguirre and Bagopaye Creek." However, the
applicants-respondents have satisfactorily explained the discrepancy.
Tax Declaration Nos. 91 and 2021 followed in tax payments from 1948
to 1958 and beyond were made prior to the survey of the property in
1965. Tax Declaration Nos. 3757 and 2662 were made subsequent
thereto and, hence, account for the difference in area stated. Such
differences are not uncommon as early tax declarations are, more often
than not, based on approximation or estimation rather than on
computation. More so, if the land as in this case was merely inherited
from a predecessor and was still held in common. Differences in
boundaries described in required municipal forms may also occur with
changes in boundary owners, changes of names of certain places, a
certain natural boundary being known by more than one name or by
plain error. Neither was it uncommon then to designate the nearest,
most visible natural landmarks such as mountains, creeks, rivers, etc. to
describe the location or situation of the boundaries of properties in the
absence of knowledge of technical methods of measuring or
determining boundaries with accuracy, especially where as in this case,
the same were made merely by humble farm people. Certain
discrepancies, if logically explained later, do not make doubtful, the
Identification of the property as made, understood and accepted by the
parties to the case.
It is respondents' contention that the land in question was originally
owned by Candida Fernandez; forfeited in favor of the government for
non-payment of taxes; subsequently repurchased by Vitaliano Aguirre
in a tax delinquency sale and finally adjudicated in favor of applicants in
1948. Petitioners, however, allege that the relationship of the land sold
at auction with the land subject of registration has not been
established, since the final deed of sale in favor of Aguirre and the
survey plan Psu-215779 refer to two different parcels of land.
The difference in boundary descriptions has already been explained.

Anent the disparity in land area, it must be noted that the property
mentioned in the final deed of sale issued by the provincial treasurer at
the delinquency auction sale was the property originally owned by
Candida Fernandez. The parcel of land sought to be registered and
Identified by Survey Plan Psu-215779 is a part of that property. The
surveyed land resulted from the partition of Candida's property among
her heirs. Adjudicated in favor of herein respondents was 22.6773
hectares thereof, the rest having gone to Emilio Aguirre, a son of
Candida whose property bounds the parcel of land in dispute on the
south. Such fact is revealed by the testimony of Mariano Funtilar on
direct examination, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Your counsel has presented a certain Exhibit 1,
which is a certification from the Municipal
Treasurer of Mulanay. It clearly states that a
certain parcel of land is declared in the name of
the heirs of Candida Fernandez, the administrator
of which is Petronila Aguirre which clearly shows
that the tax declaration was only made in the
name of the heirs Candida Fernandez, but in her
name, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Do we understand also that you are trying to
register only the portion that you personally,
your brother and sister are occupying?
A. Yes, sir and we are applying for that.
Q. In other words, it is clear that this land

supposedly originally owned by Candida
Fernandez is a bigger portion, is that correct, a
bigger parcel?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And only a portion of the land is allotted to
your brothers and sisters?
A. Yes, sir.
(Tsn-March 13, 1975, Land Reg. Case No. 192-G,
p. 7)
xxx xxx xxx
And on cross-examination
ATTY. LAUREL:
Q. Would you like to enlighten this Court that you
and your brother and sister who are children of
Antonia Resales received this property, this
entire property were the only ones who received
this entire property?
A. That was the property pointed to uses our
own, sir.
Q. I am asking you whether this entire property
was given- was inherited by the children of
Antonia Rosales only?
A. That is a big parcel but it is only a portion

which was given to us which we are causing for
registration, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
(Tsn-March 4, 1976, Land Reg. No. 192-G, p. 7)
ATTY. LAUREL:
Q. When you said portions were adjudicated to
the heirs in order to avoid conflict in the
repurchase do I get from you Mr. Funtilar, that
the property repurchased that this property you
are claiming in your application is only a portion
of the property repurchased from the
Government?
A. Yes, sir.
(Tsn-April 27, 1976, Land Reg. Case No. 1921-G,
p. 18)
The petitioners contend that the private respondents have failed to
establish possession for at least thirty years to entitle them to
confirmation of imperfect title and registration under the law. The
petitioners also fault the respondents reliance on the 1944 tax
delinquency sale, forgetting that possession must still be proved.
We are satisfied from the evidence that long before her death in 1936,
Candida Fernandez already possessed the disputed property. This
possession must be tacked to the possession of her heirs, through
administrator Vitaliano Aguirre, and later to the possession of the
private respondents themselves, who are Candida's grandchildren.
The fact of possession is bolstered by the forfeiture in 1940 of the land

in favor of the government. It would be rather absurd under the
circumstances of this case to rule that the government would order the
forfeiture of property for non-payment of real estate taxes if the
property is forest land. It is also reasonable to rule that the heirs of
Candida Fernandez redeemed the property because they wanted to
keep the land of the deceased in the possession of their family, thus
continuing prior possession. From 1936 and earlier up to 1972 is more
than the required period. As a matter of fact, the applicants' witnesses
testified to their personal knowledge of more than 50 years possession.
More important is the petitioners' allegation that the property sought
to be registered was unclassified public forest until September 15, 1953
when L C Project No. 16-0, L C Map No. 1634 declared it alienable and
disposable.
It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule that after an
applicant files his application for registration, the burden shifts totally
to the government to prove that the land forms part of the unclassified
forest zone. The ruling in Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of
Forestry (126 SCRA 69) governs applications for confirmation of
imperfect title. The applicant shoulders the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain.
The private respondents tried their best to present the necessary
evidence. A certification issued by then District Forester Fernando Roy
on September 27, 1972 reads:
xxxxxxxxx
... said parcel of land falls within the Alienable and
Disposable LC Project No. 16-D, LCMap No. 1634 certified"
(not classified) "on September 15, 1953, by the Director of
Forestry. In view thereof, this office interposes no objection

in behalf of the Director of Forestry for the registration
and/or confirmation of title on the property mentioned
therein without prejudice to such action, the Director of
Lands and other government entities may deem proper to
take on the premises.
to which, the then District Land Officer of the Bureau of Lands, Land
District No. IV-2 in Lucena City, in a communication dated March 16,
1973 responded:
1. the parcel of land subject of this registration was originally
claimed by Emilio Aguirre and A. Fernandez and the herein
applicants have acquired the rights and interest therein thru
predecessors-in-interest; and
2. that said parcel of land has not been disposed of,
reserved, leased, applied for or granted as homestead or
otherwise be alienated by the government.
In view of the above findings, and basing from the report of
the investigation submitted thereon by a representative of
this office, and considering that this Agency has no evidence
to support the opposition of the Government, it is further
informed that this office interposes no opposition in the
confirmation of the rights to and interest on the parcel of
land particularly described under Plan Psu-215779 in favor
of the herein applicants.
The Regalian doctrine which forms the basis of our land laws and, in
fact, all laws governing natural resources is a revered and long standing
principle. It must, however, be applied together with the constitutional
provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in
a way as to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice.
Every application for a concession of public land has to be viewed in the

light of its peculiar circumstances. A strict application of the Heirs
of Amunategui us. Director of Forestry (supra) ruling is warranted
whenever a portion of the public domain is in danger of ruthless
exploitation, fraudulent titling, or other questionable practices. But
when an application appears to enhance the very reasons behind the
enactment of Act 496, as amended, or the Land Registration Act, and
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Public Land Act, then their
provisions should not be made to stand in the way of their own
implementation.
The land sought to be registered was declared alienable and disposable
33 years ago. It is not forest land. It has been possessed and cultivated
by the applicants and their predecessors for at least three generations.
The attempts of humble people to have disposable lands they have
been tilling for generations titled in their names should not only be
viewed with an understanding attitude but should, as a matter of
policy, be encouraged. We see no strong reason to reverse the findings
of the trial court and the appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
decision of the respondent appellate court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and
RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by
her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD
and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their
parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II
and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented
by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V.
PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE
PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents
JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO,
minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO,
JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO,
CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents
GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA,
JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed
SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA
SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID
IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO
and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all
surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR
and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed
ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA
ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA,
CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA
OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all
surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX
and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and

FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents
FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a
balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of
whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed
before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff
is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock
and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department

of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this
petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The
complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers,
and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same
was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about
the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further
asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations
yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million
(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant
rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna
may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and
chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in
order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land

area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent
(54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known
as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization
of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water,
incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu
and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the
volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic
meters per annum approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's
unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and
dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the
Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a
critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing
velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of
windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains
arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the
siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams
constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for
domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k)
the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases
which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as
the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences

of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film
evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some
sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting
roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained
no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four
per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000
hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8%
of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and
about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors
have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various
corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas
covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000

hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines
will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this
ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious
injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of
deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to
generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As
a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and
suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to
cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great
damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially
plaintiff minors and their successors who may never see,
use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural
resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resource property he holds in
trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with
the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served
upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits
in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto

attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the
existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme
prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel
the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country
that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the
Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's
is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the
Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions
under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
present and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality
that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D.
1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel
the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities,

income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of
natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and
resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of
humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs'
right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1)
the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July
1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the
complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action

against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by
the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and
set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the
parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but
have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states
a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their
right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law
and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and selfperpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to
safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged
grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs)
to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial
question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's
non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not
apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit
that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is
well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public
interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to
allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see
nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the
petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political
question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby
before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit
that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law.
Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time
usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can
neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found,
after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the
agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural

matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The
original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with
this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is
indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common
and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it,
becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them
before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of
all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid
class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are
present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter
being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors
assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world
in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible
to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their

obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We
shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous
consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners
and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint,
the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For
although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all
intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce
and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to
prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified
data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter
before it, being impressed with political color and involving a
matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by
this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of
the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no

matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs
failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved
or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete
with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A
reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided
for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a
different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by
the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance
and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first
and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far
when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but
also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing
but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the
debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who
sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide
sanctions against all forms of pollution air,
water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)

environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and,
therefore, sanctions may be provided for
impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance
would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions
of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon
C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14Section 4 of
which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and
proper use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those
in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as
well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be
provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following
statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the
policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and

equitable access of the different segments of the population
to the development and the use of the country's natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to
recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of
the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof
which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for
the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and
development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, consistent with the
necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment
and the objective of making the exploration, development
and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible
to the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value
system that takes into account social and environmental
cost implications relative to the utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand,
specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes

particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and
higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and
Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge
of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and
have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June
1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the
social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and wellbeing." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each
generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 17The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the
said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under
its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No.
192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the
said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative
duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they
claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal
right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are
legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation
of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the
question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency
of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be
considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is
beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should
"exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion
to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest,
by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and
deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is

effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order.
The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the
statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as
the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly,
the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the
cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as
party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable
parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a
political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive
or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What
is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless,
be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political

Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this
Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional
concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of
conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the
authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and
particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even
the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess
of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can
expand or contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court,
noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred
upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is
the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The
court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no
matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not
shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he
would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by
providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever bound the
Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands
of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed
out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section
20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires,
the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of
privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs.

Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources
to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license
is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between
the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting
of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs.
Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid
that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent
or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law

clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548,
October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause,
which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall
be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are
contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because
by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been
passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose
of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government,
is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be
subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health,

safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New
York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the
making of contracts are normally matters of private and not
of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free
of governmental interference. But neither property rights
nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot
exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract
to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private
right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of
the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the nonimpairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover,
with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of
right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July
1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The
petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license

agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court,
Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most
important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal
principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly
the direction and course of the protection and management of the
environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural
resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to
clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus
standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit
(Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim
that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus
standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the
subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the
concept of "class" here involved membership in this "class" appears
to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to
benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public
respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The

Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of
action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the
public administrative agency directly concerned and the private
persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved.
Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and
all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance,
on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown
("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future determination in an
appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused
upon "one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is
fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it
cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence
to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can
be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended:
prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents,
garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by
vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of
organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares;
failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit
mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries,
coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite
or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The
other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order

No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all
appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the
constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine
Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection
of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble)
relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation
embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither
petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or
provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to
a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly,
the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the
particular government agency charged with the formulation and
implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the
headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine
Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of
implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored
on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above
noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this
doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are
too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court,
show a more specific legal right a right cast in language of a
significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the
Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to
act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial
court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief
prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply
saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in
our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and
that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective
opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on
a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential

component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right,
rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated
or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants
may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively;
in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific
violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved,
petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of
judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced
and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result
will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in
respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical
competence and experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist,
then the policy making departments the legislative and
executive departments must be given a real and effective

opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber
companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand
public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the
proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to
the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the
timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions
of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume),
what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that
they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right
petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual
nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed
wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative
agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which
exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the
environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme
importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's
decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer
examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court,
Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most
important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal
principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly
the direction and course of the protection and management of the
environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural
resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to
clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus
standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit
(Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim
that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus
standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the
subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the
concept of "class" here involved membership in this "class" appears
to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to
benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public
respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The
Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of
action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the
public administrative agency directly concerned and the private
persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved.
Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and
all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance,
on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown
("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future determination in an
appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused
upon "one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is
fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it
cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence
to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can
be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended:
prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents,
garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by
vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of
organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares;
failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit
mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries,
coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite
or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The
other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order
No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all
appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the
constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine
Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection
of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble)

relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation
embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither
petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or
provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to
a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly,
the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the
particular government agency charged with the formulation and
implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the
headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine
Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of

implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored
on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above
noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this
doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are
too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court,
show a more specific legal right a right cast in language of a
significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the
Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to
act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial
court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief
prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply
saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in
our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and
that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective
opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on
a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential
component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right,
rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated
or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants
may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively;
in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific

violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved,
petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of
judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced
and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result
will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in
respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical
competence and experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist,
then the policy making departments the legislative and
executive departments must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber
companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand
public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the
proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to

the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the
timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions
of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume),
what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that
they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right
petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual
nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed
wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative
agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which
exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the
environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme
importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's
decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer
examination.
G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995

MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, and JOEL D. MUYCO, Director of Mines and
Geosciences Bureau, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks a ruling from this Court on the validity of two
Administrative Orders issued by the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to carry out the provisions of
certain Executive Orders promulgated by the President in the lawful
exercise of legislative powers.
Herein controversy was precipitated by the change introduced by
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system of
exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources. No longer is the utilization of inalienable lands of public
domain through "license, concession or lease" under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions 1 allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
The adoption of the concept of jura regalia 2 that all natural resources
are owned by the State embodied in the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions, as well as the recognition of the importance of the
country's natural resources, not only for national economic
development, but also for its security and national
defense, 3 ushered in the adoption of the constitutional policy of "full
control and supervision by the State" in the exploration, development
and utilization of the country's natural resources. The options open to
the State are through direct undertaking or by entering into co-
production, joint venture; or production-sharing agreements, or by

entering into agreement with foreign-owned corporations for largescale exploration, development and utilization.
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. With
the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The State
may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into
co-production, joint venture, or product-sharing agreements
with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.
Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twentyfive years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by
law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of
the grant.
xxx xxx xxx
The President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by
law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the

State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract
entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the mandate of the above-quoted provision, legislative
acts 4 were successively issued by the President in the exercise of her
legislative
power. 5
To implement said legislative acts, the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in turn promulgated
Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, the validity and constitutionality
of which are being challenged in this petition.
On July 10, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her
then legislative powers under Article II, Section 1 of the Provisional
Constitution and Article XIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution,
promulgated Executive Order No. 211 prescribing the interim
procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the
exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to the
1987 Constitution in order to ensure the continuity of mining
operations and activities and to hasten the development of mineral
resources. The pertinent provisions read as follows:
Sec. 1. Existing mining permits, licenses, leases and other
mining grants issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources and Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences,
including existing operating agreements and mining service
contracts, shall continue and remain in full force and effect,
subject to the same terms and conditions as originally

granted and/or approved.
Sec. 2. Applications for the exploration, development and
utilization of mineral resources, including renewal
applications for approval of operating agreements and
mining service contracts, shall be accepted and processed
and may be approved; concomitantly thereto, declarations
of locations and all other kinds of mining applications shall
be accepted and registered by the Bureau of Mines and GeoSciences.
Sec. 3. The processing, evaluation and approval of all mining
applications, declarations of locations, operating
agreements and service contracts as provided for in Section
2 above, shall be governed by Presidential Decree No. 463,
as amended, other existing mining laws and their
implementing rules and regulations: Provided, however, that
the privileges granted, as well as the terms and conditions
thereof shall be subject to any and all modifications or
alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
On July 25, 1987, President Aquino likewise promulgated Executive
Order No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and
conclude joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing
agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral
resources, and prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and
those agreements involving technical or financial assistance by foreignowned corporations for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals. The pertinent provisions relevant to this petition
are as follows:
Sec. 1. The Secretary of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (hereinafter referred to as "the
Secretary") is hereby authorized to negotiate and enter into,
for and in behalf of the Government, joint venture, coproduction, or production-sharing agreements for the
exploration, development, and utilization of mineral
resources with any Filipino citizens, or corporation or
association at least sixty percent (60%) of whose capital is
owned by Filipino citizens. Such joint venture, coproduction, or production-sharing agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and shall include the minimum
terms and conditions prescribed in Section 2 hereof. In the
execution of a joint venture, co-production or production
agreements, the contracting parties, including the
Government, may consolidate two or more contiguous or
geologically related mining claims or leases and consider
them as one contract area for purposes of determining the
subject of the joint venture, co-production, or productionsharing agreement.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The Secretary shall promulgate such supplementary
rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively
implement the provisions of this Executive Order.
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, other existing mining laws, and their
implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive
Order, shall continue in force and effect.
Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, the DENR Secretary

issued on June 23, 1989 DENR Administrative Order No. 57, series of
1989, captioned "Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
under Executive Order No. 279." 6 Under the transitory provision of said
DENR Administrative Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, all existing
mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of
the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except
small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and
quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less, shall
be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year
from the effectivity of these guidelines.
On November 20, 1980, the Secretary of the DENR Administrative
Order No. 82, series of 1990, laying down the "Procedural Guidelines on
the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through
Negotiation." 7
Section 3 of the aforementioned DENR Administrative Order No. 82
enumerates the persons or entities required to submit Letter of Intent
(LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSAs) within two
(2) years from the effectivity of DENR Administrative Order No. 57 or
until July 17, 1991. Failure to do so within the prescribed period shall
cause the abandonment of mining, quarry and sand and gravel claims.
Section 3 of DENR Administrative Order No. 82 provides:
Sec. 3. Submission of Letter of Intent (LOIs) and MPSAs). The
following shall submit their LOIs and MPSAs within two (2)
years from the effectivity of DENR A.O. 57 or until July 17,
1991.
i. Declaration of Location (DOL) holders, mining lease
applicants, exploration permitees, quarry applicants and
other mining applicants whose mining/quarry applications
have not been perfected prior to the effectivity of DENR

Administrative Order No. 57.
ii. All holders of DOL acquired after the effectivity of DENR
A.O. No. 57.
iii. Holders of mining leases or similar agreements which
were granted after (the) effectivity of 1987 Constitution.
Failure to submit letters of intent and MPSA
applications/proposals within the prescribed period shall
cause the abandonment of mining, quarry and sand and
gravel claims.
The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of
Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 after their respective effectivity
dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. 8 to file
the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before
this Court.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Miners Association of the
Philippines, Inc. mainly contends that respondent Secretary of DENR
issued both Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 in excess of his rulemaking power under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279. On the
assumption that the questioned administrative orders do not conform
with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, petitioner contends that both
orders violate the
non-impairment of contract provision under Article III, Section 10 of the
1987 Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order No. 57
unduly pre-terminates existing mining agreements and automatically
converts them into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year
from its effectivity date. On the other hand, Administrative Order No.
82 declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent and Mineral
Production-Sharing Agreements within two (2) years from the date of
effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall cause the

abandonment of their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits.
On July 2, 1991, the Court, acting on petitioner's urgent exparte petition for issuance of a restraining order/preliminary injunction,
issued a Temporary Restraining Order, upon posting of a P500,000.00
bond, enjoining the enforcement and implementation of DENR
Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, as amended, Series of 1989 and
1990, respectively. 9
On November 13, 1991, Continental Marble Corporation, 10 thru its
President, Felipe A. David, sought to intervene11 in this case alleging
that because of the temporary order issued by the Court , the DENR,
Regional Office No. 3 in San Fernando, Pampanga refused to renew its
Mines Temporary Permit after it expired on July 31, 1991. Claiming that
its rights and interests are prejudicially affected by the implementation
of DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, it joined petitioner
herein in seeking to annul Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 and
prayed that the DENR, Regional Office No. 3 be ordered to issue a
Mines Temporary Permit in its favor to enable it to operate during the
pendency of the suit.
Public respondents were acquired to comment on the Continental
Marble Corporation's petition for intervention in the resolution of
November 28, 1991. 12
Now to the main petition. If its argued that Administrative Order Nos.
57 and 82 have the effect of repealing or abrogating existing mining
laws 13 which are not inconsistent with the provisions of Executive
Order No. 279. Invoking Section 7 of said Executive Order No.
279, 14 petitioner maintains that respondent DENR Secretary cannot
provide guidelines such as Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 which
are inconsistent with the provisions of Executive Order No. 279 because
both Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 merely reiterated the
acceptance and registration of declarations of location and all other

kinds of mining applications by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, until
Congress opts to modify or alter the same.
In other words, petitioner would have us rule that DENR Administrative
Order Nos. 57 and 82 issued by the DENR Secretary in the exercise of
his rule-making power are tainted with invalidity inasmuch as both
contravene or subvert the provisions of Executive Order Nos. 211 and
279 or embrace matters not covered, nor intended to be covered, by
the aforesaid laws.
We disagree.
We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the
legislative enactment. The principle was enunciated as early as 1908 in
the case of United States v. Barrias. 15 The scope of the exercise of such
rule-making power was clearly expressed in the case of United States v.
Tupasi Molina, 16decided in 1914, thus: "Of course, the regulations
adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of
course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the
regulations relate solely to carrying into effect its general provisions. By
such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long,
however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the
provision of the law, they are valid."
Recently, the case of People v. Maceren 17 gave a brief delienation of
the scope of said power of administrative officials:
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative

authority by a particular department must be in harmony
with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general provision. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended
(U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109
Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of
Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585;
Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29,
1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29,
1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the
law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended
to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that
subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned (University of
Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382,
citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see Collector
of Internal Revenue v. Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. v.
Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans
Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194,
197, cited in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security
Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or

regulation issued to implement said law, the basic prevails
because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms
and provisions of the basic law (People v. Lim, 108 Phil.
1091).
Considering that administrative rules draw life from the statute which
they seek to implement, it is obvious that the spring cannot rise higher
than its source. We now examine petitioner's argument that DENR
Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 contravene Executive Order Nos.
211 and 279 as both operate to repeal or abrogate Presidential Decree
No. 463, as amended, and other mining laws allegedly acknowledged as
the principal law under Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279.
Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No.
463, as amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval
of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the
exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree
No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources through "license,
concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said
constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No.
279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing
on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining
laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the
governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and
management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7
of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as

amended, other existing mining laws, and their
implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive
Order, shall continue in force and effect.
Specifically, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended,
on lease of mining claims under Chapter VIII, quarry permits on
privately-owned lands of quarry license on public lands under Chapter
XIII and other related provisions on lease, license and permits are not
only inconsistent with the raison d'etre for which Executive Order No.
279 was passed, but contravene the express mandate of Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It force and effectivity is thus
foreclosed.
Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2,
1987, 18 the State assumed a more dynamic role in the exploration,
development and utilization of the natural resources of the country.
Article XII, Section 2 of the said Charter explicitly ordains that the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. Consonant
therewith, the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources may be undertaken by means of direct act of the State, or it
may opt to enter into co-production, joint venture, or productionsharing agreements, or it may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country.
Given these considerations, there is no clear showing that respondent
DENR Secretary has transcended the bounds demarcated by Executive
Order No. 279 for the exercise of his rule-making power tantamount to
a grave abuse of discretion. Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279

specifically authorizes said official to promulgate such supplementary
rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively implement the
provisions thereof. Moreover, the subject sought to be governed and
regulated by the questioned orders is germane to the objects and
purposes of Executive Order No. 279 specifically issued to carry out the
mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner likewise maintains that Administrative Order No. 57, in
relation to Administrative Order No. 82, impairs vested rights as to
violate the non-impairment of contract doctrine guaranteed under
Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution because Article 9 of
Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates and automatically
converts mining leases and other mining agreements into productionsharing agreements within one (1) year from effectivity of said
guideline, while Section 3 of Administrative Order No. 82, declares that
failure to submit Letters of Intent (LOIs) and MPSAs within two (2) years
from the effectivity of Administrative Order No. 57 or until July 17,
1991 shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry, and sand gravel
permits.
In Support of the above contention, it is argued by petitioner that
Executive Order No. 279 does not contemplate automatic conversion of
mining lease agreements into mining production-sharing agreement as
provided under Article 9, Administrative Order No. 57 and/or the
consequent abandonment of mining claims for failure to submit LOIs
and MPSAs under Section 3, Administrative Order No. 82 because
Section 1 of said Executive Order No. 279 empowers the DENR
Secretary to negotiate and enter into voluntary agreements which must
set forth the minimum terms and conditions provided under Section 2
thereof. Moreover, petitioner contends that the power to regulate and
enter into mining agreements does not include the power to
preterminate existing mining lease agreements.
To begin with, we dispel the impression created by petitioner's

argument that the questioned administrative orders unduly
preterminate existing mining leases in general. A distinction which
spells a real difference must be drawn. Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution does not apply retroactively to "license, concession or
lease" granted by the government under the 1973 Constitution or
before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987. The
intent to apply prospectively said constitutional provision was stressed
during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, 19 thus:
MR. DAVIDE: Under the proposal, I notice that
except for the [inalienable] lands of the public
domain, all other natural resources cannot be
alienated and in respect to [alienable] lands of
the public domain, private corporations with the
required ownership by Filipino citizens can only
lease the same. Necessarily, insofar as other
natural resources are concerned, it would only be
the State which can exploit, develop, explore and
utilize the same. However, the State may enter
into a joint venture, co-production or productionsharing. Is that not correct?
MR. VILLEGAS: Yes.
MR. DAVIDE: Consequently, henceforth upon, the
approval of this Constitution, no timber or forest
concession, permits or authorization can be
exclusively granted to any citizen of the
Philippines nor to any corporation qualified to
acquire lands of the public domain?
MR. VILLEGAS: Would Commissioner Monsod like
to comment on that? I think his answer is "yes."
MR. DAVIDE: So, what will happen now license or

concessions earlier granted by the Philippine
government to private corporations or to Filipino
citizens? Would they be deemed repealed?
MR. VILLEGAS: This is not applied retroactively.
They will be respected.
MR. DAVIDE: In effect, they will be deemed
repealed?
MR. VILLEGAS: No. (Emphasis supplied)
During the transition period or after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution on February 2, 1987 until the first Congress under said
Constitution was convened on July 27, 1987, two (2) successive laws,
Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, were promulgated to govern the
processing and approval of applications for the exploration,
development and utilization of minerals. To carry out the purposes of
said laws, the questioned Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, now
being assailed, were issued by the DENR Secretary.
Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 provides:
ARTICLE 9
TRANSITORY PROVISION
9.1. All existing mining leases or agreements which were
granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small scale
mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and
quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or
less shall be subject to these guidelines. All such leases or
agreements shall be converted into production sharing
agreement within one (1) year from the effectivity of these

guidelines. However, any minimum firm which has
established mining rights under Presidential Decree 463 or
other laws may avail of the provisions of EO 279 by following
the procedures set down in this document.
It is clear from the aforestated provision that Administrative Order No.
57 applies only to all existing mining leases or agreements which were
granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211. It bears mention that under the text of
Executive Order No. 211, there is a reservation clause which provides
that the privileges as well as the terms and conditions of all existing
mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, shall be subject to
any and all modifications or alterations which Congress may adopt
pursuant to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the
strictures of the
non-impairment of contract clause under Article III, Section 10 of the
1987 Constitution 20 do not apply to the aforesaid leases or agreements
granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211. They can be amended, modified or altered by
a statute passed by Congress to achieve the purposes of Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Clearly, Executive Order No. 279 issued on July 25, 1987 by President
Corazon C. Aquino in the exercise of her legislative power has the force
and effect of a statute or law passed by Congress. As such, it validly
modified or altered the privileges granted, as well as the terms and
conditions of mining leases and agreements under Executive Order No.
211 after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by authorizing the
DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production,
or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development
and utilization of mineral resources and prescribing the guidelines for
such agreements and those agreements involving technical or financial

assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals.
Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation
clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those
granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition,
are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police
power of the State. In the 1950 case of Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 21 where
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 34 changing the 50-50
sharecropping system in existing agricultural tenancy contracts to 55-45
in favor of tenants was challenged, the Court, upholding the
constitutionality of the law, emphasized the superiority of the police
power of the State over the sanctity of this contract:
The prohibition contained in constitutional provisions against: impairing
the obligation of contracts is not an absolute one and it is not to be
read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula. Such provisions
are restricted to contracts which respect property, or some object or
value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice, and
have no application to statute relating to public subjects within the
domain of the general legislative powers of the State, and involving the
public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it.
They do not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police powers.
By enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health,
safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, even the
contracts may thereby be affected; for such matter can not be placed
by contract beyond the power of the State shall regulates and control
them. 22
In Ramas v. CAR and Ramos 23 where the constitutionality of Section 14
of Republic Act No. 1199 authorizing the tenants to charge from share
to leasehold tenancy was challenged on the ground that it impairs the
obligation of contracts, the Court ruled that obligations of contracts
must yield to a proper exercise of the police power when such power is
exercised to preserve the security of the State and the means adopted
are reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that end and are,
therefore, not arbitrary or oppressive.
The economic policy on the exploration, development and utilization of
the country's natural resources under Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution could not be any clearer. As enunciated in Article XII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources under the new system mandated in
Section 2, is geared towards a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount
of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality
of life for all, especially the underprivileged.
The exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources are matters vital to the public interest and the general
welfare of the people. The recognition of the importance of the
country's natural resources was expressed as early as the 1984
Constitutional Convention. In connection therewith, the 1986 U.P.
Constitution Project observed: "The 1984 Constitutional Convention
recognized the importance of our natural resources not only for its
security and national defense. Our natural resources which constitute
the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation, should be preserved for
those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their
prosperity. This will ensure the country's survival as a viable and
sovereign republic."
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard,
may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on nonimpairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the
mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No.
463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power,
being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of
public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of
Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211
provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the
mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision which
would lead us to conclude that the questioned order authorizes the
automatic conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order
No. 211, to production-sharing agreements. The provision in Article 9 of
Administrative Order No. 57 that "all such leases or agreements shall be
converted into production sharing agreements within one (1) year from
the effectivity of these guidelines" could not possibility contemplate a
unilateral declaration on the part of the Government that all existing
mining leases and agreements are automatically converted into
production-sharing agreements. On the contrary, the use of the term
"production-sharing agreement" if they are so minded. Negotiation
negates compulsion or automatic conversion as suggested by petitioner
in the instant petition. A mineral production-sharing agreement (MPSA)
requires a meeting of the minds of the parties after negotiations
arrived at in good faith and in accordance with the procedure laid down
in the subsequent Administrative Order No. 82.
We, therefore, rule that the questioned administrative orders are
reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law
under which they were issued and were intended to secure the
paramount interest of the public, their economic growth and welfare.
The validity and constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and
82 must be sustained, and their force and effect upheld.
We now, proceed to the petition-in-intervention. Under Section 2, Rule
12 of the Revised Rules of Court, an intervention in a case is proper
when the intervenor has a "legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or

when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof. "Continental Marble Corporation has not sufficiently shown
that it falls under any of the categories mentioned above. The refusal of
the DENR, Regional Office No. 3, San Fernando, Pampanga to renew its
Mines Temporary Permit does not justify such an intervention by
Continental Marble Corporation for the purpose of obtaining a directive
from this Court for the issuance of said permit. Whether or not
Continental Marble matter best addressed to the appropriate
government body but certainly, not through this Court. Intervention is
hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued on July 2, 1991 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo,
Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-50464 January 29, 1990

SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS INC., CORAL BEACH DEVELOPMENT
CORP., and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BATAAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Filoteo T. Banzon for petitioners.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, Convenience Foods Corporation
(hereafter simply SUNBEAM) and Coral Beach Development
Corporation (hereafter simply CORAL BEACH) bring to our attention the
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in "Republic of the
Philippines v. Hon. Pedro T. Santiago, et al.," disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted. The order of the

respondent judge dated October 7, 1977, dismissing Civil Case No. 4062
is set aside, and respondent judge is ordered to require private
respondents to file their answer to the complaint in said Civil Case No.
4062 and thereafter to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits
and to render judgment thereon.'
The following facts stated by the respondent Court in its decision and
restated by the petitioners in their petition are accurate:
(a) On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the issuance of a
Sales Patent in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc.,
over the parcels of land both situated in Mariveles, Bataan and more
particularly described and bounded as follows:
Lot 1-Sgs-2409 (area 3,113,695 sq. m )

Lot 2-Sgs-2409 area 1,401,855 sq. m
(b) On May 3, 1963, the aforesaid Sales Patent was registered with the
defendant Register of Deeds of Bataan who in turn issued Original
Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 in favor of defendant Sunbeam
Convenience Foods, Inc., for the two parcels of land above-described;
(c) Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 was cancelled
and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12421 was issued
over Lot 1, Sgs-2409, while Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12422 was
issued over Lot 2, Sgs-2409, both in favor of defendant Coral Beach
Development Corporation I
(d) On May 11, 1976, the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines instituted before the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, an action for reversion docketed as Civil Case No. 4062. 2
SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following
grounds:
1. The Republic of the Philippines should have exhausted all
administrative remedies before filing the case in court;
2. The title issued to SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH had become
indefeasible and imprescriptible;
3. The action for reversion was defective, having been initiated by the
Solicitor General and not by the Director of Lands. 3 The then Court of
First Instance of Bataan dismissed the complaint in the Order of
October 7, 1977,4adopting mainly the theory that since the titles sought
to be cancelled emanated from the administrative act of the Bureau of
Lands Director, the latter, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the
disposition of the land.
The Solicitor General received the copy of the Order on October 11,
1977 and filed a Notice of Appeal dated October 25, 1977 . 5 The
Solicitor General then moved for an extension of thirty days within
which to file the Record on Appeal and to pay the docket fee in order to
perfect the appeal. This was to be followed by another motion for
extension filed by the Solicitor General, resulting in the Court of
Appeals granting the petitioner another extension of fifteen days from
December 10, 1977. Finally before this period of extension lapsed,
instead of an appeal, a petition for certiorari with the respondent Court
of Appeals was filed.
According to the Solicitor General, the Court of First Instance
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint and in
a. Not finding that since the lower court acted in a Motion to Dismiss,
the correctness of its decision must be decided in the assumed truth
and accuracy of the allegations of the complaint. The complaint alleges
that the lands in question are forest lands; hence, inalienable.
b. Finding that Lots I and 2 are alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands despite
clear and positive evidence to the contrary.
c. Concluding that the complaint for reversion is defective as it was not
initiated by the Director of Lands.
d. Finding that the complaint for reversion states no cause of action for
alleged failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies. 6
The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition for certiorari, set
aside the Order of Dismissal rendered by the Court of First Instance in
Civil Case No. 4062, and ordered the presiding judge Hon. Pedro T.
Santiago to receive the answers of the private respondents SUNBEAM
and CORAL BEACH in the action for reversion.
Hence Sunbeam and Coral Beach filed this petition for review.
A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and is
granted only when there are special and important reasons therefore.
The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's
discretion, enumerates the premises for granting a review:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme Court or has decided it in a
way probably not in accord with law or the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court; and
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings or so far sanctioned such
departure by a lower court as to call for supervision . 7
We agree with the Court of Appeals' granting of the petition filed by the
Republic of the Philippines charging the then Court of First Instance
with grave abuse of discretion. The filing of the Motion to Dismiss the
complaint for reversion by SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH on the ground
of lack of cause of action, necessarily carried with it the admission, for
purposes of the motion, of the truth of all material facts pleaded in the
complaint instituted by the Republic.
An important factual issue raised in the complaint was the classification
of the lands as forest lands. This material allegation stated in the
Republic's complaint' was never denied specifically 9 by the defendants
(petitioners herein) SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH.
If it is true that the lands are forest lands, then all these proceedings
become moot and academic. Land remains unclassified land until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 10
Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber,
and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. 11 Thus, before any land
may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable
or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a
positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as
forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain. 12
The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not
confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or
patent is part of the public forest. 13
The only way to resolve this question of fact as to the classification of
the land is by remanding the case to the lower court for a full- dress
trial on the issues involved.
Generally, the rules of procedure must be observed so that the efficient
administration of justice is ensured. However, the rules of procedure
should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. 14They must lead to the proper and just determination of
litigation, without tying the hands of the law or making it indifferent to
realities.
Certiorari is one such remedy. Considered extraordinary, it is made
available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. 15 The long line of
decisions denying the petition for certiorari, either before appeal was
availed of or specially in instances where the appeal period has lapsed,
far outnumbers the instances when certiorari was given due course.
The few significant exceptions were: when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictate; or when the broader interests of
justice so require, or when the writs issued are null, 16 or when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority. 17
We find nothing disagreeable with the action of the Court of Appeals to

give due course to the petition considering that the issue affected a
matter of public concern which is the disposition of the lands of our
matrimony No less than the Constitution protects its policy.
We therefore find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the
appellate court, in the absence of a clear showing that the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of substance in a manner inconsistent
with jurisprudence, or that the respondent Court has departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. In sum, no
reversible error has been committed by the respondent court. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 130118. July 9, 1998

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. PEDRO M. SUNGA, JR., and TETRO ENTERPRISES,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43524. The facts are as follows:
On February 10, 1992, private respondent Tetro Enterprises, Inc.
filed a complaint, denominated for recovery of possession and
damages, against petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Regional Director of Region III of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH). The complaint was assigned to
Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga,
presided over by respondent Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr.[2] Tetro
Enterprises alleged that it was the owner of a piece of land, consisting
of 12,643 square meters, in San Fernando, Pampanga, registered in its
name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 283205-R; that the land
had a probable value ofP252,569.00; that sometime in 1974,
petitioner, without having acquired the property through expropriation
or negotiated sale, constructed a road thereon; and that, despite
demands by private respondent, petitioner refused to return the land
taken and to pay the rent for the use of the same since 1974. Private
respondent, therefore, prayed that petitioner be ordered to return the
land to it in its original state and to close the road constructed
thereon; and to pay actual damages in the amount of P100,000.00,
rentals for the use of the land at P200.00 a month, in the total amount
of P40,800.00, and attorneys fees.
Petitioner filed an answer[3] in due time, alleging that private
respondent had no cause of action because it had not exhausted
administrative remedies before filing its complaint and that the case
was actually a suit against the State without its consent. Petitioner
alleged that it constructed part of the Olongapo-Gapan Road on the
subject property with the knowledge and consent of private
respondent which in fact entered into negotiations regarding the price
of the land; that petitioner was willing to pay the fair market value of
the property at the time of taking, plus interest, but, instead of
accepting its offer, private respondent filed the present complaint; and
that the return of the land to private respondent was no longer
feasible.
Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court issued an order,
dated November 25, 1994,[4] creating a board of commissioners to
determine the actual value of the property subject of this case which
shall be a basis for an amicable settlement by the parties or the
decision to be rendered by this Court, as the case may be. The board
was composed of Eller V. Garcia, a real estate broker, representing
private respondent Tetro Enterprises, Abraham Sison, Provincial
Assessor of Pampanga, representing petitioner, and Juan P. Limpin, Jr.,
clerk of court of the RTC, as chairman.
On
December
8,
1995,
the
board
rendered
a
[5]
report recommending that the price of the subject property be fixed
between P4,000.00 andP6,000.00 per square meter as the just and
reasonable price to be paid to private respondent. The board found
that while the lot was, at the time of taking, devoted to sugarcane, it
had become highly commercial since the construction of the OlongapoGapan Road resulting in the opening of residential subdivisions and the
construction of commercial buildings.
Based on the report of the board, the RTC rendered a decision[6] on

September 2, 1996 fixing the price of the land at P6,000.00 per square
meter or the total amount of P75,858,000.00 for 12,643 square
meters. The RTC noted that a lot within the vicinity of the land in
question had been sold at P10,000.00 per square meter and that, as
Provincial Assessor Abraham Sison said, the government stood to
benefit from the acquisition of the property because it was of great
use.
A copy of the decision was received by petitioners counsel, the
Office of the Solicitor General, on September 9, 1996.
On September 17, 1996, the OSG moved for a reconsideration,
contending that the RTC erred in fixing the compensation for the taking
of the land on the basis of its current market value of P6,000.00 per
square meter when the basis should be its price at the time of taking by
the government in 1974. No proof of service of a copy of the motion
was, however, attached to the motion as required by Rule 15, 6.[7]
In its order[8] dated October 3, 1996, the RTC denied petitioners
motion, finding it to be without merit and, in addition, to be a mere
scrap of paper for having been filed in violation of Rule 15, 6 of the
Rules of Court. A copy of the order was received by the OSG on
December 6, 1996.
Meanwhile, on December 3, 1996, private respondent Tetro
Enterprises moved for the execution of the decision in its favor. In its
order dated December 23, 1996, the RTC granted the motion. On
December 13, 1996, petitioner filed a notice of appeal, but the notice
was denied by the court on January 7, 1997 on the ground that its
decision of September 2, 1996 had become final and executory.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to set
aside the orders of October 3, 1996, December 23, 1996, and January 7,
1997 of the RTC. Its petition was, however, dismissed by the Court of
Appeals in its decision of June 9, 1997. In its resolution dated August 6,

1997,[9] the appellate court denied reconsideration of its decision.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC that because of
petitioners failure to attach proof of service of its motion for
reconsideration, the motion was nothing but a mere scrap of paper
which did not toll the period of appeal, with the result that the trial
courts decision became final. Consequently, the trial court correctly
denied petitioners notice of appeal. Petitioner submitted to the Court
of Appeals a registry return card showing that private respondents
counsel had received a copy of its motion for reconsideration on
September 24, 1996, but the Court of Appeals considered this to be of
little moment for the reason that the proof of service should have
been presented to the RTC and not to the appellate court for the first
time. Concluding, the Court of Appeals held:
[I]n a very real sense, petitioners present predicament is of its own
making. Consider: counsel for the petitioner did not a) append the
registry return receipt and the affidavit of service, if one has been
prepared, to petitioners motion for reconsideration; b) at any time
apprise the lower court of the sending, if this be the case, of a copy of
the motion for reconsideration to Atty. Cruz-Ducut; c) appear at the
hearing on the date he set for the consideration of the motion for
reconsideration; d) oppose, despite notice, private respondents
motion for execution; and e) seek reconsideration of the order
disapproving petitioners notice of appeal, knowing pretty well that a
special civil action for certiorari is available only when there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Petitioner thus cannot lay blame on respondent judges doorstep
for the way the latter disposed of the incidents obtaining in this case.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT

RIGIDLY AND STRICTLY APPLIED THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AGAINST
HEREIN PETITIONER WHICH, IF NOT CORRECTED, WOULD RESULT IN
A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE TO THE GREAT AND IRREPARABLE
DAMAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT.
Petitioner argues that it had substantially complied with the
requirement of notice to the adverse party as shown by the registry
return card which it submitted to the Court of Appeals. This card shows
that a copy of petitioners motion for reconsideration was sent by
registered mail to private respondents counsel, Atty. Zenaida G. CruzDucut, on September 18, 1996.
Petitioner further contends that it has a meritorious defense
because the value of the land taken should be based not on its current
market value but on its value at the time of taking by the government
in 1974. Petitioner, therefore, prays that the decision of the Court of
Appeals be set aside and the case be remanded to the RTC for
determination of the amount of just compensation due private
respondent in accordance with law and settled jurisprudence.
On the other hand, private respondent argues that the decision of
the Court of Appeals, holding petitioners motion for reconsideration to
be a mere scrap of paper because it contained no proof of service on
the adverse party, is in accordance with the rulings of this Court. Anent
petitioners contention that the compensation for the taking of the
property should be based on its value at the time of taking in 1974 and
not on its current market value, private respondent argues that the
basis of compensation is not the issue in this case. At any rate, it is
contended that the cases invoked by petitioner do not apply since this
case is not one for expropriation but one for recovery of possession and
for damages. Moreover, private respondent argues that the
government is estopped from questioning the trial courts valuation
because it is based on the recommendation of the board of

commissioners in which petitioner was represented.
The petition is well taken.
There is no question that petitioners motion seeking
reconsideration of the decision of the RTC did not have attached to it
proof that a copy thereof had been served on the adverse party as
required by Rule 15, 6 of the Rules of Court. In fact, it appears that, at
the time the motion was filed, no copy of the same had been served on
private respondent because petitioner actually sent it to private
respondents counsel, Atty. Zenaida G. Cruz-Ducut, only on September
18, 1996,[10] i.e, the day after the motion had been filed.
Nonetheless, considering the question raised in the appeal of the
government and the amount involved in this case, we think the Court of
Appeals should have considered the subsequent service of the motion
for reconsideration to be a substantial compliance with the
requirement in Rule 15, 6. In De Rapisura v. Nicolas,[11] the movant
also failed to attach to his motion for reconsideration proof of service
of a copy thereof to the other party. Nonetheless, this Court held the
failure not fatal as the adverse party had actually received a copy of the
motion and was in fact present in court when the motion was heard. It
was held that the demands of substantial justice were satisfied by the
actual receipt of said motion under those conditions.
In People v. Leviste,[12] this Court held it was grave abuse of
discretion for the trial court to deny the motion for postponement of
the private prosecutor even though no copy of the motion had been
served on the accused, in view of the fact that the prosecution was not
available on the date of the trial. No substantial right of the accused
was impaired. On the other hand, it was important that the case be
decided on the merits rather than dismissed on a technicality. The
accused should realize that postponements are part and parcel of our
legal system, it was held.
In Azajar v. Court of Appeals,[13] the defendant filed a motion to

dismiss without notice of hearing to the plaintiff as required by Rule 15,
4. As a result, the period for filing his answer expired and he was
declared in default. Judgment by default was subsequently rendered
against him. The Intermediate Appellate Court set aside the decision
after finding that defendants reasons for his failure to set his motion
for hearing was not utterly without plausibility. This circumstance,
together with the fact that defendant had meritorious defenses which,
if true, could defeat the plaintiffs claim, in the judgment of the IAC,
justified setting aside the decision of the trial court. On appeal, the
Court sustained the ruling of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
In this case, Atty. Cruz-Ducut actually received a copy of the motion
on September 24, 1996, days before the October 2, 1996 hearing. It is
contended, however, that Atty. Cruz-Ducut ceased to be private
respondents counsel on September 18, 1996 and service of petitioners
motion should have been made on Atty. Restituto M. David, its other
counsel.
This allegation is not true. The records show that at the time she
received a copy of the motion for reconsideration on September 24,
1996, Atty. Cruz-Ducut was still private respondents counsel of
record. She withdrew as counsel only on September 30, 1996.[14] There
was thus effective service of the motion for reconsideration on private
respondent.
Indeed, as much as possible, cases should be determined on the
merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes
and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be better
served. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Solicitor General filed
the record on appeal six days late. This Court suspended the rules on
perfection of appeal as its application would result in the loss to the
State of close to 300 hectares of prime sugar land which a private
individual had apparently succeeded in registering in his name through

fraudulent misrepresentation and machination.
This is not to tolerate carelessness or negligence on the part of
government lawyers. But one thing is taking disciplinary action against
them. Another is protecting vital government interests which should
not be jeopardized through the neglect of those appearing for it when
this can be done without adverse results to the private parties. These
considerations lead us to conclude that the trial court should have
exercised its discretion in this case in favor of the government. The
amount involved P75,858,000.00 plus the prima facie merit of the
governments appeal that, in accordance with the rulings[16] of this
Court, the value of the property should be based on its price at the time
of taking of the property in 1974 and not on its current market price,
should have given the RTC pause and, without necessarily reconsidering
its ruling that the measure of compensation should be the current
market value, should have caused it to give due course to the
appeal. This case presents an aspect of the problem of compensation
absent from the decided cases, namely, the presence of an agreement
of the parties to have the actual value of the property determined by
a board, on which the government was represented, to be used by the
court in fixing the compensation for the land taken. This consideration
may not necessarily warrant a different ruling but it does suggest a
necessity: that of having the merits of petitioners appeal decided by
the appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga (Branch 41) is
ORDERED to give due course to petitioners appeal from the decision in
Civil Case No. 9197.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., no part. Did not participate in previous actions.
G.R. No. L-14213
August 23, 1919
J. H. ANKRON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, objector-appellant.
Assistant Attorney-General Lacson for appellant.
P. J. Moore for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu. Its purpose was
to have registered, under the Torrens system, a certain piece or parcel
of land situated, bounded and particularly described in the plan and
technical description attached to the complaint and made a part
thereof.
The only opposition which was presented was on the part of the
Director of Lands. The oppositor [objector] alleged that the land in
question was the property of the Government of the United States
under the control and administration of the Government of the
Philippine Islands.
During the trial of the cause two witnesses only were presented by the
petitioner. No proof whatever was offered by the oppositor. After
hearing and considering the evidence, the Honorable Francisco Soriano,
judge, reached the following conclusions of fact:
1. That the land sought to be registered consists of one parcel of land as
marked and indicated on the plan and technical description presented;
2. That all of said land, with the exception of a small part at the north,
the exact description and extension of which does not appear, has been
cultivated and planted for more than forty-four years prior to the date
of this decision;
3. That said land was formerly occupied, cultivated and planted by
Moros, Mansacas and others, under a claim of ownership, and that
they lived thereon and had their houses thereon, and that portion of
the land which was not planted or cultivated was used as pasture land
whereon they pastured their carabaos, cattle, and horses;
4. That all of said Moros and Mansacas sold, transferred and conveyed
all their right, title and interest in said land to the applicant, J. H.
Ankron, some eleven years past, at which time all of the said former
owners moved o n to adjoining lands where they now reside;
5. That the possession under claim of ownership of the applicant and
his predecessors in interest was shown to have been open, notorious,
actual, public and continuous for more than forty-four years past, and
that their claim was exclusive of any other right adverse to all other
claims;
6. That the applicant now has some one hundred fifty (150) hills of
hemp, some eight thousand (8,000) cocoanut trees, a dwelling house,
various laborers' quarters, store-building, large camarin (storehouse of
wood, a galvanized iron and other buildings and improvements on said
land.
Upon the foregoing facts the lower court ordered and decreed that said
parcel of land be registered in the name of the said applicant, J. H.
Ankron, subject, however, to the right of the Government of the
Philippine Islands to open a road thereon in the manner and conditions
mentioned in said decision. The conditions mentioned with reference
to the opening of the road, as found in said decision, are that the
applicant give his consent, which he has already done, to the opening
of said road which should be fifteen (15) meters wide and should follow
approximately the line of the road as it now exists subject to the

subsequent survey to be made by the engineer of the province of
Davao.
From that decree the Director of Lands appealed to this court.
The appellant argues, first, that the applicant did not sufficiently
identify the land in question. In reply to that argument, the record
shows that a detained and technical description of the land was made a
part of the record. The evidence shows that the boundaries of the land
in question were marked by monuments built of cement.
Theoppositor neither presented the question of the failure of proper
identification of the land in the lower court nor presented any proof
whatever to show that said cement monuments did not exist.
The appellant, in his second assignment of error, contends that the
appellant failed to prove his possession and occupation in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926. The
important prerequisites for registration of land imposed by said section
54, paragraph 6, are (a) that the land shall beagricultural public land as
defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902; (b) that the petitioner,
by himself or his predecessors in interest, shall have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same under a bona fide claim of ownership for a period of ten years
next preceding the taking effect of said Act.
In the present case the applicant proved, and there was no effort to
dispute said proof, that the land in question was agricultural land and
that he and his predecessors in interest had occupied the same as
owners in good faith for a period of more than forty years prior to the
commencement of the present action. No question is raised nor
discussed by the appellant with reference to the right of the Moros to
acquire the absolute ownership and dominion of the land which they
have occupied openly, notoriously, peacefully and adversely for a long
period of years. (Cario vs. Insular Government, 7 Phil. Rep., 132 [212
U. S., 449].)
Accepting the undisputed proof, we are of the opinion that said
paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 has been fully complied with
and that the petitioner, so far as the second assignment of error is
concerned, is entitled to have his land registered under the Torrens
system.
Under the third assignment of error the appellant contends that
portions of said land cannot be registered in accordance with the
existing Land Registration Law for the reason that they are manglares.
That question is not discussed in the present brief. The appellant,
however., refers the court to his discussion of that question in the case
of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (39 Phil. Rep., 560). By reference to
the argument in the brief in the case, it is found that the appellant
relied upon the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1148 in relation with
section 1820 of Act No. 2711 (second Administrative Code). Section 3 of
Act No. 1148 provides that "the public forests shall include all
unreserved lands covered with trees of whatever age." Said section
1820 (Act No. 2711) provides that "for the purpose of this chapter
'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all
unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all
forest reserves of whatever character."
In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), which
decision has been follows in numerous other decision, the phrase
"agricultural public lands" as defined by Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
was held to mean "those public lands acquired from Spain which are
neither mineral nor timber lands" (forestry lands).
Paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 only permits the registration,
under the conditions therein mentioned, of "public agricultural lands."
It must follow, therefore, that the moment that it appears that the land
is not agricultural, the petition for registration must be denied. If the

evidence shows that it is public forestry land or public mineral land, the
petition for registration must be denied. Many definitions have been
given for "agricultural," "forestry," and "mineral" lands. These
definitions are valuable so far as they establish general rules. In this
relation we think the executive department of the Government,
through the Bureau of Forestry, may, and should, in view especially of
the provisions of section 4, 8, and 20 of Act No. 1148, define what shall
be considered forestry lands, to the end that the people of the
Philippine Islands shall be guaranteed in "the future a continued supply
of valuable timber and other forest products." (Sec. 8, Act No. 1148.) If
the Bureau of Forestry should accurately and definitely define what
lands are forestry, occupants in the future would be greatly assisted in
their proof and the courts would be greatly aided in determining the
question whether the particular land is forestry or other class of lands.
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the AttorneyGeneral admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question
belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that
a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself
sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral
land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future
value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said,
many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and
"mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it
is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must
show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it
contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is
not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that
it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral
today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be
classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of
the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands
classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow.

Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case,
having regard for its present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter
of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine
Islands are agricultural lands, that the courts have a right to presume, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land
involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land
must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one
purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in
each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove
swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one
or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first
instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation,
decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered
forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such
reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have
intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No.
1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall
be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs.
Director of Lands (39 Phil. Rep., 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, supra.)
In view of the foregoing we are of the opinion, and so order and
decree, that the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby
affirmed, with the condition that before the final certificate is issued,
an accurate survey be made of the lands to be occupied by the road
above mentioned and that a plan of the same be attached to the
original plan upon which the petition herein is based. It is so ordered,
with costs.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Moir, JJ., concur.
October 31, 1967

G.R. No. L-23300
ANDRES MANARPAAC, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ROSALINO CABANATAN, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS NORTE, in his capacity as such, defendantsappellees.
Herman P. Coloma for plaintiffs-appellants.
Harold M. Hernando for defendant-appellee Rosalino Cabanatan.
, J.:
On appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte
dismissing the complaint, without costs.
On December 7, 1960, the plaintiffs, numbering 24 in all, surnamed
Manarpaac, filed this action against Rosalino Cabanatan, the Director of
Lands and the Register of Deeds of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, on a complaint
which as amended on December 22, 1960, alleges that the plaintiffs
have been, since time immemorial, in actual possession as owners of
two parcels of land, the first with an area of 8,742 sq. m. and assessed
at P160.00 under tax declaration No. 034206, in the name of Rogaciano
Manarpaac, the second, with an area of 12211 sq. m. and assessed at
P390.00 under tax declaration No. 030876, both parcels are situated
at Barrio 15, Batac, Ilocos Norte, specifically described in paragraph 2
of the complaint; that such possession has been public, uninterrupted
and in the concept of owner; that they have their houses built on the
land; that in the year 1956, the defendant Rosalino Cabanatan filed an
application for free patent of a parcel of agricultural public land
situated at Barrio Suyo, Batac, Ilocos Norte, with an area of 27,788 sq.
m., and said defendant taking advantage of the ignorance and lack of
education of the plaintiffs, wilfully, fraudulently, maliciously, and
surreptitiously without previous notice to the plaintiffs whatsoever,
included the above described parcels of land (par. 2 of the
complaint) in his application for free patent; that on November 7, 1959,

a free patent was issued in the name of Rosalino Cabanatan by the
Director of Lands, and on December 3, 1959, certificate of title No. V105031 was issued in the name of Rosalino Cabanatan by the register of
deeds; that said certificate of title which included the land of the
plaintiffs, is null and void, because the patent was obtained thru
fraudulent misrepresentation; and that the proceedings leading to
the investigation and survey of the land were without notice and
without compliance with the requirements of the law. Plaintiffs,
therefore, prayed that the free patent and the certificate of title be
declared null and void, and the same should be cancelled; 4. That in
case the title issued may not be annulled, that the defendant Rosalino
Cabanatan be ordered to reconvey unto the plaintiffs their lands
unlawfully and fraudulently included in said title; that the defendant
be ordered to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P1,000.00; and 6.
That the plaintiffs pray for such further relief and remedy as may be
deemed just and equitable in the premises.
The defendants filed separate answer.
In his answer dated February 8, 1961, Rosalino Cabanatan denied the
material allegations in the complaint, and, as special defense alleged:
(a) that the issuance of the free patent and certificate of title in his
name were regular and after compliance with the requirements of the
law; (b) that the plaintiffs never protested with the Director of Lands
against the defendants application for free patent; they did not appeal
from the decision of the Director of Lands awarding the land to said
defendants; and the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies required by law, and, therefore, the decision of the Director
of Lands has become final; (c) that the original complaint was for nullity
of title, however, the amended complaint is for RECONVEYANCE which
is legally impermissible, for it changed the cause of action, and hence,
the amended complaint should have been dismissed, and the plaintiffs
required to file a new complaint.
In its answer dated January 6, 1961, the Director of Lands alleged that
the issuance of the free patent was regular and after compliance with
the requirements of the law; that 2. . . . he admits the allegation in
paragraph 6 of the complaint to the effect that one year from the
issuance of patent has not yet elapse; and that the plaintiffs never
filed any protest with the Bureau of Lands against the application for
free patent filed by Rosendo Cabanatan.
The Register of Deeds in his answer dated January 11, 1961, alleged
that the issuance of the certificate of title in the name of Rosalino
Cabanatan was in pursuance of a decree of patent presented to its
office and that he merely acted in compliance of the law.
On September 22, 1962, Rosalino Cabanatan filed a motion to dismiss
on the following ground: That even assuming that plaintiffs have a
right over the land in suit, their action has already prescribed and that
the court, therefore, has no jurisdiction, predicating the contention of
the rulings that When any public lands are alienated, the same shall be
brought forthwith under the operation of Section 22 of the Land
Registration Act and shall become registered land . . . and a certificate
of title shall be issued as in other cases of registered land (Diwaling
Sumail, et al. v. CFI of Cotabato, L-8287, April 20, 1955), and the one
year period under Section 38 of Act 496 should, in the case of public
land grants (patent), be counted from the issuance of the patent by the
Government under the Public Land Act (Nelayan v. Nelayan, L-14518.
August 29, 1960).
The plaintiffs opposed the motion to dismiss.
On September 23, 1963, the court issued an order dismissing the
complaint holding that the free patent having been issued on
November 3, 1959, and the first complaint was filed on December 7,
1960, the action for review of the decree was, therefore, filed more
than one year after the issuance of the patent.
From this order, the plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court.

From the averment of facts in the complaint, it clearly appears that the
plaintiffs have been, since time immemorial in possession as owners of
the disputed land, have declared the land for tax purposes in the names
of two of them and have built their houses on the land, but that
through fraud and irregularity, defendant Rosalino Cabanatan
succeeded in securing for himself, the certificate of title in question.
The foregoing recital of facts in the complaint are sufficient averment
of ownership. Possession since time immemorial, carries the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain,
or, that it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest. And so, we said in one case . . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial.
FOR SUCH POSSESSION WOULD JUSTIFY THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE
LAND HAVE NEVER BEEN PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OR THAT IT
HAD BEEN A PRIVATE PROPERTY EVEN BEFORE THE SPANISH
CONQUEST. (Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, citing Cario v.
Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. Ed. 394.)
Whether this presumption should hold as a fact or not, is a question
appropriately determinable only after the parties have adduced, or at
least, are given the opportunity to adduce, their respective evidence.
The ruling in Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 414 [reaffirmed in Mesin v. Pineda, L-14722, May 25, 1960] sustained on all
fours the validity of plaintiffs theory, thus In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de
jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had
already acquired by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts. If by legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
question by a grant of the state, it had already ceased to be of the
public domain and had become private property, at least by
Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon,
the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer
any title or control and the sale thus made was void and of no effect,
and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the
public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to
recover possession thereof.
If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in dispute, had
already become, by operation of law, private property, there is lacking
only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring
an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it.
In the case at bar, predicated upon the allegations in the complaint,
together with the admission of defendant Cabanatan in his answer
that the amended complaint is an action for reconveyance, which are
deemed admitted on a motion to dismiss, there can hardly be any
debate that the complaint states a sufficient cause of action for
recovery of possession of the land for, settled is the rule that the
remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in anothers name is, after one year from the
date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but respecting the
decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an
ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for conveyance or, if the
property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value,
for damages. (Casilan v. Espartero, 95 Phil. 799).
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside,
and the case is ordered remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. Costs in this appeal against the defendant Rosalino
Cabanatan.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro and Fernando JJ., concur.
September 28, 1938

G.R. No. 45859
GOLD CREEK MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and
QUIRICO ABADILLA, Director of the Bureau of Mines, respondents.
Claro M. Recto and DeWitt, Perkins & Ponce Enrile for petitioner.
Solicitor-General Tuason and Ramon Diokno for respondents.
Abad Santos (Jose), J.:
This petition seeks to compel the respondents, as Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce and as Director of the Bureau of Mines,
respectively, to approve petitioners application for patent for a certain
mining claim and prepare the necessary papers in relation thereto, and
to forward and submit said papers for the signature of the President of
the Philippines.
The petition alleges that petitioner owns the Nob Fraction mineral
claim, situated in the barrio of Gomok, municipality of Itogon, subprovince of Benguet, Mountain Province, and located on public lands by
C. L. ODowd in accordance with the provisions of the Act of congress of
July 1, 1902, as amended by the Act of Congress of February 6, 1905,
and of Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission, relative to the
location of mining claims; that said claim was located on January 1,
1929, and the original declaration of location registered in the office of
the mining recorder of Benguet, Mountain Province, on January 7,
1929; that from March 16 to 17, 1934, an amended location on the
premises was made, for which an amended declaration of location was
registered in the office of the mining recorder on April 3, 1934; that
petitioner by itself and its predecessors in interest, has been in
continuous and exclusive possession of said claim from the date of
location thereof: that prior to August 9, 1933, petitioner filed in the
office of the Director of Lands an application for an order of patent
survey of said claim, which survey was duly authorized by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce and performed by a mineral land
surveyor in the former divisions of mines, Bureau of Science, from
August 9, 1933, to April 30, 1934, at the expense of petitioner; that the
return of the surveyor, the plat and field notes of the claim and
certificate that more than P1,600 worth of labor and improvements had
been expended on said claim, were approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Science; that prior to November 15, 1935, petitioner filed
with the mining recorder an application for patent, together with a
certificate showing that more than P1,600, worth of labor and/or
improvements had been expended by the petitioner upon said claim,
and with the plat and field notes above mentioned; having previously
posted a copy of such plat, together with notice of said application for
patent in a conspicuous place upon said claim; and filed a copy of such
plat and of such notice in the office of said mining recorder, as well as
an affidavit of two persons that such notice had been duly posted; that
prior to November 15, 1935, the notice of petitioners application for
patent was forwarded by the mining recorder to the division of mines,
so that the latter could order the publication of said notice was made
once a week for a period of sixty days in the Philippines Herald, El
Debate, and the Official Gazette, commencing February 13, 1936; that
the sum of P113.59 was tendered to respondents, as payment for the
purchase price of said claim, the area of which is 4.5434 hectares; and
that petitioner has requested the respondents, as Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce and as director of the Bureau of Mines,
respectively, to approve its application for patent, and to prepare the
necessary papers relative to the issuance thereof and to submit such
papers for the signatures of the President of the Philippines, but the
respondents have failed and refused, and still fail and refuse, to do so.
Petitioner claims that it is entitled, as a matter of right, to the patent
applied for, having complied with all the requisites of the law for the
issuance of such patent.
Respondents, in their answer, admit some allegations of the petition

and deny others, and, by way of special defense, allege that petitioner
was not and is not entitled as a matter of right to a patent to the Nob
Fraction claim because the Constitution provides that natural
resources, with the exception of public agriculture land, shall not be
alienated; and that the respondents are, not only under no obligation
to approve petitioners application for a patent to said claim and to
prepare the necessary papers in relation thereto, but, also, in duty
bound to proven the issuance of said patent and the preparation of the
aforesaid papers, because they have sworn to support and defend the
Constitution.
This is one of several cases now pending in this court which call for an
interpretation, a determination of the meaning and scope, of section 1
of Article XII of the Constitution, with reference to mining claims. The
cases have been instituted as test cases, with a view to determining the
status, under the Constitution and the Mining Act (Commonwealth Act
No. 137), of the holders of unpatented mining claims which were
located under the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, as
amended.
In view of the importance of the matter, we deem it conducive to the
public interest to meet squarely the fundamental question presented,
disregarding for that purpose certain discrepancies found in the
pleadings filed in this case. This is in accord with the view expressed by
the Solicitor-General in his memorandum where he says that the
statements of facts in both briefs of the petitioners may be accepted
for the purpose of the legal issues raised. We deny some of the
allegations in the petitions and allege new ones in our answers, but
these discrepancies are not of such a nature or importance as should
necessitate introduction of evidence before the cases are submitted for
decision. From our view of the cases, these may be submitted on the
facts averred in the complaints, leaving out the difference between the
allegations in the pleadings to be adjusted or ironed out by the parties
later, which, we are confident, can be accomplished without much

difficulty.
Section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution reads as follows:
SECTION 1. All agriculture, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum
of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing
right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources,
with the exception of public agriculture land, shall not be alienated, and
no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give
effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is
embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions prohibits the
alienation of natural resources, with the exception of public agriculture
land. It seems likewise clear that the term natural resources, as used
therein, includes mineral lands of the public domain, but not mineral
lands which at the time the provision took effect no longer formed part
of the public domain. The reason for this conclusion is found in the
terms of the provisions itself. It first declares that all agricultural,
timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, etc., and other natural
resources of the Philippines, belong to the State. It then provides that
their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be

limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations
at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the
time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Next comes the prohibition against the alienation of
natural resources. This prohibition is directed against the alienation of
such natural resources as were declared to be the property of the
State. And as only agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain were declared property of the State, it is fair to conclude that
mineral lands which at the time the constitutional provision took effect
no longer formed part of the public domain, do not come within the
prohibition.
This brings us to the inquiry of whether the mining claim involved in the
present proceeding formed part of the public domain on November 15,
1935, when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became
effective in accordance with section 6 of Article XV thereof. In deciding
this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provisions
must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and
understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them.
Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution
are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to
which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment
and opinion in its adoption. (Barry vs. Truax, 13 N. D., 131; 99 N. W.,
769; 65 L. R. A., 762.)
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under
consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the
Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to
the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this court in
McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a
mining claim segregated the area from the public domain. Said the
court in that case: The moment the locator discovered a valuable
mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in

accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to
deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of
the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and
they were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other
person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to
include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid
mining location is made upon public lands afterward included in a
reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not effect the validity of
the former location. By such location and perfection, the land located is
segregated from the public domain even as against the Government .
(Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S., 337; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal.,
131; 27 Cyc., 546.)
The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator
the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor
upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes
segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator.
(St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. vs. Montana Mining Co., 171 U. S., 650,
655; 43 Law. ed., 320, 322.) When a location of a mining claim is
perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of
present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive
enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within
the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral rights of
adjoining locators; and this is the locators right before as well as after
the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested
property right by virtue of his location made in compliance with the
mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent issues.
(18 R. C. L., 1152.) In Noyes vs. Mantle (127 U. S., 348, 351; 32 Law. ed.,
168, 170), the court said:
There is no pretense in this case that the original locators did not
comply with all the requirements of the law in making the location of
the Pay Streak Lode Mining claim, or that the claim was ever
abandoned or forfeited. They were the discoverers of the claim. They
marked its boundaries by stakes, so that they could be readily traced.
They posted the required notice, which was duly recorded in
compliance with the regulations of the district. They had thus done all
that was necessary under the law for the acquisition of an exclusive
right to the possession and enjoyment of the ground. The claim was
thenceforth their property. They needed only a patent of the United
States to render their title perfect, and that they could obtain at any
time upon proof of what they had done in locating the claim, and of
subsequent expenditures to specified amount in developing it. Until the
patent issued the government held the title in trust for the locators or
their vendees. The ground itself was not afterwards open to sale.
In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it
was said:
The rule established by innumerable decisions of this court, and of state
and lower Federal courts, that when the location of a mining claim is
perfected under the law, it has the effect of a grant by the United
States of the right of present and exclusive possession. The claim is
property in the fullest sense of that term; and may be sold, transferred,
mortgaged, and inherited without infringing any right or title of the
United States. The right of the owner is taxable by the state; and is
real property, subject to the lien of a judgment recovered against the
owner in a state or territorial court. (Belk vs. Neagher, 104 U. S., 279,
283; 26 L. ed., 737, 737; 1 Mor. Rep., 510; Manuel vs. Wulff, 152 U. S.,
505, 510, 511; 38 L. ed., 532-534; 14. Sup. Ct. Rep., 651; 18 Mor. Min.
Rep., 85; Elder vs. Wood, 208 U. S., 226, [317] 232; 52 L. ed., 464, 466;
28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 263; Bradford vs. Morrison, 212 U. S., 389; 53 L. ed.,
564; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep., 349.) The owner is not required to purchased the
claim or secure patent from the United states; but so long as he
complies with the provisions of the mining laws, his possessory right,
for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by
patent. (Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U. S., 306; 74
Law. ed., 445.)
The Solicitor-General admits in his memorandum that the decision in
the McDaniel case in determinative of the fundamental question
involved in the instant case. But he maintains that this decision is
based on a misapprehension of the authorities on which the court
relied, and that it is not well founded and should be abandoned. We
do not deem it necessary to belabor this point. Whether well founded
or not, the decision in that case was the law when section 1 Article XII
of the Constitution became effective; and even if we were disposed to
overrule that decision now, our action could not affect rights already
fixed under it.
Our conclusion is that, as the mining claim under consideration no
longer formed part of the public domain when the provisions of Article
XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come within the
prohibition against the alienation of natural resources; and the
petitioner has the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the
terms and conditions prescribed by law.
It remains to consider whether mandamus is the proper remedy in this
case. In Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that mandamus will lie to compel the
secretary of the Interior to dispose of an application for a patent for a
mining claim on its merits, where his refusal to do so is based on his
misinterpretation of a statute. In the course of its decision the court
said: While the decision of this court exhibit a reluctance to direct a
writ ofmandamus against an executive officer, they recognize the duty
to do so by settled principles of law in some cases. (Lane vs. Hoglund,
244 U. S., 174, 181; 61 L. ed., 1066, 1069; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 552; and
case cited.) In Roberts vs. United States (176 U. S., 221, 231; 44 L. ed.,
443, 447; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 376), referred to and quoted in the Hoglund
case, this court said:
Every statute to some extent requires constructions by the public
officer whose duties may be defined therein. Such officer must read the
law, and he must therefore, in a certain sense, construe it, in order to
form a judgment from its languages what duty he is directed by the
statute to perform. But that does not necessarily and in all cases make
the duty of the officer anything other than a purely ministerial one. If
the law direct him to perform an act in regard to which no discretion is
committed to him, and which, upon the facts existing, he is bound to
perform, then that act is ministerial, although depending upon a statute
which requires, in some degree a construction of its language by the
officer. Unless this be so, the value of this writ is very greatly impaired.
Every executive officer whose duty is plainly devolved upon him by a
statute might refuse to perform it, and hen his refusal is brought before
the court he might successfully plead that the performance of the duty
involved the construction of a statute by him, and therefore it as not
ministerial, and the court could on that account be powerless to give
relief. Such a limitation of the powers of the court, we think, would be
most unfortunate, as it would relieve from judicial supervision all
executive officers in the performance of their duties whenever they
should plead that the duty required of them arose upon the
construction of a statute, no matter how plain its language, nor how
plainly they violated their duty in refusing to perform the act required.
In the instant case, we are not justified, upon the state of the pleadings,
to grant the relief sought by the petitioner. Considering, however, that
the refusal of the respondents to act on the application for a patent on
its merits as due to their misinterpretation of certain constitutional and
statutory provisions, following the precedent established by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Wilbur vs. United States ex rel.
Krushnic, supra, a writ of mandamus should issue directing the
respondents to dispose of the application for patent on its merits,
unaffected by the prohibition against the alienation of natural

resources contained in section 1 of Article XII of the constitution and in
Commonwealth Act No. 137. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial and Diaz, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
LAUREL, J., concurring:
This is a case, as I understand it, of a mining claim whose location was
duly perfected under a law of the Congress of the United States prior to
the inauguration of our Commonwealth. This law of the Congress is the
Act of July 1, 1902, the first Congressional legislation that gave us a
cherished bill of rights.
I express the opinion that a perfected location of a mining is an
existing right within the purview of section 1, Article XII, of our
Constitution. It is a substantial property right and permits the locator to
take all the necessary steps leading to the issuance of a patent. It is not
contingent or expectant because nor contingency or expectation is
neither property nor property right. It is a legal right in the sense that it
is recognized by law and acknowledged by the Constitution. And
recognition implies protection. I must, therefore, reject the suggestion
that by the interposition of the Constitution such a right had been
wiped out or frittered and now to be referred to.
The saving clause in the section involved of the Constitution was
originally embodied in the report submitted by the Committee on
Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and Other Natural Resources
to the Constitutional Convention on September 17, 1934. It was later
inserted in the first draft of the Constitution as section 13 of Article XIII
thereof, and finally incorporated as we find it now. Slight have been the
changes undergone by the proviso from the time it came out of
committee until it was finally adopted. When first submitted and as
inserted in the first draft of the Constitution it reads: subject to any
right, grant, lease, or concession existing in respect thereto on the date

of the adoption of the Constitution. As finally adopted, the proviso
reads: subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the
time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
constitution. This recognition is not mere graciousness but springs
from the just character of the government established. The framers of
the Constitution were not obscured by the rhetoric of democracy or
swayed to hostility by an intense spirit of nationalism. They well knew
that conservation of our natural resources did not mean destruction or
annihilation of acquired property rights. Withal, they erected a
government neither episodic nor stationary but well-nigh conservative
in the protection of property rights. This notwithstanding nationalistic
and socialist traits discoverable upon even a sudden dip into a variety
of the provisions embodied in the instrument.
But while I regard the recognition and protection of the right here
invoked inevitable, I feel constrained to withhold my assent to the
invocation of the case of McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia ([1922], 42
Phil. 749), insofar as citation thereof may imply unqualified acceptance
of or adherence to the broad rule that where there is a valid and
perfected location of a mining claim, the area covered is not only
thereby segregated from the body of the public domain but becomes
the private property of the locator. My opinion is that while the locator,
under the circumstances, secures the beneficial ownership or the
dominium utile, the government retains the bare ownership or the
dominium directum, until the locators claim ripens into full ownership
upon full compliance with all the requirements of the law for the
issuance of a patent.
I, therefore, concur in the result.
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:
With regret, I have to dissent from the opinion of my learned
colleagues in this very important case now under advisement. We are
concerned with the correct construction of a constitutional prohibition

in a matter directly related to the conservation of a great portion of our
national wealth: the mines.
Because of the refusal of the respondents, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce and the Director of the Bureau of Mines, to approve the
application of the petitioner, Gold Creek Mining Company, for the
issuance in its favor of the patent for or title to a mining claim, and to
prepare the papers necessary for the issuance of said patent and
submit them for the signature of the President of the Philippines, the
petitioner seeks to obtain from this court a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondents to do what they refused to do. Instead of
granting or dismissing the petition, the majority orders the respondents
to act on the application, which, they rule, is not affected by the
prohibition against the alienation of natural resources contained in
section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution and in Commonwealth Act
No. 137.
This is the first point on which I disagree with the majority, for the
reason that, as alleged in the petition, the respondents refused to
approved the petitioners application and, on the other hand, that the
Solicitor-General pointed out in his memorandum that the statement of
facts contained in the briefs of the petitioner may be accepted for the
purpose of deciding the legal questions raised; and although there are
some discrepancies between the allegations of the parties, they are not
of such nature or moment as would require the introduction of
evidence before the case is submitted for decision. In my opinion, this
court should now dispose of the petition for mandamus on its merits,
granting or dismissing the same, instead of ordering the respondents to
act on the petitioners application, it being a fact that said respondents
had already acted by denying said application.
Now, considering the petition on its merits, should we order the
respondents to approve the petitioners application for patent, or
should we, on the contrary, deny the remedy prayed for? In other
words, should we hold that the petitioner is entitled to the patent

applied for, or on the contrary, that it has acquired such right?
Section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution provides as follows:
All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession
at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under
this constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five
yeas renewable for another twenty-five years, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, in which cases
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
The majority maintains that the foregoing constitutional provision
prohibits the alienation of natural resources and that the term natural
resources includes mineral lands of the public domain, but not the
mineral lands which at the time the provisions became effective no
longer formed part of the public domain. The majority further states
that the claim in question, having been located prior to the
inauguration of the Commonwealth, has ceased to be land of the public
domain and, therefore, does not fall within the prohibition contained in
the foregoing section which expressly provides that the natural
resources shall not be alienated.
It is true that the mining claim in question was located prior to the
inauguration of the Commonwealth on November 15, 1935. It may be
conceded that a location, once made and perfected, operates to
segregate the land from the public domain, but this in no wise means
that the Government parts with the absolute ownership over the
mining claim by the mere fact of its location. Location should only be
understood as segregating the land located from the public domain in
the sense that it is no longer open to location or susceptible of
appropriation by another, while the locator has not lost his right to or
abandoned the mining claim. To give a broader meaning and greater
effect to the location of a mining claim is to contend against the
express provisions of sections 36, 37 and 39 of the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, as amended by section 9 of another Act of Congress of
February 6, 1905, that location is all that is necessary to acquire
absolute ownership over a location of a claim to the issuance of the
patent for or title to the land, is a far cry. Location, without more,
confers only the right of possession. Thus section 36 of the Act of
Congress of February 6, 1905 refers to the manner of recording, and
amount of work necessary to hold possession of a mining claim.
Section 39 of the same Act also speaks of the right of possession of the
claim, and the right to the issuance of a patent only arises after the
execution of certain works and acts prescribed by law, such as the labor
or improvements made each year (sec. 36); the full description and
identification of the land by means of plat and field notes (sec. 37); the
notice and publication of the application for a patent by the locator,
etc., etc. (sec. 37).
The same majority states: The legal effect of a valid location of a
mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain,
but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and
the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and
conditions prescribed by the law. (emphasis mine.)
Well, then: the Act of Congress does not fix any period within which the
conditions prescribed ought to be complied with. It does specify the
time for recording a claim in the registry, but it does not determine the
period within which to make the necessary annual labor or
improvements thereon. The law requires universal publication and

notice of the application for a patent for a determine number of days,
but it fails to fix the date when said notice may be made and published.
The law requires that, if there be any claim adverse to the application
for a patent, the corresponding action should be instituted in the
proper court to determine who is entitled to the patent; but no period
is fixed within which the litigation should be decided. The law finally
requires the payment of a certain sum for every hectare of land
covered by the mining claim before the patent is issued; but it does not
prescribed the period within which to pay said sum, which is the price
for the alienation of the land by the Government in favor of the
applicant for the title or patent.
I now ask: Within what time must the conditions prescribed by the law
be complied with in order that the locator may become entitled to the
patent? I gather from the majority opinion that, as long as the location
of the mining claim was perfected before the inauguration of the new
Government of the Philippines on November 15, 1935, the other
conditions may be complied with even after said date in order that the
locator may acquire a right to the patent. I dissent on this fundamental
point from the majority opinion. I maintain that in prohibiting the
alienation of natural resources, save any existing right, the Constitution
does not refer to the right of location or to the inherent right of
possession, or to any inchoate or contingent right which are only a
means to bring about another right; as this right cannot be acquired
until after compliance with all the conditions prescribed by law, it is
evident that the prescribed conditions should be complied with before
the inauguration of the Commonwealth.
Was the petitioner entitled to the issuance of the patent for the mining
claim in question before the inauguration of the Commonwealth on
November 15, 1935? I hold that he was not, because on said date,
according to the very allegations of the petition for mandamus, the
publication in the newspapers of the application for a patent for a
period of 60 days as prescribed by law had not been made, as said

publication was only commenced on February 13, 1936. Neither was
the payment of P25 per hectare made before the inaugurations of the
new Government, that is, the Government had not been paid the price
for the alienation of the mineral land when Article XII of the
Constitution went into effect. Petitioners right, therefore, to the
patent had not matured before November 15, 1935, wherefore, he falls
squarely within the constitutional prohibition.
A similar thing has been provided for by Act No. 926, passed in October
1903, and Act No. 2874, passed in November, 1919, in relation to public
lands. Section 54, paragraph 6, of the first Act, and section 45,
paragraph (b), of the second, provide that those who have been in
possession of agricultural lands of the public domain since July 26,
1894, may acquire a perfect title of ownership; and it is necessarily
inferred that those who commenced their possession of such lands
after July 26, 1894 have no right to obtain title, notwithstanding the
fact that their possession may have been for 10, 20 or 30 years. This is
exactly what the Constitution has provided: to fix a time for
determining those who have become entitled to the patent for a
mining claim.
Although the provisions of the Act of Congress of 1905 are very clear
and there is no better aid to construction than the law itself, I
nevertheless cite the following authorities which support my points of
view in this opinion.
The locator of a mining claim under the United states laws, prior to the
actual payment of the purchase-money and the issuance to him of the
receipt therefor by the Land Department, possesses a mere privilege to
purchase the property, and a constables sale of the mine before
payment only passes that privilege. . . . (Hamilton vs. Southern Nev. G.
& S. Min. Co., 33 Fed., 562.)
. . . But he is not the owner of the land until he pays for it, and obtains
the United States patent. It is a part of a public domain. In the
meantime the defendant is occupying it under a mere license from the
government, which may be revoked at any time by the repeal of the act
giving it. . . . His licensce under the statute to occupy and to work it as
mining ground is sufficient for that purpose until withdrawn by
congress, without purchasing it. . . . (U. S. vs. Nelson, Fed. Cas. No. 15,
864.) (Emphasis mine.)
A prospector on the public mineral domain may protect himself in the
possession of his pedis possessionis while he is searching for mineral.
His possession so held is good as a possessory title against all the world,
except the government of the United States. . . . (Crossman vs. Pendery,
8 Fed., 693.)
A possessory title, while it may not be divested by any one except the
United States, may be avoided by the default of its owner, either by
abandonment or by forfeiture for non-compliance with local
regulations or with the statutory requirements as to annual labor. . . . (1
The Law of Mines and Mining in the United States, Barringer & Adams,
318, 319.)
Prior to the issuance of a patent the locator cannot be said to own the
fee simple title. The fee resides in the general government, whose
tribunals, specially charged with the ultimate conveyance of the title,
must pass upon the qualifications of the locator and his compliance
with the law. Yet, as between the locator and everyone else save the
paramount proprietor the estate acquired by a perfected mining
location possesses all the attributes of a title in fee, and so long as the
requirements of the law with reference to continued development are
satisfied, the character of the tenure remains that of a fee. As between
the locator and the government, the former is the owner of the
beneficial estate, and the latter holds the fee in trust, to be conveyed to
such beneficial owner upon his application in that behalf and in
compliance with the terms prescribed by the paramount proprietor.

(Lindley on Mines, 3d. ed., sec. 539, p. 1200.) (Emphasis mine.)
I therefore vote for the denial of the petition.

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G.R. No.

73002 December 29, 1986

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be

and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to

under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal

domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to

matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later)

xxx xxx xxx

names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the

Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial,

served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as

lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been

rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a

correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case

presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of

conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully

suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now

corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:

To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on

It has also been said that:

G.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,

person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b),

Meralco? This Court is disposing of that same contention in the Oh Cho

public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section

insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such

The discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

by virtue of their predecessors-in-interest' vested right and title may be

being a corporation and not a natural person, is not qualified to apply

(carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the

3. In fine, since under the Court's settled doctrine, the acquisitive

operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in

thousand hectares in area" (which is beamed against the undue control

In only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or

of the aforecited provision of the New Constitution. This observation

least thirty [30] years immediately preceding the filing of the

is residential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land.

application" and is therefore entitled to the registration applied for

performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall

applied section 45 (b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what

had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant,

possessor has "performed all the conditions essential to a Government

notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he

which had become private property of its predecessors-in-interest, the

the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are 'corporations or

G.R. No. L-24066

VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,

learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto

there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in

Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and

G.R. No. L-17597

Lucena, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, notices of location

8. That the respondent Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of

From all of the foregoing arguments and authorities we must conclude

G.R. No. 2940

thereto were generally known and recognized by the people of the

upon the property in question a wooden sign with a printed notice

objects by distances to lines of the survey. According to the brief of the