HEIRS OF TEOFILO GABATAN

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA
Facts:
Subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land situated at Calinugan,
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for taxation in the name
of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC, respondent alleged that she
is the sole owner having inherited the same from her deceased mother,
Hermogena Gabatan Evero. Respondent further claimed that her mother,
Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito.
Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan was entrusted to his
brother, Teofilo Gabatan and Teofilos wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. It
was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the return
of the land but to no avail. After Hermogenas death, respondent also did the
same but petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender the
subject property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died,
petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took possession of the
disputed land despite respondents demands for them to vacate the same.
In their answer, petitioners denied that respondents mother Hermogena was
the daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or
respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that
Juan Gabatan died single and without any issue and that Juan was survived by
one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo, Macaria and Justa. These siblings
and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been
in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted
possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than 50 years and
enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole
world including respondent.
RTC: rendered a decision in favor of respondent
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA.
CA: rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming that of the RTC. Likewise
gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Macaria Gabatan de
Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena
was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan:
To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale containing such declaration which was
signed by Teofilo and the latters nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a
tangible proof that they acknowledged Hermogenas status as the daughter of
Juan Gabatan.
Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse
principally contending that the CA committed the following reversible errors:

Issue:
1. The lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff-appellee (respondent) as the
sole and surviving heir of Juan Gabatan, the only child of a certain Hermogena
Clareto GABATAN
2. The lower court erred in NOT declaring that the cause of action of plaintiffappellee (respondent) if any, has been barred by laches and/or prescription.
Ruling:
The respondents main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of
ownership and possession of property. It is undisputed that the subject
property, was owned by the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his lifetime. There
are two contending parties, both insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the
decedent.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in
an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This
must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration
can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively
clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or
right.
In the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed
by the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be
more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the
determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan,
specially in light of the fact that the parties had voluntarily submitted the issue
to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship
in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and
consequently rendered judgment thereon.
We GRANT the petition.
1. After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient and
questionable the basis of the RTC in conferring upon respondent the status of
sole heir of Juan Gabatan.
Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following:

ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth
appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final
judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the
filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate
child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final
judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, two conflicting birth certificates of respondent were presented at the
RTC. Respondent, during her direct testimony, presented and identified a
purported certified true copy of her typewritten birth certificate which indicated
that her mothers maiden name was Hermogena Clarito Gabatan.
Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a certified true copy of respondents
handwritten birth certificate which differed from the copy presented by
respondent. Among the differences was respondents mothers full maiden
name which was indicated as Hermogena Calarito in the handwritten birth
certificate.
We cannot subscribe to the trial courts view that since the entries were
handwritten, was the one of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies
of the handwritten birth certificate of respondent were duly authenticated by
two competent witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal Assistant Registration Officer of
the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and Maribeth E.
Cacho, Archivist of the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa, Manila. Both
witnesses testified that: (a) as part of their official duties they have custody of
birth records in their respective offices, and (b) the certified true copy of
respondents handwritten birth certificate is a faithful reproduction of the
original birth certificate registered in their respective offices. Ms. Vidal, during
her testimony, even brought the original of the handwritten birth certificate
before the trial court and respondents counsel confirmed that the certified true
copy eventually was a faithful reproduction of the original. Ms. Vidal likewise
categorically testified that no other copy of respondents birth certificate exists
in their records except the handwritten birth certificate. Ms. Cacho, in turn,
testified that the original of respondents handwritten birth certificate found in
the records of the NSO Manila was the one officially transmitted to their office
by the Local Civil Registry Office of Cagayan de Oro. Both Ms. Vidal and Ms.
Cacho testified and brought their respective offices copies of respondents
birth certificate in compliance with subpoenas issued by the trial court and
there is no showing that they were motivated by ill will or bias in giving their
testimonies. Thus the handwritten documents deserve to be given greater
probative weight.
Aside from the testimonies of respondents witnesses, both the RTC and the CA
relied heavily on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale presented by

respondent and which appeared to be signed by the siblings and the heirs of
the siblings of Juan Gabatan. However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute
Sale, including its contents and the signatures therein, as competent evidence
was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners counsel for being a
mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated.
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself. Although the best evidence rule admits of exceptions and there are
instances where the presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed,
such as when the original is lost or the original is a public record, the basis for
the presentation of secondary evidence must still be established.
2. As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to rule against respondent.
According to respondents own testimony, Juan Gabatan died in 1933 and thus,
the cause of action of the heirs of Juan Gabatan to recover the decedents
property from third parties or to quiet title to their inheritance accrued in 1933.
Yet, respondent and/or her mother Hermogena, if they were truly the legal
heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their rights as such. It is only in 1978 that
respondent filed her first complaint to recover the subject property, against
Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo Gabatan. She claimed that she waited until
the death of Rita Gabatan to refile her case out of respect because Rita was
then already old.
We cannot accept respondents flimsy reason. It is precisely because Rita
Gabatan and her contemporaries were advancing in age and might soon expire
that respondent should have exerted every effort to preserve valuable
evidence and speedily litigate her claim. the law aids the vigilant, not those
who sleep on their rights[O]ne may not sleep on a right while expecting to
preserve it in its pristine purity.
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
CB and the RTC: The Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under
receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines pursuant to Resolution No.
699 of its Monetary Board. A few months later, it was placed under liquidation
and a Liquidator was appointed.
The Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court, a petition entitled "Petition
for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking Corporation." The petition
was approved, after which creditors filed their claims with the court.
A new Liquidator, Vitaliano N. Naagas, President of the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC), was appointed by the Central Bank.

The Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union for short),

petitioner in G.R. No. 109373, filed a complaint-in-intervention seeking
payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay differential, salary increase
differential, Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its
members as employees of PaBC. In its order, the trial court ordered payment of
the principal claims of the Union.
The Liquidator received a copy of the order he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Clarification of the order. The judge modified but in effect
denied the Liquidator's motion for reconsideration. He then filed a Notice of
Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal, which
was denied reason, late.

pending, the notice of appeal was filed late. Accordingly, the 14th division
dismissed the Liquidator's petition.
The Union and the Liquidator then separately filed petitions before this Court.
Issues:
Union (5th division)
1. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the case is a special
proceeding governed by Rules 72 to 109 of the Revised Rules of Court.
2. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in concluding that the notice of appeal
filed by Naagas was filed on time.

Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents in G.R. No. 112991,
likewise filed claims for the payment of investment in the PaBC allegedly in the
form of shares of stocks. They alleged that their claim constituted foreign
exchange capital investment entitled to preference in payment under the
Foreign Investments Law.

Liquidator (14th division of CA)

1. The Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking
Corporation s a Special Proceeding case and/or one which allows multiple
appeals, in which case the period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from
receipt of the order/judgment appealed from.

Judge of the RTC directed the Liquidator to pay private respondents the total
amount of their claim as preferred creditors. The Liquidator received the order
but he moved for reconsideration, but the court denied his motion. As in the
case of the Union, however, the judge ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off
the record on the ground that it had been filed without authority of the Central
Bank and beyond 15 days. In his order of October 28, 1992, the judge directed
the execution of his order granting the Stockholders/ Investors' claim.

Ruling:
1. The principal question in these cases is whether a petition for liquidation
under 29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is,
then the period of appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in addition
to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal in order to
perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action,
the period of appeal is 15 days from notice of the decision or final order
appealed from.

CA: The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to set aside the orders of the trial court
denying his appeal from the orders granting the claims of Union and of the
Stockholders/Investors.
The 2 Divisions of the CA to which the cases were separately raffled, rendered
conflicting rulings;

Held in the case of the Union that the proceeding before the trial court was
a special proceeding and, therefore, the period for appealing from any
decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days. Since the notice of
appeal of the Liquidator was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the
decision granting the Union's claims, the appeal was brought on time. The
5th Division, set aside the orders of the lower court and directed the latter
to give due course to the appeal of the Liquidator.
In the case of the Stockholders/Investors that a liquidation proceeding is an
ordinary action. Therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or
final order rendered therein is 15 days and that since the Liquidator's
appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order appealed
from, deducting the period during which his motion for reconsideration was

The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides:

19. Period of Appeals.
(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the cases referred to in
paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken within 15 days from notice of the
judgment, order, resolution or award appealed from.
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules
of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of
appeals shall be 30 days, a record on appeal being required.
Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special
proceeding, Chief Justice Moran states:" Action is the act by which one sues
another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which
one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence,
action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is a formal
demand of a right by one against another, while the latter is but a petition for a
declaration of a status, right or fact.
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent
corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary

action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor
the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for
affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor
state a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's
insolvency so that its creditors may be able to file their claims in the
settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations.
Contrary to the rulings of the 14th division, liquidation proceedings do not
resemble petitions for interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves
claims on a subject matter against a person who has no interest therein. This is
not the case in a liquidation proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative
of the corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the
creditors. He is thus charged with insuring that the assets of the corporation
are paid only to rightful claimants and in the order of payment provided by law.
A liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state
of deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a
common purpose: the determination of all the assets and the payment of all
the debts and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate.
2. The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals correctly granted the Liquidator's
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus and its decision should,
therefore, be affirmed.
Multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation proceedings. Consequently, a record
on appeal is necessary in each and every appeal made. Hence, the period to
appeal should be 30 days, a record on appeal being required.
Liquidator
1. The Liquidator's notice of appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the
23rd day of receipt of the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not file a record on appeal
with the result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As already stated a record
on appeal is required under the Interim Rules and Guidelines in special
proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The reason for
this is that the several claims are actually separate ones and a decision or final
order with respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the original
record on appeal must remain in the trial court where other claims may still be
pending.
Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting the
claims of the Stockholders/Investors became final. Consequently. The 14 th
Division's decision dismissing the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus must be affirmed albeit for a different reason.

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 109373 and G.R. No 112991, the decisions appealed
from are AFFIRMED.
MONTAER
vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT
Facts:
Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the
Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioners Alejandro
Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor MontaerDalupan are their children. Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died.
Private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S.
Montaer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of
properties before the Sharia District Court. The said complaint was entitled
"Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and
Properties of Late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montaer, Lillibeth K.
Montaer, Alejandro Kho Montaer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montaer, In
the said complaint, private respondents made the following allegations: (1)
Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim;
(3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the
widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montaer is the daughter of the
decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising
the estate of the decedent. Private respondents prayed for the Sharia District
Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of
the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the
decedent.
Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following
grounds: (1) the Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the
late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic.
Sharia District Court dismissed the private respondents complaint. The district
court held that Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction
extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased
Muslims.
Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, The Sharia District
Court denied petitioners opposition Despite finding that the said motion for
reconsideration "lacked notice of hearing," the district court held that such
defect was cured as petitioners "were notified of the existence of the pleading,"
and it took cognizance of the said motion. The Sharia District Court also reset
the hearing for the motion for reconsideration.
In its first assailed order the Sharia District Court reconsidered its order of
dismissal, the district court allowed private respondents to adduce further

evidence. In its second assailed order the Sharia District Court ordered the
continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and
pre-trial conference.
Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:
Issues:
1. Respondent Sharia District Court Marawi City lacks jurisdiction over
petitioners who are Roman Catholics and non-Muslims.
2. Respondent Sharia District CourtMarawi City committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it set spl. civil action 7-05 for
trial even if the complaint plainly reveals that respondent Almahleen Liling s.
Montaer seeks recognition from Alejandro Montaer.
Ruling:
1. Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Sharia District
Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of
deceased Muslims:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of
deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or
appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the
aggregate value of the property.
In the case at bar, the Sharia District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction
simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the
deceased is not a Muslim. The Sharia District Court has the authority to hear
and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires
an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the
Sharia District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim,
the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners second argument, that the proceeding before the Sharia District
Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an
erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the
confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Sharia District Court,
where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the
case was denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that the
proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased,
which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court defines a
special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact." This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the

rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased

Muslim.
In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the
decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedents heirs, which
would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate of the decedent. Here, the respondents seek to
establish the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death and, subsequently, for
private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be recognized as among
his heirs, if such is the case in fact.
Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding
has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special
proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in
which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong" necessarily has definite adverse parties, who
are either the plaintiff or defendant. On the other hand, a special proceeding,
"by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact,"has
one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right,
or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears
emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of
action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of
the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities, and
to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.
The petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Sharia District Court, respectively,
are AFFIRMED.
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS
HOLDING
CORPORATION,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA
CAMPOS BENEDICTO
Facts:
Sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate. He was survived by his
wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto),
and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. At the time of his death,
there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners.
The first, Civil Case was then pending with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod
City, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second,
Civil Case, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, with petitioners
Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the
plaintiffs therein.

Private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. the Manila RTC issued an order
appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased
husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor. In January 2001,
private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and
Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.
Petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the
manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in
the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on
the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the
Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the
required inventory of the decedents estate. Petitioners also filed other
pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private
respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that
had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
RTC: issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that
petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of
Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings. After it had denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of
Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being
the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
CA: promulgated a decision dismissing the petition and declaring that the
Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to
intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a
motion to intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the
claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant,
as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other
courts.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in
the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto, the rules of
procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on intervention,
but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.
Ruling:
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the
courts a quo. 1. they prayed that they be henceforth furnished copies of all

processes and orders issued by the intestate court as well as the pleadings
filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said court. 2. they prayed that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to
submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission
thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same. 3. petitioners
moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the
administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set
the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice
to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and
disposition of the estate.
Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but
they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special
Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also any person interested or
persons interested in the estate various specified capacities to protect their
respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a
pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably
concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of
the decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent
that the judgment could no longer be enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a
creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every
aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific
instances when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we
deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the
intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief
sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other
modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected.
Petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in
connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the
administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such
relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the developments in the
intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a
running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should
their interests be compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to
complain to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled,
or fraudulently conveyed.
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the
intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the
service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest
of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed
of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right
to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court

order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less
cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the
decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the
creditors in the estate are preserved.
In the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any
or all interested parties the petitioners as interested parties will be entitled
to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties
are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of
examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec.
7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or
administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise
encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the
application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the
administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of
the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
The disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless,
petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on
Special Proceedings
Petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons
interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such
notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on
Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special
Proceedings.
ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA
vs
COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private
respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. Out of this union, the
couple begot two illegitimate children, namely, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and
Rudyard Pride Alonzo. Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. Private
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a Petition 1 which
is reproduced hereunder:
IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION
OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER
THE PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF
MINORS ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO SP. PROC. NO/ 331
and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO, all
surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO,

COMES NOW the petitioner assisted by counsel and unto this Honorable Court
most respectfully states:
1. That she is of legal age, Filipino, married but separated from her husband
and residing at Quezon Avenue, Cotabato City, Philippines;
2. That sometime from 1970 up to and until late 1981 your petitioner lived with
Roberto Lim Chua as husband and wife and out of said union they begot two
(2) children, namely, Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua who was born in General
Santos City and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua who was born in Davao City.
The trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on 14 August
1992 and directed that notice thereof be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City and or Davao
City.
On 21 July 1992, herein petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua,
representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at the time of
the decedent's death Davao City was his residence, hence, the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City is the proper forum.
The motion to dismiss is hereby denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA, the appellate
court ruled that the petitioner's remedy is appeal from the orders complained
of under Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the Rules of Court, not certiorari and
prohibition.
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes to this
Court contending that the appellate court committed the errors.
Issue:
The public respondent court of appeals gravely erred in sweepingly holding
that petitioner's remedy is appeal.
Ruling:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the proper remedy of the petitioner in
said court was an ordinary appeal and not a special civil action for certiorari;
which can be availed of if a party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Except for her bare allegation that an ordinary
appeal would be inadequate, nothing on record would indicate that
extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition is warranted.
Finally, petitioner further argues as supplement to her memorandum that the
ruling of the Court of Appeals treating the Special Proceeding No. 331 as one
for both guardianship and settlement of estate is in contravention of our ruling
in Gomez vs. Imperial, which the petitioner quotes:
The distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased is a function
pertaining property not to the guardianship proceedings, but to another
proceeding which the heirs are at liberty to initiate.

Petitioner's reliance on said case is misplaced. In the Gomez case, the action
before the lower court was merely one for guardianship. Therefore said court
did not have the jurisdiction to distribute the estate of the deceased. While in
the case at bar, the petition filed before the court was both for guardianship
and settlement of estate.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition of petitioner Antonietta Chua is
hereby denied.
IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION GERONA
vs
CARMEN DE GUZMAN
Facts:
Petitioners herein, namely, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco and Delfin, all
surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo
Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9, 1941
was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de
la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married
Camila Ramos, who begot him several children, all surnamed De Guzman; that
Marcelo de Guzman died and subsequently the respondents executed a deed
of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de
Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the only
surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although they well knew
that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that respondents had thereby
succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer certificates of title to 7 parcels
of land, issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and new transfer
certificates of title to be issued in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th
individual interest for each; that such fraud was discovered by the petitioners
only the year before the institution of the case; that petitioners forthwith
demanded from respondents their (petitioners) share in said properties, to the
extent of 1/8th interest thereon; and that the respondents refused to heed said
demand, thereby causing damages to the petitioners. Accordingly, the latter
prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of extra-judicial
settlement, insofar as it deprives them of their participation of 1/18th of the
properties in litigation; ordering the respondents to reconvey to petitioners
their aforementioned share in said properties; ordering the register of deeds to
cancel the transfer certificates of title secured by respondents as above stated
and to issue new certificates of title in the name of both the petitioners and the
respondents in the proportion of 1/8th for the former and 7/8th for the latter;
ordering the respondents to render accounts of the income of said properties
and to deliver to petitioners their lawful share.
In their answer, respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased
Placida de Guzman, was not entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo de

Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter, and that petitioners'
action is barred by the statute of limitations.
RTC: rendered a decision finding that petitioners' mother was a legitimate child,
by first marriage, of Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the
complaint belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his
second wife, Camila Ramos; and that petitioners' action has already prescribed.
CA: affirmed RTC
Issue:
Whether or not respondents as co-heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman,
the present action for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to the
statute of limitations of action; that, if affected by said statute, the period of 4
years prescribed did not begin to run until actual discovery of the fraud
perpetrated by respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or 1957;
and that accordingly, said period had not expired when the present action was
commenced on November 4, 1958.
Ruling:
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action for
partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the
defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The
statute of limitations operates as in other cases, from the moment such
adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property
When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial
settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de
Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name, they
thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and,
consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And this is why petitioners have
brought this action for the annulment of said deed upon the ground that the
same is tainted with fraud.
Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the
action therefor may be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud.
Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, when said
instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title
were issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for the registration of the
deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole
world.
CANDELARIO VILLAMOR
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:

Spouses Victor Cortes and Maria Castaeda had 8 children, Of the eight
children, six died single and without issue. Barbara Cortes (daughter) begot a
son by the name of Eustaquio Cortes. Rufino Cortes (son), who died left two
alleged legitimate children, Ireneo Cortes Villamor and Paula Cortes Villamor.
The last to die of the Cortes children was Eugenia Cortes.
Eustaquio Cortes, son of Barbara, married one Sixta Ceniza. Born to them were
five children, all surnamed Cortes. All five remained unmarried and died
without will nor forced heirs. Dionisio, Amancia and Agapita predeceased their
father Eustaquio. Eustaquio died survived by his spouse and two sons,
Bartolome and Nicanor. Bartolome who was a Catholic priest, died. Nicanor
Cortes, also known as Father Gabriel Maria Cortes, died as a monk of the
Carthusian Order in Barcelona, Spain. He was the last of the direct descendants
of the Barbara Cortes line.
On the other hand, Paula Villamor, alleged daughter of Rufino Cortes, died
single without issue. Ireneo Villamor married one Bersabela Perez. Said
marriage was blessed with five children all surnamed Villamor, the petitioners,
herein. Ireneo Villamor died. It appears that shortly after the death of
Bartolome Cortes, Special Proceedings No. 227 was instituted for the
settlement of his estate, Fr. Diosdado Camomot, a close friend of Bartolome,
was named administrator.
Special Proceedings No. 262-C, which relates to the intestate estates of
Eugenia, Casimira Florencio, Braulia, Margarita and Barbara, all surnamed
Cortes was filed. Paula Cortes Villamor and Ireneo Cortes Villamor, claiming to
be the legitimate children of Rufino Cortes, filed a petition for the
administration of the estate of Rufino Cortes, under Special Proceedings No.
343-C, to protect their rights and counteract the effects of Special Proceedings
No. 262-C. Notice of the hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper
of general circulation. Appointed administrator in this proceeding was one
Moises Mendoza, who thereafter submitted an inventory of the properties
allegedly belonging to the estate of Rufino Cortes. The properties enumerated
in the inventory were the very same properties subject of Special Proceedings
Nos. 227 and 262-C.
Ireneo and Paula Cortes Villamor and Father Camomot filed a joint motion in
Special Proceedings No. 262-C and Special Proceedings No. 343-C, wherein
they manifested that "the heirs have arrived at an agreement to settle the
matter amicably between themselves by partitioning the estate among them"
Thus, after 6 months of negotiation, a Project of Partition was executed by
Sixta Ceniza and Father Camomot, in his capacity as administrator of the
Estate of Bartolome Cortes, assisted by their counsels.
After Ireneo's death, his children, now petitioners, executed an extra-judicial
partition, dividing the remaining 6 parcels of land among themselves. Upon the
death of Sixta Ceniza, one Cristina Ceniza, sister of respondent Daniela Ceniza
Urot instituted Special Proceedings No. 364-R for the administration of the

estate of Sixta Ceniza. In this proceedings, the nephews and nieces of Sixta
Ceniza, including herein respondent, prayed that they be declared the sole and
only forced heirs of Sixta Ceniza, although at the time, Fr. Nicanor Cortes, the
only surviving child of Sixta Ceniza, was still alive.
Fr. Cortes executed a power of attorney before the Vice-Consul of the Republic
of the Philippines in Madrid, Spain, constituting and appointing Fr. Diosdado
Camomot as his attorney-in-fact and giving him the power to appear for me
and in his behalf in Special Proceedings No. 364-R of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu.
Victorio Perez submitted an inventory which specifically Identified the
properties which came from the Project of Partition and the corresponding
number of such property or parcel of land in said Project of Partition. The court,
denied the motion of the nephews and nieces of Sixta Ceniza to be declared
her heirs and declared Fr. Nicanor Cortes as the only and universal heir of Sixta
Ceniza.
Fr. Nicanor Cortes executed a Deed of Conveyance in favor of several persons
wherein he conveyed ten parcels of land which included those received by his
mother under the Project of Partition. Fr. Nicanor Cortes died in Barcelona,
Spain. Special Proceedings No. 3062-R of the Court of First instituted for the
settlement Instance of Cebu was thereafter in of his estate. Appointed
administratrix was respondent Daniela Ceniza Urot who against petitioners,
successors-in-interest of Ireneo Villamor of the seven parcels of land and Paula
Villamor, for recovery received in the Project of Partition, accounting and
receivership.
Respondent alleged inter alia that upon learning of the death of Fr. Nicanor
Cortes, some of his nearest of kin who are his surviving first cousins, the
Cenizas [all from the side of Sixta Ceniza] initiated Special Proceedings No.
3062-R for the settlement of the estate of the deceased monk; that prior to and
in the course of initiating said proceedings, the surviving first cousins came
upon documents showing that Fr. Cortes during his absence was deprived of his
inheritance by fraud, stealth and stratagem perpetrated by Paula and Ireneo
Villamor.
It was prayed that judgment be rendered declaring as null and void the project
of partition, and the extra-judicial settlement and partition, that the defendants
[petitioners herein] be ordered to reconvey the parcels of land in question to
the administratrix in Special Proceedings No. 3062-R and to render a true and
correct accounting of the income and produce thereof as far back in time as
may be legally feasible and that during the pendency of the case, that the
properties be placed under receivership.
Petitioners, instead of filing an answer, filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that
the cause of action is barred by prior judgment and by the statute of
limitations.

RTC: denied the motion to dismiss.

CA: by means of certiorari but the same was denied for "being premature."
Petitioners filed their answer and alleged as special defenses that aside from
the fact that Special Proceedings No. 343-C was a proceeding in rem and all
the requirements to obtain jurisdiction over the person of anybody have been
complied with, Fr. Nicanor Cortes had personal knowledge of Special
Proceedings that the question of legitimacy of Ireneo and Paula Villamor had
been duly pleaded and raised as the principal issue in Special Proceedings No.
343-C; that the question of declaration of heirship of the two Villamor had
already been resolved by the court in said proceedings and have long become
final, entry of judgment, that with the age, respectability and social standing of
Sixta Ceniza, no court could have tolerated the alleged acts of Ireneo and Paula
Sixta Ceniza Villamor committed against Sixta Ceniza; that Sixta Ceniza had
the best legal advice and ample protection from her counsels.
Fr. Nicanor Cortes appeared through counsel in Special Proceedings No. 363
where Escolastico Ceniza applied as administrator but was denied by the court
in favor of Fr. Camomot upon the recommendation of Fr. Nicanor Cortes; and
that all these times, Fr. Nicanor Cortes never complained nor raised any
objection to the inventory of Special Proceedings No. 364 which was taken as a
part of the inventories in Special Proceedings 262-C and 343-C. The petitioners
alleged that the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action, intrinsic
fraud being the basis of the complaint; that the cause 6f action is barred by
prior judgment and by the statute of limitations; and, that the complaint states
no valid cause of action.
A receiver was appointed after trial, by the court rendered judgment against
the petitioners holding that Ireneo and Paula Villamor took advantage of the
helplessness of Sixta Ceniza when they had the Project of Partition
thumbmarked by her; that Ireneo and Paula Villamor resorted to false and
fraudulent representations. Under the circumstances, the fraud committed by
Ireneo and Paula Villamor was extrinsic or collateral; and that the fraud was
discovered for the first time by Atty. Ramon Ceniza, son of Jose Ceniza, one of
the heirs at law of Fr. Cortes.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC and CA erred in ruling that extrinsic fraud has been
committed and the action has not prescribed.
Ruling:
After a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, we
agree that the courts below forced their conclusions against the evidence
adduced during the trial which error justifies a review of said evidence. This
case is an exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be

reviewed in an appeal by certiorari and that factual findings of the Court of

Appeals are binding on this Court, if supported by substantial evidence.
We cannot sustain the findings of the courts that Fr. Nicanor Cortes had no
personal knowledge of Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343 for the evidence
on record is abundant to contradict such findings.
Highly significant is the fact that among the witnesses who testified before the
trial court, it was only Fr. Camomot who had personal knowledge of the events
leading to the execution of the project of partition. Notwithstanding, the trial
court, instead of according great weight to his testimony, summarily brushed it
aside and even reached the unwarranted conclusion that he was in collusion
with Ireneo and Paula Villamor. The testimony of Fr. Camomot, however, is too
detailed and straightforward to be a mere product of concoction or fabrication
or a device to cover-up the collusion imputed to him by the trial court.
Furthermore, said testimony is corroborated by other evidence on record that
sustains its veracity. Also evidence with letters made by Fr. Nicanor himself.
The lower courts portrayed Sixta Ceniza as an old woman, who because of her
"helplessness," became an easy prey to unscrupulous individuals like the
predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners. The petitioners, however, contend
that although it is true that Sixta Ceniza was blind and could not walk without
somebody escorting her, her helplessness only affected her physical condition
for according to Roure Ceniza-Sanchez, a granddaughter with whom said Sixta
Ceniza lived at that time, Sixta Ceniza's mental faculty was "very clear".
The courts held that the action has not prescribed for the preponderance of
evidence shows that the fraud was discovered for the first time by Atty. Ramon
B. Ceniza, son of Jose C. Ceniza, one of the heirs of Fr. Nicanor Cortes, only in
March, 1970. Since the action was commenced on June 4, 1970, it was filed
well within the 4 year period fixed by law.
We disagree. Prescription has set in. An action for reconveyance of real
property resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations, which
requires that the action shall be filed within 4 years from the discovery of
fraud. From what time should fraud be deemed to have been discovered in the
case at bar.
To ascertain what constitutes "a discovery of the facts constituting the fraud,"
reference must be had to the principles of equity. In actions in equity, the rule
is that the means of knowledge are equivalent to actual knowledge; that is,
that a knowledge of facts which would have put an ordinarily prudent man
upon inquiry which, if followed up, would have resulted in a discovery of the
fraud, was equivalent to actual discovery.
In the instant case, the discovery must be deemed to have taken place, at the
latest, on August 18, 1955, when Judge Clementino Diez, in Special
Proceedings No. 364-R declared Fr. Nicanor Cortes as the only and universal

heir of Sixta Ceniza and granted letters of administration to Fr. Diosdado

Camomot From that time, the law imputes to Fr. Cortes knowledge of Special
Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343, the project of partition, and such facts and
circumstances as would have him, by the exercise of due diligence, to a
knowledge of the fraud.
The period of prescription commenced to run from August 18, 1955. However,
from said date up to his death Fr. Nicanor Cortes remained silent and failed to
assert his right. He even conveyed at least three lands which were among
those apportioned to Sixta Ceniza in the Project of Partition to several persons.
Her predecessor-in-interest, Fr. Nicanor Cortes, not having filed any action for
reconveyance within the prescriptive period provided by law, neither could
private respondent do so now, for her right cannot rise higher than its source.
Finally, it is well-settled that the negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time warrants not only a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it, either had abandoned it or declined to assert it, but also casts doubt

on the validity of the claim of ownership. Such neglect to assert a right taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances
causing prejudice to the adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment appealed from is
set aside, and another entered dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. R11726.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK
vs.
HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo
Facts: