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Rule 57 PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

1. PCL INDUSTRIES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS, GR No.


147970, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 214
Civil Procedure; Attachment; To sustain an attachment, it must be shown that the debtor in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The Court finds
the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment to be improper. In Philippine Bank of
Communications v. CA, the Court held thus: Petitioner cannot insist that its allegation that private
respondent failed to remit the proceeds of the sale of the entrusted goods nor return the same is
sufficient for attachment to issue. We note that petitioner anchors its application upon Section
1(d), Rule 57. This particular provision was adequately explained in Liberty Insurance
Corporation v. CA, as follows To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that
the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The
fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which
induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given. To
constitute a ground for attachment in Sec 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud should be
committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the
time of contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, as it is in this
case. Fraud is a state of mind and need not be proved by direct evidence but may be inferred
from the circumstances attendant in each case (Republic v. Gonzales, 13 SCRA 633). We find an
absence of factual allegations as to how the fraud alleged by petitioner was committed. As
correctly held by respondent CA, such fraudulent intent not to honor the admitted obligation
cannot be inferred from the debtors inability to pay or to comply with the obligations.
Same; Same; The bare allegations in the applicants affidavit, are insufficient to prove that
petitioner was guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation. The mere fact that
petitioner failed to pay its purchases upon falling due and despite several demands made by
private respondent, is not enough to warrant the issuance of the harsh provisional remedy of
preliminary attachment. In this case, the bare allegations in the applicants affidavit, are
insufficient to prove that petitioner was guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the
obligation. The affidavit does not contain statements of other factual circumstances to show that
petitioner, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to
pay. Verily, in this case, the mere fact that petitioner failed to pay its purchases upon falling due
and despite several demands made by private respondent, is not enough to warrant the issuance
of the harsh provisional remedy of preliminary attachment.
2. MAGALING V. ONG, GR No. 173333, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 152
Remedial Law; Attachments; A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy by virtue of
which a plaintiff or other proper party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time
thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security
for the satisfaction of the judgment that may be recovered. The chief purpose of the remedy of
attachment is to secure a contingent lien on defendants property until plaintiff can, by appropriate
proceedings, obtain a judgment and have such property applied to its satisfaction, or to make
some provision for unsecured debts in cases where the means of satisfaction thereof are liable to
be removed beyond the jurisdiction, or improperly disposed of or concealed, or otherwise placed
beyond the reach of creditors.
Same; Same; Two ways by which a writ of preliminary attachment issued may be dissolved or
discharged. Once the writ of preliminary attachment is issued, the same rule provides for two
ways by which it can be dissolved or discharged. First, the writ of preliminary attachment may be
discharged upon a security given, i.e., a counter-bond, xxx Second, said provisional remedy must
be shown to have been irregularly or improperly issued, xxx.

3. PROFESSIONAL VIDEO INC. V. TESDA, GR No. 155504, June 26, 2009, 591 SCRA 83
Remedial Law; Garnishment; Public Funds; Even assuming that TESDA entered into a
proprietary contract with Professional Video, Inc. (PROVI) and thereby gave its implied consent to
be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of
garnishment or attachment; Public funds cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if
the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. - Even
assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with Professional Video, Inc. (PROVI)
and thereby gave its implied consent to be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and,
thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment. Under Sec 33 of the
TESDA Act, the TESDA budget for the implementation of the Act shall be included in the General
Appropriation Act; hence, TESDA funds, being sourced from the Treasury, are money belonging
to the Government, or any of its departments, in the hands of public officials. We specifically
spoke of the limits in dealing with this fund in Republic v. Villasor (54 SCRA 84 (1973)) when we
said: This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the
revised charter. It is therein expressly provided, The State may not be sued without its consent.
A corollary, not dictated by logic and good sense, from such a basic concept, is the public funds
cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued had been
previously granted and the state liability adjudged.
Same; Attachment; Attachment, a harsh remedy, must be issued only on concrete and specific
grounds and not on general averments merely quoting the words of the pertinent rules.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the rule on the issuance of a writ of attachment must be construed
strictly in favor of the defendant. Attachment, a harsh remedy, must be issued only on concrete
and specific grounds and not on general averments merely quoting the words of the pertinent
rules. Thus, the applicants affidavit must contain statements clearly showing that the ground
relied upon for the attachment exists.
4. METRO, INC. V. LARA GIFTS AND DECORS, INC., GR. No. 171741, November 27, 2009,
606 SCRA 175
Remedial Law; Attachment; Fraud to constitute a ground for attachment. In Liberty Insurance
Corporation v. CA, 222 SCRA 37 (1993), we explained: To sustain an attachment on this ground,
it must be shown that the debtor on contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to
defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been
the reason that induced the other party into giving consent which would not have otherwise given.
To constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud should
be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the
time of contracting it the debtor had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, as it is in this
case.
Same; Same; Applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show the factual
circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtors
mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation.
Same; Same; Way of dissolving a writ of preliminary attachment; Since the writ of preliminary
attachment was properly issued, the only way it can be dissolved is by filing a counter-bond in
accordance with Sec 12, Ruled 57 of the Rules of Court. We rule that respondents allegation
that petitioners undertook to sell exclusively and only through JRP/LGD for Target Stores
Corporation but that petitioners transacted directly with respondents foreign buyer is sufficient
allegation of fraud to support their application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Since the writ
of preliminary attachment was properly issued, the only way it can be dissolved is by filing a
counter-bond in accordance with Sec 12, Ruled 57 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; The rule that when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the
same time the applicants cause of action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is

by a counter-bond is applicable in this case. The reliance of the CA in the cases of Chuidian v.
Sandiganbayan, 349 SCRA 745 (2001), FCY Construction Group, Inc. v. CA, 347 SCRA 270
(2000), and Liberty Insurance Corporation v. CA 222 SCRA 37 (1993), is proper. The rule that
when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicants
cause of action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is by a counter-bond is
applicable in this case. It is clear that in respondents amended complaint of fraud is not only
alleged as a ground for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment, but it is also the core of
respondents complaint.
5. DAVAO LIGHT AND POWER CO. V. COURT OF APPEALS, GR No. 93262, November 29,
1991, 204 SCRA 343
Civil Procedure; Preliminary attachment may be validly applied for and granted before defendant
is summoned or is heard from. Ruled 57 xxx speaks of the grant of the remedy at the
commencement of the action or at any time thereafter. The phrase at the commencement of the
action obviously refers to the date of the filing of the complaint which, as above pointed out, is
the date that marks the commencement of the action; and the reference plainly is to a time
before summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues. What the rule is
saying quite clearly is that after an action is properly commenced by the filing of the complaint
and the payment of all requisite docket and other fees the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ
of preliminary attachment upon fulfilment of the pertinent requisites laid down by law, and that he
may do so at any time, either before or after service of summons on the defendant. And this
indeed, has been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the courts; for the plaintiff or other
proper party to incorporate the application for attachment in the complaint or other appropriate
pleading (counterclaim, cross claim, third-party claim) and for the TC to issue the writ ex-parte at
the commencement of the action if it finds the application otherwise sufficient in form and
substance.
Same; writ of attachment may properly issue ex parte. for the guidance of all concerned, the
Court reiterates and reaffirms the proposition that writs of attachment may properly issue ex parte
provided that the Court is satisfied that the relevant requisites therefore, have been fulfilled by the
applicant, although it may, in its discretion, require prior hearing on the application with notice to
the defendant; but that levy on property pursuant to the writ thus issued may not be validly
effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service on the defendant of
summons, a copy of the complaint (and of the appointment of guardian ad litem, if any), the
application for attachment (if not incorporated in but submitted separately from the complaint), the
order of attachment, and the plaintiffs attachment bond.
6. ONATE V. ABROGAR, GR No. 107303, February 23, 1995, 241 SCRA 659
Civil procedure; Writ of Attachment; Summons; it is required that when the proper officer
commences implementation of the writ of attachment, service of summons should be
simultaneously made. The statement in question has been taken out of context. The full
statement reads: it is clear from our pronouncements that a writ of preliminary attachment may
issue even before summons is served upon the defendant. However, we have likewise ruled that
the writ cannot binds and affect the defendant until jurisdiction over his person is eventually
obtained. Therefore, it is required that when the proper officer commences implementation of the
writ of attachment, service of summons should be simultaneously made.
Same; Same; Same; At the very least, the writ of attachment must be served simultaneously with
the service of summons before the writ may be enforced. Indeed, as this Court through its First
Division has ruled on facts similar to those in these cases, the attachment of properties before the
service of summons on the defendant is invalid, even though the court later acquires jurisdiction
over the defendant. At the very least, then, the writ of attachment must be served simultaneously

with the service of summons before the writ may be enforced. As the properties of the petitioners
were attached by the sheriff before he had served the summons on them, the levies made must
be considered void.
Same; Same; Lifting of Attachment; the lifting of an attachment may be resorted to even before
any property has been levied on. The Rules of Court do not require that issuance of the writ be
kept secret until it can be enforced. Otherwise in no case may the service of summons on
defendant precede the levy on attachment. To the contrary, Rule 57 Sect 13 allows the defendant
to move to discharge the attachment even before any attachment is actually levied upon, thus
negating any inference that before its enforcement, the issuance of the writ must be kept secret.
Rule 57, sec 13 provides: Sec 13. Discharge of attachment for improper or irregular issuance.
the party whose property has been attached may also, at any time either before or after the
release of the attach property, or before any attachment shall have been actually levied, upon
reasonable notice to the attaching creditor, apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the
judge of the court in which the action is pending, for an order to discharge the attachment on the
ground that the same was improperly or irregularly issued... As this Court pointed out in Davao
Light and Power, the lifting of an attachment may be resorted to even before any property has
been levied on.
Same; Same; Notice; It is not notice to the defendant that is sought to be avoided but the time
which such hearing would take because of the possibility that defendant may delay the hearing
to be able to dispose of his properties. it is indeed true that proceedings for the issuance of a
writ of attachment are generally ex parte. In Mindanao Savings and Loans Assn v. CA it was held
that no hearing is required for the issuance of a writ of attachment because this would defeat the
objective of the remedy (because) the time which such hearing would take could be enough to
enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property before a writ of attachment issues. It
is not, however, notice to defendant that is sought to be avoided but the time which such hearing
would take because of the possibility that defendant may delay the hearing to be able to dispose
of his properties. On the contrary there may in fact be a need for a hearing before the writs is
issued as where the issue of fraudulent disposal of property is raised. It is not true that there
should be no hearing lest a defendant learns of the application for attachment and he removes
his properties before the writ can be enforced.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction Over the Person of the Defendant; to authorize the attachment of
property even before jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through the service
of summons or his voluntary appearance could lead to abuse. on the other hand, to authorize
the attachment of property even before the jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
acquired through the service of summons or his voluntary appearance could lead to abuse. It is
entirely possible that the defendant may not be able to take steps to protect his interests.
Same; Same; Same; more important that the need for insuring success in the enforcement of the
writ is the need for affirming a principle by insisting on that most fundamental of all requisites the
jurisdiction of the court issuing attachment over the person of the defendant. Nor may sheriffs
failure to abide by the law be excused on the pretext that after all the court later acquired
jurisdiction over petitioners. More important than the need for insuring success in the enforcement
of the writ is the need for affirming a principle by insisting on that most fundamental of all
requisites the jurisdiction of the court issuing attachment over the person of the defendant. It
may be that the same result would follow from requiring that a new writ be served all over again.
The symbolic significance of such an act, however, is that it would affirm our commitment to the
rule of law.
Same; Same; Same; Such examination is only proper where the property of the person examined
has been validly attached. Since, as already stated, the attachment of petitioners properties
was invalid, the examination ordered in connection with such attachment must likewise be
considered invalid. Under Rule 57, sec 10, as quote above, such examination is only proper
where the property of the person examined has been validly attached.

7. SILANGAN TEXTILE V. JUDGE, G.R. No. 166719, March 12, 2007, 518 SCRA 160
Same; Attachment; Attachment is an ancillary remedy, and a writ of preliminary attachment is a
species of provisional remedy, a collateral proceeding, permitted only in connection with a regular
action, and as one of its incidents. Attachment is an ancillary remedy. It is not sought for its own
sake but rather to enable the attaching party to realize upon relief sought and expected to be
granted in the main or principal action. Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available during
the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain
rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final
judgment in the same. They are provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed
of during the pendency of the action and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in
and are dependent upon the result of the main action. A writ of preliminary attachment is a
species of provisional remedy. As such, it is a collateral proceeding, permitted only in connection
with a regular action, and as one of its incidents; one of which is provided for present need, or for
the occasion; that is, one adapted to meet a particular exigency. On the basis of the preceding
discussion and the fact that we find the dismissal of Civil Case No. 00-00420 to be in order, the
writ of preliminary attachment issued by the trial court in the said case must perforce be lifted.
8.SECURITY PACIFIC ASSURANCE CORPORATION V. HON. JUDGE TRIA-INFANTE, GR No.
144740, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 526
Actions; Provisional Remedies; Attachments; Counter bonds;
Counter bonds are mere
replacements of the property formerly attached, and just as the latter may be levied upon after
final judgment in the case in order to realize the amount adjudged, so is the liability of the counter
sureties ascertainable after the judgment has becomefinal. Over the years, in a number of
cases, we have made certain pronouncements about counter bonds. In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, as
reiterated in Vanguard Assurance Corp. V. CA, we held: ... After the judgment for the plaintiff has
become executor and the execution is returned unsatisfied, as in this case, the liability of the
bond automatically attached and, in failure of the surety to satisfy the judgment against the
defendant despite demand therefore, writ of execution may issue against the surety to enforce
the obligation of the bond. In Luzon Steel Corporation v. Sia, et. al.: ... Counter bonds posted to
obtain the lifting of a writ of attachment is due to these bonds being security for the payment of
any judgment that the attaching party may obtain; they are thus mere replacements of the
property formerly attached, and just as the latter may be levied upon after final judgment in the
case in order to realize the amount adjudged, so is the liability of the counter sureties
ascertainable after judgment has become final. ... In Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. De Los Angeles,
we ruled: ... Sec 17, Rule 57 of the ROC cannot be construed that an execution against the
debtor be first returned unsatisfied even if the bond were a solidary one, for a procedural may not
amend the substantive law expressed in the Civil Code, and further would nullify the express
stipulation of the parties that the suretys obligation should be solidary with that of the defendant.
In Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we further held that the
counter bond is intended to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may
recover in the action.
Surety; A surety is considered in law as being the same party as the debtor in relation to
whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the latter, and their liabilities are interwoven and
inseparable. Petitioner does not deny that the contract between it and VIllaluz is one of surety.
However, it points out that the kind of surety agreement between them is one that merely waives
its right of excussion. This cannot be so. The counter bond itself states that the parties jointly and
severally bind themselves to secure the payment of any judgment that the plaintiff may recover
against the defendant in the action. A surety is considered in law as being the same party as the
debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the latter, and their liabilities
are interwoven as to be inseparable.

Same; Counter bonds; Attachments; Judgments; A mere posting of a counter bond does not
automatically discharge the writ of attachment it is only after the hearing and after the judge has
ordered the discharge of attachment that the same is properly discharged; Judgment must be
construed as a whole so as to bring all of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair
and reasonable interpretation and so as to give effect to every word and part we are not
unmindful of our ruling in the case of Belisle Investment and Finance Co., Inc. v. State Investment
House, Inc., where we held: ... The CA correctly ruled that the mere posting of a counter bond
does not automatically discharge that writ attachment. It is only after hearing and after the judge
has ordered the discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is made or a counter bond is
executed to the attaching creditor is filed, that the writ of attachment is properly discharged under
Sec 12, Rule 57 of the ROC. The ruling in Belisle, at first glance, would suggest an error in the
assailed ruling of the Court of Appeals because there was no specific resolution discharging the
attachment and approving the counter bond. As above=explaine, however, consideration of our
decision in G.R. No. 106214 in its entirety will readily show that this Court has virtually discharged
the attachment after all the parties therein have been heard on the matter. xxx Verily, a judgment
must be read in its entirety, and it must be construed as a whole so as to bring all of its parts into
harmony as far as this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation and so as to give effect
to every word and part, if possible, and to effectuate the intention and purpose of the Court,
consistent with the provisions of the organic law.
9. INSULAR SAVINGS BANK V. CA, GR No. 123638, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 122
Actions; Attachments; Attachment Bonds; There can be no serious objection to the proposition
that the attached property and logically the counter-bond necessary to discharge the lien on such
property should as much as possible correspond in value to, or approximately match the
attaching creditors principal claim. As may be noted, the amount of the counter attachment
bond is, under the terms of the afore quoted Sec 12, to be measured against the value of the
attached property, as determined by the judge to secure the payment of any judgment that the
attaching creditor may recover in the action. Albeit not explicitly stated in the same section and
without necessarily diminishing the sound discretion of the issuing judge on matters of bond
approval, there can be no serious objection, in turn, to the proposition that the attached property
and logically the counter bond necessary to discharge the lien on such property should as much
as possible correspond in value to, or approximately match the attaching creditors principal
claim. Else, excessive attachment, which ought to be avoided at all times, shall ensue.
Same; Same; Same; A writ of attachment cannot be issued for moral and exemplary damages
and other unliquidated or contingent claims. Turning to the case at bar, the records show that
the principal claim of respondent, as plaintiff a quo, is in the amount of P25,200,000.00,
representing the 3 unfunded checks drawn against, and presented for clearing to, respondent
bank. Jurisprudence teaches that a writ of attachment cannot be issued for moral and exemplary
damages, and other unliquidated or contingent claim.
Same; Same; Same; If a portion of a claim is already secured, there is no justifiable reason why
such portion should still be subject of counter bond simple common sense, if not consideration
of fair play, dictates that a part of a possible judgment that has veritably been pre-emptively
satisfied or secured need not be covered by the counter bond. As things stood, therefore,
respondents principal claim against petitioner immediately prior to the filing of the motion to
discharge attachment has effectively been pruned down to P12,600,000.00. The trial court was
fully aware of this reality. Accordingly, it should have allowed a total discharge of the attachment
on a counter bond based on the reduced claim of respondent. if a portion of the claim is already
secured, we see no justifiable reason why such portion should still be subject of counter bond. It
may be that a counter bond is intended to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching
party may recover in the main action. Simple common sense, if not consideration of fair play,
however, dictates that a part of a possible judgment that has veritably been pre-emptively
satisfied or secured need not be covered by the counter bond.

Same; Same; Same; unlike the former Sec 12 of Rule 57 of the ROC where the value of the
property attached shall be the defining measure in the computation of the discharging counter
attachment bond, the present less stringent Sec 12 of Rule 57 provides that the court shall order
the discharge of attachment if the movant makes a cash deposit, or files a counter bond ... in an
amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs. It bears to
stress, as a final consideration, that the certiorari proceedings before the appellate court and the
denial of the motion to discharge attachment subject of such proceedings, transpired under the
old rules on preliminary attachment which has since been revised. And unlike the former Sec 12
of Rule 57 of the ROC where the value of the property attached shall be the defining measure in
the computation of the discharging counter attachment bond, the present less stringent Sec 12 of
Rule 57 provides that the court shall order the discharge of attachment if the movant makes a
cash deposit, or files a counter bond ... in an amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order
of attachment, exclusive of costs. Not being in the nature of a penal statute, the Rules of Court
cannot be given retroactive effect.
10. TORRES V. SATSATIN, GR No. 166759, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 453
Remedial Law; Attachment; Definition of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. A writ of preliminary
attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is
pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held
thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be
secured in the said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant.
Same; Same; Surety Bonds; In accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that all requisites for its
approval are met otherwise the bond should be rejected. In the case at bar, the CA correctly
found that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the trial court in approving the bond posted by petitioners despite the fact that not all
the requisites for its approval were complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that
all the requisites for its approval are met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected.
Same; Same; In provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the distinction
between the issuance and the implementation of the writ of attachment is of utmost importance to
the validity of the writ. In provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the
distinction between the issuance and the implementation of the writ of attachment is of utmost
importance to the validity of the writ. The distinction is indispensably necessary to determine
when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired in order to validly
implement the writ of attachment upon his person.
Same; Same; Three stages involved in the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment; For the
initial stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first
obtained. In Cuartero v. CA, 212 SCRA 260 (1992), this Court held that the grant of the
provisional remedy of attachment involved three stages; first, the court issues the order granting
the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and
third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ
commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such
jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any
order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.
Same; Same; the preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the
service of summons n the defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by
publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case; Subsequent service of summons
does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not
allow for retroactivity of a belated service.Assuming arguendo that the writ of attachment was
validly issued, although the trial court later acquired jurisdiction over the respondents by service

of summons upon them, such belated service of summons on respondents cannot be deemed to
have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a
coercive process on respondents without first obtaining jurisdiction over their person. The
preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons
on the defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted
by the circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of summons does not confer a
retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for
retroactivity of a belated service.
11. LIM, JR. V. LAZARO, GR No. 185734, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 547
Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Attachment; Preliminary Attachment; By its nature,
preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, is an ancillary remedy applied for
not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and
expected to be granted in the main or principal action it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the
main action. By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57, is an ancillary remedy
applied for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought
and expected to be granted in the main or principal action it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to
the main action. As such, it is available during its pendency which may be resorted to by a litigant
to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects
of a final judgment in the case. In addition, attachment is also availed of in order to acquire
jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances
where personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected.
12. OLIB V. PASTORAL, GR No. 81120, August 20, 1990, 188 SCRA 692
Attachment defined; Nature of. Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the
property of an adverse party is taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action
or at any time thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered
by the plaintiff or any proper party. It is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent
existence apart from the main suit or claim instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant. Being
merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the attachment must fail if the suit itself cannot be
maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer be justified.
Same; Same; Where the main action is appealed, the attachment is also considered appealed.
The consequence is that where the main action is appealed, the attachment which may have
been issued as an incident of that action, is also considered appealed and so also removed from
the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate case
independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such action.
Same; Same; Rule that the bond is not deemed extinguished by reason of non-payment of the
premium on the attachment bond. Coming now to the argument that the attachment was
automatically lifted because of the non-payment of the premium on the attachment bond, the
Court feels it is time again to correct a common misimpression. The rule is that the bond is not
deemed extinguished by reason alone of such non-payment.
Same; Same; The order of attachment is considered discharged only when the judgment has
already become final and executory and not when it is still on appeal; Reason. Finally, on the
correct interpretation of Rule 57, Section 19, of the ROC, we hold that the order of attachment is
considered discharged only where the judgment has already become final and executory and not
when it is still on appeal. The obvious reason is that, except in a few specified cases, execution
pending appeal is not allowed.

13. TRADERS ROYAL BANK V. IAC, L-66321, October 31, 1984, 133 SCRA 141
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Third Party Claim; Remedy of a person who claims to be an
owner or property levied upon by attachment is to file a third party claim with the sheriff and if
attaching creditor posts an indemnity bond, to file a separate and independent action. The
foregoing rule explicitly sets forth the remedy that may be availed of by a person who claims to be
the owner of property levied upon by attachment, viz: to lodge a third-party claim with the sheriff,
and if the attaching creditor posts am indemnity bond in favor of the sheriff, to file a separate and
independent action to vindicate his claim (Abiera v. CA). And this precisely was the remedy
resorted to by private respondent La Tondena when it filed the vindicatory action before the
Bulacan Court.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Injunction; General rule that a court cannot interfere by
injunction with the judgment of a court with concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal
power to grant injunctive relief, applied in cases where no third-party claimant is involved;
Reason and purpose of the rule. Generally, the rule that no court has the power to interfere by
injunction with judgments or decrees of a concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power
to grant the injunctive relief sought by injunction, is applied in this case where no third-party
claimant is involved, in order to prevent one court from nullifying the judgment or process of
another court of the same rank or category, a power which devolved upon the proper appellate
court. The purpose of the rule is to avoid conflict of power between different courts of coordinate
jurisdiction and to bring about a harmonious and smooth functioning of their proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Intervention, as a means of protecting claimants right in an
attachment proceeding, not exclusive, but suppletory to the right to bring an independent suit;
Denial or dismissal of third party claim to levied property, not a bar to a subsequent independent
action to establish claimants right. We cannot sustain the petitioners view. Suffice it to state
that intervention as a means of protecting the third-party claimants right in an attachment
proceeding is not exclusive but cumulative and suppletory to the right to bring am independent
suit. The denial or dismissal of a third-party claim to property levied upon cannot operate to bar a
subsequent independent action by the claimant to establish his right to the property even if he
failed to appeal from the order denying his original third-party claim.
RULE 58: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
1. FILIPINO METALS VS. SECRETARY OF TRADE & INDUSTRY, G.R. NO. 157498, JULY 15,
2005, 463 SCRA 616
Remedial Law; Injunction; No court is allowed to grant injunction to restrain the collection of any
internal revenue tax.In the recent case of Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Philippine
Cement Manufacturers Corporation, this Court intimated, but only by way of obiter dictum, that
the imposition of safeguard measures should not be enjoined as that would be tantamount to
enjoining the collection of taxes. Verily, as early as Churchill and Tait v. Rafferty, the Court
rejected judicial control over collection of taxes. That taxes must be collected promptly is a policy
deeply entrenched in our tax system. Thus, no court is allowed to grant injunction to restrain the
collection of any internal revenue tax.
Same; Same; When the petitioner assailing a statute has made out a case of unconstitutionality
strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of validity, in addition to a
showing of a clear legal right to the remedy sought, the court should issue a writ of preliminary
injunction.We have ruled that when the petitioner assailing a statute has made out a case of
unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of
validity, in addition to a showing of a clear legal right to the remedy sought, the court should issue
a writ of preliminary injunction.

Same; Same; A law need not be declared unconstitutional first before a preliminary injunction
against its enforcement may be granted.Respondents tenaciously argue that Rep. Act No. 8800
enjoys the presumption of validity and constitutionality until proven otherwise. True, but for the
purpose of issuing a provisional remedy, strictly speaking, this contention lacks relevance.
Obviously, a law need not be declared unconstitutional first before a preliminary injunction against
its enforcement may be granted. Needless to stress, the moment a law is nullified for being
unconstitutional, it ceases to exist. Thus, a writ of injunction would then become superfluous.
Same; Same; Requisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunction; To be entitled to the writ,
petitioners are only required to show that they have an ostensible right to the final relief prayed
for in their complaint.Only two requisites are necessary for a preliminary injunction to issue: (1)
the existence of a right to be protected and (2) the facts, against which the injunction is to be
directed violate said right. While a clear showing of the right is necessary, its existence need not
be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence required to justify the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction need not be conclusive or complete. The evidence need only give the court
an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction, pending the decision of the case on the
merits. Thus, to be entitled to the writ, petitioners are only required to show that they have an
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.
2. EQUITABLE PCIB VS. HON. APURILLO, G.R. NO. 168746, NOVEMBER 5, 2009, 605
SCRA 30
Remedial Law; Preliminary Injunction; A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon
clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal
action; The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or
threatened violations; Issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the sound
discretion of the trial court.A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear
showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened
violations. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation
against that right must be shown. Moreover, the rule is well entrenched that the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction as an ancillary or preventive remedy to secure the right of a party in
a pending case rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court. However, if the court commits
grave abuse of its discretion in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, such that the act
amounts to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the same may be nullified through a writ of certiorari or
prohibition.
Same; Same; A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete
evidence.A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete
evidence. The evidence submitted during the hearing on an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction is not conclusive or complete for only a sampling is needed to give the trial court an
idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the
merits. As such, the findings of fact and opinion of a court when issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction are interlocutory in nature and made even before the trial on the merits is commenced
or terminated. There are vital facts that have yet to be presented during the trial which may not be
obtained or presented during the hearing on the application for the injunctive writ. The trial court
needs to conduct substantial proceedings in order to put the main controversy to rest.
Same; Same; The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo until the
merits can be heard.The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo
until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an
action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a partys substantive
rights or interests pending the final judgment on the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ
lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be

10

avoided for, otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying
for the writ is concerned.
3. CASTRO VS. DELA CRUZ, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 190122, JANUARY 10, 2011, 639 SCRA 187
Remedial Law; Preliminary Injunction; The primary objective of a preliminary injunction, whether
prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.
For an injunctive writ to issue, a clear showing of extreme urgency to prevent irreparable injury
and a clear and unmistakable right to it must be proven by the party seeking it. The primary
objective of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case can be heard.
Same; Same; For the nullification of an injunctive writ, there must be a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.Indeed, the rule is wellentrenched that for grave abuse of discretion to exist as a valid ground for the nullification of an
injunctive writ, there must be a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Or the power must be exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
4. RUALO VS. PITARGUE, G.R. NO. 140284, JANUARY 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 121
Injunctions; To be entitled to an injunctive writ, they must show that there exists a right to be
protected and that the acts against which the injunction is directed are violative of the right.For
respondents to be entitled to an injunctive writ, they must show that there exists a right to be
protected and that the acts against which the injunction is directed are violative of the right. We
note that respondents employed the shotgun approach in their petition before the trial court to
show their entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction. Pitargue sued as a taxpayer fearing
possible misappropriation of public funds. Vasquez, who received an RTAO reassigning him,
raised violation of his constitutional rights to security of tenure and to due process. Perez sued as
a BIR employee fearing a violation of her constitutional rights to security of tenure and to due
process by a probable inclusion in the RTAOs. Let us examine whether their allegations are
sufficient for the issuance of an injunctive writ.
Same; A preliminary injunction should not establish new relations between the parties, but merely
maintain or re-establish the pre-existing relationship between them.A preliminary injunction is
merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the latters outcome. Its sole
objective is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. The
status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy.
The status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case. A preliminary injunction
should not establish new relations between the parties, but merely maintain or re-establish the
pre-existing relationship between them.
Same; Courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose
of the main case without trial.Courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which
would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. In issuing the writ of preliminary injunction,
the trial court did not maintain the status quo but restored the situation before the status quo, that
is, the situation before the issuance of the RTAOs. In effect, the trial court accepted respondents
premise about an unlawful reorganization and prejudged the constitutionality of the questioned
issuances (EO 430, RMO 57-97 and RTAO 28-97 and 1-98 to 35-98).
Same; The grant of the writ of preliminary injunction despite the lack of a clear and unmistakable
right on the part of the petitioner constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.The trial courts ruling was a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it

11

assumed the proposition which the respondents here were bound to prove. Moreover, the trial
courts grant of the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of respondents despite the lack of a clear
and unmistakable right on their part constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
5. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST VS. WONG, G.R. NO. 150280, APRIL 26, 2006, 488 SCRA
361
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Preliminary Injunction; The issuance of a preliminary injunction
rests entirely within the discretion of the court.The issuance of a preliminary injunction rests
entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case and is generally not
interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. No manifest abuse has been shown on the part
of respondent Judge de Castro, when he in fact granted preliminary injunction to serve the
purpose for which it was created, which was to preserve status quo.
6. TAYAG VS. LACSON, G.R. NO. 134971, MARCH 25, 2004, 426 SCRA 282
Remedial Law; Injunction; While generally the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction rests on the
sound discretion of the trial court taking cognizance of the case, extreme caution must be
observed in the exercise of such discretion.A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event
calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things ante litem and is generally availed of to
prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. Injunction is accepted
as the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy. While generally the grant of a writ of
preliminary injunction rests on the sound discretion of the trial court taking cognizance of the
case, extreme caution must be observed in the exercise of such discretion.
Same; Same; Requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; The possibility of
irreparable damage without proof of adequate existing rights is not a ground for injunction. For
the court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction, the petitioner was burdened to establish the
following: (1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of
that right; (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. Thus, in the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive
writ constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. Where the complainants right is doubtful or disputed,
injunction is not proper. Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantial rights
and interests. It is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. The possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of adequate existing rights is not a ground for injunction.
7. G.G. SPORTSWEAR VS. BDO, GR. NO. 184434, FEBRUARY 8, 2010, 612 SCRA 47
Remedial Law; Injunction; Test for issuing a TRO or an injunction is whether the facts show a
need for equity to intervene in order to protect perceived rights in equity.The test for issuing a
TRO or an injunction is whether the facts show a need for equity to intervene in order to protect
perceived rights in equity. In general, a higher court will not set aside the trial courts grant or
denial of an application for preliminary injunction unless it gravely abused its discretion as when it
lacks jurisdiction over the action, ignores relevant considerations that stick out of the parties
pleadings, sees the facts with a blurred lens, ignores what is relevant, draws illogical conclusions,
or simply acts in random fashion.
Same; Same; Injunction may be issued only when the plaintiff appears to be entitled to the main
relief he asks in his complaint.Injunction may be issued only when the plaintiff appears to be
entitled to the main relief he asks in his complaint. This means that the plaintiffs allegations
should show clearly that he has a cause of action. This means that he enjoys some right and that

12

the defendant has violated it. And, where the defendant is heard on the application for injunction,
the trial court must consider, too, the weight of his opposition.
Same; Same; The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when
there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under
any standard of compensation.What is more, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction
may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences
which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. Here, since there is a valid
cause to foreclose on the mortgages, petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani cannot claim that
the irreparable damage they wanted to prevent by their application for preliminary injunction is the
loss of their properties to auction sale. Their real injury, if it turns out that the right to foreclose
belongs to PIO rather than to BDO, is payment of the proceeds of the auction sale to the wrong
party rather than to their creditor. But this kind of injury is purely monetary and is compensable by
an appropriate judgment against BDO. It is not in any sense an irreparable injury.
8. BORJA VS. SALCEDO, A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1746 (FORMERLY OCA IPI NO. 10-1225-RTJ),
SEPTEMBER 26, 2003, 412 SCRA 110
Civil Procedure; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; Temporary Restraining Orders;
Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides for the procedure to be followed in the issuance of
temporary restraining orders.Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides: 1. Where an
application for temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction is included in a
complaint or any initiatory pleading filed with the trial court, such complaint or initiatory pleading
shall be raffled only after notice to the adverse party and in the presence of such party or counsel;
2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary
hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records are transmitted to the branch
selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted immediately after raffle; 3. If the matter is of
extreme urgency, such that unless a TRO is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will
arise, the Executive Judge shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy-two (72) hours from
issuance but shall immediately summon the parties for conference and immediately raffle the
case in their presence. Thereafter, before the expiry of the seventy-two (72) hours, the Presiding
Judge to whom the case is assigned shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the
TRO can be extended for another period until a hearing in the pending application for preliminary
injunction can be conducted. In no case shall the total period of the TRO exceed twenty (20)
days, including the original seventy-two (72) hours, for the TRO issued by the Executive Judge; 4.
With the exception of the provisions which necessarily involve multiple-sala stations, these rules
shall apply to single-sala stations especially with regard to immediate notice to all parties of all
applications for TRO.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The holding of a summary hearing prior to the issuance of a
temporary restraining order is mandatory.The holding of a summary hearing prior to the
issuance of a temporary restraining order is mandatory, in view of the requirement that the
application for a temporary restraining order shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in
a summary hearing after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. In other
words, a summary hearing may not be dispensed with. A TRO can be issued ex parte if the
matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless it is
issued immediately. Under such circumstance, the executive judge shall issue the TRO effective
only for seventy-two (72) hours from its issuance. The executive judge is then required to
summon the parties to a conference, during which the case should be raffled in their presence.
Before the expiry of the seventy-two hours, the presiding judge to whom the case was raffled
shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be extended for another
period until a hearing on the pending application for preliminary injunction can be held.
(Emphasis supplied)

13

9. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADM. VS. VILLANUEVA, G.R. NO. 168203, MARCH 9,


2010, 614 SCRA 659
Remedial Law; Injunction; Temporary Restraining Order; If no action is taken of the judge on the
application for preliminary injunction within twenty (20) days, the temporary restraining order
would automatically expire on the 20 th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that
effect being necessary and the courts having no discretion to extend the same; The rule against
the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited period of effectivity of a temporary restraining
order is absolute if issued by a regional trial court.As to the issue of whether the temporary
restraining order issued by the RTC remained valid even if it was beyond the 20-day period
provided under the Rules of Court, it is settled that under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order within a limited life of twenty (20) days
from date of issue. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for
preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order would be deemed automatically
vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the
said twenty (20) days, the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day
by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary and the courts
having no discretion to extend the same. The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)day limited period of effectivity of a temporary restraining order is absolute if issued by a regional
trial court.
10. OVERSEAS WORKERS VS. CHAVEZ, G.R. NO. 169802, JUNE 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 451
Actions; Injunctions; Words and Phrases; A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any
stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency or a
person to refrain from a particular act or acts.Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, defines a
preliminary injunction as an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final
order requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Same; Same; A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete
evidence.A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without
the court issuing a final injunction. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show, inter
alia, the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage. A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on
initial and incomplete evidence. The evidence submitted during the hearing on an application for
a writ of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete for only a sampling is needed to give
the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the
case on the merits. In fact, the evidence required to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction in the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete. It must also be stressed
that it does not necessarily proceed that when a writ of preliminary injunction is issued, a final
injunction will follow.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of
preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.The grant or denial
of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the trial court. Thus, the rule is, the
matter of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court, unless the court commits grave abuse of discretion. In Toyota Motor Phils.
Corporation Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. Court of Appeals, this Court pronounced that
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious

14

and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of
power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion
amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to
act at all in contemplation of law. It is clear that the assessment and evaluation of evidence in the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction involve findings of facts ordinarily left to the trial court
for its conclusive determination. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an
injunction are present in the case before it. However, as earlier stated, if the court commits grave
abuse of its discretion in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, such that the act
amounts to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the same may be nullified through a writ of certiorari or
prohibition.
Same; Same; Same; The status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case.
The status quo usually preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable and
uncontested status which preceded the actual controversy.A preliminary injunction is merely a
provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the latters outcome, the sole objective
of which is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. The
status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case. The status quo usually
preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested status which
preceded the actual controversy. The status quo ante litem is, ineluctably, the state of affairs
which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court must not make use
of its injunctive power to alter such status.
Same; Same; Same; A judge commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
where, in granting the writ of preliminary injunction, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, he did not maintain the status quo but, rather, effectively
restored the situation prior to the status quo, in effect disposing the issue of the main case
without trial on the merits.We hold that the RTC, in granting the assailed writ of preliminary
injunction, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In the case at
bar, the RTC did not maintain the status quo when it issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
Rather, it effectively restored the situation prior to the status quo, in effect, disposing the issue of
the main case without trial on the merits. What was preserved by the RTC was the state of affairs
before the issuance of Resolution No. 001, which approved the structure of the OWWA, and the
subsequent administrative orders pursuant to its passing. The RTC forgot that what is imperative
in preliminary injunction cases is that the writ cannot be effectuated to establish new relations
between the parties.
Injunctions; Injunction will not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined have already been
accomplished or consummated.Finally, as aptly pointed out by the OSG, the acts sought to be
prohibited had been accomplished. Injunction will not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined
have already been accomplished or consummated. The wheels of OWWAs reorganization started
to run upon the approval by the Board of Trustees of its Resolution No. 001 entitled, Approving
the Structure of the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration. Subsequently, a series of
issuances which approved the organizational structure and staffing pattern of the agency was
issued by the DBM, the OWWA Administrator, and by the DOLE. Resolution No. 001 has already
been implemented. Case law has it that a writ of preliminary injunction will not issue if the act
sought to be enjoined is a fait accompli.
11. POWER SITES VS. UNITED NEON, G.R. NO. 163406, NOVEMBER 24, 2009, 605 SCRA
196
Remedial Law; Preliminary Injunction; Requisites Before a Court Grants Injunctive Relief.
Before a court grants injunctive relief, the following must be demonstrated: that complainant is
entitled to the relief sought, the actual or threatened violation of complainants rights, the

15

probability of irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation as relief.


Otherwise, there is no basis for the issuance of a writ of injunction.
Same; Same; A preliminary injunction may be granted only where the plaintiff appears to be
clearly entitled to the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended;
Standard is even higher in the case of preliminary mandatory injunction.A preliminary injunction
may be granted only where the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has
substantial interest in the right sought to be defended. While the existence of the right need not
be conclusively established, it must be clear. The standard is even higher in the case of a
preliminary mandatory injunction, which should only be grantedx x x in cases of extreme
urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear
strongly in complainant's favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right
against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the effect of
the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation
between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new
relation x x x.
Same; Same; A writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent grave and
irreparable injury that is actual, substantial, and demonstrable.It is settled that a writ of
preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent grave and irreparable injury, that is, injury
that is actual, substantial, and demonstrable. Here, there is no irreparable injury as understood in
law. Rather, the damages alleged by the petitioner, namely, immense loss in profit and possible
damage claims from clients and the cost of the billboard which is a considerable amount of
money is easily quantifiable, and certainly does not fall within the concept of irreparable damage
or injury as described in Social Security Commission v. Bayona, 5 SCRA 126 (1962).
Same; Same; The writ of injunction should never issue when an action for damages would
adequately compensate the injuries caused.Here, any damage petitioner may suffer is easily
subject to mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a
preliminary injunction is not warranted. As previously held in Golding v. Balatbat, the writ of
injunction should never issue when an action for damages would adequately compensate the
injuries caused. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ rests in the probability of
irreparable injury, the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of the
multiplicity of suits, and where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the
relief
of
injunction
should
be
refused.

12. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VS. PIER 8 ARRASTRE, G.R. NO. 147861, NOVEMBER
18, 2005, 475 SCRA 426
Remedial Law; Injunction; Requisites to Justify an Injunctive Relief.The requisites to justify an
injunctive relief are: (a) the existence of a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected;
and (b) the act against which injunction is to be directed as a violation of such right. A preliminary
injunction is proper only when the plaintiff appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in his
complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Tolerance is not the surest footing on which a right in esse can be
established. In fact, we have already held in Pernito Arrastre Services v. Mendoza that PPA may
legally oust arrastre and stevedoring operators even when the latter had been conferred with
holdover permits should the exigencies of public interest so require.PASSI admits that its
contract has expired and that it is merely occupying and operating at Pier 8 in a holdover
capacity. Thus, PASSIs rights over Pier 8 arise not from contractual relations with the PPA, or a
statutory grant of authority, but merely by the tolerance of the PPA. Tolerance is not the surest
footing on which a right in esse can be established. In fact, we have already held in Pernito
Arrastre Services v. Mendoza that PPA may legally oust arrastre and stevedoring operators even
when the latter had been conferred with holdover permits should the exigencies of public interest
16

so require.
Same; Same; P.D. No. 1818; P.D. No. 1818 deprives the courts of jurisdiction to issue any
preliminary injunction or temporary retraining order on essential government projects, including
arrastre and stevedoring operations.Even if PASSI had been able to establish a basis upon
which a preliminary injunction could be issued under Rule 58 of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure, the application of P.D. No. 1818 would override the right to an injunctive remedy. P.D.
No. 1818 deprives the courts of jurisdiction to issue any preliminary injunction or temporary
retraining order on essential government projects, including arrastre and stevedoring operations.
Same; Same; Same; there are only two exceptional circumstances which warrant the nonobservance of P.D. No. 1818.Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals paid no heed to established
jurisprudence that there are only two exceptional circumstances which warrant the nonobservance of P.D. No. 1818, namely: (1) where there is clear grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the government authority or private person being enjoined, and (2) where the effect of the
non-issuance of an injunction or a restraining order would be to "stave off implementation of a
government project.
Same; Same; Courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction that would in effect
dispose of the main case without trial.The prevailing rule is that the courts should avoid issuing
a writ of preliminary injunction that would in effect dispose of the main case without trial.
Otherwise, there would be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the
burden of proof since it would assume the proposition which petitioners are inceptively bound to
prove. Indeed, a complaint for injunctive relief must be construed strictly against the pleader,
especially when the factual grounds relied upon are mere suppositions which definitely cannot
militate against the exercise of police power by the regulatory body charged with the duty to
supervise, control, regulate, construct, maintain, operate, and provide such facilities or services
as are necessary in the ports....
Same; Same; The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the trial
court.The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the trial court.
In the resolution of the Rule 65 petition assailing the RTCs orders, the Court of Appeals should
have determined if the assailed issuances were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. It did not. All that it ascribed to the RTC is error.
Same; Same; Injunction is the strong arm of equity which must be issued with great caution and
deliberation, and only in cases of great injury where there is no commensurate remedy in
damages.We have repeatedly held that there is grave abuse of discretion justifying the
issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is
clear from the foregoing discussions that the Order issued by the Manila RTC, Branch 12, was
nothing of the sort. On the contrary, its ruling on the application of P.D. No. 1818 exhibited the
exercise of its sound discretion. Injunction is the strong arm of equity which must be issued with
great caution and deliberation, and only in cases of great injury where there is no commensurate
remedy in damages.
13. PACIS VS. COMELEC, NO. L-29026, AUGUST 22, 1969, 29 SCRA 24
Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; When to file a motion for
assessment of damages upon bond. The reglementary period within which to file the
appropriate motion for assessment and award of damages upon an injunction for recovery of
damages may be filed after the judgment has become final and executory.

17

Same; Same; Restraining orders; History. The practice of issuing restraining orders (used here
in its generic term as referring to all types of "status quo" orders) started as a common-law
equitable relief in the English courts to preserve the status quo of a case pending the final
determination of the relative rights of the parties. Since these orders cause damages to the
restrained party if his rights were later affirmed more than what would be occasioned him as
an ordinary party litigant if no restraining order were issued a system by which he was
recompensed evolved.
Same; Same; Preliminary Injunction; Good faith as defense against a claim for damages for the
issuance of an injunction. The statutory undertaking of the bond is that it shall answer for all
damages which the party to be restrained may sustain by reason of the injunction "if the court
should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto." 3 Malice or lack of good faith is not
an element of recovery on the bond. This must be so, because to require malice as a prerequisite
would make the filing of a bond a useless formality. Too, it is axiomatic that probable cause is
necessary before an injunction may be ordered, and if good faith were tenable as a defense, it
would rule out practically all relief from actual damages sustained as a result of an injunction.
Same; Same; Same; Amount of recoverable damages is limited to bond. There is nothing in the
Rules of Court which allows recovery of damages other than upon the bond pledged by the party
suing for an injunction. Section 9, Rule 58, limits recovery only upon the bond.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the bond is insufficient; Remedy of aggrieved party. Where
the bond is insufficient in amount, the law expressly gives the party affected the recourse of
excepting thereto and provides for the dissolution of the injunction if "a bond sufficient in amount
with sufficient sureties approved after justification is not filed forthwith."
14. SOLID BUILDERS, INC. VS. CHINA BANKING CORP., G.R. NO. 179665, APRIL 3, 2013,
695 SCRA 101
Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; A preliminary injunction is an order
granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency,
or person to refrain from a particular act or acts; At times referred to as the Strong Arm of
Equity, we have consistently ruled that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate
and which calls for greater circumspection than the issuance of an injunction.This Court has
recently reiterated the general principles in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in Palm Tree
Estates, Inc. vs. Philippine National Bank, 682 SCRA 194 (2012): A preliminary injunction is an
order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court,
agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the
protection of a partys substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal
action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or
extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would
be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned. At times referred to as the
Strong Arm of Equity, we have consistently ruled that there is no power the exercise of which is
more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than the issuance of an injunction. It
should only be extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or
commensurate remedy in damages; in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear;
where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainants favor; where there
is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiffs right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury
being a continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish
and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily
interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation.
Same; Same; Same; A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante,
upon the applicants showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be
protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It
must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury.A
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writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the face of
actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an
injunction are present in the case before it. 25 In this connection, a writ of preliminary injunction is
issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicants showing of two important requisite
conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be
enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented
would cause an irreparable injury.
Same; Same; Same; The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to
when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied
under any standard of compensation.Neither has there been a showing of irreparable injury. An
injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or
reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which
their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of
mathematical computation. The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted
to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied
under any standard of compensation.
Same; Same; Same; Foreclosure of mortgaged property is not an irreparable damage that will
merit for the debtor-mortgagor the extraordinary provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.
Foreclosure of mortgaged property is not an irreparable damage that will merit for the debtormortgagor the extraordinary provisional remedy of preliminary injunction. As this Court stated in
Philippine National Bank v. Castalloy Technology Corporation: [A]ll is not lost for defaulting
mortgagors whose properties were foreclosed by creditors-mortgagees. The respondents will not
be deprived outrightly of their property, given the right of redemption granted to them under the
law. Moreover, in extrajudicial foreclosures, mortgagors have the right to receive any surplus in
the selling price. Thus, if the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is
entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but will give the mortgagor a cause
of action to recover such surplus.
15. SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM, COA VS. CA, G.R. NO. 174788, APRIL 11, 2013, 696 SCRA 166
Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; A preliminary injunction is proper
only when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has substantial
interest in the right sought to be defended.A preliminary injunction is proper only when the
plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right
sought to be defended. Factually, there must exist "a right to be protected and that the acts
against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right." 80 As this Court has
previously ruled, "while the existence of the right need not be conclusively established, it must be
clear." Lacking a clear legal right, the provisional remedy should not have been issued, all the
more because the factual support for issuing the writ had not been established. In giving
injunctive relief, courts cannot reverse the burden of proof, for to do so "would assume the
proposition which the petitioner is inceptively duty bound to prove." This concern is not a mere
technicality, but lies at the heart of procedural law, for every case before a court of law requires a
cause of action.
16. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. DE CHAVEZ, G.R. NO. 172206, JULY 3, 2013, 700
SCRA 399
Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Injunction; Preliminary Injunction; Essential Requisites for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.Note that for a writ of preliminary injunction to
issue, the following essential requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the invasion of the right is
material and substantial; (2) that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and, (3) that
19

there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the present
case, the right of respondents cannot be said to be clear and unmistakable, because the
prevailing jurisprudence is that the penalty of dismissal from the service meted on government
employees or officials is immediately executory in accordance with the valid rule of execution
pending appeal uniformly observed in administrative disciplinary cases.
17. FACURA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NOS. 166495, 184129, 184263, FEBRUARY 16,
2011, 643 SCRA 427
Remedial Law; Ombudsman; Injunction; Execution; The decision of the Ombudsman is
immediately executor pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the
issuance of an injunctive writ.The issue of whether or not an appeal of the Ombudsman
decision in an administrative case carries with it the immediate suspension of the imposed
penalty has been laid to rest in the recent resolution of the case of Ombudsman v. Samaniego,
where this Court held that the decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory pending
appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ.
Same; Same; Same; Same; This rule applies to the appealable decisions of the Ombudsman,
namely, those where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or reprimand, or a penalty
of suspension of more than one month, or a fine equivalent to more than one months salary.
Thus, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended
by Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17, is categorical in providing that an appeal shall not stop an
Ombudsman decision from being executory. This rule applies to the appealable decisions of the
Ombudsman, namely, those where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or
reprimand, or a penalty of suspension of more than one month, or a fine equivalent to more than
one months salary. Hence, the dismissal of De Jesus and Parungao from the government service
is immediately executory pending appeal.
18. HERNANDEZ VS. NAPOCOR, G.R. NO. 145328, MARCH 23, 2006, 485 SCRA 166
Civil Procedure; Injunctions; Temporary Restraining Orders; Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1818;
Presidential Decree No. 1818 was issued on 16 January 1981, prohibiting judges from issuing
restraining orders against government infrastructure projects.Presidential Decree No. 1818 was
issued on 16 January 1981, prohibiting judges from issuing restraining orders against government
infrastructure projects. In part, the decree says, "No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction
to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary order, preliminary mandatory
injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure project." Realizing the
importance of this decree, this Tribunal had issued different circulars to implement this particular
law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from
issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the
issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving
facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases.While its sole provision would appear to
encompass all cases involving the implementation of projects and contracts on infrastructure,
natural resource development and public utilities, this rule, however, is not absolute as there are
actually instances when Presidential Decree No. 1818 should not find application. In a spate of
cases, this Court declared that although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from
issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the
issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving
facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and
involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising
their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

20

Same; Same; Same; Same; For a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not
require that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the applicant. For a writ of
preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not require that the act complained of be in
violation of the rights of the applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of
be probably in violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules of Court, probability is
enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy, which is different from injunction as
a main action where one needs to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent
injunction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; What Presidential Decree No. 1818 aims to avert is the untimely
frustration of government infrastructure projects, particularly by provisional remedies, to the
detriment of the greater good by disrupting the pursuit of essential government projects or
frustrate the economic development effort of the nation.What Presidential Decree No. 1818
aims to avert is the untimely frustration of government infrastructure projects, particularly by
provisional remedies, to the detriment of the greater good by disrupting the pursuit of essential
government projects or frustrate the economic development effort of the nation. Presidential
Decree No. 1818, however, was not meant to be a blanket prohibition so as to disregard the
fundamental right to health, safety and well-being of a community guaranteed by the fundamental
law of the land.
19. SABALONES VS. CA, G.R. NO. 106169, FEBRUARY 14, 1994, 230 SCRA 79
Marriage; Legal Separation; Property Relations; Conjugal Properties; Administration of conjugal
properties; Injunction; The province of injunction is to keep and preserve the thing in the status
quo, rather than to remedy what is past or to punish for wrongful acts already committed.The
primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things
subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff
respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may, before
final judgment, do or continue doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus
make ineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff. As
observed by Francisco, "Injunction is primarily a preventive remedy. Its province is to afford relief
against future acts which are against equity and good conscience and to keep and preserve the
thing in the status quo, rather than to remedy what is past or to punish for wrongful acts already
committed. It may issue to prevent future wrongs although no right has yet been violated."
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Twin requirements of a valid injunction.The twin
requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened
violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner's
legitimate wife (and the complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal separation), the
private respondent has a right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal estate. There is also, in
our view, enough evidence to raise the apprehension that entrusting said estate to the petitioner
may result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and children. We agree that
inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the
conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in the meantime to participate in its
management. Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent
wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to
continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner,
pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family
Code.

20. ULANG VS. CA, G.R. NO. 99299, AUGUST 26, 1993, 225 SCRA 637

21

Injunction; Execution; What writ of injunction protects.Injunction, whether preliminary or final, is


not designed to protect contingent or future rights. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not
in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of
action. The complainant's right or title, moreover, must be clear and unquestioned, for equity, as a
rule, will not take cognizance of suits to establish title, and will not lend its preventive aid by
injunction where the complainant's title or right is doubtful or disputed. The possibility of
irreparable damage, without proof of violation of an actual existing right, is no ground for an
injunction, being mere damnum absque injuria.
Same; Same; Injunction will not lie to defeat execution of final judgment so as to take property
out of successful partys possession.Records show that on 28 August 1990, respondent Sheriff
succeeded in evicting petitioner from the premises and placed private respondent in possession
thereof. Petitioner filed his petition for certiorari before public respondent on 28 September 1990,
or one (1) month after his eviction from the premises. We find such act to be a mere ruse to
prevent the enforcement of the final judgment in AC-G.R. CV No. 01089 (Civil Case No. 2380-0)
which is the case for recovery of possession filed by Valentina Salazar against Roberto Ulang. A
mandatory injunction will not lie to take the property out of control of the party in possession. The
respondent court, therefore, did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
21. DECANO VS. EDU, NO. L-30070, AUGUST 29, 1980, 99 SCRA 410
Courts; Jurisdiction; Public Officers; Land Transportation; Mandamus; Injunction; Where the
annulment of the dismissal of an employee is the cause of action and mandamus and injunction
form mere corollary remedies thereto, a Court of First Instance of Pangasinan has jurisdiction to
issue writs of mandamus and injunction against an officer of the Land Transportation Commission
even if the latter holds office in Quezon City.Here, petitioner seeks primarily the annulment of
the dismissal order issued by respondent Edu, mandamus and injunction being then merely
coronary remedies to the main relief sought, and what is prayed to be enjoined, as in fact the trial
court did enjoin by preliminary injunction, is the implementation of the termination order against
the petitioner. It is true that the order of dismissal was issued by respondent Edu, but it was to be
implemented in Dagupan City by his subordinate officer, respondent Acting Registrar of the LTC
stationed at Dagupan City. Insofar, therefore, as respondent Edu is concerned, the order
terminating the services of respondent was a fait accompli and this he had done without authority,
as earlier discussed. The injunction is question, consequently, must be taken only to restrain the
implementation of respondent Edu's order by his co-respondent whose official station at Dagupan
City is within the territorial boundaries of the trial court's jurisdictional district.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same.As held by the Court in the 1965 case of Gayacao
vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, etc, et al., 10 where the issue is the correctness of a
national official's decision, the provincial courts of first instance have equal jurisdiction with the
Manila courts to review decisions of national officials, as otherwise litigants of ted means would
practically be denied access to the courts of the localities where the reside and where the
questioned acts are sought to be enforced.
22. VERZOSA VS. CA, G.R. NOS. 119511-13, NOVEMBER 24, 1998, 299 SCRA 100
Remedial Law; Injunctions; Requisites before an injunctive writ may be issued. An injunctive
writ may be issued when the following requisites are established: (1) The invasion of the right is
material and substantial; (2) The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; (3) There is an
urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Same; Same; Private respondent had a clear and unmistakable right to protect her title to and
possession of the mortgaged property by enjoining the foreclosure sale.The undisputed owner

22

of the property which was mortgaged to Petitioner Verzosa was private respondent who, upon
learning of the scheduled foreclosure, immediately filed a Complaint to annul the mortgage,
praying that a restraining order be issued to restrain such foreclosure. Private respondent insisted
that she had paid her P25,000 debt, except for the remaining unpaid balance of P915.75 which
she was willing to consign to the court. In other words, she had title to and possession of the
property and she claimed to have paid her obligation, except for the nominal unpaid balance
which she was willing to consign judicially. Hence, she had a clear and unmistakable right to
protect her title to and possession of the mortgaged property by enjoining the foreclosure sale.
Same; Same; The status quo is the last actual peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a
controversy, and its preservation is the office of an injunctive writ. The "status quo" is the last
actual peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a controversy, and its preservation is the
office of an injunctive writ.
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; Amendments; For purposes of determining the
commencement of a suit, the original, complaint is deemed abandoned and superseded by the
amended complaint only if the amended complaint introduces a new or different cause of action
or demand.In Ruymann, the Court held that "an amendment to a complaint which introduces a
new or different cause of action, making a new or different demand, is equivalent to a fresh suit
upon a new cause of action, and the statute of limitations continues to run until the amendment is
filed." In the said case, a complaint for injunction was amended to include a larger tract of land
which had not been included in the original suit. The Court held that "the suit will be deemed to
have been commenced upon the date of amendment, in determining whether the defendant had
acquired title by adverse possession to the portion of the tract of land not included in the original
complaint (Montgomery v. Shaver, 40 Oregon 244)." It is clear therein that the Complaint was
amended to include a new or different cause of action or demand; hence, it was as if a new
complaint was filed. It follows that when the amended complaint does not introduce new issues,
causes of action, or demands, the suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the original
complaint was filed, not on the date of the filing of the amended complaint. In other words, for
demands already included in the original complaint, the suit is deemed to have commenced upon
the filing of such original complaint. In short, for purposes of determining the commencement of a
suit, the original, complaint is deemed abandoned and superseded by the amended complaint
only if the amended complaint introduces a new or different cause of action or demand.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the actual filing in court that controls and not the date of the
formal admission of the amended pleading.Hence, it has been held that "an amendment which
merely supplements and amplifies the facts originally alleged relates back to the date of the
commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations, the period of which
expires after service of the original complaint but before service of amendment." It is the actual
filing in court that controls and not the date of the formal admission of the amended pleading.
Same; Same; Same; The Court of Appeals was correct in upholding the trial court that the status
quo was the situation of the parties at the time of the filing of the original complaint.In the
instant case, the Amended Complaint did not introduce a new or different cause of action or
demand. The original Complaint was amended only to rectify the lack of verification and
thereafter to implead Martinez, who had purchased the contested property from Verzosa. In the
same vein, Waje and Paradise do not apply because the Amended Complaints therein alleged
new causes of action. Similarly unavailing is petitioners' contention that the injunctive writ was
applied retroactively and, hence, violative of Ruymann and other subsequent cases. To repeat,
Ruymann was wrongly applied by petitioners. There being no new issues introduced in the
Amended Complaint herein, the present suit is deemed to have commenced on the date of the
filing of the original Complaint. Hence, the CA was correct in upholding the trial court that the
status quo was the situation of the parties at the time of the filing of the original Complaint.
Same; Same; Generally consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction.Where
the acts have been performed prior to the filing of the injunction suit, the general rule is that

23

consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction. However, "where the acts are
performed after the injunction suit is brought, a defendant may not as [a matter] of right proceed
to perform the acts sought to be restrained and then be heard to assert in the suit that the
injunction will not lie because he has performed these acts before final hearing has been had, but
after the beginning of the action. A defendant thus acts at his peril." It has been held that "[t]he
general rule of law is that, where a defendant completes, after the beginning of an action, the act
thereby sought to be restrained, and before the issue of any final order or decree, the court has
the power to, and may, compel, by a mandatory injunction, the restoration of the former condition
of things and thereby prevent the giving of an advantage by reason of the wrongful act. And
where a defendant does an act thus sought to be restrained, he proceeds at his peril, and the
court in which the action is pending may compel a restoration of the former status or grant to the
plaintiff such relief as may be proper."
Same; Same; Even where an injunction has not been issued, if the suit is one for injunction, the
defendant, if he does the thing sought to be enjoined does so at his peril.In this case, an action
was brought to enjoin Petitioner Verzosa from proceeding with the mortgage sale, yet he
proceeded to do so while the action was still pending. Such conduct is reprehensible. "If one in
the face of a pending suit for injunction, does the thing sought to be enjoined, he cannot thus
outwit equity and the court, but must restore the status quo. . . . Even where an injunction has not
been issued, if the suit is one for injunction, the defendant, if he does the thing sought to be
enjoined does so at his peril."
23. TAY CHUN SUY VS. CA, G.R. NO. 93640, JANUARY 7, 1994, 229 SCRA 151
Courts; Injunctions; Rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments
or decrees of another court with concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction possessing equal power to
grant injunctive relief, applies only when no third-party claimant is involved.At any rate, our
ruling in Santos v. Bayhon should put to rest petitioner's doubt as to the jurisdiction of the trial
court The general rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments
or decrees of another court with concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction possessing equal power to
grant injunctive relief, applies only when no third-party claimant is involved (Traders Royal Bank v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 142). When a third-party, or a stranger to the action,
asserts a claim over the property levied upon, the claimant may vindicate his claim by an
independent action in the proper civil court which may stop the execution of the judgment on
property not belonging to the judgment debtor. (emphasis supplied)
24. BPI VS. HONTANOSAS, G.R. NO. 157163, JUNE 25, 2014
AC No. 07-99 was issued as a guideline for lower court judges in the issuance of TROs and writs
of preliminary injunctions to prevent the implementation of infrastructure projects, or the seizure
and forfeiture proceedings by the Bureau of Customs, viz:
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 07-99 June 25, 1999
TO: ALL JUDGES OF LOWER COURTS RE: EXERCISE OF UTMOST CAUTION, PRUDENCE,
AND JUDICIOUSNESS IN ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS AND WRITS
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
Despite well-entrenched jurisprudence and circulars regarding exercise of judiciousness and care
in the issuance of temporary restraining orders (TRO) or grant of writs ofpreliminary injunction,
reports or complaints on abuses committed by trial judges in connection therewith persist. Some
even intimated thatirregularities, including corruption, might have influenced the issuance ofthe
TRO or the writ of preliminary injunction.

24

No less than the President of the Philippines has requested this Court to issue a circular
reminding judges to respect P.D. No. 1818, which prohibits the issuance of TROs in cases
involving implementation of government infrastructure projects. The Office of the President has
likewise brought to the attention of this Court orders of judges releasing imported articles under
seizure and forfeiture proceedings by the Bureau of Customs.
Judges are thus enjoined to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance
of TRO and in the grant of writs of preliminary injunction to avoid any suspicion that its issuance
or grant was for considerations other than the strict merits of the case.
Judges should bear in mind that in Garcia v. Burgos(291 SCRA 546, 571-572 [1998]), this Court
explicitly stated:
Sec. 1 of PD 1818 distinctly provides that "[n]o court in the Philippines shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory
injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project . . . of the
government, . . . to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from
proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project . . . or
pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation." At
the risk of being repetitious, we stress that the foregoing statutory provision expressly
deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against the implementation or
execution of an infrastructure project.
Their attention is further invited to Circular No. 68-94, issued on 3 November 1994 by the OCA
OIC Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, on the subject "Strict Observance of Section
1 of P.D. 1818 Envisioned by Circular No. 13-93 dated March 5, 1993, and Circular No. 20-92
dated March 24, 1992.
Finally, judges should never forget what the Court categorically declared in Mison v.
Natividad(213 SCRA 734, 742 [1992] that "[b]y express provision of law, amply supported by wellsettled jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and
forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put
it to naught."
The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that this circular is immediately disseminated
and shall monitor implementation thereof.
STRICT OBSERVANCE AND COMPLIANCE of this Circular is hereby enjoined.
AC No. 07-99 was irrelevant herein, however, because Civil Case No. CEB-26468 did not involve
the implementation of infrastructure projects, or the seizure and forfeiture proceedings by the
Bureau of Customs. Consequently, the petitioners urging that respondent Judge be held
administratively liable for violating AC No. 07-99 was misplaced.
However, the RTCs issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from
proceeding with the foreclosure of the mortgages was plainly erroneous and unwarranted.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final
order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. 27 It is
the "strong arm of equity," an extraordinary peremptory remedy that must be used with extreme
caution, affecting as it does the respective rights of the parties. The requirements for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO are enumerated in Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be
granted when it is established:
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(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
In City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc., the Court
restated the nature and concept of a writ of preliminary injunction, as follows:
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to
the judgment ordinal order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain
from a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts,
in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, a prohibitory
injunction is one that commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a
mandatory injunction commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong
in the past.
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party
who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be
protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded
in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or
whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the
final relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a)
that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is
violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right
which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give
rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute.
Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted
by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Under the circumstances averred in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-26468, the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction upon the application of the respondents was improper. They had
admittedly constituted the real estate and chattel mortgages to secure the performance of their
loan obligation to the petitioner, and, as such, they were fully aware of the consequences on their
rights in the properties given as collaterals should the loan secured be unpaid. The foreclosure of
the mortgages would be the remedy provided by law for the mortgagee to exact payment. In fact,
they did not dispute the petitioners allegations that they had not fully paid their obligation, and
that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was precisely brought by them in order to stave off the impending
foreclosure of the mortgages based on their claim that they had been compelled to sign preprinted standard bank loan forms and mortgage agreements.
It is true that the trial courts are given generous latitude to act on applications for the injunctive
writ for the reason that conflicting claims in an application for the writ more often than not involve
a factual determination that is not the function of the appellate courts; and that the exercise of
sound discretion by the issuing courts in injunctive matters ought not to be interfered with except
when there is manifest abuse. Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion must be sound, that
is, the issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be upon the grounds and in the manner
provided by law. Judges should always bear in mind that the writ of preliminary injunction is

26

issued upon the satisfaction of two requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected
exists prima facie; and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. According to
Saulog v. Court of Appeals, the applicant must have a sufficient interest or right to be protected,
but it is enough that:x x x for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a present right
which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. And while a clear showing of
the right claimed is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established. In fact,
the evidence to be submitted to justify preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need
not be conclusive or complete but need only be a "sampling" intended merely to give the
court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the
case on the merits. This should really be so since our concern here involves only the
propriety of the preliminary injunction and not the merits of the case still pending with the
trial court.
Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private respondent needs only
to show that it has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its complaint x x x.
It is also basic that the power to issue a writ of injunction is to be exercised only where the reason
and necessity therefor are clearly established, and only in cases reasonably free from doubt. For,
truly, a preliminary injunction should not determine the merits of a case, or decide controverted
facts. As a preventive remedy, injunction only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury,
and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled. As an ancillary and
preventive remedy, it may be resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights during the
pendency of the principal action, and for no other purpose. Such relief will accordingly protect the
ability of the court to render a meaningful decision; it will further serve to guard against a change
of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting of proper relief after a trial on the merits.
Verily, its essential function is to preserve the status quo between the parties until the merits of
the case can be heard.
Moreover, the applicant must prove that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an
irreparable injustice. But the respondents failed to establish the irreparable injury they would
suffer should the writ of preliminary injunction not be issued. They principally feared the loss of
their possession and ownership of the mortgaged properties, and faced the possibility of a
criminal prosecution for the post-dated checks they issued. But such fear of potential loss of
possession and ownership, or facing a criminal prosecution did not constitute the requisite
irreparable injury that could have warranted the issuance of the writ of injunction. "An injury is
considered irreparable," according to Philippine National Bank v. Castalloy Technology
Corporation,
x x x if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can
be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can
be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical
computation. The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to
when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be
remedied under any standard of compensation.
The injury being feared by the herein respondents is not of such nature. Ultimately, the
amount to which the mortgagee-bank shall be entitled will be determined by the disposition
of the trial court in the main issue of the case. We have explained in Equitable PCI Bank,
Inc. v. OJ Mark Trading, Inc. that all is not lost for defaulting mortgagors whose properties
were foreclosed by creditors-mortgagees. The respondents will not be deprived outrightly
of their property, given the right of redemption granted to them under the law. Moreover, in
extrajudicial foreclosures, mortgagors have the right to receive any surplus in the selling
price. Thus, if the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is
entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but will give the mortgagor a

27

cause of action to recover such surplus.


As a general rule, the courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction whether preliminary
or final in order to enjoin or restrain any criminal prosecution. But there are extreme cases in
which exceptions to the general rule have been recognized, including: (1) when the injunction is
necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when it is
necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(3) when there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are
without or in excess of authority; (5) when the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) when the court has no jurisdiction
over the offense; (8) when it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) when the
charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is
clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied. However, the respondents did not sufficiently show that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 came
under any of the foregoing exceptions. Hence, the issuance by the RTC of the writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the petitioner from instituting criminal complaints for violation of BP No. 22
against the respondents was unwarranted.
Every court should remember that an injunction should not be granted lightly or precipitately
because it is a limitation upon the freedom of the defendant's action. It should be granted only
when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it, for no
power exists whose exercise is more delicate, which requires greater caution and deliberation, or
is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction.
25. DELA PAZ VS. ADIONG, A.M. NO. RTJ-04-1857 (FORMERLY OCA IPI NO. 02-1477-RTJ),
NOVEMBER 23, 2004, 443 SCRA 480
Actions; Injunction; Injunction can only be granted upon a verified application showing facts
entitling the applicant to the relief demanded and upon the filing of a bond executed to the party
or person enjoined.The rule on injunction as found under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
provides that the same can only be granted upon a verified application showing facts entitling the
applicant to the relief demanded and upon the filing of a bond executed to the party or person
enjoined. It is also provided that no preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and
prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined unless shown that great or irreparable
injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice; that a temporary
restraining order may be issued effective for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the
party sought to be enjoined.
Same; Same; The authority of a judge to issue a writ of injunction is limited only to and operative
only within his province or district and any such writ issued in contravention of such limitation is
void.Respondent's court is in Marawi City which falls within the twelfth judicial region. The writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent requiring FAPE, which is holding office
in Makati City, and its officials who have their residences in Metro Manila, to issue a check in the
amount of P4,000,000.00 payable to Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum, is outside the territorial
jurisdiction of respondent's court. Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the
respondent is void considering that his authority to issue an injunction is limited only to and
operative only within his respective provinces or districts. Consequently, the Order dated March 5,
2002 directing the sheriff of Makati and Mandaluyong to serve the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to FAPE, et al. is a jurisdictional faux pas as the respondent can only enforce his orders
within the territorial jurisdiction of his court.

26. DFA VS. FALCON, G.R. NO. 176657, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010, 629 SCRA 644

28

Remedial Law; Injunction; Infrastructure Projects; National Government Projects; No court, aside
from the Supreme Court, may enjoin a "national government project" unless the matter is one of
extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue such that unless the act complained of is
enjoined, grave injustice or irreparable injury would arise.It is indubitable that no court, aside
from the Supreme Court, may enjoin a "national government project" unless the matter is one of
extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue such that unless the act complained of is
enjoined, grave injustice or irreparable injury would arise.
Same; Same; Same; The trial court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction
against the e-Passport Project.Republic Act No. 9285 is a general law applicable to all matters
and controversies to be resolved through alternative dispute resolution methods. This law allows
a Regional Trial Court to grant interim or provisional relief, including preliminary injunction, to
parties in an arbitration case prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. This general statute,
however, must give way to a special law governing national government projects, Republic Act
No. 8975 which prohibits courts, except the Supreme Court, from issuing TROs and writs of
preliminary injunction in cases involving national government projects. However, as discussed
above, the prohibition in Republic Act No. 8975 is inoperative in this case, since petitioners failed
to prove that the e-Passport Project is national government project as defined therein. Thus, the
trial court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the e-Passport Project.
Same; Same; To be entitled to injunctive relief the party seeking such relief must be able to show
grave, irreparable injury that is not capable of compensation.Time and again, this Court has
held that to be entitled to injunctive relief the party seeking such relief must be able to show
grave, irreparable injury that is not capable of compensation.
Same; Same; An injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.
We reiterated this point in Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corporation, where we
likewise opined: Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must be a clear
showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which
the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right. It must be shown that the invasion of the
right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and
unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. Moreover, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing
necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard
compensation.
Same; Damages; When injury considered irreparable.An injury is considered irreparable if it is
of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor
in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with
reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. It is considered
irreparable injury when it cannot be adequately compensated in damages due to the nature of the
injury itself or the nature of the right or property injured or when there exists no certain pecuniary
standard for the measurement of damages.
Rule 59 RECEIVERSHIP
1. DOLAR V. SUNDIAN, L-27631, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 616
Civil Law; Property; Receivership; When relief by way of receivership is essentially equitable in
nature. Ordinarily, a receiver cannot be put on property which is already in custody, of the law
under process from another court of competent jurisdiction; and there cannot be more than one
receiver over the same property... A court of equity has power to appoint a receiver of property
which is already in the hand of an executor or administrator, but such power should be exercised
with caution, and a receiver should not be appointed to take assets out of the hands of legally

29

appointed representatives except in cases of manifest danger of loss or destruction of, or material
injury to, assets... Also, a receiver will be appointed when the executor or administrator has been
guilty of misconduct, waste, or misuse of assets, and there is real danger of loss; and conversely,
a receiver will not be appointed to take assets from the custody of an executor or administrator
unless there is manifest danger of loss or destruction of, or material injury to, the assets and a
receivership is clearly necessary to protect and preserve the property.
Same; When Piece of property is considered part of deceaseds estate subject to settlement.
Where a piece of property which originally is a part of the estate of a deceased person is sold by
an heir of the deceased having a valid claim thereto, and said piece of property is, by mistake,
subsequently inventories or considered part of the deceaseds estate subject to settlement, and,
thereafter, with the authority and approval of the probate court is sold once more to another
person, a receiver of the property so sold may, during the pendency of a motion to set aside the
second sale, be appointed by the court when its sound judgment the grant of such temporary
relief is reasonably necessary to secure and protect the rights of its real owner against any
danger of loss or material injury to him arising from the use and enjoyment thereof by another
who manifestly cannot acquire any right of dominion thereon because the approving surrogate
court had already lost jurisdiction to authorize the further sale of such property to another person.
2. VIVARES V. REYES, GR No. 155408, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 80
Remedial Law; Civil Law; Receivership; He who alleges fraud has the burden to prove it.
Petitioners miserably failed to adduce clear, convincing, and hard evidence to show the alleged
fraud in the transfers and the antedating of said transfers. The fact that the transfers were dated
prior to the demise of the Torcuato on May 12, 1992 does not necessarily mean the transfers
were attended by fraud. He who alleges fraud has the burden to prove it.
Same; Same; Same; Receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted only in extreme situations.
Receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted only in extreme situations. As early as 1914, the
Court already enunciated the doctrinal pronouncement in Velasco & Co. v. Gochuico & Co., that
courts must use utmost circumspection in allowing receivership, thus: The power to appoint a
receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with extreme caution and only under
circumstances requiring summary relief or where the court is satisfied that there is imminent
danger of loss, to be averted. The court should consider the consequences to all of the parties
and the power should not be exercised when it is likely to produce irreparable injustice or injury to
private rights or the facts demonstrate that the appointment will injure the interests of others
whose rights are entitled to as much consideration from the court as those of the complainant.
3. TANTANO V. ESPINA-CABOVERDE, GR No. 203585, July 29, 2013, 702 SCRA 508
Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Receivership; Receivership is a harsh remedy to be
granted with utmost circumspection and only in extreme situations.- We have repeatedly held that
receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted with utmost circumspection and only in extreme
situations. The doctrinal pronouncement in Velasco & Co. v. Gochuico & Co., is instructive: The
power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with extreme caution and
only under circumstances requiring summary relief or where the court is satisfied that there is
imminent danger of loss, to be averted. The court should consider the consequences to all of the
parties and the power should not be exercised when it is likely to produce irreparable injustice or
injury to private rights or the facts demonstrate that the appointment will injure the interests of
others whose rights are entitled to as much consideration from the court as those of the
complainant.
Same; Same; Same; Being a drastic and harsh remedy, receivership must be granted only when
there is a clear showing of necessity for it in order to save the plaintiff from grave and immediate

30

loss or damage. Sec 1(d), Rule 59 of the Rules of Court is couched in general terms and broad
in scope, encompassing instances not covered by the other grounds enumerated under said
section. However, in granting applications for receivership on the basis of this section, courts
must remain mindful of the basic principle that receivership may be granted only when the
circumstances so demand, either because the property sought to be placed in the hands of a
receiver is in danger of being lost or because they run the risk of being impaired, and that being a
drastic and harsh remedy, receivership must be granted only when there is a clear showing of
necessity for its in order to save the plaintiff from grave and immediate loss or damage.
Same; Same; Same; Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: 1) WON the injury
resulting from such appointment would probably be greater than the injury ensuing if the status
quo is left undisturbed; and 2) WON the appointment will imperil the interest of others whose
rights deserve as much a consideration from those as those of the person requesting for
receivership. Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: 1) WON the injury resulting
from such appointment would probably be greater than the injury ensuing if the status quo is left
undisturbed; and 2) WON the appointment will imperil the interest of others whose rights deserve
as much a consideration from those as those of the person requesting for receivership. Moreover,
this court has consistently ruled that where the effect of the appointment of a receiver is to take
real estate out of the possession of the defendant before the final adjudication of the rights of the
parties, the appointment should be made only in extreme cases.
Same; Same; Same; A receiver should not be appointed to deprive a party who is in possession
of the property in litigation, just as a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued to transfer
property in litigation from the possession of one party to another where the legal title is in dispute
and the party having possession asserts ownership in himself, except in a very clear case of
evident usurpation. This Court has held that a receiver should not be appointed to deprive a
party who is in possession of the property in litigation, just as a writ of preliminary injunction
should not be issued to transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another
where the legal title is in dispute and the party having possession asserts ownership in himself,
except in a very clear case of evident usurpation. Furthermore, this Court has declared that the
appointment of a receiver is not proper when the rights of the parties, one of whom is in
possession of the property depend on the determination of their respective claims to the title of
such property unless such property is in danger of being materially injured or lost, as by the
prospective foreclosure of a mortgage on it or its portions are being occupied by third persons
claiming adverse title.
Same; Same; Same; Section 2 of Rule 59, Rules of Court is very clear in that before issuing the
order appointing a receiver the court shall require the applicant to file a bond executed to the
party against whom the application is presented. - Section 2 of Rule 59, is very clear in that
before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall require the applicant to file a bond
executed to the party against whom the application is presented. The use of the word shall
denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in this case, the consent
of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence, the filing of an applicants bond is required at all times. On
the other hand, the requirement of a receivers bond rests upon the discretion of the court. Sec 2,
Rule 59 clearly states that the court may, in its discretion, at any time after the appointment,
require an additional bond as further security for such damages.
Rule 60 REPLEVIN
1. SERVICEWIDE SPECIALISTS V. CA, GR No. 110048, November 19, 1998, 318 SCRA 493
Mortgages; Replevin; An applicant for replevin must show that he is the owner of the property
claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof. Where the right of the
plaintiff to the possession of the specified property is so conceded or evident, the action need

31

only be maintained against him who so possesses the property.


Same; Same; In default of the mortgagor, the mortgagee is thereby constituted as attorney-in-fact
of the mortgagor, enabling such mortgagee to act for and in behalf of the owner. There can be
no question that persons having a special right of property in the goods the recovery of which is
sought, such as a chattel mortgagee, may maintain an action for replevin therefor. Where the
mortgage authorizes the mortgagee to take possession of the property on default, he may
maintain an action to recover possession of the mortgaged chattels from the mortgagor or from
any person in whose hands he may find them. Thus, in default of the mortgagor, the mortgagee
is thereby constituted as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor, enabling such mortgagee to act for and
in behalf of the owner. That the defendant is not privy to the chattel mortgage should be
inconsequential. By the fact that the object of replevin is traced to his possession, one properly
can be a defendant in an action for replevin. It is here assumed that the plaintiff right to possess
the thing is not or cannot be disputed.
Same; Same; Foreclosure; The conditions essential for such foreclosure would be to show, firstly,
the existence of the chattel mortgage and, secondly, the default of the mortgagor. In a suit of
replevin, a clear right of possession must be established. A foreclosure under a chattel mortgage
may properly be commenced only once there is default on the part of the mortgagor of his
obligation secured by the mortgage. The replevin in this case has been resorted to in order to
pave the way for the foreclosure of what is covered by the chattel mortgage. The conditions
essential for such foreclosure would be to show, firstly, the existence of the chattel mortgage and,
secondly, the default of the mortgagor.
Same; Same; Same; An adverse possessor, who is not the mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of
his possession, let alone be bound by the terms of the chattel mortgage contract, simply because
the mortgagee brings up an action for replevin. Since the mortgagees right of possession is
conditioned upon the actual fact of default which itself may be controverted, the inclusion of other
parties, like the debtor or the mortgagor himself, may be required in order to allow a full and
conclusive determination of the case. When the mortgagee seeks replevin in order to effect the
eventual foreclosure of the mortgage, it is not only the existence of, but also the mortgagors
default on, the chattel mortgage that, among other things, can properly uphold the right to replevy
the property. The burden to establish a valid justification for such action lies with the plaintiff. An
adverse possessor, who is not the mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of his possession, let alone
be bound by the terms of the chattel mortgage contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up
an action for replevin.
2. VDA DE DANAO V. GINETE, AM No. MTJ-03-1474, January 21, 2003, 395 SCRA 542
Same; Same; Actions; Replevin; Requisites. In the present case, contrary to the elementary
rules on replevin, respondent improperly ordered the seizure of a vehicle under custodial egis in
another court, a higher one at that. Sec 2 of Rule 60 clearly requires that certain facts must be
alleged in the application for replevin, as follows: Sec 2 Affidavit and Bond. The applicant must
show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts: xxx xxx
xxx c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant
to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under
custodial egis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; Under the foregoing
provision, the plaintiff must show, by affidavit, that the subject property has not been 1) distrained,
2) taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, 3) seized under a writ of execution or
preliminary attachment, or 4) placed under custodial egis.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Basic is the rule that property already placed under legal custody
may not be a proper subject of replevin. The records reveal that Fermin Asilum, the plaintiff in
the replevin case, concealed from the MTC the fact that he was involved in a pending suit and
that the property he wanted to recover had been seized by authorities earlier in realtion to that

32

criminal case. This circumstance was, however, disclosed by the defendants in their answer.
Notwithstanding the disclosure, respondent issued the Writ of Seizure a manifest and gross
error on his part. Since they are duty bound to administer the law and to be diligent in
ascertaining the facts. Basic is the rule that property already placed under legal custody may not
be the proper subject of replevin. This principle applies especially when a court coordinate or, as
int his case, of superior jurisdiction has already established its authority over the property. A
contrary ruling would be tantamount to subverting a doctrine steadfastly adhered to, the main
purposes of which are to assure stability and consistency in judicial actuations and to avoid
confusion that may otherwise ensue if courts are permitted to interfere with one anothers lawful
orders.
3. SMART V. ASTORGA, GR No. 148132, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 434
Actions; Provisional Remedies; Replevin; Words and Phrases; Replevin is an action whereby the
owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels; The term may refer either to the
action itself; for the recovery of personality, or to the provisional remedy traditionally associated
with it, by which possession of the property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during
the pendency of the action.Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to
repossession of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from on who has
wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to
permit on having right to possession to recover property in specie from one from who has
wrongfully taken or detained the property. The term may refer either to the action itself, for the
recovery of personality, or to the provisional remedy traditionally associated with me with it, by
which possession of the property may be obtained b y the plaintiff and retained during the
pendency of action.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdictions; Labor Law; An employers demand for payment of the market
value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor but a civil, dispute; A
dispute which involves the relationship of a debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer
relations falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.Contrary to the CA,s ratiocination , the
RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its direction in denying
Astorgas motion to dismiss. SMARTs demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in
the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the
relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations. As such the dispute
falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
4. RIVERA V. VARGAS, GR No. 165895, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 89
Actions; Replevin; Replevin is both a form of principal remedy and of provisional relief; The
action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of
possession.Broadly understood in this jurisdiction, replevin is both a form of principal remedy
and of provisional relief. It ay refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of
personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional
remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and to
hold it pendente lite. The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines
nothing more than the right of possession.
Same; Same; A person seeking a remedy in an action for replevin must follow the course laid
down I the statute, since the remedy is penal in nature. Before a final judgment, property cannot
be seized unless by virtue of some provision of law. The Rules of Court, under Rule 60,
authorizes such seizure in cases of replevin. However, a person seeking remedy in an action for
replevin must follow the course laid down in the statute, since the remedy is penal in nature.
When n attempt is made to comply with the provisions of the law relating to seizure in this kind of
action, the writ or order allowing the seizure is erroneous and may be set aside on motion by the

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adverse party. Be it noted, however, that a motion to squash the writ of replevin goes to the
technical regularity of procedure, and not to the merits of the case in the principal action.
Same; Same; Same; Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the
constitutional guaranty on procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the
constitutional guaranty on procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable
searches and seizures. If the writ was not served upon the adverse party but was instead merely
handed to a person who is neither an agent of the adverse party nor a person authorized to
receive court processes on his behalf, the service thereof is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid,
running afoul of the statutory and constitutional requirements. The service is likewise invalid if the
writ of replevin was served without the required documents. Under these circumstances, no right
to seize and to detain the property shall pass, the act of the sheriff being both unlawful and
unconstitutional.
Same; Same; A trial court is deemed to have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction with
respect to the ancillary action of replevin if it seizes and detains a personality on the basis of a
writ that was improperly served. The trial court is reminded that not only should the writ or order
of replevin comply with all the requirements as to matters of form or contents prescribed by the
Rules of Court. The writ must also satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective: i.e. it
should be directed to the officer who is authorized to serve it; and it should be served upon the
person who not only has the possession or custody of the property involved but who is also a
party or agent of a party to the action. Consequently, a trial court is deemed to have acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction with respect to the ancillary action of replevin if it seizes and detains
a personalty on the basis of a writ that was improperly served, such as what happened in this
case.
5. AGNER V. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC., GR No. 182963, June 3, 2013, 697 SCRA 89
Remedial law; Writ of replevin. Further, the Court even ruled in Navarro v. Escobido that prior
demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing in
Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on the
possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed.
Remedial law; Burden of proof. Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who pleads
payment has the burden of proving it; the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather
than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. When the creditor is in possession of the document of
credit, proof of non-payment is not needed for it is presumed. Respondents possession of the
Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage strongly buttresses its claim that the obligation has not
been extinguished.
6. NORTHERN MOTORS V. HERRERA, L-32674, February 22, 1973, 49 SCRA 392
Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Replevin; The mortgagee in a chattel mortgage has a right
to the possession of the property mortgaged upon breach of the mortgage contract by the
mortgagor. There can be no question that persons having a special right of property in the
goods the recovery of which is sought, such as a chattel mortgage, may maintain an action for
replevin therefor. We explained that when the debtor defaults, and the creditor desires to
foreclose the mortgaged chattel, he must necessarily take the mortgaged property in his hands,
but when the debtor refuses to yield the possession of the property, the creditor must institute an
action, either to effect a judicial foreclosure directly, or to secure possession as a preliminary to
sale contemplated under Sec 14 of Act no. 1508. The right of the mortgagee to have possession
of the mortgaged chattel after the condition of the mortgage is breached must be therefore
deemed to be well settled.

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Same; Same; Same; the plaintiff is not required to allege the intervention of a public officer in his
attempt to obtain possession of the mortgaged property from the defendant. The rules do not
require that in an action for replevin, the plaintiff should allege that the mortgagee has asked or
directed a public officer to foreclose the mortgage and that the mortgagor has refused to
surrender the mortgaged chattel to such public officer.
Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and practice; In an action for replevin, the court should consider
both the complaint and its annexes. In determining the sufficiency of the application for writ if
replevin, the allegations thereof and the recitals of the documents appended thereto and made
part thereof should be considered.
Rule 61 SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
1. LAM V. CHUA, GR No. 131286, March 18, 2004, 426 SCRA 176
Civil Law; Support; Provisional Character; Judgment for support does not become final. -
Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its
allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to
support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or
decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final
determination.
Same; Same; Evidence; It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the
evidence presented before it. - It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on
the evidence presented before it. The evidence must prove the capacity ore resources of both
parents who are jointly obliged to support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the
Family Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation of the child.
2. DE ASIS V. CA, GR No. 127578, February 15, 1999, 303 SCRA 176
Parent and child; Support; Compromise Agreements; Future support cannot be the subject of a
compromise. The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third
person. Article 301 of the Civil code, the law in point, reads: Art. 301. The right to receive support
cannot be renounced, nor can be transmitted to the third person. Neither can it be compensated
with what the recipient owes the obligor. x x x Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject
of a compromise.
Same; Same; Same; To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of
a person to support is virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public
burden. The raison detre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or
compromise of the right to support is stated thus: The right to support being founded upon the
need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right
for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be
renounced; hence, support, which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced. x x x
To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is
virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden. This is
contrary to public policy.
Same; Same; Same; An agreement for the dismissal of a complaint for maintenance and support
conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot
be countenanced. The manifestation sent in by respondents mother in the first case, which
acknowledged that it would be useless to pursue its complaint for support, amounted to
renunciation as it as it served to vinculum that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim

35

support from his putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between
the petitioner and respondents mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and
support conditioned upon the dismissal of counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which
cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition against any compromise of the right to
support.
Same; Same; Judgments; Res Judicata; A former dismissal predicated upon a compromise
affecting the civil status of persons and future support cannot have force and effect and can not
bar the filing of another action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant. Neither
are we persuaded by petitioners theory that the dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case Q-88-935
has the effect of res judicata on the subsequent case for support. The case of Advincula vs.
Advincula comes to fore. x x x It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon an
compromise. Acknowledgement, affecting as it does the civil status of persons and future support,
cannot be the subject of a compromise. (pars. 1 & 4 , Art. 2035, Civil Code.) Hence, the first
dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not bar the filing of another action, asking for the
same relief against the same defendant.
3. CALDERON V. ROXAS, GR No. 185595, January 9, 2013, 688 SCRA 330
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Interlocutory Order and Final Order,
Distinguished. This Court has laid down the distinction between interlocutory and final orders,
as follows: xxx A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing
more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the
basis of theevidence presented at trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of
the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on
the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is
ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is
concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties next move
(which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the
taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it
becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive term, final and executory. Xxx
Converseley, on order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task
of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each
other, but obviouskly indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory
e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for
extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying
applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a
final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may
not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from
the final judgment rendered in the case.
Same; Provisional Remedies; Support Pendente Lite; The Rules of Court provide for the
provisional remedy of support pendete lite which may be availed of at the commencement of the
proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment of the proper action or
proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time
prior to the judgment or final order. The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of
support pendet lite which may be availed of at the commencement of the proper action or
proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment orfinal order. On March 4, 2003, this Court
promulgated the Rule on Provisional Orders which shall govern the issuance of provisional orders
during the pendency of cases for the declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of voidable
marriage and legal separation. These include orders for spousal support, child support, child
custody, visitation rights, hold departure, protection and administration of common property.
Same; Civil Procedure; Interlocutory Orders; An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental
matters and leaves something more to be doneto resolve the merits of the case. The word

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interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of the suiit
which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. An
interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be doneto
resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is considered final if the order
disposes of the action. Clearly, whether an order or resolution is final or interlocutory is not
dependent on compliance or noncompliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner
suggests. It is also important to emphasize the temporary or provisional nature of the assailed
orders.
Same; provisional Remedies; Provisional remedies are writs and proceses available during the
pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain
rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final
judgment in the case. Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the
pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain
rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final
judgment in the case. They are provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed
of during the pendency of the action, and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in
and are dependent upon the result of the main action. The subject orders on the amtter of support
pendente lite are but an incident to the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

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