BA-RA 7941 VS.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 177271
May 4, 2007
FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari
and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which
have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections
on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and
subsequently were accredited by the Comelec to participate in the
2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor
for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to
Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list
organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this
urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters
to the Director of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of
those groups nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales,
et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under
date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees names confidential
and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request.
Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees
away from the public is deducible from the excerpts of the news report
appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is that
there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the
names of nominees, and that party list elections must not be
personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the
Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et
al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections without
simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees
possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the
"Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector each seeks to.

In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P.

Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation
impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose
or publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups
named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional
prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d]
as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the
Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from
participating in the elections.
ISSUE:
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to
the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground
that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be
qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of
the nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to
information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the
Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to
disclose to the public the names of said nominees.
HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify
the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar
as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of
the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited
to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to
immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups,
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA
7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus
advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to

make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of

judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari
proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and
the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole
function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the
tribunals evaluation of the evidence. (Note that nowhere in R.A. No.
7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list
nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an
organization. )
2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
COMELECs basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees
of subject party-list groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941, which last sentence
reads: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on
the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to
deny the requested disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No.
7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing
through mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have
the right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed
judgment. While the vote cast in party-list elections is a vote for a
party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in
appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of

Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law

or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of
the votes in an election
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein
petitions. The right to information is a public right where the real
parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like
all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its
companion right of access to official records are not absolute. The
peoples right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is
further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. But no
national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless,
the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the
legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the
party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus,
therefore, lies.

QUINTOS-DELES VS. COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL

COMMISSION
G.R. No. 83216 September 4 1989 [Appointing Power]
FACTS:
This is a special civic action for prohibition and mandamus with
injunction seeking to compel CoA to allow Quintos-Deles to perform
and charge her duties as House of Representatives member
representing Women's Sector and to restrain respondents from
subjecting her appointment to the confirmation process. Quintos-Deles
ad three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the
President pursuant to Art. VII Sec 16 p.2 and Art. XVIII Sec. 7 of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
W/N the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral
representatives to the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the
CoA.
RULING:

Yes. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2,

Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by
express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is
indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives are among the other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President in this Constitution, referred to in the first
sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison,
supra).
Deles' appointment was made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, p.2
which gives the President the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress. The records show that Deles appointment was made on
April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April
17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16,
Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.
AQUINO VS. COMELEC: G.R. NO. 120265, SEPTEMBER 18, 1995
(248 SCRA 400
Agapito A. Aquino, Petitioner
Commission on Elections, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon and JuanitoIcaro,
Respondents
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.:
The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our
nascent democracy is to be preserved. In any challenge having the
effect of reversing a democratic choice, expressed through the ballot,
this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would
give effect to the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates
that all elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to a
winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable, the
ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect

to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our

democratic institutions.
FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private
respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and
Mateo Bedon,Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.Cembo, Makati
City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the
latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be
for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the
Constitution.
HELD:
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative
of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has
established not just residence but domicile of choice.
Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections,
indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion,
Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years
immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate
indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His
birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his
parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his
domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent
certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is
evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While
a lease contract maybe indicative of petitioners intention to reside in
Makati City, it does notengender the kind of permanency required to
prove abandonment of onesoriginal domicile.

Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to

Makatiis a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To
successfully effecta change of domicile, petitioner must prove an
actual removal or an actualchange of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one
and definite acts which correspond withthe purpose. In the absence of
clear and positive proof, the domicile of originshould be deemed to
continue.

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC 262 SCRA 256

G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996
FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227
(The Bases Conversionand Development Act of 1992), which created
the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA
to implement the declared national policy of converting the
Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic
military reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately,
petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the
preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other
installations left by the American navy.
On April 1993, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang
Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute
concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic
Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the
President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10,
Serye 1993.

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify Pambayang

Kapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economic Zone,
b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by
promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting
Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the
LGC of 1991.
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the
ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an
ordinance.
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining
the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the
former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality
of Morong.
On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and
2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and
providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the
referendum.
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting
the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is
intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an
amendment of a national law
ISSUE:
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of
the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10
2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within
the powersof the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such
initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."
HELD:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. FIRST. The
process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but
respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.
In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the

footnote below, the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27

times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec
labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes
was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents
were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum
Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the
description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word
"initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this
exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. As defined, Initiative is
the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or
reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly.
On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people
to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a
legislative body and which in most cases would without action on
the part of electors become a law. In initiative and referendum,
the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the
process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections.
These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the
respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance
or the content of legislation.
2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal
resolution is still in the proposal stage and not yet an approved
law. The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not
yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would
be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the
people have voted for it and it has become an approved
ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be
enforced or implemented there under. At this point, it is merely a
proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere
conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may
decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or
cases. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court
has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to
determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However,
it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed
initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or
passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court,
for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made
no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the
pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in
its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no
decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court

which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction

over, in the exercise of its review powers.
VALMONTE VS. BELMONTE 262 SCRA 292: G.R. NO. 125416,
SEPT. 26, 1996
Facts:
Petitioners in the special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be
directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the INUDO and PDP-Laban who were
able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election
thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marco; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow
petitioners access to the public records for the subject information on
June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the
Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General
Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying
that for failure to receive a reply, We are now considering ourselves
free to so whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our
desires objectives in pursuance of public interest.
ISSUE:
W/N Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire
upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady
Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.

HELD:
Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His
position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The
judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what
the law is, and not that the law should be. Under our system of

government, policy issues are within the domain of the political

branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the
repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers themselves
may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy,
considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans
were alleged to have been granted. it cannot be denied that because
of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures,
most especially those holding responsible positions in government,
enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary
individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny. The
transactions used here presumably is generic and, therefore, it can
cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated
contract. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution
which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless
persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and
controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the people. The Court is
convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a governmentcontrolled corporation created by special legislation are within the
ambit of the peoples right to be informed pursuant to the
constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Although
citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are
entitled to access to official records, the Constitution does not accord
them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information
on matters of public concern.