1

[UDK No. 9864 : December 3, 1990.]

RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING
JUDGE of the [CAR] RTC, Branch 4, Iligan City, and SPOUSES DOMINGO and
EUGENIA MARTIL, Respondents.
Facts:
Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres were tenants from the landholding" owned by
the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil. The land was mortgaged to the Philippine
National Bank and which was later on foreclosed and acquired by the Philippine
National Bank for being the highest bidder thereat. And the Philippine National Bank
sold a portion of the subject parcel of land to the National Steel Corporation. Petitioner
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in March, 1988, "an agrarian case
for damages by reason of their unlawful dispossession and prayed that mortgage and
the transactions thereafter made in relation thereto be annulled and voided.
An order rendered by Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr. dismissed the complaint rationalizing
that jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over agrarian cases had been transferred to
the Department of Agrarian Reform by virtue of Executive Order No. 229 and Executive
No. 129-A.
The Tangub Spouses filed a petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court but
discerning that no special and important reason for taking cognizance of the action, it
was referred to the Court of Appeals, that tribunal having concurrent jurisdiction to act
thereon.
The Court of Appeals rendered Decision dismissing the petition finding that the Trial
Court had correctly resolved the jurisdictional question rationalizing that in Estanislao
Casinillo v. Hon. Felipe G. Javier, Jr., et al., it was "emphatically ruled that agrarian
cases no longer fall under the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts but rather under the
jurisdiction of the DAR Adjudication Board.
The petitioner is once again before this Court, contending that the Trial Court's order of
dismissal, and the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming it, is patently illegal and
unconstitutional because they deprive a poor tenant access to courts and directly violate
R.A. 6657.
Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court, acting as a special agrarian court, has
jurisdiction over an agrarian case for damages by reason of the petitioners unlawful
dispossession.
Ruling:
The Regional Trial Court was therefore correct in dismissing Agrarian Case. It being a
case concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land, not involving
the "special jurisdiction" of said Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly
came within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform, or
more particularly, the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely to
wield the adjudicatory powers of the Department, supra.
Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229:
1) vested the Department of Agrarian Reform with "quasi-judicial powers to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters," and

2) granted it "jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform,

except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the
Department of Agriculture [DA], as well as "powers to punish for contempt and to issue
subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders or decisions."
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 129-A made the Department of Agrarian Reform
"responsible for implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and, for
such purpose," authorized it, among others, to
"(g) Provide free legal services to agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve agrarian
conflicts and land tenure problems
And Section 5 of the same Executive Order No. 129-A specified the powers and
functions of the Department of Agrarian Reform, including the following::- nad
"(b) Implement all agrarian laws, and for this purpose, punish for contempt and issue
subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, writ of execution of its decision, and other legal
processes to ensure successful and expeditious program implementation; the decisions
of the Department may in proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial Courts but
shall be immediately executory notwithstanding such appeal;
"SEC. 50 of RA6657. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested
with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department
of Agriculture [DA] and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR].
It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to
hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner,
employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with
justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform
rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every
action or proceeding before it.
Appeals from any "decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute
or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or
interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to
the Court of Appeals by Certiorari except as otherwise provided . . . within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy thereof," the "findings of fact of the DAR [being] final and
conclusive if based on substantial evidence."
The Regional Trial Courts have not, however, been completely divested of jurisdiction
over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other hand, confers
"special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional Trial Courts
designated by the Supreme Court at least one (1) branch within each province to
act as such. These Regional Trial Courts qua Special Agrarian Courts have, according
to Section 57 of the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over:
1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners," and
2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . [the] Act."
In these cases, "(t)he Rules of Court shall apply . . unless modified by . . . (the) Act."
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED, and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

2
G.R. No. 112526
October 12, 2001
STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, JUAN B. AMANTE ET AL, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter, SRRDC) was the
registered owner of two parcels of land, situated at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna,
with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are
watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang community, and that
ninety (90) light industries are now located in the area.
The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a notice of
coverage to petitioner and invited its officials or representatives to a conference. During
the meeting, the following were present: representatives of petitioner, the Land Bank of
the Philippines, PARCCOM, PARO of Laguna, MARO of Laguna, the BARC Chairman
of Barangay Casile and some potential farmer beneficiaries, who are residents of
Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna. It was the consensus and recommendation of the
assembly that the landholding of SRRDC be placed under compulsory acquisition.
Petitioner filed a protest before MARO on the ground that the area was not appropriate
for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above
and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as
beneficiaries. farmer beneficiaries together with the BARC chairman answered the
protest and objection stating that the slope of the land is not 18% but only 5-10% and
that the land is suitable and economically viable for agricultural purposes, as evidenced
by the Certification of the Department of Agriculture, municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of
acquisition to petitioner, stating that petitioner's landholdings covered by TCT Nos.
81949 and 84891, containing an area of 188.2858 and 58.5800 hectares, valued at
P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93, respectively, had been placed under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Petitioner SRRDC in two letters separately
addressed to Secretary Florencio B. Abad and the Director, Bureau of Land Acquisition
and Distribution, sent its formal protest, protesting not only the amount of compensation
offered by DAR for the property but also the two (2) notices of acquisition. Secretary
Abad referred the case to the DARAB for summary proceedings to determine just
compensation under R. A. No. 6657, Section 16.
DARAB promulgated a decision
(1) The dismissal for lack of merit of the protest against the compulsory coverage of the
landholdings of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation in Barangay Casile,
Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform; (2) The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation the amount of P7,841,997.64) for its landholdings covered by
the 2 Transfer Certificates of Title. Should there be a rejection of the payment tendered,
to open, if none has yet been made, a trust account for said amount in the name of Sta.
Rosa Realty Development Corporation; (3) The Register of Deeds of the Province of
Laguna to cancel with dispatch Transfer certificate of Title Nos. 84891 and 81949 and
new one be issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, free from liens and

encumbrances; and (4) Program is hereby affirmedThe Regional Office of the

Department of Agrarian Reform through its Municipal and Provincial Agrarian Reform
Office to take immediate possession on the said landholding after Title shall have been
transferred to the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and distribute the same to the
immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries as determined
by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of Cabuyao, Laguna.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the DARAB decision
and the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision affirming the decision of DARAB.
The case before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (hereafter DARAB) ordering the compulsory acquisition of
petitioner's property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
The Court issued a Resolution which reads: The Court therefore, resolved to restrain:
(a) the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board from enforcing its decision
dated December 19, 1991 in DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-LAG-0001, which was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals in a Decision dated November 5, 1993, and which ordered,
among others, the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform through its
Municipal and Provincial Reform Office to take immediate possession of the landholding
in dispute after title shall have been transferred to the name of the Republic of the
Philippines and to distribute the same through the immediate issuance of Emancipation
Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal Agrarian Officer of
Cabuyao, Laguna, (b) The Department of Agrarian Reform and/or the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, and all persons acting for and in their behalf and
under their authority from entering the properties involved in this case and from
introducing permanent infrastructures thereon; and (c) the private respondents from
further clearing the said properties of their green cover by the cutting or burning of trees
and other vegetation, effective today until further orders from this Court.
Issue:
The main issue raised is whether the property in question is covered by CARP despite
the fact that the entire property formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment
of R. A. No. 6657.
Ruling:
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P. D. No. 1067) provides:
"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying
any ground water may be declared by the Department of Natural resources as a
protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by such Department to
prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within the
protected area which may damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or
ground water or interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection, management or
administration of such waters."
Watersheds may be defined as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries and
enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds."
Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man, so why was the Casile
property titled in the name of SRRDC? The answer is simple. At the time of the titling,
the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources had not declared the property as
watershed area. The parcels of land in Barangay Casile were declared as "PARK" by a

Zoning Ordinance adopted by the municipality of Cabuyao in 1979, as certified by the

Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang Bayan
of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a Resolution voiding the zoning classification of the land at
Barangay Casile as Park and declaring that the land is now classified as agricultural
land.
However, more than the classification of the subject land as PARK is the fact that
subsequent studies and survey showed that the parcels of land in question form a vital
part of a watershed area.
However, the scenario has changed, after an in-depth study, survey and reassessment.
We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an area
that need to be protected for watershed purposes. In a report of the Ecosystems
Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding
the environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds, they
concluded that:
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support
system to thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it. From these
watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource water. x x x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed
management. More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities like road building
and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious agricultural activities of
the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would not be long before these
watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of watershed degredation threatens
the livelihood of thousands of people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an
acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy and program be immediately
formulated and implemented before the irreversible damage finally happens.
Hence, the following are recommended:
7.2 The Casile farmers should be relocated and given financial assistance.
7.3 Declaration of the two watersheds as critical and in need of immediate rehabilitation.
7.4 A comprehensive and detailed watershed management plan and program be
formulated and implemented by the Canlubang Estate in coordination with pertinent
government agencies."
Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the DARAB hearing,
petitioner presented proof that the Casile property has slopes of 18% and over, which
exempted the land from the coverage of CARL.
Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the disputed parcels
of land may be excluded from the compulsory acquisition coverage of CARP because of
its very high slopes.
In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question. However,
payment of just compensation was not in accordance with the procedural requirement.
The law required payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust account as was done by
DAR.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals.
In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and
determination of the nature of the parcels of land involved to resolve the issue of its
coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program.
In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to supposed farmer

beneficiaries shall continue to be stayed by the temporary restraining order issued on

December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until final decision on the case.
3
G.R. No. 154112
September 23, 2004
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, petitioner, vs. ROBERTO J. CUENCA and
Hon. ALFONSO B. COMBONG JR., in His Capacity as the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, La Carlota City, respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent Roberto J. Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 816-A and covered by TCT No. 1084, containing an area of
81.6117 hectares, situated in Brgy. Haguimit, La Carlota City and devoted principally to
the planting of sugar cane. (MARO) of La Carlota City issued and sent a NOTICE OF
COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca. Private respondent Cuenca filed with the
Regional Trial Court, La Carlota City, a complaint against MARO and Land Bank of the
Philippines for Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration of Unconstitutionality
of E.O. No. 405, Series of 1990, With Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order.
Private respondent contends that Executive Order No. 405 which amends, modifies
and/or repeals CARL and, therefore, it is unconstitutional considering that on 14 June
1990, then President Corazon Aquino no longer had law-making powers and that the
implementation of CARP in his landholding is no longer with authority of law considering
that, if at all, the implementation should have commenced and should have been
completed between June 1988 to June 1992.
MARO Noe Fortunado filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
court a quo has no jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the action, pursuant
to R.A. 6657 but respondent Judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing
MARO and LBP to cease and desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage.
MARO Fortunado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order granting the TRO
contending inter alia that the DAR, through the MARO, in the course of implementing
the Notice of Coverage under CARP cannot be enjoined through a Temporary
Restraining Order in the light of Sections 55 and 68 of R.A. 6657.
The respondent Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunados motion to dismiss and issued a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to
cease and desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage, and the LBP from
proceeding with the determination of the value of the subject land.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) [thereafter filed before the CA] a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The CA ruled in favor of private respondent stressing that the issue was not simply the
improper issuance of the Notice of Coverage, but was mainly the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 405, the CA ruled that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had
jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with that authority, the court a quo also had the
power to issue writs and processes to enforce or protect the rights of the parties.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over agrarian reform cases and matters.

Whether or not the RTC has the authority to issue writ of preliminary injunction against
the DAR in implementing the CARP.
Ruling:
Two Basic Rules
Two basic rules have guided this Court in determining jurisdiction in these cases. First,
jurisdiction is conferred by law.8 And second, the nature of the action and the issue of
jurisdiction are shaped by the material averments of the complaint and the character of
the relief sought.9 The defenses resorted to in the answer or motion to dismiss are
disregarded; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend entirely upon the
whim of the defendant.
The Court of Agrarian Relations were abolished, however, pursuant to Section 44 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (approved August 14, 1981), which had fully been
implemented on February 14, 1983. Jurisdiction over cases theretofore given to the
CARs was vested in the RTCs.
Then came Executive Order No. 229. Under Section 17 thereof, the DAR shall exercise
"quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the
Department of Agriculture [DA]." The DAR shall also have the "powers to punish for
contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders
or decisions."
The intention evidently was to transfer original jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian
Reform, a proposition stressed by the rules formulated and promulgated by the
Department for the implementation of the executive orders just quoted. The rules
included the creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board designed to exercise
the adjudicatory functions of the Department, and the allocation to it of
x x x [O]riginal and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter vested upon it by law,
and all cases, disputes, controversies and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Executive Order
No. 229, Executive Order No. 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic
Act No. 6289, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations.
A careful perusal of respondents Complaint shows that the principal averments and
reliefs prayed for refer -- not to the "pure question of law" spawned by the alleged
unconstitutionality of EO 405 -- but to the annulment of the DARs Notice of Coverage.
Clearly, the main thrust of the allegations is the propriety of the Notice of Coverage.
We stress that the main subject matter raised by private respondent before the trial
court was not the issue of compensation (the subject matter of EO 405). Note that no
amount had yet been determined nor proposed by the DAR. Hence, there was no
occasion to invoke the courts function of determining just compensation.
To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of Coverage constitutes the first necessary step
towards the acquisition of private land under the CARP. Plainly then, the propriety of the
Notice relates to the implementation of the CARP, which is under the quasi-judicial
jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR could not be ousted from its authority by the

simple expediency of appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an

issue that is clearly agrarian.
In view of the foregoing, there is no need to address the other points pleaded by
respondent in relation to the jurisdictional issue. We need only to point that in case of
doubt, the jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a controversy
involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies,
"even if the question[s] involved [are] also judicial in character," as in this case.
Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, it follows that
the RTC of La Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to issue the assailed
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be stricken down as a nullity.
Such nullity is particularly true in the light of the express prohibitory provisions of the
CARP and this Courts Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002. These
Circulars enjoin all trial judges to strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657, which reads:
"Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. No
injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower
courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture
(DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED.
4
[G.R. No. 132767. January 18, 2000]
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DEPT. OF AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, DAVAO CITY and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao. The
lands were taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution to landless
farmers pursuant to R.A. No. 6657. Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by
respondents Land Bank of the Philippines and the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), petitioner filed a petition for a determination of the just
compensation for its property. The petition was filed on January 26, 1994 with the
Regional Trial Court which dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond
the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB. Section
51 of Republic Act No. 6657 provides: Section 51. Finality of Determination. - Any case
or controversy before it (DAR) shall be decided within thirty (30) days after it is
submitted for resolution. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Any
order, ruling or decision shall be final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy thereof.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed rationalizing
Issue:
SHOULD A PETITION FOR THE JUDICIAL FIXING OF JUST COMPENSATION
BEFORE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT BE [FILED] WITHIN THE PERIOD PROVIDED
IN RULE XIII, SECTION 11 OF THE DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE AND BEFORE

THE DECISION OF THE DAR PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR BECOMES FINAL AND

EXECUTORY?
Ruling:
Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day
period provided in Rule XIII, 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court
correctly dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of
dismissal.
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive"
because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are
not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter, the law may
provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to
the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the
legality of administrative action.
To implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6657, particularly 50 thereof, Rule XIII, 11 of
the DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:
Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and
payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought
directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one
motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
5
G.R. No. 169008 August 14, 2007
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ,
Respondent.
Facts:
After compulsory acquisition by the DAR, on November 16, 1993, of respondent
Martinezs 62.5369-hectare land in Barangay Agpudlos, San Andres, Romblon,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, petitioner LBP offered P1,955,485.60 as just
compensation. Convinced that the proffered amount was unjust and confiscatory,
respondent rejected it. Thus, the DARAB, through its Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for the
preliminary determination of just compensation in accordance with Section 16 (d) of the
CARL.
PARAD Virgilio M. Sorita, finding some marked inconsistencies in the figures and
factors made as bases by LBP in its computation, rendered judgment ordering the
payment amounting to Php12,179,492.50.
LBPs counsel filed a petition for the fixing of just compensation before the Special
Agrarian Court (SAC), the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon while respondent
moved to dismiss the case contending that the orders, rulings and decisions of the
DARAB become final after the lapse of 15 days from their receipt.
Meanwhile, respondent, still asserting the finality of PARAD Soritas decision, filed
before the Office of the PARAD a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, which
was eventually granted. LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but denied by the

PARAD resolution. LBP, now, moved to quash the said PARAD resolution.
LBP, even as the motion to quash was yet unresolved, instituted a petition for certiorari
before the CA assailing the issuance of a writ of execution which, however, was
dismissed finding LBP guilty of forum-shopping for not disclosing the pendency of the
Motion to Quash.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the PARAD, in this case, gravely abused its discretion when it issued a
writ of execution despite the pendency of LBPs petition for fixing of just compensation
with the SAC.
Ruling:
We find petitioner not entitled to the grant of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court
because the Office of the PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook
to execute the September 4, 2002 decision. Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules
of Procedure, which was then applicable, provides that:
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just
Compensation. - The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary
determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board
but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian
Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be
entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.
In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and in Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, we explained the consequence of the said rule to the
effect that the adjudicators decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of
the 15-day period. Considering therefore that, in this case, LBPs petition with the SAC
for the fixing of just compensation was filed 26 days after its receipt of the PARADs
decision, or eleven days beyond the reglementary period, the latter had already attained
finality. The PARAD could very well issue the writ of execution.
In this case, petitioner moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at the same time
petitioned for their annulment via certiorari under Rule 65. In both proceedings, the
parties are identical and the reliefs prayed for are the same. In the two actions,
petitioner also has a singular stance: the PARAD resolutions should not be executed in
view of the pendency of the petition for fixing of just compensation with the SAC. Thus a
situation is created where the two fora could come up with conflicting decisions. This is
precisely the evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum-shopping.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED.
6
G.R. No. 175175 September 29, 2008
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF ELEUTERIO CRUZ,
Respondents.
Facts:
Respondent Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz are Anicia Cruz-Papa, Resurreccion CruzPagcaliwagan, Antonio D. Cruz, Lourdes Cruz-Doma, Lorna Cruz-Felipe, Mamerto D.

Cruz, Eduardo D. Cruz and Victoria Cruz-Dumlao. Eleuterio Cruz is the registered
owner of an unirrigated riceland situated in Lakambini, Tuao, Cagayan per Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-368. Of the total 13.7320 hectares of respondents landholding,
an area of 13.5550 hectares was placed by the government under the coverage of the
operation land transfer program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. Petitioner
pegged the value of the acquired landholding at P106,935.76 based on the guidelines
set forth under P.D. No. 27 and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228.
Respondents rejected petitioners valuation and instituted an action for a summary
proceeding for the preliminary determination of just compensation before the PARAD
which rendered a decision fixing the just compensation in the amount of P80,000.00 per
hectare.
Petitioner filed a petition for the determination of just compensation before the RTC of
Tuguegarao City which affirmed the decision of the PARAD. Petitioner appealed to CA
but still affirmed the SAC decision fixing just compensation at P80,000.00 per hectare.
Hence, the instant petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, arguing that the formula set forth in P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 should be
applied in fixing just compensation since respondents landholding was acquired under
P.D. No. 27. Citing Section 2 of E.O. No. 228 and LBP v. Hon. David C. Naval,
petitioner posits that the correct formula in determining the just compensation should be
Land Value = (2.5 x AGP x P35) x A, where AGP is the Average Gross Production per
hectare; P35.00 is the Government Support Price for palay in 1972; and A is the total
land area.
Issue:
Whether or not the values in E.O. No. 228 are applicable to lands acquired under P.D.
No. 27 in cognizance of the well-settled rule that just compensation is the value of the
property at the time of the taking on 21 October 1972, when the ownership of the
subject property was transferred from the landowner to the farmers-beneficiaries and
when the former was effectively deprived of dominion and possession over said land.
Ruling:
There the Court explained that while under P.D. No. 27 tenant farmers are already
deemed owners of the land they till, they are still required to pay the cost of the land
before the title is transferred to them and that pending the payment of just
compensation, actual title to the tenanted land remains with the landowner.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, the Court explained why the guidelines
under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 are no longer applicable to the delayed payment of
lands acquired under P.D. No. 27, to wit: It would certainly be inequitable to determine
just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD No. 27 and EO 228
considering the DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable
length
of
time. That
just
compensation
should
be
determined
in
accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative
considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and
ample.
The decisive backdrop of the instant case coincides with that in Paris, that is, the
amount of just compensation due to respondents had not yet been settled by the time
R.A. No. 6657 became effective. Following the aforementioned pronouncement in Paris,

the fixing of just compensation should therefore be based on the parameters set out in
R.A. No. 6657, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 having only suppletory effect.
A perusal of the PARADs Decision dated 23 November 1999, which mandated
payment of just compensation in the amount of P80,000.00 per hectare, reveals that the
PARAD did not adhere to the formula prescribed in any of the regulations issued by the
DAR and The PARAD decision also did not refer to any evidence in support of its
finding. The SAC, meanwhile, referred to DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, as amended,
as the controlling guideline in fixing just compensation. However, stating that no
evidence was presented by respondents on the aforementioned parameters, the SAC
ruled that it was constrained to adopt the finding of the PARAD, which fixed the value of
the land at P80,000.00 per hectare. On appeal, the CA adopted the same finding.
The general rule is that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
CA, are binding and conclusive on the Court. However, the rule admits of exceptions, as
when the factual findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures
or when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based.
A perusal of the PARAD decision, which was adopted by both the SAC and the CA,
shows that its valuation of P80,000.00 per hectare is sorely lacking in any evidentiary or
legal basis.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, the Court ruled that the factors enumerated
under Section 17, R.A. No. 6657 had already been translated into a basic formula by
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to its rule-making power under
Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. Thus, the Court held in Celada that the formula outlined in
DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998 should be applied in computing just compensation.
WHEREFORE, Agrarian Case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
7
G.R. No. 164876
January 23, 2006
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. LEONILA P. CELADA,
Respondent.
Facts:
Respondent Leonila P. Celada owns 22.3167 hectares of agricultural land situated in
Calatrava, Carmen, Bohol, of which 14.1939 hectares was identified in 1998 by the
DAR as suitable for compulsory acquisition under CARP. The matter was then indorsed
to petitioner LBP for field investigation and land valuation. LBP valued respondents
land at P2.1105517 per square meter for an aggregate value of P299,569.61 but it was
rejected. Nonetheless, LBP deposited the said sum in cash and bonds in the name of
respondent.
Pursuant to Section 16(d) of RA No. 6657, the matter was referred to the DARAB,
Region VII-Cebu City, for summary administrative hearing on determination of just
compensation.
While the DARAB case was pending, respondent filed, a petition for judicial
determination of just compensation against LBP, the DAR and the MARO of Carmen,
Bohol, before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City contending that the current
market value of her land is at least P150,000.00 per hectare based on: (1) the land in

question has been mortgaged to the defunct Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bohol), Inc., for
P1,220,000.00 on July 23, 1998 since it was appraised at P15.00 per square meter; and
(2) Agricultural lands in said barangay are priced ranging from P140,000.00 to
P150,000.00 per hectare and current land transactions reveal said price range.
LBP filed its Answer7 raising non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The RTC rendered decision denying the Affirmative Defense of Land Bank and fixes the
compensation of the land of petitioner at P2.50 per square meter or a total of
P354,847.50.
LBP elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which, however, dismissed the appeal
outright based on: (a) lack of affidavit of service; (b) failure of counsel to indicate his Roll
of Attorneys number; and (c) failure to attach material portions of the records.
The lack of affidavit of service is not deemed fatal where the petition filed below is
accompanied by the original registry receipts showing that the petition and its annexes
were served upon the parties.16 On the other hand, the failure of counsel to indicate his
Roll of Attorneys number would not affect respondents substantive rights, such that
petitioners counsel could have been directed to comply with the latter requirement
rather than dismiss the petition on purely technical grounds. As for petitioners failure to
attach material portions of the records, the appellate court a certain leeway to require
parties to submit additional documents as may be necessary in the interest of
substantial justice. While a remand of the case to the appellate court would seem to be
in order, we deem it proper to resolve the case on the merits if only to write finis to the
present controversy.
LBP filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION FOR
DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION WHILE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS IS ON-GOING BEFORE THE DARAB, REGION VII, CEBU CITY.
THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN FIXING THE JUST COMPENSATION OF THE LAND
BASED NOT ON ITS ACTUAL LAND USE BUT ON THE VALUATION OF
NEIGHBORING LANDS.
Ruling:
We do not agree with petitioners submission that the SAC erred in assuming
jurisdiction over respondents petition for determination of just compensation despite the
pendency of the administrative proceedings before the DARAB. In Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for determination of just
compensation without waiting for the completion of the DARABs re-evaluation of the
land. The Court nonetheless held therein that the SAC acquired jurisdiction over the
action for the following reason:
It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners. This original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if
the DAR would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases
and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decision. Thus,
although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the
RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and

exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such
jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into
appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus,
direct resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid.
It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an
exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or
determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a
judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies.24
Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of respondents petition for
determination of just compensation.
In the same vein, there is no merit to petitioners contention that respondent failed to
exhaust administrative remedies when she directly filed the petition for determination of
just compensation with the SAC even before the DARAB case could be resolved. The
issue is now moot considering that the valuation made by petitioner had long been
affirmed by the DARAB in its order dated April 12, 2000. As held in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Wycoco, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
inapplicable when the issue is rendered moot and academic, as in the instant case.
We agree with petitioner that the SAC erred in setting aside petitioners valuation of
respondents land on the sole basis of the higher valuation given for neighboring
properties.
The SAC based its valuation solely on the observation that there was a "patent
disparity" between the price given to respondent and the other landowners. We note
that it did not apply the DAR valuation formula since according to the SAC, it is Section
17 of RA No. 6657 that "should be the principal basis of computation as it is the law
governing the matter".
The SAC was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to implement the
said provision.
It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret
the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to
great respect.32 Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute33 and have
in their favor a presumption of legality.34 As such, courts cannot ignore administrative
issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an
administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same.
Under the circumstances, we find the explanation and computation of petitioner to be
sufficient and in accordance with applicable laws. Petitioners valuation must thus be
upheld.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
8

G.R. No. 128557 December 29, 1999

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and JOSE PASCUAL, respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent Jose Pascual owned three (3) parcels of land located in

Guttaran, Cagayan: Parcel 1 contains an area of 149,852 square meters as

surveyed by the DAR but the actual land area transferred is estimated at
102,229 square meters and classified as unirrigated lowland rice; Parcel 2
contains an area of 123,043 square meters as surveyed by the DAR but
the actual land area transferred is estimated at 85,381 square meters and
classified as cornland; and, Parcel 3 contains an area of 192,590 square
meters but the actual land area transferred is estimated at 161,338 square
meters and classified as irrigated lowland rice. Pursuant to the Land
Reform Program of the Government under PD 27 and EO 228, DAR placed
these lands under its Operation Land Transfer (OLT).
Under EO 228, the formula for computing the Land Value (LV) or Price Per
Hectare (PPH) of rice and corn lands is 2.5 x AGP x GSP = LV or PPH.
In compliance with EO 228, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO)
of the DAR in an "Accomplished OLT Valuation Form No. 1" dated 2
December 1989 recommended that the "Average Gross Productivity"
(AGP) based on "[3] Normal Crop Year" for Parcels 1 and 2 should be 25
cavans per hectare for unirrigated lowland rice and 10 cavans per hectare
for corn land.
Private respondent Jose Pascual, opposing the recommended AGP of the
PARO, filed a petition for the annulment of the recommendation on the
productivity and valuation of the land covered by OLT, with the DARAB.
Oscar Dimacali, Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of
Cagayan heard the case and despite due notice however Francisco Baculi,
the PARO who issued the assailed recommendation, failed to appear at the
trial. Only private respondent Jose Pascual and Atty. Eduard Javier of
petitioner LBP were present. Thereafter private respondent was allowed to
present evidence ex-parte.
The PARAD ruled in favor of private respondent nullifying the 2 December
1989 AGP recommended by the PARO. Instead, the PARAD applied the
22 June 1976 AGP and the AGP stated in private respondent's Tax
Declarations to determine the correct compensation. The PARAD also
used the "Government Support Price" (GSP) of P300 for each cavan of
palay and P250 for each cavan of corn. 11 He then ordered petitioner LBP
to pay private respondent P613,200.00 for Parcel 1, P148,750.00 for Parcel
2, and P1,200,000.00 for Parcel 3, or a total amount of P1,961,950.00.
However, when the judgment became final and executory, petitioner LBP
as the financing arm in the operation of PD 27 and EO 228 refused to pay
thus forcing private respondent to apply for a Writ of Execution with the
PARAD which the latter issued but still, petitioner LBP declined to comply
with the order.

Despite the directive of the Secretary of the DAR and the various demand
letters of private respondent Jose Pascual, the latter finally filed an action
for Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to compel petitioner to pay the
valuation determined by the PARAD. On 15 July 1996 the appellate court
granted the Writ.
Petitioner LBP filed this petition and avers that the Court of Appeals erred
in issuing the Writ of Mandamus in favor of private respondent and argues
that it cannot enforce PARAD's valuation since it cannot make such
determination for want of jurisdiction hence void. Section 12, par. (b), of PD
946 provides that the valuation of lands covered by PD 27 is under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Petitioner LBP
also contends that the Court of Appeals cannot issue the Writ of
Mandamus because it cannot be compelled to perform an act which is
beyond its legal duty and rationalizing that for a financing or guarantee
agreement to exist there must be at least three (3) parties: the creditor, the
debtor and the financier or the guarantor. Since petitioner merely
guarantees or finances the payment of the value of the land, the farmerbeneficiary's consent, being the principal debtor, is indispensable and that
the only time petitioner becomes legally bound to finance the transaction is
when the farmer-beneficiary approves the appraised land value.
Issue:
Whether or not the consent of the farmer-beneficiary is needed in
establishing the determination of just compensation.
Whether or not the Land Bank can be compelled by writ of mandamus.
Ruling:
A perusal of the law however shows that the consent of the farmerbeneficiary is not required in establishing the vinculum juris for the proper
compensation of the landowner. Section 18 of RA 6657 states
Sec. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP shall
compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the
landowner and the DAR and the LBP in accordance with the criteria
provided for in Sections 16 and 17 and other pertinent provisions hereof, or
as may be finally determined by the court as the just compensation for the
land (emphasis supplied).
As may be gleaned from the aforementioned section, the landowner, the
DAR and the Land Bank are the only parties involved. The law does not
mention the participation of the farmer-beneficiary. However, petitioner
insists that Sec. 18 of RA 6657 does not apply in this case as it involves
lands covered by PD 27.

We cannot see why Sec. 18 of RA 6657 should not apply to rice and corn
lands under PD 27. Section 75 of RA 6657 clearly states that the provisions
of PD 27 and EO 228 shall only have a suppletory effect.
Having established that under Sec. 18 of RA 6657 the consent of the
farmer-beneficiary is unnecessary in the appraisal of land value, it must
now be determined if petitioner had agreed to the amount of compensation
declared by the PARAD. If it did, then we can now apply the doctrine in
Sharp International Marketing v. Court of Appeals. 39 In that case, the Land
Bank refused to comply with the Writ of Mandamus issued by the Court of
Appeals on the ground that it was not obliged to follow the order of
Secretary of Agrarian Reform to pay the landowner. This Court concurred
with the Land Bank saying that the latter could not be compelled to obey
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform since the bank did not merely exercise a
ministerial function. Instead, it had an independent discretionary role in land
valuation and that the only time a writ of mandamus could be issued
against the Land Bank was when it agreed to the amount of compensation
determined by the DAR.
Although the case at bar pertains to an involuntary sale of land, the same
principle should apply. Once the Land Bank agrees with the appraisal of
the DAR, which bears the approval of the landowner, it becomes its legal
duty to finance the transaction. In the instant case, petitioner participated in
the valuation proceedings held in the office of the PARAD through its
counsel, Atty. Eduard Javier. It did not appeal the decision of PARAD which
became final and executory. As a matter of fact, petitioner even stated in its
Petition that "it is willing to pay the value determined by the PARAD
PROVIDED that the farmer beneficiaries concur thereto." These facts
sufficiently prove that petitioner LBP agreed with the valuation of the land.
The only thing that hindered it from paying the amount was the nonconcurrence of the farmer-beneficiary. But as we have already stated, there
is no need for such concurrence. Without such obstacle, petitioner can now
be compelled to perform its legal duty through the issuance of a writ of
mandamus.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals granting the
Writ of Mandamus directing petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines to pay
private respondent Jose Pascual the total amount of P1,961,950.00 stated
in the Decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of
Cagayan is AFFIRMED.