G.R. No.

170338 December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC
INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
FACTS:
During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises. During the 2007 election the conversation of President
Arroyo and the herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional director, regarding the desire of the president to have a
favorable outcome in terms of his senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and was played during the house of
representative investigation. Because of such turn of events, a petition was filed before the court praying that such playing of the
illegally seized communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping law. Also such petition for injunction prays
that the Senate committee be prevented from further conducting such investigation for the basic reason that there was no proper
publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make such investigation of the unlawfully seized documents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate to further proceed with their investigation?
HELD:
No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The
requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.Publication is indeed imperative,
for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public
at the Senates internet web page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or
its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does
not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to
publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000,
to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data
message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other
words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by
the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure."
Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed for the reason that the rules that they will
observe was not properly published as provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if allowed without observance
of the required publication will put a persons life, liberty and property at stake without due process of law. Also, the further
assertion of the senate that they already published such rules through their web page, in observance of the RA 8792 or the
Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by the court as matter of evidence and still does not conform with what the
constitution propounded.
In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing the senate to conduct such inquiry in aid of legislation.

FLORES V DRILON, G.R. No. 104732, June 22,1993

FACTS:
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of the
SBMA provided that for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the
chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts.
(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted
circumstance.
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B)
would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another post.
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which he may have received
pursuant to his appointment.
HELD:
(1)YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in
any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs
the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of
SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work
for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constituents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor without need
of appointment. The phrase shall be appointed unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not
merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example, an elective
official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically
authorized by law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no choice
but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an
exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it
cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the
discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be
viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be
the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and
no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his
incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he
may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA;
hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official
are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to
such benefits.

MARCOS VS. COMELEC

FACTS:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte, stating that she is 7-months resident in the said district. Montejo, incumbent Representative and a candidate for the same
position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that Imelda did not meet the constitutional one-year
residency requirement. Imelda thus amended her COC, changing seven months to since childhood. The provincial election
supervisor refused to admit the amended COC for the reason that it was filed out of time. Imelda, thus, filed her amended COC
with COMELECS head office in Manila.
On April 24, 1995, the COMELEC Second Division declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck off the amended as well as
original COCs. The COMELEC in division found that when Imelda chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with
her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed
to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile. The COMELEC en
banc affirmed this ruling.
During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election. But the COMELEC suspended her proclamation.
Imelda thus appealed to the Supreme Court.
Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy must be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before the election. Since the COMELEC
rendered the resolution on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election, COMELEC already lose jurisdiction over her
case. She contended that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over
the election of members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE:
1.Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9,
1995 elections?
2.Does the COMELEC lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the elections?
3.Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of Imelda's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections?
HELD:
1.Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary residence
qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives for the following reasons:
a.Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in
spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This
domicile was established when her father brought his family back to Leyte.
b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with
evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change
of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. Petitioner
held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an
intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile. What petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concernedaffecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual
residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner
married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium.

d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to
choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only
impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice"
was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to
"rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte ... to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a
home in our homeland." Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her
brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.
2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the COMELEC
does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence
of his guilt is strong.
Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be
merely directory, "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had
intended such result it would have clearly indicated it.
3. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of
Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Imelda, not being a member of the
House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Romualdez-Marcos vs
Comelec, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995)
Sergio Osmea, Jr. v. Salipada Pendatun
FACTS:
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr. delivered a speech entitled A Message to Garcia. In the said speech, he
disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower
house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmea during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless
and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmea then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmea avers that the resolution violates
his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he
averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated
HELD:
No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the legislature which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the
Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and
conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.

Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada
with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such
visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement
of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate
and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) unconstitutional?
HELD:
The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and
sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are
sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by
congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate
through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution the provision in 25, Article XVIII] requiring
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
The Court is of firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges
the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to
the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is
the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have
in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an
agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty. The records reveal that the United States
Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to
living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and
binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the
Constitution.

G.R. No. 169777* April 20, 2006, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his
capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N.
PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader,
SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA,
LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON,
ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS,Petitioners, vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and
anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines,Respondents.
FACTS:
These consolidated cases are petitions for certiorari stating that the President has abused her power by issuing Executive Order
No. 464 dated September 28, 2005. Petitioners herein pray that such order be declared as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines through its various Committees conducts inquiries and
investigations in aid of legislation which call for attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and
offices including those employed in the Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 - 23, 2005 the Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery Group. Such railway project is called the North Railway Project.
The Senate issued invitations on several AFP officials for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on
Sept. 28, 2005 for the privilege speech of the following senators: Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., Sen. Jinggoy Estrada, Sen. Rodolfo
Biazon, Sen. Jamby Madrigal, Sen. Biazon. Also invited to the hearing was the AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso Senga who
by letter dated September 28, 2005 requested for its postponement due to a pressing operational situation that demands his utmost
attention.
On September 28, 2005 Senate Franklin Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita a letter respectfully
requesting for the postponement of the hearing to which various executive officials have been invited in order for said officials to
study and prepare for various issues so they can better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.
Senate Pres. Drilon however was unable to grant such request because it was sent belatedly and all preparations are complete
within that week. He also received a letter from North Rail project President Jose L. Cortes Jr. requesting that the hearing of the
North Rail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of UP Law Center on contract agreements related to the
project had been secured.
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued Executive Order # 464 entitled Ensuring Observance of Principle of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation under the Constitution and for other Purposes", which states that all heads of the executive branch shall
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of the Congress; public officials may not divulge
confidential classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to
prejudice the public interest and that executive matters shall only be conducted in executive session.
On September 28, Sen. Pres. Franklin Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita a copy of E.O. 464 and that
executive officials invited were not able to attend because they failed to secure the required consent from the President. On
October 3, 2005, three petitions docketed as G.R. No. 169659 (Bayan Muna vs. Eduardo Ermita), 169660 (Francisco Chavez vs.
Eduardo Ermita) and 169667 (Alternative Law Groups vs. Eduardo Ermita) were filed before the court also challenging the
constitutionality of E.O. 464.
In G.R. No. 169659 Bayan Muna v. Eduardo Ermita, partylist Bayan Muna and HR members Satur Ocampo, Crispin Beltran,
Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador and Teodoro Casino, COURAGE = organization of Govt employees and CODAL
(Counsels for Defense of Liberties) pray that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional and that Executive Sec. Eduardo Ermita be
prohibited from imposing sanctions on officials who appear before Congress due to congressional summons. They also contend
that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and impedes them to fulfill their respective obligations.
In G.R. No. 169660 Francisco Chavez vs. Eduardo Ermita, Francisco Chavez claims that his constitutional rights as a citizen and
taxpayer and law practitioner are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464 thus he prays that such order be declared null and
unconstitutional. In G.R. No. 169667 Alternative Law Groups vs. Eduardo Ermita, ALG claims that the group has legal standing
to institute the petition to enforce its constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. On October 11, 2005,
Senate of the Philippines alleging that it has a vital interest in the resolution of the issue of validity in E.O. 464, claims that it
prohibits the valid exercise of the Senates powers and functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern.
On October 14, 2005, PDP- Laban a registered political party w/ members elected in the Congress filed a similar petition.

ISSUE/S:
* Whether E.O. 464 violates the following provisions of the Constitution: Art. II Sec. 28, Art. III Sec. 4, Art. III Sec. 7, Art. VI
Sec. I, Art. VI, Sec. 21, Art. VI Sec. 22, Article XI sec. 1 and Art. XIII sec. 16.
* Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress.
HELD:
E.O. 464 to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress, deprives the Congress of the
information in the possession of these officials. The power of inquiry, a power vested in the Congress, is expressly recognized in
Sec. 21 of Article VI because, according to the Court, a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation intended to affect or change; thus, making it an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. However, even when the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized
exemptions to the power of inquiry which exemptions fall under the rubric of executive privilege. The executive privilege,
whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public; is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a
sensitive character. Executive privilege per se is not meant to cover up embarrassing information. It is a relative concept, the
validity of its assertion to a great extent depends upon the political situation of the country.
Aquino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati
City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP
of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than
1 year immediately preceding the elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of
the Constitution
HELD:
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that
he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.
Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time,
his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as
the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time
of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying
one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of
permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile.
Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by
the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond
with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009 WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA
TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO,
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
FACTS:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance
Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila (the Ordinance). The ordinance sanctions any
person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms
more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit
attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The
respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously
guarded by the Constitution. Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the
incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit
relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, When
elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of
the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist
guides and transports. Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all
ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of
the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for
the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement;
it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. CA, in turn, reversed
the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to
privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for
short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained
through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a
lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by
the well-being of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
HELD:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs through those
decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three
ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging
establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the
services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which
the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit
but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a
room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units
by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police
power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police
power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must
align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury
to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the
constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the
lodging establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as
guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen,
but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to
such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling
state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it
is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life
of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative
business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private
rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can
work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying
existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work
would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing
prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate
merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any
hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their
clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the
lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the
rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the
petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates
and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
No pronouncement as to costs.

GR Nos. 132875-76, February 3, 2000

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee vs. Romeo G. Jalosjos, accused-appellant
FACTS:
Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction
for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. Jalosjos, filed a motion asking that he
be allowed to fully discharge his duties of a Congressman including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having convicted in the first instance including of a non-bailable offense.
Jalosjos argument is the mandate of sovereign will which he states that he was re-elected as Congressman of Firs District of
Zamboanga del Norte by his constituents in order that their voices will be heard and since the accused-appellant is treated as bona
fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos, be allowed to discharge his mandate as member of the House of
Representatives.
HELD:
No. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators or members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the
Constitution and shows that this privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
It is true, that election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, the rights and privileges from being
elected as public official may be restricted by law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position,
the higher the rank the greater the requirement of obedience rather that exemption.
The accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11
Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the
abuse is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman with a crime punishable imprisonment by more than six (6) months
is not merely authorized by law, has constitutional foundations. Allowing Jalosjos to attend in Congressional sessions and
meetings for five (5) days in a week which will make him a free man with all the privileges and would make his status to that of a
special class, it also would be a making of the purpose of the correction system.

Petitioner: Miriam Defensor Santiago vs Respondents: Sandiganbayan: Francis E. Garchitorena (Presiding Justice, First
Division) Jose S. Balajadia (Member, First Division) Minita V. Chico-Nazario (Member, First Division)
FACTS:
The case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID)
against the petitioner, who was then the CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. It was accused that the petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her
official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization for the stay of
several aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988.
On January 25, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved a ninety (90) day preventive suspension of the petitioner, already a Senator of
the Republic of the Philippines, and from any other government position she may be holding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of
the Philippines.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public
official charged with violation of the provision of RA No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. It would appear,
indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information
filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of
suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be no ifs and buts about it. Explaining the nature of the preventive
suspension, the Supreme Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:
x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. In issuing the
preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as
the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public
officials and employees indicted before it.
Ruling (Continued):
Section 13 of RA No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is
alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would
indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused.
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension. The Supreme Court also
held that the order of suspension prescribed by RA No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks
under the Constitution which provides that eachx x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence
of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty
days.
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in
its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., the Court affirmed the order of suspension of
Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of
Congress. The Court ruled:
"x x x . Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the power of each House of
Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all
its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days is
unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA No. 3019, which is not a penalty
but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior
as a Member of the House of Representatives." RA No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and
that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013, ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
FACTS:
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections
for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD:
No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme
Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some
principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not
need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political
constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors
that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented must
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties
or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack welldefined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the party-list
elections. But, since theres really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined
political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the
party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties
into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice
Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying
the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)

III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the marginalized and
underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It is
also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike major political parties, to field or
sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list
system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other causeoriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its
provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies as they are ideologically
marginalized.

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and commanding general of the Japanese forces
during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other
atrocities committed against military and civilians. The military commission was establish under Executive Order 68.
2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military commission did not have the
jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)
3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US prosecutors cannot practice law in the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid
HELD:
1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by the President and was in
accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance
with generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other
international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan,
preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a
signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted
principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)
2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest because its country and people have
greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being charged of.
3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and representation are not
governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law.

Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 scra 767

FACTS:
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG),
filed a complaint with Sandiganbayan against the petitioners of this case. PCGG allege, among others, that: defendants
(petitioners therein) Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and Juliette. Gomez Romualdez, alleged cronies of former President Marcos
and First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos, engaged in schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of
the Filipino people. On 13 September 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over
of SolOil Incorporated by Ricardo Lopa (who died during the pendency of this case) and called upon the senate to look into
possible violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or RA 3019. The Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers or Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC) started its investigation through a hearing on 23 May 1989, but Lopa and Bengzon
declined to testify. The SBRC rejected petitioner Bengzon s plea and voted to pursue its investigation. Petitioner claims that the
SBRC, in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the SBRCs inquiry has a valid legislative purpose.
HELD:
NO. The speech of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look
into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA 3019. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent SBRC was to find out
WON the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the
36/39 corporations of Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Thus, the
Supreme Court ruled to restrain the SBRC in their investigation since the petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a
case before the Sandiganbayan, which involoves issues intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry before the
respondent Committee, and that no legislation was apparently being contemplated in connection with the said investigation.

CD Philconsa v. Enriquez
FACTS:
On 17 December 1993, Congress passed and approved General Appropriation Bill of 1994. As passed, it imposed conditions and
limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. On 30 December
1993, President signed the bill into law. On the same day, President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the
provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions. Petitioner Philippine Constitution Association claim
that the President cannot veto the Special Provision on the appropriation for debt service without vetoing the entire amount of
P86, 323, 438.00.
ISSUE:
Has the President the power to veto provisions of an Appropriations Bill?
HELD:
Yes, if the provision is considered inappropriate. The veto power, while exercised by the President, is a part of the legislative
process; hence, it is found in Article 6, not in Article 7. Thus, there is sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a
veto. Under Art. 6, Sec. 27 [1], the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts of it. But an exception to this is the power
given to the President to veto any particular item or items in a general appropriations bill, under Art. 6, Sec. 27 [2]. Now, a
provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not
relate to the entire bill. And any provision that does not relate to any particular item and extends its operation beyond an item of
appropriation is considered an inappropriate provision. An inappropriate provision, in turn, can be vetoed separately as an item.

League of Cities v. COMELEC

Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing the
constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent
municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
FACTS:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not
act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA
9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which
sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and
forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in
February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws)
on various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality
approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share
the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
ISSUES:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
HELD:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive
application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government
Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the
national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a
municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an
intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law
passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption
would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Emmanuel Pelaez vs Auditor General
FACTS:
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this was purportedly pursuant to
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may change the seat of government
within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from
disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that
Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new
law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created by the President.
Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that
through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD:
No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed,
without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of
every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require which would mean that the
President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed
for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is the text which
immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is the President may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require. Only the seat of government may be changed by the
President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in character not
administrative (not executive).