ARMANDO BARCELLANO VS DOLORES BANAS

Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room
for interpretation
PONENTE: PEREZ
FACTS:
Respondent Dolores Bans, an heir of Bartolome Bans owned a lot in
Bacacay, Albay. Adjoining the said lot is a property owned by Vicente
Medina. In 1997, Medina offered his lot for sale to the owners of the
adjoining lots. The property was eventually sold to Armando Barcellano. The
heirs of Bans contested the sale, and conveyed their intention to redeem
the property. However, according to Medina, the deed of sale has been
executed. There was also mention that the Bans heirs failed to give the
amount required by medina for them to redeem the lot. Action to redeem the
property was filed before the RTC. It denied the petition on the ground that
the Bans heirs failed to exercise their right to redemption within the period
provided in article 1623 of NCC. On appeal, such ruling was reversed.
ISSUE:
W/N the RTC decision to deny the Bans heirs of their right of legal
redemption is valid
HELD:
The court denied the petition, and affirmed the appellate court decision
granting the Bans heirs the right to redeem the subject property. The
decision was based on the provisions of article 1623 NCC. A written notice
must be issued by the prospective vendor. Nothing in the record and
pleadings submitted by the parties showed that there was a written notice
sent to the respondents. Without a written notice, the period of 30 days
within which the right of legal redemption may be exercised does not exist.
In this case, the law was clear. A written notice by the vendor is mandatory.
G.R. No. 152259, July 29, 2004ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,vs.THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLEof the
PHILIPPINES, respondents.FACTS:
The People of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commissionon
Good Government (PCGG), filed on July 12, 1989 an information before
theanti-graft court charging the accused with violation of Section 5, Republic
ActNo. 3019,5 as amended. That on or about and during the period from
July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, inMetro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,Alfredo T. Romualdez, brother-in-law of
Ferdinand E. Marcos, former Presidentof the Philippines, and therefore,
related to the latter by affinity within thethird civil degree, did then and there
willfully and unlawfully, and with evidentbad faith, for the purpose of
promoting his self-interested and/or that of others, intervene directly or
indirectly, in a contract between the NationalShipyard and Steel Corporation
(NASSCO), a government-owned andcontrolled corporation and the Bataan
Shipyard and Engineering Company(BASECO), a private corporation, the
majority stocks of which is owned byformer President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
whereby the NASSCO sold, transferredand conveyed to the BASECO its
ownership and all its titles and interests overall equipment and facilities
including structures, buildings, shops, quarters,houses, plants and
expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at theEngineer Island known
as the Engineer Island Shops including some of itsequipment and machineries from
Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte neededby BASECO in its shipbuilding
and ship repair program for the amount of P5,000,000.00.
ISSUE:

Whether the constitutional right of the petitioner to be informed of the nature

and cause of the accusation against him was violated for notspecifying the
acts of intervention that he supposedly performed.
HELD:
The Court did not agree with the petitioner's contention.When allegations in
the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not
a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars. The pertinent
provision in the Rules of Court is Section 9 of Rule 116, whichwe
quote:"Section 9. Bill of particulars. -- The accused may, before
arraignment, movefor a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead
and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the
complaint or informationand the details desired.
Alfredo T. Romualdez, petitioner, vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (Fifth
Division) and the People of the Philippines, respondents.
____________________________________________________________
___________
Facts: People of the Philippines, through PCGG, filed a petition charging
the accused with violation of Section 5, RA. 3019 as amended. Said
petitioner, brother-in-law of former President Marcos and therefore, related
by affinity within the third civil degree, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his selfinterested sic and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a
contract between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO),
a government-owned and controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard
and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority
stocks of which is owned by former President Marcos, whereby the
NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and
all its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities including
structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and
semi-expendable assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the
Engineer Island Shops including some of its equipment and machineries
from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its
shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount of P5,000,000.00.
Issue: whether or not petitioner enjoys derivative immunity from suit.
Ruling: In Estrada vs. Desierto, the SC exhaustively traced the origin of
executive immunity in order to determine the extent of its applicability.
Executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President. It
could not be used to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for
alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. The reasoning of petitioner
must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from one who is no longer
sitting as President. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their
close relatives are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts illegally is
not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any other trespasser.

ANTONIO
A.
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

MECANO, petitioner,

Ponente: CAMPOS, JR.

FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he
is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th
Indorsement, denied petitioners claim on the ground that Section 699 of the

RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order
No. 292), solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor
re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of
Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that the
issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in
its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand,
strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987
operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
HELD:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on
petitioners claim for benefits.
RATIO:
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later
date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a
prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before
there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the
lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old
one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least,
as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and
not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are
the same from the time of the first enactment.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by
implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the
subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two
Codes should be read in pari materia.

Persons and Family Relation

45
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED REPEALMAGKALAS vs. NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITYG.R. No. 138823 September 17, 2008Facts:
Plaintiff and her predecessors-in-interest have been occupying a lot
designated as TAG-77-0063, Block 1, Barangay 132, located at the corner
of 109 Gen. Concepcion and Adelfa Streets,Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City,
for the past 39 years.On March 26, 1978, P.D. No. 1315 was issued
expropriating certain lots at Bagong Barrio,Caloocan City. In the same
Decree, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was named Administrator
of the Bagong Barrio Urban Bliss Project with the former to take
possession, control(sic) and disposition of the expropriated properties with
the power of demolition. During theCensus survey of the area, the structure
built by the plaintiff was assigned TAG No. 0063. After
conducting studies of the area, the NHA determined that the area where
plaintiffs structure is
located should be classified as an area center (open space). The Area
Center was determined incompliance with the requirement to reserve 30%

open space in all types of residential development.Plaintiff, together with

Mr.& Mrs. Josefino Valenton and Mr.& Mrs. Rey Pangilinan, throughcounsel,
filed an appeal from the decision to designate the area where the plaintiff
and the two otherspouses have erected structures, as an Area Center. The
said appeal was denied by the NHA. In aletter, dated August 6, 1985, the
NHA sent a Notice of Lot Assignment to plaintiff recognizing thelatter as a
Censused Owner of a structure with TAG No. 0063-04 which was identified
forrelocation.On August 23, 1985, plaintiff filed a Complaint for Damages
with prayer for the issuance ofa restraining order and writ of Preliminary
Injunction against the NHA with the Regional TrialCourt of Caloocan City.
The Order denying plaintiffs prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary inju
nction was
appealed, by way of Petition for Certiorari, to the Court of Appeals
(docketed therein as CA-G.R.No. 33833). On March 10, 1999, the trial court
promulgated its assailed decision dismissing
petitioners complaint. Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied by
the trial court in its Order dated May 14, 1999. Hence, this petition for
review of the said decisionand order of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the demolition or relocation of the petitioners structure will
violate the
vested rights of the petitioner over the acquired property under the social ju
stice clause of theconstitution.
Ruling:
Petitioner maintains that she had acquired a vested right over the property
subject of thiscase on the ground that she had been in possession of it for
forty (40) years already. Thus, to orderher relocation and the demolition of
her house will infringe the social justice clause guaranteedunder the
Constitution.
Fernando vs St. Scholasticas College
GR 1611107, 12 March 2013
Facts: Respondent SSCs property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter
fence. Marikina City enacted an ordinance which provides that walls and
fences shall not be built within a five-meter allowance between the front
monument line and the building line of an establishment.
The City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents
ordering them to demolish, replace, and move back the fence. As a
response, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an application
for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before
the Regional Trial Court of Marikina. The RTC granted the petition and the
CA affirmed. Hence, this certiorari.
Issue: Is Marikina Ordinance No. 192, imposing a five-meter setback, a
valid exercise of police power?
Ruling: No. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to
make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Two
tests have been used by the Court the rational relationship test and the
strict scrutiny test:
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the
following requisites:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require its exercise; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The real intent of the setback requirement was to make the
parking space free for use by the public and not for the exclusive use of
respondents. This would be tantamount to a taking of private property for

public use without just compensation. Anent the objectives of prevention of

concealment of unlawful acts and un-neighborliness due to the walls and
fences, the parking area is not reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of these goals. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 of the
Ordinance to be unreasonable and oppressive. Hence, the exercise of
police power is not valid.