Crim 2 Part 7

CRIMINAL LAW 2 (Atty.
Rene Rizza Bernardo-Mamburam) 1

2ND EXAM COVERAGE CASES and SPECIAL LAWS
BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS
DACUMOS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
EN BANC
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The Court has carefully considered the arguments of the

parties in their respective pleadings and finds no reason for
reversing the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting the
petitioner of direct bribery.
As found by the respondent court, the petitioner, a revenue

examiner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue stationed at San
Pablo City, offered to settle the tax liability of R. Revilla
Interiors, in the amount of P73,307.31 by pulling out its
assessments papers from the office of the BIR Commissioner
and procuring a tax clearance. For such service, he would
require a fee of P35,000.00 (later reduced to P30,000.00).
Gregorio Samia, the manager of the firm, pretended to go
along with him but reported the matter to the National Bureau
of Investigation, which arranged an entrapment. This was
effected on October 28, 1986, near the Rizal Cafe in Makati.
Samia, meeting with the petitioner there, told him he had only
P1,000.00 then but would deliver P9,000.00 to him that same
evening at his residence and pay the balance of P20,000.00 in
November. The petitioner wrote his address on the back of a
receipt, which he gave Samia. Samia tendered the white
envelope containing P1,000.00 previously dusted with
fluorescent powder, but the petitioner accepted it only when
they had left the eatery and he was nearing his car outside. He
put the envelope in his pocket. The NBI agents closed in,
identified themselves, and place him under arrest. The
petitioner's reaction was to draw out the envelope and throw it
on the ground. One of the agents retrieved it. At the NBI
headquarters, the petitioner's hands were found positive for
fluorescent powder, as so were the envelope itself and the bills
inside.
The petitioner claims the charges against him were fabricated.

He argues inter alia that he could not have promised to remove
the assessment papers from the Commissioner's office as he
had no access to that place; that at the time of his supposed
offer the tax liability of the firm had not yet been ascertained
and that in any case the percentage tax imposed on it was

mandatory and not subject to adjustment. He stresses that as
a tax examiner with 29 years service he would not have been
"so crude and so rash" as to demand money from Samia
whom he barely knew. He said he had met Samia at the Rizal
Cafe only because the latter was "irritatingly insistent" on
securing his help regarding the firm's tax amnesty. It was
Samia who had urged the envelope on him but he had rejected
it twice, first when they were at the restaurant and later when
they were outside. He also faults the respondent court for
misappreciating the evidence and for obvious bias in favor of
the prosecution.
The issues he raises are mainly factual. The petitioner has not
shown that the findings thereon of the respondent court are
tainted with arbitratriness or are not supported by substantial
evidence. His charge that he was "framed" because Samia
resented his refusal to be bribed is not convincing. It is belied
by his proven acts. The implausibility of his promises does not
mean they were not made or that they did not appear to be
credible, coming as they did from one with his long experience
in the BIR and appeared to know his way around. The Court
finds it especially remarkable that he met Samia at a private
place instead of his office at the BIR, considering that they
were supposed to be discussing official business and it was
Samia who he says was requesting his assistance.
It was within the discretion of the respondent court to weigh the

evidence of the parties and to admit such of it as it regarded as
credible and reject those that it considered perjurious or
fabricated Every trial court must have that leeway. If the
Sandiganbayan chose to believe Samia and not the petitioner
or Exhibit F-1, the NBI report, rather than Exhibit 5, the
petitioner's alleged assessment report, this would not
necessarily prove that its decision was biased and arbitrary.
The Court is not inclined to believe that Samia would be so

vindictive as to falsely incriminate the petitioner with the
serious charge of bribery simply because the petitioner refused
to reduce the tax assessment of R. Revilla Interiors. Samia
was not even directly involved in the assessment. As for
Exhibit 5, the respondent court cannot be faulted for not
accepting it in the absence of corroboration that the petitioner
actually filed it only on October 17, 1986 (to show that he could
not have offered to reduce the assessment of the taxpayer
company earlier in September, as alleged). On the other hand,
the technical report on the test conducted by the NBI for
fluorescent powder on the petitioner's hands invited easy
acceptance.
CRIMINAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rene Rizza Bernardo-Mamburam) 2

While protesting his innocence, the petitioner has failed to

rebut the evidence of the prosecution that has sufficiently
established his guilt and shifted the burden of proof to him. He
has not discharged that burden by just contending that the
decision is based on "speculations, conjectures and
assumptions" and that the conclusions drawn therefrom are
"mistaken, absurd and fallacious." The thrust of his defense is
that the respondent court should have believed him instead of
the People, but he has not convinced us that the trial court has
erred. In short, he has failed to prove, in this petition for
certiorari where only questions of law may be raised, that he is
entitled to a reversal of his conviction.
The petitioner seems to be suggesting in the conclusion to his

petition that judgment was rendered against him because he
happens to be a tax collector, whom he says "history, even
from Biblical times, depicts . . . as the most unpopular and
vilified adjunct of any society." The plea does not persuade. It
suffices to observe that he was convicted not because he is a
tax collector but because he accepted a bribe.
We find, on the basis of the evidence of record, that the

constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome
and that the guilt of the petitioner has been established beyond
reasonable doubt. ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision is
AFFIRMED and the petition DENIED, with costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
GRAFT AND CORRUPTION

PD No. 46
MALACAANG
Manila
WHEREAS, under existing laws and the civil service rules, it is

prohibited to receive, directly or indirectly, any gift, present or
any other form of benefit in the course of official duties;
WHEREAS, it is believed necessary to put more teeth to
existing laws and regulations to wipe out all conceivable forms
of graft and corruption in the public service, the members of
which should not only be honest but above suspicion and
reproach; and
WHEREAS, the stoppage of the practice of gift-giving to
government men is a concrete step in the administration's
program of reforms for the development of new moral values in
the social structure of the country, one of the main objectives of
the New Society;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated
September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated
September 22, 1972, do hereby make it punishable for any
public official or employee, whether of the national or local
governments, to receive, directly or indirectly, and for private
persons to give, or offer to give, any gift, present or other
valuable thing to any occasion, including Christmas, when
such gift, present or other valuable thing is given by reason of
his official position, regardless of whether or not the same is for
past favor or favors or the giver hopes or expects to receive a
favor or better treatment in the future from the public official or
employee concerned in the discharge of his official functions.
Included within the prohibition is the throwing of parties or
entertainments in honor of the official or employees or his
immediate relatives.
For violation of this Decree, the penalty of imprisonment for not
less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years and
perpetual disqualification from public office shall be imposed.
The official or employee concerned shall likewise be subject to
administrative disciplinary action and, if found guilty, shall be
meted out the penalty of suspension or removal, depending on
the seriousness of the offense.
Any provision of law, executive order, rule or regulation or
circular inconsistent with this Decree is hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 46 November 10, 1972
This Decree shall take effect immediately after its publication.
MAKING IT PUNISHABLE FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND

EMPLOYEES TO RECEIVE, AND FOR PRIVATE PERSONS
TO GIVE, GIFTS ON ANY OCCASION, INCLUDING
CHRISTMAS
Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of November, in the

year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.
RA No. 3019
REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019

ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Section 1. Statement of policy. It is the policy of the Philippine
Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a
public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private
persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or
which may lead thereto.
Section 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, that term
(a) "Government" includes the national government, the local
governments, the government-owned and governmentcontrolled corporations, and all other instrumentalities or
agencies of the Republic of the Philippines and their branches.
(b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified
or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation,
even nominal, from the government as defined in the
preceding subparagraph.
(c) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or
indirectly a gift from a person other than a member of the
public officer's immediate family, in behalf of himself or of any
member of his family or relative within the fourth civil degree,
either by consanguinity or affinity, even on the occasion of a
family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the
value of the gift is under the circumstances manifestly
excessive.
(d) "Person" includes natural and juridical persons, unless the
context indicates otherwise.
manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or

obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for
the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section
thirteen of this Act.
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept
employment in a private enterprise which has pending official
business with him during the pendency thereof or within one
year after its termination.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices
or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without
sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any
matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly
or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some
pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose
of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor
of or discriminating against any other interested party.
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or
transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to

acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest

in any business, contract or transaction in connection with
which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in
which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from
having any interest.
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to

perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations
duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing
himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit
such violation or offense.
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain,

or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring
the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a
member, and which exercises discretion in such approval,
even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the
action of the board, committee, panel or group.
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,

present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any
other person, in connection with any contract or transaction
between the Government and any other part, wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the
law.
Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those

public officers responsible for the approval of manifestly
unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the
board, panel or group to which they belong.
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present

or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for
another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit,

privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or
not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or
advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who
is not so qualified or entitled.

(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character,
acquired by his office or by him on account of his official
position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information
in advance of its authorized release date.
The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or
benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or
giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in
subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release of
the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of
this section shall, together with the offending public officer, be
punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be
permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the
Court, from transacting business in any form with the
Government.
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be
unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation
with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage
of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or
pecuniary advantage from any other person having some
business, transaction, application, request or contract with the
government, in which such public official has to intervene.
Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by
consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word
"close personal relation" shall include close personal
friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional
employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free
access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or
cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined
in Section 3 hereof.
Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful
for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity,
within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines,
the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the
Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to
intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction,
contract or application with the Government: Provided, That
this section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the
assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is
related, has been already dealing with the Government along
the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or
application already existing or pending at the time of such
assumption of public office, nor to any application filed by him
the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the
official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance
with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued
pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official
capacity or in the exercise of a profession.
Section 6. Prohibition on Members of Congress. It shall be
unlawful hereafter for any Member of the Congress during the
term for which he has been elected, to acquire or receive any

personal pecuniary interest in any specific business enterprise
which will be directly and particularly favored or benefited by
any law or resolution authored by him previously approved or
adopted by the Congress during the same term.
The provision of this section shall apply to any other public
officer who recommended the initiation in Congress of the
enactment or adoption of any law or resolution, and acquires or
receives any such interest during his incumbency.
It shall likewise be unlawful for such member of Congress or
other public officer, who, having such interest prior to the
approval of such law or resolution authored or recommended
by him, continues for thirty days after such approval to retain
such interest.
Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every public
officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or after
assuming office, and within the month of January of every
other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his term
of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall
prepare and file with the office of the corresponding
Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or
chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President,
or in the case of members of the Congress and the officials
and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the
corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of
assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers
assuming office less than two months before the end of the
calendar year, may file their statements in the following months
of January.
Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One
thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has
been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether
in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of
property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his
salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a
ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the
spouse and unmarried children of such public official may be
taken into consideration, when their acquisition through
legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank
deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of
this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary.
Section 9. Penalties for violations. (a) Any public officer or
private person committing any of the unlawful acts or
omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act
shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than one year
nor more than ten years, perpetual disqualification from public

office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government
of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly
out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.
Any complaining party at whose complaint the criminal
prosecution was initiated shall, in case of conviction of the
accused, be entitled to recover in the criminal action with
priority over the forfeiture in favor of the Government, the
amount of money or the thing he may have given to the
accused, or the value of such thing.
(b) Any public officer violation any of the provisions of Section
7 of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one
hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court.
during his incumbency, except where the practice of such

profession, trade or occupation involves conspiracy with any
other person or public official to commit any of the violations
penalized in this Act.
Section 15. Separability clause. If any provision of this Act
the application of such provision to any person
circumstances is declared invalid, the remainder of the Act
the application of such provision to other persons
circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.
or
or
or
or
Section 16. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect on its

approval, but for the purpose of determining unexplained
wealth, all property acquired by a public officer since he
assumed office shall be taken into consideration.
Approved: August 17, 1960
The violation of said section proven in a proper administrative

proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of
a public officer, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted
against him.
TRIESTE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Section 10. Competent court. Until otherwise provided by law,

all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original
jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance.
Section 11. Prescription of offenses. All offenses punishable
under this Act shall prescribe in ten years.
Section 12. Termination of office. No public officer shall be
allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any
offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on bribery.
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under
any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed
to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
Section 14. Exception. Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or
insignificant value offered or given as a mere ordinary token of
gratitude or friendship according to local customs or usage,
shall be excepted from the provisions of this Act.
Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted to prejudice or prohibit
the practice of any profession, lawful trade or occupation by
any private person or by any public officer who under the law
may legitimately practice his profession, trade or occupation,
EN BANC
G.R. No. 70332-43 November 13, 1986
GENEROSO TRIESTE, SR., petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), respondent.
Arturo M. de Castro for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
ALAMPAY, J.:
The present case relates to an appeal by way of a Petition for
Review of the decision promulgated on November 6, 1984, by
the Sandiganbayan convicting the herein petitioner, Generoso
Trieste, Sr., of twelve (12) separate violations of Section 3
paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices - Act, which petitioner were
accused of in Criminal Cases Nos. 6856-6867 of said Court.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was
denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan under its Resolution
of March 11, 1985.
The twelve (12) separate Informations filed by the Tanodbayan
against the herein petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h) of the
Anti-Graft Law are all similarly worded as the information

presented in Criminal Case No. 6856 which is hereunder
quoted:
Crim. Case #6866, Vchr #211-81-04-62 at 787.00

Crim. Case #6867, Vchr #211-81-04-63 at 560.00
That on or about the month of July, 1980 and some time

subsequent thereto, in the municipality of Numancia, Aklan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovenamed accused, being then the Municipal Mayor and
member of the Committee on Award of the Municipality of
Numancia, Aklan and as such, had administrative control of the
funds of the municipality and whose approval is required in the
disbursements of municipal funds, did then and there wilfully
and unlawfully have financial or pecuniary interest in a
business, contract or transaction in connection with which said
accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and in
which he is prohibited by law from having any interest, to wit
the purchases of construction materials by the Municipality of
Numancia, Aklan from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation, of which the accused is the president,
incorporator, director and major stockholder paid under
Municipal Voucher No. 211-90-10-174 in the amount of
P558.80 by then and there awarding the supply and delivery of
said materials to Trigen Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation and approving payment thereof to said corporation
in violation of the Anti-Graft and corrupt Practices Act.
except only as to the dates of the commission of the offense,
voucher numbers, and amounts involved.
Criminal Cases Nos. 6856, 6857, 6858, 6859, 6860. 6861, and
6862 were allegedly committed in July, 1980; Criminal Cases
Nos. 6863 and 6864, in August, 1980; and Criminal Cases
Nos. C-865, 6866 and 6867 in October, 1980. The separate
vouchers involved in the twelve (12) cases are said to be the
following:
Crim. Case #6856, Vchr #211-90-10-174 at P558.80
Crim. Case #6857, Vchr #211-80-10-187 at 943.60
Crim. Case #6858, Vchr #211-80-10-189 at 144.00
Crim. Case #6859, Vchr #211-80-10-190 at 071.30
Crim. Case #6860, Vchr #211-80-10-191 at 270.00
Crim. Case #6861, Vchr #211-80-10-232 at 1,820.00
Crim. Case #6862, Vchr #211-80-10-239 at 1,085.80
Crim. Case #6863, Vchr #211-80-10-407 at 150.00
Crim. Case #6864, Vchr #211-80-12-494 at 500.00
Crim. Case #6865, Vchr #211-81-04-61 at 840.00
Total(Consolidated Comment, pg. 4; Rollo, 325)

After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged
decision dated November 6, 1984, convicting the petitioner in
all the twelve (12) criminal cases, (Rollo, pp. 324-325) and in
each case he was sentenced,"...to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY as the minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY as the maximum, to further suffer perpetual
disqualification from the public office, and to pay the cost of the
action." (pp. 37-40, Decision; Rollo, 322).
After the petition for review was filed in this case and pending
the submission by respondent of its comment to the petition,
herein petitioner presented to this Court on June 7, 1985, an
urgent petition to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan dated
September 12, 1983, suspending him from Office as the
elected Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan. His term was to
expire in 1986. No objection to the petition for the lifting of the
suspension order was interposed by the Solicitor General.
Accordingly, and pursuant to the resolution of this Court dated
October 1, 1985, petitioner's preventive suspension was lifted
and his reinstatement as Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan
was ordered to take effect immediately.
A supplemental petition, dated October 10, 1985, was later
filed by petitioner's new counsel in collaboration with the
original counsel on record of petitioner. In this supplemental
pleading, it was vigorously stressed that the petitioner did not,
in any way, intervene in making the awards and payment of the
purchases in question as he signed the voucher only after all
the purchases had already been made, delivered and paid for
by the Municipal Treasurer. It was further pointed out that there
was no bidding at all as erroneously adverted to in the twelve
informations filed against herein petitioner because the
transactions involved were emergency direct purchases by
personal canvass.
Upon leave of the Court given, the former Solicitor General
filed a consolidated comment dated November 4,1984, to the
original petition filed in this case dated April 30, 1985 as well as
on the supplemental petition dated October 10, 1985. He
argued the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the
same raise factual issues which are, therefore, non-reviewable
(Consolidated Comment, pg. 20; Rollo, 341). The submission
made by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Consolidated
Comment dated November 4, 1986, are hereunder quoted:
xxx xxx xxx

The impugned decision convicted petitioner for violation of
Section 3 (h), paragraph (h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act which reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. - In addition to
existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in
any business, contract or transaction in connection with which
he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which
he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having
any interest.
The elements essential in the commission of the crime are:
a) The public officer has financial or pecuniary interest in a
business, contract or transaction;
b) In connection with which he intervenes in his official
capacity.
Concurrence of both elements is necessary as the absence of
one will not warrant conviction. (Rollo, pp. 338-339).
The earlier view taken by the Solicitor General's Office was
that petitioner's evidence of divestment of interest in Trigen
'Corporation, which is said to have been effected on February
25, 1980, before the petitioner assumed the Mayorship, should
have been presented at the earliest opportunity before the
Tanodbayan and because this was not done by him the
resolution of the Tanodbayan finding a prima facie case against
petitioner should be sustained. Furthermore, petitioner was
faulted because the transfer of his interest in the corporate
stock of Trigen Corporation should have been recorded in the
Securities and Exchange Commission but no evidence of this
sort, was presented. The consolidated comment also played
up the advertisement of Trigen Corporation in the program of
the Rotary Club of Kalibo, Aklan, showing the printed name of
petitioner as the President-Manager of the said corporation.
(Consolidated Comment; Rollo, pp. 340-341)
Petitioner filed a Reply controverting the allegations and
arguments recited in the aforestated Consolidated Comment of
the Solicitor General.
After considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the
issues raised in the petition and supplemental petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the Sandiganbayan, as
well as the consolidated comment and the reply thereto filed by
petitioner's counsel, the Court in its resolution of January 16,
1986, gave due course to the petition and required the parties
to file their respective briefs.
Petitioner's exhaustive and well-reasoned out Brief which was
filed with the Court on April 14, 1986, raised the following legal
questions.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing recital of facts, the following legal questions
arise:
1. Does the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal
vouchers and other supporting papers covering purchases of
materials previously ordered by the Municipal Treasurer
without the knowledge and consent of the former, subsequently
delivered by the supplier, and, thereafter paid by the same
Municipal Treasurer also without the knowledge and consent of
the Municipal Mayor, constitute a violation of the provisions of
Section 3 (h) of Rep. Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
2. Does the mere signing of the mere documents above
constitute the kind of intervention of taking part in (his) official
capacity within the context of the above-mentioned law?
3. Was damage or prejudice, as an element of the offense
under Section 3 (h) of the said law, caused to the Government
or the Municipality of Numancia as a result of the contracts in
question and as a corollary thereto, was undue advantage and
gained by the transacting corporation?
4. Was there divestment on the part of the herein petitioner of
his shares in Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation
long before the questioned transactions? (Appellant's Brief,
page 15)
It was then discus and argued by the petitioner that the
prosecution failed to establish the presence of all the elements
of the offense, and more particularly to adduce proof that
petitioner has, directly or indirectly, a financial or pecuniary
interest in the imputed business contracts or transactions.
Discussion of petitioner's arguments in this regard will not
however, be recited anymore as this was obviated when a new
Solicitor General, after seeking and obtaining several
extensions of time to file its Brief in this case at bar, filed on
October 7, 1986, a "Manifestation For Acquittal" (in lieu of the
People's Brief). Rollo, 293).
The new Solicitor General's Office after adopting the statement
of facts recited in the consolidated comment of the former
Solicitor General's Office moved for the acquittal of the
petitioner, upon acknowledging and concluding that:

xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen
A. Yes, Sir. (pp. 36-37, Tsn., Oct. 26, 1983)
Petitioner sought to establish that before he assumed office as

mayor on March 3, 1980, he had already sold his shares with
Trigen to his sister Mrs. Rosene Trieste-Tuason. The sale was
made by corresponding indorsements to her stock certificate
which was duly recorded in the stock and transfer book of the
corporation.
In the absence of a public bidding and as emphatically

declared by the prosecution's sole witness Vega that all the
transactions were on direct purchases from Trigen, how can
one ever imagine that petitioner has awarded the supply and
delivery of construction materials to Trigen as specifically
charged in the twelve (12) informations? The charges are of
course baseless and even contradict the evidence of the
prosecution itself.
Respondent Sandiganbayan however doubts the sale because

the same was not reported to the SEC. SEC records, as the
prosecution evidence show, do not reflect the sale and
petitioner still appears as the firm's President.
Even the respondent Court finally found that petitioner did not
intervene during the bidding and award, which of course is a
false assumption because of Vega's testimony that there was
no public bidding at all. Respondent Court said:
The prosecution's evidence to establish non-divestment of

petitioner's interest with Trigen is weak. Anyway, Trigen has not
updated its reports to the SEC since 1976. It have not even
submitted its financial annual report ever since. Absence of the
sales report in the SEC does not mean that the sale did not
take place. Reporting the sale is not a mandatory requirement.
. . . . In short, accused's intervention may not be present during

the bidding and award, but his liability may also come in when
he took part in said transactions such as signing the vouchers
under certifications 1, 2 and 3 thereof, to make it appear that
the transactions were regular and proper. (Resolution dated
March
11,
1985
denying
petitioner's
motion
for
reconsideration/new trial, page 7).
Sales of stocks need not be reported to SEC

In any event, the law only requires submission of annual
financial reports, not sales or disposal of stocks (Section 141,
Corporation Code of the Philippines).
Upholding the evidence of petitioner's divestment of his interest
with Trigen would necessarily allow him to act freely in his
official capacity in the municipality's dealings or transactions
with Trigen. That in itself is sufficient to acquit him of the crimes
charged. (Rollo, pp. 299-300).
In the matter of the alleged intervention of petitioner, the Office
of the Solicitor General itself subscribes to and on its own
volition place on record the following observations:
Prosecution failed to prove charges; evidence discloses
absence of bidding and award
The prosecution's lone witness, Treasurer Aniceto Vega,
testified that there never was a public bidding conducted
because all the transactions were made by direct purchases
from Trigen.
Q. In other words, in all these transactions there never really
was any public bidding?
A. Yes, Sir. There was no public bidding.
Q. And these purchases were made by direct purchases from
the establishment of Trigen?
No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment

Now, did petitioner intervene by approving payments to Trigen
as also charged in the information? Can there be intervention
after payment.
Vega testified that petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal
vouchers (Exhibits A to L) for the purchase and payment of
construction materials. It was sometime after delivery of the
construction materials that he (Vega) signed and paid the
twelve (12) -municipal vouchers (pages 5 to 7), decision of
respondent Sandiganbayan dated November 2, 1984). The
prosecution has not presented evidence to show as to when
petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers. But it can
safely be assumed as a matter of procedure that petitioner had
signed the voucher after Treasurer Vega signed and paid
them., (Rello, pp. 301-303)
xxx xxx xxx
Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms that petitioner
signed vouchers after payment
Additional facts which respondent Court failed to consider and
which could have altered the outcome of the case in the
following uncontroverted testimony of Josue Maravilla:
Q. When these municipal vouchers were prepared by the
municipal treasurer, as you said, and then presented to Mayor
Trieste for his signature, were the purchases in question
already paid?

A. They had already been paid for, sir.
indicated therein were already prepared by the municipal

treasurer.
Q. Previously, prior to the signature of Mayor Trieste?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you say already made by the municipal treasurer-the

amounts were already paid by the municipal treasurer?
A.J. ESCAREAL:
A. Already paid.
Q. Under what authority were they paid?
Q. Who disbursed the funds evidenced by the Trigen official

receipts?
A. Under official receipt issued by Trigen.

Q. Who authorized the payment?
A. The municipal treasurer who paid the materials.
ATTY. CONSULTA:
Q. You said they had already been paid for. Do you know of
any receipts issued by Trigen to indicate that at the time these
municipal vouchers were signed by Mayor Trieste, the
materials had already been delivered and paid by the
municipality to Trigen?
xxx xxx xxx
A. Yes, sir
Q. Now, what exhibits particularly do you know were issued
by Trigen to indicate that payments were made prior to the
signing of the municipal vouchers by Mayor Trieste?
A. Exhibits A, G, B, F, C, D, Exhibit I and Exhibit H.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, Mr. Maravilla, aside from these prosecution's exhibits
which are Trigen receipts showing payments long before the
municipal vouchers were prepared, what can you say about
the other municipal vouchers in this case in reference to
payments made by Trigen to the municipality?
A. The municipal treasurer, then Mr. Vega.

Q. Now, do you know why Mr. Vega asked that those municipal
vouchers be nevertheless signed in spite of the fact that he
knew that the amounts had already been disbursed and paid
by him to Trigen?
A. He said that the municipal vouchers for record purposes is
necessary to be signed by the mayor. (Tsn., Mar. 5, 1984, pp.
19-49).
Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers
after the materials were delivered, petitioner's signature on the
vouchers after payment is not, we submit the kind of
intervention contemplated under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
Law.
xxx xxx xxx
What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is
the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has
financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach.
(Opinion No. 306, Series 1961 and Opinion No. 94, Series
1972 of the Secretary of Justice). The official need not dispose
his shares in the corporation as long as he does not do
anything for the firm in its contract with the office. For the law
aims to prevent the don-tenant use of influence, authority and
power (Deliberation on Senate Bill 293, May 6, 1959,
Congressional Record, Vol. 11, page 603).
Payment made by Trigen?
There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his

capacity as Mayor, used his influence, power, and authority in
having the transactions given to Trigen. He didn't ask anyoneneither Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter,
to get the construction materials from Trigen.
ATTY. CONSULTA:
Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction
I am sorry, Your Honor, made to Trigen by the municipality?
Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen's transaction with the

municipality, which by the way, has been dealing with it even
before petitioner had assumed the mayorship on March 3,
1980. Personal canvasses conducted found that Trigen's offer
was the lowest, most reasonable, and advantageous to the
municipality. . . . (Rollo, pp. 307-308; Emphasis supplied).
ESCAREAL:
A. Official receipts issued by Trigen also indicate that when

municipal vouchers marked Exhibits E, B, C, D, F, G, H, I were
prepared, they had already been delivered and the amounts

It is also an acknowledged fact that there was no complaint for
non-delivery, underdelivery or overpricing regarding any of the
transactions.
Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of
this Court by the Solicitor General and in view of the
reassessment made by that Office of the issues and the
evidence and the law involved, the Court takes a similar view
that the affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot be
rightfully sustained. The conscientious study and thorough
analysis made by the Office of the Solicitor General in this
case truly reflects its consciousness of its role as the People's
Advocate in the administration of justice to the end that the
innocent be equally defended and set free just as it has the
task of having the guilty punished. This Court will do no less
and, therefore, accepts the submitted recommendation that the
decision and resolution in question of the respondent
Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as a matter of justice, the
herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan,
dated November 2, 1984, in Criminal Cases Nos. 6856 to
6867, finding the herein petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr. guilty
of the violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act
3019, as amended, is hereby set aside and reversing the
appealed judgment, a new judgment is now rendered
ACQUITTING Generoso Trieste, Sr., of said offenses charged
against him with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
MEJORADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-51065-72 June 30, 1987
ARTURO A. MEJORADA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the May 23, 1979
decision of the Sandiganbayan finding the accused Arturo A.
Mejorada in Criminal Cases Nos. 002-009 guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(E) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
Eight informations were filed by the Provincial Fiscal against
the petitioner and jointly tried before the Sandiganbayan. The
eight informations substantially allege the same set of
circumstances constituting the offense charged, Criminal Case
No. 002 reads as follows:
That in (sic) or about and during the period comprised from
October 1977 to February 1978, in the municipality of Pasig,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being employed
in the Office of the Highway District Engineer, Pasig, Metro
Manila, as Right-of-Way-Agent conspiring and confederating
together with two (2) other John Does whose true Identities
and present whereabouts are still unknown, with evident bad
faith, and for personal gain, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, directly intervene, work for, and
facilitate the approval of one Isagani de Leon's claim for the
payment in the removal and reconstruction of his house and a
part of his land expropriated by the government having been
affected by the proposed Pasig-Sta Cruz-Calamba Road. 2nd
IBRD Project at Binangonan, Rizal, while the accused, Arturo
A. Mejorada is in the discharge of his official and/or
administrative functions and after said claim was approved and
the corresponding PNB Check No. SN 5625748 was issued
and encashed in the amount of P7,200.00 given only
P1,000.00 to claimant (Isagani de Leon), appropriating,
applying and converting to themselves the amount of
P6,200.00, thereby causing damage and prejudice to Isagani
de Leon and the government in the aforementioned amount of
P6,200.00.
Contrary to law.
Except for the date of the commission of the offense, the name
of the aggrieved private party, the PNB Check number, the
amount involved and the number or John Does, the seven
other informations are verbatim repetitions of the above.
The facts are found by the respondent Sandiganbayan are as
follows:

Arturo A. Mejorada was a public officer who was first employed
as a temporary skilled laborer in the Bureau of Public Works on
March 16, 1947, and then as right-of-way agent in the Office of
the Highway District Engineer, Pasig, Metro Manila, from
February, 1974 up to December 31, 1978. As a right-of-way
agent, his main duty was to negotiate with property owners
affected by highway constructions or improvements for the
purpose of compensating them for the damages incurred by
said owners.
Among those whose lots and improvements were affected by
the widening of the proposed Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road.
2nd IBRD Project, at Binangonan, Rizal were Isagani de Leon,
Isaac Carlos, Napoleon Maybituin, Dominga Villaroza,
Florentino de la Cruz, Cipriano Aran, Celestina S. Mallari and
Rodolfo Rivera, all residents of Mambog, Binangonan, Rizal.
Sometime in October or November 1977, petitioner contacted
the aforenamed persons and informed them that he could work
out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or
improvements affected by the widening of said highway. In the
process, Mejorada required the claimants to sign blank copies
of the "Sworn Statement on the Correct and Fair Market Value
of Real Properties" and "Agreement to Demolish, Remove and
Reconstruct improvements" pertinent to their claims. The
claimants complied without bothering to find out what the
documents were all about as they were only interested in the
payment of damages.
In said "Sworn Statements" and "Agreements to Demolish", the
value of the respective properties of the claimants were made
to appear very much higher than the actual value claimed by
them. Likewise, the said "Agreements to Demolish" reflected
the value of the improvements as per assessor" which on the
average was only P2,000.00 lower than the value declared by
the owners in their sworn statements. The value as per
assessor was, in turn, supported by the Declarations of Real
Property in the names of the claimants containing an assessed
value exactly the same as that stated in the Agreements to
Demolish "as per assessor", except the claims of De la Cruz
and Aran where there is only a difference of P400.00 and
P200.00, respectively. It turned out, however, that said
Declarations of Property are not really intended for the
claimants as they were registered in the names of other
persons, thus showing that they were all falsified.
A few months after processing the claims, accused
accompanied the claimants to the Office of the Highway
District Engineer at the provincial capitol of Pasig, Metro
Manila, to receive payments and personally assisted the
claimants in signing the vouchers and encashing the checks by
certifying as to their Identities and guaranteeing payment.
Right after the claimants had received the proceeds of their
checks, accused accompanied them to his car which was
parked nearby where they were divested of the amounts paid
to them leaving only the sum of P1,000.00 to each, except

Isaac Carlos to whom P5,000.00 was left, explaining to them
that there were many who would share in said amounts. All the
claimants were helpless to complaint because they were afraid
of the accused and his armed companion.
The claimants, through the assistance of counsel, filed their
complaints with the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Pasig, Metro
Manila, narrating in their supporting sworn statements what
they later testified to in court.
Five issues are raised in this petition to review the decision of
the Sandiganbayan:
I. Whether or not the essential elements constituting the
offense penalized by section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
have been clearly and convincingly proven by the prosecution;
II. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is a court of competent
jurisdiction duly constituted in accordance with Pres. Dec. No.
1606;
III. Whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is
excessive and contrary to the three-fold rule as provided for by
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code;
IV. Whether or not there is a variance between the offense
charged in the information and the offense proved;
V. Whether or not the conclusion drawn from the record of the
Sandiganbayan in arriving at a verdict of conviction of
petitioner is correct is a question of law which this Honorable
Court is authorized to pass upon.
I. Petitioner contends that the eight informations filed against
him before the Sandiganbayan are fatally defective in that it
failed to allege the essential ingredients or elements
constituting the offense penalized by Section 3(e) of Rep. Act
No. 3019.
The section under which the accused-petitioner was charged
provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts
or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
xxx xxx xxx
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest

partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices
or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
Third, the injury to any party, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference was done
through manifest, partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
Petitioner enumerated three elements which, in his opinion,

constitute a violation of Section 3(e).
Petitioner argues that for the third element to be present, the

alleged injury or damage to the complainants and the
government must have been caused by the public officer in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions and
inasmuch as when the damage was caused to the
complainants, he was no longer discharging his official
administrative functions, therefore, he is not liable for the
offense charged.
First, that the accused must be a public officer charged with

the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions.
Petitioner contends that inasmuch as he is not charged with
the duty of granting licenses, permits or other concessions,
then he is not the officer contemplated by Section 3 (e).
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the
corrupt practices of any public officers declared unlawful. Its
reference to "any public officer" is without distinction or
qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We
agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the
last sentence of paragraph (e) is intended to make clear the
inclusion of officers and employees of officers or government
corporations which, under the ordinary concept of "public
officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained
construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively
to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or
permits or other concessions.
The first element, therefore, of Section 3 (e) is that the accused
must be a public officer. This, the informations did not fail to
allege.
Second, that such public officer caused undue injury to any
party, including the Government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions.
Petitioner denies that there was injury or damage caused the
Government because the payments were allegedly made on
the basis of a document solely made by the Highway District
Engineer to which petitioner had no hand in preparing. The
fact, however, is that the government suffered undue injury as
a result of the petitioner's having inflated the true claims of
complainants which became the basis of the report submitted
by the Highway District Engineer to the Regional Director of
the Department of Highways and which eventually became the
basis of payment. His contention that he had no participation is
belied by the fact that as a right-of-way-agent, his duty was
precisely to negotiate with property owners who are affected by
highway constructions for the purpose of compensating them.
On the part of the complainants, the injury caused to them
consists in their being divested of a large proportion of their
claims and receiving payment in an amount even lower than
the actual damage they incurred. They were deprived of the
just compensation to which they are entitled.
The argument is devoid of merit. The Sandiganbayan

established the fact that the petitioner took advantage of his
position as a right-of-way-agent by making the claimants sign
the aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn
statements which contained falsified declarations of the value
of the improvements and lots. There was evident bad faith on
the part of the petitioner when he inflated the values of the true
claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share of
the amounts due them.
In view of the above holding. We also dispose of the fourth
issue which relates to the allegation that petitioner cannot be
convicted for a violation of the Anti-Graft Law because the
evidence adduced by the prosecution is not the violation of
Section 3 (e) but the crime of robbery. Contrary to the
petitioner averment. We find no variance between the offense
charged in the information and the offense proved. The
prosecution was able to establish through the corroborating
testimonies of the witnesses presented how through evident
bad faith, petitioner caused damage to the claimants and the
Government. The manner by which the petitioner divested the
private parties of the compensation they received was part of'
the scheme which commenced when the petitioner
approached the claimants and informed them that he could
work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots
and/or improvements affected by the widening of the PasigSta. Cruz-Calamba Road. The evidence presented by the
prosecution clearly establish a violation of Section 3(e).
II. The petitioner also assails the competency of the
Sandiganbayan to hear and decide this case. He argues that
before the Sandiganbayan could legally function as a judicial
body, at least two (2) divisions, or majority of the justices shall
have been duly constituted and appointed.
We previously ruled on this matter in the case of De Guzman
v. People (G.R. No. 54288, December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA
337). In that case, the petitioner De Guzman questioned the
authority of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide his case on
the same ground that herein petitioner assails its jurisdiction.
The Court upheld the authority of the Sandiganbayan saying
that:

Although the Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding
Justice, and eight Associate Justices, it does not mean that it
cannot validly function without all of the Divisions constituted.
Section 3 of P.D. 1606 provides that the "Sandiganbayan shall
sit in three divisions of three justices each" while Section 5
thereof provides that the unanimous vote of three justices of a
division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
judgment.
Thus the Sandiganbayan functions in Divisions of three
Justices each and each Division functions independently of the
other. As long as a division has been duly constituted it is a
judicial body whose pronouncements are binding as judgments
of the Sandiganbayan.
We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the fifth issue raised in

view of the foregoing discussion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
RA No. 6713
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Eighth Congress
The judgment convicting petitioner was a unanimous Decision

of the First Division duly constituted. It thus met the
requirement for the pronouncement of a judgment as required
by Section 5 of P.D. 1606 supra.
III. The third issue raised by the petitioner concerns the penalty
imposed by the Sandiganbayan which totals fifty-six (56) years
and eight (8) days of imprisonment. Petitioner impugns this as
contrary to the three-fold rule and insists that the duration of
the aggregate penalties should not exceed forty (40) years.
Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as
set forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. This article is
to be taken into account not in the imposition of the penalty but
in connection with the service of the sentence imposed (People
v. Escares, 102 Phil. 677 [1957]). Article 70 speaks of "service"
of sentence, "duration" of penalty and penalty "to be inflicted".
Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned about the
"imposition of penalty". It merely provides that the prisoner
cannot be made to serve more than three times the most
severe of these penalties the maximum of which is forty years.
The Sandiganbayan, therefore, did not commit any error in
imposing eight penalties for the eight informations filed against
the accused-petitioner. As We pointed out in the case
of People v. Peralta, (No. L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25
SCRA 759, 783-784):
Republic Act No. 6713
February 20, 1989
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND

ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES,
TO
UPHOLD
THE
TIME-HONORED
PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST,
GRANTING
INCENTIVES
AND
REWARDS
FOR
EXEMPLARY SERVICE, ENUMERATING PROHIBITED
ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees."
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is the policy of the State
to promote a high standard of ethics in public service. Public
officials and employees shall at all times be accountable to the
people and shall discharge their duties with utmost
responsibility, integrity, competence, and loyalty, act with
patriotism and justice, lead modest lives, and uphold public
interest over personal interest.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
... Even without the authority provided by Article 70, courts can
still impose as many penalties as there are separate and
distinct offenses committed, since for every individual crime
committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed by law. Each
single crime is an outrage against the State for which the latter,
thru the courts of justice, has the power to impose the
appropriate penal sanctions.
(a) "Government" includes the National Government, the local

governments, and all other instrumentalities, agencies or
branches of the Republic of the Philippines including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and their
subsidiaries.lawphi1.net
In the light of the above reasons, petitioner cannot assail the

penalty imposed upon him as harsh, cruel and unusual (See
Veniegas v. People, G.R. No. 57601-06 July 20, 1982, 115
SCRA 790, 792).
(b) "Public Officials" includes elective and appointive officials

and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career
or non-career service, including military and police personnel,
whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of
amount.

(c) "Gift" refers to a thing or a right to dispose of gratuitously, or
any act or liberality, in favor of another who accepts it, and
shall include a simulated sale or an ostensibly onerous
disposition thereof. It shall not include an unsolicited gift of
nominal or insignificant value not given in anticipation of, or in
exchange for, a favor from a public official or employee.
(d) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or
indirectly, a gift from a person other than a member of his
family or relative as defined in this Act, even on the occasion of
a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the
value of the gift is neither nominal nor insignificant, or the gift is
given in anticipation of, or in exchange for, a favor.
(e) "Loan" covers both simple loan and commodatum as well
as guarantees, financing arrangements or accommodations
intended to ensure its approval.
(f) "Substantial stockholder" means any person who owns,
directly or indirectly, shares of stock sufficient to elect a director
of a corporation. This term shall also apply to the parties to a
voting trust.
(g) "Family of public officials or employees" means their
spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of
age.
(h) "Person" includes natural and juridical persons unless the
(i) "Conflict of interest" arises when a public official or
employee is a member of a board, an officer, or a substantial
stockholder of a private corporation or owner or has a
substantial interest in a business, and the interest of such
corporation or business, or his rights or duties therein, may be
opposed to or affected by the faithful performance of official
duty.
(j) "Divestment" is the transfer of title or disposal of interest in
property by voluntarily, completely and actually depriving or
dispossessing oneself of his right or title to it in favor of a
person or persons other than his spouse and relatives as
defined in this Act.
(k) "Relatives" refers to any and all persons related to a public
official or employee within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity, including bilas, inso and balae.
Section 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and
Employees. - (A) Every public official and employee shall
observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the
discharge and execution of official duties:
(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and
employees shall always uphold the public interest over and
above personal interest. All government resources and powers

of their respective offices must be employed and used
efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to
avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.
(b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall
perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of
excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall
enter public service with utmost devotion and dedication to
duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of
their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees
shall remain true to the people at all times. They must act with
justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against
anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They
shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain
from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.
They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on account of
their office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity
except with respect to appointments of such relatives to
positions considered strictly confidential or as members of their
personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs.
(d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall
provide service to everyone without unfair discrimination and
regardless of party affiliation or preference.
(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and
employees shall extend prompt, courteous, and adequate
service to the public. Unless otherwise provided by law or
when required by the public interest, public officials and
employees shall provide information of their policies and
procedures in clear and understandable language, ensure
openness of information, public consultations and hearings
whenever appropriate, encourage suggestions, simplify and
systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape and
develop an understanding and appreciation of the socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the country, especially in the
depressed rural and urban areas.
(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees
shall at all times be loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino
people, promote the use of locally produced goods, resources
and technology and encourage appreciation and pride of
country and people. They shall endeavor to maintain and
defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion.
(g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees
shall commit themselves to the democratic way of life and
values, maintain the principle of public accountability, and
manifest by deeds the supremacy of civilian authority over the
military. They shall at all times uphold the Constitution and put
loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or party.

(h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their
families shall lead modest lives appropriate to their positions
and income. They shall not indulge in extravagant or
ostentatious display of wealth in any form.
(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive
measures to promote (1) observance of these standards
including the dissemination of information programs and
workshops authorizing merit increases beyond regular
progression steps, to a limited number of employees
recognized by their office colleagues to be outstanding in their
observance of ethical standards; and (2) continuing research
and experimentation on measures which provide positive
motivation to public officials and employees in raising the
general level of observance of these standards.
Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. - In the
performance of their duties, all public officials and employees
are under obligation to:lawphi1.net
(a) Act promptly on letters and requests. - All public officials
and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working days from
receipt thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of
communications sent by the public. The reply must contain the
action taken on the request.
(b) Submit annual performance reports. - All heads or other
responsible officers of offices and agencies of the government
and of government-owned or controlled corporations shall,
within forty-five (45) working days from the end of the year,
render a performance report of the agency or office or
corporation concerned. Such report shall be open and
available to the public within regular office hours.
(c) Process documents and papers expeditiously. - All official
papers and documents must be processed and completed
within a reasonable time from the preparation thereof and must
contain, as far as practicable, not more than three (3)
signatories therein. In the absence of duly authorized
signatories, the official next-in-rank or officer in charge shall
sign for and in their behalf.
(d) Act immediately on the public's personal transactions. - All
public officials and employees must attend to anyone who
wants to avail himself of the services of their offices and must,
at all times, act promptly and expeditiously.
(e) Make documents accessible to the public. - All public
documents must be made accessible to, and readily available
for inspection by, the public within reasonable working hours.
Section 6. System of Incentives and Rewards. - A system of
annual incentives and rewards is hereby established in order to
motivate and inspire public servants to uphold the highest
standards of ethics. For this purpose, a Committee on Awards
to Outstanding Public Officials and Employees is hereby

created composed of the following: the Ombudsman and
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as Co-Chairmen,
and the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and two
government employees to be appointed by the President, as
members.
It shall be the task of this Committee to conduct a periodic,
continuing review of the performance of public officials and
employees, in all the branches and agencies of Government
and establish a system of annual incentives and rewards to the
end that due recognition is given to public officials and
employees of outstanding merit on the basis of the standards
set forth in this Act.
The conferment of awards shall take into account, among other
things, the following: the years of service and the quality and
consistency of performance, the obscurity of the position, the
level of salary, the unique and exemplary quality of a certain
achievement, and the risks or temptations inherent in the work.
Incentives and rewards to government officials and employees
of the year to be announced in public ceremonies honoring
them may take the form of bonuses, citations, directorships in
government-owned or controlled corporations, local and
foreign scholarship grants, paid vacations and the like. They
shall likewise be automatically promoted to the next higher
position with the commensurate salary suitable to their
qualifications. In case there is no next higher position or it is
not vacant, said position shall be included in the budget of the
office in the next General Appropriations Act. The Committee
on Awards shall adopt its own rules to govern the conduct of its
activities.
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to
acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) Financial and material interest. - Public officials and
employees shall not, directly or indirectly, have any financial or
material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of
their office.
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall
not:
(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer,
employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or
nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or
licensed by their office unless expressly allowed by law;
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such

practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; or
(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private
enterprise which has a regular or pending official transaction
with their office.
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one
(1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public
office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but
the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise
apply.
(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. Public officials and employees shall not use or divulge,
confidential or classified information officially known to them by
reason of their office and not made available to the public,
either:
(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to
anyone; or
(2) To prejudice the public interest.
(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public officials and
employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any
gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary
value from any person in the course of their official duties or in
connection with any operation being regulated by, or any
transaction which may be affected by the functions of their
office.
As to gifts or grants from foreign governments, the Congress
consents to:
The Ombudsman shall prescribe such regulations as may be

necessary to carry out the purpose of this subsection, including
pertinent reporting and disclosure requirements.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to restrict or prohibit any
educational, scientific or cultural exchange programs subject to
national security requirements.
Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. - Public officials and
employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit
declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to
know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and
business interests including those of their spouses and of
unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in
their households.
(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial
Disclosure. - All public officials and employees, except those
who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or
temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statement of
Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business
Interests and Financial Connections and those of their spouses
and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living
in their households.
The two documents shall contain information on the following:
(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed
value and current fair market value;
(b) personal property and acquisition cost;
(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in
banks, stocks, bonds, and the like;
(d) liabilities, and;
(i) The acceptance and retention by a public official or

employee of a gift of nominal value tendered and received as a
souvenir or mark of courtesy;
(e) all business interests and financial connections.
(ii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in

the nature of a scholarship or fellowship grant or medical
treatment; or
(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;
(iii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel

grants or expenses for travel taking place entirely outside the
Philippine (such as allowances, transportation, food, and
lodging) of more than nominal value if such acceptance is
appropriate or consistent with the interests of the Philippines,
and permitted by the head of office, branch or agency to which
he belongs.
The documents must be filed:
(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and

(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.
All public officials and employees required under this section to
file the aforestated documents shall also execute, within thirty
(30) days from the date of their assumption of office, the
necessary authority in favor of the Ombudsman to obtain from
all appropriate government agencies, including the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, such documents as may show their assets,
liabilities, net worth, and also their business interests and

financial connections in previous years, including, if possible,
the year when they first assumed any office in the
Government.
(D) Prohibited acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person to

obtain or use any statement filed under this Act for:
(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or
Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees

may file the required statements jointly or separately.
The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the
Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections
shall be filed by:
(1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the
national office of the Ombudsman;
(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively;
Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court; Judges,
with the Court Administrator; and all national executive officials
with the Office of the President.
(3) Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy
Ombudsman in their respective regions;
(4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, with the Office of the President, and those below
said ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective
regions; and
(5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil Service Commission.
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. - It shall be the
duty of every public official or employee to identify and
disclose, to the best of his knowledge and information, his
relatives in the Government in the form, manner and frequency
prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.
(C) Accessibility of documents. - (1) Any and all statements
filed under this Act, shall be made available for inspection at
reasonable hours.
(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or
reproduction after ten (10) working days from the time they are
filed as required by law.
(3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be
required to pay a reasonable fee to cover the cost of
reproduction and mailing of such statement, as well as the cost
of certification.
(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the
public for a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the
statement. After such period, the statement may be destroyed
unless needed in an ongoing investigation.
(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and

communications media for dissemination to the general public.
Section 9. Divestment. - A public official or employee shall
avoid conflicts of interest at all times. When a conflict of
interest arises, he shall resign from his position in any private
business enterprise within thirty (30) days from his assumption
of office and/or divest himself of his shareholdings or interest
within sixty (60) days from such assumption.
The same rule shall apply where the public official or employee
is a partner in a partnership.
The requirement of divestment shall not apply to those who
serve the Government in an honorary capacity nor to laborers
and casual or temporary workers.
Section 10. Review and Compliance Procedure. - (a) The
designated Committees of both Houses of the Congress shall
establish procedures for the review of statements to determine
whether said statements which have been submitted on time,
are complete, and are in proper form. In the event a
determination is made that a statement is not so filed, the
appropriate Committee shall so inform the reporting individual
and direct him to take the necessary corrective action.
(b) In order to carry out their responsibilities under this Act, the
designated Committees of both Houses of Congress shall have
the power within their respective jurisdictions, to render any
opinion interpreting this Act, in writing, to persons covered by
this Act, subject in each instance to the approval by affirmative
vote of the majority of the particular House concerned.
The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other
individual involved in a similar factual situation, and who, after
issuance of the opinion acts in good faith in accordance with it
shall not be subject to any sanction provided in this Act.
(c) The heads of other offices shall perform the duties stated in
subsections (a) and (b) hereof insofar as their respective
offices are concerned, subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Justice, in the case of the Executive Department and the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in the case of the Judicial
Department.
Section 11. Penalties. - (a) Any public official or employee,
regardless of whether or not he holds office or employment in a
casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular capacity,
committing any violation of this Act shall be punished with a
fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary or

suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or removal depending
on the gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by
the appropriate body or agency. If the violation is punishable by
a heavier penalty under another law, he shall be prosecuted
under the latter statute. Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this
Act shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five
(5) years, or a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court of
competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office.
appropriations of the Civil Service Commission. Thereafter,

such sum as may be needed for its continued implementation
shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative

proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of
a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is
instituted against him.
Section 16. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees and orders

or parts thereof inconsistent herewith, are deemed repealed or
modified accordingly, unless the same provide for a heavier
penalty.
(c) Private individuals who participate in conspiracy as coprincipals, accomplices or accessories, with public officials or
employees, in violation of this Act, shall be subject to the same
penal liabilities as the public officials or employees and shall be
tried jointly with them.
Section 17. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after thirty
(30) days following the completion of its publication in the
Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
(d) The official or employee concerned may bring an action

against any person who obtains or uses a report for any
purpose prohibited by Section 8 (D) of this Act. The Court in
which such action is brought may assess against such person
a penalty in any amount not to exceed twenty-five thousand
pesos (P25,000). If another sanction hereunder or under any
other law is heavier, the latter shall apply.
Section 12. Promulgation of Rules and Regulations,
Administration and Enforcement of this Act. - The Civil Service
Commission shall have the primary responsibility for the
administration and enforcement of this Act. It shall transmit all
cases for prosecution arising from violations of this Act to the
proper authorities for appropriate action: Provided, however,
That it may institute such administrative actions and
disciplinary measures as may be warranted in accordance with
law. Nothing in this provision shall be construed as a
deprivation of the right of each House of Congress to discipline
its Members for disorderly behavior.
The Civil Service Commission is hereby authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act, including guidelines for individuals who
render free voluntary service to the Government. The
Ombudsman shall likewise take steps to protect citizens who
denounce acts or omissions of public officials and employees
which are in violation of this Act.
Section 13. Provisions for More Stringent Standards. - Nothing
in this Act shall be construed to derogate from any law, or any
regulation prescribed by any body or agency, which provides
for more stringent standards for its official and employees.
Section 14. Appropriations. - The sum necessary for the
effective implementation of this Act shall be taken from the
Section 15. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act or

the application of such provision to any person or circumstance
is declared invalid, the remainder of the Act or the application
of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not
be affected by such declaration.
Approved, February 20, 1989.

RA No. 1379
REPUBLIC ACT No. 1379
AN ACT DECLARING FORFEITURE IN FAVOR OF THE
STATE ANY PROPERTY FOUND TO HAVE BEEN
UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR
EMPLOYEE AND PROVIDING FOR THE PROCEEDINGS
THEREFOR.
Section 1. Definitions. (a) For the purposes of this Act, a
"public officer or employee" means any person holding any
public office or employment by virtue of an appointment,
election or contract, and any person holding any office or
employment, by appointment or contract, in any State owned
or controlled corporation or enterprise.
(b) "Other legitimately acquired property" means any real or
personal property, money or securities which the respondent
has at any time acquired by inheritance and the income
thereof, or by gift inter vivos before his becoming a public
officer or employee, or any property (or income thereof)
already pertaining to him when he qualified for public office or
employment, or the fruits and income of the exclusive property
of the respondent's spouse. It shall not include:
1. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its
ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name of,
or held by, the respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants,
relatives, or any other person.

2. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but
transferred by him to another person or persons on or after the
effectivity of this Act.
3. Property donated to the respondent during his incumbency,
unless he can prove to the satisfaction of the court that the
donation is lawful.
Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or
employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of
property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income
and the income from legitimately acquired property, said
property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired. The Solicitor General, upon complaint by
any taxpayer to the city or provincial fiscal who shall conduct a
previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal
cases and shall certify to the Solicitor General that there is
reasonable ground to believe that there has been committed a
violation of this Act and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, shall file, in the name and on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines, in the Court of First Instance of the city or
province where said public officer or employee resides or holds
office, a petition for a writ commanding said officer or employee
to show cause why the property aforesaid, or any part thereof,
should not be declared property of the State: Provided, That no
such petition shall be filed within one year before any general
election or within three months before any special election.
The resignation, dismissal or separation of the officer or
employee from his office or employment in the Government or
in the Government-owned or controlled corporation shall not be
a bar to the filing of the petition:Provided, however, That the
right to file such petition shall prescribe after four years from
the date of the resignation, dismissal or separation or
expiration of the term of the office or employee concerned,
except as to those who have ceased to hold office within ten
years prior to the approval of this Act, in which case the
proceedings shall prescribe after four years from the approval
hereof.
Section 3. The petition. The petition shall contain the following
information:
(a) The name and address of the respondent.
(b) The public officer or employment he holds and such other
public offices or employment which he has previously held.
(c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired
during his incumbency in his past and present offices and
employments.
(d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been
identified by the Solicitor General.
(e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper
earnings and incomes from legitimately acquired property, and
(f) Such other information as may enable the court to
determine whether or not the respondent has unlawfully
acquired property during his incumbency.
Section 4. Period for the answer. The respondent shall have a
period of fifteen days within which to present his answer.
Section 5. Hearing. The Court shall set a date for a hearing,
which may be open to the public, and during which the
respondent shall be given ample opportunity to explain, to the
satisfaction of the court, how he has acquired the property in
question.
Section 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to
the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the
property in question, then the court shall declare such property,
forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment
the property aforesaid shall become property of the
State: Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered within six
months before any general election or within three months
before any special election. The Court may, in addition, refer
this case to the corresponding Executive Department for
administrative or criminal action, or both.
Section 7. Appeal. The parties may appeal from the judgment
of the Court of First Instance as provided in the Rules of Court
for appeals in civil cases.
Section 8. Protection against self-incrimination. Neither the
respondent nor any other person shall be excused from
attending and testifying or from producing books, papers,
correspondence, memoranda and other records on the ground
that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise,
required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to
prosecution; but no individual shall be prosecuted criminally for
or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning
which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise, except that such individual so
testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and conviction
for perjury or false testimony committed in so testifying or from
administrative proceedings.
Section 9. Immunity. The Solicitor General may grant immunity
from criminal prosecution to any person who testifies to the
unlawful manner in which the respondent has acquired any of
the property in question in cases where such testimony is
necessary to prove violations of this Act.
Section 10. Effect of record of title. The fact that any real
property has been recorded in the Registry of Property or office
of the Register of Deeds in the name of the respondent or of

any person mentioned in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection
(b) of section one hereof shall not prevent the rendering of the
judgment referred to in section six of this Act.
Section 11. Laws on prescription. The laws concerning
acquisitive prescription and limitation of actions cannot be
invoked by, nor shall they benefit the respondent, in respect of
any property unlawfully acquired by him.
Section 12. Penalties. Any public officer or employee who
shall, after the effective date of this Act, transfer or convey any
unlawfully acquired property shall be repressed with
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine not
exceeding ten thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and
fine. The same repression shall be imposed upon any person
who shall knowingly accept such transfer or conveyance.
Section 13. Separability of provisions. If any provision of this
Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is
held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of
such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be
affected thereby.
Section 14. Effective date. This Act shall take effect on its
approval, and shall apply not only to property thereafter
unlawfully acquired but also to property unlawfully acquired
before the effective date of this Act.
Approved: June 18, 1955
PD No. 749
MALACAANG
Manila
WHEREAS, it has heretofore been virtually impossible to

secure the conviction and removal of dishonest public servants
owing to the lack of witnesses: the bribe or gift-givers being
always reluctant to testify against the corrupt public officials
and employees concerned for fear of being indicted and
convicted themselves of bribery and corruption;
WHEREAS, it is better by far and more socially desirable, as
well as just, that the bribe or gift giver be granted immunity
from prosecution so that he may freely testify as to the official
corruption, than that the official who receives the bribe or gift
should be allowed to go free, insolently remaining in public
office, and continuing with his nefarious and corrupt practices,
to the great detriment of the public service and the public
interest.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the
Constitution, do hereby decree and order that:
Section 1. Any person who voluntarily gives information about
any violation of Articles 210, 211, and 212 of the Revised Penal
Code; Republic Act Numbered Three Thousand Nineteen, as
amended; Section 345 of the Internal Revenue Code and
Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and other
provisions of the said Codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on
the part of the public officials concerned; and other laws, rules
and regulations punishing acts of graft, corruption and other
forms of official abuse; and who willingly testifies against any
public official or employee for such violation shall be exempt
from prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference
to which his information and testimony were given, and may
plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in
bar of such prosecution: Provided; that this immunity may be
enjoyed even in cases where the information and testimony
are given against a person who is not a public official but who
is a principal, or accomplice, or accessory in the commission of
any of the above-mentioned violations: Provided, further, that
this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness
notwithstanding that he offered or gave the bribe or gift to the
public official or his accomplice for such gift or bribe-giving;
and Provided, finally, that the following conditions concur:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 749 July 18, 1975
1. The information must refer to consummated violations of any

of the above-mentioned provisions of law, rules and
regulations;
GRANTING IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION TO GIVERS

OF BRIBES AND OTHER GIFTS AND TO THEIR
ACCOMPLICES IN BRIBERY AND OTHER GRAFT CASES
AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS
2. The information and testimony are necessary for the

conviction of the accused public officer;
WHEREAS, public office is a public trust: public officers are but

servants of the people, whom they must serve with utmost
fidelity and integrity;
3. Such information and testimony are not yet in the

possession of the State;
4. Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its
material points; and

5. The informant or witness has not been previously convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives

of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 2. The immunity granted hereunder shall not attach

should it turn out subsequently that the information and/or
testimony is false and malicious or made only for the purpose
of harassing, molesting or in any way prejudicing the public
officer denounced. In such a case, the public officer so
denounced shall be entitled to any action, civil or criminal,
against said informant or witness.
SECTION 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the

"Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007".
Section 3. All preliminary investigations conducted by a

prosecuting fiscal, judge or committee, and all proceedings
undertaken in connection therewith, shall be strictly confidential
or private in order to protect the reputation of the official under
investigation in the event that the report proves to be
unfounded or no prima facie case is established.
Section 4. All acts, decrees and rules and regulations
inconsistent with the provisions of this decree are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 5. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 18th day of July, in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-five.
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the

policy of the State to promote integrity, accountability, proper
management of public affairs and public property as well as to
establish effective practices aimed at the prevention of graft
and corruption in government. Towards this end, the State shall
maintain honesty and responsibility among its public officials
and employees, and shall take appropriate measures to
promote transparency in each agency with regard to the
manner of transacting with the public, which shall encompass a
program for the adoption of simplified procedures that will
reduce red tape and expedite transactions in government.
SEC. 3. Coverage. - This Act shall apply to all government
offices and agencies including local government units and
government-owned or -controlled corporations that provide
frontline services as defined in this Act. Those performing
judicial, quasi-judicial and legislative functions are excluded
from the coverage of this Act.
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the
following terms are defined as follows:
(a) "Simple Transactions" refer to requests or applications
submitted by clients of a government office or agency which
only require ministerial actions on the part of the public officer
or employee, or that which present only inconsequential issues
for the resolution by an officer or employee of said government
office.
RA No. 9485
Metro Manila
Thirteenth Congress
Third Special Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the nineteenth
day of February, two thousand seven.
June 02, 2007
AN ACT TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY IN THE DELIVERY OF

GOVERNMENT SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC BY REDUCING
BUREAUCRATIC RED TAPE, PREVENTING GRAFT AND
CORRUPTION, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFOR
(b) "Complex Transactions" refer to requests or applications

submitted by clients of a government office which necessitate
the use of discretion in the resolution of complicated issues by
an officer or employee of said government office, such
transaction to be determined by the office concerned.
(c) "Frontline Service" refers to the process or transaction
between clients and government offices or agencies involving
applications for any privilege, right, permit, reward, license,
concession, or for any modification, renewal or extension of the
enumerated applications and/or requests which are acted upon
in the ordinary course of business of the agency or office
concerned.
(d) "Action" refers to the written approval or disapproval made
by a government office or agency on the application or request
submitted by a client for processing.
(e) "Officer or Employee" refers to a person employed in a
government office or agency required to perform specific duties

and responsibilities related to the application or request
submitted by a client for processing.
SEC. 8. Accessing Frontline Services. - The following shall

be adopted by all government offices and agencies:
(f) "Irrevelant requirement" refer to any document or

performance of an act not directly material to the resolution of
the issues raised in the request or needed in the application
submitted by the client.
(a) Acceptance of Applications and Request - (1) All officers or

employees shall accept written applications, requests, and/or
documents being submitted by clients of the office or agencies.
(g) "Fixer" refers to any individual whether or not officially

involved in the operation of a government office or agency who
has access to people working therein, and whether or not in
collusion with them, facilitates speedy completion of
transactions for pecuniary gain or any other advantage or
consideration.
SEC. 5 Reengineering of Systems and Procedures. - All
offices and agencies which provide frontline services are
hereby mandated to regularly undertake time and motion
studies, undergo evaluation and improvement of their
transaction systems and procedures and re-engineer the same
if deemed necessary to reduce bureaucratic red tape and
processing time.
SEC. 6. Citizen's Charter. - All government agencies including
departments,
bureaus,
offices,
instrumentalities,
or
government-owned and/or controlled corporations, or local
government or district units shall set up their respective service
standards to be known as the Citizen's Charter in the form of
information billboards which should be posted at the main
entrance of offices or at the most conspicuous place, and in
the form of published materials written either in English,
Filipino, or in the local dialect, that detail:
(a) The procedure to obtain a particular service;
(b) The person/s responsible for each step;
(c) The maximum time to conclude the process;
(d) The document/s to be presented by the customer, if
necessary;
(e) The amount of fees, if necessary; and
(f) The procedure for filing complaints.
SEC. 7. Accountability of the Heads of Offices and
Agencies. - The head of the office or agency shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of this Act and shall be held
accountable to the public in rendering fast, efficient, convenient
and reliable service. All transactions and processes are
deemed to have been made with the permission or clearance
from the highest authority having jurisdiction over the
government office or agency concerned.
(2) The responsible officer or employee shall acknowledge

receipt of such application and/or request by writing or printing
clearly thereon his/her name, the unit where he/she is
connected with, and the time and date of receipt.
(3) The receiving officer or employee shall perform a
preliminary assessment of the request so as to promote a
more expeditious action on requests.
(b) Action of Offices - (1) All applications and/or requests
submitted shall be acted upon by the assigned officer or
employee during the period stated in the Citizen's Charter
which shall not be longer than five working days in the case of
simple transactions and ten (10) working days in the case of
complex transactions from the date the request or application
was received. Depending on the nature of the frontline services
requested or the mandate of the office or agency under
unusual circumstances, the maximum time prescribed above
may be extended. For the extension due to nature of frontline
services or the mandate of the office or agency concerned the
period for the delivery of frontline services shall be indicated in
the Citizen's Charter. The office or agency concerned shall
notify the requesting party in writing of the reason for the
extension and the final date of release for the extension and
the final date of release of the frontline service/s requested.
(2) No application or request shall be returned to the client
without appropriate action. In case an application or request is
disapproved, the officer or employee who rendered the
decision shall send a formal notice to the client within five
working days from the receipt of the request and/or application,
stating therein the reason for the disapproval including a list of
specific requirement/s which the client failed to submit.
(c) Denial of Request for Access to Government Service - Any
denial of request for access to government service shall be
fully explained in writing, stating the name of the person
making the denial and the grounds upon which such denial is
based. Any denial of request is deemed to have been made
with the permission or clearance from the highest authority
having jurisdiction over the government office or agency
concerned.
(d) Limitation of Signatories - The number of signatories in any
document shall be limited to a maximum of five signatures
which shall represent officers directly supervising the office or
agency concerned.

(e) Adoption of Working Schedules to Serve Clients - Heads of
offices and agencies which render frontline services shall
adopt appropriate working schedules to ensure that all clients
who are within their premises prior to the end of official working
hours are attended to and served even during lunch break and
after regular working hours.
(f) Identification Card - All employees transacting with the
public shall be provided with an official identification card which
should be visibly worn during office hours.
(g) Establishment of Public Assistance/Complaints Desk - Each
office or agency shall establish a public assistance/complaints
desk in all their offices.
SEC. 9. Automatic Extension of Permits and Licenses. - - If
a government office or agency fails to act on an application
and/or request for renewal of a license, permit or authority
subject for renewal within the prescribed period, said permit,
license or authority shall automatically be extended until a
decision or resolution is rendered on the application for
renewal: Provided, That the automatic extension shall not
apply when the permit, license, or authority covers activities
which pose danger to public health, public safety, public morals
or to public policy including, but not limited to, natural resource
extraction activities.
SEC. 10. Report Card Survey. - All offices and agencies
providing frontline services shall be subjected to a Report Card
Survey to be initiated by the Civil Service Commission, in
coordination with the Development Academy of the Philippines,
which shall be used to obtain feedback on how provisions in
the Citizen's Charter are being followed and how the agency is
performing.
The Report Card Survey shall also be used to obtain
information and/or estimates of hidden costs incurred by clients
to access frontline services which may include, but is not
limited to, bribes and payment to fixers.
A feedback mechanism shall be established in all agencies
covered by this Act and the results thereof shall be
incorporated in their annual report.
SEC. 11. Violations. - After compliance with the substantive
and procedural due process, the following shall constitute
violations of this Act together with their corresponding
penalties:
(a) Light Offense - (1) Refusal to accept application and/or
request within the prescribed period or any document being
submitted by a client;
(2) Failure to act on an application and/or request or failure to

refer back to the client a request which cannot be acted upon
due to lack of requirement/s within the prescribed period;
(3) Failure to attend to clients who are within the premises of
the office or agency concerned prior to the end of official
working hours and during lunch
(4) Failure to render frontline services within the prescribed
period on any application and/or request without due cause;
(5) Failure to give the client a written notice on the disapproval
of an application or request; and
(6) Imposition of additional irrelevant requirements other than
those listed in the first notice.
Penalties for light offense shall be as follows:
First Offense - Thirty (30) days suspension without pay and
mandatory attendance in Values Orientation Program;
Second Offense - Three (3) months suspension without pay;
and
Third Offense - Dismissal and perpetual disqualification from
public service.
(b) Grave Offense - Fixing and/or collusion with fixers in
consideration of economic and/or other gain or advantage.
Penalty - Dismissal and perpetual disqualification from public
service.
SEC. 12. Criminal Liability for Fixers. - In addition to Sec. 11
(b), fixers, as defined in this Act, shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment not exceeding six years or a fine not less than
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not more than Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) or both fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
SEC. 13. Civil and Criminal Liability, Not Barred. - The
finding of administrative liability under this Act shall not be a
bar to the filing of criminal, civil or other related charges under
existing laws arising from the same act or omission as herein
enumerated.
SEC. 14. Administrative Jurisdiction. - The administrative
jurisdiction on any violation of the provisions of this Act shall be
vested in either the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) or the Office of the
Ombudsman as determined by appropriate laws and
issuances.

SEC. 15. Immunity; Discharge of Co-Respondent/Accused
to be a Witness. - Any public official or employee or any
person having been charged with another under this Act and
who voluntarily gives information pertaining to an investigation
or who willingly testifies therefore, shall be exempt from
prosecution in the case/s where his/her information and
testimony are given. The discharge may be granted and
directed by the investigating body or court upon the application
or petition of any of the respondent/accused-informant and
before the termination of the investigation: Provided, That:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
respondent/accused-informant whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of
said respondent/accused-informant;
(c) The testimony of said respondent/accused-informant can
be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) The responden/accused-informant has not been previously
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; and
(e) Said responden/accused-informant does not appear to be
the most guilty.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall
automatically form part of the records of the investigation.
Should the investigating body or court deny the motion or
request for discharge as a witness, his/her sworn statement
shall be inadmissible as evidence.
SEC. 16. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Civil
Service Commission in coordination with the Development
Academy of the Philippines (DAP), the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
(PAGC), shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations
within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act.
SEC. 17. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act
shall be declared invalid or unconstitutional, such declaration
shall not affect the validity of the remaining provisions of this
Act.
SEC. 18. Repealing Clause. - All provisions of laws,
presidential decrees, letters of instruction and other
presidential issuances which are incompatible or inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby deemed amended or
repealed.
SEC. 19. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect within fifteen
(15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in
two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: JUN 02, 2007
PLUNDER
RA No. 7080
Metro Manila
Eighth Congress
July 12, 1991
AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF

PLUNDER
the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Definition of Terms - As used in this Act, the term a) Public Officer means any person holding any public office in
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of
an appointment, election or contract.
b) Government includes the National Government, and any of
its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.
c) Person includes any natural or juridical person, unless the
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business
enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates
and/or business associates by any combination or series of the
following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,
share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary
benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer concerned;

3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of
assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or governmentowned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself
or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice
of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
See Section 2 As amended by Section 12 of RA No.7659
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in
Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of
at least Seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by life
imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification from
holding any public office. Any person who participated with said
public officer in the commission of plunder shall likewise be
punished. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances shall be considered by the court. The court shall
declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and
other incomes and assets including the properties and shares
of stock derived from the deposit or investment thereof
forfeited in favor of the State.
Section 3. Competent Court - Until otherwise provided by
law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Section 4. Rule of Evidence - For purposes of establishing
the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each
and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of
the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
Section 5. Suspension and Loss of Benefits - Any public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended

from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and other benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime, administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
Section 6. Prescription of Crimes - The crime punishable
under this Act shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. However,
the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired
by public officers from them or from their nominees or
transferees shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or
estoppel.
Section 7. Separability of Provisions - If any provisions of
this Act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this
Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Section 8. Scope - This Act shall not apply to or affect pending
prosecutions or proceedings, or those which may be instituted
under Executive Order No. 1, issued and promulgated on
February 28, 1986.
Section 9. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect after fifteen
(15) days from its publication in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation.
Approved: July 12, 1991
MALVERSATION
LABATAGOS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71581 March 21, 1990

CARMEN LABATAGOS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Guerrero, Carmelo, De Silva, Lagmay & Lazo Law Office and
Pedro R. Lazo for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) * in Criminal Case No. 4799,
finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crime of malversation of public funds defined
and penalized under Article 217, par. 4 of the Revised Penal
Code.
From January 1978 to December 1980, petitioner Carmen
Labatagos was the cashier and collecting officer of the
Mindanao State University MSU General Santos City. She filed
a leave of absence for the months of March, April and May
1978 and did not discharge her duties for the said period.
On 1 October 1980, Francisco T. Rivera, under Commission on
Audit (COA) General Order No. 8022-117 (Exh. C) was
designated leader of a team to conduct the examination of the
cash and accounts of the petitioner. When the team conducted
the examination, the petitioner did not have any cash in her
posssession, so she was asked to produce all her records,
books of collection, copies of official receipts and remittance
advices and her monthly reports of collections.
Based on the official receipts and the record of remittances for
the period from January to August 1978, the audit examination
disclosed that the petitioner collected the total amount of
P113,205.58 (Exhs. A-1 and A-2) and made a total remittance
to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the
depository bank of the university, in the amount of P78,868.69,
leaving an unremitted amount of P34,336.19.
On the basis of similar official receipts and record of
remittances, the audit examination further disclosed that for the
period from January 1979 to June 6, 1980, the petitioner made
a total collection of P327,982.00 (Exhs. B, B-1, and B-1-a) and
remitted to the DBP the total amount of P256,606.25 (Exhs. B2 and B-2-a) incurring a shortage of P71,365.75.
The petitioner signed without exception both Reports of
Examination (Exhs. A and B) as well as their supporting
summaries.
Thereafter, Francisco T. Rivera submitted his report on the

examination to the Chairman, Commission on Audit, through
the Regional Director, COA, Region IX (Exhs. A-4 and B-4).
Subsequently, Rivera prepared the letters of demand
corresponding to the two (2) audit reports (Exhs. A-3 and B-3)
and served them personally on the petitioner who signed both
letters. Despite the demand letters, the petitioner did not
submit any explanation of her shortages.
Hence, on 27 October 1981, the Tanodbayan filed with the
Sandiganbayan an information charging petitioner with the
crime of Malversation of Public Funds, committed as follows:
That between the periods January 1978 to August 17, 1978,
and January 1, 1979 to June 6, 1980, in General Santos City,
Philippines, the said accused a public officer being then the
Cashier and Collecting Officer of the Mindanao State
University, General Santos Unit, General Santos City, who, by
reason of the duties of her office was charged with the duty of
collecting school dues and tuition fees of the students of said
school, and of remitting to, or depositing with, the school's
depository bank, the Development Bank of the Philippines,
General Santos City branch, all money collections by way of
school dues and tuition fees she collected as Cashier and
Collecting Officer, was responsible and accountable for the
funds collected and received by her, by reason of her position
as Collecting Officer, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
fraudulently, and with grave abuse of confidence,
misappropriate, and embezzle the total sum of ONE
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED ELEVEN
AND 94/100 P105,711.94), Philippine Currency, out of her
collection of P441,187.58, during the aforesaid period, which
sum of P105,711.94 she appropriated and converted to her
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
the Republic of the Philippines in said amount. 1
During the trial, petitioner in her defense claimed that she
signed the audit reports on the understanding that her shortage
would amount to only P2,000.00; that she could not be held
accountable for the collections for March, April and May 1978
because she was on maternity leave; and that several
disbursements in the total amount of P49,417.12 were not
credited in her favor by the auditors. She claimed further that
she should not be held accountable for the alleged
misappropriations between the months of January 1978 and
August 1978 in the amount of P34,336.19 because those who
appropriated the amounts were her superiors and that the
amounts taken were properly receipted but that the receipts
were lost.
Respondent Sandiganbayan, however, did not give weight nor
credence to her defense. Hence, as previously stated,
petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of malversation of public funds.

The petitioner then filed the instant petition, and alleged the
following reasons why the petition should be granted; (1) that
respondent court made manifestly mistaken inferences and
misapprehended the significance of the evidence which
resulted in the erroneous decision rendered in the case; and
(2) that respondent court erred in finding the petitioner guilty of
the crime charged when there is ample evidence submitted
showing that she did not put the missing funds to her personal
use.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the
guilt of the petitioner has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
The established facts show that respondent court did not err in
convicting petitioner for the crime of malversation. As held by
said court:
There is no merit in the accused's defense. Her claim that she
signed the audit report and statement of collections and
deposits prepared by the audit team of Francisco Rivera on the
understanding that her shortage was only P2,000.00 is belied
by the figures clearly reflected on the said documents. Exhibit
A, the audit report which she signed without exception, shows
that she incurred a shortage of P34,336.19 for the period from
January to August 1978; while Exhibit A-1, the statement of her
collections and deposits for the same period which she
certified as correct, indicates the same amount of P34,336.19
as her shortage.
Mrs. Ester Guanzon, the prosecution's rebuttal witness,
confirmed that she assisted the accused in the collection of
fees; that the accused filed application for maternity leave in
March 1978 but continued reporting for work during that month;
that the accused did not report for work in April 1978; and that
she (Guanzon) was the one assigned to collect the fees in her
stead. Miss Guanzon, however, explained that she turned over
all her collections to the accused during all the times that she
was assisting her in collecting the fees; and that even in April
1978 when the accused was physically absent from office, she
also turned over her collections to the accused ill the latters
house with the duplicate copies of the receipts she issued
which the accused signed after satisfying herself that the
amounts I turned over tallied with the receipts.
October 22, 1980. (Exh. 5) The first sum, P7,140.20,

purporting to be refunds of tuition fees to students granted
tuition privilages is hot supported by any official authorization
for such refunds by the University authorities. Besides, the
supposed list of students who were recipients of the refunds
(Exh. 10) is incompetent evidence being a mere xerox copy
uncertified as a true copy of an existing original.
The second sum, P4,494.80 was purportedly spent for the cost
of uniforms of the school and basketball balls. P2,100.00 in all
(Exhs. 6 and 6-A), and the balance taken by Alikhan
Marohombsar and Auditor Casan, (Exh. 6-B). The third
amount, P6,702.12, was supposedly covered by vouchers
submitted to the Auditor's office through Rosa Cabiguin. (Exh.
12-K) Again, the auditor did not err in not crediting the
aforesaid sums to the accused's accountability. The P2,100.00
cost of uniforms and balls, unsupported by a duly
accomplished and approved voucher, was not a valid
disbursement. And since the alleged vouchers for P6,792.12
were not presented in evidence nor was any effort exerted to
compel their production in court by subpoena duces tecum, the
same was properly refused to be deduced from the incurred
shortage of the accused.
All the other sums allegedly taken from the accused by
Director Osop, Alikhan Marohombsar and Auditor Casan
totalling P31,070.00. (Exhs. 12, 12-A, etc., 13-A and 14-A),
supported as they are by mere pieces of paper, despite the
admission by Director Osop of having signed some of them
(Exhs. 12-A, 12-D, 12-E and 12-I) were not valid
disbursements. Granting that the amounts reflected in the chits
were really secured by the persons who signed them, the
responsibility to account for them still rests in the accused
accountable officer. Malversation consists not only ill
misappropriation or converting public funds or property to one's
personal use but also by knowingly allowing others to make
use of or misappropriate them. 2
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the
questioned decision of respondent court and the issues raised
in this petition being essentially factual, the petition for review
is DENIED and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ILOGON v. SANDIGANBAYAN
SUPREME COURT
Manila
There is color of truth to Mrs. Guanzon's explanation. All the

collections for the months of March and April 1978 are fully
accounted for they are itemized in the reports of collection,
(Exhs. F and G) and shown to have been duly remitted in the
remittance advices for those months. (Exhs. F-1 to F-5; G-1
and G-2).
EN BANC
G.R. No. 102356
The auditor was correct in refusing to credit the accused with

the three (3) different amounts mentioned in her letter of
February 9, 1993

CALINICO B. ILOGON, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
cash items
allowed 13,012.00 P 53,128.13
Florecita V. Bilbes for petitioner.
Shortage P 118,871.29 1
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
=========
The amount of shortage was later reduced to P118,003.10.

This shortage represents the following:
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
1. Vales P 8,846.00
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision * of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 9776 entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Calinico B. Ilogon", dated May 14, 1991
finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentencing him to the indeterminate
penalty of from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with
the accessory penalties of the law; to suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine in the sum
of P118,003.10, an amount equal to the amount malversed,
with costs.
Petitioner Calinico B. Ilogon was the acting Postmaster of the
Bureau of Posts in Cagayan de Oro City from July, 1978 to
January, 1986. He likewise performed the task of accepting
payments, making collections and effecting disbursement as
there was no cashier employed during the period of his
incumbency. He was adept at this work because, before his
designation as Acting Postmaster he was, as a matter of fact, a
duly-appointed cashier.
2. Cash shortage (paid vouchers) already reimbursed and/or

paid and received by you P 48,028.58
3. Cash items disallowed (paid vouchers) already reimbursed
and/or paid and received by individual creditors P 5,787.97
4. Cash items disallowed (paid vouchers) amount disallowed
by the Regional Office P 31,036.85
5. Cash items disallowed (paid vouchers) amount still payable
non-budgetry expenses as certified by the accountant P
19,555.84
6. Actual shortage P 4,747.86
P 118,003.10 2
=========
On September 19, 1983, Commission on Audit Auditors Robin

S. Aban and Alfonso A. Gala conducted an examination of the
cash and accounts of petitioner covering the period from
September 8, 1983 to September 13, 1988. The examination
showed that the petitioner incurred a shortage in his accounts
amounting to P118,871.29 itemized in the following manner:
Accountability:
Balance shown by your
cashbook on September 12, 1983
certified correct by you
and verified by us P171,999.42
Credits to Accountability:
Deduct:
Cash, checks, and treasury
warrants P 40,116.13
On November 27, 1984, petitioner was charged with the crime

of Malversation of Public Funds as defined and penalized
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in an
Information 3 which reads as follows:
That on or about September 13, 1983 or prior and subsequent
thereto, in Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Tribunal, the said accused, a
public officer, being the Acting Postmaster of the Bureau of
Posts of the said City, and as such accountable for the public
funds collected and received by reason of his position, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with grave
abuse of confidence misappropriate, misapply and embezzle
for his own personal use and benefit from the said funds, the
total sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND AND
THREE PESOS AND TEN CENTAVOS (P118,003.10)
Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Before the Sandiganbayan, herein petitioner put up the
following defense:
1. In respect to the shortage of P8,846.00, Item 1 in the
auditor's letter of demand, the amount represents vales (cash
advances) granted to postal employees of Cagayan de Oro
City in payment of salaries or wages which the accused paid
out to them, even before the period for which they were
supposed to be paid. He received reimbursement checks on
the 20th or 25th September, 1983 in payment thereof, but he
remitted these payments to the Land Bank of the Philippines
only on October 17, 1983, per Official Receipt Number 312164.
...
2. As regards that category of shortage amounting to
P48,028.58, the accused claims that this amount represents
the aggregate of the cash advances to salaries of the Regional
Director, Postal Inspector, and postal employees of Davao,
Iloilo and other places who were assigned in Cagayan de Oro
City. The accused did not have these amounts on hand when
his cash and account were audited on September 13, 1983,
because the reimbursements for the said cash advances were
not yet in his possession. If they were, the amounts given were
less than the amounts stated in the voucher, consisting,
therefore, of partial liquidations. In case of a partial liquidation,
he would simply annotate the partial payment in the voucher.
He would not enter partial payments in the cash book.
3. Respecting that category of shortage amounting to
P5,787.97, the accused explained that this shortage
constituted cash advances to postal employees. While
reimbursement checks had already been paid to the
employees involved by the Regional Office of the Bureau of
Posts, these employees had negotiated or encashed their
reimbursement checks without turning over the proceeds
thereof to the accused Acting Postmaster.
The accused claims that the shortage had later been paid
through a remittance he made in the Sum of P20,438.60,
Exhibit "14", and in the amount of P65,000.00, Exhibit "10"
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, as regards the cash shortage of P4,747.86, the
accused admitted the fact that he did not actually have this
amount of cash when, during the audit, he was told to present
all his cash on hand. It is his claim that all the while, this
amount had in fact been in the possession of his teller. While
he forgot to tell the auditors that the cash was actually with the
teller, he remitted this amount to the Land Bank on September
19, 1983, as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 31176, Exhibit
"11". 4
After trial, the respondent Sandiganbayan found petitioner

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Hence,
this appeal.
Petitioner would try to evade the application of Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code by arguing that he never
misappropriated the amount of P118,003.10 for his own
personal use as the bulk of it was given as cash advances to
his co-employees. He pleads:
. . . the act of petitioner in giving out vales and/or cash
advances should not be condemned or be considered as a
criminal act but should instead be lauded not only because the
same was done purely for humanitarian reasons and that is to
alleviate the plight of his co-employees during those hard times
when the salaries of lowly government employees were very
much below the ordinary level of subsistence and his desire to
see to it that the public interest will not be jeopardized, . . ., but
also because this has been the undisturbed practice in their
office since time immemorial, even before the accused's
incumbency . . . . 5
Petitioner's argument fails to persuade Us.
In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction
is proof that the accountable officer had received public funds
and that he did not have them in his possession when demand
therefor was made. There is even no need of direct evidence
of personal misappropriation as long as there is a shortage in
his account and petitioner cannot satisfactorily explain the
same. 6
In this case, petitioner was the official custodian of the missing
funds. He himself admitted the shortage of P118,003.10 in his
cash and accounts as Acting Postmaster but could not give a
satisfactory explanation for the same. he would invoke what he
calls "humanitarian reasons" as the justification for the said
shortage.
But,
like
the
accused Cabello
v. Sandiganbayan, 7 petitioner herein knows that his granting of
"chits" and "vales" which constituted the bulk of the shortage
was a violation of the postal rules and regulations. Such
practice, it was held in Cabello, is also prohibited by
Memoramdum Circular No. 570, dated June 29, 1968, of the
General Auditing Office. This Court went further to state that
"giving vales" is proscribed under Presidential Decree No.
1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines, specifically Section 69 thereof, which provides
that postmasters are only allowed to use their collections to
pay money orders, telegraphic transfers and withdrawals from
the proper depository bank whenever their cash advances for
the purpose are exhausted." 8
The fact that petitioner did not personally use the missing
funds is not a valid defense and will not exculpate him from his
criminal liability. And as aptly found by respondent
Sandiganbayan, "the fact that (the) immediate superiors of the

accused (petitioner herein) have acquiesced to the practice of
giving out cash advances for convenience did not legalize the
disbursements".
(4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor, to suffer

eight (8) years and one (1) day of temporary special
disqualification and to pay the costs of this action.
The fact also that petitioner fully settled the amount of

P188,003.10 later is of no moment. The return of funds
malversed is not a defense. It is neither an exempting
circumstance nor a ground for extinguishing the accused's
criminal liability. At best, it is a mitigating circumstance. 9
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)
In the light of the above finding and under the plain language of
the applicable laws, We hold that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the verdict finding the petitioner guilty of the crime
charged. The judgment of the Sandiganbayan is hereby
AFFIRMED and the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF PRISONERS
RODILLAS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-58652
May 20, 1988
ALFREDO RODILLAS Y BONDOC, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Santiago R. Robinol for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition brought by Alfredo Rodillas y Bondoc asking
for the reversal of a decision of the Sandiganbayan which
found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner Thru Negligence (Art. 224,
RPC). The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Alfredo Rodillas y Bondoc GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
as principal in the crime of Evasion through Negligence, as
defined and penalized under Article 224 of the Revised Penal
Code, and there being no modifying circumstance to consider,
hereby sentences him to suffer the straight penalty of FOUR
Petitioner Rodillas was charged with having committed the said

crime in an information which reads as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of March, 1980, in the City of
Caloocan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, said accused, being then a policeman duly
appointed and qualified as such, hence a public officer,
specially charged with the duty of keeping under his custody
and vigilance and of conducting and delivery from the City Jail,
Caloocan City to the Court of First Instance, Branch XXXIV,
Caloocan City and return, one Zenaida Sacris Andres, a
detention prisoner being tried for violation of Section 4, R.A.
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, under Crim. Case No. C-12888, did then and there with
great carelessness and unjustifiable negligence, allow and
permit said Zenaida Sacris Andres to have snacks and enter
the comfort room at the second floor of the Genato Building,
Rizal Avenue, Caloocan City after the hearing of said case,
v,,ithout first ascertaining for himself whether said comfort
room is safe and without any egress by which the said
detention prisoner could escape, thereby enabling said
Zenaida Sacris Andres, to run away and escape thru the
window inside the comfort room, as in fact she did run away
and escape from the custody of said accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p. 6)
The prosecution's evidence upon which the court based its
finding of guilt is summarized as follows:
... accused herein is a Patrolman of the Integrated National
Police Force of Caloocan City and assigned with the jail
section thereof. On March 27, 1980, when he reported for
work, he was directed by his superior, Corporal Victor
Victoriano, officer-in-charge in assigning police officers to
escort prisoners, to escort Zenaida Sacris deadline Andres, a
detention prisoner, before the sala of Judge Bernardo Pardo of
the Court of First Instance, Br.XXXIV, located at the Genato
Building, Caloocan City, to face trial for an alleged Violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as the policewoman officer
who was supposed to escort the said detainee was then sick.
He and the detainee proceeded to the court building and
arrived thereat between 8:30 and 9:00 o'clock in the morning.
while waiting for the arrival of the judge at the courtroom, Pat.
Orlando Andres, who happened to be in the court and a
relative of the husband of said detention prisoner Zenaida,
approached the accused and requested the latter if he could
permit Zenaida to talk to her husband. The accused consented
and Zenaida Andres had a short talk with her husband. After a
short while, the presiding judge deferred the decision against

her because of a new Presidential Decree revising some
provisions regarding violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The petitioner assigns the following errors:

I
After the court had already adjourned, the husband of Zenaida

requested the accused to allow them to have lunch as they
were already very hungry. He consented to the request and
they proceeded to the canteen located at the mezzanine floor
of the court building (Exhibit 1).<re||an1w> He took a seat
beside Zenaida and Pat. Andres while the relatives of said
detainee were seated at a separate table. While eating, the
husband of Zenaida asked him if he could accompany his wife
to the comfort room as she was not feeling well and felt like
defecating. The accused accompanied Zenaida and a lady
companion to the ladies' comfort room located at the second
floor of the building (Exibit 2). Zenaida and her lady companion
entered the comfort room, while he stood guard along the alley
near the ladies' comfort room facing the door thereof (Exhibit
5). Not long after, the lady companion of Zenaida came out of
the comfort room and told him that she was going to buy
sanitary napkins for Zenaida as the latter was then bleeding
and had a menstruation and could not go out of the comfort
room.
After ten minutes elapsed without the lady companion of
Zenaida coming back, the accused became suspicious and
entered the comfort room. To his surprise, he found Zenaida no
longer inside the comfort room. He noticed that the window of
said comfort room was not provided with window grills. He tried
to peep out of the window by stepping on the flush tank which
is just about 3 feet from the window and noticed that outside of
the window there was a concrete eave extending down to the
ground floor of the building which he presumed that Zenaida
might have used as a passage in escaping (Exhibits 2-A, 3 and
4 to 4-C). He immediately went out to look for the escapee
inside the building with the help of Pat. Andres but they were
not able to see her. Pat. Andres advised him to go to Zenaida's
house as she might be there, which home is located at Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. Pat. Andres having told him that the
husband of the escapee is from Rizal, Nueva Ecija, the
accused borrowed the car of his brother-in-law and proceeded
to said town. Upon arrival thereat, they contacted the relatives
of Zenaida and asked for information as to her whereabouts,
but they answered in the negative. They went back to
Caloocan City and went again directly to Bagong Barrio to the
house of Zenaida, arriving thereat at around 8:00 o'clock in the
evening. While at the residence of Zenaida, Cpl. Victoriano
arrived and the accused related to him about the escape of
Zenaida. He formally reported the matter of his superior officer
at the City Jail Capt. Leonardo Zamora. The accused declared
further that as a jailer, he never had any training nor lecture by
his superiors regarding the manner of delivering prisoners.
However, he admitted that he did not inspect first the comfort
room before he allowed Zenaida to enter because there were
many females going in and out of said comfort room, and that
he did not promptly report the escape earlier because they
were then pressed for time to intercept Zenaida at the highway.
(Rollo, pp. 18-21).
WHETHER
PETITIONER'S
CONVICTION
BY
THE
SANDIGANBAYAN BASED ONLY ON HIS ADMISSIONS
WITHOUT THE PROSECUTION HAVING PRESENTED
EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS NEGLIGENCE WILL LIE.
II
WHETHER THE ACTS OF PETITIONER COULD BE
QUALIFIED AS DEFINITE LAXITY AMOUNTING TO
DELIBERATE NON-PERFORMANCE OF DUTY TO SUSTAIN
HIS CONVICTION. (Brief for the petitioner, p. 5)
In essence, the sole question to be resolved in the case at bar
is whether, under the foregoing facts and circumstances, the
respondent Sandiganbayan committed a reversible error in
holding the petitioner guilty of infidelity in the custody of a
prisoner through negligence penalized under Art. 224 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner specifically alleges that his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan was based merely on his admissions without
the prosecution presenting evidence to prove his negligence.
Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that "the act,
declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him. The admissions and
declarations in open court of a person charged with a crime are
admissible against him. (See U.S. v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578).
The records show that the elements of the crime for which the
petitioner was convicted are present. Article 224 of the Revised
Penal Code states:
ART. 224. Evasion through negligence. If the evasion of the
prisoner shall have taken place through the negligence of the
officer charged with the conveyance or custody of the escaping
prisoner, said officer shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period and temporary special disqualification.
The elements of the crime under the abovementioned article
are: a) that the offender is a public officer; b) that he is charged
with the conveyance or custody of a prisoner, either detention
prisoner or prisoner by final judgment; and c) that such
prisoner escapes through his negligence (See Reyes, L.B.,
Revised Penal Code, Book II, 1977 ed., p. 407).
There is no question that the petitioner is a public officer.
Neither is there any dispute as to the fact that he was charged
with the custody of a prisoner who was being tried for a
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The only disputed issue is the petitioner's negligence resulting
in the escape of detention prisoner Zenaida Andres. The
negligence referred to in the Revised Penal Code is such
definite laxity as all but amounts to a deliberate nonperformance of duty on the part of the guard (Id., p. 408).
It is evident from the records that the petitioner acted
negligently and beyond the scope of his authority when he
permitted his charge to create the situation which led to her
escape. The petitioner contends that human considerations
compelled him to grant Zenaida Andres requests to take lunch
and to go to the comfort room to relieve herself.
As a police officer who was charged with the duty to return the
prisoner directly to jail, the deviation from his duty was clearly a
violation of the regulations.
In the first place, it was improper for the petitioner to take lunch
with the prisoner and her family when he was supposed to
bring his charge to the jail. He even allowed the prisoner and
her husband to talk to each other at the request of a co-officer.
It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner
to take necessary precautions to assure the absence of any
means of escape. A failure to undertake these precautions will
make his act one of definite laxity or negligence amounting to
deliberate non-performance of duty. His tolerance of
arrangements whereby the prisoner and her companions could
plan and make good her escape should have aroused the
suspicion of a person of ordinary prudence.
The request for lunch and the consequent delay was an
opportunity for the prisoner to learn of a plan or to carry out an
earlier plan by which she could escape. The plan was in fact
carried out with the help of the lady who accompanied his
prisoner inside the comfort room. The use of a toilet is one of
the most familiar and common place methods of escape. It is
inconceivable that a police officer should fall for this trick. The
arrangement with a lady friend should have aroused the
petitioner's suspicion because the only pretext given by the
petitioner was that she was going to answer the call of nature.
It was, therefore, unnecessary for her to be accompanied by
anyone especially by someone who was not urgently in need
of a toilet if the purpose was merely to relieve herself. Despite
this, the petitioner allowed the two to enter the comfort room
without first establishing for himself that there was no window
or door allowing the possibility of escape. He even allowed the
prisoner's companion to leave the premises with the excuse
that the prisoner was having her monthly period and that there
was a need to buy sanitary napkins. And he patiently waited for
more than ten minutes for the companion to return. This was
patent negligence and incredible naivette on the part of the
police officer.
Contrary to what the petitioner claims, the escape was not a
confluence of facts and,circumstances which were not
foreseen and were not unnatural in the course of things. Not

only should they have been foreseen but they should have
been guarded against.
Considering that the city jail was only a kilometer away and it
was only 11:30 a.m., it would not have been inhuman for the
petitioner to deny the prisoner's request to first take lunch.
Neither would it have been inhuman if he cleared the toilet of
female occupants and checked all possible exists first and if he
did not allow the lady companion to go with Zenaida Andres to
the comfort room. These human considerations, however, are
immaterial because the fact remains that as a police officer, he
should have exercised utmost diligence in the performance of
his duty.
The supposed confluence of facts does not alter his liability.
That he was not trained in escorting women prisoners is
likewise unacceptable as there are no hard and fast rules of
conduct under all conceivable situations for police officers
acting as guards. However, they are expected to use
prudence, diligence, and common sense. That Judge Pardo
did not immediately pronounce judgment so the petitioner
could have immediately brought Zenaida back to jail is
inconsequential. In the first place, the escape would not have
materialized had he immediately escorted her back to jail after
the hearing. That he cannot follow the prisoner inside the
comfort room because it would create a commotion, he being a
male, is a lame excuse. There is nothing wrong in asking the
ladies for permission so he could check the comfort room first
to insure that the prisoner cannot escape. The fact that the
building is made of concrete and the outside windows covered
with grills should not make a police officer complacent
especially because well-planned escapes are not uncommon.
Escapes are, in fact, even presumed so much so that two (2)
guards are usually assigned to a prisoner. (Tsn, August 4,
1981, p. 40)
There appears to have been no genuine effort on the part of
the petitioner to recapture the escapee. Instead of promptly
reporting the matter so that an alarm could immediately be
sent out to all police agencies and expert procedures followed,
he allegedly tried to look for her in the latter's house in
Caloocan and failing in this, proceeded to Nueva Ecija. It was
only later in the evening that he formally reported the matter to
his superior. This even gave the escapee greater opportunity to
make good her escape because the chances of her being
recaptured became much less. Such action requires concerted
police effort, not a one-man job which petitioner should have
been or was probably aware of.
The petitioner further contends that he cannot be convicted
because there was no connivance between him and the
prisoner. In support of his claim, he cites the case of Alberto v.
dela Cruz, (98 SCRA 406). The citation, however, is erroneous.
It creates the impression that for one to be held liable under
Art. 224, there must be a showing that he first connived with

the prisoner. This was not the ruling in said case. Conniving or
consenting to evasion is a distinct crime under Art. 223 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner here is not being charged with conniving under
Art. 223 but for evasion through negligence under Art. 224 of
the same Code. It is, therefore, not necessary that connivance
be proven to hold him liable for the crime of infidelity in the
custody of prisoners.
We quote the Solicitor General that the Sandiganbayan's
observation regarding escaped prisoners is relevant and
timely. The Court stated:
It is high time that the courts should take strict measures
against law officers to whom have been entrusted the custody
and detention of prisoners, whether detention prisoners or
prisoners serving sentence. Laxity and negligence in the
performance of their duties resulting in the mysterious escapes
of notorious criminals have become common news items,
involving as it does the suspicion that monetary considerations
may have entered into the arrangements which led to the
successful escape of such notorious criminals even from
military custody. No quarters should be extended to such kind
of law officers who, deliberately or otherwise, fail to live up to
the standard required of their duties, thus directly contributing
not only to the clogging of judicial dockets but also to the
inevitable deterioration of peace and order. (Brief for
Respondents, pp. 17-18)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioner appeals by petition for review on certiorari the
decision dated January 15, 2007 rendered by the
Sandiganbayan, finding him guilty in Criminal Case No. 24655
of a violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, 1 and in
Criminal Case No. 24656 of usurpation of judicial functions as
defined and penalized under Article 241, Revised Penal
Code. 2
Antecedents
Belen Lopez Vda. de Guia (Belen) was the registered absolute
owner of two parcels of agricultural land with an area of
197,594 square meters located in Santa Barbara, Baliwag,
Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
209298 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. On March 19,
1975, Belens son, Carlos de Guia (Carlos), forged a deed of
sale, in which he made it appear that his mother had sold the
land to him. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan
cancelled TCT No. 209298 by virtue of the forged deed of sale
and issued TCT No. 210108 in Carlos name.
On March 20, 1975, Carlos sold the land to Ricardo San Juan
(Ricardo). On the same date, Ricardo registered the deed of
sale in the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, which cancelled TCT
No. 210108 and issued TCT No. 210338 in Ricardos name.
Subsequently, Ricardo mortgaged the land to Simeon Yangco
(Simeon).
Upon learning of the transfers of her land, Belen filed on
December 20, 1975 an adverse claim in the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan. Her adverse claim was annotated on TCT No.
210338. She also filed in the then Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Baliwag, Bulacan a civil action for cancellation of sale,
reconveyance, and damages against Carlos, Ricardo and
Simeon, docketed as Civil Case No. 655-B.
SO ORDERED.
USURPATION OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS

JOSE REYES v. PEOPLE
SUPREME COURT
Manila
On January 20, 1981, the CFI decided Civil Case No. 655-B,
dismissing Belens complaint and affirming the validity of the
deeds of sale between Belen and Carlos and between Carlos
and Ricardo. Belen filed a motion for reconsideration but her
motion was denied.
Belen appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC),
docketed as AC-G.R. CV No. 5524-UDK.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 177105-06
August 12, 2010
JOSE REYES y VACIO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
On April 19, 1983, the IAC dismissed Belens appeal due to

non-payment of docket fees. The dismissal became final on
May 17, 1983, and entry of judgment was issued on June 21,
1983. The records were remanded to the CFI on July 6, 1983.3

Thereafter, the tenants of the land, namely, Paulino Sacdalan,
Leonardo Sacdalan, Santiago Sacdalan, Numeriano Bautista
and Romeo Garcia (tenants), invoked their right to redeem
pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended.4 Acting thereon, Ricardo executed a deed of
reconveyance in favor of the tenants on October 24, 1983.5
Upon registration of the deed of reconveyance, TCT No.
210338 was cancelled, and TCT No. 301375 was issued in the
names of the tenants. The land was subdivided into several
lots, and individual TCTs were issued in the names of the
tenants.
In the meanwhile, Belen discovered for the first time through a
letter-inquiry to the IAC Clerk of Court that her appeal in ACG.R. CIV No. 5524-UDK had been dismissed for non-payment
of docket fees. She thus filed in the IAC a motion to reinstate
her appeal. The IAC granted her motion.6 The reinstated
appeal was re-docketed as AC-G.R. CV No. 02883.
On February 20, 1986, the IAC promulgated its decision in ACG.R. CV No. 02883, granting Belens appeal,7thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered:
(1) declaring as null and void and without any effect
whatsoever the deed of sale executed by and between
appellant Belen Lopez vda. De Guia and defendant Carlos de
Guia, Exhibit "A;"
(2) declaring defendant-appellant Ricardo San Juan as a
purchaser in bad faith and ordering him to reconvey to
appellant the two (2) parcels of land described in the
complaint;
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel and/or
annul TCT No. 210338 in the name of defendant-appellee
Ricardo San Juan as well as TCT No. 210108 in the name of
defendant-appellee Carlos de Guia for being null and void and
to reinstate TCT No. 209298 in the name of appellant as the
true and valid title over the lands described therein; and
(4) ordering the defendants-appellees to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The IAC decision became final on March 15, 1986, and entry
of judgment was made on November 7, 1986. 8 The records
were remanded to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baliwag,
Bulacan (RTC).
On December 18, 1986, Belen filed in the RTC a motion for
execution vis--vis the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883. The
RTC granted her motion. However, when the writ of execution
was about to be executed, Belen learned that Ricardo had sold

the land to the tenants through a deed of reconveyance. Thus,
Belen filed in the RTC a motion to declare Ricardo and the
tenants in contempt of court for circumventing the final and
executory judgment in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883.
On October 12, 1987, the RTC held Ricardo and the tenants in
contempt of court and ordered each of them to pay a fine
of P200.00. It directed Ricardo and the tenants to reconvey the
land to Belen and to deliver to her the share in the harvest.
Ricardo and the tenants appealed the RTC order to the Court
of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 14783
entitled Mariano Bautista, et al vs. Hon. Felipe N. Villajuan, Jr.
as Judge RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch XIV and Belen
Lopez Vda. De Guia.
On November 8, 1988, Belen, through her daughter and
attorney-in-fact, Melba G. Valenzuela (Melba), filed in the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a
complaint for ejectment and collection of rents against the
tenants, entitled Belen Lopez Vda. De Guia thru her Attorneyin-Fact, Melba G. Valenzuela vs. Paulino Sacdalan, Romeo
Garcia, Numeriano Bautista, Leonardo Sacdalan and Santiago
Sacdalan and docketed as DARAB Case No. 034-BUL88.9
On July 6, 1989, the CA rendered its decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 14783,10 affirming the RTC order dated October 12, 1987
with modification. It ruled that the RTC correctly ordered
Ricardo and the tenants to reconvey the land to Belen, but held
that the RTC erred in finding Ricardo and the tenants in
contempt of court. This decision became final and executory
on July 31, 1989.
On March 16, 1993, the petitioner, as Provincial Adjudicator,
rendered a decision in DARAB Case No. 034-BUL88
entitled Belen Lopez vda. De Guia thru her Attorney-in-Fact,
Melba G. Valenzuela v. Paulino Sacdalan, Romeo Garcia,
Numeriano Bautista, Leonardo Sacdalan and Santiago
Sacdalan,11 dismissing Belens complaint for ejectment and
collection of rents and affirming the respective TCTs of the
tenants, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board finds the
instant case wanting of merit, the same is hereby dismissed.
Consequently, the Transfer Certificate of titles Nos. T-307845,
T-307846, T-307856, T-307857, T-307869, T-307870, T307871, T-307873 and T-307874 issued in the name of
Numeriano Bautista, Romeo Garcia, Leonardo Sacdalan,
Paulino Sacdalan and Santiago Sacdalan respectively are
hereby AFFIRMED. The plaintiff and all other persons acting in
their behalf are hereby ordered to permanently cease and
desist from committing any acts tending to oust or eject the
defendants or their heirs or assigns from the landholding in
question.

SO ORDERED.12
Belen filed a notice of appeal in the DARAB on March 26,
1993.
On March 31, 1993, the petitioner granted the tenants motion
for execution in DARAB Case No. 034-BUL88.13
and damage to the said Belen de Guia and to the public

interest.19
Criminal Case No. 24656
(for usurpation of judicial functions under
Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code)
In due course, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of

the DARAB Central Office,16 and ordered the tenants: (a) to
vacate the land; (b) to deliver its possession to Belen; and (c)
to pay to Belen the rents on the land corresponding to the
period from 1981 until they would have vacated.
That on or about 16 March 1993, or immediately prior or

subsequent thereto, in Malolos, Bulacan, Philippines, abovenamed accused Jose V. Reyes, a public officer being then
employed as Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Malolos,
Bulacan, while in the performance of his official function as
such and taking advantage thereof, with full knowledge of a
Decision in AC-GR CV-02883 of the Court of Appeals, which
declared Belen de Guia as the true owner of the lands litigated
in said case, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously disregard, obstruct and ignore the said final and
executory decision of the Court of Appeals, by rendering a
decision in DARAB Case No. 034-Bul-88 thereby favoring and
emboldening the tenants-respondents in said DARAB case to
unlawfully continue occupying the lands of Belen de Guia, the
complainant, to her damage and prejudice, as well as to the
public interest.20
The tenants filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA

denied their motion.
Arraigned on August 8, 2000, the petitioner, assisted by

counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to each information.21
Thus, the tenants appealed to this Court (G.R. No. 128967),

which affirmed the CAs decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 39315.17
After trial, on January 15, 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered

its assailed decision,22 finding the petitioner guilty of both
charges; and sentencing him to suffer: (a) in Criminal Case No.
24655 (for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019), an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment from six years and
one month, as minimum, to 10 years as maximum, with
perpetual disqualification from holding public office; and (b) in
Criminal Case No. 24656 (for usurpation of judicial functions
under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code), imprisonment of
four months ofarresto mayor.
Aggrieved, Belen, through Melba, filed an urgent motion to set

aside the writ of execution in DARAB Case No. 034BUL88,14 but her motion was denied.
On October 24, 1994, the DARAB Central Office affirmed the
petitioners ruling.15
After her motion for reconsideration was denied, Belen lodged
an appeal to the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 39315).
On May 13, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed two

informations in the Sandiganbayan, one charging the petitioner
with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, and the other with
usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised
Penal Code,18 as follows:
Criminal Case No. 24655
(for violation of section 3 (e) of RA 3019)
That on or about 16 March 1993, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Malolos, Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused Jose V. Reyes, a public officer being then
employed as Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Malolos,
Bulacan, while in the performance of his official function as
such and acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally render his
decision in DARAB Case No. 034-Bul-88 favorable to the
tenants who were respondents in said agrarian case, thereby
ignoring and disregarding the final and executory decision of
the Court of Appeals in AC-GR CV-02883 which declared
complainant Belen de Guia as the true owner of the lands
subject of the litigation in both cases, thus causing undue injury
The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners motion for

reconsideration on March 15, 2007.23
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
The issues raised herein are:
a) Whether the petitioner was guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019 in rendering his decision in DARAB CASE NO. 034
BUL88; and
b) Whether the petitioner was guilty of usurpation of judicial
functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code.24

Anent the first issue, the petitioner maintains that there was no
evident bad faith, manifest partiality, and gross inexcusable
negligence on his part when he decided DARAB Case No.
034-BUL88; that his decision therein had been solely based on
what he had perceived to be in keeping with the letter and spirit
of the pertinent laws; and that his decision had been rendered
upon a thorough appreciation of the facts and the law.25
As to the second issue, the petitioner insists that his rendition
of the decision did not amount to the felony of usurpation of
judicial functions.
Ruling
The petitioner was correctly held guilty of and liable for
violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in rendering his decision in
DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88, but his conviction for usurpation
of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal
Code is reversed and set aside.
A.
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging

administrative, judicial, or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including
the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his
functions.27
The first element was established. The petitioner was a public
officer when he rendered his decision in DARAB Case No. 034
BUL88, being then a Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB
discharging the duty of adjudicating the conflicting claims of
parties.
The second element includes the different and distinct modes
by which the offense is committed, that is, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
Proof of the existence of any of the modes suffices to warrant
conviction under Section 3 (e).28
Elements of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, established herein

RA 3019 was enacted to repress certain acts of public officers
and private persons alike that constitute graft or corrupt
practices or may lead thereto.26 The law enumerates the
punishable acts or omissions and provides their corresponding
penalties.
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, under which petitioner was charged
and found guilty, relevantly provides:
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
xxx
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
xxx
The essential elements of the offense under Section 3 (e) are
the following:
Manifest partiality exists when the accused has a clear,

notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side
or one person rather than another.29 It is synonymous with
bias, which excites a disposition to see and report matters as
they are wished for rather than as they are.30
Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the
part of the accused to do wrong or to cause damage. 31 It
contemplates a breach of sworn duty through some perverse
motive or ill will.32
Gross inexcusable negligence refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected.33
The decision rendered on February 20, 1986 in AC-G.R. CV
No. 02883 nullifying the forged deed of sale between Belen
and Carlos; declaring Ricardo a purchaser in bad faith;
ordering Ricardo to reconvey the land to Belen; directing the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the respective TCTs of
Ricardo and Carlos; and reinstating Belens TCT became
final on March 15, 1986. After the entry of judgment was made
on November 7, 1986, the records were remanded to the RTC
in Baliwag, Bulacan, which eventually granted Belens motion
for execution.
Due to its finality, the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883
became immutable, and could no longer be modified in any
respect, whether the modification was to correct erroneous

conclusions of fact or law, whether made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land. 34 The reason for
such immutability is that a litigation must end sometime, and
an effective and efficient administration of justice requires that
the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict
once a judgment becomes final.35
The petitioner was fully aware of the finality of the decision in
AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 prior to his promulgation of the
decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88. Indeed, he actually
admitted having read and examined the following documents
(adduced by the Prosecution) prior to his rendition of the
decision,36 namely:
(1) Belens position paper dated August 7, 1992 submitted to
him in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88, in which Belen stated
that the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 had become final
and executory;37
(2) The entry of judgment issued in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883;38
(3) Belens TCT No. 209298, reflecting the entry of judgment
issued in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 and the cancellation of the
TCTs of the tenants-lessees by virtue of the decision in ACG.R. CV No. 02883;39 and
(4) Addendum to Belens position paper, mentioning the decree
in the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883.40
Yet, the petitioner still rendered his decision in DARAB Case
No. 034 BUL88 that completely contradicted and disregarded
the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 by invalidating Belens
title on the land and upholding the TCTs of the tenants. He
thereby exhibited manifest partiality, for such decision of his
was a total and willful disregard of the final decision in AC-G.R.
CV No. 02883. His granting the tenants motion for execution
made his partiality towards the tenants and bias against Belen
that much more apparent.
Correctly did the Sandiganbayan find that the petitioner had

displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in rendering
his decision in DARAB Case No. 034-BUL88.
The third element of the offense when the act of the accused
caused undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or, gave any private party unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference in the discharge of the functions of the accused
was also established. In this regard, proof of the extent or
quantum of damage was not essential, it being sufficient that
the injury suffered or the benefit received could be perceived to
be
substantial
enough
and
was
not
merely
negligible.421avvphi1
Belen was constrained to engage the services of a lawyer and
to incur other expenses in order to protect and prosecute her
interest in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88. In all, her expenses
were in the substantial sum ofP990,000.00.43 Moreover, the
petitioners stubborn refusal to recognize and obey the
decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 forced a further but
needless prejudicial delay in the prompt termination of the
cases. The delay proved very costly to Belen, for, in that length
of time (that is, from March 16, 1993 up to the present), Belen
has been unduly deprived of her exclusive ownership and
undisturbed possession of the land, and the fruits thereof. The
injury and prejudice surely equated to undue injury for Belen.
Likewise, the petitioners ruling in DARAB Case No. 034
BUL88 gave unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference to
the tenants by allowing them to remain in possession of the
land and to enjoy the fruits.
Given the foregoing considerations, the Sandiganbayan
correctly convicted the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 24655
for violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
B.
Usurpation of judicial functions
Similarly, the petitioners evident bad faith displayed itself by

his arrogant refusal to recognize and obey the decision in ACG.R. CV No. 02883, despite his unqualified obligation as
Provincial Adjudicator to abide by the CAs ruling that was
binding on him as Provincial Adjudicator and on all the parties
in DARAB Case No. 034-BUL88.
Worthy of note is that the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39315, and
this Court, in G.R. No. 128967, had characterized the
petitioners aforementioned conduct as "an utter disrespect to
the judiciary," as vested with a "dishonest purpose," and as
constituting "a contumacious attitude which should not be
tolerated."41 These acute characterizations fortify the holding
that he harbored a deliberate intent to do wrong to Belen.
Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code states:

xxx The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period
to prision correcional in its minimum period shall be imposed
upon any officer of the executive branch of the government
who shall assume judicial powers or shall obstruct the
execution of any order or decision rendered by any judge
within his jurisdiction.
In usurpation of judicial function, the accused, who is not a
judge, attempts to perform an act the authority for which the
law has vested only in a judge. 44 However, the petitioners task
as Provincial Adjudicator when he rendered judgment in
DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88 was to adjudicate the claims of
the opposing parties. As such, he performed a quasi-judicial

function, closely akin to the function of a judge of a court of
law. He could not be held liable under Article 241 of the
Revised Penal Code, therefore, considering that the acts
constitutive of usurpation of judicial function were lacking
herein.
Fourteenth Congress
Third Regular Session
C.
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twentyseventh day of July, two thousand nine.
Penalties
REPUBLIC ACT N0. 9745
The Sandiganbayan appreciated the mitigating circumstance of

old age in favor of the petitioner by virtue of his being already
over 70 years old.
AN ACT PENALIZING TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,

INHUMAN
AND
DEGRADING
TREATMENT
OR
PUNISHMENT AND PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR
The Sandiganbayan thereby erred. The mitigating

circumstance of old age under Article 13 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code applied only when the offender was over 70 years
at the time of the commission of the offense.45The petitioner,
being only 63 years old when he committed the offenses
charged,46 was not entitled to such mitigating circumstance.

the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Under Section 9 of RA 3019, the penalty for violation of Section

3 (e) of RA 3019 is imprisonment for not less than six years
and one month nor more than 15 years, and perpetual
disqualification from public office. Pursuant to Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by a
special law, the accused is punished with an indeterminate
sentence the maximum of which does not exceed the
maximum fixed by the law violated, and the minimum is not
less than the minimum term prescribed by the law violated.
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 24655, the Sandiganbayan
correctly imposed on the petitioner the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six years and one month, as
minimum, to 10 years as maximum. The penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office was also correctly imposed.
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the conviction of the
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 24655 (for violation of section 3
(e) of RA 3019), but reverses and sets aside his conviction in
Criminal Case No. 24656 (for usurpation of judicial functions as
defined and penalized under Article 241 of the Revised Penal
Code).
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
TORTURE
RA No. 9745
Metro Manila
Section 1. Short Title. - This Ad shall be known as the "AntiTorture Act of 2009".
Section 2. Statement of Policy. - It is hereby declared the
policy of the State:
(a) To value the dignity of every human person and guarantee
full respect for human rights;
(b) To ensure that the human rights of all persons, including
suspects, detainees and prisoners are respected at all times;
and that no person placed under investigation or held in
custody of any person in authority or, agent of a person
authority shall be subjected to physical, psychological or
mental harm, force, violence, threat or intimidation or any act
that impairs his/her free wi11 or in any manner demeans or
degrades human dignity;
(c) To ensure that secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado or other similar forms of detention, where
torture may be carried out with impunity, are prohibited; and
(d) To fully adhere to the principles and standards on the
absolute condemnation and prohibition of torture as provided
for in the 1987 Philippine Constitution; various international
instruments to which the Philippines is a State party such as,
but not limited to, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W) and the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and all other relevant
international human rights instruments to which the Philippines
is a signatory.
Section 3. Definitions. - For purposes of this Act, the following
terms shall mean:

(a) "Torture" refers to an act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person
for such purposes as obtaining from him/her or a third person
information or a confession; punishing him/her for an act
he/she or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed; or intimidating or coercing him/her or a third
person; or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a person in authority
or agent of a person in authority. It does not include pain or
Buffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions.
(b) "Other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment" refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or
punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act,
inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in
authority against a person under his/her custody, which attains
a level of severity causing suffering, gross humiliation or
debasement to the latter.
(c) "Victim" refers to the person subjected to torture or other
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as
defined above and any individual who has suffered harm as a
result of any act(s) of torture, or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment.
(d) "Order of Battle" refers to any document or determination
made by the military, police or any law enforcement agency of
the government, listing the names of persons and
organizations that it perceives to be enemies of the State and
that it considers as legitimate targets as combatants that it
could deal with, through the use of means allowed by domestic
and international law.
Section 4. Acts of Torture. - For purposes of this Act, torture
shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) Physical torture is a form of treatment or punishment
authority upon another in his/her custody that causes severe
pain, exhaustion, disability or dysfunction of one or more parts
of the body, such as:
(1) Systematic beating, headbanging, punching, kicking,
striking with truncheon or rifle butt or other similar objects, and
jumping on the stomach;
(2) Food deprivation or forcible feeding with spoiled food,
animal or human excreta and other stuff or substances not
normally eaten;
(3) Electric shock;
(4) Cigarette burning; burning by electrically heated rods, hot

oil, acid; by the rubbing of pepper or other chemical
substances on mucous membranes, or acids or spices directly
on the wound(s);
(5) The submersion of the head in water or water polluted with
excrement, urine, vomit and/or blood until the brink of
suffocation;
(6) Being tied or forced to assume fixed and stressful bodily
position;
(7) Rape and sexual abuse, including the insertion of foreign
objects into the sex organ or rectum, or electrical torture of the
genitals;
(8) Mutilation or amputation of the essential parts of the body
such as the genitalia, ear, tongue, etc.;
(9) Dental torture or the forced extraction of the teeth;
(10) Pulling out of fingernails;
(11) Harmful exposure to the elements such as sunlight and
extreme cold;
(12) The use of plastic bag and other materials placed over the
head to the point of asphyxiation;
(13) The use of psychoactive drugs to change the perception,
memory. alertness or will of a person, such as:
(i) The administration or drugs to induce confession and/or
reduce mental competency; or
(ii) The use of drugs to induce extreme pain or certain
symptoms of a disease; and
(14) Other analogous acts of physical torture; and
(b) "Mental/Psychological Torture" refers to acts committed by
a person in authority or agent of a person in authority which
are calculated to affect or confuse the mind and/or undermine
a person's dignity and morale, such as:
(1) Blindfolding;
(2) Threatening a person(s) or his/fher relative(s) with bodily
harm, execution or other wrongful acts;
(3) Confinement in solitary cells or secret detention places;
(4) Prolonged interrogation;

(5) Preparing a prisoner for a "show trial", public display or
public humiliation of a detainee or prisoner;
(6) Causing unscheduled transfer of a person deprived of
liberty from one place to another, creating the belief that he/she
shall be summarily executed;
(7) Maltreating a member/s of a person's family;
(8) Causing the torture sessions to be witnessed by the
person's family, relatives or any third party;
(9) Denial of sleep/rest;
(10) Shame infliction such as stripping the person naked,
parading him/her in public places, shaving the victim's head or
putting marks on his/her body against his/her will;
(11) Deliberately prohibiting the victim to communicate with any
member of his/her family; and
(12) Other analogous acts of mental/psychological torture.
Section 5. Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. - Other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or
punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act,
authority against another person in custody, which attains a
level of severity sufficient to cause suffering, gross humiliation
or debasement to the latter. The assessment of the level of
severity shall depend on all the circumstances of the case,
including the duration of the treatment or punishment, its
physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex,
religion, age and state of health of the victim.
Section 6. Freedom from Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, An Absolute Bight. Torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment as criminal acts shall apply to all circumstances. A
state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability, or
any other public emergency, or a document or any
determination comprising an "order of battle" shall not and can
never be invoked as a justification for torture and other cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.
the corresponding data on the prisoners or detainees

incarcerated or detained therein such as, among others,
names, date of arrest and incarceration, and the crime or
offense committed. This list shall be made available to the
public at all times, with a copy of the complete list available at
the respective national headquarters of the PNP and AFP. A
copy of the complete list shall likewise be submitted by the
PNP, AFP and all other law enforcement agencies to the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), such list to be
periodically updated, by the same agencies, within the first five
(5) days of every month at the minimum. Every regional office
of the PNP, AFP and other law enforcement agencies shall also
maintain a similar list far all detainees and detention facilities
within their respective areas, and shall make the same
available to the public at all times at their respective regional
headquarters, and submit a copy. updated in the same manner
provided above, to the respective regional offices of the CHR.
Section 8. Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule; Exception. Any confession, admission or statement obtained as a result of
torture shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceedings,
except if the same is used as evidence against a person or
persons accused of committing torture.
Section 9. Institutional Protection of Torture Victims and Other
Persons Involved. - A victim of torture shall have the following
rights in the institution of a criminal complaint for torture:
(a) To have a prompt and an impartial investigation by the CHR
and by agencies of government concerned such as the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO), the PNP, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
the AFP. A prompt investigation shall mean a maximum period
of sixty (60) working days from the time a complaint for torture
is filed within which an investigation report and/or resolution
shall be completed and made available. An appeal whenever
available shall be resolved within the same period prescribed
herein,
(b) To have sufficient government protection against all forms
of harassment; threat and/or intimidation as a consequence of
the filing of said complaint or the presentation of evidence
therefor. In which case, the State through its appropriate
agencies shall afford security in order to ensure his/her safety
and all other persons involved in the investigation and
prosecution such as, but not limited to, his/her lawyer,
witnesses and relatives; and
Section 7. Prohibited Detention. - Secret detention places,

solitary confinement, incommunicado or other similar forms of
detention, where torture may be carried out with impunity. Are
hereby prohibited.
(c) To be accorded sufficient protection in the manner by which

he/she testifies and presents evidence in any fora in order to
avoid further trauma.
In which case, the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Armed

Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and other law enforcement.
agencies concerned shall make an updated list of all detention
centers and facilities under their respective jurisdictions with
Section 10. Disposition of Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo

and Habeas Data Proceedings and Compliance with a Judicial
07'der. - A writ of habeas corpus or writ of amparo or writ of
habeas data proceeding, if any, filed on behalf of the victim of

torture or other cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment or
punishment shall be disposed of expeditiously and any order of
release by virtue thereof, or other appropriate order of a court
relative thereto, shall be executed or complied with
immediately.
(e) The approximate time and date when the injury, pain,
disease and/or trauma was/were sustained;
Section 11. Assistance in Filing a Complaint. - The CHR and

the PAO shall render legal assistance in the investigation and
monitoring and/or filing of the complaint for a person who
suffers torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment, or for any interested party thereto.
(g) The time, date and nature of treatment necessary; and
The victim or interested party may also seek legal assistance

from the Barangay Human Rights Action Center (BRRAC)
nearest him/her as well as from human rights nongovernment
organizations (NGOs).
Section 12. Right to' Physical, Medical and Psychological
Examination. - Before and after interrogation, every person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall have
the right to he informed of his/her right to demand physical
examination by an independent and competent doctor of
his/her own choice. If such person cannot afford the services of
his/her own doctor, he/she shall he provided by the State with
a competent and independent doctor to conduct physical
examination. The State shall endeavor to provide the victim
with psychological evaluation if available under the
circumstances. If the person arrested is a female, she shall be
attended to preferably by a female doctor. Furthermore, any
person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation,
including his/her immediate family, shall have the right to
immediate access to proper and adequate medical treatment.
The physical examination and/or psychological evaluation of
the victim shall be contained in a medical report, duly signed
by the attending physician, which shall include in detail his/her
medical history and findings, and which shall he attached to
the custodial investigation report. Such report shall be
considered a public document.
Following applicable protocol agreed upon by agencies tasked
to conduct physical, psychological and mental examinations,
the medical reports shall, among others, include:
(a) The name, age and address of the patient or victim;
(b) The name and address of the nearest kin of the patient or
victim;
(c) The name and address of the person who brought the
patient or victim for physical, psychological and mental
examination, and/or medical treatment;
(d) The nature and probable cause of the patient or victim's
injury, pain and disease and/or trauma;
(f) The place where the injury, pain, disease and/or trauma
was/were sustained;
(h) The diagnosis, the prognosis and/or disposition of the

patient.
Any person who does not wish to avail of the rights under this
pr<;lvision may knowingly and voluntarily waive such rights in
writing, executed in the presence and assistance of his/her
counsel.
Section 13. Who are Criminally Liable. - Any person who
actually participated Or induced another in the commission of
torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment or who cooperated in the execution of the act of
torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment by previous or simultaneous acts shall be liable as
principal
Any superior military, police or law enforcement officer or
senior government official who issued an order to any lower
ranking personnel to commit torture for whatever purpose shall
be held equally liable as principals.
The immediate commanding officer of the unit concerned of
the AFP or the immediate senior public official of the PNP and
other law enforcement agencies shall be held liable as a
principal to the crime of torture or other cruel or inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment for any act or omission, or
negligence committed by him/her that shall have led, assisted,
abetted or allowed, whether directly or indirectly, the
commission thereof by his/her subordinates. If he/she has
knowledge of or, owing to the circumstances at the time,
should have known that acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment shall be committed, is
being committed, or has been committed by his/her
subordinates or by others within his/her area of responsibility
and, despite such knowledge, did not take preventive or
corrective action either before, during or immediately after its
commission, when he/she has the authority to prevent or
investigate allegations of torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment but failed to prevent or
investigate allegations of such act, whether deliberately or due
to negligence shall also be liable as principals.
Any public officer or employee shall be liable as an accessory
if he/she has knowledge that torture or other cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment is being committed
and without having participated therein, either as principal or

accomplice, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of
the following manner:
(a) By themselves profiting from or assisting the offender to
profit from the effects of the act of torture or other cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment;
(b) By concealing the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment and/or destroying the
effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery;
or(c) By harboring, concealing or assisting m the escape of the
principal/s in the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment: Provided, That the
accessory acts are done with the abuse of the official's public
functions.
Section 14. Penalties. - (a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the perpetrators of the following acts:
(1) Torture resulting in the death of any person;
(2) Torture resulting in mutilation;
(3) Torture with rape;
(4) Torture with other forms of sexual abuse and, in
consequence of torture, the victim shall have become insane,
imbecile, impotent, blind or maimed for life; and
(5) Torture committed against children.
(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed on
those who commit any act of mental/psychological torture
resulting in insanity, complete or partial amnesia, fear of
becoming insane or suicidal tendencies of the victim due to
guilt, worthlessness or shame.
(c) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed on
those who commit any act of torture resulting in psychological,
mental and emotional harm other than those described 1n
paragraph (b) of this section. '
(d) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the
victim shall have lost the power of speech or the power to hear
or to smell; or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm or
a leg; or shall have lost the use of any such member; Or shall
have become permanently incapacitated for labor.
(e) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the
victim shall have become deformed or shall have lost any part
of his/her body other than those aforecited, or shall have lost
the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor
for a period of more than ninety (90) days.
(f) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to

prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed if, in
consequence of torture, the victim shall have been ill or
incapacitated for labor for mare than thirty (30) days but not
more than ninety (90) days.
(g) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium period shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture,
the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for thirty
(30) days or less.
(h) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed for acts
constituting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment as defined in Section 5 of this Act.
(i) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon
those who establish, operate and maintain secret detention
places and/or effect or cause to effect solitary confinement,
incommunicado or other similar forms of prohibited detention
as provided in Section 7 of this Act where torture may be
carried out with impunity.
(j) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon the
responsible officers or personnel of the AFP, the PNP and
other law enforcement agencies for failure to perform his/her
duty to maintain, submit or make available to the public an
updated list of detention centers and facilities with the
corresponding data on the prisoners or detainees incarcerated
or detained therein, pursuant to Section 7 of this Act.
Section 15. Torture as a Separate and Independent Crime. Torture as a crime shall not absorb or shall not be absorbed by
any other crime or felony committed as a consequence, or as a
means in the conduct or commission thereof. In which case,
torture shall be treated as a separate and independent criminal
act whose penalties shall be imposable without prejudice to
any other criminal liability provided for by domestic and
international laws.
Section 16. Exclusion from the Coverage of Special Amnesty
Law. - In order not to depreciate the crime of torture, persons
who have committed any act of torture shall not benefit from
any special amnesty law or similar measures that will have the
effect of exempting them from any criminal proceedings and
sanctions.
Section 17. Applicability of Refouler. - No person shall be
expelled, returned or extradited to another State where there
are substantial grounds to believe that such person shall be in
danger of being subjected to torture. For the purposes of
determining whether such grounds exist, the Secretary of the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Secretary of the
DOJ, in coordination with the Chairperson of the CHR, shall
take into account all relevant considerations including, where
applicable and not limited to, the existence in the requesting

State of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights.
Section 18. Compensation to Victims of Torture. - Any person
who has suffered torture shall have the right to claim for
compensation as provided for under Republic Act No. 7309:
Provided, That in no case shall compensation be any lower
than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00). Victims of torture shall
also have the right to claim for compensation from such other
financial relief programs that may be made available to him/her
under existing law and rules and regulations.
Section 19. Formulation of a Rehabilitation Program. - Within
one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the DOJ and the
Department of Health (DOH) and such other concerned
government agencies, and human rights organizations shall
formulate a comprehensive rehabilitation program for victims of
torture and their families. The DSWD, the DOJ and thc DOH
shall also call on human rights nongovernment organizations
duly recognized by the government to actively participate in the
formulation of such program that shall provide for the physical,
mental, social, psychological healing and development of
victims of torture and their families. Toward the attainment of
restorative justice, a parallel rehabilitation program for persons
who have committed torture and other cruel, inhuman and
degrading punishment shall likewise be formulated by the
same agencies.
Section 20. Monitoring of Compliance with this Act. - An
Oversight Committee is hereby created to periodically oversee
the implementation of this Act. The Committee shall be headed
by a Commissioner of the CRR, with the following as
members: the Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Justice
and Human Rights, the respective Chairpersons of the House
of Representatives' Committees on Justice and Human Rights,
and the Minority Leaders of both houses or their respective
representatives in the minority.
Section 21. Education and Information Campaign. - The CHR,
the DOJ, the Department of National Defense (DND), the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and
such other concerned parties in both the public and private
sectors shall ensure that education and information regarding
prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment shall be fully included in
the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military,
medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may

be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any
individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or
imprisonment. The Department of Education (DepED) and the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) shall also ensure
the integration of human rights education courses in all
primary, secondary and tertiary level academic institutions
nationwide.
Section 22. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. - The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code insofar as they are
applicable shall be suppletory to this Act. Moreover, if the
commission of any crime punishable under Title Eight (Crimes
Against Persons) and Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal
Liberty and Security) of the Revised Penal Code is attended by
any of the acts constituting torture and other cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment as defined herein, the
penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum period.
Section 23. Appropriations. - The amount of Five million pesos
(Php5,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated to the CHR for the
initial implementation of tills Act. Thereafter, such sums as may
be necessary for the continued implementation of this Act shall
be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The DOJ
and the CHR, with the active participation of human rights
nongovernmental organizations, shall promulgate the rules and
regulations for the effective implementation of tills Act. They
shall also ensure the full dissemination of such rules and
regulations to all officers and members of various law
enforcement agencies.
Section 25. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is
declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other provisions not
affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 26. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive
orders or rules and regulations contrary to or inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Section 27. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15)
days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least
two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: November 10, 2009

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CRIMINAL LAW 2 (Atty.

Rene Rizza Bernardo-Mamburam) 1

The Court has carefully considered the arguments of the

As found by the respondent court, the petitioner, a revenue

The petitioner claims the charges against him were fabricated.

and that in any case the percentage tax imposed on it was

It was within the discretion of the respondent court to weigh the

The Court is not inclined to believe that Samia would be so

CRIMINAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rene Rizza Bernardo-Mamburam) 2

While protesting his innocence, the petitioner has failed to

The petitioner seems to be suggesting in the conclusion to his

We find, on the basis of the evidence of record, that the

GRAFT AND CORRUPTION

WHEREAS, under existing laws and the civil service rules, it is

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 46 November 10, 1972

This Decree shall take effect immediately after its publication.

MAKING IT PUNISHABLE FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND

Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of November, in the

CRIMINAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rene Rizza Bernardo-Mamburam) 3

manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to

(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to

(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain,

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,

Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those

(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present

(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit,

CRIMINAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rene Rizza Bernardo-Mamburam) 4

term for which he has been elected, to acquire or receive any

CRIMINAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rene Rizza Bernardo-Mamburam) 5

during his incumbency, except where the practice of such

Section 16. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect on its

The violation of said section proven in a proper administrative

Section 10. Competent court. Until otherwise provided by law,

CRIMINAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rene Rizza Bernardo-Mamburam) 6

Crim. Case #6866, Vchr #211-81-04-62 at 787.00

That on or about the month of July, 1980 and some time

Total(Consolidated Comment, pg. 4; Rollo, 325)

CRIMINAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rene Rizza Bernardo-Mamburam) 7

CRIMINAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rene Rizza Bernardo-Mamburam) 8

A. Yes, Sir. (pp. 36-37, Tsn., Oct. 26, 1983)

Petitioner sought to establish that before he assumed office as

In the absence of a public bidding and as emphatically

Respondent Sandiganbayan however doubts the sale because

The prosecution's evidence to establish non-divestment of

. . . . In short, accused's intervention may not be present during

Sales of stocks need not be reported to SEC

No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment

CRIMINAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rene Rizza Bernardo-Mamburam) 9

indicated therein were already prepared by the municipal

Q. Previously, prior to the signature of Mayor Trieste?

Q. Did you say already made by the municipal treasurer-the

Q. Under what authority were they paid?

Q. Who disbursed the funds evidenced by the Trigen official

A. Under official receipt issued by Trigen.

A. The municipal treasurer, then Mr. Vega.

Payment made by Trigen?

There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his

Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction

I am sorry, Your Honor, made to Trigen by the municipality?

Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen's transaction with the

A. Official receipts issued by Trigen also indicate that when

CRIMINAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rene Rizza Bernardo-Mamburam) 10