CHAPTER 2 CASES

known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by

Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia.
Eventually, Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was issued in the names of
Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda The Court issued a writ of

G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988

possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao

refused to honor on the ground that they also have TCT No. 25772

EDUARDO

S.

BARANDA

and

ALFONSO

HITALIA,

petitioners,

vs.

over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, after considering the private
respondents' opposition and finding TCT No. 25772 fraudulently

HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS

AVITO SACLAUSO, HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY.
HECTOR P. TEODOSIO, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

acquired, ordered that the writ of possession be carried out. A motion

for reconsideration having been denied, a writ of demolition was
issued on March 29, 1982. Perez and Gotera filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On August 6,
1982, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. Perez and Gotera

Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No.

filed the petition for review on certiorari denominated as G.R. No.

64432 and the private respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of

62042 before the Supreme Court. As earlier stated the petition was

these two (2) cases and the instant case is the same a parcel of land

denied in a resolution dated January 7,1983. The motion for

designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo

reconsideration was denied in another resolution dated March 25,

covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406.

1983, which also stated that the denial is final. This decision in G.R.
No. 62042, in accordance with the entry of judgment, became final

The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered
the filing of the earlier petitions. These facts and events are cited in our
resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as follows:

. . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title

filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land

on March 25, 1983. The petitioners in the instant case G.R. No.
64432--contend that the writs of possession and demolition issued in
the respondent court should now be implemented; that Civil Case No.
00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed only to
delay the implementation of the writ; that counsel for the respondent

should be held in contempt of court for engaging in a concerted but

February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case No. 00827 which covered the same

futile effort to delay the execution of the writs of possession and

subject matter as the Resolutions above cited pursuant to our Resolution

demolition and that petitioners are entitled to damages because of

dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R.

prejudice caused by the filing of this petition before the Intermediate

No. 64432 became final on May 20, 1984.

Appellate Court. On September 26, 1983, this Court issued a

Temporary Restraining Order ' to maintain the status quo, both in the
Intermediate Appellate Court and in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo.
Considering that (l)there is merit in the instant petition for indeed the
issues discussed in G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case No. 00827

Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the following order:

Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S.

Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated August 28, 1984:

before the respondent court have already been passed upon in G.R.
No. 62042; and (2) the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the

(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions

Intermediate Appellate Court was only intended not to render the

dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by

petition moot and academic pending the Court's consideration of the

Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 62042;

issues, the Court RESOLVED to DIRECT the respondent Intermediate

Appellate Court not to take cognizance of issues already resolved by
this Court and accordingly DISMISS the petition in Civil Case No.
00827. Immediate implementation of the writs of possession and
demolition is likewise ordered. (pp. 107-108, Rollo G.R. No. 64432)

On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion
for reconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432.
On this same date, another resolution was issued, this time in G.R. No.
62042, referring to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion of

(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December

29, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division)
in G.R. No. 64432;

(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under
Act

496,

therefore

she

must

register

all

orders,

judgment,

resolutions of this Court and that of Honorable Supreme Court.

Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition

thereto, the same is hereby GRANTED.

the private respondents (Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment
in the resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the

WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby

meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate Court issued a resolution dated

declared null and void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098

is hereby declared valid and subsisting title concerning the

2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once

ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, all of Sta.

cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S.

Barbara Cadastre.

Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia;

The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register

Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises. (p.

the Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso

473, 64432 Rollo)

Hitalia as prayed for." (p. 466, Rollo--G.R. No. 64432)

Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a Resolution in
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for

G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for.

reconsideration and manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of

Acting on another motion of the same nature filed by the petitioners, we

Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito, on the ground that there was a pending case

issued another Resolution dated October 8, 1986 referring the same to the

before this Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under G.R.

Court Administrator for implementation by the judge below.

No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the former which
remained unresolved.

In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November

In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.

6,1986 and January 6,1987 respectively, to wit:

No. 64432 ex-parte motions for issuance of an order directing the Regional
Trial Court and Acting Register of Deeds to execute and implement the
judgments of this Court. They prayed that an order be issued:

1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under
Hon. Judge Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P.
Sornito to register the Order dated September 5, 1984 of the lower
court;

ORDER

This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the

movants through counsel on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of
Atty. Helen Sornito, Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and
formerly acting register of deeds for the Province of Iloilo dated
October 23, 1986 and the Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso,
Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated November 5, 1986.

Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda

and Alfonso Hitalia dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full

implementation of the writ of possession was granted by the

Register of Deeds of Iloilo is ordered to issue a new Certificate of

Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division per its Resolution dated

Title in lieu thereof in the name of petitioners Atty. Eduardo S.

September 17,1986, the present motion is hereby GRANTED.

Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate shall contain a

memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate. (pp.

WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is

286-287, Rollo 64432)

hereby ordered to register the Order of this Court dated September

5, 1984 as prayed for.

On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez,

private respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed

xxx xxx xxx

ORDER

This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of

Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 submitted by the petitioners
Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on December 2, 1986,
in compliance with the order of this Court dated November 25, 1
986, a Motion for Extension of Time to File Opposition filed by Maria
Provido Gotera through counsel on December 4, 1986 which was
granted by the Court pursuant to its order dated December 15,
1986. Considering that no Opposition was filed within the thirty (30)
days period granted by the Court finding the petition tenable, the

a motion for explanation in relation to the resolution dated September 17,

1986 and manifestation asking for clarification on the following points:

a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of

TCT T-25772, should the same be referred to the Court of Appeals
(as mentioned in the Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it
already deemed granted by implication (by virtue of the Resolution
dated September 17, 1986)?

b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only
the implementation of the writ of possession but also the
cancellation of TCT T-25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517? (p.
536, Rollo 4432)

same is hereby GRANTED.

Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a
WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender

resolution dated May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating therein:

Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10)
days from the date of this order, after which period, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared annulled and the

xxx xxx xxx

Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7,

12, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis

1983 and in G.R. No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is

pendens in the new certificates of titles.

the implementation of our resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED to

refer the matters concerning the execution of the decisions to the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to apply
disciplinary sanctions upon whoever attempts to trifle with the
implementation of the resolutions of this Court. No further motions
in these cases will be entertained by this Court. (p. 615, Rollo64432)

In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated
November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds
AvitoSaclauso annotated the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-25772 as null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificates of
titles numbers T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 in the name of petitioners
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of TItle
No. T-106098.

However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate

case (Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was
carried out and annotated in the new certificates of titles issued to the
petitioners. This was upheld by the trial court after setting aside its earlier
order dated February 12, 1987 ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.

This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No. 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its order dated February

In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion
to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.

Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 23 denied the petitioners' motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987
order in another order dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed this
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
to compel the respondent judge to reinstate his order dated February l2,
1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the
petitioners.

The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice
of is pendens on the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the
petitioners, the petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an urgent exparte motion to immediately cancel notice of lis pendens annotated
thereon.

In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the
motion and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis
pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T111561 and T-111562.

Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for

That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the

reconsideration of the February 12, 1987 order stating therein:

cancellation of subject Notice of Lis Pendens can only be

made or deemed cancelled upon the registration of the

That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of

certificate of the Clerk of Court in which the action or

the said order based on the second paragraph of Section 77

proceeding was pending, stating the manner of disposal

of P.D. 1529, to wit:

thereof.

"At any time after final judgment in favor of the

Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice

defendant or other disposition of the action such as

of Lis Pendens was based is still pending with the

to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to

Intermediate Court of Appeals, only the Intermediate Court

the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in

of Appeals and not this Honorable Court in a mere cadastral

which a memorandum or notice of Lis Pendens has

proceedings can order the cancellation of the Notice of Lis

been registered as provided in the preceding

Pendens. (pp. 68-69, Rollo)

section, the notice of Lis Pendens shall be deemed

cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of the

Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the

clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was

plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not privies to the case affected by the

pending stating the manner of disposal thereof."

Supreme Court resolutions, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his
February 12, 1987 order and granted the Acting Register of Deeds' motion

That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated

for reconsideration.

on T-106098, T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of

a case docketed as Civil Case No. 15871, now pending with

The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case

the Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, "Calixta Provido,

No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the

Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maria Provido and Perfecto Provido,

notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were

Plaintiffs, versus Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia,

earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and

Respondents."

G.R. No. 64432. A corollary issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register of
Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of
title.

Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of

petitioners Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in G.R. No. 62042 was

Sta. Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and

as follows:

G.R. No. 64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta
Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P.
Teodosio, the Provides' counsel, a notice of is pendens was annotated on
petitioners' Certificate of Title No. T-106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta.
Barbara Cadastre.

Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an

order dated October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.

The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the
reason why respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order
directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated on the certificates of titles of the petitioners.

This petition is impressed with merit.

xxx xxx xxx

2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings,

respondent Judge Midpantao L. Adil had the authority to
declare as null and void the transfer certificate of title in the
name of petitioner Maria Provido Gotera and her other coowners. (p. 3, Rollo; Emphasis supplied)

It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to
G.R. No. 62042 contrary to the trial court's findings that they were not.

G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo
in the reconstitution proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name of
Providos over Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre null and void for being
fraudulently obtained and declaring TCT No. 106098 over the same parcel
Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the name of petitioners Eduardo

Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although

Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia valid and subsisting.

Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not impleaded as parties, it is very
clear in the petition that Maria Provido was acting on behalf of the Providos
who allegedly are her co-owners in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as
shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 issued in her name and
the names of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, among others. (Annex
"E" G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues raised by

The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March
25,1983 long before Civil Case No. 15871 was filed.

Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private

respondents herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the
full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R.
No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered immediate implementation of the

writs of possession and demolition in the reconstitution proceedings

peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence

involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.

so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main
allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of

The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner:

the

plaintiff

is

responsible,

are

Rizal, supra)

not lose the property or any part of it. For, notice of lis

course he intends to gamble on the results of the litigation.

the

Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of

pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure that he would

and that he should keep his hands off the same, unless of

which

prejudice of the defendant. (Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The

the party causing the registration thereof With the lis

incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation;

for

unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the

Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of

pendens serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or

trial,

The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to
the Supreme Court illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but
unsuccessfuly the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432.

(Section 24, Rule 14, RuIes of Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al.,

69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3,

Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in

citing cases.) (Natanov. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-486)

sustaining the respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of
lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571,

The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts
obtaining in this case necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in
the cases of Victoriano v. Rovila (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of
Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and Sarmiento v.

Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil

Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In upholding the position of the
Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof which provides:

Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that:

Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a
We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of
pendency which has been filed in a proper case, cannot be
cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined, the
proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it under

notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the

Court after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose
of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be

registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of

of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this

Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the

Decree."

registration thereof.
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have

regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in

been misled by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter

pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for

when in fact he was the same Judge who issued the order dismissing Civil

registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action

Case No. 15871 prompting the private respondents to appeal said order

taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the

dated October 10, 1984 to the Court of Appeals. The records of the main

question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the

case are still with the court below but based on the order, it can be safely

Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of

assumed that the various pleadings filed by the parties subsequent to the

Deeds. ... ."

motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners (the defendants therein) touched

on the issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the Providos
over Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final
decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.

The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and
phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231;

The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the

Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132

Register of Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a

SCRA 663) The statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to

torrens certificate of title.

register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no

room for construction. According to Webster's Third International Dictionary

Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of
the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all
the requisites for registration. ... . If the instrument is not registrable, he
shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such
denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him

of the English Language the word shall means "ought to, must,
...obligation used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws,
regulations or directives to express what is mandatory." Hence, the function
of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds
encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The
respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file

a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him

to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of
the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the
proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument

G.R. No. L-20611

May 8, 1969

presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of

Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and

AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners,

Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of

vs.

Presidential Decree No. 1529.

REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent.

In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full

MAKALINTAL, J.:

implementation of this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042

Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in LRC
and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice of lis
Consulta No. 366.
pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No.
4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should

On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of

never have allowed himself to become part of dilatory tactics, giving as

Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT

excuse the wrong impression that Civil Case No. 15871 filed by the private

No. 548) and an instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the

respondents involves another set of parties claiming Lot No. 4517 under

request that the same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of the

their own Torrens Certificate of Title.

instrument sought to be annotated one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of

the parcel of land described in OCT No. 548, appears to have donated inter-

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order
vivos an undivided two-thirds (/) portion thereof in favor of petitioners. The
of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent
entire area of the land is 11.2225 hectares.
orders issued by the trial court which annulled the February 12, 1987 order
are SET ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents.

The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally
defective or otherwise not sufficient in law." It appears that previously

SO ORDERED.
annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three

separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio

Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner,

Balbin in favor of three different buyers. The pertinent entries read:

conveying an undivided portion of an area of 15,000 square meters

in favor of Juana Gabayan, this Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby

Entry No. 5658.

Sales.

Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying
an undivided portion of an area of 3,710 square meters only in favor of
Florentino Gabayan, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby

cancelled with respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu

thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed
to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...

Date of Instrument:

February 12, 1952. ...

cancelled with respect to said area of 3,710 square meters and in lieu
thereof, the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all

The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales

rights, participation in interest of the vendor. ...

contains an additional memorandum stating that "three co-owner's

duplicate certificates of title No. 548 have been issued (by the register of

Date of Instrument:

xxx

xxx

January 25, 1955, ...

xxx

deeds of Ilocos Sur) in the name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and
Juana Gabayan upon verbal request of Mr. Andres Cabeldo, Notary Public of
Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the name of the vendees, this 5th day of January,

Entry No. 5659.

Sale of portion.

1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly because these three other co-owner's copies
of the certificate of title No. 548 had not been presented by petitioners, the

Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying

Register of Deeds refused to make the requested annotation.

an undivided portion of an area of 16,713 square meters in favor of Roberto

Bravo, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with

Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land

respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of the

Registration, who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds

vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation and

in a resolution dated April 10, 1962. With respect to the principal point in

interest of the vendor ...

controversy, the Commissioner observed:

Date of Instrument:

June 9, 1953. ...

(1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the

property described in the Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having

Entry No. 5660.

Sale of portion.

previously sold undivided portions thereof on three different

occasions in favor of three different buyers. Consequently, aside

We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously

from the owner's duplicate issued to Cornelio Balbin, there are now

assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question,

three co-owner's duplicates which are presumably in the possession

namely, that of the registered owner himself, such that its production

of the three buyers. Accordingly, in addition to the owner's duplicate

whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient

of Original Certificate of Title No. 548, the three co-owner's

authority from him for the register of deeds to make the corresponding

duplicates must likewise be surrendered. The claim of counsel for

memorandum of registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies of

the donees that the issuance of the three co-owner's duplicates was

the title were in existence, presumably issued under section 43 * of Act 496.

unauthorized is beside the point. Unless and until a court of

As correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners'

competent jurisdiction rules to the contrary, these titles are

claim that the issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside

presumed to have been lawfully issued.lawphi1.et

the point, its legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a court of
competent jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title in

Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners
would want to compel annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in
their possession, citing section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the
production of the owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any
voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall be conclusive
authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to make a
memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument." Under
this provision, according to petitioners, the presentation of the other copies

existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if

an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and
not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued
as a duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain identical
entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land
covered by the title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to
carry differing annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would
cease to be reliable.

of the title is not required, first, because it speaks of "registered owner" and
not one whose claim to or interest in the property is merely annotated on

One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in

the title, such as the three vendees-co-owners in this case; and secondly,

upholding the action taken by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that

because the issuance of the duplicate copies in their favor was illegal or

since the property subject of the donation is presumed conjugal, that is,

unauthorized.

property of the marriage of the donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased
wife, Nemesia Mina, "there should first be a liquidation of the partnership
before the surviving spouse may make such a conveyance." This legal

conclusion may appear too general and sweeping in its implications, for

Footnotes

without a previous settlement of the partnership a surviving spouse may

Section 43. Certificates where land registered in names of two or

dispose of his aliquot share or interest therein subject of course to the

more persons. Where two or more persons are registered owners as

result of future liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that, if the

tenants in common, or otherwise, one owner's duplicate certificate

conjugal character of the property is assumed, the deed of donation

may be issued for the whole land, or a separate duplicate may be

executed by the husband, Cornelio Balbin, bears on its face an infirmity

issued to each for his undivided share.

which justified the denial of its registration, namely, the fact that the twothirds portion of said property which he donated was more than his one-half
share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had sold
portions of the same land to three other parties.

G.R. No. L-28790

April 29, 1968

It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur (CC No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and

ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration,

the character of the land in question are in issue, as well as the validity of

petitioner,

the different conveyances executed by him. The matter of registration of

vs.

the deed of donation may well await the outcome of that case, and in the

CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, as Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL M.

meantime the rights of the interested parties could be protected by filing

SALAS, as Executive Secretary, respondents.

the proper notices of lis pendens.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos

Sur and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo,

JJ.,
Capistrano,

concur.
J.,

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

took

Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.

no

part.

Secretary of Justice from investigating the official actuations of the

Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare inoperative his
suspension by the Executive Secretary pending investigation.

The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly

conduct

prejudicial

to

the

public

interest",

petitioner

was

"hereby

appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a

suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above

position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the terms of section 2 of said

charges."

Act, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation,

emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First
Instance." The appropriation laws (Rep. Acts 4642, 4856 and 5170) in the
item setting forth the salary of said officer, use the following expression:

On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the

contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack
of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In
their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land

1. One Land Registration Commissioner with the rank and privileges

Registration

Commissioner,

exercises

judicial

functions,

or

that

the

of district judge P19,000.00.

petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of

the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of

On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner

a letter requiring him to explain in writing not later than March 9, 1968 why
no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or
recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidatedsubdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by

investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in

nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial
functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of
judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of
powers.

the original titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice
that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a

Thus, the stark issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land

Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and

Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the

investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance,

conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned (Rep. Act 1151

and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the

and Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of

Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary

First Instance.

Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
First to militate against petitioner's stand is the fact that section 67 of the
On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by

Judiciary Act providing for investigation, suspension or removal of Judges,

the Executive Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on

specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed

"finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and

from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall

exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed,

the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these

much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District

Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of

Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.

impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).

In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a

In our opinion, such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the

Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated

Legislature when it granted these executive officials the rank and privileges

only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its

of Judges of First Instance. This conclusion gains strength when account is

recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being

taken of the fact that in the case of the Judges of the Court of Agrarian

possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had

Relations and those of the Court of Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said

indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. These favoured officers

bodies (Republic Act 1267, as amended by Act 1409; Rep. Act No. 1125)

include (a) the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice

expressly provide that they are to be removed from office for the same

(Judiciary Act, sec. 42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors General, seven in number

causes and in the same manner provided by law for Judges of First

(Rep. Act No. 4360); (c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City (R.A. No. 4495); (d)

Instance", or "members of the judiciary of appellate rank". The same is true

the City Fiscal of Manila (R. A. No. 4631) and (e) the Securities and

of Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act No. 103) and of the

Exchange Commissioner (R. A. No. 5050, s. 2). To adopt petitioner's theory,

Commissioner of Public Service (Public Service Act, Sec. 3). It is thereby

therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of

shown that where the legislative design is to make the suspension or

investigating and disciplining all these officials, whose functions are plainly

removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other

executive, and the consequent curtailment by mere implication from the

officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.

Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove

administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the
Constitution expressly placed under the President's supervision and control
(Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 10[i]).

But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is

that, if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of
"privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance"
the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or

Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the

removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of

Solicitor General, another appointee of the President, could not be removed

privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental

by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General

doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the

administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and

289, 72 L. ed. 880, 884, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Ex parte Bakelite

simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over

Corp. 279 U.S. 438, 449, 73 L. ed. 789, 793, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 411.

such officials.

(Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Company, 281 U.S.

469, 74 L. ed. 972.) (Emphasis supplied.)

Justice Cardozo ruled in In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder (247 N.

Y. 401, 160 N. E. 655), saying:

In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and
its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to

There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge

the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably
incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.

The United States Supreme Court said in Federal Radio Commission vs.
General Electric Co., et al., 281 U.S. 469, 74 Law. Ed., 972,

But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character,

whether for purposes of review or otherwise. It was brought into
being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with
judicial power only and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases
and controversies falling within the classes enumerated in that
article. It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can
it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are
essentially legislative or administrative. Keller v. Potomac Electric
Power Co., supra (261 U.S. 444, 67 L. ed. 736, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445)
and cases cited; Postum Cereal Co. vs. California Fig Nut Co. supra
(272 U.S. 700, 701, 71 L. ed. 481, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284); Liberty
Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74, 71 L. ed. 541, 544, 47
Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Asso. 277 U.S. 274,

perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with
the administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the Supreme
Court to arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in
Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600).1wph1.t

Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other

executive officials by claiming that under Section 4 of Republic Act No.
1151, he is endowed with judicial functions. The section invoked runs as
follows:

Sec. 4. Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land

Registration. When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard
to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in
pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to
him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree
with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the
question

shall

be

submitted

to

the

Commissioner

of

Land

Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds,

stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the
suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the

Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the

of consultas are but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive

records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice

functions and merely incidental to the latter.

to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step
to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases
shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds:
Provided, further, That, when a party in interest disagrees with the
ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a
question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme
Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.

Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that

statutes should be given, whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring
them in conflict with the Constitution, 2 We are constrained to rule that the
grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of the
"same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not
include, and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation
by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon that

Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a

Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of privileges would

consulta by a Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with

be violative of the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the

administrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision of the

investigation and suspension of the aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to

section, the decision of the Land Registration Commissioner "shall be

sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law (R. A. 2260) are neither abuses

conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon

of discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.

other parties. This limitation1 in effect identifies the resolutions of the Land
Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau director, whose
resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the Commissioner's

WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied,
and the petition is ordered dismissed. No costs.

resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative;
any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the corresponding
CHAPTER 3 CASES

department head.

But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds
should constitute a judicial (or more properly quasi judicial) function,
analysis of the powers and duties of the Land Registration Commissioner
under Republic Act No. 1151, sections 3 and 4, will show that the resolution

G.R. No. 175746

March 12, 2008

CHARLES L. ONG, Petitioner,

been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the

vs.

concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of the Philippines
(respondent), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed
the application for registration of title. Respondent asserted that neither
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,

exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since
June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act

This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 25, 2006 Decision 1 of

No. 141, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; that applicants

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085, which reversed and set aside

failed to adduce any muniment of title to prove their claims; that the tax

the January 16, 2002 Decision2 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan,

declaration appended to the application does not appear genuine and

Pangasinan in Land Registration Case No. 99-023, and the November 20,

merely shows pretended possession of recent vintage; that the application

2006 Resolution3 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

was filed beyond the period allowed under P.D. No. 892; and that the
subject lot is part of the public domain which cannot be the subject of

The antecedent facts are as follows.

On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and as

duly authorized representative of his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto and

private appropriation.

On January 16, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of

petitioner and his brothers, viz:

Cesar, filed an Application for Registration of Title 4 over Lot 15911 (subject
lot) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area of five

The foregoing evidences presented by the applicant indubitably established

hundred seventy four (574) square meters, more or less. They alleged that

sufficient basis to grant the applicant (sic) for registration. Originally, the

they are the co-owners of the subject lot; that the subject lot is their

whole parcel of land was owned by spouses Teofilo Abellara and Abella

exclusive property having acquired the same by purchase from spouses

Charmine who acquired the same by virtue of a Deed of Sale from Cynthia

Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998; that the subject lot is

Cacho, Agustin Cacho, Jr., Jasmin Cacho, Jover Cacho and Lauro Cacho.

presently unoccupied; and that they and their predecessors-in-interest have

Later, they sold the same parcel of land to spouses Tony C. Villamil and
Alicia Bautista, who in turn sold the same land to herein applicants.

The same parcel of land has been declared in the name of the applicant and

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of

her predecessors-in-interest and its taxes has (sic) been religiously paid.

the court a quo granting the application for registration of title of applicantsappellees is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.

The said circumstances further show that the possession and ownership of
the applicant and her (sic) predecessors-in-interest over the same parcel of

SO ORDERED.6

land has (sic) been continuous and peaceful under bona fide claim of
ownership before the filing of the instant application for registration on [July
1, 1999].

In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that
the subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. Thus, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that they

WHEREFORE, after confirming the Order of General Default, the Court

possessed the subject lot in the nature and for the duration required by law.

hereby orders and decrees the registration of a parcel of land as shown on

However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest

plan ap-01-004897 approved by the Bureau of Land(s) situated in Barangay

have been in adverse possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner

Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, containing an area of Five Hundred Seventy

since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. It

Four (574) square meters, subject of the application for registration of title,

noted that the earliest tax declaration which petitioner presented is dated

in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1529, in favor of CHARLIE L. ONG

1971. Consequently, petitioner could not fairly claim possession of the land

in his behalf and as representative of his brothers namely, ROBERTO L.

prior to 1971. Neither was petitioner able to prove that he or his

ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG and CESAR L. ONG.

predecessors-in-interest actually occupied the subject lot prior to the filing

of the application. Thus, the trial court erred in granting the application for

Furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the Solicitor General, Makati

registration of title over the subject lot.

City, Metro Manila, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Dagupan City,
Atty. Celestino Domingo Jr., the Office of the Land Registration Authority,

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

Quezon City, as well as the applicant.

1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS BROTHERS,
SO ORDERED.5

NAMELY, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG AND CEZAR L. ONG,

HAVE

Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the

assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

REGISTRABLE

OWNERSHIP

OVER

THE

REAL

PROPERTY

SUBJECT MATTER OF LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO. 99-023, AND

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION OF THE

Appeals arrived at conflicting findings.9 After a careful review of the records,

FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

we sustain the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

THAT THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IS A PUBLIC LAND IS CORRECT. 7

There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as alienable and
The petition lacks merit.

disposable land of the public domain. The Report10 dated January 17, 2000
of the Bureau of Lands stated that the subject lot is "within the alienable

Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 ("Property Registration Decree"), as amended,

provides

SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

and disposable zone as classified under Project 50 L.C. Map No. 698 and
released and classified as such on November 21, 1927." 11 This finding is,
likewise, embodied in the Report12 dated January 7, 1999 of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) and the blue print Copy13 of the plan
covering the subject lot. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have

predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and

notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945

occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a

or earlier.

bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The records show that petitioner and his brothers bought the subject lot
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for

from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998, 14 who in

registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the

turn purchased the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen

disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have

on January 16, 1997.15 The latter bought the subject lot from Cynthia,

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and

Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all surnamed Cacho, on July 10, 1979. 16

occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,

The earliest tax declaration which was submitted in evidence was Tax

1945, or earlier.8 These requisites involve questions of fact which are not

Declaration No. 2560617 issued in 1971 in the names of spouses Agustin

proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Factual findings of the court a

Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista. While tax declarations are not conclusive

quo are generally binding on this Court except for certain recognized

proof of ownership, they constitute good indicia of possession in the

exceptions, as is the case here, where the trial court and the Court of

concept of owner and a claim of title over the subject property. 18 Even if we

were to tack petitioners claim of ownership over the subject lot to that of

he and his wife never actually occupied the subject lot from the time they

their alleged predecessors-in-interest, spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia

bought the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen in 1997. 23

Baustista in 1971, still this would fall short of the required possession from

Aside from these two testimonies, no other evidence was presented to

June 12, 1945 or earlier.1avvphi1

establish the character of the possession of the subject lot by petitioners

other alleged predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, petitioners evidence failed

Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is

not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because
the law requires possession and occupation. As held in Republic v.
Alconaba:

to establish specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim that he and

his predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the
nature and duration required by law.

19

The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to
make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore,
the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing
effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to

must show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged
possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required
by law.24 Unfortunately, petitioners evidence do not constitute the "wellnigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary in cases of this nature. 25
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the Decision of the
trial court and in denying his application for registration of title over the
subject lot.

highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be
a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The April 25,

acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise

2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085 which

over his own property.20

reversed and set aside the January 16, 2002 Decision of the Municipal Trial
Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan in Land Registration Case No. 99-023, and

Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot
from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his

the November 20, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED.

brothers actually occupied the subject lot. 21 No improvements were made

thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot on several
occasions.22 Petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Tony Bautista testified that

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ELENA TALION, JOE RANDY TRESVALLES, ELIAS VALENZUELA, GERRY

VALENZUELA, LILIBETH VALENZUELA, JOSEPHINE VICTORINO, JOJO
VICTORINO, MAXIMINO VICTORINO, NOEL VICTORINO, REYNANTE
VICTORINO,
represented

ROBERTO
by

VICTORINO

NELSIE

B.

and

JOVITO

CAETE,

VILLAREAL,

petitioners,

vs.
GENUINO ICE COMPANY, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 154080

January 22, 2008

DECISION

NELSIE B. CAETE, RONA ANAS, MILAGROSA APUAN, ERLINDA

AQUINO, GODOFREDO AQUINO, CORITA BARREDO, TESSIE BARREDO,
JESUS

BATRINA,

BUENAVENTURA,

ALBERTO

EUSEBIO

BUENAVENTURA,

CAPIRAL,

MARIO

BONIFACIO

CAPIRAL,

LOLITA

CAPIRAL, ELENA CAPIRAL, LETICIA CAPIRAL, RENATO CAPIRAL, ELY

CABANGON, ERWIN CATALUNA, JESSIE CONRADO, JOEL CONRADO,
NARCISIO CONRADO, RICARDO CALAMPIANO, ALUMNIO CORSANES,
NILO

COLATOY,

MARJETO

DAYAN,

HENRY

DIAZ,

SALVACION

ESMANDE, REYNALDO FUENTEBELLA, GERRY GEQUILLANA, DELSIE

GARCIA, NERISSA GONZALES, VISITACION JUNSAY, ESTELA JOVEN,
JOSE LANZUELA, MARLON MALANGAYON, RENATO MARCELO, ANITA
MARZONIA, MARCELINO MONTALBO, AMADO MULI, JR., LEONITA
MULI, EDUARDO OLVIDO, ALMARIO PACON, ASUNCION PACON,
SALVACION PAGAYUNAN, ESTER PANTALEON, SHERLITA RABE, ANITA
REYES,
GERALYN

MEDELYN
RIVERA,

ALEXANDER

RIOS,

BERTITO

ARMANDO

SANGALAN,

RIVAS,

RIVERA,

ERNESTO

ENGRACIA

MA.

SANTIAGO,

MERCY
JOY

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

RIVERA,
SHERVA,

SANTIAGO,

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals dated January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64337 entitled
"Genuino Ice Company, Inc. vs. Hon. Victorino P. Evangelista, Nelsie B.
Caete, et al.," and its Resolution 2 dated June 26, 2002, dismissing
petitioners "Second Amended Complaint" in Civil Case No. Q-99-36483 filed
in Branch 223 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

Records show that on January 11, 1999, petitioners filed a complaint for
cancellation of title to property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
Nos. N-140441;3 14399;4 RT-94384 (292245);5 RT-94794 (292246);6 and
292247.7 Petitioners alleged that said titles are spurious, fictitious and were
issued "under mysterious circumstances," considering that the holders
thereof including their predecessors-in-interest were never in actual,
adverse and physical possession of the property, rendering them ineligible
to acquire title to the said property under the Friar Lands Act. 8 Petitioners

also sought to nullify Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614 from which

(2) "A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot 669,

the foregoing titles sought to be cancelled originated or were derived.

situated at Barangay Culiat, Quezon City x x x."

Respondent Genuino Ice Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the ground

5. That the above-described real property is a portion of a friar land

that the complaint states no cause of action because petitioners are not real

known

parties-in-interest; that no relief may be granted as a matter of law; and

distribution among the bona fide occupants thereof pursuant to the

that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, but it was denied

Friar Lands Act.

as

"Piedad

Estate,"

which

property

is

intended

for

by the trial court. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the same was
6. That transfer certificates of title allegedly having originated or

denied.

derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 614 were issued by the
On November 4, 1999, petitioners filed a "Second Amended Complaint" 10

Register of Deeds of Quezon City, which transfer certificates of title

which sought to annul, in addition to the titles already alleged in the original

are in truth and in fact fictitious, spurious and null and void, for the

complaint, TCT Nos. 274095 and 274096;11 274097 and 274098;12 and

following reasons: (a) that no record of any agency of the

274099.13

government shows as to how and in what manner was OCT 614

issued; (b) that no record of any proceedings whatsoever, whether

The Second Amended Complaint alleged the following causes of action, as

well as the remedy sought to be obtained, thus:

4. That plaintiffs (petitioners) and their predecessors-in-interest are

among those who have been in actual, adverse, peaceful and
continuous possession in concept of owners of unregistered parcels
of land situated at Sitio Mabilog, Barangay Culiat, Quezon City,
Metro Manila, which parcels of land are more particularly described
as follows:

(1) "A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot 668,

situated at Barangay Culiat, Quezon City x x x."

judicial or administrative, can support defendants claim that the

above-described property originated from OCT 614; and (c) that the
transfer certificates of title over the above-described property were
issued under mysterious circumstances for the above-named
defendants and their so-called predecessors-in-interest never had
any actual, adverse, physical possession of the said property, thus,
not allowed to acquire title over the property in litigation pursuant
to the Friar Lands Act.

7. That defendants are holders of transfer certificates of title of the

above-described property, which transfer certificates of title are null

and void, for reasons specifically mentioned in Paragraph 6 hereof x

(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property in

x x;

litigation pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands Act and other
existing laws.14

8. That the acts in acquiring and keeping the said transfer

certificates of title in violation of the Friar Lands Act and other

Respondent moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the

existing laws are prejudicial to plaintiffs rights over the above-

following grounds:

described property.
a) The complaint states no cause of action because: (1) on the
9. That equity demands that defendants transfer certificates of title

allegations alone, plaintiffs (petitioners) are not real parties in

as specified in Paragraph 7 hereof be declared fictitious, spurious

interest who may bring suit to cancel defendants (including

and null and void ab initio.

respondent) titles; (2) based on the allegations and prayer of the

complaint, no relief, as a matter of law, may be granted;

PRAYER
b) Prescription has set in;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of
this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiffs

c) There are earlier similar complaints (Civil Case Nos. Q-95-22834

and against defendants:

and Q-95-23111) filed by a different set of plaintiffs against a

different set of defendants but which involve the same subject

(1) Declaring as null and void ab initio OCT 614 and all transfer
certificates of title derived therefrom;

(2) Declaring as null and void defendants transfer certificates of

title over the property in litigation;

matter, cause of action and allegations of the plaintiffs, with respect

to the cancellation of OCT 614 and succeeding titles derived from it.
Said complaints have since been dismissed by Branch 93 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, the dismissal of which is the
subject of a pending certiorari proceeding in the appellate court. 15

(3) Ordering defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel

defendants transfer certificates of title and all transfer certificates
of title derived therefrom;

On January 3, 2001,16 the trial court denied respondents motion to dismiss

the Second Amended Complaint. Its motion for reconsideration was likewise

denied hence respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of

Order of the Philippine Islands, as indicated in Public Act No. 1120 (Friar

Appeals.

Lands Act) enacted on April 26, 1904. 18

The appellate court granted respondents petition for certiorari and

After the Piedad Estate was registered in OCT No. 614 in the name of the

dismissed petitioners Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a

Philippine Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496, the area

cause of action. Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:

was subdivided originally into 874 lots. As a result of subsequent surveys

executed in the course of disposition, the number of lots increased to 1,305.

A. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE

COMPLAINT FILED BY THE PETITIONERS WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF QUEZON CITY IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-99-36483 DOES NOT
STATE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION;

B. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE

PETITIONERS ARE NOT REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST;

Disposition of these lots was made by the Bureau of Lands thru sales, under
the Friar Lands Act, as early as 1910 and records show that even before the
Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate have been disposed of. 19 The
Piedad Estate has long been segregated from the mass of the public domain
and has become private land duly registered under the Torrens system
following the procedure for the confirmation of private lands prescribed in
Act 496. Thus the lands inside the Piedad Estate are no longer lands of the

C. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE

public domain.20

OF "EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES"; and,

One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successorsD. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

in-interest, may not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of

DISCRETION AND DENIED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

occupation from time immemorial, as this contravenes the historical fact

WHEN IT DISMISSED THEIR COMPLAINT. 17

that friar lands were bought by the Government of the Philippine Islands,
pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United States, approved on July 1,

We deny the petition.

The subject lots are part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land
acquired on December 23, 1903 by the Philippine Government from the
Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola
de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto

1902, not from individual persons but from certain companies, a society and
a religious order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only "actual settlers and
occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the Government" were
given preference to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings, in disregard

of the settlement and occupation of persons before the government

A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of

acquired the lands.

action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions

21

of fact, or conclusions of law. General allegations that a contract is

The basic rules of proper pleading and procedure require that every
pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for
his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere

valid or legal, or is just, fair and reasonable, are mere conclusions of

law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid,
illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts
showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law. 24

evidentiary facts.22 And in all averments of fraud or mistake, the

circumstances

constituting

fraud

or

mistake

must

be

stated

with

particularity.23

"Ultimate facts" means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause
of action, or such facts as are so essential that they cannot be stricken out
without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. 25 "Cause of

It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint determine the

nature of the action, and consequently, the jurisdiction of the
courts. This is because the complaint must contain a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action and must specify the relief sought. No rule is better
established than that which requires the complaint to contain a
statement of all the facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.
Additionally, Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that in
all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. In the case at
bar, while there are allegations of fraud in the above quoted
complaints, the same are not particular enough to bring the
controversy within the SEC's jurisdiction. The said allegations are
not statements of ultimate facts but are mere conclusions of law.

action" has been defined as an act or omission of one party in violation of

the legal right or rights of the other;26 and its essential elements are: 1) a
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; 2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and 3) an act or omission on the part of
the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages. If these elements are not
extant, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action. 27 In the resolution of a motion to
dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in
the complaint as well as its annexes must be considered. 28 The test in such
case is whether a court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based
upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein. 29

Corollarily, the question of whether or not a complaint states a cause of

First, their initial claim that OCT 614 of which all the other subject titles

action against a defendant or the action is premature is one of law. The trial

are derivatives is null and void, has been proven wrong. As has been held

court can consider all the pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and

in Pinlac and other cases, OCT 614 did legally exist and was previously

the evidence on record. However in so doing, the trial court does not rule on

issued in the name of the Philippine Government in 1910 under the

the truth or falsity of such documents. It merely includes such documents in

provisions of Act 496.

the hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding of lack of cause of

action based on these documents would not involve a calibration of the
probative value of such pieces of evidence but would only limit itself to the
inquiry of whether the law was properly applied given the facts and these
supporting documents. Therefore, what would inevitably arise from such a
review are pure questions of law, and not questions of fact.

The trial court must likewise apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence in
determining whether the allegations in a complaint establish a cause of
action. While it focuses on the complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard
decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. In
resolving a motion to dismiss, every court must take cognizance of
decisions this Court has rendered because they are proper subjects of
mandatory judicial notice. The said decisions, more importantly, form part
of the legal system, and failure of any court to apply them shall constitute
an abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with law, and
shall be a ground for administrative action against an inferior court
magistrate.30

Considering the foregoing, it is not difficult to see the need for particularity
and incipient substantiation in the petitioners Second Amended Complaint.

Second, the Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry of Natural Resources,

which was specifically tasked to investigate the historical background of the
Piedad Estate, found that as early as the period prior to the Second World
War, all lots in the Piedad Estate had already been disposed of.

Third, the Piedad Estate has been placed under the Torrens system of land
registration, which means that all lots therein are titled.

Fourth, as held in the Balicudiong case, one who acquires land under the
Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-in-interest, may not claim
successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time
immemorial, which means that petitioners claimed actual, adverse,
peaceful and continuous possession of the subject property is really of no
moment unless it is shown that their predecessors-in-interest were actual
settlers and occupants at the time said lands were acquired by the
Government, and whose rights were not disregarded even though they were
in occupation of the same before the government acquired the land; yet, no
period of time in relation to adverse possession is alleged.

Petitioners

Second

Amended

Complaint

betrays

no

more

than

an

incomplete narration of facts unsupported by documentary or other

exhibits; the allegations therein partake of conclusions of law unsupported

fide occupants" thereof. In other words, petitioners concede the States

by a particular averment of circumstances that will show why or how such

ownership of the property.

inferences or conclusions were arrived at. It is replete with sweeping

generalizations and inferences derived from facts that are not found therein.
While there are allegations of fraud upon the claim that the subject titles
were fictitious, spurious and obtained under "mysterious circumstances,"
the same are not specific to bring the controversy within the trial courts
jurisdiction. There is no explanation or narration of facts as would show why
said titles are claimed to be fictitious or spurious, contrary to the
requirement of the Rules that the circumstances constituting fraud must be
stated with particularity; otherwise, the allegation of fraud would simply be
an unfounded conclusion of law. In the absence of specific averments, the
complaint is defective, for it presents no basis upon which the court should
act, or for the defendant to meet it with an intelligent answer.

As to the second issue raised, petitioners claim that they are bona fide
occupants of the subject property within the contemplation of the Friar
Lands Act, having allegedly been in actual, adverse, peaceful and
continuous possession of the property, although it is not stated for how long
and since when. In their second amended complaint, they seek judgment

(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property

in litigation pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands Act and
other existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)

Being so, petitioners may not be considered the real parties in interest for
the purpose of maintaining the suit for cancellation of the subject titles. The
Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that only the State, through the
Solicitor General, may institute such suit. Jurisprudence on the matter has
been settled and the issue need not be belabored. Thus

The Court also holds that private respondents are not the proper
parties to initiate the present suit. The complaint, praying as it did
for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title of petitioners
on the ground that they were derived from a "spurious" OCT No.
4216, assailed in effect the validity of said title. While private
respondents did not pray for the reversion of the land to the
government, we agree with the petitioners that the prayer in the
complaint will have the same result of reverting the land to the
government under the Regalian doctrine. Gabila vs. Barriga ruled
that only the government is entitled to this relief. The Court in that
case held:

"The present motion to dismiss is actually predicated on

Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, i.e.,
failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, for it
alleges in paragraph 12 thereof that the plaintiff admits that

They do not pray to be declared owners of the subject property despite

he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment

their alleged adverse possession but only to be adjudged as the "bona

of the defendants title, because, even if the said title were

canceled or amended, the ownership of the land embraced

for in the amended complaint is the cancellation or amendment of

therein,

defendant-appellees title."31

or

of

the

portion

thereof

affected

by

the

amendment, would revert to the public domain. In his

amended complaint the plaintiff makes no pretense at all
that any part of the land covered by the defendants title
was privately owned by him or by his predecessors-ininterest. Indeed, it is admitted therein that the said land
was at all times a part of the public domain until December
18, 1964, when the government issued a title thereon in
favor of defendant. Thus, if there is any person or entity to

Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of
the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or
a mere incidental interest. The interest of the party must also be personal
and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some
third and unrelated party. Real interest, on the other hand, means a present

relief, it can only be the government.

substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,

In the case at bar, the plaintiffs own averments negate the

contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.32

existence of such right, for it would appear therefrom that whatever

right might have been violated by the defendant belonged to the
government, not to the plaintiff. Plaintiff-appellant argues that
although his complaint is captioned as one for cancellation of title,
he has nevertheless stated therein several causes of action based
on his alleged rights of possession and ownership over the
improvements,

on

defendant-appellees

alleged

fraudulent

acquisition of the land, and on the damages allegedly incurred by

him (plaintiff-appellant) in relation to the improvements. These
matters are merely ancillary to the central issue of whether or not
defendant-appellees title should be canceled or amended, and they
may not be leaned upon in an effort to make out a cause of action
in relation to the said focal issue. Indeed, the principal relief prayed

If petitioners are to be believed, they would possess a mere inchoate

interest in the properties covered by the subject titles, a mere expectancy
conditioned upon the fact that if the questioned titles are cancelled and the
property is reverted to the State, they would probably or possibly be given
preferential treatment as qualified buyers or lessees of the property under
the Friar Lands Act. But this certainly is not the "interest" required by law
that grants them license or the personality to prosecute their case. Only to
the State does the privilege belong.

On the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, suffice it to state

that since petitioners do not possess the necessary interest to prosecute the
case for cancellation of title in the courts, neither do they have the right to
pursue administrative remedies outside thereof. They are not the owners;

nor are they qualified applicants therefor. It has not been shown by their

Resolution dated June 26, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration, are

complaint that they have previously taken steps to avail of the benefits

AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

under the Friar Lands Act, since all they seek, should the questioned titles
be nullified, is to be declared bona fide occupants of the property covered
by the questioned titles. Neither is there any indication that they possess
the qualifications necessary to enable them to avail of the preference
granted under the Act.

Finally, there is no merit in petitioners contention that respondent belatedly

G.R. No. L-24066

December 9, 1925

filed the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and that the
appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it entertained and

VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

resolved the same.

ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE

The Order of the trial court dated January 3, 2001 denying respondents

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant.

motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint was received by the

respondent

on

January

16,

2001.

Respondent

filed

motion

for

reconsideration on January 18, 2001 which was denied on February 28,

2001. Respondent received the order denying its motion for reconsideration
on March 27, 2001. On the same day, it filed a Notice to File Petition for
Certiorari. On April 2, 2001, the petition for certiorari was filed with the
Court of Appeals. Clearly, the same was timely filed hence, the appellate
court correctly entertained the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64337 dismissing petitioners
"Second Amended Complaint" in Civil Case No. Q-99-36483 and the

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a

complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of
Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute
owner of the parcel of land described in the second paragraph of the
complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of
Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private property; (c) ordering
the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and
(d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with
the costs.

For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and

September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the

every allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the

right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the execution of the deed of sale,

land in question was a property of the Government of the United States

Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land,

under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands before its sale

availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the

to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with law.

sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession and
occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio

After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff
entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the
Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of
the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon.
From this judgment the Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto
the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the judgment rendered in a
prior case between the plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon on the parcel
of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is
entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of
the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering
that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the Province of
Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and (3) the
denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.

The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the
land in question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza
for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B).
After having been in possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish
pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on

Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse
and public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or
disturbance,

except

when

Angela

Razon,

on

September

13,

1913,

commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover

the possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the
evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of
Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit
E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question
through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the
purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said
application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6, 1915,
asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After
making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands
overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon.
By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31,
1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said
document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in
question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible
entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga,

which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to

through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain

real property (Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.

openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a
right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII

With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised
by the appellant in his assignments of error.lawphi1.net

It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in
possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and
publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that
is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does
not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and
rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on August
15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi
had already been in possession thereof personally and through his
predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that
Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on
December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess
and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of
memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme

of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor,
Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate
of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section
47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land
in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public
domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed
of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus
made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire
any right.

The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public
domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover
possession thereof.lawphi1.net

Court of the United States in the case of Cario vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin

If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had

Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in

already become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there

paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all

lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to

the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied

bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it.

with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and

For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed

of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities

from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special

and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;

pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its

secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER

ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on

CO. INC., ETC., respondents.

October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members
of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;

NARVASA, J.:
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment

applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;

of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First

Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood &

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or

Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters,

sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the

more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the

Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the

Dumagat tribe.

Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to

generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48

and Acer Infiel;

of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the
appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,

proceedings in this wise:

Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and
tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws

the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to

possession is already considered from time immemorial.

the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning

this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced

7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to

the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership
to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or
their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable
public land or within the public domain;

8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced
more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of
improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during
its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on
September 18, 1982;

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be

registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the government
when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated
for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of
Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a

only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into
effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its
Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding
alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000
hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force
in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was
reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48,
paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the
townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979,

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-

and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of

interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious

Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on

possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public

November 22, 1979.

domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at

least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application

for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force

Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the

majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed

title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in

all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be

favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973

entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein

against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in

(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves

lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.

or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open.

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the

lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether

time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then

disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least

still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on

30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b)

the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional

hereof.

prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations

obviously does not apply.

The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted
findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate

In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs.

Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that

Castro-Bartolome, et al,

Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question

Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the

on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who

capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in

had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied

Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the

those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year

vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos,

period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in

since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976,

Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor

Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for

is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels,

confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were

is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any

public land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical

provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV

person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the

already referred to.

Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to

where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case,

apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco

prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon

appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:

completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial
or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.

..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land
only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino
citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land

That said dissent expressed what is the better and, indeed, the correct,
view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings
cited therein,

and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its

registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be

The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the

given due course or has to be dismissed.

Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands

wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was

Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes

ruled that:

no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural

public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5

the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an

those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do

occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.

not overlook the argument that this means may prove in

attributes title to

registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not
make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to
alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured
under

section

48(b).

The

proceeding

under

section

48(b)

'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of

Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

1980,

thru Susi in 1925

decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of

an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in
danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove'
(acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might
be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of
cases beginning with Carino in 1909

would have recommended an application under the foregoing

down to Herico in

which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open,

exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period

are indications that registration was expected from all but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained
would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to

confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the

no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and

decree, if not by earlier law. ...

of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more

Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste

categorical language, in Susi:

vs. Director of Lands,

Cabanatuan,

.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption

juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No.

Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza,

Miguel vs. Court of Appeals

10

Manarpac vs.

and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by

invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in

jurisprudence.

2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements
for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been

Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:

11

in actual and physical possession, personally and through his

predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a
right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the
grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation
of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for
it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which
the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's
case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more
than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-ininterest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no
longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....

xxx xxx xxx

therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No.

2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in

question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the

the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed

public domain and had become private property, at least by

to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a

presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of

government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title

Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela

being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain

Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had

and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The

application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to

does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be

which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29,

evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the

1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded

strength of said patent.

that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing

12

in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed

Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from

acquiring and owning private lands.

by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the
dictum of the statute itself

that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land,

presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government

despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title

grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being

in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the

admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings

Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire

would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to

the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution

ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character

that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or

and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but

acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired

simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not

that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation

originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such

then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public

a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the

agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental

required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in

circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis

Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all,

of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of

but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained

the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law

would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer

came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper.

title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by

This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the

earlier law."

Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

13

We hold that the said constitutional prohibition

has no retroactive

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the

application to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc.

issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land

because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied

from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent

for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.

for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right

14

without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<re||
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by

an1w>

15

the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution

allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by

exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner'

Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental

prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in

circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in

constitutional law.

nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought
to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's

xxx xxx xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A
state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the
enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or
by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate
exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).

xxx xxx xxx

entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the

undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution,
could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid
subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their
lawful

successor-in-interest

by

valid

conveyance

which

violates

no

constitutional mandate.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the
majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of

be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases

the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the

already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor,

land in question had become fixed and established and was no

personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and

longer open to doubt or controversy.

exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public
Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse

or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis

overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years

of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private

dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)

property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby
acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against
said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a
juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of
title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than
substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering

the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the
evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as
natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of
the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and
mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on

herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly

the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the

qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the

Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of

applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired

their title would be impractical and would just give rise to

and sold or exchanged.

multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical

error not having filed the application for registration in the name of
the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is
conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land
to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against
the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of
the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the
end result of their application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the
conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not
be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling
of all such applications in their names and adding to the

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the
Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and,
after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands
back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades,
whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with
no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to
conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively

recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms
and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed
the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it
is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions

of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly

DECISION

on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was

disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public
land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973
Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a
brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered
as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of

the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without

TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decision1 of the Sixth Division of the
Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate
court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 2 Branch
8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC)3 of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which
granted the application for registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit

costs in this instance.

(Naguit), the respondent herein.

SO ORDERED.
The facts are as follows:
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to
Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for
registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan.
The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas
G.R. No. 144057

January 17, 2005

Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square

meters.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

The

application

seeks

judicial

confirmation

of

respondents

imperfect title over the aforesaid land.

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT,
respondents.

On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The
public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles,
representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later
date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the

petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court issued an order of general

1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be

default against the whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles

brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or

and the government.

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and
confirmed in the name of Naguit. 6

The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor

1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.4 On July 9, 1992, Urbano

General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the

executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming

land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15,

(Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and

1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T.

confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or

Geollegue of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region

1956.5 Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale

VI.7 However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order

in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same.

dated February 18, 1998.81awphi1.nt

She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator.

The administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as
mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees
which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due
on the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the
subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees.
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and
in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or

Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to
the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its
decision, dismissing the appeal.9

Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule
42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate
court rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and
affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.

even the government until she filed her application for registration.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor

filed by the Republic on September 4, 2000.10

manifested that the government did not intend to present any evidence
while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico

The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the

Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27,

appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no need for the

governments prior release of the subject lot from the public domain before

possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the

it can be considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No.

public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,

1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the

1945, or earlier.

concept of owner for the required period.11

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under

prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be
first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for

The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate

Court12 in arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and
exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was
declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have
maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required
by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the
land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.

Section

14 of

the

Property

Registration

Decree,

....

registration of title under Section 14(1) that the property in question is

alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that
such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable

governing

original

registration proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly provides:

character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper

phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking,

Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether

qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they

personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. 13

Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt

an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the

petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,

existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential

adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not

proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation

declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be

reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a

susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged

statute."15 In that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR as

possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of

alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the

Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from

alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact that

giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as

therein respondents had occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to

alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even

allow the application for registration of the said property. In the case at bar,

be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was

even the petitioner admits that the subject property was released and

not yet even considered an independent state.

certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR. 16

Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely

This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,17 wherein

requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and

the Court noted that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908,

disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the

it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as alienable

State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to

and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed. In

release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that

Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years

the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the

before the property was declared alienable and disposable.1awphi1.nt

need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of

Thus, in this case, where the application was made years after the property

adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has

had been certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does

already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then

not apply.

there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its

exclusive prerogative over the property.

A different rule obtains for forest lands, 18 such as those which form part of a
reservation for provincial park purposes19 the possession of which cannot

This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of

ripen into ownership.20 It is elementary in the law governing natural

Appeals .14 Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the land subject of

resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. As held in

Palomo v. Court of Appeals,21 forest land is not registrable and possession

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have

thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property,

been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and

unless

and

occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide

alienable.22 In the case at bar, the property in question was undisputedly

claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately

classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is

preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when

inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. 23

prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to

such

lands

are

reclassified

and

considered

disposable

have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on

be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which

pertains to original registration through ordinary registration proceedings.

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of

The right to file the application for registration derives from a bona fide

possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to

claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the

agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.

claimants

However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that

open,

continuous,

exclusive and

notorious

possession of

alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30)
years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again

A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which
reads:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein,
but those titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at
June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.

Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the

Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the
public domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the term
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be noted
though that the Constitution declares that "alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands." 24 Clearly, the subject lands

under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property

Registration

Decree,

as

correctly

accomplished

by

the

lower

Registration Decree are of the same type.

courts.l^vvphi1.net

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory

The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had

P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of

been in possession in the concept of owner for the required period. The

the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12,

argument begs the question. It is again hinged on the assertionshown

1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration

earlier to be unfoundedthat there could have been no bona fide claim of

Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have

ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land was declared alienable or

acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of

disposable.

existing laws."
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil

Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the

Code.25 There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as

continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land

alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of

since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court

open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. 26

generally respects the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably,

With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation

possession since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50

of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration

to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as

by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if

tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and

possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than

realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,

June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and

nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of

exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by

owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that

virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at

least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The

The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted
with coconut trees now over fifty years old.27 The inherent nature of the land
but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There
is no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the Property

voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests

not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested

parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the

DECISION

Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

ownership.28

Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the

respondent can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which
commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond
any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be
properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system. That she has
been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open,
continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from any private person
and the government itself makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and
deserving of protection under the law.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, 1 which
affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion,
Cebu, dated 21 December 1999, 2 granting the application for land
registration of the respondents.

Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and
David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application
for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in
Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners
in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents,
spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. 3 Together

SO ORDERED.

with their application for registration, respondents submitted the following

set of documents:

(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent
Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of
G.R. No. 156117

May 26, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents.

respondent David;4

(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots; 5

(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural

muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and

Resources

sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The

(DENR)

dispensing

with

the

need

for

Surveyor's

Certificates for the Subject Lots;6

Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and
were not subject to private appropriation. 11

(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the

absence of certificates of title covering the Subject Lots; 7

The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. 12 All
owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice

(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural

Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the
Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963;

of Initial Hearing.13 A copy of the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a
conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of
the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were

(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No.

941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422,
issued in 1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David,
covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in 1994; and

located.14 Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on 02
August 199915 and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999.16

During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order
of Special Default,17 with only petitioner Republic opposing the application

(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses

Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and
the improvements thereon to their sons and respondents herein,
Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias,
while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.

for registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel,
proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional
facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence
from the respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.

On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the

10

On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic)

filed an Opposition to the respondents' application for registration of the
Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period
of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents'

registration and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No.
8422 and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an
Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December
1999, final and executory, and directing the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for the Subject
Lots.18

Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999,

alienable and disposable zone, still the argument of the appellant

to the Court of Appeals.19 The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22

does not hold water.

November 2002, affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:

As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to

as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the

be registered has been classified as within the alienable and

object of prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By

disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to

express provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater

Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that "All things

right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section

which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of

14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any

prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any

manner provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of

of its subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the object of

appelless should only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO

prescription" and that "Ownership and other real rights over

declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been

immovables

adverse

possessing the subject parcels of land in open, continuous, and in

possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good

the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the

faith."

instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As

also

prescribe

through

uninterrupted

such, this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents

quo.20

already acquired the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this

application, since 1950 and that they cultivated the same and

The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the

planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees

Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of

(Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed

the following arguments:

that herein appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied

and possessed the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively,
and adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo
that appellees' possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963
or from the time the subject lots had been classified as within the

First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-ininterest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the
Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
According to the petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject Lots prior to
25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance with the

periods of possession required by law. The Subject Lots were classified as

alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENRO's certification. It

also alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive
prescription period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol,21 where
this Court declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as
the Public Land Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased, requires
that possession of land of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or

Jurisdiction

Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had
no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed
by the respondents but for reasons different from those presented by
petitioner Republic.

earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of

imperfect title.

A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents' application

Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the

for registration.

subject of the application consisted of two parcels of land individually and

separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is

Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots

implicit in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known

even though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David

as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the application for

were actually seeking the individual and separate registration of Lots No.

registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple

8422 and 8423, respectively.

applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners.
While an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when
the subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in
case the subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within the
same province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by
a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it
must be strictly complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since
the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land registration
under the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the
MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it.

Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by

the respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to
proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots,
based on this Court's pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals,22 to wit:

. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute noncompliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that
said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or
jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode

of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is

Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance

mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all

with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the

proceedings utterly null and void.

defect in the joint application for registration filed by the respondents with
the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of

This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This
procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their application for

a single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and

David, more appropriately, should have filed separate applications for
registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.

registration of the Subject Lots.

Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of
The Property Registration Decree23 recognizes and expressly allows the
following situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several
applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to
be registered;24 and (2) the filing of a single application for registration of
several parcels of land provided that the same are located within the same
province.

25

The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the

present situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for two
parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and individual registration of
the parcels of land in their respective names.

Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation,
then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course
of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree itself provides that,
"[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by
analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient."

jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case. 26 They are not
even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof. 27 Instead, under the Rules of
Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied
admission of the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court,
acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to
order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with
separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of
a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to
be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).

The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may
have been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner
Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect the
misjoinder when the application for registration was still pending before it;
and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call the attention
of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for severance of the causes of
action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court.

B.

Respondents,

however,

failed

to

comply

with

the

publication

be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall

requirements mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC

be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the

was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration court.

land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and

"to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all

Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present

Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration

persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to

show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.

proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the

publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from

Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the

assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents' application for

Property Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the

registration.

Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land

registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v. Court

A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,

28

and jurisdiction in rem

cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through

publication and service of notice.29

Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be

given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by
means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the
Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following manner:

of Appeals30 that publication in a newspaper of general circulation is

mandatory for the land registration court to validly confirm and register the
title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property
Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements of
publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all
such requirements, including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of
general circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly
complied with. In the same case, this Court expounded on the reason

1. By publication.

behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a

newspaper of general circulation, thus

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial
hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general

of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and

circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already

once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines:

requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by

Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall

mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in

the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the

evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should

Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper

the claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial

and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices

hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred from contesting

published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at

respondents' application for registration and even the registration decree

all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring

that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of

properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum,

Special Default on 03 September 1999.

the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the

consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and
the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as
possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.31

The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of

general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same
ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the
MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire
jurisdiction over respondents' application for registration thereof. Therefore,

In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in

the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the registration and

fact held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was

confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No.

printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and

8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February

officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman

2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and

Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in the

directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the

province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on

Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC

19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing.

without jurisdiction.

Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial

II

hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the

Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to
the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for
him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose
respondents' application for registration, and to present his claim and

Period of Possession

Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the

Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or
incomplete title.

While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to

The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain,

hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration, this Court

except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands

nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required

which reverted to the State.36 It explicitly enumerates the means by which

period of possession for acquiring title to public land.

public lands may be disposed, as follows:

Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis

(1) For homestead settlement;

for their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they
obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses
Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease;

Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession
of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since 1950. 32

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents

(a) By judicial legalization; or

themselves, the Subject Lots are "within Alienable and Disposable, Block I,
Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it
is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per
Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992." 33 The Subject Lots
are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and
disposable as of 25 June 1963.

persons

without

any

Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of

the Public Land Act because there are specific requirements and application
procedure for every mode.38 Since respondents herein filed their application
before the MTC,39 then it can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking
the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title

As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by

private

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).37

grant,

express

or

implied,

from

the

government;34 and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public

land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other
mode of acquisition recognized by law.

over the Subject Lots.

Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land,

not exceeding 144 hectares, 40 may be availed of by persons identified under
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No.

35

1073, which reads

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,

bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such

entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.

lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been

perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the

Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may

only be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or
incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.
Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land

Land Registration Act, to wit:

since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].

became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of

possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the

alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from

the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never
ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable
and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply
thereto.41 It is very apparent then that respondents could not have complied
with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots
that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.

conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be

entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this

The confirmation of respondents' title by the Court of Appeals was based on

chapter.

the erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title to the

Subject Lots under the Property Registration Decree. According to the

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by

themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been

in

open,

continuous,

exclusive

and

notorious

possession and occupation of lands of the public domain

suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a

Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of

the Property Registration Decree allows individuals to own land in any other
manner provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents, having
possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-

in-interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their

alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be

application, have acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary

issued to them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act. 44

prescription under Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil
Hence, respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots must

Code.42

have complied with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property

Public Land Act and the procedural requirements under the Property

Registration

Registration Decree.

Decree

and

the

Public

Land

Act.

Under

the

Property

Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed by the

court; while under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the
land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and
possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect
title or continuous, open, and notorious possession. 43 As established by this
Court in the preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to
register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain and respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the
provisions of the Public Land Act.

However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may

acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public
Land Act, their application for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof
must be in accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for Section 50
of the Public Land Act reads

SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or

successors in right, claiming any lands or interest in lands under the
provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an application
to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the

Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and

other real rights apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land
Act specifically governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one another,
the Public Land Act may be considered a special law 45 that must take
precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an established rule of
statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the
special law prevails Generalia specialibus non derogant.46

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22
November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion,
Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and its Order, dated
02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents' application
for registration is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179987

September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented
Malabanan),
Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

by

Sally

A.

RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of
the parties who both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009,
whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the
application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated
in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not
established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in
accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot
9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20,
1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the
property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming
that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and
occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the
judicial confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June
11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay
Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and
described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under
Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15,
1982.2

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting

Malabanans application for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration
and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan
Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported
by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is
of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang,
Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree
of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA,
arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC
and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the
ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto), 4 the CA declared that under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to
the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period
of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the
property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15,
1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for
purposes of computing Malabanans period of possession.
Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his
heirs elevated the CAs decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through
a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the
property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and
disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to
perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the
Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to
the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for
registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12,

1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land
registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab
initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.

Ruling

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. 6 to
support their argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into
private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the
public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was
essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property
through prescription at the time of the application without regard to
whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified as
agricultural land of the public domain.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss

the different classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land
registration laws of the Philippines.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because

Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and
occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in
interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere
classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed
sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the
rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos, 7 Menguito v. Republic 8 and Republic
v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as
alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil
Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco
believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had
been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and
ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by
Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed
the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been
in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time
when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a
clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and
Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has
enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an
applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945
or earlier.

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property, 10 may be classified as either of
public dominion or of private ownership. 11 Land is considered of public
dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the
State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service
or for the development of the national wealth. 12 Land belonging to the State
that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer
intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial
property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial
property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first
introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the
Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the
State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land
of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or
alienated them to private persons.17
Classifications
according to alienability

of

public

lands

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable

primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the
Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, 18 lands of the public domain were
classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. 19 Section 10,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain
into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the
reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987
Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into
agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks. 20
Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to
which they may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their

legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the

Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public
land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated;
all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit:
(a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private
ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b)
lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks
are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified
as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable
such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the
courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth,
thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law to that effect. 27 Thus, until the Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until
Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land
to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the
Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by
which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural
lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed
of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of
Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which
expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12,
1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the
public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to
clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber,
or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside
the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it
excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable"
further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of
the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the
applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application
to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, 28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest,
has been in possession and occupation of the property subject of
the application;

(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous,

exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June
12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural
land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the
authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must
have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in
order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already
classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine
applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and
disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However,
emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required by
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a
public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as
alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made
on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to
such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes
that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over
by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and
insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of
the requisite possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of
Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of
the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and
occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the
fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret
only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates
that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the
registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945,
or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title is derived
only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This
means that the character of the property subject of the application as
alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines
its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere
lapse or completion of the period. 29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the

lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a

result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the
Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the
application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite
period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified
as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application
for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is
inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to
determine the point at which prescription may run against the State. The
imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicants
possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land
of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by
the Government are complied with through actual physical, open,
continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by
operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government,
because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that
such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to
adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino
citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number
of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear
in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative
development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act
No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in
the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly
residential lands, subject to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for
public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration of
Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or
private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition
and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the
Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of
public land or lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable.
Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also

presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be

alienated or disposed;

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration

and the respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of
merit. SO ORDERED.

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
G.R. No. 155450
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered
alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive
modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act.
If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land
subject of the application needs only to be classified as
alienable and disposable as of the time of the application,
provided the applicants possession and occupation of the
land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a
conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant arises, 36 and
the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an
imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has
already ceased to be part of the public domain and has
become private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or
declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth are removed from the
sphere of public dominion and are considered converted
into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that
may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of
acquisition
is
prescription,
whether
ordinary
or
extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite
acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in
observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that
property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not
be the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to
establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite
character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even
upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has
remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land
registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless
Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the
land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth.1wphi1

August 6, 2008

REPUBLIC

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES

represented

Executive

Director,

Department

of

Resources,

Regional

Office

by

Environment
No.

2,

the
and

Regional
Natural

petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND VICTORIA
TURINGAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAGAYAN, and the COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 of the 21 May 20012 and 25 September 20023
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The

21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines

(petitioner) amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree,
cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 September 2002
Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court)

The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team

issued Decree No. 3819284 in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria

to conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property.

Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents

Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering
a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of
7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao,
Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11585 5 (OCT No. 11585) in
the name of spouses Carag.

On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the

encumbrance expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer
certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277, 6
issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B
consisting of 100,000 square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T1278, issued in the name of the private respondents, covering Lot 2472-A

The investigating team reported that:

A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared

for spouses Carag, and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, was found to be still within the timberland area at the
time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio
Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released as
alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC
Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994.

B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have

possessed and occupied by themselves and thru their predecessorsin-interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-

L of LC Map 2999, since time immemorial.8

consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.

Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151"
On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with

was "only released as alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982."

the Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the

In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land

DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No.

Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action

381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to

for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed

adjudicate a portion of the subject property which was allegedly still

with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation.

classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928.
On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No.
381928, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for

annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles 9 on

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a
portion of the subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square
meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still classified
as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore,
was not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed
portion was classified as alienable and disposable.

On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss. 10 Private

respondents alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court because the real ground for the complaint was mistake, not
lack of jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original
proceedings, could have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies but failed to do so.
Private respondents added that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a
certified true copy of the decision sought to be annulled. Private
respondents also maintained that the complaint was barred by the doctrines
of res judicata and law of the case and by Section 38 of Act No. 496. 11
Private respondents also stated that not all the heirs of spouses Carag were
brought before the Court of Appeals for an effective resolution of the case.
Finally, private respondents claimed that the real party in interest was not
petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind against
private respondents.12

On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of

lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals
declared:

The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in
civil actions which this court may annul are those which the
"ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available." The Amended
Complaint contains no such allegations which are jurisdictional
neither can such circumstances be divined from its allegations.
Furthermore, such actions for Annulment may be based only on two
(2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground
is

alleged

in

the

Amended

Complaint

which

is

for

Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of

Nullity of Titles. It merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square
meters of timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been
erroneously included in the title of the Spouses Antonio Carag and
Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585
issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that hence,
such adjudication and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland
area is null and void ab initio under the provisions of the 1935, 1973
and 1987 Constitutions.

On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion,

annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. 13

Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as
those in the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed

out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public

6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and

Land Act.14 (Citations omitted)

7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of the Court

While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural

grounds, we will still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment

The Issues

of decree has no merit.

Petitioner raises the following issues:

Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court

1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the

First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the

ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other

grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for

appropriate remedies are no longer available;

annulment of decree.15

2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of

We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner

lack of jurisdiction;

stated:

3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in

11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive

the amended complaint and in the motion to dismiss;

Branch of the Government had the authority and power to declassify or

reclassify land of the public domain, the Court did not, therefore,

4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had

jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of respondent
spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan;

5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the
original proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted
jurisdiction to the then Court of First Instance over the land;

have the power and authority to adjudicate in favor of the

spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said tract of
timberland, portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151, at the time of the
issuance of the Decree and the Original Certificate of Title of
the said spouses; and such adjudication and/or Decree and Title
issued covering the timberland area is null and void ab initio

considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine

In Ancheta v. Ancheta,17 we ruled:

constitution.
In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order
xxxx

of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on

lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or

15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the
name of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the
derivative titles thereto in the name of the Heirs and said spouses,
specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto of timberland area, by
the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), and the
Register of Deeds of Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous for the
reason that said Court and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan
did

not

have

any

authority

or

jurisdiction

to

decree

or

adjudicate the said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151,

over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not
allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or
reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom
are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so
because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC
without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time
either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment
or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,
unless barred by laches.18

consequently, the same are null and void ab initio, and of no force and
effect whatsoever.16 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Since petitioners complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the

subject of the action, petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies

Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it

was seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial courts

of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of petitioner.

lack of jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the disputed
portion, which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was

Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioners

not alienable and disposable.

complaint were factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper
trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. 19

Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of
petitioners failure to allege that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available."

Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be

Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either

observed. Should a trial be necessary, the reception of evidence

lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the

may be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional

subject matter of the claim. 20 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is

Trial Court.

conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
filing of the action.21

Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the
complaint for the complete and proper determination of the case.

Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa
v. Insular Government,22 we ruled:

However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for

further proceedings, we shall decide the case on the merits.

From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced

that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and

Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit

Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to

spouses Carag the disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims
that the disputed portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not
alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In
effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the
subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and
disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the
Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to

timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign

nation are public in character, and per se alienable and,
provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general or
reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be
acquired by any private or juridical person x x x 23 (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by

the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands
were deemed alienable.

declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain.

In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been
declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in
accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land
classification maps24 petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show
that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for

some public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and

SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or

Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no

concession which have been officially delimited and classified and,

statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber

when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for

land.25

public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government,

nor in any manner become private property, nor those on

The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No.
2874,26 which provides:

SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to
time classify the lands of the public domain into -

which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act

or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been
reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the
Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands
of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had
their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the

(a) Alienable or disposable

same

reasons,

suspend

their

concession

or

disposition

by

proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis

(b) Timber and

(c) Mineral lands

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from
one class to another, for the purposes of their government and
disposition.

supplied)

However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as
well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not
covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of
disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish
regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or

Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the

mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance

disputed portion of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to

with law.

Section 6 of Act No. 2874.

Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands

in Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private

which have been declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:

parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become

private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has

certificate of title. When the land registration court issued a

petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private

decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an

right may be claimed under any existing law at that time.

original certificate of title to the land, the court had already

made a determination that the land was agricultural and that

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,

27

the Republic sought to

annul the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a
land registration court, because when the application for land registration
was filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The
Republic also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine
whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land since the

the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive

possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of
years. It was the land registration court which had the
jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was
agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or
evidence in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied)

authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as

provided in Act Nos. 92628 and 2874. The Court ruled:

As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of
Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine

We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful

if the authority of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable
and disposable would apply to lands that have become private
property or lands that have been impressed with a private right
authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express
declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted above, those
who

have

been

in

open,

continuous,

exclusive

and

notorious

possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain

under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894

whether the subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for
was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the
land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled
to the decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party
in the original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not
appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as
agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and
beyond review.

may file an application with the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these

The finality of the trial courts decision is further recognized in Section 1,

applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the

Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides:

conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public

G.R. No. 167707

domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND

NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENRREGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF
DEEDS,
DIRECTOR
OF
LAND
REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE
TOURISM
AUTHORITY,
petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all those similarly
situated, respondents.

all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the

Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject
to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time
of the inauguration of the Government established under

October 8, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775
Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber

October 8, 2008

established under this Constitution."29 When the Commonwealth

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE

LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX
"A"
OF
THIS
PETITION,
petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR
LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN, respondents.

Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag

DECISION

and mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized
that these lands were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government

had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed

REYES, R.T., J.:

portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of
Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of
the Philippines complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation
and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition
for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which
granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest
and agricultural land.
The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white
sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine
tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants 4 who live
in the bone-shaped islands three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named
persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands,
caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine
reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).
President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated
September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded
them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey
of
land
for
titling
purposes,
respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap
filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over
their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes
and paid realty taxes on them.10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its
implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man.
Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of
private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots
registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of
lands classified as "public forest," which was not available for disposition
pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code,11 as amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801

and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation
of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island
had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession
they had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the
following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of
parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with
coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had
heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less
fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they
were occupying for tax purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely
legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or
impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego
with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their
respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island,
more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco
S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed
before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondentsclaimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners
and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in
accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein;
and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional
Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself
constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands
titled in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA
Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could
not be the subject of disposition. 18 The Circular itself recognized private
ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the

Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in

Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as
part of the forest reserve.22
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. 23 The
Republic then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the
decision of the lower court.24
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a
declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part
of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. 25 Hence,
the present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 26 classifying Boracay Island
into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of
agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise
provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of
roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the
area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay, 27 Wilfredo
Gelito,28 and other landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court an original
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
1064.30 They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested
rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of
their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also
invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building
internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots. 31
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation
reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither
mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. 32
Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period
entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not

have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an
unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being
public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot
be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the
executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify
lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a
need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for
disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the land
classification of Boracay Island.33
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those
similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island. 34
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN
CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE
TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING
OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE
AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY
LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC
FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.

IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND

DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE
FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF
THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER
THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA
141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY
AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION
FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY? 35 (Underscoring
supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondentsclaimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775)
have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The
twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their
right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 36 in
relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874
and CA No. 141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President
Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439 issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to
reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following
divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement,
mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may

be provided by law,41 giving the government great leeway for

classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935
Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. 43 Of these, only
agricultural lands may be alienated. 44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May
22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively
classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified
land of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 45 The doctrine
has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.47 Thus, all lands that have not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
the State as part of the inalienable public domain. 48 Necessarily, it is up to
the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for
private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed
of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the
favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be
granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of
their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership. 49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and
possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. 50 The Regalian
doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the
Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands that
were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage
Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic
registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. 52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish
Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory
information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land,
under certain conditions which were set forth in said decree. 54 Under
Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory
information title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is
converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years
of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse, 56
from the date of its inscription.57 However, possessory information title had
to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until
April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State. 58

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be
founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo
real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion
con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase;
and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines
under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this
law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into
three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by
means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold
system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public
lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the
Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No.
926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not
timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system
of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and
imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system. 66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act
No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the
homestead system and made provisions for judicial and administrative
confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It
permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the
controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain. 67 Under
the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July
26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. 68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874,
otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more
comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos
and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same
privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en
concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was
required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No.
2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended,
remains as the existing general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral
lands,70 and privately owned lands which reverted to the State. 71

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time
immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded
by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, 72 which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision
was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides for possession
and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. 76 Under the
decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of
their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of
the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all
unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529,
known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the
various laws relative to registration of property. 78 It governs registration of
lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including
chattel mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court
has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, 80 declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. 81 In fact,
Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those
lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.83 To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. 84 There must still be a
positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. 85 The applicant may also
secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The
records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of

Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government

proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such wellnigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before
2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.
They call for proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island,
or portions of it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay
was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government (1909).89 These cases were decided under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old
cases that "in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the
lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown." 90
Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These
cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or
portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which
land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether
the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on
proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the
Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with
implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.91 This was the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S.
Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it
stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be
formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open
to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and
Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine
Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision
vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so
that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending
upon the preponderance of the evidence.93

To aid the courts in resolving land registration

was then necessary to devise a presumption
evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."94

cases under Act No. 926, it

on land classification. Thus
have a right to presume, in
in each case the lands are

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to

an argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically
reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of
imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into
agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines,
except those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and
disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and
worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the longentrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land
registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more
specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation
of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or
administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly
cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of
Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of
the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute.
Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof
that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could
adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron,
this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General
admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to
one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land
has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare
that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some
proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the
minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for
"agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a
question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or
mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or
the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act
No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the
land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or
mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be

classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the

rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified
as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case
must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having
regard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes.
We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public
knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are
agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands
until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular
land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore,
be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the
other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each
particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is
not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or
mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of
land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No.
1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land
shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened
before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private
interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said
Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain"
shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs.
Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)95
(Emphasis ours)

domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government, 102 and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.103

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of

lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already became
private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in
Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the
President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands
into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no
longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the
classification of lands of the public domain.97

A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of

Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 107-a
ruled:

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued
their title in 1933,98 did not present a justiciable case for determination by
the land registration court of the propertys land classification. Simply put,
there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the
Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No.
926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for
judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine
the propertys land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on
Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds of Manila, 100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141,
vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally

different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots
were included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so,
whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an
alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution 104 from acquiring
agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether
unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed
agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko
relied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874,
including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated, those cases
cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not
have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does
not create a presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants
also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island
for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 106 ipso facto
converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a
title in their name.

"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of
lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided
for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for
the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion
of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act
operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine
Islands remained in the government; and that the governments title to
public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties
between Spain and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all
lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and
are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the

Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.108
(Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No.
1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under
PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource
Information Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of
the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of
the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a
public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been
the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of
which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD
No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso
facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already
existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD
No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island.
Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the
way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local
and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort,
rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso
beach resorts on the island; 111 that the island has already been stripped of
its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will
destroy the islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as public
forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution 112
classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer to large tracts of
wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry114 is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it
of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land.

The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and

does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and
"forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public domain as
appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land
while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. 116 At any
rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island,
and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been
replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial
establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest
to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not
convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants
argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978
entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation
classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants
assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of
Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular
which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular
No. 3-82 to "private lands" 117 and "areas declared as alienable and
disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural.
Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and
areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from
the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest
reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands
merely recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive
department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of
the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Developments authority
to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act
needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable

or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as

President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale
behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves
and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be
administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public
and private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential with
due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put,
the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and
ecological purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.119
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island,
but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines,
such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental
Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto
Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de
Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay
Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be
declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is
clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared
part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private
ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 120 provide that it is only the
President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who
has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timber and mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely
exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain,
presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is
the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office
of the President. Courts have no authority to do so. 122 Absent such
classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered
open to disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved
forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation
likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line
of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form
part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or
irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay
Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within
her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation
No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural
lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705,
President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without
running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall
cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131
and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or
suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to
agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until
Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the
public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did
not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay
Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD
No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.
Republic,124 the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not
categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact that
they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence
of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified
land until released and rendered open to disposition. 125 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification"
of land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of
Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law.
We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section
4(a) is the word "reclassification." Where there has been no previous
classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public
domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest

purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or
some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no
"reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section
4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law
delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to
those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the
Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or
classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions
of the Revised Forestry Code.127
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested
rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two
requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA
No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessorsin-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or
from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No.
1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land.
The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying
the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.

declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of

recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court
that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having
been in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions
of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their
continued possession and investments give them a vested right which
cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants
do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give
them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying.
This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence
presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand,
private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title
over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued
possession and considerable investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the
development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and
international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of
years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the
Court commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to apply
the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang
batas at ito ang dapat umiral.

Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on

the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail
because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable
land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public
Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already
alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself. 129
Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no
matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. 130

All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible
to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA
No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the
residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments
on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean
lack of right to possess.

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect

title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were
classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first
element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their
lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders
of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their
possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for
original registration of title, such as by homestead131 or sales patent,132
subject to the conditions imposed by law.

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory
relief that private claimants complied with the requisite period of
possession.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to

acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain
requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill 133 now
pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill
will become a law is for Congress to decide.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to

prove the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step
necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not
be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification of the
island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer
overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its
remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress
and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their
promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and
activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our
environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by
Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public
policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have
written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the
pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection,
development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests
constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of
common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on
our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions.
Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply
are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become
dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With
the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With
erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to
property crops, livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious
human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a
lumbermans decalogue.135

G.R. No. 181502

February 2, 2010

FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

RESOLUTION

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court
of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

CORONA, J.:

This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for the third time) of the
June 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying the petition for review filed
by petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.

Petitioners late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for

registration of a vast tract of land 1 located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan

City in the then Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva Ecija on

The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court of

August 12, 1976.2 She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and

Appeals (CA). In its decision 6 dated February 26, 1992, penned by Justice

worked, developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of

Vicente V. Mendoza (Mendoza decision), 7 the appellate court reversed and

the same continuously, publicly and adversely for more or less 26 years.

set aside the decision of the CFI. The CA found that Reyes was applicable to
petitioners case as it involved the same property.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG), opposed the application because the land in question was

The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in

within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR), established by

question to Possessory Information Title No. 216. As Garcias right to the

virtue of Proclamation No. 237 (Proclamation 237) 3 in 1955. Thus, it was

property was largely dependent on the existence and validity of the

inalienable as it formed part of the public domain.

possessory information title the probative value of which had already been
passed upon by this Court in Reyes, and inasmuch as the land was situated

Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already ruled in Director of

Lands v. Reyes4 that the property subject of Garcias application was

inside a military reservation, the CA concluded that she did not validly
acquire title thereto.

inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. Moreover, the

existence of Possessory Information Title No. 216 (allegedly registered in the

During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was

name of a certain Melecio Padilla on March 5, 1895), on which therein

substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G.

respondent Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation anchored

Diaz.81avvphi1

its claim on the land, was not proven. Accordingly, the decree of registration
issued in its favor was declared null and void.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision. While

the motion was pending in the CA, petitioner also filed a motion for recall of

Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcias favor in a decision 5 dated

the records from the former CFI. Without acting on the motion for

July 1, 1981.

reconsideration, the appellate court, with Justice Mendoza as ponente,

issued a resolution9 upholding petitioners right to recall the records of the
case.

Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an

(2) x x x x x x

amicable settlement on the matter and even gave the parties sufficient
(3) x x x x x x

time to draft and finalize the same.

The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the

Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares

(4) x x x x x x

(5) x x x x x x

supposedly outside the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her
application for the portion of the property inside the military reservation.

(6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of this Court

They filed a motion for approval of the amicable settlement in the CA. 10

approving the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed

between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia

On June 30,
agreement.

11

1999,

the

appellate

court

approved the

compromise

Diaz[;]

On January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration

Administration to issue the corresponding decree of registration in

(7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement dated May

petitioners favor.12

18, 1999 executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and
Florencia Garcia Diaz; the said Amicable Settlement is hereby

However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. Restituto S. Lazaro, the

DECLARED to be without force and effect;

OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the

issuance of the decree of registration. The OSG informed the appellate court

(8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the

that the tract of land subject of the amicable settlement was still within the

Solicitor General and, consequently, SET ASIDE the Resolution

military reservation.

dated January 12, 2000 which ordered, among other matters, that a
certificate of title be issued in the name of plaintiff-appellee

On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended resolution (amended

resolution)13 annulling the compromise agreement entered into between the
parties. The relevant part of the dispositive portion of the resolution read:

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:

(1) x x x x x x

Florencia Garcia Diaz over the portion of the subject property in

consonance with the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999
approved by the Court in its Resolution dated June 30, 1999;

(9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 approving the
May 18, 1999 Amicable Settlement and the Resolution dated

September 20, 1999 amending the aforesaid June 30, 1999

case to the Supreme Court en banc.19 The Court denied20 it considering that

Resolution; and

a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. 21 Furthermore,

the motion to refer the case to the banc was likewise denied as the banc is

(10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, 1992

dismissing applicant-appellee Diaz registration herein.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first time, she assailed the
validity of the Mendoza decision the February 26, 1992 decision adverted
to in the CAs amended resolution. She alleged that Justice Mendoza was
the assistant solicitor general during the initial stages of the land
registration proceedings in the trial court and therefore should have
inhibited himself when the case reached the CA. His failure to do so, she
laments, worked an injustice against her constitutional right to due process.
Thus, the Mendoza decision should be declared null and void. The motion
was denied.14

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari 15 in this Court.

It was denied for raising factual issues. 16 She moved for reconsideration. 17
This motion was denied with finality on the ground that there was no
substantial argument warranting a modification of the Courts resolution.
The Court then ordered that no further pleadings would be entertained.

not an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of the divisions may

be appealed.22 We reiterated our directive that no further pleadings would
be entertained and that entry of judgment be made in due course.

Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote identical letters, first

addressed to Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and
then to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno himself. 23 The body of the letter,
undoubtedly in the nature of a third motion for reconsideration, is hereby
reproduced in its entirety:

This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the
destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence," that to
your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009,
page 1)[.]

I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my
lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a
second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the
implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition
for Review.

Accordingly, we ordered entry of judgment to be made in due course. 18

Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for
Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift entry of judgment and
motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and to refer the

justice so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en

banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the

last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto

If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite

attached as Annex "A".

from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light. I must confess that
I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe that such

The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves
the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which

an action will do more harm than good, and even destroy the good name of
Hon. Justice Mendoza.

is NULL and VOID, ab initio.

I fully support your call for "moral force" that will slowly and eventually lead
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a
position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum

our country to redirect its destiny and escape from this moral decadence, in
which we all find ourselves.

requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render "impartial
justice," because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of

I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief Justice continues to fight

Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding

the dark forces that surround us everyday.

the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who
appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land
registration proceedings in which he lost.

I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure that cases such as
mine do not happen again, so that the next person who seeks justice will
not experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial

In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor and judge in the very

system.

same case.
Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis in the original).
In the case of the "Alabang Boys[,]" the public was outraged by the actions
of Atty. Verano who admitted having prepared a simple resolution to be
signed by the Secretary of Justice.

The language of petitioners letter/motion is unmistakable. It is a thinly

veiled threat precisely worded and calculated to intimidate this Court into
giving in to her demands to honor an otherwise legally infirm compromise

In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of violation of my

agreement, at the risk of being vilified in the media and by the public.

constitutional right. It is simply immoral, illegal and unconstitutional, for the

prosecutor to eventually act as the judge, and reverse the very decision in
which he had lost.

This Court will not be cowed into submission. We deny petitioners

letter/third motion for reconsideration.

APPLICABILITY OF REYES

decision to dismiss the proceedings as the property in question was part of

the public domain. Quintins successor-in-interest, Florencia Taedo, who

The Court agrees with the Republics position that Reyes is applicable to this
case.

despite knowledge of the proceedings did not participate therein, thereafter

sold the same property to Benigno S. Aquino. The latter sought to have it
registered in his name. The question in that case, as well as in this one, was

To constitute res judicata, the following elements must concur:

whether our decision in the case in which another person was the applicant
(1) the former judgment or order must be final;

constituted res judicata as against his successors-in-interest.

(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;

We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration cases filed under
the provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an

(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over

the subject matter and parties; and

registration and declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes

(4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.

incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for

persons.27

24

The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied with. However,
petitioner takes exception to the fourth requisite, particularly on the issue of
identity of parties. In her petition for review filed in this Court, she contends
that since the applicants in the two cases are different, the merits of the two
cases should, accordingly, be determined independently of each other.

res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also against all

We also declared in Aquino that:

From another point of view, the decision in the first action has become the
"law of the case" or at least falls within the rule of stare decisis. That
adjudication should be followed unless manifestly erroneous. It was taken

25

This contention is erroneous.

and should be taken as the authoritative view of the highest tribunal in the
Philippines. It is indispensable to the due administration of justice especially
by a court of last resort that a question once deliberately examined and

The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those in Aquino v. Director

decided should be considered as settled and closed to further argument. x x

of Lands.26 In that case, Quintin Taedo endeavored to secure title to a

x28

considerable tract of land by virtue of his possession thereof under CA 141.

When the case eventually reached this Court, we affirmed the trial courts

Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its

All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in this case, ought to be

decision in favor of petitioner on July 1, 1981, this Court, in Reyes, already

reminded that it is their duty to obey the decisions of the Supreme Court. A

made an earlier ruling on November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty was

conduct becoming of inferior courts demands a conscious awareness of the

inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. Thus, petitioners

position they occupy in the interrelation and operation of our judicial

argument that the findings of fact of the trial court on her registrable title

system. As eloquently declared by Justice J.B. L. Reyes, "There is only one

are binding on us on the principle that findings of fact of lower courts are

Supreme Court from whose decision all other courts should take their

accorded great respect and bind even this Court is untenable. Rather, it

bearings."31

was incumbent upon the court a quo to respect this Courts ruling in Reyes,
ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS

and not the other way around.

However, despite having been apprised of the Court's findings in Reyes

(which should have been a matter of judicial notice in the first place), the
trial court still insisted on its divergent finding and disregarded the Court's
decision in Reyes, declaring the subject land as forming part of a military

Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237 itself recognizes that its
effectivity is "subject to private rights, if any there be."

By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the property where

the military reservation is situated is forest land. Thus:

reservation, and thus outside the commerce of man.

Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive
By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the
decision of this Court and therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion. 29
Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void and
does not exist in legal contemplation.

as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is

largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the
hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said

30

land consist of public forest. x x x (Emphasis supplied)32

Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest

lands are not registrable under CA 141.

[E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies

exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or area covered with
forest are excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of

registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one

Coming now to petitioners contention that her "private rights" to the

issued using the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens

property, meaning her and her predecessors possession thereof prior to the

system of registration, nullifies the title. (Emphasis supplied).33

establishment of the FMMR, must be respected, the same is untenable. As

earlier stated, we had already recognized the same land to be public forest

However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been

even before the FMMR was established. To reiterate:

reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner

(upon the recommendation of the proper department head who has the

Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive

authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or

as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is

disposable, timber and mineral lands)34 coupled with possession by the

largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the

claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for

hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land

petitioner, she was not able to produce such evidence. Accordingly, her

consist of public forest. x x x

occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-in-interest, could not have

ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is because prior to the
conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or possession
thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year
possession requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the
Public Land Act.

35

This was our ruling in Almeda v. CA.

36

The rules on the

confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land

Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could never
ripen to ownership.

But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it
was established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still a
dearth of evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her
predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. In Reyes, we noted:

classified as forest land is released through an official proclamation to that

effect. Then and only then will it form part of the disposable agricultural

Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five (5)

lands of the public domain.37

years after the inscription of the informacion possessoria, could not have
converted the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years after such
inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.

xxx

During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was

Reyes,39 thus rendering its probative value suspect, further militates against

cleared and cultivated under the kaingin system, while some portions were

granting her application for registration.

used as grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the
planting of vegetables and had about forty (40) tenants for the purpose.
During the Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. x x x

xxx

A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the
raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of
ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious as to
give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While grazing livestock over

NULLITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

On the compromise agreement between the parties, we agree with the CA

that the same was null and void.

An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement is in the nature of a

contract and must necessarily comply with the provisions of Article 1318 of
the New Civil Code which provides:

Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:

land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show

possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it,

(1) Consent of the contracting parties;

without substantial inclosures, or other permanent improvements, is not

sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription. The
possession of public land, however long the period may have extended,

(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;

(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.

never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State

Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the consent of the

unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same

Republic,

under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a

Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Land Management

grant from the State.38

Bureau, Land Registration Authority, and the Office of the President, was

through

the

appropriate

government

agencies,

i.e.

the

secured by the OSG when it executed the agreement with her. 40 The lack of
xxx

Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information title on which

petitioner also bases her claim of ownership was found to be inexistent in

authority on the part of the OSG rendered the compromise agreement

between the parties null and void because although it is the duty of the OSG
to represent the State in cases involving land registration proceedings, it

must do so only within the scope of the authority granted to it by its

All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public

principal, the Republic of the Philippines.41

order or public policy may likewise be the object of a contract. (Emphasis

supplied)

In this case, although the OSG was authorized to appear as counsel for
respondent, it was never given the specific or special authority to enter into

Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of the obligation contrary

a compromise agreement with petitioner. This is in violation of the

to law and against public policy. The agreement provided that, in

provisions of Rule 138 Section 23, of the Rules of Court which requires

consideration of petitioners withdrawal of her application for registration of

"special authority" for attorneys to bind their clients.

title from that portion of the property located within the military reservation,
respondent was withdrawing its claim on that part of the land situated

Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have authority

to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made
in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial

outside said reservation. The Republic could not validly enter into such
undertaking as the subject matter of the agreement was outside the
commerce of man.

procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise

their clients litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a clients

PETITIONERS CONTEMPT OF COURT

claim but the full amount in cash. (Emphasis supplied).

This Court, being the very institution that dispenses justice, cannot
Moreover, the land in question could not have been a valid subject matter of

reasonably be expected to just sit by and do nothing when it comes under

a contract because, being forest land, it was inalienable. Article 1347 of the

attack.

Civil Code provides:

That petitioners letter-motion constitutes an attack against the integrity of
Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men,

this Court cannot be denied. Petitioner started her letter innocently enough

including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights

by stating:

which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.

This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases

destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence," that to

expressly authorized by law.

your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009,
page 1)[.]

It, however, quickly progressed into a barely concealed resentment for what

very same land registration proceedings in which he lost. (Emphasis

she perceived as this Courts failure to exercise "utmost prudence" in

supplied).

rendering "impartial justice" in deciding her case. Petitioner recounted:

Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes to shove, she has no
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my

choice but to expose the irregularity concerning the Mendoza decision to

lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a

the media. This is evident in her arrogant declaration that:

second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the
implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our
Petition for Review.

Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for

justice so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en
banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the
last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto

If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite
from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light.

But she hastens to add in the same breath that:

I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I

however believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and even
destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.

attached as Annex "A".

Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task:
The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves
the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which

. . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so

is NULL and VOID, ab initio.

that the next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain and
frustration that I suffered under our judicial system.

It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a
position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum

When required to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt for

requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render

her baseless charges and veiled threats, petitioner answered:

"impartial justice," because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of

the Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court,
notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the
very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the

xxx

The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a "veiled threat[.] It was written in
response to the call of the Chief Justice for a moral revolution. Juxtaposed

against the factual backdrop of the "Alabang Boys" case and the Meralco

It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has consistently rendered

[c]ase, involving Mr. Justice Jose L. Sabio which also enjoyed wide publicity

justice with neither fear nor favor. The disposition in this case was arrived at

over the tri-media, petitioner felt that the facts of the said cases pale in

after a careful and thorough deliberation of the facts of this case and all the

comparison to the facts of her case where the lawyer of her opponent

matters pertaining thereto. The records of the case, in fact, show that all the

eventually became justice of the appellate court and ended up reversing the

pertinent issues raised by petitioner were passed upon and sufficiently

very decision in which he lost, in clear violation of her [c]onstitutional [r]ight

addressed by the appellate court and this Court in their respective

to fundamental fair play for no contestant in any litigation can ever serve

resolutions.

as a judge without transgression of the due process clause. This is basic.

As to petitioners complaint regarding this Courts denial of her petition
Petitioner confesses that she may have been emotional in the delivery of

through a mere minute resolution (which allegedly deprived her of due

her piece, because correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes they are

process as the Court did not issue a full-blown decision stating the facts and

irrefutable. If in the course of that emotional delivery, she has offended your

applicable jurisprudence), suffice it to say that the Court is not duty-bound

honors sensibilities, she is ready for the punishment, and only prays that

to issue decisions or resolutions signed by the justices all the time. It has

his Court temper its strike with compassion as her letter to the Chief

ample discretion to formulate ponencias, extended resolutions or even

Justice was never written with a view of threatening the Court.

minute resolutions issued by or upon its authority, depending on its

evaluation of a case, as long as a legal basis exists. When a minute

xxx

Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain redress and correction of
the inequity bestowed upon her by destiny. It was never meant as a threat.

resolution (signed by the Clerk of Court upon orders of the Court) denies or
dismisses a petition or motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, it is
understood that the assailed decision or order, together with all its findings
of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained. 42

The Court now puts an end to petitioners irresponsible insinuations and

threats of "going public" with this case. We are not blind to petitioners
clever and foxy interplay of threats alternating with false concern for the
reputation of this Court.

Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her case in this Court by filing
three successive motions for reconsideration, including the letter-motion
subject of this resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings that "no
further pleadings shall be entertained in this case." Her unreasonable
persistence constitutes utter defiance of this Courts orders and an abuse of

the rules of procedure. This, alongside her thinly veiled threats to leak her

It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel of the nullity

case to the media to gain public sympathy although the tone of

of the proceedings of the Court of Appeals that places in doubt the

petitioners compliance with our show-cause resolution was decidedly

entire proceedings it previously conducted, which led to the rendition of the

subdued compared to her earlier letters constitutes contempt of court.

February 26, 1992 Decision, a fact that escaped the scrutiny of

applicant for registration Flora L. Garcia, as well as her lawyer,

In Republic v. Unimex,43 we held:

A statement of this Court that no further pleadings would be entertained is

a declaration that the Court has already considered all issues presented by
the parties and that it has adjudicated the case with finality. It is a directive
to the parties to desist from filing any further pleadings or motions. Like all
orders of this Court, it must be strictly observed by the parties. It should not
be circumvented by filing motions ill-disguised as requests for clarification.

A FEW OBSERVATIONS

If petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only guarding her constitutional

right to due process, then why did she question the validity of the Mendoza
decision late in the proceedings, that is, only after her motion for
reconsideration in the CA (for its subsequent annulment of the compromise
agreement) was denied? It is obvious that it was only when her case
became hopeless that her present counsel frantically searched for some
ground, any ground to resuscitate his clients lost cause, subsequently

Atty. Cayetano Dante Diaz, who died in 1993, and the late Justice
Fernando A. Santiago, who stood as counsel for Flora L. Garcias
successor-in-interest, herein petitioner, Florencia G. Garcia.44 (Emphasis
supplied).

The above cited statement does not help petitioners cause at all. If
anything, it only proves how desperate the case has become for petitioner
and her counsel.

WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26, 2009 of petitioner is

NOTED and is hereby treated as a third motion for reconsideration. The
motion is DENIED considering that a third motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading and the plea utterly lacks merit.

Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court. Accordingly, a FINE of Five

Thousand Pesos is hereby imposed on her, payable within ten days from
receipt of this resolution. She is hereby WARNED that any repetition hereof
shall be dealt with more severely.

raising the issue. This is evident from a statement in her petition to this
Court that:

Treble costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 173423, March 05, 2014

SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA AND ERLINDA FORTUNA, Petitioners, v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by the
petitioners, spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna, assailing the decision
dated May 16, 20052 and the resolution dated June 27, 2006 3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143. The CA reversed and set aside the
decision dated May 7, 20014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Fernando, La Union, Branch 66, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 2372.
THE BACKGROUND FACTS

In its Decision dated May 7, 2001, 7 the RTC granted the application
for registration in favor of the spouses Fortuna. The RTC declared that
[the spouses Fortuna] have established [their] possession, including that of
their predecessors-in-interest of the land sought to be registered, has been
open, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole world and in the
concept of an owner since 1948, or for a period of over fifty (50)
years.8crallawlibrary
The Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA, arguing that the
spouses Fortuna did not present an official proclamation from the
government that the lot has been classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land. It also claimed that the spouses Fortunas evidence - Tax
Declaration No. 8366 - showed that possession over the lot dates back
only to 1948, thus, failing to meet the June 12, 1945 cut-off period provided
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 or the Property
Registration
Decree
(PRD).
In its decision dated May 16, 2005,9the CA reversed and set aside
the RTC decision. Although it found that the spouses Fortuna were able to
establish the alienable and disposable nature of the land, 10 they failed to
show that they complied with the length of possession that the law requires,
i.e., since June 12, 1945. It agreed with the Republics argument that Tax
Declaration No. 8366 only showed that the spouses Fortunas predecessorin-interest, Pastora, proved that she had been in possession of the land only
since
1948.

In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for

registration of a 2,597-square meter land identified as Lot No. 4457,
situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. The application was filed
with
the
RTC
and
docketed
as
LRC
No.
2372.

The CA denied the spouses Fortunas motion for reconsideration of its

decision in its resolution dated June 27, 2006. 11crallawlibrary

The spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by
Pastora Vendiola, upon whose death was succeeded by her children,
Clemente and Emeteria Nones. Through an affidavit of adjudication dated
August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced all her interest in Lot No. 4457 in favor
of Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot in favor of Rodolfo Cuenca on May
23, 1975. Rodolfo sold the same lot to the spouses Fortuna through a deed
of
absolute
sale
dated
May
4,
1984.

Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA
rulings.

The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and
uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than 50 years,
and submitted as evidence the lots survey plan, technical description, and
certificate
of
assessment.
Although the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed
the application,5 it did not present any evidence in support of its opposition.
Since no private opposition to the registration was filed, the RTC issued an
order of general default on November 11, 1996 against the whole world,
except
the
Republic.6crallawlibrary

THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS

They contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No.
1942. RA No. 1942 amended the PLA by requiring 30 years of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession to acquire imperfect title
over an agricultural land of the public domain. This 30-year period,
however, was removed by PD No. 1073 and instead required that
the possession should be since June 12, 1945. The amendment
introduced by PD No. 1073 was carried in Section 14(1) of the PRD. 12crall
The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January
25, 1977 and published on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was issued on
June 11, 1978 and published on January 2, 1979. On the basis of the Courts
ruling in Taada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al.,13 they allege that PD No.
1073 and the PRD should be deemed effective only on May 24, 1977 and
January 17, 1979, respectively. By these dates, they claim to have already
satisfied the 30-year requirement under the RA No. 1942 amendment
because Pastoras possession dates back, at the latest, to 1947.

They allege that although Tax Declaration No. 8366 was made in 1948, this
does not contradict that fact that Pastora possessed Lot No. 4457 before
1948. The failure to present documentary evidence proving possession
earlier than 1948 was explained by Filma Salazar, Records Officer of the
Provincial Assessors Office, who testified that the records were lost beyond
recovery due to the outbreak of World War II.
Notwithstanding the absence of documents executed earlier than 1948, the
spouses Fortuna contend that evidence exists indicating that Pastora
possessed the lot even before 1948. First, Tax Declaration No. 8366 does
not contain a statement that it is a new tax declaration. Second, the
annotation found at the back of Tax Declaration No. 8366 states that this
declaration cancels Tax Nos. 10543[.]14 Since Tax Declaration No. 8366 was
issued in 1948, the cancelled Tax Declaration No. 10543 was issued, at the
latest, in 1947, indicating that there was already an owner and possessor of
the lot before 1948. Third, they rely on the testimony of one Macaria Flores
in LRC No. 2373. LRC No. 2373 was also commenced by the spouses
Fortuna to register Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098,15 which were also
originally owned by Pastora and are adjacent to the subject Lot No. 4457.
Macaria testified that she was born in 1926 and resided in a place a few
meters from the three lots. She stated that she regularly passed by these
lots on her way to school since 1938. She knew the property was owned by
Pastora because the latters family had constructed a house and planted
fruit-bearing trees thereon; they also cleaned the area. On the basis of
Macarias testimony and the other evidence presented in LRC No. 2373, the
RTC granted the spouses Fortunas application for registration of Lot Nos.
4462, 27066, and 27098 in its decision of January 3, 2005. 16 The RTCs
decision
has
lapsed
into
finality
unappealed.
The spouses Fortuna claim that Macarias testimony in LRC No. 2373 should
be considered to prove Pastoras possession prior to 1948. Although LRC No.
2373 is a separate registration proceeding, it pertained to lots adjacent to
the subject property, Lot No. 4457, and belonged to the same predecessorin-interest. Explaining their failure to present Macaria in the proceedings
before the RTC in LRC No. 2372, the spouses Fortuna said it was only after
the reception of evidence x x x that [they] were able to trace and establish
the
identity
and
competency
of
Macaria[.] 17crallawlibrary
Commenting on the spouses Fortunas petition, the Republic relied mostly
on the CAs ruling which denied the registration of title and prayed for the
dismissal of the petition.
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the petition for failure of the spouses Fortuna to sufficiently prove
their compliance with the requisites for the acquisition of title to alienable
lands
of
the
public
domain.
The nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and disposable public land
has not been sufficiently established

The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned by
the State.18 Of the four classes of public land, i.e., agricultural lands, forest
or timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks, only agricultural lands
may be alienated.19 Public land that has not been classified as alienable
agricultural land remains part of the inalienable public domain. Thus, it is
essential for any applicant for registration of title to land derived
through a public grant to establish foremost the alienable and
disposable nature of the land. The PLA provisions on the grant and
disposition of alienable public lands, specifically, Sections 11 and 48(b), will
find application only from the time that a public land has been classified as
agricultural and declared as alienable and disposable.
Under Section 6 of the PLA,20 the classification and the reclassification of
public lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The
President, through a presidential proclamation or executive order, can
classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public
domain. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve a land classification and
declare such land as alienable and disposable. 21 Accordingly, jurisprudence
has required that an applicant for registration of title acquired through a
public land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable by establishing the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land was
established by the
notation
in
the
survey
plan,22 which
states:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C.
Map No. 1395 certified August 7, 1940. It is outside any civil or military
reservation.23
It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that there
is, per record, neither any public land application filed nor title previously
issued for the subject parcel[.] 24 However, we find that neither of the
above documents is evidence of a positive act from the
government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain.
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of
the covered properties alienable and disposable character. 25 These
notations, at the very least, only establish that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved alienable and
disposable area per verification through survey by the proper government
office. The applicant, however, must also present a copy of the
original classification of the land into alienable and disposable

land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the

President.26 In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,27 the Court ruled that
[t]he applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO28 or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must
present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable
and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as
proclaimed by the President.
The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the
President or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the public
land as alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared these
documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the
issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public land
as
alienable
and
disposable.29crallawlibrary
For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been
reclassified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain though a
positive act of the Executive Department, the spouses Fortunas claim of
title through a public land grant under the PLA should be denied.
In judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title, the period
of possession should commence, at the latest, as of May 9, 1947
Although the above finding that the spouses Fortuna failed to establish the
alienable and disposable character of Lot No. 4457 serves as sufficient
ground to deny the petition and terminate the case, we deem it proper to
continue to address the other important legal issues raised in the petition.
As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and disposition of
alienable agricultural lands. Under Section 11 of the PLA, alienable lands of
the public domain may be disposed of, among others, by judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. This mode of acquisition
of title is governed by Section 48(b) of the PLA, the original version of which
states:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:ch
anRoblesVx x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since

July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when

prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
[emphasis supplied]
On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a 30year period of possession under RA No. 1942. Section 48(b) of the PLA, as
amended by RA No. 1942, read:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. [emphasis and underscore ours]
On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year period of possession
by requiring possession since June 12, 1945. Section 4 of PD No. 1073
reads:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
[emphasis supplied]
Under the PD No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least 32 years - from
1945 up to its enactment in 1977 - is required. This effectively impairs the
vested rights of applicants who had complied with the 30-year possession
required under the RA No. 1942 amendment, but whose possession
commenced only after the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 was established by
the PD No. 1073 amendment. To remedy this, the Court ruled in Abejaron v.
Nabasa30 that Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-ininterest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25,
1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since
January 24, 1947 may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or
incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the [PLA]. January 24, 1947 was
considered as the cut-off date as this was exactly 30 years counted
backward from January 25, 1977 - the effectivity date of PD No.
1073.
It appears, however, that January 25, 1977 was the date PD No. 1073
was enacted; based on the certification from the National Printing
Office,31PD No. 1073 was published in Vol. 73, No. 19 of the Official
Gazette, months later than its enactment or on May 9, 1977. This
uncontroverted fact materially affects the cut-off date for applications for

judicial confirmation of incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the PLA.

Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that [the] Decree shall take effect
upon its promulgation, the Court has declared in Taada, et al. v. Hon.
Tuvera, etc., et al.32 that the publication of laws is an indispensable
requirement for its effectivity. [A]ll statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. 33 Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No.
1073 should be understood to mean that the decree took effect only upon
its publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off date
for applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title under Section 48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words,
applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947.
The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove that they possessed Lot
No. 445 since May 8, 1947

on her way to school, and she saw Pastoras family construct a house, plant
fruit-bearing trees, and clean the area. However, the Court is not convinced
that Macarias testimony constituted as the well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence
required
in
cases
of
this
nature.
The records disclose that the spouses Fortuna acquired adjoining parcels of
land, all of which are claimed to have previously belonged to Pastora. These
parcels of land were covered by three separate applications for registration,
to wit:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
a.

LRC No. N-1278, involving Lot Nos. 1 and 2, with a total area of
2,961 sq. m., commenced by Emeteria;

b.

LRC No. 2373, involving Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098, with a
total area of 4,006 sq. m., commenced by the spouses Fortuna; and

c.

LRC No. 2372 (the subject case), involving Lot No. 4457, with a total
area of 2,597 sq. m.

Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain, the spouses Fortunas application for
registration of title would still not prosper for failure to sufficiently prove
that they possessed the land since May 8, 1947.

As these cases involved different but adjoining lots that belonged to the
same predecessor-in-interest, the spouses Fortuna alleged that the final
rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373, 37 upholding Pastoras ownership, be
taken
into
account
in
resolving
the
present
case.

The spouses Fortunas allegation that: (1) the absence of a notation that Tax
Declaration No. 8366 was a new tax declaration and (2) the notation stating
that Tax Declaration No. 8366 cancels the earlier Tax Declaration No. 10543
both indicate that Pastora possessed the land prior to 1948 or, at the
earliest, in 1947. We also observe that Tax Declaration No. 8366 contains a
sworn statement of the owner that was subscribed on October 23, 1947.34
While these circumstances may indeed indicate possession as of 1947, none
proves that it commenced as of the cut-off date of May 8, 1947. Even if the
tax declaration indicates possession since 1947, it does not show the nature
of Pastoras possession. Notably, Section 48(b) of the PLA speaks of
possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one
synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because
it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an
applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. 35 Nothing in
Tax Declaration No. 8366 shows that Pastora exercised acts of possession
and occupation such as cultivation of or fencing off the land. Indeed, the lot
was
described
as
cogonal.36crallawlibrary

Notably, the total land area of the adjoining lots that are claimed to have
previously belonged to Pastora is 9,564 sq. m. This is too big an area for the
Court to consider that Pastoras claimed acts of possession and occupation
(as testified to by Macaria) encompassed the entirety of the lots. Given the
size of the lots, it is unlikely that Macaria (age 21 in 1947) could
competently assess and declare that its entirety belonged to Pastora
because she saw acts of possession and occupation in what must have been
but a limited area. As mentioned, Tax Declaration No. 8366 described Lot
No. 4457 as cogonal, thus, Macaria could not have also been referring to
Lot No. 4457 when she said that Pastora planted fruit-bearing trees on her
properties.

The spouses Fortuna seeks to remedy the defects of Tax Declaration No.
8366 by relying on Macarias testimony in a separate land registration
proceeding, LRC No. 2373. Macaria alleged that she passed by Pastoras lots

Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less
than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a

The lower courts final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373, upholding
Pastoras possession, do not tie this Courts hands into ruling in favor of the
spouses Fortuna. Much to our dismay, the rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and
2373 do not even show that the lots have been officially reclassified as
alienable lands of the public domain or that the nature and duration of
Pastoras occupation met the requirements of the PLA, thus, failing to
convince us to either disregard the rules of evidence or consider their
merits. In this regard, we reiterate our directive in Santiago v. De los
Santos:38crallawlibrary

failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize

with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To be
granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming,
there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic
assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the
state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its rights over the
same as dominus.

as permanent forest to form part of the forest reserves. He shall decree

those classified and determined not to be needed for forest
purposes as alienable and disposable lands, the administrative
jurisdiction and management of which shall be transferred to the Bureau of
Lands: Provided, That mangrove and other swamps not needed for shore
protection and suitable for fishpond purposes shall be released to, and be
placed under the administrative jurisdiction and management of, the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. Those still to be classified under
the present system shall continue to remain as part of the public forest.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 16, 2005
and the resolution dated June 27, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 71143 are AFFIRMED insofar as these dismissed the spouses
Antonio and Erlinda Fortunas application of registration of title on the basis
of the grounds discussed above. Costs against the spouses Fortuna. SO
ORDERED.
Endnotes:

The CA relied on the statement in the tracing cloth plan and the blue print
copy thereof which stated that [t]his survey is inside alienable and
disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C. Map No. 1395 certified August 7,
1940. It is outside any civil or military reservation. The tracing cloth plan
has been approved by the Chief of the Survey Division and the Regional
Director of the Region I Office of the Bureau of Lands. It also relied on the
DENR-CENRO certificate dated July 19, 1999, which states that there is, per
record, neither any public land application filed nor title previously issued
for the subject parcel[.] (Rollo, p. 41.) Supra note 3.
10

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally
or
through
their
duly
authorized
representatives:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. [emphasis
ours]
21
Section 13 of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines,
approved on May 19, 1975, pertaining to the system of land classification,
states:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

G.R. No. L-26127 June 28, 1974

12

x x x. The Department Head [now DENR Secretary] shall study, devise,

determine and prescribe the criteria, guidelines and methods for the proper
and accurate classification and survey of all lands of the public domain into
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest, and grazing lands, and into such other classes as now or
may hereafter be provided by law, rules and regulations.
In the meantime, the Department Head shall simplify through interbureau action the present system of determining which of the unclassified
lands of the public domain are needed for forest purposes and declare them

(Civil Case No. 3621)

VICTOR BENIN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J. M.
TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-26128 June 28, 1974

(Civil Case No. 3622)

JUAN ALCANTARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an

vs.

aggregate area of approximately 278,928 square meters; that they

MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M.

inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn

TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant.

inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their
predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly,

G.R. No. L-26129 June 28, 1974

(Civil Case No. 3623)

adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the
fruits harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had
said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the

DIEGO PILI, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in

vs.

1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels

MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M.

of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under

TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant.

Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or
sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and
other places, after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs,

ZALDIVAR, J.:p

Appeal from the decision, dated January 18, 1965, of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, the Hon. Judge Eulogio Mencias, presiding in Civil Cases
Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623. 1

constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.

In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and
possessors of two parcels of agricultural land, described in paragraph V of
the complaint, located in the Barrio of La Loma (now Barrio San Jose) in the
municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of

On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints

approximately 148,118 square meters; that these parcels of land were

containing substantially the same allegations. 2

inherited by them from their deceased father Bonoso Alcantara, who in turn
inherited the same from his father, Juan Alcantara; that plaintiffs Juan

In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and
possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph
V of the complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose)

Alcantara and Jose Alcantara were the children of Bonoso Alcantara; that
these two brothers inherited the land from their father, and they and their
predecessors in interest had been in open, adverse and continuous

possession of the same, planting therein palay and other agricultural

land sometime on March 11, 1894, and when the cadastral survey of said

products and exclusively enjoying said products; that on March 28, 1894

land was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in 1933 Candido Pili and

plaintiffs' grandfather, Juan Alcantara, had said lands surveyed; that during

plaintiffs filed and registered their claim of ownership over the said parcel of

the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose

land; that plaintiffs had the land declared for taxation purposes under Tax

in 1933 Bonoso Alcantara and the plaintiffs filed and registered their claims

Declaration No. 2597, Quezon City, Philippines; that after the outbreak of

of ownership over said lands; that plaintiffs had said lands declared for

the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter,

taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2390, of Quezon City; that

evacuees from Manila and other places, after securing permission from

after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and

plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses in said land and plaintiffs

subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after

collected monthly rentals from their lessees or tenants.

having secured permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their

houses on said lands and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from them.

The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective
complaint, that sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the

In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and

peaceful possession of their lands, the defendants, particularly the

possessors of a parcel of agricultural land located in the Barrio of La Loma

defendant

(now San Jose), municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area

representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using

of approximately 62,481 square meters; that this parcel of land was

bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started

inherited by plaintiffs from their ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited

defacing, demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of

the same from his parents; that Candido Pili and his predecessors in interest

plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements consisting of rice paddies

owned, possessed, occupied and cultivated the said parcel of land from time

(pilapiles), bamboos and fruit trees, and permanent improvements such as

immemorial; that upon the death of Candido Pili his children Luisa Pili,

old roads, old bridges and other permanent landmarks within and outside

Pascual Pili, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili succeeded to the ownership and

the lands in question, disregarding the objections of plaintiffs, and as a

possession and cultivation of said land; that plaintiffs and their predecessors

result plaintiffs were deprived of the rentals received from their lessees;

in interest, as owners and possessors of said land, had openly, adversely

that plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim of defendants,

and continuously cultivated the land, planting thereon palay and other

and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their lands, as described

agricultural products and enjoying exclusively the products harvested

in their respective complaint, had either been fraudulently or erroneously

therefrom; that during his lifetime, Candido Pili ordered the survey of said

included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1

J.M.

Tuason

and

Co.

Inc.,

through

their

agents

and

(known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the

jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication; that Decree No.

Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original applicants

17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is

for registration, now defendants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa

likewise null and void from the beginning, because it was issued pursuant to

Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion

a void decision and because the boundaries, technical descriptions and

Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz.

areas appearing in the decree are different and not identical with the
boundaries, technical descriptions and areas in the application for

The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registered
owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had applied for the
registration of two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the
Diliman Estate), located in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del
Monte, province of Rizal, of which parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate)
contained an area of 8,798,617 square meters; that the registration
proceedings were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land
Registration; that the application for registration in LRC No. 7681, containing
the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa
Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the Official
Gazette; that before the decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the
area, boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and
amended; that the amendments and alterations, which were made after the
publication of the original application, were never published; that on March
7, 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC No. 7681 based on the amended
plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration
was issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the
registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa
Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate); that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in
LRC No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no

registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the area of parcel No. 1
as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1
appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official
Gazette; that Original Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to parcel 1
(Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the beginning because it was
issued pursuant to a void decree of registration; that the area, boundaries
and technical description of Parcel No. 1 appearing in Decree of Registration
No. 17431 and in the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are different from
the area, boundaries and technical description appearing in the application
for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the plaintiffs had
not been notified of the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 although the
applicants knew, or could have known, by the exercise of necessary
diligence, the names and addresses of the plaintiffs and their predecessors
in interest who were then, and up to the time the complaints were filed, in
possession and were cultivating the lands described in paragraph V of their
respective complaint; and that during, before, and even after the issuance
of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 the defendants had tacitly recognized
the ownership of the plaintiffs over their respective lands because said
defendants had never disturbed the possession and cultivation of the lands
by the plaintiffs until the year 1951; and that all transfer certificates of title

issued subsequently, based on Original Certificate of Title No. 735, are also

The plaintiffs, in the three cases, were allowed by the trial court to litigate

null and void. 3

as paupers.

The plaintiffs in each of the three cases prayed the court: (1) to declare

Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually served with summons.

them owners and entitled to the possession of the parcel, or parcels, of land

The other defendants were ordered summoned by publication in accordance

described in their respective complaint, as the case may be; (2) to revoke

with Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason &

the decision of the Court of Land Registration, dated March 7, 1914 in LRC

Co., Inc. appeared. The other defendants were all declared in default.

No. 7681, and to declare Decree No. 17431, dated July 6, 1914 null and void
from the beginning with respect to Parcel No. 1(Santa Mesa Estate) in
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which include the lands of the plaintiffs;
(3) to declare Original Certificate of Title No. 735, particularly as it refers to
Parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) also null and void; (4) to declare null and
void all transfer certificates of titles issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal
and of Quezon City subsequent to, and based on, Original Certificate of Title
No. 735; (5) to order the defendants, in the event Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 is declared valid, to reconvey and transfer title over the land
described in their respective complaint in favor of the plaintiffs in each case,

On June 23, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss
in each of the three cases. This motion to dismiss was denied by the trial
court on July 20, 1955.

On July 18, 1955 the trial court issued an order granting the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by the plaintiffs in their complaints. The
preliminary injunction, however, was lifted by order of the trial court on
October 3, 1955, upon the posting by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. of
bonds in the total amount of P14,000.00 pursuant to the order of the court
of September 26, 1955.

as the case may be; (6) to order the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the
market value of the lands in question in case of defendants' inability to

On August 11, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed in the three

reconvey the same; (7) to order the defendants to pay damages to the

cases a motion for reconsideration of the order of July 20, 1955 denying the

plaintiffs; (8) to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the

motion to dismiss. This motion for reconsideration was denied by order of

defendants, their lawyers, their agents and representatives from disturbing

the court of September 26, 1955.

the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs during the pendency of these
cases.

On November 29, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed an answer in
each of the three cases. In its answer, this defendant, among others,
specifically denied plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands involved in

each case. The answer contains special and affirmative defenses, to wit: (1)

On June 7, 1962, after the plaintiffs had presented their evidence, defendant

that the plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by prior judgment and res

J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. presented a motion to dismiss the cases upon

judicata in view of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its

grounds that (1) the actions were barred by the statute of limitations; (2)

Civil Case No. Q-156 which was subsequently elevated to the Supreme

that the actions barred by a prior judgment; and (3) that plaintiffs had not

Court as G.R. No. L-4998, in which latter case the Supreme Court affirmed in

presented any evidence to prove their claim of ownership. The defendant

toto the order of the lower court dismissing the case; (2) that the

later filed a motion to withdraw the third ground of its motion to dismiss.

complaints failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action

The plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss, as well as to the

against the defendants; (3) that the plaintiffs' action, assuming that their

motion of defendant to withdraw its third ground to dismiss. The trial court,

complaints state sufficient cause of action, had prescribed either under Act

in an order dated December 3, 1962, granted defendant's motion to

No. 496 or under statutes governing prescription of action; (4) that

withdraw the third ground of its motion to dismiss but denied the motion to

defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is a buyer in good faith and for valuable

dismiss. 5

consideration of the parcels of land involved in the three cases; (5) that the
registration proceedings had in LRC No. 7681 instituted by the defendant's
predecessors in interest was in accordance with law, and the requirements
for a valid registration of title were complied with. By way of counterclaim
the defendant prayed that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay damages as
therein specified.

The plaintiffs, amended their complaints in the three cases, by including

additional parties as plaintiffs, and the amended complaints were admitted
by the trial court. The defendant, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., filed a

After trial, on January 18, 1965, the lower court rendered a decision for the
three cases, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants as
follows:

A Declaring that the decision, the decree and the title issued in
LRC No. 7681, are null and void, ab initio, and of no effect
whatsoever;

manifestation that it was reproducing and realleging its answers to the

original complaints as its answers to the amended complaints in view of the

B Declaring that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on

fact that the amendments to the complaints consist merely in the inclusion

page 136 Vol. A-7 of the Registration Book of Rizal is null and void

of additional indispensable as well as necessary parties-plaintiffs. 4

from the very beginning (and) of no effect whatsoever;

C Declaring that all Transfer Certificates of Title emanating or

H Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621

allegedly derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the

the sum of P600.00 a month as actual damages for uncollected

Province of Rizal are likewise null and void;

rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them;

D Declaring that the plaintiff in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and

I Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.

3623 are the owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels of

3623 the sum of P600.00 a month, as actual damages for

land claimed and described in paragraph V of their respective

uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to

complaints;

them;.

E Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them

J Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.

to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possesion of the parcels of

3623 the sum of P150.00 a month as actual damages for uncollected

land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No.

rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them; .

3621 and indicated as Parcel A, Parcel B and Parcel C, in SWO40187 (Exh. "UU" and Exh. "VV");

F Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them

to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels
of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No.
3623 and indicated as Parcel D and Parcel F, in SWO-40187 (Exh.
"UU" and Exh. 'VV");

G Ordering the Defendants and all persons claiming under them

to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels
of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No.
3623 and indicated in Parcel E, in SWO-491187 (Exh. "UU and Exh.
"VV");

K Ordering the defendants to pay the costs; .

L The defendants' counterclaim is hereby declared dismissed for

lack of merit." 6

A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on
January 30, 1965. However, before the motion for new trial was resolved by
the court, said defendant, on February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to
this Court and an appeal bond, and on February 12, 1965 he filed the record
on appeal. 7 The record on appeal, after it had been corrected and amended,
as ordered and/or authorized by the trial court, was approved on September
29, 1965. 8

Appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in this appeal, contends that the trial court
committed the following errors:

I. The lower court erred in holding that the Land Registration Court

V. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the

in GLRO No. 7681 lacked or was without jurisdiction to issue decree

ground of res judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss

No. 17431 for the alleged reason that:

filed on said ground.

(1) The amendment to the original plan was not published;

VI. The trial court erred in declaring null and void all
certificates of title emanating from OCT 735.

(2) The description of Parcel 1 in the decree is not identical

with the description of Parcel 1 as applied for and as

VII. The trial court erred in holding that J.M. Tuason & Co.,

published in the Official Gazette;

Inc. is not a purchaser in good faith and for value.

(3) Parcel 1 as decreed is bigger in area than Parcel 1 as

VIII. The trial court erred in awarding ownership of the

applied for;

lands claimed by, and in awarding damages to, the

appellees.

(4) A. Bonifacio Road is the only boundary on the West of

Parcel 1.

IX. The trial court erred in denying and in dismissing

appellant's counterclaim and in sentencing appellant to

II. The trial court erred in finding that the transcription of

pay the costs of these suits.

the decree No. 17431 was not in accordance with the law
and that, therefore, said OCT 735 was a complete nullity

As stated by the trial court in its decision, "These cases involve the validity

and the land remains unregistered.

of the decision and the decree issued in LRC No. 7681 resulting in the
issuance of Title No. 735, and the ownership and possession of several

III. The trial court erred in taking cognizance of these cases

parcels of land, claimed by the plaintiffs in their respective complaints...."

despite its lack of jurisdiction to hear and decide the same.

The lower court, summarizing its findings, among others, concluded that:
IV. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on
the grounds of prescription and laches, and in denying the
motions to dismiss filed on said grounds.

(1) the decision and the decree in LRC No. 7681 are null and void ab initio,
having been rendered without jurisdiction; (2) Original Certificate of Title No.
735 issued pursuant to the decree in LRC No. 7681 is null and void, having
been issued pursuant to a void degree; (3) Original Certificate of Title No.

735 is null and void because the No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681, assuming the

parcels of land litigated are found within the boundaries of the present Sta.

degree to be valid, had not been inscribed in accordance with the provisions

Mesa Heights Subdivision (Parcel 1) covered by Original Certificate of Title

of Section 41 of Act 496; (4) all Transfer Certificates of Title allegedly

No. 735. 10 It is shown in the survey plans, presented by both the plaintiffs

emanating and derived from the void Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are

and the defendant, that the six parcels of lands involved in these three

likewise null and void; and (5) the plaintiffs in these three civil are the

cases are located at the northwestern portion of Parcel 1. (Exhs. UU, VV;

owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land described in

and Exh. 29).

their respective complaints.

The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that sometime in
We have carefully examined and studied the voluminous records, and the

1911 Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz,

numerous documentary evidence, of these three cases, and We find that

Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and

the conclusions of the trial court are not supported by the evidence and the

Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, filed with the Court of Land

applicable decisions of this Court.

Registration an application for the registration of their title over two parcels
of land, designated in the survey plans accompanying the application as

The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that had been declared null and void
ab initio by the trial court covers two big parcels of land, mentioned in said
title as Parcel 1, having an area of 8,778,644.10 square meters more or less,
known as the Santa Mesa Estate; and Parcel 2, having an area of
15,961,246 square meters more or less, known as the Diliman Estate. The
three parcels of land involved in Civil Case No. 3621, having an aggregate
area of 278,853 square meters, more or less; the two parcels of land
involved in Civil Case No. 3622 having an aggregate area of 154,119.7
square meters, more or less; and the one parcel of land involved in Civil
Case No. 3623, having an area of 62,481 square meters, more or less, are
all included in the area of Parcel 1.

The trial court, in its decision, states

that the identity of the parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is not
disputed and that both the plaintiffs and the defendant admit that the

Parcel 1 with an area of 8,798,617 square meters, and Parcel 2 with an area
of 16,254,037 square meters. The application was docketed as LRC No.
7681. There was another application covering three other parcels of land,
docketed as LRC No. 7680. The application in LRC No. 7681 was set for
hearing on November 20, 1911 (Exh. X). The application and the notice of
hearing, containing the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land
applied for, were published in the issue of the Official Gazette of October 25,
1911 (Exh. YY). On November 20, 1911 the Court of Land Registration
issued an order of general default against the whole world except the
Insular Government, the Director of Lands and the municipalities of
Caloocan and San Juan del Monte (Exh. 28). On December 23, 1911 the
court issued an order authorizing the amendment of the plan in LRC No.
7681 (Exh. 23). November 11, 1913 the applicants and the Government

entered into an agreement whereby the Government agreed to withdraw its

In compliance with the order contained in the decision of December 29,

opposition to the application for registration of title over the portion known

1913, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration, on

as Hacienda Diliman (Parcel 2) on condition that the roads existing on said

January 24, 1914, submitted a report (Exh. 22) to the court which, among

tract of land be allowed to remain, and it was further agreed "that the

others, stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include

issuance, of the title to applicants shall be made subject to all the

any land that had not been previously included in the original plan.

exceptions established by Section 39 of Act 496 as amended by Section 1 of

Act 2011" (Exh. 21). On December 29, 1913 the Court of Land Registration
rendered a decision (Exh. 24) in both LRC No. 7680 and LRC No. 7681 which,
among others, stated that during the registration proceedings the plans
accompanying the two applications were amended in order to exclude
certain areas that were the subject of opposition, that the order of general
default was confirmed, that the Chief of the Surveyor's Division of the Court
of Land Registration was ordered to submit a report as to whether or not the
new (amended) plans had included lands which were not by the original
plans, and whether or not the new plans had excluded the lands that had
already been covered by the decree in LRC No. 3563. The decision further
stated that in the event that the new plans did not include new parcels of
land and that the lands that were the subject of the proceedings in LRC No.
3563 had been excluded, an additional decision would be made decreeing
the adjudication and registration of the lands that were the subject of the
registration proceedings in favor of the applicants, as follows: To Mariano
Severo Tuason y de la Paz, two sixths (2/6) undivided portion to Teresa
Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Juan Jose
Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Demetrio Asuncion
Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6)undivided portion; and to Augusto
Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion.

On March 7, 1914 the Court of Land Registration rendered a supplemental

decision declaring that, on the basis of the decision of December 29, 1913
and of the report of the Surveyor of Court of Land Registration, the
applicants Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz and others were the owners of
the land applied for, as described in the amended plan, in the proportion
mentioned in the decision, and ordering that the land applied for be
registered in the names of the applicants and that a decree of registration
be issued in accordance with the decision and the amended plan. On March
27, 1914 the Chief of the Survey Division addressed a communication to the
registration court, in connection with LRC No. 7681, suggesting that the
decision of the court of March 7, 1914 be modified such that the decree of
registration be based upon the original plan as published and not upon the
amended plan (Exh. Z-3). The Court of Land Registration did not follow the
recommendation of the Chief of the Survey Division. On July 6, 1914 Decree
of Registration No. 17431 was issued by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Court of Land Registration
of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681. The decree contains the technical
description of the two parcels of land in accordance with the plan as
amended. It appears in the decree that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10
square meters, more or less, or an increase of 27.10 square meters over the

area of 8,798,617 square meters that was stated in the application for

sold to numerous parties Parcel 1 having been converted into a

registration and in the notice of hearing which were published in the Official

subdivision known as the Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision, and the lots had

Gazette of October 25, 1911; and that Parcel 2 has an area of 15,961,246

been sold to private individual and entities, such that in that subdivision

square meters, more or less, or a decrease of 292,791 square meters from

now are located the National Orthopedic Hospital, the station of Pangasinan

the area of 16,254,037 square meters that was stated in the application and

Transportation Co. (Pantranco), Sto. Domingo Church, Lourdes Church and

in the notice of hearing that were published in the Official Gazette (Exhs. 25

others. Necessarily, as a result of the sales of the lots into which Parcel 1

and YY). All in all, there is a decrease of 292,763.90 square meters in the

was subdivided, transfer certificates of title were issued to the purchasers of

aggregate area of the two parcels of land sought to be registered.

the lots, and these transfer certificates of title were based upon transfer
certificates of title that emanated from Original Certificate of Title No. 735.

Subsequently, on July 8, 1914, the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal

issued Original Certificate of Title No. 735 in the names of the applicants,

The trial court declared null and void all transfer certificates of title
emanating, or derived, from Original Certificate of No. 735.

Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan

Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto

The decision of the trial court declaring null and void ab initio Original

Huberto Tuason y de la Paz (Exh. 30).

Certificate of Title No. 735 would invalidate the title over the entire area
included in Parcel 1 which admittedly includes the six parcels of land

1. We shall now deal with the first error assigned by the appellant.

The lower court declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void
ab initio because, according to said court, that title was based on Decree of
Registration No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681 that was null and void, said decree
having been issued pursuant to a decision of the Court of Land Registration
in LRC No. 7681 which had no jurisdiction to render said decision.

claimed by the plaintiffs-and also the title over the entire area included in
Parcel 2. Let it be noted that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square
meters, more or less, and Parcel 2 has an area of 15,961,246 square
meters, more or less; while the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs
have an aggregate area of only 495,453.7 square meters, more or less. In
other words, the area of the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is
only a little over two per cent (2%) of the aggregate area of Parcel 1 and

As We have adverted to, Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covers two big

Parcel 2. But the decision of the trial court nullified Original Certificate of

parcels of land: Parcel 1, known as the Santa Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2,

Title No. 785, without any qualification.

known as the Diliman Estate. The records show that these two parcels of
land had been subdivided into numerous lots, and most of those lots had

The trial court held that the Court of Land Registration had no jurisdiction to

the registration court can not acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of

render the decision in LRC No. 7681 because during the registration

land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and the

proceedings, after the original application and notice of hearing had been

decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision

duly published, the plan of Parcel 1 was amended and no publication

concerns the newly included land.

regarding the amended plan was made. The trial court pointed out that the

publication, the law is infringed with respect to the publicity that is required

area and the description of Parcel 1 in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are

in registration proceedings, and third parties who have not had the

not identical with the area and description of Parcel 1 applied for and

opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights

published in the Official Gazette. The trial court stressed on the point that

because of failure of notice.

publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court to

exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the

hear and decide an application for registration and to order the issuance of

original plan as previously published, a new publication is not necessary.

a decree of registration, as provided in Act 496 (Land Registration Act).

In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not

12

11

The reason is because without a new

But if the amendment consists in the

13

affected by the failure of a new publication. 14

We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land
Registration Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No.

In the case at bar We find that the original plan covering Parcel 1 and Parcel

7681. Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or

2 that accompanied the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 was

order, an amendment of the application for registration when it appears to

amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of

the court that the amendment is necessary and proper. Under Section 24 of

opposition, or which were the subject of another registration case; and the

the same act the court may at any time order an application to be amended

Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration was ordered to

by striking out one or more parcels or by severance of the application. The

determine whether the amended plan included lands or areas not included

amendment may be made in the application or in the survey plan, or in

in the original plan. In compliance with the order of the registration court

both, since the application and the survey plan go together. If the

said Chief of the Survey Division informed the court that no new parcels

amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an

were included in the new (or amended) plan. Thus, in the decision of the

area or parcel of land not previously included in the original application, as

Court of Land Registration in LRC Nos. 7680 and 7681, dated December 29,

published, a new publication of the amended application must be made.

1913 (Exh. 24), We read the following:

The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons

concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new publication

Despues de las notificaciones y avisos de las dos solicitudes

1.o Que los nuevos planos presentados por los solicitantes

en ambos expedientes, se enmendaron los planos unidos a

corresponden a las parcelas 1.a 2.a, y 3.a, del Expedients

los mismos para excluir ciertas porciones que habian sido

No. 7680 y a la 1.a parcela del No. 7681, que son las

objeto de oposicion.

mismas a que se refiere el plano Exhibito A del No. 7680.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

POR TANTO, ratificando como por la presente se ratifica la

4. Que los nuevos planos presentados de las parcelas 1.a,

declaracion de rebeldia general, se ordena:

2.a y 3.a del Expediente 7680, y de la 1.a del 7681 no

incluyen terreno alguno que no haya sido comprendido en

"1.o

Que

el

Jefe

de

la

Division

de

los planos originales. 16

Agrimensores de este Tribunal terreno que

no haya sido comprendido en los planos

And so, in the supplemental decision of the Court of Land Registration in

originales ...." 15

LRC No. 7681, dated March 7, 1914 (Exh. 24-A), the report of the Chief of
the Survey Division was taken into consideration and the court ordered the

On January 24, 1914, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land
Registration made a report to the court (Exh. 22), from which the report We
read the following:.

Cumpliendo lo mandado por el Tribunal en el No. 1 de la

parte dispositiva de su Decision de fecha 29 de Diciembre
proximo pasado, el que suscribe, despues de un detenido
estudio de los planos unidos a los Expedientes arriba
citados, tiene el honor de informar:

registration of the lands applied for by the applicants as described in the

amended plan ("como esta descrito en el plano enmendado"). It is thus
shown that the amended plan in LRC No. 7681 did not cover parcels, or
areas, that were not previously included in the original plan which
accompanied the application that had been published in the Official
Gazette. There was, therefore, no necessity for a new publication of the
amended plan in order to vest the Court of Land Registration with
jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for registration in LRC No.
7681 and to order the issuance of Decree of Registration No. 17431 upon
which Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was based.

Way back in 1933, this Court had occasion to rule on the validity of the very

emanated from Original Certificate of Title No. 735, upon the ground, as

same Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which the trial court had declared

now urged by the appellees in the three cases at bar, that during the

null and void in the three cases now before this Court. In the case of the

registration proceedings the original plan of the lands known as the Sta.

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59 Phil. 183) the validity of Original

Mesa and Diliman was amended, and no publication was made of the

Certificate of Title No. 735 was assailed by the appellants (Pascual Acua

amended plan. Regarding the question of the non-publication of the

and others) precisely upon the ground that during the registration

amended plan, this Court said:

proceedings, which brought about the issuance of Original Certificate of

Title No. 735, the original plan of the applicants was ordered amended, and
no new publication was made of the amended plan and so it was urged that
the registration court did not have jurisdiction to order the issuance of the
decree of registration in favor of the applicants. The action in this case was
instituted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands as receiver of the Tuason
Entail for the purpose, among others, of recovering from Pascual Acua and
others certain lands included in the Santa Mesa and Diliman hacienda
located in the barrios of Bagobantay and Diliman, in the municipalities of
Caloocan and San Juan del Monte Province of Rizal. Upon hearing, the Court
of First Instance of Rizal declared that none of the defendants owned any
part of the land in controversy. On appeal, this Court observed that the
character in which the plaintiff sued was not open to question, and the
material facts were as follows: The heirs of the Tuason estate, referred to as
the Tuason Entail, held a Torrens title to a tract of land with an area of about
1,600 hectares located in the province of Rizal. This property was then
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 issued in lieu of older
certificates dating from July 8, 1914. This Transfer Certificate of Title No.
3792 emanated from Or Certificate of Title No. 735.

17

The appellants

precisely sought to nullify the title of the heirs of the Tuason estate, which

Among the arguments made by the appellants of the Bagobantay

group, it is alleged that the Torrens title relied by the plaintiff is void,
and in support of this contention it stated that, during the course of
the registration proceedings, an order was made by the court for
the amendment of the applicants and that this order was not
followed by new publication, wherefore, it is supposed the court was
without jurisdiction to decree the title to the applicants. In this
connection reliance is placed upon the doctrine stated in the
Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial (49 Phil. 122). But the brief
for the appellants fails to call attention to the fact that the rule
stated in the case cited has reference to an amendment of the plan
by which additional land, different from that included in the original
survey is intended to be brought within the process of registration.
In the case before us, the order referred to was for the exclusion of
certain portions of the land covered by the original survey, and the
doctrine of the case cited cannot apply. Apart from this it does not
appear that the portion intended to be excluded comprehended any
part of the land which had been usurped.

18

The appellees, however, asserts that the case of the Bank of the Philippine

paid particular attention on this point of the lower court's decision, and our

Islands vs. Acua, supra, is not applicable to the three cases now before this

impression is that the trial court had exploited certain minor discrepancies

Court because what was involved in said case was Parcel 2 of Original

between the description of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration and its

Certificate of Title No. 735, and not Parcel 1 which is the land involved in

description in the original application, in order to bolster its ruling that "to

these cases. This assertion of the appellees is not correct. The decision in

render a decision on the amended plan, boundary descriptions, and

that case states that the action was instituted by the Bank of the Philippine

additional lands comprised within Parcel 1 in Decree No. 17431, a

Islands, as receiver of the Tuason Entail, for the purpose, among others, of

republication of such amended plan, boundary description, technical

recovering from Pascual Acua and others "certain lands contained in the

description and additional areas is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the

Sta. Mesa and Diliman Hacienda located in the barrios of Bagobantay and

Court." 20

Diliman in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte."

19

But

what matters is the doctrine that was laid down by this Court in that case
that is: that when the original survey plan is amended, after the publication
of the application in order to include land not previously included in the
original survey, a new publication of the amended plan is necessary in order
to confer jurisdiction upon the registration court to order the registration of
the land that is added to what was included in the original survey plan. The
ruling of this Court in the Bank of the Philippine Islands case has a decisive
application in the three cases now before this Court.

Oddly enough, when the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the
decree of registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the application
as published, it did not mention the fact that the difference in area is only
27.10 square meters. We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters
is too minimal to be of decisive consequence in the determination of the
validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. It was error on the part of the
lower court to lay stress on this circumstance and made it a basis for ruling
that because in the amended plan there is this increase in area as
compared to the area appearing in the application as published, the Land

The trial court laid stress on the point that publication of the amended plan

Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to render the decision decreeing

of Parcel 1 should have been made because it appears in the Decree of

the registration of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681. The Chief of the Survey Division

Registration No. 17431, and as reproduced in Original Certificate of Title No.

of the Court of Land Registration, in his report to the court of January 24,

735, that the area of said parcel is "bigger" than the area stated in the

1914 (Exh. 22), stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 did not include any land

application as published in the Official Gazette; and, also, that the

that was not included in the original plan. That report was made precisely in

boundaries of Parcel 1 stated in the decree are not identical with the

compliance with the order of the registration court, in the decision of

boundaries stated in the application as published in the Official Gazette. We

December 29, 1913 in LRC No. 7681, to inform the court "si los nuevos

planos incluyen o no terreno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos

Moreover, no evidence was presented to identify this area of 27.10 square

originales". That report was submitted by the Chief Surveyor "despues de

meters, nor to show its location, in relation to the entire area of Parcel 1.

un detenido estudio de los planos unidos a los expedientes". Under the

The appellees did not even attempt to show that this excess area of 27.10

foregoing circumstances, our inference is that the area of 27.10 square

square meters is included within the parcels that they are claiming. We

meters was already included in the original plan, and that the computation

cannot, therefore; consider this area of 27.10 square meters as an area that

of the area in the original survey must have been inaccurate; and the error

was separate and distinct from, and was added to, the land that was

was corrected in the recomputation of the area when the amended plan was

covered by the original survey plan, such that the publication of the

prepared. We made a careful study and comparison of the technical

amended plan would be necessary in order that the registration court could

description of Parcel 1 appearing in the application as published, and the

acquire jurisdiction over that area. As We have pointed out, this increase of

technical description appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exhs.

27.10 square meters was simply the result of the recomputation of the area

19, 19-A and Z-6), and We accept the explanation of counsel for the

when the original plan was amended. There is no showing that the

appellant that this seeming increase of 27.10 square meters had been

recomputation is incorrect. Neither is there a showing that this small area of

brought about "by the fact that when the amendment of the plan was

27.10 square meters belongs to any person and that person had been

made, the distances and bearings in a few points along the southwestern

deprived of his property, or had failed to claim that particular area because

boundary (Please see Exh. 19) were brought to the nearest millimeter and

of the non-publication of the amended plan. On the other hand, there is the

to the nearest second respectively; whereas, the computation of the survey

report of the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration

in the original plan was to the nearest decimeter and to the nearest minute

(Exh. 22) stating that the amended plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not

only".

include any land which was not included in the original plan.

21

We believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square meters

would not justify the conclusion of the lower court that "the amended
plan ... included additional lands which were not originally included in Parcel
1 as published in the Official Gazette." It being undisputed that Parcel 1 has
an area of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86 hectares), We
believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters, between the
computation of the area when the original plan was made and the
computation of the area when the amended plan was prepared, can not be
considered substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel 1.

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases where the original
survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings by the addition
of lands not previously included in the original plan should publication be
made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of
the area that was added after the publication of the original plan. 22

The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired

27.10 square meters but also the remaining area of 8,798,617 square

jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration

meters of Parcel 1 and the entire area of 15,961,246 square meters of

proceedings in virtue of the publication of the application, that jurisdiction

Parcel 2. The trial court, in its decision, declared Original Certificate of Title

attaches to the land or lands mentioned and described in the application. If

No. 735 "null and void from the very beginning and of no effect

it is later shown that the decree of registration had included land or lands

whatsoever", without any qualification. This declaration by the lower court,

not included in the original application as published, then the registration

if sanctioned by this Court and given effect, would nullify the title that

proceedings and the decree of registration must be declared null and void in

covers two big parcels of land (Parcels 1 and 2) that have a total area of

so far but only in so far as the land not included in the publication is

24,759,890.10 square meters, or almost 2,476 hectares. And not only that.

concerned. This is so, because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the

The trial court declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that are

land not included in the publication-the publication being the basis: of the

derived, or that emanated, from Original Certificate of Title No. 735,

jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the decree of registration,

regardless of whether those transfer certificates of title are the results of

relating to the lands that were included in the publication, are valid. Thus, if

transactions done in good faith and for value by the holder of those transfer

it is shown that a certificate of title had been issued covering lands where

certificates of title.

the registration court had no jurisdiction, the certificate of title is null and
void insofar as it concerns the land or lands over which the registration
court had not acquired jurisdiction. 23

It must be noted that the appellees in the present cases claim six parcels
that have an area of some 495,453.7 square meters (about 49.5 hectares),
whereas the combined area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 is 24,759,890.10 square

And so in the three cases now before this Court, even granting that the

meters (about 2,476 hectares). It must also be noted that both Parcel 1 and

registration court had no jurisdiction over the increased area of 27.10

Parcel 2 have been subdivided into numerous lots (Exhs. 14 and 14-B) which

square meters (as alleged by appellees), the most that the lower court

have already been acquired by numerous persons and/or entities that are

could have done was to nullify the decree and the certificate of title insofar

now holding certificates of title which can be traced back to Original

as that area of 27.10 square meters is concerned, if that area can be

Certificate of Title No. 735. The decision of the lower court, however, would

identified. But, certainly, the lower court could not declare, and should not

render useless Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and all transfer

have declared, null and void the whole proceedings in LRC No. 7681; and,

certificates of title emanating, or derived, therefrom. The decision of the

certainly, the lower court erred in declaring null and void ab initio Original

lower court would certainly prejudice the rights of the persons, both natural

Certificate of Title 735 which covers not only the supposed excess area of

and juridical, who had acquired portions of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, relying on

the doctrine of the indefeasibility of Torrens title. The decision of the lower

properties of Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, by

court would, indeed, prejudice the rights of persons who are not parties in

Parcel 2, Santa Clara Monastery, by Parcel 1; and W. by a road,

the present cases. And this is so, because the trial court, in its decision, did

Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church.

not adhere to the applicable decisions of this Court in resolving the

pertinent issues in these cases.

As described in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exh. 25), the boundaries

of Parcel 1 are as follows:

Another reason mentioned by the lower court to support its ruling that
Decree of Registration No. 17431 is null and void is that the description of
Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is different from the description of the
same parcel in the notice of hearing of the original application for
registration as published in the Official Gazette. The different description
that appears in the decree of registration, according to the lower court, is an
amendment to the Original survey plan that accompanied the application
and the amended survey plan should have been republished; and because
there was no such republication the registration court was without
jurisdiction to issue the decree of registration. The lower court also
committed an error in making this ruling. We find that the lower court
incorrectly laid stress on differences in the names of the owners, and on
differences in the designations, of the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 along its
southwestern boundary. We find, however, that these differences are well
explained in the record.

In the notice of hearing in LRC No. 7681 (Exhibits YY and YY-2) the
boundaries of Parcel 1 are stated as follows:

PARCEL 1. Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao y

Escobar, et al., (Maysilo Estate): On the E. by San Juan River; on the
SW. by properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al.,
Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W. Rosenstock &
Co.; and on the W. by a road, Cementerio del Norte and property of
the Roman Catholic Church ...

It will thus be noted that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the northern,

eastern, and western sides, as they appear in the notice of hearing that was
published and in Decree of Registration No. 17431, are the same. It is in the
southwestern boundary where there appear some differences in the names
of the owners, or in the designations, of the adjoining lands. Thus, in the
published notice of hearing, it appears that the names of the owners, or the
designations, of the lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the
Southwest are parcel 3, properties of Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan
de Dios, parcel 2, Monasterio de Santa Clara and parcel 1; while in the
decree of registration it appears that the lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC
No. 7681) on the Southwest are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y

Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao and others

de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W.

(Maysilo Estate); E. by the San Juan River; SW. by Parcel 3,

Rosenstock & Co. Upon a careful examination of the records, We find that

the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary, as indicated in

must have found that what used to be the property of the Santa Clara

the notice of hearing that was published in the Official Gazette, are the

Monastery at the time of the original Survey was already the property of C.

same lands that are indicated in the decree of registration as the lands that

W. Rosenstock & Co. when the amended plan was prepared. This can simply

adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary. There is simply a change in

mean that there was a change of ownership from Santa Clara Monastery to

the names of the owners or in the designations, of the lands. We find that

C.W. Rosenstock & Co. It must be considered that the original survey took

parcels 3, 2 and 1, appearing as the boundary lands on the southwestern

place from December, 1910 to June, 1911 (Exhibits 18 and 19), while the

side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681, as published, are in fact parcels of land

registration case was decided on March 7, 1914.

that are owned, and had been applied for registration, by Mariano Severo
Tuason y de la Paz, et al. in LRC No. 7680. This LRC No. 7680 was heard and
decided jointly with LRC No. 7681 by the Land Registration Court (Exh. 24).
These parcels 3, 2 and 1 of LRC No. 7680, being lands owned by Mariano
Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., it may as well be stated in the decree of
registration that those lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No.
7681 are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., instead
of designating them as parcel 3, parcel 2, and parcel 1 (of LRC 1680). And
so, what appears in Decree of Registration No. 17431 as the properties of
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., at the southwestern side of Parcel
1 are no other than those very parcels 3, 2 and 1 that appear in the notice
of hearing as the lands that bound Parcel 1 on the southwest.

Under Section 40 of Act 496, the decree of registration "shall contain a

description of the land as finally determined by the court." Evidently, the
Court of Land Registration acted in consonance with this provision of the law
when, in its decision in LRC 7681, it took into consideration the actual
description of Parcel 1 as shown in the amended survey plan, and when it
disregarded the recommendation of the Chief of the Survey Division, dated
March 27, 1914, that the decision of the court of March 7, 1914 "be based
upon the original plans, as published, and not upon the amended plan." It
may well be said that Decree of Registration N. 17431 simply contains the
correct area of Parcel 1 and the correct names of the owners of the lands
that bound Parcel 1 in LRC No. 1681 as of the time when the decision of the
land registration court was rendered.

In the description of Parcel 1 as published, it appears that one of the

boundaries on the southwestern side is Santa Clara Monastery, while in the
decree of registration the words "Santa Clara Monastery" do not appear but,
instead, are replaced by the words "C. W. Rosenstock & Co." It will be
remembered that during the registration proceedings the plan of Parcel 1
was ordered amended, and the surveyor, who prepared the amended plan

In this connection, the following pronouncement of this Court in the case of

Domingo vs. Ongsiako, 55 Phil. 361, 373-4, is pertinent:

We may further observe that underlying the contention of the

plaintiffs is the idea that errors in the plans nullify the decrees of
registration. This is erroneous. It is the land and not the plan which

is registered. Prior to the enactment of Act No. 1875, practically all

We have taken note of the fact that the six parcels of land that are claimed

plans for land registration were defective especially in regard to

by the plaintiffs in the three cases now before this Court are on the

errors of closures and areas, but so far no such errors have been

northwestern portion of Parcel 1 (parcels labelled A, B, C, D, E and F, in Exh.

permitted to affect the validity of the decrees. If the boundaries of

UU; and Exhs. 17, 29 and 29-B). They are far from the southwestern

the land registered can be determined, the technical description in

boundary. The circumstance, therefore, regarding the dissimilarity in the

the certificate of title may be corrected without cancelling the

names of the owners, or the designations, of the lands that adjoin the

decree. Such corrections have been made in this case by approved

southwestern side of Parcel 1 is of no moment insofar as the lots claimed by

surveys which embrace all of the land here in question. To nullify

appellees are concerned. What matters is that the lots claimed by the

and cancel final decrees merely by reason of faulty technical

appellees are included in Parcel 1 of LRC No. 1681 and are located at the

descriptions would lead to chaos.

northwestern portion of said Parcel 1. Indeed, it was error on the part of the
lower court to make as one of the bases in declaring Decree of Registration
No. 17431 and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void and of no
effect whatsoever the aforestated dissimilarities in the names of the
owners, or in the designations, of the lands on the southwestern side of
Parcel 1, because those dissimilarities are well explained in the records of
these cases.

The lower court committed still another error when it made the finding that
the only boundary of Parcel 1 on the western side is "A. Bonifacio road" and
then declared that the lands situated west of the A. Bonifacio road were
never the subject of the registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681. The lower
court declared the lands west of A. Bonifacio road as unregistered lands and
awarded the ownership of those lands to the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos.
3621 and 3622 (appellees in G.R. Nos. L-26127 and L-26128). This finding of
the lower court is contrary to the evidence presented by the parties in these
cases. Both the appellees and the appellant submitted as their evidence the

notice of hearing of the application as published in the Official Gazette

three cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the lands that they claim "had either

(Exhibit X, YY and YY-2; and Exhibit 26) and the decree of registration No.

been fraudulently or erroneously included ... in Parcel 1 (known as Santa

17431 (Exhibit Y, and Exh. 25) wherein are clearly stated that the

Mesa Estate) of the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records

boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West are: (1) a road, (2) Cementerio del Norte

of the Province of Rizal." 24 In their appeal brief, the appellees categorically

and (3) Roman Catholic Church (Exhs. Z-6, UU, and Exhs. 6, 18, 19 and 20).

stated that "Both the appellees and the appellant admit that these parcels

But the lower court considered the A. Bonifacio road as the only boundary

of land claimed by the plaintiffs in these three (3) civil cases are located

on the West, and ignored the two other boundaries on the West that are

within Parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) covered by Original Certificate of Title

mentioned both in the notice of hearing as published and in the decree of

No. 735". 25 In the pre-trial order of the lower court of December 18, 1957, it

registration. The sketches and the survey plans, forming part of the

was stated that the parcels of land litigated in these are portions of the

evidence on record, show that the road, labelled as "A. Bonifacio", goes

lands covered by OCT No. 735. 26 The lower court itself, at the earlier part of

alongside the western boundary of Parcel 1 (separating Parcel 1 and the

its decision, stated that "both the plaintiffs and the defendants admit that

Cementerio del Norte), until it reaches a point where it traverses the

the parcels of land litigated in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are

northwestern portion of Parcel 1, such that from the point where it enters

found within the boundaries of the present Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision

the area of Parcel 1 what is left as the boundaries on the western side are

covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735" 27 The appellees in these two

the Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church (Exhibits UU, VV,

cases had never asserted that part of the lands that they claim are outside

17, 19 and 29). Ignoring the existence of the Cementerio del Norte and the

the boundaries of Parcel 1, nor did they assert that part of the lands that

Roman Catholic Church as the other boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West, the

they claim have remained unregistered and not covered by Original

lower court declared that the lands west of the A. Bonifacio road, which

Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court had made a finding not only

form part of the lands that are claimed by the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos.

contrary to the evidence of the appellees but even more than what the

3621 and 3622, are outside the boundary of Parcel 1 on the west and that

appellees asked when it said in its decision that the western boundary of

those particular areas had remained as unregistered lands and are not

Parcel 1 is only the A. Bonifacio road and that the lands claimed by the

covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This finding of the lower

appellees west of this road had never been registered. This Court certainly

court is contrary to the very admission of the appellees in these three cases

can not give its approval to the findings and rulings of the lower court that

that all the lands (six parcels in all) that they claim are included in the area

are patently erroneous.

of Parcel 1 mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. In paragraph

XIV of the original, as well as in the amended complaint, in each of these

2. The lower court also erred when it declared Original Certificate of Title

SEC. 41. Immediately after final decision by the court

No. 735 null and void upon the ground that the decree of registration was

directing the registration of any property, the clerk shall

not transcribed in the Registration Book in accordance with the provisions of

send a certified copy of such decision to the Chief of the

Section 41 of Act 496. In its decision, the lower court said:

General Land Registration Office, who shall prepare the

decree in accordance with section forty of Act numbered

During the trial, the Book of Original Certificate of Title was

brought to the Court. The Court had occasion to see and
examine the `ENTRY' made in the Registration Book. The
Court found that the Face of the Title which, under ordinary
circumstances, should be Page 1 is found as Page 2. The
sheet containing the technical description which should be
page 2 is Page 1. The FACE of the Title, which should have
been Page 1, contained the last portion of the description of
the land described in the decree. The sheet containing the

four hundred and ninety-six, and he shall forward a certified

copy of said decree to the register of deeds of the province
or city in which the property is situated. The register of
deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be called the
"Registration Book" in which a leaf, or leaves in consecutive
order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry
made by the register of deeds in this book in each case shall
be the original certificate of title, and shall be signed by him
and sealed with the seal of his office....

bulk of the description of the lands decreed should have

been Page 2. The so-called Original Certificate of Title No.

The pertinent provisions of Section 40 of Act 496 reads, as follows:

735 found on Page 138, Book A-7 of the Register of Deeds of

Rizal is, therefore, null and void because the provisions of
Section 41 of the Land Registration Law have not been
complied with. Said Section requires that the entry in the
Registration Book must be a transcription of the Decree and
the paging should consist of a leaf or leaves in consecutive
order ....

28

SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of

the year, hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be signed
by the clerk. It shall state whether the owner is married or
unmarried, and if married, the name of the husband or wife.
If the owner is under disability, it shall state the nature of
the disability, and if a minor, shall state his age. It shall
contain a description of the land as finally determined by

The pertinent provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 reads, as follows:

the court , . . The decree shall be stated in a convenient

form

for

transcription

upon

the

certificates

of

title

hereinafter mentioned.

7681 of said court. The names of the declared owners, their civil status,
their spouses if married, and their respective interest or share in the lands
covered by the title are stated on the face of this title. We have noted that

Section 29 of Act 496 provides that as soon as the decree of title has been
registered in the office of the register of deeds, as provided in Section fortyone, the property included in said decree shall become registered land
under the Act. Section 42 of Act 496 provides that the certificate shall take
effect upon the date of the transcription of the decree.

This Court has held that as defined in Section 41 of Act 496, the certificate
of title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by the register of

the technical descriptions of the lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by the title
are copied on the sheets constituting the title. We have compared the
technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they appear on this photostat of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50) with the technical
descriptions of these lands as they appear in the decree of registration
(Exhibit Y for the plaintiffs, and Exhibit 25 for the defendant), and We find
that the technical descriptions appearing on the title are the complete and
faithful

deeds in the registry. 29

reproduction,

or

transcription,

of

the

technical

descriptions

appearing in the decree of registration.

The appellant presented as evidence a photostat of Original Certificate of
Title No. 735, as found in the Registration Book in the office of the register
of deeds of Rizal (Exhibit 50).

30

We have examined this document very

carefully, and We find that it is a copy of the original that satisfies all the
requirements of a valid Torrens title as provided for in Sections 40 and 41 of
Act 496.

We have noted what the lower court found, that the technical descriptions
of Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first page, of this title,
as a technical description is ordinarily copied on the certificate of title. What
appears on the face of this title is the last part of the technical description
of Parcel 2. The technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 begin on the
second page and end on the first page. This circumstance, that is, that the

On the face, or on the first page, of this title, there is the certification of the

technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the

Chief of the Land Registration Office that the decree of registration was

first page, of the title, is the basis of the lower court in ruling that the

registered in Manila on July 6, 1914 at 7:41 a.m.; and the certification of the

decree of registration was not transcribed in the registration book in

Register of Deeds of Rizal that the decree was received for transcription in

accordance with Section 41 of Act 496, and so Original Certificate of Title

his office on July 8, 1914 at 3:30 P.M. It is also stated on the face of this title

No. 735 is null and void. We have noted, however, that in its decision the

that it was entered pursuant to Decree No. 17431 of the Court of Land

lower court made no mention that in the transcription of the decree in the

Registration, dated at Manila on the 7th day of March 1914, in Case No.

registration book any of the data that is required in Section 40 of Act 496 to

be included had been omitted. We have also noted and this fact is

Act shall be construed liberally so far as may be necessary for the purpose

undenied that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they

of effecting its general intent." If We adopt a literal construction of the

appear in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are fully and faithfully

provisions of Section 41 of Act 496, as was done by the lower court, such

transcribed on the photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit

that the defect in the manner or form of transcribing the decree in the

50). There is no showing that the manner of transcribing the decree, as it

registration book would render null and void the original certificate of title,

appears on that photostat, was done for a fraudulent purpose, or was done

then it can happen that the validity or the invalidity of a certificate of title

in order to mislead. Considering that the decree of registration is fully

would depend on the register of deeds, or on the personnel in the office of

transcribed in the Registration Book, and also as copied in Original

the register of deeds. The register of deeds, or an employee in his office,

Certificate of Title No. 735, the circumstance that the beginning of the

can wittingly or unwittingly render useless a decree of registration regularly

technical descriptions is not found on the face, or on the first page, of

issued pursuant to a decision of a registration court and thus nullify by the

Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is not a ground to nullify the said

error that he commits in the transcription of the decree in the Registration

certificate of title. We agree with the lower court that the transcription of

Book an original certificate of title that has been existing for years. This

the technical descriptions should begin, or should have been started, on the

strict interpretation or construction of Section 41 of Act 496 would certainly

face, or on the first page, of the title. We hold, however, that the fact that

not promote the purpose of the Land Registration Law (Act 496), which

this was not so done in the case of Original Certificate of Title No. 735

generally are to ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a given

should not be taken as a factor in determining the validity of Original

landed property

Certificate of Title No. 735. This defect in the manner of transcribing the

issued by the court to the owner of the land absolute proof of such title 32; to

technical descriptions should be considered as a formal, and not a

quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question of legality of title

substantial, defect. What matters is that the original certificate of title

33

contains the full transcription of the decree of registration, and that the

indisputable. 34

31

; to make, so far as it is possible, a certificate of title

; and to decree that land title shall be final, irrevocable and

required data provided for in Section 40 of Act 496 are stated in the original
certificate of title. The lower court made a literal construction of the
provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 and strictly applied its construction in
the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We
believe that the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 should be interpreted
liberally, in keeping with Section 123 of said Act which provides that "This

We, therefore, hold that the formal defect in the transcription of Decree of
Registration No. 17431 in the Registration Book did not render null and void
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. Consequently, We declare that the two
parcels of land (Parcel 1 which includes the lands claimed by the appellees,

and Parcel 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are properly

Registration Court, and that said decree of registration was fully transcribed

registered under the Torrens System of registration.

in the Registration Book in the office of the Register of Deeds of the

province of Rizal. We have found also that the six parcels of land that are

3. The principal issue that has to be resolved in the present appeal is

whether or not the lower court had correctly declared that "Original

claimed by the appellees. in the three cases now before Us are all included
in Parcel 1 that is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735.

Certificate of Title No. 735 ... is null and void from the very beginning and of
no effect whatsoever.

35

In view of Our findings and conclusion that Original Certificate of Title No.
735 was issued in accordance with the provisions of Act 496, and that the

In the preceding discussions, We have held that the lower court erred when
it declared null and void Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We have found
that the registration proceedings that brought about the decree of
registration upon which was based the issuance of Original Certificate of

six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees in the present cases
are covered by said certificate of title, what is left for this Court to decide is
whether or not the appellees still have any legal right over the six parcels of
land that they claim.

Title No. 735 were in accordance with the provisions of Act 496, as
amended. We have held that the Land Registration Court that ordered the

Let it be noted that, as maintained by counsel for the appellees, the action

issuance of the decree of registration had jurisdiction to hear and decide the

of the appellees is principally to recover the ownership and possession of

application for registration filed by Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan

the six parcels of land mentioned and described in their complaints. The

Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, and Augusto Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la

appellees would accomplish their objective through alternative ways: (1)

Paz. The records show that the notice of hearing of the application, which

secure the nullification of the decision of the Land Registration Court in LRC

embodied the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land (Parcel 1,

No. 6781, the nullification of the Decree of Registration No. 17431 and the

known as the Sta. Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman Estate),

nullification of Original Certificate of Title No. 735; (2) if they fail in their

was duly published as required by law. The records show that the hearing on

efforts to secure the desired nullifications, with Original Certificate of Title

the application was regularly held, and that the registration court had seen

No. 735 being considered valid and effective, they seek the reconveyance

to it that no land which was not included in the original survey plan and not

to them by the defendants named in their complaints, including herein

covered by the original application was made the subject of the registration

appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., of the six parcels of land that they claim;

proceedings. We have found that the decree of registration was properly

and (3) if they cannot secure a reconveyance, they seek to secure payment

issued by the Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Land

to them by the defendants named in their complaints of the actual value of

declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void, did not make any

the six parcels of land that they claim.

statement, or observation, regarding the status or situation of the remaining

lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 after

It appears to Us that the appellees are not sure of their stand, or have not
adopted a definite stand, in asserting the rights that they claim.

It is the settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him of his
land that he claims had been wrongly registered in the name of another
person must recognize the validity of the certificate of title of the latter. It is
also the rule that a reconveyance may only take place if the land that is
claimed to be wrongly registered is still registered in the name of the person

adjudicating to the appellees the six parcels of land claimed by them in

their complaints.

In the present appeal counsel for the appellees had maintained, and has
endeavored to show, that the lower court was correct in annulling Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 and in adjudicating in favor of the appellees the
ownership and possession of the six parcels of land claimed by them in their
complaints.

who procured the wrongful registration. No action for reconveyance can

take place as against a third party who had acquired title over the

But, as hereinbefore held by Us, the lower court erred in declaring Original

registered property in good faith and for value. And if no reconveyance can

Certificate of Title No. 735 void and of no effect. We have held that Original

be made, the value of the property registered may be demanded only from

Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued as a result of the registration

the person (or persons) who procured the wrongful registration in his name.

proceedings in LRC No, 7681 which was regular and that said certificate of

36

title is valid and effective. The proceedings in LRC 7681 being in rem, the
decree of registration issued pursuant to the decision rendered in said

The lower court accepted, and sustained, the assertion of the appellees that
the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration were null
and void and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void ab
initio and of no effect. The trial court even went to the extent of declaring
that some of the parcels of land claimed by the appellees in Civil Cases Nos.
3621 and 3622 (now G.R. Nos. L-26127 and L-26128 before this Court) were
not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court forthwith
declared the appellees the owners of the parcels of land claimed by them,
as described in their complaints. Strangely enough, the lower court, upon

registration case bound the lands covered by the decree and quieted title
thereto, and is conclusive upon and against all persons, including the
government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in
the application, notice or citation, or included in the general inscription "To
whom it may concern", and such decree will not be opened by reason of the
absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by
any proceedings in any court for reversing judgment or decree. Such decree
may only be reopened if any person deprived of land or of any estate or

interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud would file in the

defendants (without naming them), and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Of all the

competent court of first instance a petition for review within one year after

defendants named in the three complaints only defendant J.M. Tuason &

entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value had acquired

Co., Inc. appeared and filed its answer to the complaints. All the other

an interest on the land, and upon the expiration of said period of one year,

defendants did not appear, and so they were all declared in default. 38 It had

the decree, or the certificate of title issued pursuant to the decree, is

to happen that way because as of the time when the three complaints were

incontrovertible (See. 38, Act 496). In the case now before Us, the Decree of

filed on May 19, 1955 the ownership of Parcel 1 that was originally covered

Registration No. 17431 in LRC 7681 was entered on July 8, 1914. It is

by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had already passed to defendant J.M.

undisputed that no person had filed any petition for review of the decree of

Tuason & Co., Inc. In fact this defendant had caused Parcel 1 to be

registration in LRC 7681 within the period of one year from July 8, 1914.

subdivided and had sold the subdivision lots.

That decree of registration, and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued
pursuant thereto, therefore, had been incontrovertible since July 9, 1915.

The records show that Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was
part of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Tuason Entail) which

Moreover, innocent purchases for value had acquired interest in the lands

became involved in a litigation in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 37

During the pendency of the case the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason

39

were administered by the Bank of the Philippine Islands as the judicial

The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued on July 8, 1914 in the
names of the original an applicants for registration, namely, Mariano Tuason
y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz,
Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz and Augusta Huberto Tuason y de la
Paz. Herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not one of those who were
registered as the original owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title
No. 735. When the original complaints were filed in these three cases in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal the parties named defendants in each of the
three cases were Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason
y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la
Paz, Augusta Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, the heirs of each one of these

receiver. In the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated May 5,
1938, in Civil Case No. 24803, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as
receiver, was authorized, directed and ordered to execute, upon payment to
it of the sum of P763,925.75, a deed of transfer and assignment in favor of
the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 31997, which was originally Parcel 1 included in Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 (Exh. 13-B). On June 13, 1938 the receiver Bank of the
Philippine Islands executed the deed of transfer and assignment (Exh. 13-A).
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal was
forthwith issued in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. (Exhs. 12-b and
36). The deed of transfer and assignment was approved by the court in an

order dated June 17, 1938. This conveyance to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc.

persons with different purposes, for different lines of business and with

took place at a time when the Supreme Court had already decided the case

distinct or separate assets and interests. Besides, as has been shown, the

of Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59 Phil. 183) wherein this Court

Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. acquired the land (Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of

upheld the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and also the

Title No. 735) from the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the receiver of the

validity of the transfer certificate of title emanating therefrom. 40

properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason, in a sale that was authorized, and

subsequently approved, by the court. The Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. paid the

The circumstances attending the acquisition by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc.

of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 which was
formerly Parcel 1 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 clearly
indicate that said corporation acquired its title in a regular transaction as
purchaser in good faith and for value. On June 15, 1938 the Heirs of D.
Tuason, Inc. in turn sold the same property to J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name of the latter
(Exhs. 12-c and 37).

The lower court declared that herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was a
purchaser in bad faith. We do not find any evidence in the record that would
sustain such a finding of the lower court. One reason given by the lower
court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser in bad faith
is the fact that the incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. and the
incorporators of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. were practically the same persons
belonging to the same Tuason family. We do not see anything wrong if some
incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason Inc. are also incorporators of the J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. During these days when businesses are promoted,
operated, and managed, through corporate entities, it is not surprising to
see two or more corporations organized by the same persons or group of

sum of P763,950.80 for the property. Certainly if the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc.
had acquired the land originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
735 in a transaction that was authorized by the court, for a valuable
consideration, thereby acquiring a good title over the property as a
purchaser in good faith and for value, the title that it transferred to J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. when it sold same property to the latter was also a good
title, and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was also a purchaser in good faith and for
value even if it appears that the incorporators of the two corporations
belong to the same Tuason family. The records of these cases are bereft of
any evidence which would indicate that the sale of Parcel 1 in question by
the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was fraudulent.

Another reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. a buyer in bad faith is that when said appellant bought Parcel 1
originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 it was aware of the
fact that the appellees or their predecessors in interest were in possession
of, and were cultivating, the six parcels of land that they now claim in these
cases. The conclusion of the lower court is too strained. It should be
remembered that the registered property bought by J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
had an area of some 879 hectares. It could happen that certain relatives or

ancestors of appellees had been squatting on some portions of the land and

would annul the order of the execution issued by the Quezon City

claimed certain areas as their own, to the extent of having the areas

courts. It should be noted that the herein plaintiffs at the beginning

claimed by them declared for taxation purposes in their names. Thus the

pleaded to the Court that the area on which their respective houses

appellees presented in evidence tax declarations that appear to have taken

stand be not touched and their possession thereof be respected by

effect as of 1941. We have noted, however, that at the back of those tax

defendant J. M. & Co. In other words, each plaintiff is merely asking

declarations are written the words "This parcel is a duplicate of the land

for about 250 square meters each which represents the land on

under Tax No. 764-J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc." (Exhs. E-Alcantara, F-Alcantara,

which the house stands and their immediate yard, and not the

FF-1-Benin,

These

whole land covered by these three or 68 hectares. On the other

annotations simply reveal that when the predecessors of the appellees had

hand, the Court requires J. M. Tuason & Co. to put up a bond of

those tax declarations made to cover the lands that they claim, those lands

P2,000 in favor of each of the defendant (sic) to answer for

were already included in the tax declaration of appellant J. M. Tuason & Co.,

whatever damages he may suffer by reason of the continuance

Inc. Appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had been exercising, and asserting, its

during

proprietary rights over the lands in question after it bought the same from

of.

GG-Benin,

HH-Benin,

the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc.

42

BBB-Pili,

and

BBB-1-Pili).

41

the

action

of

the

acts

complained

43

This is borne by the statement in the order,

dated September 26, 1955, issued by Judge Juan P. Enriquez who at the
time was presiding the branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal where
these three were pending, as follows:

Besides, the possession by the appellees, either by themselves or through

their predecessors in interest, if there was such possession at all, would be
unavailing against title holder of a Torrens certificate of title covering the
parcels Of lands now in question. From July 8, 1914 when Certificate of Title

3. It having been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co. had title covering

No. 735 was issued, no possession by any person of any portion of the lands

the land in question which they are subdividing into small lots for

covered by said original certificate of title, or covered by a subsequent

sale and in view of the observation under paragraph 2 hereof the

transfer certificate of title derived from said original certificate of title, could

Court finds that there is no justifiable reason to maintain the writ of

defeat the title of the registered owner of the lands covered by the

preliminary injunction that has been issued. This is particularly true

certificate of title. In this connection, let it be noted that appellant J. M.

in Civil Case No. 2622, defendants having secured a final judgment

Tuason & Co., Inc. became the registered owner of Parcel 1, which was

against plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara for ejectment

originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, only on June 15,

before the Municipal court of Quezon City; and such injunction

1938, or almost 24 years after Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was

court ordered appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and all those claiming under

issued.

said appellant, to vacate and restore to the appellees the possession of the
parcels of lands that are claimed by them in the present cases. The

It can well be said that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had relied on the title of the
Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. when it bought the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No.34853, and the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. likewise had
relied on the title of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Mariano Severo Tuason y de la
Paz, et al.) when it bought the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 31997 from the judicial receiver, duly authorized and approved by the
court. We, therefore, can not agree with the lower court when it declared
appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser on bad faith.

The evidence shows that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted
the land originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, including
the six parcels claimed by appellees into a subdivision, and numerous
persons and entities had purchased the subdivision lots, and the purchasers

possessors of the lots comprised within the six parcels of land in question,
and who hold certificates of title covering the lots that they bought, are not
parties in the present cases, and yet the decision of the lower court would
annul their titles and compel them to give up the possession of their
properties. To give effect to the decision of the lower court is to deprive
persons of their property without due process of law.

44

The decision of the

lower court would set at naught the settled doctrine that the holder of a
certificate of title who acquired the property covered by the title in good
faith and for value can rest assured that his title is perfect and
incontrovertible. 45

In view of the foregoing discussions, it is obvious that the action of the

appellees in the three cases now before this Court must fail..

in turn were issued transfer certificates of title covering the lots that they
bought, based on the transfer certificate of title in the name of J. M Tuason

It has been shown that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had acquired a

& Co., Inc. The buyers of the lots relied upon the certificate of title in the

valid title over the land which includes the six parcels that are claimed by

name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and because they paid for the lots they

the appellees. The fact, that the predecessors in interest of the appellees

certainly are purchasers in good faith and for value. The purchasers of these

or any person, for that matter had not filed a petition for the review of

lots have built thereon residential houses, office buildings, shops, hospital,

the decree of registration in LRC No. 7681 within a period of one year from

even churches. But the lower court, disregarding these circumstances,

July 8, 1914 when the decree of registration was issued, is a circumstance

declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that emanated, or that

that had forever foreclosed any proceeding for the review of said decree. As

were derived, from Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This is a grave error

We

committed by the lower court. And the error is compounded when the lower

incontrovertible. An action, similar to one brought by the appellees in each

have

adverted

to,

that

decree

of

registration

had

become

of the present cases, which attack collaterally the said decree of registration
cannot be entertained.

46

form parts of the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees. 47

Neither may the action of the appellees for

reconveyance of the lands in question be entertained because such action

had already prescribed, barred by laches, considering that Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 had been issued way back in 1914 and the
complaint in the present cases were filed only on May 19, 1955, or after a
lapse of some 41 years. Moreover, as of the time when these complaints
were filed the six parcels of land claimed by the appellees are no longer
covered by the certificate of title in the names of the persons who procured
the original registration of those lands. The title to Parcel 1, which includes
the six parcels of land claimed by the appellees, had passed to the hands
parties who were innocent purchase for value. This Parcel 1 which was one
of the two parcels originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735,
was subsequently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997. As has

Neither may the appellees have a cause of Action for damages against
appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., considering that said appellant is not one
of the original registered owners that procured the registration of the land.
There is no evidence that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had anything to do with
the registration proceedings which brought about the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 even supposing that the registration was
procured fraudulently.

4. Numerous cases have been decided by this Court, dealing on questions

regarding the validity and ineffectiveness of Original Certificate of Title No.
735. The rulings of this Court in those cases are necessarily relevant to, and
of decisive bearing in, the resolution of the issues involved in the three
cases now at bar.

been shown, this Parcel 1 was part of the properties of the Mayorasgo
Tuason and it was conveyed by order of the court in Civil Case No. 24803 of

(a) We have earlier cited the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs.

the Court of First Instance of Manila to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc., and the

Acua (59 Phil., 183), where the jurisdiction of the Court of Land

latter in turn conveyed the same to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Transfer

Registration that issued the decree which was the basis of Original

Certificate of Title No. 34853 in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. was

Certificate of Title No. 735 was questioned, and this Court upheld the

cancelled and transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name

jurisdiction of the registration court and categorically pronounced the

of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. It has also been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735.

had converted Parcel 1 to a subdivision. Numerous persons and entities

bought those subdivision lots, and to those buyers were issued transfer
certificates of title covering the lots that they acquired. It is very clear,
therefore, that an action for reconveyance cannot prosper against appellant
J. M. Tuason & Co., much less against the registered owners of the lots that

(b) There is the case of Jose Alcantara, et al., versus Mariano Tuason y de la
Paz, et al. (G.R. No. L-4998, Mar. 13, 1953, 92 Phil. 796), where this Court
declared that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is incontrovertible and is
conclusive against all persons claiming, either by themselves or by their

predecessors in interest, rights over the lands covered by said certificate of

defendants had obtained Original Certificate of Title No. 735 over a parcel of

title.

land which included the lands possessed by them (plaintiffs) and which they
and their ancestors had been enjoying as owners, for more than thirty years

We find that the Alcantara case is intimately related to the three cases at
bar, and the rulings of this Court in that former case are of decisive
application to these three cases.

On August 29, 1950 a complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Quezon City Branch) by Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, Pascual Pili,
Alejandro de Dios, Tomas Bagagonio, Quintina Sandoval, and Tomasa Lazaro
against Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. This case was docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-156. It will be noted that three of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156,
namely, Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili, are among the original
plaintiffs in the three cases now before this Court; Elias Benin, in Civil Case
No. 3621; Jose Alcantara, in Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, in Civil
Case No. 3623. Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in
that Civil Case No. Q-156 claimed that they were the lawful owners of six (of
the ten) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of their complaint Jose
Alcantara claiming two parcels, Elias Benin claiming three parcels, and
Pascual Pili claiming one parcel. Substantially, it is alleged in the complaint
48

that each plaintiff, by himself and by his predecessors in interest, as

lawful owner, had been in the actual, open and continuous possession of his
own respective parcel, or parcels, of land from time immemorial until
January 1950 when the defendants by force and by the use of armed men
started to convert their lands into a subdivision; that on July 8, 1914 the

before the issuance of the title; that the silence and inaction of the
defendants since the date of their original certificate of title showed that
said certificate of title did not express the status of the their claim to the
said parcels, that plaintiffs were not given formal notice by the defendants
of the registration of the lands, such that defendants' certificate of title No.
735 was not in accordance with law, and that defendants did not have
proper title for registration to the parcels of land owned by the plaintiffs, as
described in the complaint; and that because the certificate of title issued
by the register of deeds was still in the names of the defendants, successors
in interest of the Tuasons y de la Paz, and has not passed to innocent
parties for valuable consideration, the conveyance of the same to the
plaintiffs was in order. The plaintiffs prayed that therein defendants be
ordered to execute deeds of conveyance of the parcels of land described in
their complaint in favor of the plaintiffs, that the defendants' certificate of
title be cancelled and the corresponding certificate be ordered issued in the
names of the plaintiffs. We quote from the decision:

The material allegations of the complaint are: that plaintiffs are

owners of the parcels of land set forth in their complaint, which
parcels are situated along Bonifacio street, barrio of San Jose,
Quezon City, and that they have been in actual, open, and
continuous possession and enjoyment thereof without molestation
from defendants from time immemorial to the present; that on July

8, 1914, defendants obtained a certificate of title (No. 735) over a

appeal.

parcel of land, which included the lands by plaintiffs, and which they
and their ancestors had been enjoying as owners more than 30
years before the issuance of said title; that on June 23, 1950,
defendants caused the removal of two houses of plaintiffs on the
land; and that defendants did not file any action against plaintiffs
before the inclusion of the lands in their title, in violation of the "due
process of law" clause of the Constitution. There are other
allegations which really are arguments of legal discussion, thus: that
defendants could not acquire title by the registration proceedings
against the lawful holder, especially without formal notice, because
registration is to confirm title, not to acquire it; that the silence of
the defendants since the issuance of their title shows that this does
not express the lawful status of their claim, etc. The defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it states no of
action and that, if it does, the same is barred by the statute of
limitations. The court sustained this motion on the second ground.
Subsequently, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the same
substantial allegations, but with new ones, i.e., that it was in
January, 1950, that they learned that their lands were included in
the registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of
defendants' title; that defendants never claimed ownership to the
lands, but directly or indirectly allowed plaintiffs to continue
exercising their rights of ownership over the same. This amended
complaint

was

denied

admission,

and

the

motion

for

the

reconsideration of the order of dismiss was also denied. Hence the

In affirming the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint, this Court
held:

Without considering whether the trial court's refusal to admit the amended
complaint is erroneous or not we are constrained to hold that the dismissal
of the action, even with the amended complaint is a basis thereof, is
correct. From the allegations of both the original and amended complaints,
it appears that the defendants are holders of a certificate of title issued on
July 8, 1914 as a consequence of registration proceedings. There is no
allegation in both original and amended complaints that the plaintiffs were
not notified, or were not aware, of the registration proceedings. It is
presumed, therefore, that as occupants proper notices thereof were served
on them and that they were aware of said proceedings. If this is so, then the
plaintiffs, who were, or whose predecessors in interest were, on the land
during the registration proceedings, were bound by said proceedings. The
latter are in rem and bind the whole world, whether served with notice
personally or not. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil., 49). And the decree of
registration, in pursuance of which defendants' title was issued, binds the
land and quiets title thereto, and is conclusive against the plaintiffs.
(Section 38, Land Registration Act). The supposed right of plaintiffs by
reason of their alleged continued possession for thirty years was, therefore,
destroyed fully and completely by the registration proceedings, and their
supposed ignorance of the inclusion of the lands can not exclude them from
the effects of the registration proceedings, and the supposed conduct of

defendants in allowing plaintiffs to continue on the land after registration

But Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara, and Pascual Pili again came to court to claim

can not serve as basis of any title or right thereto, because acts of a

ownership over portions of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title

possessory character by tolerance of an owner does not constitute

No. 735. On May 19, 1955 Elias Benin, joined by his brother Victor Benin and

possession (Article 1942, Spanish Civil Code), and because no title to

his sister Marta Benin, filed Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara joined by his

registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be

brother Juan Alcantara, filed Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, joined by

acquired

his sister Luisa Pili, filed Civil Case No. 3623. These are the three cases

by

prescription

or

adverse

possession

(Section

46,

Land

Registration Act).

which originated in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch)
which are now before this Court on appeal.

Thus, in the Alcantara case, as in the Bank of the Philippine Island vs. Acua
case, supra, this Court upheld the validity of the registration proceedings

In the earlier part of this decision, We have pointed out that the complaints

which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This

in these three cases had been amended so as to include as parties plaintiffs

Court declared that "the decree of registration, in pursuance of which

all the heirs of the persons who were alleged to be the owners of the parcels

defendants' title was issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto and is

of land claimed by the plaintiffs in each case. Thus, the complaint in Civil

conclusive against the plaintiffs." In other words, in virtue of that decision,

Case No. 3621 was amended to include all the heirs of Sixto Benin, the

the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, among them Jose Alcantara, Elias

alleged owner of the three parcels of land described in the complaint and

Benin and Pascual Pili, and their successors-in-interest, could no longer

the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case. The

question the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, nor claim any

complaint in Civil Case No. 3622 was amended to include all the heirs of

right of ownership over any portion of the land that is covered by said

Bonoso Alcantara, the alleged owner of the two parcels of land described in

certificate of title.

the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in
the case. The complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 was amended to include all
the heirs of Candido Pili, the alleged owner of the one parcel of land
described in the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all
the plaintiffs in the case.

In those three cases, in the court below, herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. (defendant therein) filed a motion to dismiss upon the principal ground

"that the cause of action (assuming there is one) is barred by prior

In order that the rule of res judicata may apply, the following requisites

judgment, or by the statute of limitation". In its motion to dismiss J.M.

must be present: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have

Tuason & Co., Inc. contended that the decision of the Supreme Court in the

been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of

Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos.

the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be,

3621, 3622 and 3623 of the Court of the First Instance of Rizal. The lower

between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject-

court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. In its answer to the complaint

matter, and of cause of action (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281-283).

in each of these three cases, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. set up as affirmative
defenses the very grounds of its motion to dismiss. After the plaintiffs had
closed their direct evidence, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed another motion to
dismiss upon the ground that the action was barred by the statute of
limitations and by a prior judgment, and that the plaintiffs had not
presented evidence to prove their claim of ownership. This second motion
to dismiss was also denied by the lower court. 49

We find that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998) is a final
judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and over the parties. The only requisite for res
judicata which we have to determine is whether between Civil Case Q-156
(G.R. No. 4998), on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 8621, 3622 and 3623
(G.R. Nos. L-26127, 26128 and 26129), on the other, there is identity of
parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.

In its decision, which is now on appeal before this Court, the lower court
held that the decision in the Alcantara case was not a bar to the action in
these three cases, ruling that there is no identity, of the parties, of the
subject matter, and of the cause of action, between Civil Case No. Q-156, on
the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other.

It is now contended by appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in the present
appeal, that "the trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the
ground of res judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said
ground." 50

Does the judgment in the aforementioned Alcantara case operate as a bar

to the action of the appellees in the three cases at bar?

In our examination of the records and the evidence, We find that there is
identity of subject matter. In the lower court's pretrial order dated
December 18, 1957, which was based on the agreement of the parties, it is
stated

That the parcels of land in litigation in Case No. Q-156 are

substantially identical to the same parcels of land litigated
in

them

3623.

51

cases

Nos.

3621,

8622

and

We also find that there is identity of cause of action. It is apparent, upon

reading the original complaint (Exhibit 1) in Civil Case Q-156 and the

decision in the Alcantara case (G.R. No. L-4998), that the cause of action in

J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc., while in Civil Cases Nos.

Civil Case Q-156 was based on the alleged fact that the defendants had

3621, 3622 and 3623 the defendants were Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta,

dispossessed and deprived the plaintiff therein of the parcels of land

Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, Augusta Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la

described in the complaint, which were claimed by the plaintiffs as their

Paz (the persons appearing as registered owners in Original Certificate of

own and of which they had been in actual, open and continuous possession

Title No. 735), their heirs, and J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. We find that the

from time immemorial, and that said lands were wrongly included in

natural persons surnamed Tuason, and the heirs, refer to the persons who

Certificate of Title No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In the three

belong to the Tuason family that secured the registration of Parcel 1 in

cases at bar, plaintiffs (now appellees) also complain of having been

Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The defendant Gregorio Araneta Inc. in

dispossessed and deprived by the defendants of the parcels of land of which

Civil Case No. Q-156 is the administrator of the Tuason properties. So, the

they were absolute owners and possessors, by themselves and through

parties defendants in all these cases are practically the same. We find,

their predecessors in interest, since time immemorial and that their said

however, that in Civil Case No. Q-156 as well as in Civil Cases Nos. 3621,

lands wrongly included in Parcel 1 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that

3622 and 3623, it was the defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. that actually

was obtained by the defendants. In Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand,

controverted the claims of the plaintiffs.

and in the three cases now at bar, on the other, the plaintiffs therein seek
the

nullification

of

Original

Certificate

of

Title

No.

735,

and

reconveyance to them of the parcels of land that they claim as theirs.

the
52

It

appears clear to Us that in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in the three cases at
bar, the object or purpose of the plaintiffs is to recover the ownership and
possession of the same parcels of land.

After a careful study, We are of the considered view that the judgment in
the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of
Elias Benin in Civil Case No. 3621 (G.R. No. 26127), of plaintiff Jose
Alcantara in Civil Case No. 3622 (G.R. No. 26128), and of plaintiff Pascual Pili
in Civil Case No. 3623 (G. R. No. 26129) under the doctrine of res
adjudicata. We are likewise of the considered view that the decision in the

As far as the parties are concerned, We find that there is no exact identity of

Alcantara case would serve to rule out the action of the other plaintiffs in

parties between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos.

Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 under the doctrine of stare decisis.

3621, 3622 and 3623, on the other. It appears that of the plaintiffs in Civil
Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 only Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara and
Pascual Pili were plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156. In Civil Case No. Q-156,
the defendants were Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason,

In Civil Case No. 3621 the original plaintiffs were Victor Benin, Marta Benin,
and Elias Benin--two brothers and a sister. In the amended complaint it was
alleged that these three original plaintiffs had another brother, and another

sister, namely Esteban Benin and Felipa Benin. But because all the five

It being Our finding that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-

Benin brothers and sisters died, they were all substituted by their heirs,

4998-the Alcantara case) is a final judgment on the merits that was

such that as of the time when Civil Case No. 3621 was decided the plaintiffs

rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over

were: (1) the heirs of Victor Benin; (2) the heirs of Marta Benin; (3) the heirs

the parties, and that there is identity of subject matter and cause of action

of Elias Benin; (4) the heirs of Esteban Benin, and (5) the heirs of Felipa

between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621,

Benin.

3622, and 3623, on the other; and it appearing that Elias Benin is a partyplaintiff both in Civil Case Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3621; that Jose

In Civil Case No. 3622 the original plaintiffs were Juan Alcantara and Jose
Alcantara. Juan Alcantara died, and he was substituted by his heirs, such
that as of the time Civil Case No. 3622 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1)
the heirs of Juan Alcantara, and (2) Jose A. Alcantara.

In Civil Case No. 3623 the original plaintiffs were Pascual Pili and Luisa Pili.
In the amended complaint, it was alleged that Luisa Pili and Pascual Pili had
two brothers who were already dead, namely, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili, so
they were substituted by their heirs. Luisa Pili died, and she was substituted
by her heirs, such that as of the time Civil Case No. 3623 was decided, the
plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Diego Pili; (2) the heirs of Manuel Pili; (3) the
heirs of Luisa Pili, and (4) Pascual Pili.

It would thus appear that of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 Elias Benin
is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3622 Jose E. Alcantara, who is still living, is the only one who
was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623
Pascual Pili, who is still living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil
Case No. Q-156.

Alcantara is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and Civil Case No.
3622; that Pascual Pili is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and
Civil Case No. 3623; and that the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in
Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are practically the same persons
and/or entities, We hold that the doctrine of bar by a previous judgment or
res adjudicata squarely applies to Elias Benin, or to his heirs and successors
in interest in Civil Case No. 3621; to Jose Alcantara and his heirs or
successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3622; and to Pascual Pili and his
heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3623. 53

We now consider the case of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621,
3622 and 3623.

It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of
ownership of the three parcels of land described in the complaint on their
being heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil
Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two
parcels of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and
successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case

No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of

It is Our view, therefore, that the decision of this Court, in G.R. No. L-4998,

land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in

which affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the

interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931.

complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili (along with four
other plaintiffs) in Civil Case No. Q-156 should apply not only against the

When Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, alleged in their complaint
in Civil Case No. Q-156 (which was filed in 1950) that they were the owners
of the parcels of land specified in their complaint, having inherited the same
from their ancestors and had been in possession of the same from time
immemorial, each was claiming a right as an heir of Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto
Benin, and Candido Pili, respectively. Similarly, in Civil Cases Nos. 3621,
3622 and 3623, the source of the rights claimed by the plaintiffs Jose
Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili and all the other plaintiffs were their
respective ancestor, or predecessor in interest, namely Bonoso Alcantara,
Sixto Benin and Candido Pili, as the case may be.

Inasmuch as Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and
Candido Pili died in 1931, it is obvious that during all the time when the
registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681 were taking place before the Court
of Land Registration, which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 on July 8, 1914, Sixto Benin, Bonoso Alcantara and Candido
Pili were living. The records show that no one of these three persons, or
their representative, had filed any opposition to the application for
registration in said LRC 7681, nor did any one of them, or their
representative, file any petition for review of the decree of registration No.
17431 that was issued in said LRC No. 7681.

heirs, of Elias Benin, against Jose Alcantara, and against Pascual Pili, as
plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, respectively, but also
against all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We find that the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3621 do not claim a right which is different from that claimed
by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156. Likewise, the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 3622 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Jose Alcantara
in Civil Case No Q-156. And, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 do not
claim a right different from that claimed by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q156. They all claim the same right, based on the alleged ownership of their
respective common predecessor in interest in Civil Case No. 3621 the
common predecessor in interest being Sixto Benin; in Civil Case No. 3622
the common predecessor in interest being Bonoso Alcantara; and in Civil
Case No. 3623 the common predecessor in interest being Candido Pili. In
Civil Case No. Q-156 Elias Benin based his claim of ownership upon the
ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Sixto
Benin; Jose Alcantara, upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who
necessarily must be Bonoso Alcantara; and Pascual Pili, upon the ownership
of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Candido Pili. It
follows, therefore, that the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-4998 (Civil
Case No. Q-156), which held untenable the cause of action of the
successors in interest, of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido
Pili, to recover the ownership and possession of any land covered by

Original Certificate of Title No. 735, would also foreclose a similar cause of

And so, even if there are plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases who

action of all other persons who claim to be successors in interest of Sixto

are not privies to plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili in

Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili over any land covered by

Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998 the Alcantara case) and were not

said certificate of title. As We have adverted to, Sixto Benin died in 1936,

parties in that case, still the ruling of this Court in that former case, to the

Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido Pili died in 1931. These three

effect that therein plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest were bound by

predecessors in interest of the appellees died long after the issuance of

the proceedings in the registration court which culminated in the issuance

Original Certificate of Title No. 735, which took place on July 8, 1914.

of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, holds and applies to those plaintiffs in
these three cases, because the claim of ownership of these plaintiffs is
based on the same predecessors in interest of plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias
Benin and Pascual Pili in said Civil Case No. Q-156.

54

It may well be said

that the interests of the appellees in G.R. No. L-26127 (Civil Case No. 3621)
who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin were
represented by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the
appellees in G.R. No. 26128 (Civil Case No. 3622) who claim rights as heirs
or successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara were represented by Jose
Alcantara in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R.
No. 26129 (Civil Case No. 3623) who claim rights as heirs or successors in
interest of Candido Pili were represented by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q156 (G.R. No. L-4998).

(c) In the case of Albina Santiago, et al. vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (G.R. No.
L-14223, November 23, 1960)

, where Original Certificate of Title No. 735,

55

was also in question, this Court ruled on issues akin to the issues involved in
the three cases now at bar. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-2918, against J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc. alleging, substantially, that

their ancestor, Inocencio Santiago, was the owner of a parcel of land,

done through fraud because they, nor their predecessors, were not actually

evidenced by a document (attached to their complaint as Annex A) issued

notified of the registration proceedings. As ground for cancellation of the

by the Spanish government on May 12, 1848

; that Inocencio Santiago had

certificate of title of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Albina Santiago and her co-

since then been in possession of the aforesaid land as owner, publicly,

plaintiffs further alleged that the technical description in Original Certificate

continuously and adversely until his death, when his two children, Isaias and

of Title No. 735 had been falsified to include areas never brought within the

Albina, succeeded and continued to own and possess said land pro indiviso

jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court, since they were areas not

in the same character as that of their predecessor that upon the death of

included in the application and publication in the registration proceedings;

Isaias Santiago his one-half share of the land was inherited by his eleven

that long before the predecessors of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. applied for, and

children who, together with their aunt Albina, continued to own and possess

secured, registration of the land which included their parcel of land they had

the land in the same character as that of their predecessors; that Albina and

already acquired ownership thereof not only by the document, Annex A of

her co-plaintiffs came to know that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had previously

their complaint, but also by acquisitive prescription. Albina Santiago and her

filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City Civil Case No. Q-27 for

co-plaintiffs prayed, that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. be ordered to desist from

"quieting of title and recovery of possession" against five of the children of

enforcing Civil Case No. Q-27 against them; that a resurvey be ordered to

Isaias Santiago involving the parcel of land of which they were co-owners;

determine whether or not Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679)

that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had claimed that parcel to be part of the land

included the land described in their complaint; that a reconveyance to them

covered by its Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119; that the judgment in

be ordered of whatever portion of the land claimed by them may be found

Civil. Case No. Q-27, in which they (Albina Santiago, et al.) were never

included in transfer Certificate of Title No. 119; that Transfer Certificate of

impleaded

Title No. 119 and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 be ordered cancelled

final

as

parties,

had

56

already

become

; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had executed the judgment against

and substituted with a new certificate of title embracing only those lands

them, excluding and rusting them from the enjoyment and possession of

included in the application, publication and/or decree in LRC No. 7681 of the

the land. Albina and her co-plaintiffs also alleged that Transfer Certificate of

Court of Land Registration.

57

Title No. 119 (37679) of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., as well as Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 from which the former was derived, did not
include the parcel claimed by them; that even granting that Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 119 included the parcel claimed by them the
inclusion of that parcel in the certificate of title of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was

Upon motion of defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City dismissed the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., upon the
grounds that there was no cause of action, that the case was barred by a
prior judgment in Civil Case No. Q-27 which was affirmed by the Supreme

Court in G.R. No. L-5079, and that the action of the plaintiffs, if they had

But granting that the plaintiffs-appellants herein are not

any, had prescribed.

privies of the defendants Santiago in the former litigation

over

This Court affirmed the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint of
Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs.

58

Regarding the contention of Albina

Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that the judgment in the previous case (Civil
Case No. Q-27, affirmed in G.R. No. L-5079) would not operate as res
judicata against them because they were not parties in that suit, and that
they did not derive their title from the defendants in the previous suit, this
Court held:

this

same

property

(S.C.G.R.

No.

L-5079), still the pronouncement of this Court, made in the

former case, to the effect that the Spanish document
(Annex A) issued in favor of Ynocencio Santiago (ancestor of
appellants herein) was neither a titulo de informacion
posesoria nor a title by composicion con el estado, and,
therefore, vested no ownership over the land therein
described in favor of Ynocencio Santiago, holds and applies

We agree with appellants that the decision in the preceding suit to

quiet title, prosecuted by the appellee Tuason & Co. against other
heirs of Ynocencio Santiago (99 Phil., 615; 50 Off. Gaz. 11, 5727),
can not constitute res judicata against these appellants who were
not parties to that suit and do not derive their title from the
defendants in the previous litigation (Rule 39, sec. 44 (b). There is
authority for the proposition that a judgment may be made binding
in a subsequent litigation upon one who, although not a formal
party to a previous suit, has actually conducted or controlled the
action or defense therein (65 ALR 1134), or who was adequately
represented in such previous litigation; but no clear proof of the
existence of such exceptional circumstance is before us in the

to herein appellants, since the quality or the legal effect of

the document does not depend upon the person who invoke
it.

If the late Ynocencio Santiago did not become the owner of

the disputed property by virtue of the document Annex A,
then appellants herein, as heirs of Ynocencio have not
acquired such ownership either. It follows that the first and
second causes of action of their complaint, predicated as
they are on the assumption that such ownership and its
consequential

rights

resulted

from

Annex

A,

must

necessarily fail. Not being owners, they can complain of no

invasion of dominical rights.

present case. On the other hand, the rule is that co-owners are not
privies inter se in relation to the property owned in common.

It will thus be noted that in the aforementioned decision in the Santiago

case, even if Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs were not considered

xxx xxx xxx

privies to the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-27, and even if they were not

covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. These appellees, therefore,

parties in that previous case, this Court nevertheless applied to them the

have not succeeded to any right that can derrogate the validity and

judgment (G. R. No. L-5079) in that previous case where it was pronounced

conclusiveness of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and of the certificates

that the document, Annex A of the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., was

of title that are derived from said original certificate of title.

neither a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title by composision con el

estado, and it did not establish the right of ownership of their predecessor in
interest, Inocencio Santiago, Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs had based
their claim of ownership on that document (Annex A).

59

This Court held in

that previous case that the document was unavailing against Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 119 of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and against Original
Certificate of Title No. 735.

And so, following the logic of this Court in its decision in the Santiago case,
in the three cases at bar We hold that even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3621, except the heirs of Elias Benin, are not privies to Elias Benin and were
not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3622, except Jose Alcantara, are not privies to Jose Alcantara and were not
parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; and even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3623, except Pascual Pili, are not privies to Pascual Pili and were not parties
in Civil Case No. Q156, still the pronouncement of this Court in the judgment
in that previous case (G.R. No. L-4998), to the effect that the plaintiffs in
that case and their predecessors in interest were bound by the registration
proceedings which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title
No. 735, holds and applies to all the plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three
cases. In that judgment this Court ruled out, or did not sustain, the rights
claimed by the predecessors in interest of herein appellees over the land

Coming back to the Santiago case, as regards the contention of Albina

Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that the registration proceedings which
resulted in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were irregular
and fraudulent, this Court held:

(T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not personally notified
of the registration proceedings that resulted in a decree of
registration of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not
constitute in itself a case of fraud that would invalidate the decree.
The registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate as
against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive
adjudication of the ownership of the lands registered, not only
against those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also
against parties who were summoned by publication but did not
appear. The registration by the appellee's predecessors-in-interest
freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever character that
existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of
title, except those noted in the certificate and legal encumbrances
saved by law (Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases
cited therein). In addition, there being no allegation that the
registered owners procured the non-appearance of appellants at the

registration proceedings, and very much more than one year having

In view of the findings, and the rulings, that We have hereinbefore made, it

elapsed from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914,

follows that, as contended by the appellant, the lower court also erred when

neither revocation of such decree nor a decree of reconveyance are

it declared the appellees the owners of the lands claimed by them and in

obtainable any more.

awarding damages to them, in these three cases. 61

Regarding the claim of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that they had

We consider it unnecessary to rule on the counterclaim of appellant J.M.

acquired title by prescription over the parcel of land claimed by them, this

Tuason & Co., Inc., for damages and attorneys fees against the appellees

Court held:

considering, as the records show, that the appellees are persons who are
not in a position to pay damages in any form.

It follows also that the allegation of prescriptive title in favor of

plaintiffs does not suffice to establish a cause of action. If such
prescription was completed before the registration of the land in
favor of the Tuasons, the resulting prescriptive title was cut off and

63

62

We believe that the

appellees had filed their complaints in the honest, but mistaken, belief that
they have a good cause of action against the appellant corporation and not
because they meant to embarrass or humiliate the persons who are
identified or connected with the appellant.

extinguished by the decree of registration. If, on the contrary, the

prescription was either begun or completed after the decree of

WHEREFORE, the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal

registration, it conferred no title because, by express provision of

(Quezon City Branch) in Civil Cages Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, appealed

law, prescription cannot operate against the registered owner (Act

from, is reversed and set aside. The bond filed by appellant in the three

496, section 46).

cases in the court below for the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction is
ordered cancelled. No pronouncement as to costs.

Thus, in this Santiago case, as in the Alcantara case, this Court declared
conclusive and indefeasible Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which was
issued as a result of the registration proceedings in L.R.C. No. 7681 of the
Court of Land Registration. There are many other cases where this Court has
made a similar pronouncement regarding Original Certificate of Title No.
735. 60

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Respondent further claimed that he and his predecessors-in-interest have

been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, and public possession of
the lot in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. 3

Together with his application for registration, respondent submitted the

G.R. No. 169397

following documents:

March 13, 2007

1. Blueprint copy of the Conversion and Subdivision Plan Swo-13-

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

000465 of Lot 535 as surveyed for Magdaleno Sarmiento, et al; 4

vs.
RESTITUTO SARMIENTO, represented by his attorney-in-fact,

2. Photocopy of Geodetic Engineers Certificate;5

MAGDALENO SARMIENTO, Respondent.

3. Technical Description of Lot 535-D;6
DECISION
4. Owners Copy of Tax Declaration No. EL-009-01681 in the name of
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Restituto

Sarmiento

(respondent)

Restituto A. Sarmiento;7
through

his

brother-attorney-in-fact

Magdaleno Sarmiento (Magdaleno) filed on November 29, 2000 with the

5. Photocopy of the Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated July 16, 1988; 8

and

Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Taguig, Metro Manila an application for

registration1 of a parcel of land, delineated as Lot 535-D under Approved

6. Special Power of Attorney executed by Restituto Sarmiento

Survey Plan Swo-13-000465 with a total land area of 2,664 square meters

appointing Magdaleno Sarmiento as his attorney-in-fact.9

and located at Barangay Wawa, Taguig, Metro Manila (the lot).

On January 17, 2001, the Solicitor General, through the Prosecutor of Taguig
Respondent claimed to have acquired the lot through donation under a

who was deputized to assist in the case, filed, as counsel for the Republic of

Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob2 dated July 16, 1988 executed by his father,

the Philippines (petitioner), an Opposition 10 to respondents application for

Placido Sarmiento (Placido), which lot formed part of Lot 535 that was

registration. Contending that (1) neither the applicant nor his predecessors-

allegedly inherited by Placido from Florentina Sarmiento (Florentina).

in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession

and occupation of the lot since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto, as required

was not in a position to verify whether the lot was already covered by a land

under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act), as

patent or a previously approved isolated survey.17

amended by Presidential Decree (P.D) No. 1073; 11 (2) respondents

muniments of title and/or tax declarations and tax payment receipts do not
appear to be genuine and do not anyway constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of his bona fide acquisition of the lot in the concept of an
owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (3) the claim of ownership in fee
simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by

Respondents formal offer of evidence18 did not merit comment/opposition

from petitioner which in fact waived the presentation of evidence for the
government.19

By Decision20 of May 27, 2002, the MeTC granted respondents application

for registration. Thus it disposed:

respondent as he failed to file an appropriate application for registration

within six months from February 16, 1976, as required under P.D. No. 892; 12

WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the allegations in the

and (4) the lot is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the

application to have been sufficiently established by the applicants

Philippines, hence, not subject to private appropriation.

evidence, this Court hereby confirms the title of applicant Restituto

Sarmiento, Filipino citizen, of legal age, married to Betty Sarmiento and a

At the initial hearing of the application on April 4, 2001, respondent offered

and marked in evidence documents proving compliance with jurisdictional
requirements, following which the MeTC issued an order of general default
against the whole world, except against the government.

Magdaleno14

and

adjoining

lot

owner

Rodolfo

Sta.

Ana, 15

the

Assistant Regional Director for Legal Services and Public Affairs, filed its
Report

Taguig Cadastral Mapping under Conversion and Subdivision Plan Swo-13000465 situated at Barangay Wawa, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila,

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through the

16

subject parcel of agricultural land known as Lot 535-D, MCadm-590-D,

13

After the conclusion of the testimonies of respondents brother-attorney-infact

resident of No. 11, Guerrero Street, Wawa, Taguig, Metro Manila over the

dated April 16, 2001 reiterating respondents claims as set forth in

consisting of Two Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Four (2,664) square meters
and hereby order the registration thereof in his name.

After the finality of this Decision and upon payment of the corresponding
taxes due on the said lot, let an order for the issuance of decree of
registration be issued.

his application for registration.

SO ORDERED.21
The Land Registration Authority, through the Director of the Department of
Registration, also filed a report with the MeTC with the information that it

In granting respondents application, the MeTC found that respondent and

land is about two (2) kilometers away from the Laguna Lake but it gets

his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lot in the

flooded for about two (2) months during the rainy season and sometimes up

concept of an owner for more than 30 years, viz:

to three (3) months if the town proper (poblacion) of Taguig is itself

underwater. (TSN, June 6, 2001). x x x

The subject lot was a portion of the parcel of land previously declared for
taxation purposes in the name of its original owner Florentina Sarmiento

Applicant Restituto Sarmiento and his predecessors-in-interest had been in

under Tax Declaration (T.D.) No. 4995 (Exhibit "N"). Upon the death of

possession of the subject parcel of land continuously, uninterruptedly,

Florentina Sarmiento, a portion of said land was inherited by Placido

openly, publicly, adversely and in the concept of owners for more than thirty

Sarmiento, the father of the herein applicant Restituto Sarmiento, while the

(30) years now. x x x22

other portion went to Placidos [s]ister Teodora Sarmiento. On July 16, 1988,
Placido Sarmiento transferred the portion of the parcel of land inherited by
him from Florentina Sarmiento to his children, namely: herein applicant
Restituto Sarmiento, Magdaleno Sarmiento and Conigunda Sarmiento by
virtue of a deed denominated as "Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob" (Exhibits "O"

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, faulting the MeTC for granting
the application despite respondents failure to comply with the mandatory
requirement of submitting the original tracing cloth plan in evidence. 23
Petitioner advanced that according to the survey of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA), the lot is located below the reglementary

and "O-5"). (TSN, June 16, 2001).

lake elevation of 12.50 meters, hence, a part of the Laguna Lake bed which
On April 24 and June 25, 1998, Magdaleno Sarmiento, among others, caused

is incapable of private appropriation.24

the survey of the entire area of the parcel of land x x x According to the said
plan, the said survey is inside alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27B, L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry

By Decision25 of May 20, 2005, the appellate court held that as the lot was
sufficiently identified by the blue print copy of the plan and the technical
description, the presentation of the original tracing cloth ceased to become

(Exhibit "K-2", supra).

indispensable for the grant of the application.26

The said property was being planted to rice, watermelons, and other
vegetables

by

Florentina

Sarmiento

and

her

successors-in-interest

themselves and by their hired helpers for about fifty years (50) years
already. It is not tenanted and there are no other persons having a claim
over the said property since the Japanese occupation. The said parcel of

The appellate court further held that petitioners claim that the lot forms
part of the Laguna Lake bed cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,
and even assuming that it was properly raised, the purported ground survey

of the LLDA had no probative value since it was not a certified original

confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title

copy.27

thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

The appellate court thus affirmed the decision of the MeTC. Petitioners

xxxx

motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution 28 of August 19,

2005, petitioner now comes before this Court on a petition for review on

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and

certiorari.

occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide

It is well settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons

claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,

without any grant, express or implied, from the government, and it is

immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,

indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that

except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively

his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition

presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government

recognized by law.29

grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.

While respondent did not state in his application the statutory basis of his
application, it can reasonably be inferred that he seeks the judicial

Under the above-quoted provision, an applicant for confirmation of

confirmation or legalization of his imperfect or incomplete title over the lot 30

imperfect title must prove that (a) the land forms part of the disposable and

which he claims to be a riceland.

alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) he has been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of

Judicial confirmation of imperfect title is, under the Public Land Act, one of
the means by which public agricultural lands may be disposed.

the land under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial

31

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. 1073, 32 provides:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying

lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for

or since June 12, 1945.33

To support its contention that the lot does not form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, petitioner submitted before the
appellate court the technical survey data and topographic map of the LLDA
showing that the lot is situated below the reglementary elevation of 12.50
meters. Since that was the first time petitioner raised the issue, the

appellate court correctly glossed over it, for offending basic rules of fair

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and

play, justice, and due process. 34 In any event, an examination of what

disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed

purports to be the technical survey data of the LLDA shows that it is not a

words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land

certified original copy but a mere photocopy, the veracity and genuineness

Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of

of which cannot be ascertained by this Court.

Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No.

Swo-13-000227).

The absence or weakness of the evidence for petitioner notwithstanding,

respondent still bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,

lot he seeks to register forms part of the alienable agricultural land of the

provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,

public domain.35

and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by

To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print copy of the

the State. . . ."

conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears
the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case)

alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified

must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms

on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."

part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of

Menguito v. Republic

36

teaches, however, that reliance on such a notation to

prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains part
of the inalienable public domain.

the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of

owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered
as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must
be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be
registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer's notation

in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable
land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly
changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor

has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely

From an examination of this 1948 tax declaration, photocopy of which was

on the said surveyor's assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven

marked as Exhibit "N"42 by respondent, not only does it bear no number or

that the land in question has been declared alienable. 37 (Citations omitted;

the number is illegible; the area of the "palayero" (riceland) cannot be

Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

determined as what is entered under the column "Area" is "1-25-48" which

apparently stands for June 25, 1948, the date of registration for estate tax

But even assuming that respondent has proven that the lot is alienable, his
application would still be denied for failure to comply with the period of
possession requirement.

been in possession and occupation of lands applied for since July 26, 1894.
38

which provided for a

simple thirty-year prescriptive period. 39 RA 1942 has, however, already been

amended by P.D. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977, which requires
applicants to have been in possession and occupation of the lands applied
for since June 12, 1945.1avvphi1

At the time respondent filed his application on November 29, 2000, he had
only been in possession of the lot for more than 12 years, following his
acquisition of ownership thereof from Placido by Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob40
dated July 16, 1988. Respondent seeks to tack his possession with that of
his predecessors-in-interest, however.

From respondents evidence, his grandmother Florentina (from whom his

father allegedly inherited the lot which was in turn donated to him)
registered the lot for estate tax purposes in 1948.41

a notation after her printed name reading deceased. And it names Lucio and
Jose Buenaflor as the administrators of the lot.

Originally, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act required applicants to have

The law was later amended by Republic Act (RA) 1942

purposes. While this tax declaration names Florentina as the owner, there is

From the other tax declarations, Exhibits "N-1" up to "N-12" 43 inclusive,

presented by respondent, it appears that Lucio and Jose Buenaflor acted as
the property administrators only until February 17, 1966 when Tax
Declaration No. 8842 (Exhibit "N-2"), which was registered on January 14,
1966, was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 8952 (Exhibit "N-3") whereon,
for the first time, Placido and Teodoro Sarmiento were named administrators
of the lot. On March 30, 1966, Tax Declaration No. 8952 was cancelled by
Tax Declaration No. 9631 (Exhibit "N-4") on which Placido appears as the
owner of Lot No. 535 of which the lot in question forms part.

To this Court, Tax Declaration No. 9631-Exhibit "N-4" does not constitute
competent proof of Placidos title over Lot 535. For one, respondent failed to
prove that Placido is an heir of Florentina. For another, respondent failed to
prove the metes and bounds of the "palayero" allegedly owned by
Florentina and that the lot actually forms part thereof.

But even assuming arguendo that, as found by the MeTC, Placido was an
heir and inherited Lot 535 from Florentina, respondent still failed to provide

proof, nay allege, that Florentina possessed Lot 535 since June 12, 1945 or

reversed and set aside the Summary Judgment 2 dated December 22, 1998

earlier under a bona fide claim of ownership.

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 255. Also subject
of the present petition is the CA Resolution 3 dated December 16, 2004

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the

which denied the motion for reconsideration of the earlier decision.

Court of Appeals dated May 20, 2005 and August 19, 2005, respectively, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration filed by

A summary of the facts, as culled from the records of the case, follows:

respondent, Restituto Sarmiento, over Lot 535-D, with a total area of Two
Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Four (2,664) square meters situated at
Barangay Wawa, Taguig, Metro Manila is DENIED.

On February 16, 1995, petitioner spouses Morris and Socorro Carpo (Carpos)
filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title 4 with the RTC of Makati City against
Ayala Corporation, Ayala Property Ventures Corporation (APVC), and the

SO ORDERED.

Register of Deeds of Las Pias, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-292.

In their Complaint, the Carpos claimed to be the owners of a 171,209square meter parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
296463 issued in their names. 5 They further alleged that Ayala Corporation
G.R. No. 166577

February 3, 2010

was claiming to have titles (specifically, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367
and T-4368) over the property covered by the Carpos TCT No. 296463 and

SPOUSES MORRIS CARPO and SOCORRO CARPO, Petitioners,

that Ayala Corporation had made such property its equity contribution in

vs.

APVC to be developed into a residential subdivision. Attached as annexes to

AYALA LAND, INCORPORATED, Respondent.

the complaint were photocopies of:

DECISION

(a) TCT No. 296463 issued on August 13, 1970 in the name of the
Carpos, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, plan Psu-56007) located in

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

In the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioners seek to set aside and annul the Decision 1 dated December
22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61784, which

the Barrio of Almanza, Las Pias with an area of 171,309 square

meters;

(b) TCT No. 125945 issued on April 6, 1988 in the name of Ayala

The complaint prayed that the trial court render judgment:

Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, Plan Psu-80886)

located in Bo. Tindig na Manga, Las Pias with an area of 171,309
square meters;

(1) canceling and declaring void TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367, T-4368
and all alleged derivatives thereof, issued in the name of Ayala Corporation
and/or APVC over the properties or portion thereof embraced in the Carpos

(c) TCT No. T-4367 issued on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala

TCT No. 296463 and issuing a writ of possession in favor of the Carpos

Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 2, plan Psu-47035)

and/or ordering Ayala Corporation and APVC to surrender to the Carpos the

located in the Sitio of May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Pias with an

properties or portion thereof being occupied by the said corporations under

area of 218,523 square meters; and

inherently invalid or void titles; (2) declaring TCT No. 296463 issued in their
names as valid and the Carpos as the owners of the property described

(d) TCT No. T-4368 issued on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala
Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, plan Psu-47035)
located in the Sitio of May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Pias with an
area of 155,345 square meters.

No copy of TCT No. T-4366 was attached to the complaint.

According to the complaint, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368
and their derivatives "appear to have been issued in the name of Ayala and
purport to cover and embrace the Carpos property or portion thereof duly
covered registered under the already indefeasible and incontrovertible TCT
[No.] 296463 are inherently invalid and enforceable (sic) for not being the
duly issued derivatives of the Carpos title."6 The Carpos additionally applied
for a restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Ayala
Corporation and APVC from doing construction and development works on
the properties in purported violation of the Carpos rights.

therein "including the parcels of land being claimed and occupied by Ayala
[Corporation] and APVC withou[t] valid and enforceable titles"; and (3)
ordering Ayala Corporation and APVC to pay jointly and severally the
amount of P100,000 as attorneys fees plus costs of suit and litigation
expenses.7

On March 10, 1995, before defendants could file an answer, petitioners filed
an Amended Complaint, impleading respondent Ayala Land, Incorporated
(ALI) in lieu of Ayala Corporation after purportedly verifying with the
Register of Deeds of Las Pias that the title to the subject property was
registered in the name of ALI and not Ayala Corporation.8

On October 12, 1995 and January 12, 1996, ALI filed its Answer with
Counterclaims and Opposition to Application for Restraining Order and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction9 and Pre-trial Brief with Motion to Admit Amended
Answer,10 respectively.

In its Amended Answer, ALI alleged that APVC no longer exists having been

On December 17, 1996, ALI filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the

merged with ALI in 1991. ALI pointed out that the areas covered by TCT Nos.

ground that there was allegedly no genuine issue as to any material fact

T-4366, T-4367, and T-4368 do not overlap with the Carpos claimed

and the only issue for the court to resolve was a purely legal one which of

property and the dispute pertained only to the land covered by the Carpos

the two (2) titles should be accorded priority. According to ALI, the parties

TCT No. 296463 and TCT No. T-5333 in the name of Las Pias Ventures, Inc.

were relying on their respective TCTs, and since ALI admittedly traces its

(LPVI) which was derived from TCT No. 125945 in the name of Ayala

title to OCT No. 242 which was issued more than twenty (20) years earlier

Corporation. It appeared that Ayala Corporation contributed the property to

than the Carpos predecessors title (OCT No. 8575), its title is, thus,

LPVI and LPVI had, in turn, also merged with ALI. Further, ALI alleged that it

superior. Expectedly, the Carpos filed an opposition to the motion for

is the true owner of the property covered by TCT No. T-5333 as it traces

summary

back its title to Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 242 issued in 1950

controversies to be litigated."

judgment,

arguing

that

there

were

"genuine

issues

and

while the Carpos title was derived from OCT No. 8575 issued only in 1970.
ALI also claimed the Carpos complaint was barred by res judicata in view of
the 1941 decision of this Court in Guico v. San Pedro 11 which upheld the
ownership of a certain Eduardo Guico over the subject property as Lot 3, of
Psu-80886 over the claim of a certain Florentino Baltazar who was asserting
ownership of the same under his plan, Psu-56007.

During the pendency of the case, ALI secured a title in its own name, TCT
No. T-41262, over the property previously covered by TCT No. T-5333. 12

In an Order dated April 7, 1997, the RTC denied ALIs motion for summary
judgment. This denial was challenged in a petition for certiorari with the CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243.

In a decision14 dated September 25, 1997, the CA granted ALIs petition and
ordered the RTC to render a summary judgment. Both parties moved for
reconsideration of the CA Decision. ALI filed a motion for partial
reconsideration, entreating the CA itself to render the summary judgment in
the interest of judicial economy and on a claim that the sole issue was legal.

In the Order13 dated March 6, 1996, the Makati RTC ruled that the present

The Carpos, in their motion, insisted that there were genuine issues in this

case was an action in rem and directed the transfer of the case to the RTC

case that must be threshed out in a trial. Both motions were denied in the

of Las Pias where the disputed property is located. The case was thereafter

CA Resolution dated January 12, 1998.151avvphi1

assigned to Branch 255 of the Las Pias RTC and docketed as Civil Case No.
96-0082.

Both parties elevated the matter to this Court in separate petitions for
review on certiorari. In G.R. No. 132259, ALI assailed the CAs refusal to

render a summary judgment, while in G.R. No. 132440, the Carpos assailed

198 SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme Court held: "That unless a

the CAs ruling that trial was unnecessary.

survey plan is duly approved by the Director of Lands the same is of

dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence. Indubitably, therefore, the

In separate minute Resolutions,

16

the Court denied both petitions. Both

parties motions for reconsideration were likewise denied.

Accordingly, the RTC rendered a Summary Judgment dated December 22,

1998, finding the Carpos title superior to that of ALI and ruling, thus:

Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayalas claim
of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any
admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the
defendants answer reveals that OCT No. 242 covers the property surveyed
under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to allege that the same was
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this
court to be skeptical of the validity of the issuance of OCT No. 242. In
original land registration cases, it is mandatory that the application should
be accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for registration,
duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey plan without

reported survey and its alleged results are not entitled to credit and should
be rejected."

The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory

character and unless the plan and its technical description are duly
approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value
(Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it was ruled that the
Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey
plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA
177).

Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which defendant ALI claimed to
have been originated from OCT No. 242 had not been approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently prepared and approved
by the then Land Registration Commissioner and under the law, the same is
void.

the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of
being of dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted as

It will also be noted that aside from the admissions made by defendant ALI

evidence. The property being claimed by the defendant ALI, allegedly

in its answer, it clearly appears in its title TCT No. T-5333 that the date of

registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed under SWO

survey was on July 28, 1930. Plaintiffs property covered by TCT No. 296463

and not bearing the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any

was surveyed on January 4-6, 1927. This means that plaintiffs predecessor-

title issued emanating from a survey plan without the approval of the

in-interest had claimed ownership of the property ahead of that of

Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity and therefore

defendant ALIs predecessor-in-interest. The principle of prior registration

void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,

cannot be applied in this case because the land previously surveyed cannot

anymore be the subject of another survey, and there is already a record of a

(c) Ordering the defendant Ayala Land, Inc. to pay the sum of

prior survey in the Bureau of Lands. This is precisely the reason why the

P100,000.00 as attorneys fees; and

survey plan has to be approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. This
must be the reason why the later survey in favor of Ayalas predecessor-ininterest did not anymore bear the approval of the Director of Lands because
had it been submitted for approval, the records of the Bureau of Lands will
show that an earlier survey of the same land had already been made and
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.

Evidently, Ayalas claim of superiority of its title over that of the plaintiffs
cannot therefore be sustained. Be that as it may, the fact that cannot be
disputed on the basis of Ayalas answer is its admission that SWO survey
without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands was submitted
in the alleged registration proceedings, rendering the decree and the title
issued thereunder to be tainted with irregularity and therefore void.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing and the prevailing jurisprudence

on the matter, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Declaring TCT No. 296463 in the name of the plaintiffs Spouses
Morris G. Carpo and Socorro R. Carpo as valid and legal, and
superior to that of defendant Ayalas TCT No. T-5333;

(b) Declaring TCT No. T-5333, TCT No. 125945, TCT No. T-6055, TCT
No. 4366, TCT No. 4367 and TCT No. 4368 and their derivatives as
null and void;

(d) To pay the costs.17

On January 5, 1999, ALI filed a notice of appeal but the same was dismissed
by the CA in a Resolution18 dated May 14, 1999 for failure to pay the full
amount of docket fees. In its motion for reconsideration, ALI pointed out
that it paid the full amount assessed by the cash clerk on duty at the RTC
Las Pias. The motion was also denied, prompting ALI to file with this Court
a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 140162. Finding ALIs petition
meritorious, the Court, in a Decision19 dated November 22, 2000, reversed
the CAs dismissal of ALIs appeal and remanded the same to the CA for
further proceedings.

On December 22, 2003, the CA rendered the herein challenged decision in

favor of ALI, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

FOR THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, the instant appeal is GRANTED, the

assailed Summary Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias, Branch
255, dated December 22, 1998, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a
new one is rendered as follows:

(1) TCT No. 41262, formerly TCT No. T-5333, in the name of
defendant-appellant Ayala Land, Incorporated is hereby declared to
be the VALID title to the subject property;

(2) TCT No. 296463 issued in the name of plaintiffs-appellees is

D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS RES

declared to be NULL and VOID;

JUDICATA AGAINST PETITIONERS BASED ON THE CASE OF GUICO V. SAN

PEDRO, ET AL., 72 PHIL 415, WITHOUT PROPER DETERMINATION OF

(3) The concerned Register of Deeds is hereby ORDERED to cancel

plaintiffs-appellees TCT No. 296463, and any and all titles issued

WHETHER THE FACTS IN SAID CASE ARE DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO THIS

CASE AND WHETHER THE ELEMENTS OF RES JUDICATA ARE PRESENT. 22

covering the subject property, for being spurious and void, and of
no force and effect.20

Petitioners prayed that this Court render a decision: (a) reversing and
setting aside the CA Decision dated December 22, 2003 and Resolution

The Carpos filed their motion for reconsideration but the same was denied
by the CA in its Resolution dated December 16, 2004. Hence, the instant
petition for review filed by Socorro Carpo and the heirs of Morris Carpo.

dated December 16, 2004; (b) reinstating and affirming in toto the RTCs
Summary Judgment dated December 22, 1998; or in the alternative (c)

21

remanding the case to the RTC for further proceedings.

The Petition contained the following assignment of errors:

After a thorough review of the records, we deny the petition and concur with
A THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF
RESPONDENT IS VALID EVEN WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SURVEY PLAN

the CA that the Summary Judgment rendered by the trial court should be
reversed and set aside.

APPROVED BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS.

Preliminary discussion regarding subject matter of the controversy
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING PETITIONERS GUILTY OF
LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION.

At the outset, it should be noted that the trial court in its Summary
Judgment declared null and void (a) TCT No. T-5333 (and its antecedent, TCT

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE RTC "RELIED

HEAVILY" ON AN ALLEGED "ADMISSION" BY RESPONDENT OF THE VALIDITY
OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS OVER THE DISPUTED PARCEL OF LAND.

No. [125945] T-6055A) covering a parcel of land with an area of 171,309

square meters; (b) TCT No. T-4366 with a land area of 254,085 square
meters; (c) TCT No. T-4367 with a land area of 218,523 square meters; and
(d) TCT No. T-4368 with a land area of 155,345 square meters, despite the
lack of evidence of identity of the properties described in TCT Nos. T-4366,
T-4367 and T-4368 with the property covered by the Carpos TCT No.
296463 or any portion of said property claimed by petitioners. This was

grievous and palpable error on the part of the trial court considering that

"9. In connection with the subject case, Affiant was requested to find out,

the property being claimed by the Carpos under their TCT No. 296463 had

based on the technical descriptions in their respective titles, if the lots

an area of only 171,309 square meters and the total area of the properties

described in the title of plaintiffs, TCT No. 296463, overlaps the lots of ALI

in the titles invalidated by the trial court was 799,262 square meters.

covered by TCT No. 41262 (formerly, TCT No. T-5333 of LPVI, and, more
previously, TCT No. T (125945) 6055-A, in the name of Ayala Corporation),

It must be emphasized that in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243, involving the same

TCT No. 4366, TCT No. 4367 and TCT No. 4368, x x x.

parties, the CA ruled that:

9.1. To accomplish this task, Affiant resorted to the plotting of the technical
On the other hand, defendant ALI, in its responsive pleading did not deny
the existence of a title in the name of the plaintiffs/private respondents.
Instead, it alleged:

descriptions found in the plaintiffs and ALIs respective titles. The standard
operating procedure, adopted by Affiant in this particular instance, in
plotting properties is to study the technical description in the titles and at

"14. The parcel of land described in TCT No. 296463, issued in the name of
the plaintiffs, completely overlaps the property covered by ALIs TCT No. T5333. But TCT No. T-296463 traces itself to OCT No. 8575 which was issued
on August 12, 1970, long after OCT No. 242 (the title from which ALIs TCT
No. T-5333 was derived) was issued on May 9, 1950 (on the basis of Decree

the same time, to get all the available survey plans described in the titles
for reference.

9.2. To evidence this plotting that Affiant conducted, Affiant prepared a

Sketch Plan reflecting Plaintiffs title vis-a-vis ALIs title. Attached hereto as
Annex "G" is an original copy of the Sketch Plan prepared by the Affiant.

of Registration No. 2917, Record No. 43516). Hence, ALIs TCT No. T-5333 is
superior to TCT No. 296463. xxx."

9.3. The orange-shaded portion on the Sketch Plan indicates the area
covered by the title of the plaintiffs and it is clearly shown in this plan that

This is an admission that the private respondents have a title to the

property

in

question,

and

that

the

property

described

in

private

respondents TCT No. 296463 completely overlaps the title of petitioner ALI.

plaintiffs claimed property entirely overlaps ALIs property delineated in

TCT No. T-41262. Plaintiffs claimed property (Lot 3, PSU-56007) is in fact
identical to ALIs lot (Lot 3, PSU-80886).

This fact is further substantiated by an affidavit of Jose Rizal Mercado, a

Geodetic Engineer who, after attesting to his qualifications, competence and

9.4. The blue, pink and green lines on the Sketch Plan indicate the

experience, declared under oath:

boundaries of ALIs TCT Nos. 4366, 4367 and 4368, respectively, and it is
clearly shown that these do not overlap with plaintiffs claimed property."

The Sketch Plan attached thereto clearly indicates the overlapping and

affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the parties, as well as

identical boundaries between the private respondents TCT No. 296463 and

the applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter. In other words, there

petitioners TCT No. 125945, (formerly TCT No. T-5333). 23 In addition to the

need not be a protracted trial thereon, since all that the trial court should do

affidavit of the Geodetic Engineer, the petitioner likewise attached to its

is to apply the law to the issue, taking into consideration the documents

Motion for Summary Judgment copies of the following titles:

attached by the parties in their respective pleadings and/or submitted

together with the motion or the opposition thereto. The same is true with

xxxx

In contrast, the private respondents never controverted the petitioners

allegation that their (private respondents) title, TCT No. 296463 traces its
origin to OCT No. 8575, issued on August 12, 1970, while that of the
petitioner has its origin in OCT No. 242, issued on May 9, 1950. Moreover,
the private respondents attached no supporting document to its Opposition
to the Motion for Summary Judgment.

Thus, as matters stand, the requisites for the grant of summary judgment
appear to have been satisfied xxx.

the other defenses raised by the petitioner in its responsive pleading, to wit:
res judicata, prescription and laches which may likewise be resolved
without going to trial.24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

The foregoing CA decision became final and executory after the separate
petitions for review filed with this Court by the parties were denied with
finality. The parties, and even the trial court, were bound by the CAs factual
finding therein that the only lots whose technical descriptions overlap are
those covered by the Carpos TCT No. 296463 and ALIs TCT No. T-5333
which later became TCT No. T-41262. There was simply no basis for the trial
court to invalidate all the ALI titles mentioned in the complaint.

xxxx
The incorrectness of this sweeping invalidation of ALI titles in the Summary
Since the existence of two titles over the same property, as well as the fact

Judgment is even more evident in the case of TCT No. T-4367 (Lot 2, plan

of overlapping of the technical descriptions of the two titles are admitted in

Psu-47035) and TCT No. T-4368 (Lot 3, plan Psu-47035). Petitioners claims

the pleadings, and substantiated by the supporting documents attached by

with respect to these properties are already barred by res judicata. In Realty

the defendant-movant (petitioner herein) to its Motion for Summary

Sales Enterprise, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 25petitioner Morris

Judgment, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. If at all, the sole

Carpo already asserted his purported ownership of these two properties

issue is a legal one, to wit: whose title (as to the conflicting ones) is superior

based on a transfer certificate of title with the same survey plan number

and must be upheld. This issue may be decided on the basis of the

(Psu-56007) as TCT No. 296463. However, in Realty, his claim was

discredited by the Court when it held that Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.

Bonifacio Vera (hereafter referred to as Vera Court), for "declaration of

(Realty), ALIs predecessor in interest,26 is the one with valid title to these

nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No. 20408." Named defendants were

properties. The relevant portions of the Realty Decision are quoted here:

Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., Macondray Farms, Inc. and the Commissioner
of Land Registration. x x x.

Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Pias, Metro
Manila, having an aggregate area of 373,868 sq. m., situated in the vicinity

xxxx

of the Ayala Alabang Project and BF Homes Paraaque are covered by three
(3) distinct sets of Torrens titles to wit:

In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao Mayuga, father of

Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty, who originally filed on

1) TCT No. 20408 issued on May 29, 1975 in the name of Realty

June 24, 1927 a registration proceeding docketed as LRC Case No. 657,

Sales Enterprise, Inc., which was derived from OCT No. 1609, issued

GLRO Record No. N-29882 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to confirm

on May 21, 1958, pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases

his title over parcels of land described as Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan Psu-47035.

Nos. 657, 758 and 976, GLRO Record Nos. N-29882, N-33721 and N-

(Lots 2 and 3 are the subject of the instant litigation among Carpo, Realty

43516, respectively.

and QCDFC.) Case No. 657 was jointly tried with two other cases, LRC Case
No. 976, GLRO Record No. 43516 filed by Eduardo Guico and LRC Case No.

2) TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13, 1970 in the name of

Morris G. Carpo, which was derived from OCT No. 8629, issued on

758, GLRO Record No. 33721 filed by Florentino Baltazar, as the three cases
involved identical parcels of land, and identical applicants/oppositors.

October 13, 1970 pursuant to decree No. N-131349 in LRC Case No.
N-11-M (N-6217), GLRO Record No. N-32166.

xxxx

3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on July 27, 1971 in the

Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, the original

name of Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation,

registered owners, by virtue of a deed executed before Iluminada Figueroa,

derived from OCT No. 8931 which was issued on July 27, 1971

Notary Public of Manila dated October 9, 1970. x x x.

pursuant to LRC Case No. P-206 GLRO Record No. N-31777.

xxxx
On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, presided over by Judge Rizalina

The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are heirs of Florentino

Baltazar, an oppositor in the original application filed by Estanislao Mayuga

in 1927. As stated earlier, the CFI-Rizal confirmed the title of Estanislao to

Petitioners alleged that the CA erred in declaring that the title of respondent

Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 "desestimando oposicion de Florentino

is valid even without the requisite survey plan approved by the Director of

Baltazar . . . con respeto a dichos lotes . . ." As such successors of

the Bureau of Lands.

Florentino, they could not pretend ignorance of the land registration

proceedings over the disputed parcels of land earlier initiated by Eduardo
Guico, Florentino Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as when as the decisions
rendered therein.

Petitioners clearly misunderstood or deliberately misread the CAs ruling on

this point. It is the CAs view that the trial courts pronouncement that OCT
No. 242 was issued without an approved survey plan was unwarranted in
view of the presumption of regularity that said title enjoys.

Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the name of Dominador Mayuga,
from whom Realty derived its title, was issued in 1958, or twelve years
before the issuance of the title in the name of the Baltazars in 1970.

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of
two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in
date prevails x x x. In successive registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the
person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or
interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who
is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect
thereof x x x."27 (Emphasis and underscoring ours; citations omitted.)

We cannot but agree with the CA on this point upon perusing the following
portion of the Summary Judgment:

Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayalas claim
of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any
admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the
defendants answer reveals that OCT No. 242 covers the property surveyed
under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to allege that the same was
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this
court to be skeptical of the validity of the issuance of OCT No. 242. In
original land registration cases, it is mandatory that the application should
be accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for registration,
duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey plan without

We now discuss each assignment of error raised in the petition.

the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of
being of dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted as

First Assignment of Error

evidence. The property being claimed by the defendant ALI, allegedly

registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed under SWO
and not bearing the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any

title issued emanating from a survey plan without the approval of the

likewise no evidence on record to support the trial courts finding that the

Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity and therefore

survey plan submitted to support the issuance of OCT No. 242 in the 1950

void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,

land registration proceedings was approved only by the Land Registration

198 SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme Court held: "That unless a

Commissioner and not by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.

survey plan is duly approved by the Director of Lands the same is of

dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence. Indubitably, therefore, the
reported survey and its alleged results are not entitled to credit and should
be rejected."

It would appear the trial court came to the conclusion that OCT No. 242 was
issued without a duly approved survey plan simply because the notation
"SWO" appeared in the technical description of the said title which was
attached to the answer and due to ALIs failure to allege in its pleadings that

The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory

the survey plan submitted in support of the issuance of OCT No. 242 was

character and unless the plan and its technical description are duly

approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.29

approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value
(Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it was ruled that the
Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey
plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA
177).

It is incomprehensible how the trial court could conclude that the survey
plan mentioned in OCT No. 242 was unapproved by the appropriate
authority all from the notation "SWO" which appeared beside the survey
plan number on the face of the title or from a failure to allege on the part of
ALI that a duly approved survey plan exists. We quote with approval the

Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which defendant ALI claimed to

discussion of the CA on this point:

have been originated from OCT No. 242 had not been approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently prepared and approved
by the then Land Registration Commissioner and under the law, the same is
void.28

Pursuant to the foregoing, the court a quo erred when, in ruling that the
validity of OCT No. 242 is dubious, it gave emphasis to defendantappellants failure to allege that the survey plan of OCT No. 242 was duly
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. It is admitted that a

To begin with, a perusal of the defendants answer or amended answer

survey plan is one of the requirements for the issuance of decrees of

would show that, contrary to the trial courts allusions thereto, there is no

registration, but upon the issuance of such decree, it can most certainly be

admission on the part of ALI that OCT No. 242 was issued without a survey

assumed that said requirement was complied with by ALIs original

plan that was duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. There is

predecessor-in-interest at the time the latter sought original registration of

the subject property. Moreover, the land registration court must be assumed

the subject property and the law will in no way oblige it to go behind the

to have carefully ascertained the propriety of issuing a decree in favor of

certificate of title to determine the condition of the property. This is the

ALIs predecessor-in-interest, under the presumption of regularity in the

fundamental nature of the Torrens System of land registration, to give the

performance of official functions by public officers. The court upon which

public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to

the law has conferred jurisdiction, is deemed to have all the necessary

dispense with the need of inquiring further.30 (Underscoring ours; citations

powers to exercise such jurisdiction, and to have exercised it effectively.

omitted.)

This is as it should be, because once a decree of registration is made under

the Torrens system, and the time has passed within which that decree may
be questioned the title is perfect and cannot later on be questioned. There
would be no end to litigation if every litigant could, by repeated actions,
compel a court to review a decree previously issued by another court fortyfive (45) years ago. The very purpose of the Torrens system would be
destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second
action for registration, as what the court a quo did when it faulted ALIs
failure to allege that its predecessor-in-interest submitted a survey plan
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands in the original land
registration case.

The Court need not emphasize that it is not for ALI to allege in its pleadings,
much less prove, that its predecessor-in-interest complied with the

It cannot be gainsaid that the issuance of OCT No. 242 was a result of the
registration decree of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, pursuant to land
registration proceedings in Case No. 976. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, OCT No. 242 and its derivatives, including ALIs TCT No. T-41262,
enjoy the presumption of regularity and ALI need not allege or prove that its
title was regularly issued. That is precisely the nature of such a
presumption, it dispenses with proof. Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court provides:

Section 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are

satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:

xxxx

requirements for the original registration of the subject property. A party

dealing with a registered land need not go beyond the Certificate of Title to

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

determine the true owner thereof so as to guard or protect his or her

interest. Hence, ALI was not required to go beyond what appeared in the
transfer certificate of title in the name of its immediate transferor. It may
rely solely, as it did, on the correctness of the certificate of title issued for

(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or

elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;

(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the

seeks to overcome the presumption who would have the burden to present

court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an

adequate and convincing evidence to the contrary. This, petitioners did not

issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the

even attempt to do.

arbitrators and passed upon by them; x x x.

We cannot accept petitioners proposition that they did not have the burden
Thus, we held in Herce, Jr. v. Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna 31:

of proof of showing the irregularity of ALIs title since the burden of proof
purportedly did not shift to them since no full-blown trial was conducted by

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Ordinary Decree Book, LRC

the RTC.

(CLR) Rec. No. 6763, showing that Decree No. 4244 was issued on March 3,
1911, is presumed to have been regularly issued by the accountable public

This specious argument deserves scant credit. Rule 131, Section 1 of the

officers who enjoy the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of

Rules of Court provides:

their functions. Thus, the proceedings that led to the issuance of Decree No.
4244 in favor of the Municipality of Cabuyao cannot be overturned without
any countervailing proof to the contrary. In the words of Tichangco v.
Enriquez:32

To overturn this legal presumption carelessly more than 90 years since

the termination of the case will not only endanger judicial stability, but
also violate the underlying principle of the Torrens system. Indeed, to do so
would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of Torrens titles to
meaningless verbiage. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to

present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law.

With the filing of the complaint, petitioners should already have alleged all
the bases of their cause of action, particularly their allegation that ALIs title
is null and void and that such title should be cancelled. However, a scrutiny
of the complaint would show that petitioners never alleged the purported
lack of an approved survey plan as a defect of ALIs title. All that the
complaint alleged is that ALIs titles should be declared void for not being

The presumption of regularity enjoyed by the registration decree issued in

derivatives of the Carpos title. Implicit in that allegation is that petitioners

Case No. 976 and OCT No. 242 includes the presumption that all the

were relying solely on the supposed priority of their own title over ALIs. It

requisites for the issuance of a valid title had been complied with. ALI need

stands to reason then that ALI did not have to allege in its Answer that its

not allege or prove that a duly approved survey plan accompanied the

mother title, OCT No. 242, was supported by a duly approved survey plan

issuance of OCT No. 242 in 1950 because it is presumed. It is the party who

when petitioners did not raise the same as an issue in their complaint or in

In all, we find that the CA committed no reversible error when it applied the

any other pleading filed with the trial court.

principle "Primus Tempore, Portior Jure" (First in Time, Stronger in Right) in

this case and found that ALIs title was the valid title having been derived

Indubitably, in view of the CAs Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243, this

from the earlier OCT.

controversy has been reduced to the sole substantive issue of which

between the two titles, purporting to cover the same property, deserves

Second Assignment of Error

priority. This is hardly a novel issue. As petitioners themselves are aware, in

Realty, it was held that:

Petitioners contend that it is error on the part of the CA to rule that their
cause of action has been barred by prescription and laches. According to

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of

them, since the OCT from which ALI derived its title is void for want of a

two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in

duly approved survey plan, their cause of action did not prescribe. However,

date prevails x x x. In successive registrations, where more than one

as discussed above, the conclusion of the trial court that OCT No. 242 is

certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the

void was not sufficiently borne out by the evidence on record. Verily, the

person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or

premise upon which petitioners build their theory of imprescriptibility of

interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who

their action did not exist.

is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect
thereof x x x."33 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Degollacion v. Register of Deeds of Cavite, 34 we held that "[w]here two

certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether wholly or
partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which
the certificates of title were derived."

In sum, we find no reason to disturb the CAs finding that:

As previously emphasized, OCT No. 242 of ALIs predecessor-in-interest was

issued on May 7, 1950, or forty-five (45) years before plaintiffs-appellees
filed their complaint on March 10, 1995. As such, it is the Courts firmly held
view that plaintiffs-appellees claim is barred not only by prescription, but
also by laches.

Aside from the fact that OCT No. 242 had become incontrovertible after the
lapse of one (1) year from the time a decree of registration was issued, any
action for reconveyance that plaintiffs-appellees could have availed of is

also barred. Although plaintiffs-appellees complaint was for quieting of title,

"SECTION 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value

it is in essence an action for reconveyance based on an implied or

The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised xxx subject,

constructive trust, considering that plaintiffs-appellees were alleging in said

however, to the right of any person xxx to file in the proper Court of First

complaint that there was a serious mistake, if not fraud, in the issuance of

Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration

OCT No. 242 in favor of ALIs predecessor-in-interest. It is now well-settled

not later than one year from and after the date of entry of such decree of

that an action for reconveyance, which is a legal remedy granted to a

registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court

landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in

where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest

anothers name, must be filed within ten years from the issuance of the

therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase innocent

title, since such issuance operates as a constructive notice. Since ALIs title

purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be

is traced to an OCT issued in 1950, the ten-year prescriptive period expired

deemed to include and innocent lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrances

in 1960.

for value."35

By laches is meant the negligence or omission to assert a right within a

Third Assignment of Error

reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert

it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve mere
lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion
or enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances
inequitable or unfair to permit. In the instant case, plaintiffs-appellees, as
well as their predecessor-in-interest, have not shown that they have taken
judicial steps to nullify OCT No. 242, from which ALIs title was derived, for
forty-five (45) years. To allow them to do so now, and if successful, would be
clearly unjust and inequitable to those who relied on the validity of said

The next assigned error involves the question of whether the trial court, in
rendering the Summary Judgment, indeed relied heavily on the alleged
admission made by ALI on the validity of Carpos title, as declared by the
CA. Specifically, the CA stated as follows:

In its assailed decision, the court a quo relied heavily on the alleged
admission by ALI in it[s] Answer of the existence and validity of plaintiffsappellees title. We have read the pertinent pleading and We find ALIs
statement to be of no moment.

OCT, the innocent purchasers for value, who are protected by the precise
provisions of P.D. 1529, thus:

Nowhere in ALIs statement was there an admission of the validity of

plaintiffs-appellees title. x x x.

The Court cannot comprehend where and how the court a quo could have

admission of the existence of Carpos title "are conclusive upon it" and bars

gotten the impression that ALI was admitting not only the existence, but

ALI from taking a "position contrary to or inconsistent with its answer"

also the validity of plaintiffs-appellees certificate of title. x x x. 36

followed by the statement that the trial court is "not inclined to concur with
Ayalas claim of validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242,

An examination of the Summary Judgment of the trial court would readily

show that indeed the trial court relied on ALIs supposed admission of the
existence of Carpos title in ruling which of the conflicting titles was valid.

absent of (sic) any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs." This is yet
another non sequitur argument on the part of the trial court which the CA
correctly pointed out in its own Decision.

Pertinently, the trial court merely declared:

Fourth Assignment of Error
The existence of plaintiffs TCT No. 296463 has been admitted by defendant
Ayala in its answer to have been originated from OCT No. 8575 which was

As to the issue of res judicata, the Court of Appeals ruled that the decision

issued on August 12, 1970. It is very significant that defendant ALI admitted

in the case of Guico v. San Pedro 38 was binding on the Carpos as it

it in its answer that OCT No. 8575 and plaintiffs TCT No. 296463 both

proceeded to discuss, thus:

originated from Decree No. 131141 issued on October 15, 1969 in the name
of Apolonio Sabater as Annex "G" to defendant ALIs answer. This admission
made by the defendant in its answer is conclusive upon it. It cannot
therefore take position contrary to or inconsistent with its answer, and the
facts are to be taken as true (Westminister High School vs. Sto. Domingo, et
al., G.R. No. 12666 R-July 5, 1955; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248-255).

In Guico vs. San Pedro, the Supreme Court resolved the conflicting claims
over a tract of land situated in barrio Tindig na Manga, Paraaque, Rizal,
which was subdivided into eleven (11) lots. The subject land was sought to
be registered by a certain Eduardo C. Guico on the basis of an
accompanying plan Psu-80886, which interestingly is also the basis of ALIs
TCT No. T-5333, now TCT No. 41262. Guicos application was opposed by,

Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayalas claim

among others, Florentino Baltazar, on the basis of plan Psu 56007, under

of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any

which plaintiffs-appellees title was derived.

admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. x x x. 37

It appears that Lots 2 and 3 were adjudicated to Guico on the basis of PsuAlthough the Summary Judgment did not expressly state that ALI admitted

80886 (Lot 3 is the subject matter of the instant case), Lot 10 in favor of

the validity of Carpos title with its admission of the said titles existence,

Baltazar on the basis of Psu 56007, under which plaintiffs-appellees title

that is the unmistakable import of the trial courts statements that ALIs

was based, and the rest to the heirs of Narciso Mayuga. While Baltazar

claimed Lot 3 on the basis of his Psu-56007, his claim was rejected and the

any event, the CAs questioned Decision had sufficient basis in fact and law

Lot was adjudicated to Guico on the basis of his Psu-80886.

even without relying on the Guico case.1avvphi1

It is clear, therefore, that whatever claim plaintiffs-appellees have on the

In conclusion, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible

subject property on the basis of Lot 3 Psu-56007, through their predecessor-

error in setting aside the patently erroneous Summary Judgment of the trial

in-interest, Florentino Baltazar, the same had been clearly and finally denied

court.

by the Supreme Court in Guico vs. San Pedro.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
For res judicata to apply, four requisites must be met: (1) the former

December 22, 2003 and the Resolution dated December 16, 2004 are

judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or an order on

hereby AFFIRMED.

the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the

SO ORDERED.

first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of
cause of action. Plaintiffs-appellees only have objections with respect to the
fourth requisite, offering the lame excuse that it is not bound by such
decision, there being no identity of parties in Guico vs. San Pedro and the
instant case.39

We agree with petitioners that it is not apparent from an examination of

Guico and the evidence on record that indeed the predecessors-in-interest
of ALI and the Carpos with respect to the subject property are Eduardo
Guico and Florentino Baltazar, especially since the parties respective OCTs
were not issued in these persons names but rather a certain Alberto
Yaptinchay and Apolonio Sabater. It cannot be categorically said that there

G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by
MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all
surnamed ABISTO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

was identity of parties between the Guico case and the instant case.
Clearly, one of the elements of res judicata, i.e., that there must be,

Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land

between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, is lacking. In

registration case mandatory or directory?

Statement of the Case

The Facts

The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure

On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition

to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to

for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under

grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.

petition to set aside the Decision

Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional

promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the

The application was docketed as Land

subsequent Resolution 2 promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent

Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.

Court of Appeals

pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs Margarita,

in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the

challenged Decision reads: 4

However, during the

Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado

represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal

guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.

appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new one entered

confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado,

The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the

Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental

petition "for want of jurisdiction." However, it found that the applicants

Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa,

through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,

Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented

exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.

by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion

Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under
MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro.

The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private

oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of evidence.

In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: 7

. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with

the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants
to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published
in the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the

Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding

Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired

taxes due on this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be

jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with

issued.

the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial

The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA

hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.

Resolution dared November 19, 1991.

The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982,

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated

which in its pertinent portion provides: 8

this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioner's counsel anchored
his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule

It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23

[of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in
the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in

45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals.

Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not
for certiorari under Rule 65. 9

the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is

mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to

The Issue

publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper

of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is
dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is
indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be
powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration
case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing
also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably

Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave

abuse of discretion" 10 in holding

. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC

Case No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper of general
circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such
publication.

necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise,

any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be

Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial

legally infirm.

hearing shall be "published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper

of general circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the Official

Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals

which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and
ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.

Gazette is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and . . . in . .

. a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement
of due process." 11

Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with

Newspaper Publication Mandatory

the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a

mere "procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official Gazette
is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 12

In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals

The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring

publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall,
within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting

ruled: 13

the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier
. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette

than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the

and in a newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory

order.

terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal
force that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the court.

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application

for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3)
posting.

Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the
opportunity "to explain matters fully and present their side." Thus, it
justified its disposition in this wise: 14

. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required

procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other
requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice
by mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous places,
were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party who
is minded to make any objection of the application for registration.

1. By publication.

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial
hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice
of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and
once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines:
Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall
be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall
be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the
land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and

The Court's Ruling

We find for petitioner.

"to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all

persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to

law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the

show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.

requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who,

per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and

xxx xxx xxx

occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by

Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that
publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the
land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether,
absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land
registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private
respondents.

parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is

likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed
provision.

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.

17

Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as

against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in

We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the

demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the

the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through

publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with.
Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be

publication requirement.

adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which

The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the

they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking

Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court

the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by

order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an

satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the

imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. 15 While

identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an

concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory

action for recovery of realty.

construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire

world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when

provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in

all persons concerned nay, "the whole world" who have rights to or

its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan,

the Court

interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come

through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529

to court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The

requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing

elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property

16

and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If the intention of the

18

He must prove his title against the whole

is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant,

alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private

said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.

respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the

future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation

should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and

publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of

Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private

which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is

respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.

due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read
and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation,

SO ORDERED.

such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties
on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of
neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In
sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the
objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible
demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication,
mailing and posting.

G.R. No. 171631

REPUBLIC

OF

November 15, 2010

THE

PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

vs.
AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ,

Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication

requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse;
even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself

and GLICERIO R. DELA PAZ, represented by JOSE R. DELA PAZ,

Respondents.

DECISION

allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with

such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale

PERALTA, J.:

clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.

19

There is no

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, which affirmed the

Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC

1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not covered by any land

Case No. N-11514, granting respondents application for registration and

patent or any public land appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of

confirmation of title over a parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo,

the Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, that the tax on the real

Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.

property for the year 2003 has been paid.

The factual milieu of this case is as follows:

Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an

agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob4 dated June 18,

On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela

Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela
Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City an application for registration of
land under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known as the

1987, executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz
(Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired the said property from their
deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a "Sinumpaang

Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land with

an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila,

described

under

survey

Plan

Ccn-00-000084,

(Conversion

Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig
Cadastral Mapping). Together with their application for registration,
respondents submitted the following documents: (1) Special power of
attorney showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela Paz to file the
application; (2) Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234,
MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-00-000084) with the
annotation that the survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B
classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development,

Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay 5 dated March

10, 1979. In their application, respondents claimed that they are co-owners
of the subject parcel of land and they have been in continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept
of owner since they acquired it in 1987. Respondents further averred that
by way of tacking of possession, they, through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted
possession of the same, in the concept of an owner even before June 12,
1945, or for a period of more than fifty (50) years since the filing of the
application of registration with the trial court. They maintained that the
subject property is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.

Quezon City on January 03, 1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00000084; (4) Geodetic Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-

The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date,

01466; (6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987; (7) Sinumpaang

respondents presented documentary evidence to prove compliance with the

Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay dated March 10,

jurisdictional requirements of the law.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the

3234, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping, containing Twenty-Five

Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration on the

Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five (25,825) Square Meters, more or less,

following grounds, among others: (1) that neither the applicants nor their

situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the

predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and

operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration

notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for a period of

Decree.

not less than thirty (30) years; (2) that the muniments of title, and/or the
tax declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if any, attached to
or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land applied for; and (3) that the
parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the

After the decision shall have been become final and executory and, upon
payment of all taxes and other charges due on the land, the order for the
issuance of a decree of registration shall be accordingly undertaken.

SO ORDERED.7

Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for the Republic, there
was no other oppositor to the application.

Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. 8 The CA, in its
Decision dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the

On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default 6 against
the whole world except as against the Republic. Thereafter, respondents
presented their evidence in support of their application.

In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents'
application for registration of the subject property. The dispositive portion of
the decision states:

decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents were able to show that
they have been in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession of
the subject property through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest.
The CA found that respondents acquired the subject land from their
predecessors-in-interest,

who

have

been

in

actual,

continuous,

uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in the concept of an owner

since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents were able to

WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered,

present sufficient evidence to establish that the subject property is part of

judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING and CONFIRMING the title of

the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence, the instant

AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and Glicerio R.

petition raising the following grounds:

dela Paz, all married and residents of and with postal address at No. 65
Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land described and
bounded under Plan Ccn-00-000084 (consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER

subject land. To prove their continuous and uninterrupted possession of the

GRANTING

THE

subject land, they presented several tax declarations, dated 1949, 1966,

SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO

1974, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in the name of their

ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS,

predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents presented a tax clearance

EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN THE

issued by the Treasurer's Office of the City of Taguig to show that they are

CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.

up to date in their payment of real property taxes. Respondents maintain

RESPONDENTS'

APPLICATION

FOR

REGISTRATION

OF

that the annotations appearing on the survey plan of the subject land
II

serves as sufficient proof that the land is within the alienable and

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE

SUBJECT LOT IN RESPONDENTS' NAME CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE
WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. 9

In

its

Memorandum,

respondents

and

petitioner

their

claims

that

the

predecessors-in-interest

CA's

have

findings

been

in

that
open,

more than fifty years or even before June 12, 1945, was unsubstantiated.
failed

to show

actual

issues raised by the petitioner are questions of fact which the Court should
not consider in a petition for review under Rule 45.

The petition is meritorious.

uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession in the concept of owners, for

Respondents

disposable portion of the public domain. Finally, respondents assert that the

or constructive possession

and

occupation over the subject land in the concept of an owner. Respondents

also failed to establish that the subject property is within the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain. The subject property remained to

In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of

Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless
the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on
record, or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. 10 It
is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again,
unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally
devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error
or grave abuse of discretion.11

be owned by the State under the Regalian Doctrine.

In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present
evidence of specific acts of ownership showing open, notorious, continuous
and adverse possession and occupation in the concept of an owner of the

that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain.

Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration

presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the

Decree provides:

person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To

SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part
of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the

overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established

that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.15

To support its contention that the land subject of the application for
registration is alienable, respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-0000008416 (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234, MCADM
590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer Arnaldo C.
Torres with the following annotation:

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B clasified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on
Jan. 03, 1968.

subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier.12 These the respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive

Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.

and convincing evidence.13

In Republic v. Sarmiento,17 the Court ruled that the notation of the surveyorUnder the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands

geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision

of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any

plan approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly

(DENR) Center, that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area,

within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly,

Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the

public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable

Bureau of Forestry," is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible

agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part

evidence to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the

of the inalienable public domain.14 The burden of proof in overcoming the

inalienable public domain.

Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,18 the Court held that:

Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as
alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject
lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan
stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable.
However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must

verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant

must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.

establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a

presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,

Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind

investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act

of proof required by law to prove that the subject land falls within the

or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the

alienable and disposable zone. Respondents failed to submit a certification

Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the

from the proper government agency to establish that the subject land are

case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by

part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. In the

the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to

absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is

the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has

already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same

nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property

as still inalienable public domain.20

surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper

government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are
indeed alienable and disposable.

Anent respondents possession and occupation of the subject property, a

reading of the records failed to show that the respondents by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject

Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche, 19 the Court held

land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.1avvphil

that the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this
connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land
classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR

The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and

occupation over the subject property consists of the testimonies of Jose and
Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of the adjacent lot. However, their
testimonies

failed

to

establish

respondents

predecessors-in-interest'

possession and occupation of subject property since June 12, 1945 or

earlier. Jose, who was born on March 19, 1939, 21 testified that since he

why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in interest have possessed

attained the age of reason he already knew that the land subject of this

the subject properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12,

case belonged to them.22 Amado testified that he was a tenant of the land

1945, it was only in 1949 that their predecessors-in-interest started to

adjacent to the subject property since 1950, 23 and on about the same year,

declare the same for purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule that tax

he knew that the respondents were occupying the subject land. 24

declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the

right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact

Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no

specific details as to when respondents' predecessors-in-interest began
actual occupancy of the land subject of this case. While Jose testified that
the subject land was previously owned by their parents Zosimo and Ester,

that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in
the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-ininterest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a
claim of ownership.28

who earlier inherited the property from their parent Alejandro, no clear
evidence was presented to show Alejandro's mode of acquisition of

The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear

ownership and that he had been in possession of the same on or before

picture that respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-

June 12, 1945, the period of possession required by law. It is a rule that

interest have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession

general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof

and occupation of the subject land, under a bona fide claim of ownership

of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice. 25 An applicant in a land

since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish

the application but must impress thereto the facts and circumstances
evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land. 26

Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property
was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public
domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,

Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration

continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof

issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949.

under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their

At best, respondents can only prove possession since said date. What is

application for confirmation and registration of the subject property under

required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by

PD 1529 should be denied.

respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of

ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.27 Respondents failed to explain

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, affirming the

Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case

eight hundred twenty-five (25,825) square meters situated at Barangay

No. N-11514, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration

Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, is DENIED.

and confirmation of title filed by respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R.

dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented by Jose R.
dela Paz, over a parcel of land, with a total area of twenty-five thousand

SO ORDERED.