Professional Documents
Culture Documents
August 9, 2005
EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-PACIOLES, Petitioners,
vs.
MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who
dies but not to the people he leaves behind. For in death,
a persons estate remains, providing a fertile ground for
discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is
another case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband
and a mother of the deceased are locked in an
acrimonious dispute over the estate of their loved one.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B.
Pacioles, Jr., herein petitioner, against Miguela ChuatocoChing, herein respondent, assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision1 dated September 25, 1996 and Resolution 2
dated January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571. 3 The
Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated January 17,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99,
Quezon City denying petitioners motion for partition and
distribution of the estate of his wife, Miguelita ChingPacioles; and his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are undisputed.
On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real
properties with an estimated value of P10.5 million, stock
investments worth P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting
to P6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She
was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their
two minor children.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the
RTC a verified petition4 for the settlement of Miguelitas
estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be
issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the
estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelitas mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein
respondent, filed an opposition, specifically to petitioners
prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the
grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to
exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of
Miguelitas estate is composed of "paraphernal
properties." Respondent prayed that the letters of
administration be issued to her instead. 5 Afterwards, she
RESPONDENT
COURT
GRAVELY
ERRED
IN
AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE COURTS ORDER AND
RESOLUTION
NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT
RESPONDENT CHINGS OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE
CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS."
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial
court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon
questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be
part of the decedents estate?
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court
either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to
matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and
probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend
to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings.15 The patent rationale for
this rule is that such court exercises special and limited
jurisdiction.16
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that
an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon
questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine
whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely
incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals,17 we held:
"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve
with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the
probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and
is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title."
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payment of the
administration.28
debts
and
expenses
for
points
as
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DERIVATIVE SUIT
It is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary
action cannot resolve to perform acts
pertaining to a special proceeding because it is
subject to specific prescribed rules. [Emphasis
supplied.]
That an accounting of the funds and assets of Zenith to
determine the extent and value of Anastacias
shareholdings will be undertaken by a probate court and
not by a special commercial court is completely consistent
with the probate courts limited jurisdiction. It has the
power to enforce an accounting as a necessary means to
its authority to determine the properties included in the
inventory of the estate to be administered, divided up, and
distributed. Beyond this, the determination of title or
ownership over the subject shares (whether belonging to
Anastacia or Oscar) may be conclusively settled by the
probate court as a question of collation or advancement.
We had occasion to recognize the courts authority to act
on questions of title or ownership in a collation or
advancement situation in Coca v. Pangilinan33 where we
ruled:
It should be clarified that whether a particular
matter should be resolved by the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction
or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not
a jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a
procedural question involving a mode of practice
"which may be waived."
As a general rule, the question as to title to
property should not be passed upon in the testate
or intestate proceeding. That question should be
ventilated in a separate action. That general rule
has qualifications or exceptions justified by
expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass
upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice
to its final determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not
decide a question of title or ownership, yet if
the interested parties are all heirs, or the
question is one of collation or advancement,
or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of
third parties are not impaired, the probate court
is competent to decide the question of
ownership.
[Citations
omitted.
Emphasis
supplied.]
In sum, we hold that the nature of the present controversy
is not one which may be classified as an intra-corporate
need not
supplied.)
be
witnessed.
(Emphasis
Q. From where?
A.
From the land rentals and commercial
buildings at Pabayo-Gomez streets.12
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A.
Because we sometimes post a record of
accounts in behalf of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal.
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A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who was in possession of that will?
A. I.
Q. Since when did you have the possession of
the will?
A. Posting records.
A. It was in my mother's possession.
Q. Aside from that?
Q. So, it was not in your possession?
A. Carrying letters.
A. Sorry, yes.
Q. Letters of whom?
Q. And when did you come into possession since
as you said this was originally in the possession of
your mother?
A. Matilde.
Q. To whom?
A. 1985.17
A. To her creditors.
15
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A. Yes, sir.
Q. Showing to you this exhibit "S", there is that
handwritten "tugon", whose handwriting is this?
A. My Aunt.
Q. For what purpose?
Q. Why do you say this is the handwriting of your
aunt?
Q. Advice of what?
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Q.
What was your purpose of going to her
lawyer?
A. In writing.
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A.
Yes, sir I know her because she is my
godmother the husband is my godfather. Actually I
am related to the husband by consanguinity.
Q.
Aside from attending as counsel in that
Special Proceeding Case No. 427 what were the
other assistance wherein you were rendering
professional service to the deceased Matilde Vda
de Ramonal?
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No costs.
BENGZON, J.:
SO ORDERED.
Nobyembre 5, 1951.
Vicente Esguerra,
Sr. .............................................
Fausto E.
Gan .........................................................
Rosario E.
Gan .........................................................
Filomena
Alto ..........................................................
Beatriz
Alto ..............................................................
validly made here. (See also Sec. 46, Rule 123; Art. 830New Civil Code.)
Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic
wills?
Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest
objections to the holographic will is that it may be lost or
stolen4 an implied admission that such loss or theft
renders it useless..
This must be so, because the Civil Code requires it to be
protocoled and presented to the judge, (Art. 689) who
shall subscribe it and require its identity to be established
by the three witnesses who depose that they have no
reasonable doubt that the will was written by the testator
(Art. 691). And if the judge considers that the identity of
the will has been proven he shall order that it be filed (Art.
693). All these, imply presentation of the will itself. Art. 692
bears the same implication, to a greater degree. It
requires that the surviving spouse and the legitimate
ascendants and descendants be summoned so that they
may make "any statement they may desire to submit with
respect to the authenticity of the will." As it is universally
admitted that the holographic will is usually done by the
testator and by himself alone, to prevent others from
knowing either its execution or its contents, the above
article 692 could not have the idea of simply permitting
such relatives to state whether they know of the will, but
whether in the face of the document itself they think the
testator wrote it. Obviously, this they can't do unless the
will itself is presented to the Court and to them.
Undoubtedly, the intention of the law is to give the near
relatives the choice of either complying with the will if they
think it authentic, or to oppose it, if they think it spurious. 5
Such purpose is frustrated when the document is not
presented for their examination. If it be argued that such
choice is not essential, because anyway the relatives may
oppose, the answer is that their opposition will be at a
distinct disadvantage, and they have the right and
privilege to comply with the will, if genuine, a right which
they should not be denied by withholding inspection
thereof from them.
We find confirmation of these ideas--about exhibition of
the document itself--in the decision of the Supreme Court
of Spain of June 5, 1925, which denied protocolization or
probate to a document containing testamentary
dispositions in the handwriting of the deceased, but
apparently mutilated, the signature and some words
having been torn from it. Even in the face of allegations
and testimonial evidence (which was controverted),
ascribing the mutilation to the opponents of the will. The
aforesaid tribunal declared that, in accordance with the
provision of the Civil Code (Spanish) the will itself, whole
and unmutilated, must be presented; otherwise, it shall
produce no effect.
Considerando que sentado lo anterior, y
estableciendose en el parrafo segundo del
articulo 688 del Codigo civil, que para que sea
P2,707.44
===========
Additional residence tax for P14.50
2.
1945
===========
3. Real Estate dealer's tax for the P207.50
fourth quarter of 1946 and the ===========
May 8, 2009
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The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied
with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts
determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the
circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or
violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party was or is being committed. 17 (Emphasis
and italics in the original, citation omitted)
Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between
private individuals, with the petitioners therein branding as
"acts of terrorism" the therein respondents alleged entry
into the disputed land with armed men in tow. The Court
therein held:
On the whole, what is clear from these statements both
sworn and unsworn is the overriding involvement of
property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions
of physical possession of the property disputed by the
private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or
to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that
the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The
right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the
extent of the treats and harassments implied from the
presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the
alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of
the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the
threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the
petitioners is imminent or continuing. 18 (Emphasis in
the original; underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show
any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their
life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners
"in unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and
then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force
and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically
manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested
the herein petitioners (respondents)"19 will not suffice to
prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No
undue confinement or detention was present. In fact,
respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a
day after their arrest.20
Although respondents release from confinement does not
necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo,
absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition
that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty,
and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys
the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the
issuance of the writ cannot be justified.
June 5, 2008
December 3, 2009
SO ORDERED.
October 7, 2008
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007.
Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and
Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo
Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant
Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1)
the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court
issue the writ commanding therein respondents to make a
verified return within the period provided by law and
containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be
granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule
and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not
covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing,
render judgment as required in Sec. 187 of the Amparo
Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.8
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the
August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo
Rule and further resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be
issued to respondents requiring them to file with
the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written return
within five (5) working days from service of the
writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and
designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas
P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on
the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and
decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo.9
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein
respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT
OF AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are
hereby REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this
Court within five days from notice of this
decision all official and unofficial reports of
the investigation undertaken in connection
with their case, except those already on
file herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places
of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka
Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within
five days from notice of this decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court
all medical reports, records and charts,
reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed,
if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of
medical and (sic) personnel (military and
civilian) who attended to them from
2006 for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora
Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos
Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan
Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the "petitioners") and other
John Does numbering about 120. The private respondents
alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered
owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel
of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay,
Malay, Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2) they were the
disputed land's prior possessors when the petitioners armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and
together with unidentified persons numbering 120 entered the disputed land by force and intimidation,
without the private respondents' permission and against
the objections of the private respondents' security men,
and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
In their Answer4 dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied
the material allegations of the complaint. They essentially
claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors
of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private
respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private
respondents' certificate of title to the disputed property is
spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint
and interposed a counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January
2007 a decision5 in the private respondents' favor. It found
prior possession - the key issue in forcible entry cases - in
the private respondents' favor, thus:
"The key that could unravel the answer to this
question lies in the Amended Commissioner's
Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of
the records and the evidence the parties have
submitted. It is shown in the Amended
Commissioner's Report and Sketch that the land
in question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone
wire perimeter fence in pink and green highlighter
as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said
perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs
14 years ago. The foregoing findings of the
Commissioner in his report and sketch
collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after
they acquired the land in question on May 27,
1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex 'A', Affidavit
of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the
construction of the perimeter fence sometime in
1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275,
rec.).
From the foregoing established facts, it could be
safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in actual
[]
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the institution of
separate actions,24 for the effect of earlier-filed criminal
actions,25 and for the consolidation of petitions for the
issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed
criminal and civil action.26 These rules were adopted to
promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for
the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort
to other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process
dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the
reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point
in separately and directly intervening through a writ of
amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing
that the right to life, liberty or security - the personal
concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately
in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is
continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an
application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case,
by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari,
applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of
the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
The Writ of Habeas Data
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SO ORDERED.12
Petitioners' attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the
above-mentioned orders of Judge Veneracion and Judge
Hamoy failed, hence their recourse to the Court of
Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioners
averred that respondents judges had acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders allowing the
petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in
petitioners' records of birth to prosper in the lower courts.
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When
cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.'
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The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412
contemplates a summary procedure.
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as
follows:
"No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without a judicial order."
It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be
followed except to say that the corrections or changes
must be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be
gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for
obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature.
Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both
the terms "corrected" and "changed". In its ordinary sense,
to correct means to make or set right"; "to remove the
faults or errors from"44 while to change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute". 45 The provision
neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or
corrected nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect
that the correction or change may have. Hence, it is
proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register may
be changed or corrected under Article 412. What are the
entries in the civil register? We need not go further than
Articles 407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer.
"Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register."
"Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the
civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination
of
filiation;
(15)
voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name."
It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the
preceding provisions include not only status but also
nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement
that Article 412 does not contemplate matters that may
affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous.
This interpretation has the effect of isolating Article 412
from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New
Civil Code, in clear contravention of the rule of statutory
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Rule 108 petitions and the relief sought therefrom are very
different from those in the criminal complaint against
petitioners and their father which has for its cause of
action, the commission of a crime as defined and
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, and which
seeks the punishment of the accused; or the action for the
cancellation of Lee Tek Sheng naturalization certificate
which has for its cause of action the commission by Lee
Tek Sheng of an immoral act, and his ultimate deportation
for its object; or for that matter, the action for partition of
Keh Shiok Cheng's estate which has for its cause of action
the private respondents' right under the New Civil Code to
inherit from their mother's estate.
We therefore concur in the finding of the Court of Appeals
that there is no forum shopping to speak of in the concept
that this is described and contemplated in Circular No. 2891 of the Supreme Court. HCISED
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
28, 1994 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
son out of wedlock on May 24, 1992; that she and the
boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were never married; and that
the child is therefore illegitimate and should follow the
mother's surname. The petition impleaded the Local
Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena Borbon as
respondents.3
On April 23, 1997, the trial court issued a notice of hearing
stating:
May 9, 2002
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