TECSON VS COMELEC

Facts:
- On December 31, 2003, FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP).
- In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ represented himself to be a natural-born citizen.
- His real name was stated to be Fernando, Jr. or Ronald Allan Poe, born in Manila on August 20, 1939.
- On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate
of candidacy on the ground that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
- According to Fornier, FPJs parents were foreigners his mother Bessie Kelley Poe was an American and his father Allan F. Poe was a Spanish
national being a son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
- Even if Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate.
- Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before marrying Bessie Kelley according to an uncertified copy of a supposed
certification of the marriage in July 5, 1936.
- Even if no such prior marriage existed, Allan F. Poe married Bessey Kelley only a year after the birth of FPJ. The marriage certificate of their
marriage reflected the date of their marriage to be on September 16, 1940 where Allan was 25, unmarried and Filipino, and Bessie was 22,
unmarried and American.
- FPJs earliest established ascendant was his grandfather Lorenzo Pou.
- No birth certificate for Lorenzo but his death certificate issued upon his death in September 11, 1954 at age 84 identified him as a Filipino residing
in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
- Lorenzo married Marta Reyes and their son Allan was born on May 17, 1915. The birth certificate of Allan showed that his father was an Espaol
father and to a mestiza Espaol mother.
- FPJ presented the following pieces of evidence among others:
- Certification that there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan
- Certification by the OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there was no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe
and Paulita Gomez
- Certificate of birth of Ronald Allan F. Poe
- Original Certificate of Title if the Registry Deeds of Pangasinan in the name of Lorenzo Pou,
- Copies of tax declarations under the name of Lorenzo Pou
- Copy of certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou
- Copy of marriage contract of Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley
- Certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos, Pangasinan stating that the records of the birth of the said office from 1900 to May
1946 were destroyed during World War II
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, refers to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or

"Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates"
for President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondents birth, provided
that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters death
certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any other
evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence
prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan--respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a
Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935
Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus,
the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed
marriage had no bearing on respondents citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced
by the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

GO SR VS RAMOS
Go vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 167569, September 4, 2009
Facts: These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and
undesirable alien. He submitted as proof, Jimmys birth certificate indicating that the latters citizenship is Chinese. The
birth certificates of Jimmys siblings also indicate that they are Chinese. Jimmy, as a defense, explained that he is Filipino
since his father is also a Filipino, having elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph
4 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625, while his mother is Filipina.

Citizenship; election. Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship.
Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such
intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer
oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.

However, the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made upon reaching
the age of majority. The age of majority then commenced upon reaching 21 years. In the opinions of the then Secretary of
Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time
period on the decisions of the Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of
the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a reasonable time after attaining the
age of majority. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three
(3) years from reaching the age of majority.
It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the person has
always regarded himself as a Filipino. In hits case, not a single circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension
of the 3-year period. The fact that Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate such
belief, considering that the acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, the mere fact that he
was able to vote does not validate his irregular election of Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter
indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his real citizenship,
which, in this jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges granted only to
Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy
the rights and privileges of citizens of this country.
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a
Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding
citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state. Carlos T. Go., Sr., vs. Luis T. Ramos/Jimmy T. Go vs. Luis T.
Ramos/Hon. Alipio F. Fernandez, etc., et al. vs. Jimmy T. Go a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano, G.R. No. 167569/G.R.
No. 167570/G.R. No. 171946, September 4, 2009.
Citizenship; jus soli. The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of ones citizenship.
However, the Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. Since
then, said doctrine only benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court
decision on the mistaken application of jus soli.
Neither will the Philippine Bill of 1902 nor the Jones Law of 1916 make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare claim
that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the said laws, without any
supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice.
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the
parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of
a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines;
he automatically becomes a citizen himself. However, it is our considered view that absent any evidence proving that
Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him. Carlos T.
Go., Sr., vs. Luis T. Ramos/Jimmy T. Go vs. Luis T. Ramos/Hon. Alipio F. Fernandez, etc., et al. vs. Jimmy T.
Go a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano, G.R. No. 167569/G.R. No. 167570/G.R. No. 171946, September 4, 2009.

GONZALES V. PENNISI (2010)

Doctrines:
Judicial review is permitted if the courts believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. When the evidence submitted by a
deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should be recognized and the courts should promptly
enjoin the deportation proceedings. Courts may review the actions of the administrative offices authorized to deport aliens
and reverse their rulings when there is no evidence to sustain the rulings.
Facts:
Michael Alfio Pennisi (respondent) was born on 13 March 1975 in Queensland, Australia to Alfio Pennisi, an Australian
national, and Anita T. Quintos (Quintos), allegedly a Filipino citizen. In March 1999, respondent filed a petition for recognition as
Filipino citizen before the Bureau of Immigration (BI). Respondent submitted the following documents before the BI:
1. Certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Quintos, and a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of
San Antonio, Nueva Ecija stating that Quintos was born on 14 August 1949 of Filipino parents, Felipe M. Quintos
and Celina G. Tomeda, in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija;
2. Certified true copy of the certificate of marriage of respondents parents dated 9 January 1971, indicating the
Philippines as Quintos birthplace;
3. Certified true copy of Quintos Australian certificate of registration of alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino;
4. Certified true copy of respondents birth certificate stating that he was born on 13 March 1975 and indicating the
Philippines as his mothers birthplace; and
5. Certified true copy of the letter dated 14 July 1999 of the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural
Affairs, stating that as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has not been granted Australian citizenship.
On 17 February 2000, BI Associate Commissioner Alan Roullo Yap issued an order granting respondents petition for
recognition as Filipino citizen. In a 2nd Indorsement dated 28 February 2000, the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
disapproved the order. However, upon respondents submission of additional documents, BI Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez
granted the order as per Recognition Order No. 206679 dated 3 March 2000 which states:
Finding the grounds cited in the instant petition for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines filed on behalf of the
applicant to be well-founded and meritorious, we hereby authorize the recognition of MICHAEL ALFIO PENNISI
as a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Article III[,] Section 1, para. 2 of the 1973 Constitution.
The DOJ affirmed Recognition Order No. 206679, as follows:
The additional documents submitted (duly authenticated Certificate of Birth of the petitioner and Certificate of
Marriage of his parents), together with the original records, satisfactorily establish that petitioner was born in
Queensland, Australia, on March 13, 1975, the legitimate issue of the spouses Anita T. Quintos, a natural-born
Filipino citizen, and Alfio Pennisi, an Australian national, and may, therefore, be deemed a citizen of the Philippines
pursuant to Section 1(2), Article III of the 1973 Constitution, in relation to Section 1(2), Article IV of the present
Constitution.
Thereafter, the DOJ issued Department Order No. 412 dated 21 September 2004 creating a special committee, with Chief State
Counsel Ricardo V. Paras as Chairperson, to investigate the citizenship of Filipino-foreign players in the PBA. The special committee
required respondent to submit a position paper in connection with the investigation. On 18 October 2004, the DOJ issued a
resolution revoking respondents certificate of recognition and directing the BI to begin summary deportation proceedings
against respondent and other Filipino-foreign PBA players.
On 20 October 2004, respondent and Davonn Harp (Harp), another Filipino-foreign PBA player, filed a petition for
prohibition with an application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 268 (trial court), to enjoin the DOJ and BI from instituting summary deportation proceedings against them. On even date,
respondent received a letter from the BI directing him to submit, within five days from notice, a memorandum in connection with the
deportation proceedings being conducted against him. Respondent submitted his memorandum on 25 October 2004.
In a hearing before the trial court on the same date, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the DOJ and BI, manifested that
respondent would not be subjected to summary deportation and that he would be given an opportunity to present evidence of his
Filipino citizenship in a full-blown trial on the merits. However, in a Summary Deportation Order dated 26 October 2004, the BI
directed the deportation of several Filipino-foreign PBA players, including respondent. Respondent and Harp withdrew their petition
before the trial court without prejudice, which the trial court granted in its order of 4 November 2004. Respondent filed a petition for
review, with an application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals ruled that apart from the affidavits, no other evidence was presented to prove that Quintos was not a
Filipino citizen or that her birth certificate was false or fraudulently obtained. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents
documentary evidence before the BI and DOJ have more probative value and must prevail. The Court of Appeals further noted that
among the documents presented by respondent were authenticated documents issued by the Commonwealth of Australia attesting that
Quintos consistently presented herself to be a Filipino citizen. The Court of Appeals ruled that the authenticity of the documents
issued by the Australian government was never questioned nor put in issue. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the fact that the
Quintoses and Tomedas were not included in the census or master list of voters did not automatically render Quintos birth certificate
invalid. The Court of Appeals ruled that unless a public document is declared invalid by competent authority, it should be
presumed valid and binding for all intents and purposes.

Issue:
W/N the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in finding that respondent is a Filipino citizen
Held:
NO, the Court sustains the Court of Appeals decision that the evidence presented before the BI and the DOJ, stating that as of 14 July
1999, Quintos has not been granted Australian citizenship, have more probative value and must prevail over the statements of Soliman
and Peralta before the Senate Committees. The Committee Report on respondent stated:
F. Michael Alfio Pennisi was able to present before the BI and the committees, the documents required in granting
recognition of Philippine citizenship, particularly the birth certificate of his Filipino mother, Anita Tomeda Quintos.
However, a verification of the authenticity of the above documents reveals highly suspicious circumstances.
His alleged mother and other relatives, specifically the parents of the former, namely: Felipe M. Quintos and Celina
G. Tomeda, who were mentioned in his application for recognition of Philippine citizenship in the BI, are not known
and have never existed in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
According to the affidavits executed by Barangay Captain Ramon Soliman and Barangay Treasurer Condrado P.
Peralta of the abovementioned place, there are no Quintoses or Tomedas that have lived or have resided in the said
barangay.
Both barangay officials further claimed that even in the census or master list of voters, the family names of Quintos
or Tomedas do not exist.
His mothers certificate of birth in the civil registrar of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija was issued on the basis of an
application for late registration, which is ten (10) years after the date of birth.
The memorandum of the DOJ special committee also cited only the affidavits of Soliman and Peralta and then
concluded that the evidence presented before the Senate Committees had overcome the presumption that the entries
in the certificate of live birth of Quintos are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that while the affidavits of Soliman and Peralta might have cast doubt on the
validity of Quintos certificate of live birth, such certificate remains valid unless declared invalid by competent
authority. The rule stands that (d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. x x x.
We further sustain the Court of Appeals that there could be reasons why the Quintoses and Tomedas were not included in the
census, such as they could have been mere transients in the place. As for their absence in the masters list of voters, they could
have failed to register themselves as voters. The late registration of Quintos certificate of live birth was made 10 years after her
birth and not anytime near the filing of respondents petition for recognition as Filipino citizen. As such, it could not be
presumed that the certificates late filing was meant to use it fraudulently. Finally, the Australian Department of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs itself attested that as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has not been granted Australian citizenship. Respondent submitted
a certified true copy of Quintos Australian certificate of registration of alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino. These pieces of
evidence should prevail over the affidavits submitted by Soliman and Peralta to the Senate Committees.
Citizenship; collateral attack prohibited. Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a
Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he refers to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichongs father
which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. Under Philippine
law, an attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. Renald F. Vilando vs.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero
Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.
Citizenship; forfeiture; application for an alien certificate of registration. Vilandos assertion that Limkaichong
cannot derive Philippine citizenship from her mother because the latter became a Chinese citizen when she married Julio
Sy, as provided for under Section 1 (7) of Commonwealth Act No. 63 in relation to Article 2 (1) Chapter II of the Chinese
Revised Nationality Law of February 5, 1959, likewise failed. Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true
copy of the alleged Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to prove that Limkaichongs mother indeed lost her Philippine
citizenship. He failed to establish his case through competent and admissible evidence to warrant a reversal of the HRET
ruling. Also, an application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture of Philippine
citizenship. Obtaining an ACR by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her original citizenship.
Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. The Supreme Court has consistently held that an application for,
and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. For

renunciation to effectively result in loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Such express renunciation is lacking in
this case. Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her
daughter. Renald F. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and
Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.
In. Re. CHING
In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar
but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath.
Apparently, Chings father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married before he
was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign
citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a
certified public accountant a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La
Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching
should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; that under prevailing jurisprudence, upon
reaching the age of majority is construed as within 7 years after reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old
because he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching
the age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General recommended that the rule be relaxed due to the special
circumstance of Ching.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyers oath.
HELD: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot agree with the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years had lapsed and its way beyond the allowable 7 year period. The
Supreme Court even noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it cant be
extended any further). Chings special circumstances cant be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life
that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in
place. Further, Ching didnt give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess its simply
because he never thought hes Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute
an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Chings
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CHULE Y. LIM, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court stemmed from a petition for correction of
entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del
Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4933.
In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was
registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth

to Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays
that they be corrected.
The trial court then issued an Order,[1] which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the hearing of this case be set on December 27, 1999
before this Court, Hall of Justice, Rosario Heights, Tubod, Iligan City at 8:30 oclock in the afternoon at which date, place and time any
interested person may appear and show cause why the petition should not be granted.
Let this order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Iligan and the Province of Lanao del Norte once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioner.
Furnish copies of this order the Office of the Solicitor General at 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Vill., Makati City and the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City at Quezon Ave., Pala-o, Iligan City.
SO ORDERED.
During the hearing, respondent testified thus:
First, she claims that her surname Yu was misspelled as Yo. She has been using Yu in all her school records and in
her marriage certificate.[2] She presented a clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) [3] to further show the
consistency in her use of the surname Yu.
Second, she claims that her fathers name in her birth record was written as Yo Diu To (Co Tian) when it should have
been Yu Dio To (Co Tian).
Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and
mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being
a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she should have been
described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married.
Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents were both Filipinos from
Camiguin. She added that she and her daughters father were never married because the latter had a prior subsisting
marriage contracted in China.
In this connection, respondent presented a certification attested by officials of the local civil registries of Iligan City
and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to
the present.
The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not present any evidence although it actively participated
in the proceedings by attending hearings and cross-examining respondent and her witnesses.
On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondents petition and rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, to set the records of the petitioner straight and in their proper perspective, the
petition is granted and the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is directed to make the following corrections in the birth records of the
petitioner, to wit:
1. Her family name from YO to YU;
2. Her fathers name from YO DIU TO (CO TIAN) to YU DIOTO (CO TIAN);
3. Her status from legitimate to illegitimate by changing YES to NO in answer to the question LEGITIMATE?; and,
4. Her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts decision.
[5]

Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT CHULE Y.
LIM FROM CHINESE TO FILIPINO DESPITE THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT NEVER DEMONSTRATED ANY
COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO CONTINUE USING HER FATHERS SURNAME
DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT RESPONDENT IS AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD. [6]
To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error respondents recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court to effect what indisputably are substantial corrections and changes in entries in the civil register. To clarify, Rule 108
of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil
register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic
v. Valencia[7]where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts
have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite
partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. [8]
As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that the Republics failure to cite this error amounts to a
recognition that this case properly falls under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court considering that the proceeding can
be appropriately classified as adversarial.
Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional
requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the
1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.
[9]
Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of
Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by
the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The
said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of
the Philippines.[10]
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only
to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering
that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said
constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to
elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar,[11] citing In re Florencio Mallare,[12] we held:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer
on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of
the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16,
1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino
divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. [13]
This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of
majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old. [14] The exercise of the right of suffrage
and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. [15]
In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals decision in allowing respondent to use
her fathers surname despite its finding that she is illegitimate.

The Republics submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her fathers
surname. What it did allow was the correction of her fathers misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she
can remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her to use her fathers surname.
We agree with the Court of Appeals when it held:
Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To bar her at this time from using her fathers surname which she has used for four
decades without any known objection from anybody, would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of the reasons allowed for changing
ones name or surname is to avoid confusion.
Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law regulating the use of aliases, a person is allowed to use a name by
which he has been known since childhood.
Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed the same issue. In Pabellar v. Rep. of the Phils.,[16] we held:
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which regulates the use of aliases, allows a person to use a name by which he has been
known since childhood (Lim Hok Albano v. Republic, 104 Phil. 795; People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679; Republic v. Taada, infra).
Even legitimate children cannot enjoin the illegitimate children of their father from using his surname (De Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84
Phil. 222).[17]
While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname, [18] there is no such requirement for the
continued use of a surname which a person has already been using since childhood. [19]
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship remains
valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief
to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. [20] In this case, the Republic has not
shown that the Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In respondents case,
the change in the surname that she has been using for 40 years would even avoid confusion to her community in general.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68893 dated May 29, 2002, is AFFIRMED.Accordingly, the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is
DIRECTED to make the following corrections in the birth record of respondent Chule Y. Lim, to wit:
1. Her family name from YO to YU;
2. Her fathers name from YO DIU TO (CO TIAN) to YU DIOTO (CO TIAN);
3. Her status from legitimate to illegitimate by changing YES to NO in answer to the question LEGITIMATE?; and,
4. Her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino.
SO ORDERED.