CAYETANO v MONSOD

In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on Elections. His
appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Monsods appointment was
opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed to meet the
Constitutional requirement which provides that the chairman of the COMELEC should have been
engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.
Monsods track record as a lawyer:
1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.
2. Immediately after passing, worked in his fathers law firm for one year.
3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held
various positions in various foreign corporations.
4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local
corporations until 1986.
5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What constitutes practice
of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know
that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what is loosely described as
business counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working day the average general
practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal
skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing
numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside
their specialty. By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the
relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else.
Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills
of client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.
1. Habituality. The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding ones self out to
the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the
general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a
lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva,
14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active
and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to
the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

(People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents
involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term practice of law (Ernani Pao, Bar
Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. Peoples Stockyards State
Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v.
Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and
all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et
al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training
and experience is within the term practice of law. (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyerclient relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law
but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he
cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics,
1989 ed., p. 30).
Monsod did not habitually practice law. It may be granted that he performed activities which are
related to the practice of law like drafting legal documents and giving legal advice, but he only did
so as isolated incidents.
In Re Cunanan, et al., March 18, 1954
IN RE CUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Resoluti, 1954on
March 18
Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953.
In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those
candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the
bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were
still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also
others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the
law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.
Held:
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment

and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have
been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system
from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character,
or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.
In the Matter of Integration of the IBP
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to
integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be
constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of
the Bar at this time?
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view
that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the
exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec.
13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law."
The Second Issue hinges on the effects of
Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional
rights of freedom of association and freedom
of speech, and on the nature of the dues
exacted from him.
1. Freedom of Association
2. Regulatory Fee
3. Freedom of Speech
4. Fair to all Lawyers
Anent the third and last issue a total of
15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago
who have turned in their individual
responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted
in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or
2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or
1.04 per cent) are non-commital

The purposes of an integrated Bar, in

general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its
members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and
conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its
members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of
cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law,
jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice
and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to
the Bench and to the public, and publish
information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal
research in substantive and adjective law,
and make reports and recommendations
thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other
things, make it possible for the legal
profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in
maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the
abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting
officers;

on the importance of preventive legal advice,

and on the functions and duties of the Filipino
lawyer; and
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its
responsibility in the disciplining and/or
removal of incompetent and unworthy judges
and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally
cannot defend itself except within its own
forum, from the assaults that politics and selfinterest may level at it, and assist it to
maintain its integrity, impartiality and
independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of
judges and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law,
and break up any monopoly of local practice
maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of
disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and
establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer

reference services throughout the country so

that the poor may not lack competent legal
service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational
materials that are difficult to obtain in many of
our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of
continuing legal education for practising
attorneys in order to elevate the standards of
the profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and
promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law
libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the
people on their legal rights and obligations,
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and
meaningful country-wide involvement of the
lawyer population in the solution of the
multifarious problems that afflict the nation.

Petition for Leave to Resume Practive of Law

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved
and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of
allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada.
Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.
Issue: WON petitioner may still resume practice? YES
Held: Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for admission to the bar
be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a
resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines.
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law.
In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]. Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen
of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225.
Before he can can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do
so, conditioned on:
- the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues;
- the payment of professional tax;
- the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update
him of legal developments and
- the retaking of the lawyers oath.
DECISION: GRANTED
Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar (Vicente Ching)
FACTS: Petitioner, who resided in the Philippines since his birth during the 1935 Constitution, is a
legitimate son of a Filipina married to a Chinese citizen. Subsequently, petitioner elected Philippine
citizenship 14 years after he reached the age of majority. OSG recommends the relaxation of the
standing rule on the construction of the phrase reasonable period and the allowance of the

petitioner to elect Philippine citizenship due to circumstances like petitioner having lived in the
Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino.
ISSUE: Whether or not a legitimate child under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an
alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship 14 years after he has reached the age of majority.
HELD: No, despite the special circumstances, Petitioner failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
The span of 14 years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of
the requirement upon reaching the age of majority. In addition, there was no reason why he
delayed his election of Philippine citizenship
Brion v. Brillantes, Jr
Facts:
Petitioner Marciano P. Brion, Jr., in this petition for disbarment, avers that respondent violated the
courts decree of perpetual disqualification imposed upon respondent Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr. (in
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza v. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr.) from
assuming any post in government service, including any posts in government-owned and
controlled corporations, when he accepted a legal consultancy post at the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA), from 1998 to 2000. Said consultancy included an appointment by LWUA as
6th member of the Board of Directors of the Urdaneta (Pangasinan) Water District. Upon expiration
of the legal consultancy agreement, this was subsequently renewed as a Special Consultancy
Agreement.
Respondent admits the existence of the Legal Consultancy Contract as well as the Special
Consultancy Contract. However, he raises the affirmative defense that under Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1993, services rendered pursuant to a
consultancy contract shall not be considered government services, and therefore, are not covered
by Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent has transgressed the letter and spirit of the courts decree in
the Atienza case.
Held:
By performing duties and functions, which clearly pertain to a contractual employee, albeit in the
guise of an advisor or consultant, respondent has transgressed both letter and spirit of the Courts
decree in Atienza.
The Court finds that for all intents and purposes, respondent performed duties and functions of a
non-advisory nature, which pertain to a contractual employee of LWUA. As stated by petitioner in
his reply, there is a difference between a consultant hired on a contractual basis (which is governed
by CSC M.C. No. 27, s. 1993) and a contractual employee (whose appointment is governed,

among others, by the CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointment and other Personnel Actions). The
lawyers primary duty as enunciated in the Attorneys Oath is to uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. That duty in its irreducible
minimum entails obedience to the legal orders of the courts. Respondents disobedience to this
Courts order prohibiting his reappointment to any branch, instrumentality, or agency of
government, including government owned and controlled corporations, cannot be camouflaged by
a legal consultancy or a special consultancy contract.
Hence, Atty. Brillantes was suspended and ordered to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
(Php10,000.00).
Belleza v. Macasa
FACTS:
Complainant availed of respondents legal services in connection with the case of her son. He then
paid P30, 000 for Attorneys fees in three installments but respondent did not issue any receipt.
Respondent also received P18,000 from complainant as a bond to secure the provisional liberty of
the latters son. Again, respondent did not issue any receipt. Complainant later found out that
respondent did not remit the amount to the court.
Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several occasions but the
latter ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainants son and
complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public Attorneys Office for her sons defense.
Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint for disbarment.
ISSUE: WON respondent should be disbarred.
RULING:
After accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving his attorneys fees,
respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient legal assistance. For all
intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client. Indeed, on account of
respondents continued inaction, complainant was compelled to seek the services of the Public
Attorneys Office. Respondents lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainants son was
reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainants son, it also deprived him of his constitutional
right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to him for posting a bond to
secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent unduly impeded the latters constitutional
right to bail.
Furthermore, respondent never denied receiving P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of
posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her son. He never used the money for its
intended purpose yet also never returned it to the client. Worse, he unjustifiably refused to turn
over the amount to complainant despite the latters repeated demands.

Respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa is hereby found GUILTY not only of dishonesty but also of
professional misconduct x x x He is therefore DISBARRED from the practice of law effective
immediately.