Professional Documents
Culture Documents
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that
from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and
registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World.
And it has many consequences.
STHDAc
This decision inevitably aects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons
and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while
unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide
denitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings
under Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so,
the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the
Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of
untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has
unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed
in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on
our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and
the legal principles that have developed our public land law, though our social
obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan led an application for land registration
covering a parcel of land identied as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre, 2
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, 3 and
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous
adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
HaSEcA
The application was raed to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay
City, Branch 18. The Oce of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the
State. 4 Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his
witness, Aristedes Velazco, testied at the hearing. Velazco testied that the
property was originally belonged * to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his
great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo
and Esteban the fourth being Aristedes's grandfather. Upon Lino's death, his four
sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966,
Esteban's wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties
inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and
Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,
including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was
this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. 5
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes
Velazco. He further manifested that he "also [knew] the property and I arm the
truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco." 6 The Republic of the Philippines
likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certication dated
11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Oce,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated
that the subject property was "veried to be within the Alienable or Disposable land
per Land Classication Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982." 7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration
and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan
Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as
supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this
Once this Decision becomes nal and executory, the corresponding decree
of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan
had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in nding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law
for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 8 reversing the RTC
and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to
the classication of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the
appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certication had veried that the
property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the
Velazcos' possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of
the period of possession. This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14 (1)
of the Property Registration Decree was based on the Court's ruling in Republic v.
Herbieto. 9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals; 10 hence, it
was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before
this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit, 11 which was handed down just
four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto
cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial
Court therein which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction
in the rst place since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the
hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling
doctrine, especially when the property in question is agricultural land. Therefore,
with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the
alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of
possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration
Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc, 12 and on 11 November 2008, the
case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the
oral arguments, to wit:
HICEca
1.
In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain
may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be
classied as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sucient
that such classication occur at any time prior to the ling of the applicant
for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2.
For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
may a parcel of land classied as alienable and disposable be deemed private
land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance
with the Civil Code?
3.
May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either
because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be
registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in
relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4.
Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their
names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree or both? 13
With respect to Section 14 (2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30
years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the
coverage of Section 14 (2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land
sought to be registered was previously classied as agricultural land of the public
domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been
"converted" into private property through prescription. To bolster their argument,
petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties. 19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14 (2) are more
extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive
prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial property", while Section
14 (2) speaks of "private lands". It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case
that presented Section 14 (2) as a ground for application for registration, and that
the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48 (b)
of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The
OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run
against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land
was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise oer special arguments with respect to the particular factual
circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full
understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.
HSEIAT
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its
enactment, governed the classication and disposition of lands of the public domain.
The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands. 20 Alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain are further classied according to their uses
into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations
for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses. 21
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act
acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of
"by conrmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through "judicial legalization". 22
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the
details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48.
The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
conrmation of their claims and the issuance of a certicate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona de claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the ling of the application for conrmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certicate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
DEHcTI
Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the
law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two signicant amendments were introduced
by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was changed to "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain". The OSG submits that this amendment
restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered. 23 This is not actually the
case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, "agricultural lands" are a mere subset
of "lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition." Evidently, alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only "agricultural
lands".
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for
"thirty (30) years immediately preceding the ling of the application" to possession
"since June 12, 1945 or earlier". The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was rst promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to
agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.
However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that
the bona de claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30)
years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at
June 12, 1945. . . .
It bears further observation that Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the
same as Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codied the
various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the public
domain. It is Section 14 (1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the
public domain. The provision reads:
SEC. 14.
Who may apply. The following persons may le in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1)
those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona de claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
SDTIaE
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion
of Section 14 (1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in eect. Both laws
commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who "have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona de claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That circumstance may have led to the impression
that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for conrmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The
following persons may le in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of
the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than
establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public
Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 eective 25 January 1977, that has
primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been "in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona de claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title by applying with the
proper court for the conrmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title.
DCSETa
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under
Section 48 (b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and
Section 14 (a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the
position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her
predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona de claim of ownership since
12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must have
been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSG's approach, all lands
certied as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either
under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in
Naguit.
EcTDCI
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is led. If the
State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need
to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classied as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is
already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.
EIcSTD
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14 (1) is that which
was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in
Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual
inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable
prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona de claim
of ownership to avail of judicial conrmation of their imperfect titles than what
would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is signicant, especially
considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from
Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab
initio in the rst place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial
hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suces that the
Court's acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein
concerning Section 14 (1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura, 26 the Court, citing
Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the
[s]ubject [property was] classied as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. . ." That
statement, in the context of Section 14 (1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the
passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The
application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14 (2). The evidence
submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on their
part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14 (1). It is not
even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed
entitlement to original registration following Section 14 (1), their position being
that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona de claim of ownership for
over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.
aCHDST
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any
precedental value with respect to Section 14 (1). On the other hand, the ratio of
Naguit is embedded in Section 14 (1), since it precisely involved situation wherein
the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona de claim of ownership
prior to 12 June 1945. The Court's interpretation of Section 14 (1) therein was
decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or
Herbieto provides the nal word of the Court on Section 14 (1) is now settled in
favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals 27 since in the latter, the application for registration had been led before
the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces
Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its
ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in
Republic v. Ceniza, 28 which involved a claim of possession that extended back to
1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only in
1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset
of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certication dated November
25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Ocer in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Oce in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to
be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project
No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980". This is sucient
evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private
respondents' application. Further, the certication enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in this
case. Worth noting also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating
that:
[n]o opposition was led by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to
contest the application of appellees on the ground that the property
still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the
lots in question are forestal land. . . .
IDASHa
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of
public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a
conrmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private
respondents as far as the rst requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of
proving the alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able
to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the
factual ndings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions,
petitioner did not show that this is one of them. 29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored
Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48 (b) of public domain lands
declared alienable or disposable thirty-ve (35) years and 180 days after 12 June
1945? The telling dierence is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was
led nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or disposable,
while in Bracewell, the application was led nine (9) years before the land was
declared alienable or disposable. That crucial dierence was also stressed in
Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a dierence which the dissent seeks
to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14 (2).
The provision reads:
SEC. 14.
Who may apply. The following persons may le in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
The Court in Naguit oered the following discussion concerning Section 14 (2),
which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we
nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory
P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of
the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12,
1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws."
DEcSaI
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14 (2), unlike in this case where
petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where
the evidence denitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back as
1948. It is in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible
basis for application for original registration under Section 14 (2). Specically, it is
Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are
patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the
other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive
prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes
private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
caTESD
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of
real property through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by
ordinary prescription of ten (10) years, 32 or through extraordinary prescription of
thirty (30) years. 33 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good
faith, 34 as well as just title. 35
When Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that
persons "who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws", it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis
for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that specically
allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including patrimonial
property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that needs armation is
whether Section 14 (2) does encompass original registration proceedings over
patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has acquired through
prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that
properties classied as alienable public land may be converted into private property
by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.
36 Yet if we ascertain the source of the "thirty-year" period, additional complexities
relating to Section 14 (2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge. For there
are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The rst source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of
alienable public lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at least
thirty years.
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made
the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the rst time. Nonetheless,
applications for registration led prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule
introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14 (2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it
applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in
relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil
Code ordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription,
which, under Article 1137, is completed "through uninterrupted adverse possession.
. . for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith".
Obviously, the rst source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942,
became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under
Section 14 (2). However, there is a material dierence between how the thirty
(30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil
Code.
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer
to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set
forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application
for conrmation of title, without any qualication as to whether the property should
be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the
entire thirty (30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert
Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement, 38 similar to our earlier
nding with respect to the present language of Section 48 (b), which now sets 12
June 1945 as the point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as
basis for original registration became Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree, which entitled those "who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws" to apply for original registration.
Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription
under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into
operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does
not hold true with respect to Section 14 (1).
B.
Unlike Section 14 (1), Section 14 (2) explicitly refers to the principles on
prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law
concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section
14 (2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14 (1).
DSHTaC
The critical qualication under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of
the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription". The identication what consists of patrimonial property is
provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420.
(1)
Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2)
Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and
are intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Art. 421.
All other property of the State, which is not of the character
stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State". It is this provision that controls how public
dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to
acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property
"which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion
property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already
classied as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if
when * it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classied as alienable or disposable, remains property of
the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable
lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus aects the registrability
even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona
de possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in
accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands
owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and
ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply
the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The
remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch.
Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
aATEDS
camps, in whole or in part. 42 Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the
military lands subject thereof are "alienable and disposable pursuant to the
provisions of existing laws and regulations governing sales of government
properties." 43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have
become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial,
as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these lands are to be
sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases at Clark
and Subic. 44 Such purpose can be tied to either "public service" or "the
development of national wealth" under Article 420 (2). Thus, at that time, the lands
remained property of the public dominion under Article 420 (2), notwithstanding
their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the
BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands become private property and
cease to be property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such
in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the
period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial
be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule
in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of
possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for
the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion
property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription
according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14 (2)
falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no
way that possession during the time that the land was still classied as public
dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription
and justify registration.
EHTSCD
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14 (1) and Section
14 (2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14 (1) mandates registration on the
basis of possession, while Section 14 (2) entitles registration on the basis
o f prescription. Registration under Section 14 (1) is extended under the
aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while
registration under Section 14 (2) is made available both by the Property
Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the
thirty-year period available through Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former
speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under the
latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription.
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how
our land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under
the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article
1113, which states that "[a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription", and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription".
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired
under the Civil Code. The rst is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under
Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article
1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the
Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State
through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to
impose such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisites good
faith and just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of
Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code, 45 provisions
that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarication. Under Article
1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription "when the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law
for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the
owner or could not transmit any right". Dr. Tolentino explains:
ITCcAD
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership,
and which would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had
been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by prescription.
Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in
payment. 46
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the
applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major
premise for the argument is that "the State, as the owner and grantor, could not
transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the required period of
possession". 47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor
referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the
person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale,
exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or
other real rights.
SIEHcA
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1)
In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and conrms that "those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona de claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on
the length and quality of their possession.
(a)
(b)
(2)
In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when
the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition
of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a)
(b)
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insucient to establish that Malabanan
has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48 (b) of the Public
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14 (2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is
no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classication of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
VI.
A nal word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines
established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomture over the implications of
today's ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in
the country will be aected by this ruling. The social implications cannot be
dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to the
Filipino people if we simply levied the law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a
phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common
among the so-called "Third World" countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the
disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has
been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these public
domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have proven unattractive
due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said
properties. 52 Judicial conrmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most
viable, if not the most attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as
revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively
held residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more
have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They have
been regarded for generation by their families and their communities as common
law owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according them legitimate
states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the
law itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be
up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and
formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public
domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite
two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial conrmation of imperfect
title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of
public dominion property into patrimonial.
One's sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not
only of that individual, but also to the person's family. Once that sense of security is
deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring
welcome closure to the long pestering problem.
caHIAS
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion in dismissing the application for registration of a
piece of land originally led by the late Mario Malabanan (Malabanan), petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest. The land subject of the instant Petition, being alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, may not be acquired by prescription under the
provisions of the Civil Code, nor registered pursuant to Section 14 (2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
CTIEac
At the outset, it must be made clear that the Property Registration Decree governs
registration of land under the Torrens system. It can only identify which titles,
already existing or vested, may be registered under the Torrens system; but it
cannot be the source of any title to land. It merely conrms, but does not confer
ownership. 1
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree allows "those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws",
First, Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree clearly and explicitly refers
to "private lands", without mention at all of public lands. There is no other way to
understand the plain language of Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree
except that the land was already private when the applicant for registration
acquired ownership thereof by prescription. The prescription therein was not the
means by which the public land was converted to private land; rather, it was the
way the applicant acquired title to what is already private land, from another person
previously holding title to the same. 2 The provision in question is very clear and
unambiguous. Well-settled is the rule that when the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only
for application. 3
With the understanding that Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree
applies only to what are already private lands, then, there is no question that the
same can be acquired by prescription under the provisions of the Civil Code,
because, precisely, it is the Civil Code which governs rights to private lands.
ECcTaS
Second, Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, as amended, reads:
Section 11.
Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be
disposed of only as follows:
(1)
(2)
By sale;
(3)
By lease; and
(4)
By judicial legalization; or
By administrative legalization (free patent). (Emphasis
ours.)
The afore-quoted provision recognizes that agricultural public lands may be disposed
of by the State, and at the same time, mandates that the latter can only do so by
the modes identied in the same provision. Thus, the intent of the legislature to
make exclusive the enumeration of the modes by which agricultural public land
may be disposed of by the State in Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as amended, is
not only readily apparent, but explicit. And, undeniably, the enumeration of the
modes for acquiring agricultural public land in the said provision does not include
prescription, in the concepts described and periods prescribed by the Civil Code.
Neither the Civil Code nor the Property Registration Decree can overcome the
express restriction placed by the Public Land Act, as amended, on the modes by
which the State may dispose of agricultural public land.
The Public Land Act, as amended, is a special law specically applying to lands of the
public domain, except timber and mineral lands. The Public Land Act, as amended,
being a special law, necessarily prevails over the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is
the rule in statutory construction that "where two statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail."
Generalia specialibus non derogant. 4
As for the Property Registration Decree, it must be stressed that the same cannot
confer title to land and can only conrm title that already exists or has vested. As
has already been previously discussed herein, title to agricultural public land vests
or is acquired only by any of the modes enumerated in Section 11 of the Public Land
Act, as amended.
TcADCI
And, third, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act was amended several times,
changing the period of possession required for acquiring an imperfect title to
agricultural public land:
Under the public land act, judicial conrmation of imperfect title required
possession en concepto de dueo since time immemorial, or since July
26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this requirement was retained. However, on
June 22, 1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No. 141.
This later enactment required adverse possession for a period of only
thirty (30) years. On January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No.
1073, further amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for ling
applications for judicial conrmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to
December 31, 1987. Under this decree, "the provisions of Section 48 (b)
and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended
in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable
land of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru
his predecessor-in-interest under a bona de claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945." 5 (Emphasis ours.)
Prior to Presidential Decree No. 1073, imperfect title to agricultural land of the
public domain could be acquired by adverse possession of 30 years. Presidential
Decree No. 1073, issued on 25 January 1977, amended Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act by requiring possession and occupation of alienable and disposable land of
the public domain since 12 June 1945 or earlier for an imperfect title. Hence, by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1073, the requisite period of possession for
acquiring imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain is no
longer determined according to a xed term (i.e., 30 years); instead, it shall be
reckoned from a xed date (i.e., 12 June 1945 or earlier) from which the
possession should have commenced.
If the Court allows the acquisition of alienable and disposable land of the public
domain by prescription under the Civil Code, and registration of title to land thus
acquired under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, it would be
sanctioning what is eectively a circumvention of the amendment introduced by
Presidential Decree No. 1073 to Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. Acquisition of
alienable and disposable land of the public domain by possession would again be
made to depend on a xed term ( i.e.,10 years for ordinary prescription and 30 years
for extraordinary prescription), rather than being reckoned from the xed date
presently stipulated by Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.
DCcIaE
There being no basis for petitioners' application for registration of the public
agricultural land in question, accordingly, the same must be dismissed.
I, however, must express my dissent to the discussion in the majority opinion
concerning the contradictory pronouncements of the Court in Republic v. Court of
Appeals 6 and Republic v. Herbieto, 7 on imperfect titles to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, acquired in accordance with Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, and registered pursuant to Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
According to Naguit,a person seeking judicial conrmation of an imperfect title
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, need only prove that he
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the
subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the subject land is alienable and
disposable at the time of ling of the application for judicial conrmation and/or
registration of title. On the other hand, it was held in Herbieto that such a person
must establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and
occupation of the subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the subject
land was likewise already declared alienable and disposable since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The majority opinion upholds the ruling in Naguit, and declares the
pronouncements on the matter in Herbieto as mere obiter dictum .
As the ponente o f Herbieto, I take exception to the dismissive treatment of my
elucidation in said case on the acquisition of imperfect title to alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, as mere obiter dictum .
An obiter dictum has been dened as an opinion expressed by a court upon some
question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a
remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by the
way", that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before
him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or
introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as
precedent. 8
To recall, the Republic of the Philippines opposed in Herbieto the registration of
certain parcels of land of the public domain in the names of Jeremias and David
Herbieto, based on two grounds, one substantive and the other procedural, i.e., (1)
the applicants for registration failed to prove that they possessed the subject parcels
of land for the period required by law; and (2) the application for registration suers
from fatal inrmity as the subject of the application consisted of two parcels of land
once and for all, settle the dispute and issues between the parties. Without
expressly discussing and categorically ruling on the second ground, Jeremias and
David Herbieto could have easily believed that they could re-le their respective
applications for registration, just taking care to comply with the publication-ofnotice requirement.
Of particular relevance herein is the following discourse in Villanueva v. Court of
Appeals 9 on what constitutes, or more appropriately, what does not constitute
obiter dictum :
It has been held that an adjudication on any point within the issues
presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule
applies to all pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved, which
are presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the
case, and led up to the nal conclusion, and to any statement as to matter
on which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly decided
does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is,
or might have been, made on some other ground, or even though, by
reason of other points in the case, the result reached might have been the
same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. A
decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter
dictum merely because, owing to the disposal of the contention, it was
necessary to consider another question, nor can an additional reason in a
decision, brought forward after the case has been disposed of on one
ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2) or
more points, any one of which is sucient to determine the ultimate issue,
but the court actually decides all such points, the case as an authoritative
precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can be
regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be
denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and more
fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition make
statements of the court regarding other propositions dicta.
IcHTCS
An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be
considered a dictum; and this rule applies as to all pertinent questions, although
only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of
the consideration of the case, and lead up to the nal conclusion, and to any
statement in the opinion as to a matter on which the decision is predicated.
Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because
the disposition of the case is or might have been made on some other ground, or
even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might have
been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. 10
I submit that Herbieto only applied the clear provisions of the law and established
jurisprudence on the matter, and is binding as a precedent.
Section 14 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, explicitly requires for the
acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, possession by a Filipino citizen of the said parcel of land since 12 June 1945
or earlier, to wit:
Section. 48.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or
an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for conrmation of their claims and the issuance of a certicate of
title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona de claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the ling of
the applications for conrmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certicate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(Emphasis ours.)
SCIcTD
Meanwhile, jurisprudence has long settled that possession of the land by the
applicant for registration prior to the reclassication of the land as alienable and
disposable cannot be credited to the applicant's favor. 11
Given the foregoing, judicial conrmation and registration of an imperfect title,
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14 (1) of the
Property Registration Decree, respectively, should only be granted when: (1) a
Filipino citizen, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
land of the public domain, under a bona de claim of acquisition of ownership, since
12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2) the land in question, necessarily, was already
declared alienable and disposable also by 12 June 1945 or earlier.
There can be no other interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended, and Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, which would not
run afoul of either the clear and unambiguous provisions of said laws or binding
judicial precedents.
I do not agree in the observation of the majority opinion that the interpretation of
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, adopted in Herbieto, would result
in absurdity. Indeed, such interpretation forecloses a person from acquiring an
imperfect title to a parcel of land declared alienable and disposable only after 12
June 1945, which could be judicially conrmed. Nonetheless, it must be borne in
mind that the intention of the law is to dispose of agricultural public land to
qualied individuals and not simply to dispose of the same. It may be deemed a
strict interpretation and application of both law and jurisprudence on the matter,
but it certainly is not an absurdity.
Stringency and prudence in interpreting and applying Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, is well justied by the signicant consequences arising from
a nding that a person has an imperfect title to agricultural land of the public
domain. Not just any lengthy occupation of an agricultural public land could ripen
into an imperfect title. An imperfect title can only be acquired by occupation
and possession of the land by a person and his predecessors-in-interest
for the period required and considered by law sucient as to have
segregated the land from the mass of public land. When a person is said
to have acquired an imperfect title, by operation of law, he acquires a
right to a grant, a government grant to the land, without the necessity of
a certicate of title being issued. As such, the land ceased to be part of
the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the State to dispose
of. An application for conrmation of title, therefore, is but a mere
formality. 12
EIAHcC
Prefatory Statement
Critical to the position taken in this Dissent is the reading of the hierarchy of laws
that govern public lands to fully understand and appreciate the grounds for dissent.
In the area of public law, foremost in this hierarchy is the Philippine Constitution,
whose Article XII (entitled National Economy and Patrimony ) establishes and fully
embraces the regalian doctrine as a rst and overriding principle. 3 This doctrine
postulates that all lands belong to the State, 4 and that no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the State. 5
In the statutory realm, the PLA governs the classication, grant, and disposition of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and, other than the
Constitution, is the country's primary law on the matter. Section 7 of the PLA
delegates to the President the authority to administer and dispose of alienable
public lands. Section 8 sets out the public lands open to disposition or concession,
and the requirement that they should be ocially delimited and classied and,
when practicable, surveyed. Section 11, a very significant section, states that
Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as
follows and not otherwise:
(1)
(2)
By sale;
(3)
By lease;
(4)
(5)
By judicial legalization;
(6)
SEC. 48.
The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
conrmation of their claims and the issuance of a certicate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a)
Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
the United States have applied for the purchase, composition or other
form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal
decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the
proceedings in connection therewith, but have, with or without default
upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if
such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and
cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications.
(b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona de claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against
the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninetyfour, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certicate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
Signicantly, subsection (a) has now been deleted, while subsection (b) has been
amended by PD 1073 as follows:
SEC. 4.
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII
of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessorin-interest, under a bona de claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945.
Complementing the PLA is the PRD. 6 It was enacted to codify the various laws
relating to property registration. It governs the registration of lands under the
Torrens System, as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages. Section
14 of the PRD provides:
SEC. 14.
Who May Apply. The following persons may le in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1)
Those
who
by
themselves
or
through
their
predecessors-in-interest
have
been
in
open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona de claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2)
(3)
(4)
Subsection (1) of Section 14 is a copy of, and appears to have been lifted from,
Section 48 (b) of the PLA. The two provisions, however, dier in intent and legal
eect based on the purpose of the law that contains them. The PLA is a
substantive law that classies and provides for the disposition of
alienable lands of the public domain. The PRD, on the other hand,
specically refers to the manner of bringing registerable lands, among
them alienable public lands, within the coverage of the Torrens system.
Thus, the rst is a substantive law, while the other is essentially procedural, so
that in terms of substantive content, the PLA should prevail. 7
Signicantly bearing on the matter of lands in general is the Civil Code and its
provisions on Property 8 and Prescription. 9 The law on property assumes importance
because land, whether public or private, is property. Prescription, on the other hand,
is a mode of acquiring ownership of land, although it is not one of the modes of
disposition mentioned in the PLA.
Chapter 3, Title I of Book II of the Civil Code is entitled "Property in Relation to the
Person to Whom it Belongs". On this basis, Article 419 classies property to be
property of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 proceeds to further
classify property of public dominion into those intended for public use, for public
service, and for the development of the national wealth. Article 421 states that all
other properties of the State not falling under Article 420 are patrimonial property
of the State, and Article 422 adds that property of public dominion, no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State. Under Article 425, property of private ownership, besides
patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of all
property belonging to private persons, either individually or collectively.
Prescription is essentially a civil law term and is not mentioned as one of the modes
of acquiring alienable public land under the PLA, (Signicantly, the PLA under its
Section 48 provides for its system of how possession can ripen into ownership;
the PLA does not refer to this as acquisitive prescription but as basis for conrmation
of title.) Section 14 (2) of the PRD, however, species that "[t]hose who have
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed
rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of
the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and
conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the
Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native
settlers upon public lands", for the establishment of town sites and sale of
lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
conrmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short,
the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public
lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and
that the government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty
of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the
United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property
of the government and the friar lands. 14
This basic essence of the law has not changed and has been carried over to the
present PLA and its amendments. Another basic feature, the requirement for open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable public land under a bona fide claim of ownership also never changed. Still
another consistent public land feature is the concept that once a person has
complied with the requisite possession and occupation in the manner provided by
law, he is automatically given a State grant that may be asserted against State
ownership; the land, in other words, ipso jure becomes private land. 15 The
application for judicial conrmation of imperfect title shall then follow, based on the
procedure for land registration. 16 It is in this manner that the PLA ties up with the
PRD.
A feature that has changed over time has been the period for reckoning the required
occupation or possession. In the rst PLA, the required occupation/possession to
qualify for judicial conrmation of imperfect title was 10 years preceding the
eectivity of Act No. 926 July 26, 1904 (or since July 26, 1894 or earlier). This
was retained up to CA 141, until this law was amended by Republic Act (RA) No.
1942 (enacted on June 22, 1957), 17 which provided for a simple 30-year
prescriptive period for judicial conrmation of imperfect title. This period did not
last; on January 25, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1073 (PD 1073) 18 changed the
required 30-year possession and occupation period provision, to possession and
occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier. PD 1073
likewise changed the lands subject of imperfect title, from agricultural lands of the
public domain to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. PD 1073 also
extended the period for applications for free patents and judicial conrmation of
imperfect titles to December 31, 1987.
The signicance of the date "June 12, 1945" appears to have been lost to history. A
major concern raised against this date is that the country was at this time under
Japanese occupation, and for some years after, was suering from the uncertainties
and instabilities that World War II brought. Questions were raised on how one could
possibly comply with the June 12, 1945 or earlier occupation/possession
requirement of PD 1073 when the then prevailing situation did not legally or
physically permit it.
Without the benet of congressional records, as the enactment of the law (a
Presidential Decree) was solely through the President's lawmaking powers under a
regime that permitted it, the most logical reason or explanation for the date is the
possible impact of the interplay between the old law and the amendatory law.
When PD 1073 was enacted, the utmost concern, in all probability, was how the law
would aect the application of the old law which provided for a thirty-year
possession period. Counting 30 years backwards from the enactment of PD 1073 on
January 25, 1977, PD 1073 should have provided for a January 24, 1947 cut-o
date, but it did not. Instead, it provided, for unknown reasons, the date June 12,
1945.
The June 12, 1945 cut-o date raised legal concerns; vested rights acquired under
the old law (CA 141, as amended by RA 1942) providing for a 30-year possession
period could not be impaired by the PD 1073 amendment. We recognized this legal
dilemma in Abejaron v. Nabasa, 19 when we said:
However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of possession
and occupation required by the Public Land Act, as amended by
R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the eectivity of P.D.
No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said P.D. that occupation
and possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier,
does not apply to him. As the Susi doctrine holds that the grant of title by
virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by operation of law, then upon Abejaron's
satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would have already gained
title over the disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine laid down
in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that
the law cannot impair vested rights such as a land grant. More
clearly stated, "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their
predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D.
1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona de claim of acquisition of ownership,
for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947" may apply
for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under
Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
From this perspective, PD 1073 should have thus provided January 24, 1947 and
not June 12, 1945 as its cut-o date, yet the latter date is the express legal reality.
The reconciliation, as properly dened by jurisprudence, is that where an applicant
has satised the requirements of Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended by RA 1942,
prior to the eectivity of PD 1073, the applicant is entitled to perfect his or her title,
even if possession and occupation does not date back to June 12, 1945. For
purposes of the present case, a discussion of the cut-o date has been
fully made to highlight that it is a date whose signicance and import
cannot be minimized nor glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by
judicial social policy concerns; the full legislative intent must be respected.
In considering the PLA, it should be noted that its amendments were not conned to
RA 1942 and PD 1073. These decrees were complemented by Presidential Decree
No. 892 (PD 892) 20 issued on February 16, 1976 which limited to six months
the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. 21 Thereafter,
the recording of all unregistered lands shall be governed by Section 194 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344. Section 3 of PD 1073
totally disallowed the judicial conrmation of incomplete titles to public land based
on unperfected Spanish grants.
Subsequently, RA 6940 22 extended the period for ling applications for free patent
and judicial conrmation of imperfect title to December 31, 2000. The law now also
allows the issuance of free patents for lands not in excess of 12 hectares to any
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than 12
hectares and who, for at least 30 years prior to the eectivity of the amendatory
Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to
disposition.
Congress recently extended the period for ling applications for judicial conrmation
of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under RA 9176 from December 31, 2000 under RA 6940 to December 31,
2020. 23
These subsections and their impact on the present case are separately discussed
below.
Section 14 (1)
Section 14 (1) merely repeated PD 1073 which sets a cut-o date of June 12, 1945
and which, under the conditions discussed above, may be read to be January 24,
1947.
The ponencia discussed Section 48 (b) of the PLA in relation with Section 14 (1) of
the PRD and, noted among others, that "under the current state of the law, the
substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) may be availed of only until
December 31, 2020". This is in light of RA 9176, passed in 2002, 24 limiting the
ling of an application for judicial conrmation of imperfect title to December 31,
2020. The amendatory law apparently refers only to the use of Section 14 (1) of the
PRD as a mode of registration. Where ownership right or title has already vested in
the possessor-occupant of the land that Section 48 (b) of the PLA grants by
operation of law, Section 14 (2) of the PRD continuous to be open for purposes of
registration of a "private land" since compliance with Section 48 (b) of the PLA vests
title to the occupant/possessor and renders the land private in character.
The ponencia likewise rules against the position of the Oce of the Solicitor
General that the public land to be registered must have been classied as alienable
and disposable as of the cut-o date for possession stated in Section 48 (b) June
12, 1945. In doing this, it cites and reiterates its continuing support for the ruling in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit that held: 25
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945", as used in the provision, qualies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonade claim of ownership". Generally speaking, qualifying
words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it eect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was
not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is
that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is led. If the State, at the time the application is
made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
As it did in Naguit, the present ponencia as well discredits Bracewell. It does the
same with Republic v. Herbieto 26 that came after Naguit and should have therefore
overtaken the Naguit ruling. In the process, the ponencia cites with approval the
ruling in Republic v. Ceniza, 27 penned by the same ponente who wrote Bracewell.
While the ponencia takes pains to compare these cases, it however completely
misses the point from the perspective of whether possession of public lands
classied as alienable and disposable after June 12, 1945 should be credited for
purposes of a grant under Section 48 (b) of the PLA, and of registration under
Section 14 (1) of the PRD. These cases, as analyzed by the ponencia, merely granted
or denied registration on the basis of whether the public land has been classied as
alienable and disposable at the time the petition for registration was led. Thus,
except for Naguit, these cases can be cited only as instances when registration was
denied or granted despite the classication of the land as alienable after June 12,
1945.
The ruling in Naguit is excepted because, as shown in the quotation above, this is
one case that explained why possession prior to the classication of public land as
alienable should be credited in favor of the possessor who led his or her application
for registration after the classication of the land as alienable and disposable, but
where such classification occurred after June 12, 1945.
Closely analyzed, the rulings in Naguit that the ponencia relied upon are its
statutory construction interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the PLA and the observed
ABSURDITY of using June 12, 1945 as the cut-off point for the classification.
Five very basic reasons compel me to strongly disagree with Naguit and its reasons.
Second. The Civil Code reason. Possession is essentially a civil law term that can
best be understood in terms of the Civil Code in the absence of any specic
denition in the PLA other than in terms of time of possession. 30 Article 530 of the
Civil Code provides that "[O]nly things and rights which are susceptible of being
appropriated may be the object of possession." Prior to the declaration of
alienability, a land of the public domain cannot be appropriated; hence, any claimed
possession cannot have legal eects. This perspective fully complements what has
been said above under the constitutional and PLA reasons. It conrms, too, that the
critical dierence the ponencia saw in the Bracewell and Naguit situations does not
really exist. Whether an application for registration is led before or after the
declaration of alienability becomes immaterial if, in one as in the other, no eective
possession can be recognized prior to the declaration of alienability.
Third. Statutory construction and the cut-o date June 12, 1945 . The
ponencia assumes, based on its statutory construction reasoning and its reading of
Section 48 (b) of the PLA, that all that the law requires is possession from June 12,
1945 and that it suces if the land has been classied as alienable at the time of
application for registration. As heretofore discussed, this cut-o date was
painstakingly set by law and should be given full signicance. Its full import appears
from PD 1073 that amended Section 48 (b), whose exact wordings state:
SEC. 4.
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII
of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessorin-interest, under a bona de claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945.
Under this formulation, it appears clear that PD 1073 did not expressly state what
Section 48 (b) should provide under the amendment PD 1073 introduced in terms
of the exact wording of the amended Section 48 (b). But under the PD 1073
formulation, the intent to count the alienability to June 12, 1945 appears very clear.
The provision applies only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
that is described in terms of the character of the possession required since June 12,
1945. This intent seen in the direct, continuous and seamless linking of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain to June 12, 1945 under the
wording of the Decree is clear and should be respected.
parties. Admittedly, its ruling on jurisdictional grounds could have fully resolved the
case, but it cannot be faulted if it went beyond this threshold issue into the merits
of the claim of eective possession prior to the classication of the land as alienable
and disposable.
To be sure, Herbieto has more to it than the Naguit ruling that the ponencia passes
o as the established and denitive rule on possession under Section 14 (1) of the
PRD. There, too, is the undeniable reason that no denitive ruling touching
on Section 14 (1) can be deemed to have been established in the present
case since the applicant Heirs could only prove possession up to 1948. For
this reason, the ponencia falls back on and examines Section 14 (2) of the
PRD. In short, if there is a perfect example of a ruling that is not necessary
for the resolution of a case, that unnecessary ruling is the ponencia's
ruling that Naguit is now the established rule.
Section 14 (2)
Section 14 (2), by its express terms, applies only to private lands. Thus,
on plain reading, it does not apply to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain that Section 14 (1) covers. This is the dierence between
Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2).
The ponencia, as originally formulated, saw a way of expanding the coverage of
Section 14 (2) via the Civil Code by directly applying civil law provisions on
prescription on alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. To quote the
obiter dictum in Naguit that the ponencia wishes to enshrine as the denitive rule
and leading case on Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2): 32
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classied as
alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. With
such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of
"private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June
12, 1945, and such possession being open, continuous and exclusive, then
the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The ponencia then posits that Article 1113 of the Civil Code should be considered
in the interpretation of Section 14 (2). Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
The application of Article 1113 assumes, of course, that (1) the Civil Code fully
applies to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; (2) assuming that
the Civil Code fully applies, these properties are patrimonial and are therefore
"private property"; and (3) assuming that the Civil Code fully applies, that these
properties are within the commerce of men and can be acquired through
prescription.
I find the Naguit obiter to be questionable because of the above assumptions and its
direct application of prescription under Section 14 (2) to alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain. This Section becomes relevant only once the
ownership of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain vests
in the occupant or possessor pursuant to the terms of Section 48 (b) of
the PLA, with or without judicial conrmation of title, so that the land has
become a private land. At that point, Section 14 (2) becomes fully
operational on what had once been an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
Hierarchy of Law in Reading PRD's
Section 14 (2)
The hierarchy of laws governing the lands of the public domain is clear from Article
XII, Section 3 of the Constitution. There are matters that the Constitution itself
provides for, and some that are left for Congress to deal with. Thus, under Section 3,
the Constitution took it upon itself to classify lands of the public domain, and to
state that only agricultural lands may be alienable lands of the public domain. It
also laid down the terms under which lands of the public domain may be leased by
corporations and individuals. At the same time, it delegated to Congress the
authority to classify agricultural lands of the public domain according to the uses to
which they may be devoted. Congress likewise determines, by law, the size of the
lands of the public domain that may be acquired, developed, held or leased, and the
conditions therefor.
In acting on the delegation, Congress is given the choice on how it will act,
specically, whether it will pass a general or a special law. On alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, Congress has, from the very beginning, acted
through the medium of a special law, specically, through the Public Land Act that
by its terms "shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but timber and mineral
lands shall be governed by special laws." Notably, the Act goes on to provide that
nothing in it "shall be understood or construed to change or modify the
administration and disposition of the lands commonly called 'friar lands' and those
which, being privately owned, have reverted to or become property of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration and disposition shall be
governed by laws at present in force or which may hereafter be enacted." 33 Under
these terms, the PLA can be seen to be a very specic act whose coverage extends
only to lands of the public domain; in this sense, it is a special law on that subject.
In contrast, the Civil Code is a general law that covers general rules on the eect
and application of laws and human relations; persons and family relations; property
and property relations; the dierent modes of acquiring ownership; and obligations
and contracts. 34 Its general nature is best appreciated when in its Article 18, it
provides that: "In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and
special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code."
The Civil Code has the same relationship with the PRD with respect to the latter's
special focus land registration and fully applies civil law provisions in so far
only as they are allowed by the PRD. One such case where the Civil Code is
expressly allowed to apply is in the case of Section 14 (2) of the PRD which calls for
the application of prescription under existing laws.
As already explained above, the PLA and the PRD have their own specic purposes
and are supreme within their own spheres, subject only to what the higher
Constitution provides. Thus, the PRD must defer to what the PLA provides when the
matter to be registered is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Application of the Civil Code
In its Book II, the Civil Code has very clear rules on property, including State
property. It classies property as either of public dominion or of private ownership,
35 and property for public use, public service and those for the development of the
national wealth as property of the public dominion. 36 All property not so
characterized are patrimonial property of the State 37 which are susceptible to
private ownership, 38 against which prescription will run. 39
In reading all these provisions, it should not be overlooked that they refer to the
properties of the State in general, i.e., to both movable and immovable properties.
40 Thus, the Civil Code provisions on property do not refer to land alone,
much less do they refer solely to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. For this specie of land, the PLA is the special governing law
and, under the Civil Code itself, the Civil Code provisions shall apply only in
case of deficiency. 41
This conclusion gives rise to the question can alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain at the same time be patrimonial property of the State because
they are not for public use, public purpose, and for the development of national
wealth?
The answer to this question can be found, among others, in the interaction
discussed above between the PLA and PRD, on the one hand, and the Civil Code, on
the other, and will depend on the purpose for which an answer is necessary.
If, as in the present case, the purpose is to determine whether a grant or disposition
of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain has been made, then the
PLA primarily applies and the Civil Code applies only suppletorily. The possession
and occupation that the PLA recognizes is based on its Section 48 (b) and, until the
requirements of this Section are satised, the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain remains a State property that can be disposed only under the terms
of Section 11 of the PLA. In the face of this legal reality, the question of whether
for purposes of prescription an alienable and disposable land of the public domain
is patrimonial or not becomes immaterial; a public land, even if alienable and
disposable, is State property and prescription does not run against the State. 42 In
other words, there is no room for any hairsplitting that would allow the
inapplicable concept of prescription under the Civil Code to be directly
applied to an alienable and disposable land of the public domain before
this land satisfies the terms of a grant under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Given this conclusion, any further discussion of the patrimonial character of
alienable and disposable public lands under the norms of the Civil Code is rendered
moot and academic.
From the prism of the overriding regalian doctrine that all lands of the public
domain are owned by the State, an applicant for land registration invoking Section
14 (2) of the PRD to support his claim must rst clearly show that the land has been
withdrawn from the public domain through an express and positive act of the
government. 43
A clear express governmental grant or act withdrawing a particular land from the
mass of the public domain is provided both in the old and the prevailing Public Land
Acts. These laws invariably provide that compliance with the required possession of
agricultural public land (under the rst and second PLAs) or alienable and disposable
land of the public domain (under the prevailing PLA) in the manner and duration
provided by law is equivalent to a government grant. Thus, the land ipso jure
becomes private land. It is only at that point that the "private land" requirement of
Section 14 (2) materializes. 44
Prescription
In my original Dissent (in response to the original ponencia), I discussed ordinary
acquisitive prescription as an academic exercise to leave no stone unturned in
rejecting the ponencia's original conclusion that prescription directly applies to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under Section 14 (2) of the PRD.
I am happy to note that the present ponencia has adopted, albeit without any
attribution, part of my original academic discussion on the application of the Civil
Code, particularly on the subjects of patrimonial property of the State and
prescription.
Specically, I posited assuming arguendo that the Civil Code applies that the
classication of a public land as alienable and disposable does not per se signify that
the land is patrimonial under the Civil Code since property, to be patrimonial, must
not be for public use, for public purpose or for the development of national wealth.
Something more must be done or shown beyond the fact of classication. The
ponencia now concedes that "[T]here must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public use or the development of the national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil
Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run."
I agree with this statement as it describes a clear case when the property has
become private by the government's own declaration so that prescription under the
Civil Code can run. Note in this regard that there is no inconsistency between this
conclusion and the hierarchy of laws on lands of the public domain that I expounded
on . To reiterate, the PLA applies as a special and primary law when a
public land is classied as alienable and disposable, and remains fully and
exclusively applicable until the State itself expressly declares that the land
now qualies as a patrimonial property. At that point, the application of
the Civil Code and its law on prescription are triggered. The application of
Section 14 (2) of the PRD follows.
To summarize, I submit in this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion that:
1.
The hierarchy of laws on public domain must be given full application in
considering lands of the public domain. Top consideration should be accorded to the
Philippine Constitution, particularly its Article XII, followed by the consideration of
applicable special laws the PLA and the PRD, insofar as this Decree applies to
lands of the public domain. The Civil Code and other general laws apply to the
extent expressly called for by the primary laws or to supply any of the latter's
deficiencies.
2.
The ruling in this ponencia and in Naguit that the classication of public lands
as alienable and disposable does not need to date back to June 12, 1945 at the
latest, is wrong because:
a.
b.
The Public Land Act applies only from the time a public land is
classied as alienable and disposable; thus, Section 48 (b) of this
law and the possession it requires cannot be recognized prior to
any classification.
c.
Under the Civil Code, "[O]nly things and rights which are
susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession." Prior to the classication of a public land as alienable
and disposable, a land of the public domain cannot be
appropriated; hence, any claimed possession cannot have legal
effects.
d.
e.
The alleged absurdity of the law addresses the wisdom of the law
and is a matter for the Legislature, not for this Court, to address.
2.
3.
4.
Id.
5.
The trial court decision identied Eduardo Velazco as the vendor of the property,
notwithstanding the original allegation in the application that Malabanan purchased
the same from Virgilio Velazco. See note 3. In his subsequent pleadings, including
those before this Court, Malabanan or his heirs stated that the property was
purchased from Eduardo Velazco, and not Virgilio. On this point, the appellate
court made this observation:
"More importantly, Malabanan failed to prove his ownership over Lot 9864-A. In his
application for land registration, Malabanan alleged that he purchased the subject
lot from Virgilio Velazco. During the trial of the case, however, Malabanan testied
that he purchased the subject lot from Eduardo Velazco, which was corroborated
by his witness, Aristedes Velazco, a son of Virgilio Velazco, who stated that
Eduardo was a brother of his grandfather. As aptly observed by the Republic, no
copy of the deed of sale covering Lot 9864-A, executed either by Virgilio or
Eduardo Velazco, in favor of Malabanan was marked and oered in evidence. In
the appealed Decision, the court a quo mentioned of a deed of sale executed in
1995 by Eduardo Velazco in favor of Malabanan which was allegedly marked as
Exhibit "I". It appears, however, that what was provisionally marked as Exhibit "I"
was a photocopy of the deed of sale executed by Virgilio Velazco in favor of Leila
Benitez and Benjamin Reyes. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides
that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally oered. The
oer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his ndings of facts and
his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence oered by the parties at the trial.
Thus, Malabanan has not proved that Virgilio or Eduardo Velazco was his
predecessor-in-interest." Rollo, pp. 39-40.
6.
Rollo, p. 74.
7.
8.
Penned by Associate Justice Marina Buzon of the Court of Appeals Fifth Division,
10.
11.
12.
13.
Id. at 186-187.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
Section 47, Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 9176.
25.
26.
See note 3.
27.
28.
29.
Id. at 710-712.
30.
31.
32.
See e.g., Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA
604, 611; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235
SCRA 567, 576; Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group v. Dr. Malvar,
438 Phil. 252, 275 (2002).
See Article 1134, CIVIL CODE.
33.
34.
35.
36.
Citing Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA
604, 611; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235
SCRA 567, 576; Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group v. Dr. Malvar,
438 Phil. 252, 275 (2002).
37.
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, immediately before its amendment by Rep.
Act No. 1942, reads as follows:
"Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona de claim of acquisition of
ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certicate of title under the provisions
of this Chapter".
38.
Again, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942,
was superseded by P.D. No. 1073, which imposed the 12 June 1945 reckoning
point, and which was then incorporated in Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
39.
See Villarico v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 136438, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 110.
40.
41.
42.
43.
Id.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
See Section 19, Land Registration Act, which allowed application for registration
of title by "person or persons claiming, singly or collectively, to own the legal estate
in fee simple".
51.
52.
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 21 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567,
576.
2.
As in the case where the land was already the subject of a grant by the State to a
private person, but the latter failed to immediately register his title, thus, allowing
another person to acquire title to the land by prescription under the provisions of
the Civil Code.
3.
Department of Agrarian Reform v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 1048, 1052 (1996).
4.
5.
Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 901, 909-910 (2000).
6.
7.
8.
Delta Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 173, 186 (1997).
9.
10.
11.
See Almeda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 196 SCRA 476;
Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 235 Phil. 680, 695-696 (1987); Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 232 Phil. 444, 457 (1987), cited in Republic v. Herbieto, supra
note 7. See also Republic v. Court of Appeals, 238 Phil. 475, 486-487 (1987);
Republic v. Bacus, G.R. No. 73261, 11 August 1989, 176 SCRA 376-380; Republic
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 38810, 7 May 1992; 208 SCRA 428, 434; De la Cruz
v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 898, 904 (1998); Republic v. De Guzman, 383 Phil.
479, 485 (2000).
12.
See National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 45664, 29 January
1993, 218 SCRA 41, 54.
2.
3.
See Collado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107764, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA
343.
4.
5.
See Republic v. Herbieto, G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 182.
6.
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, amending Act No. 496 that originally brought
the Torrens system into the Philippines in 1903.
7.
Substantive law is that which creates, denes and regulates rights, or which
regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action, that part of the
law which courts are established to administer, as opposed to adjective or remedial
law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their
invasion (Primicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil. 446.) It is the nature and the purpose of
the law which determines whether it is substantive or procedural, and not its place
in the statute, or its inclusion in a code (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium,
Volume I [Ninth Revised Edition], p. 19). Note that Section 55 of the PLA refers to
the Land Registration Act (the predecessor law of the PRD) on how the Torrens
title may be obtained.
8.
CIVIL CODE, Book II (Property, Ownership and its Modifications), Articles 415-711.
9.
CIVIL CODE, Book III (Dierent Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Articles 11061155.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Enunciated in the old case of Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424
(1925); See Abejaron v. Nabasa, cited on p. 10 of this Dissent.
16.
PLA, Sections 49-56; the reference to the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496)
should now be understood to mean the PRD which repealed Act 496.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
An Act Granting a Period ending on December 31, 2000 for Filing Applications for
Free Patent and Judicial Conrmation of Imperfect Title to Alienable and Disposable
Lands of the Public Domain under Chapters VII and VIII of the Public Land Act (CA
141, as amended).
23.
24.
25.
Supra note 1.
26.
G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183, 201-202.
27.
28.
29.
(a)
Alienable or disposable,
(b)
Timber, and
(c)
Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
SEC. 7.
For the purposes of the administration and disposition of
alienable
or
disposable
public
lands,
the
President,
upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall
from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act.
SEC. 8.
Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession
which have been ocially delimited and classied and, when practicable, surveyed,
and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor
appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor
those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other
valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have
ceased to be so. However, the President may, for reasons of public interest,
declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had
their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reason,
suspend their concession or disposition until they are again declared open to
concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the National
Assembly.
SEC. 9.
For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the
public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classied, according to the
use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a)
Agricultural;
(b)
(c)
(d)
Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.
section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one
class to another.
SEC. 10.
The words "alienation", "disposition", or "concession" as used
in this Act, shall mean any of the methods authorized by this Act for the
acquisition, lease, use, or benet of the lands of the public domain
other than timber or mineral lands.
30.
31.
32.
33.
CA 141, Section 2.
34.
These are the Introductory Chapters and Books I to IV of the Civil Code.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
Article 415 of the Civil Code denes immovable property, while Article 416 denes
movable property.
41.
42.
43.
44.