The Challenges of Credible Elections in Nigeria and Ghana

THE CHALLENGES OF CREDIBLE ELECTION IN
WEST AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF GHANA 2008

AND NIGERIA 2011 ELECTIONS
BY
OKON ENOCH NDEM

109084112
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL

OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES THROUGH THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY
OF LAGOS
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER
OF SCIENCE DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
OCTOBER, 2012
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that this project entitled The Challenges Of
Credible Election In West Africa: A Case Study Of Ghana 2008

And Nigeria 2011 Elections is carried out by Okon Enoch Ndem,
Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Science, University of
Lagos, Akoka-Yaba, Lagos under my supervision.
______________________
DR. AUGUSTINE ENEANYA
PROJECT SUPERVISOR
___________________
DATE
____________________________
PROF. SOLOMON AKINBOYE
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT
___________________
DATE
DEDICATION
This is dedicated to the loving memory of Kenule Beeson Saro-Wiwa
(1941-1995) and members of the NYSC who died in the postElections violent of 2011 Elections.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I am indebted to numerous contributors whose supports have seen the
success of this project; but for short of space, I would not be able to
mention all; to whom I apologized.
However, I am most grateful to Almighty God for his His protection,
provision, direction, guidance and sustenance throughout the course of
this work.
My sincere gratitude also goes to my family, Grace, Princeley, Praise and
Peace for their support, cares and understanding.
I wish to acknowledge the contribution of my friends; Reverend Ikpeme
Ene, Engr Idim Nsemo, Mr. Joseph Emmanuel, Edet Ante Kingsley
Okugbe and Bankole Wahab.
Special thanks to Pastor Sunny Udo, his wife Doris and the children, as
well as my Elder brother, Mr. Oscar Okokon Ndem for moral support and
encouragement.
This acknowledgement will not be complete without the mention my
diligent supervisor, Dr. Augustine Eneanya, who took pains in reading
through, making observation and corrections. Your suggestions are

instrumental to the timely completion of this work. Also worth
mentioning is Miss Rebecca Oluwasegun who typed the manuscript.
I am also indebted to Professors Solomon Akinboye, Remi Anifowose; Drs.
M. M. Fadakinte, Emma Onah, Rasheed Akinyemi, GSM Okeke, Sylvester
Ugoh, Jide Oluwajuwitan and other teaching and non-teaching staff of
the Department of Political Science. I am again grateful to all members of
the University Community and the entire social system (no matter how
imperfect it is) for giving me the opportunity to realize this dream.
ABBREVIATIONS
AC
Action Congress
ACN
Action Congress of Nigeria
AD
Alliance for Democratic
AG
Action Group
ANPP
All Nigeria People Party
APP
All Peoples Party
AU
African Union
CNC
Congress for National Consensus
CODEO
Coalition of Domestic Election Observers
CPC
Congress for Progressive Change
CPP
Convention Peoples Party
DPN
Democratic Party of Nigeria
EC
Electoral Commission
ECOWAS
Economic Council of West African States
EU EOM
European Union Election Observation Mission
EU
European Union
GCPP
Great Consolidated Peoples Party
GDM
Grassroot Democratic Movement
GNPP
Great Nigeria Peoples Party
IDEA
International Institute
Electoral Assistance
IEA
Institute of Economic Affairs
INEC
Independent National Electoral Commission
INEC
Independent National Electoral Commission
ING
Interim National Government
MDS
Movement for Democratic of Substance
MNCs
Multinational Corporations
NAL
National Alliance of Liberals
NAP
Nigerian Advance Party
NCCE
National Commission for Civic Education
NCNC
National Council of Nigeria and Cameroun Citizen
NCNP
National Centre Party of Nigeria
NCP
National Convention Party
NDC
National Democratic Congress
NECON
National Electoral Commission of Nigeria
NEDECO
Network of Domestic Election Observers
NEPU
Northern Element Progressive Union
NGOs
Non-Governmental Organization
NIP
National Independence Party
NLC
Nigeria Labour Congress
NLM
National Liberation Movement

9
for
Democracy
and
NNA
Nigerian National Alliance
NNDP
Nigerian National Democratic Party
NPC
National Population Commission
NPC
Northern People Congress
NPN
National Party of Nigeria
NPP
New Patriotic Party
NPP
Nigeria Peoples Party
NPP
Northern Peoples Party
NRC
National Republican Convention
PDP
People Democratic Party
PFP
Popular Front Party
PHP
Peoples Heritage Party
PNDC
Provisional National Defense Council
PNP
Peoples Nationalist Party
PP
Progressive Party
PRP
Peoples Redemption Party
SDP
Social Democratic Party
TMG
Transition Monitoring Group
UGCC
United Gold Coast Convention
UMBC
United Middle Belt Congress
UNCP
United Nigeria Congress Party
UNP
United National Party
10
UP
Unity Party
UPGA
United Progressive Grand Alliance
UPN
Unity Party of Nigeria
11
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pages
Certification
ii
Dedication
iii
Acknowledgement
iv
Abbreviation
vi
Table of Contents
xi
Abstract
xii
Chapter One:
Introduction
1.1
Background to Study
1.2
Statement of Problem
10
1.3
Objective of Study
11
1.4
Research Questions
12
1.5
Significance of Study
13
12
1.6
Scope and Limitation of the Study
14
1.7
Research Methodology
17
Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1
Literature Review
20
2.2
Theoretical Framework
47
Chapter Three: Background to Elections in Ghana and Nigeria

3.1
Historical Pattern of Elections in Ghana and Nigeria
55
3.2
History of Elections in Ghana
62
3.3
The History of Elections Nigeria
73
Chapter Four:
Credible Elections in Ghana and Nigeria: A Case

Study of Ghana 2008 and Nigeria 2011
Elections
4.1 The 2008 Election in Ghana
90
4.2
The 2011 Elections in Nigeria
100
4.3
A Comparative Analysis of Ghana 2008 and Nigeria

2011 Elections
113
13
Chapter Five:
5.1
Challenges of Credible Elections in Ghana and

Nigeria
Socio-Political Challenges of Ghana 2008 and Nigeria

2011 Elections
5.2
122
Administrative And Logistical Challenges of Ghana 2008

and Nigeria 2011 Elections
5.3
135
Comparative Challenges of Ghana 2008 and Nigeria

2011 Elections
142
Chapter Six: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations
6.1
Summary
135
6.2
Conclusion
158
6.3
Recommendations
159
Bibliography
163
14
ABSTRACT
With the end of the Cold War and subsequent upliftment of Liberal
Democracy to a global common which Credible Election is an
integral doctrine; and practice autocratic regimes, sustained by
frivolous and cosmetic elections are crumbling world wide, and
West Africa sub-region is not exempted from this development. As
expected, this income with divergent challenges which are interrelated with enormous impact on the stability and indeed survival
of these states, as was in Cote Divoire, Sierra Leone Liberia and
Niger Republic, thus compelling an academic discourse.
This work therefore dwells on the Credible Elections of Ghana 2008
2009 which was acclaimed to be an ideal example and Nigeria
experience of April 2011.
While highlighting the challenges of this phenomenon in these
countries, effort is also made to trace historical antecedence and
patterns of Electioneering process and the reason for the changes
overtime in a given milieu.
15
More so, genuine comparison is made between the elections of the

two countries; similarities as well as differences in the challenges
are highlighted and explained.
Finally, critical assessment of the challenges and trend in the
countries are covered; while necessary recommendations are
included as suggestive panacea for ameliorating negative trends
associated with the challenges and simultaneously, sustaining
gains for future elections.
16
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.3
BACKGROUND TO STUDY
Before the advent of the Europeans and indeed the Berlin

Conference of 1884 85, West African traditional societies existed
with various political structures and cultures which reflected the
world view of these societies. Some of the societies enjoyed elements
of democratic decision making as was obtained from the Igbo
Republican System in the Eastern Nigeria; whereas the selection of
Obas as well as the Check and Balance role of the Oyomesi on the
Alaafin of Oyo in Yorubaland deterred the emergence of an
autocratic monarch in the society. The council of Elders with
diverse label in different kingdoms represented the numerous
interested and hamlets; hence the traditional societies were
relatively
transparent.
Although
the
caliphate
system
of
Hausa/Fulani of the Northern Nigerian was less equalitarian, this

was justified on the theocratic nature of the administration which
17
could be compared with the Holy Roman Empire in the Medieval

Europe. Again, the centralized system of the Fante, Ashante, Old
Ghana, Old Mali, Songhai and Samouri Toures Mandigo Empire
were less oppressive and arbitrary compared to the charlattan rule
of the colonialists.
The Berlin Conference of 1884/85 which legalized Colonialism
was undemocratic as no African representation was made, so as to
promote the indigenous interest on decision(s) affecting the future
of the Continent in general and West Africa in particular. But those
decisions reached by the European, powers, were binding on
Africans with absolute impunity.
Hence, Williams (1999) asserts that colonialism itself must be seen
as
profoundly
undemocratic
intervention.
This
is
obvious,
considering the enviable development of these political structures

across the sub-region which were comparable to their counterparts
in
Western
Societies.
Williams
(Ibid)
further
stressed
that
Colonialism invariably destroyed vestiges of democratic culture it

met
in
Africa
and
replaced
this
18
with
massively alienating
bureaucracy under and all powerful central authority. Olowu

(1999) declares it (colonialism) distorted or destroyed pre-colonial
governance system through the arrangement such as Indirect Rule
System which made local chiefs more despotic or created new ones
(Warrant Chiefs) where there was none.
Colonial Rule itself was philosophically and organizationally elitist,
centralized and absolutist. It promoted the concentration of
administrative and supporting infrastructures in few cities or at
worst, around a single city. This created two cultures the
traditional: in which the masses lived and existed outside the
framework of colonial elitism and the modern which were the
centres of the governmental structures or of economic imperialism.
The system treated the entire worldview of the indigenous people
with disdain and termed all their practices as barbaric and
backward. It was a systematic method of hypocritical exploitation
and imposition of Europeans wills on West Africa, hence it policies
made
the
sub-regional
economies
small,
excessively
open,
dependent and poorly integrated which was in itself the reflection of
19
economic imperialism; the result is the exploitation, accumulation

and siphoning of surpluses from the colonies to the mother
countries of the colonialists. Given the obnoxious, oppressive and
exclusive nature of Colonial Rule, no indigenous participation or
representation in the political structure and process of these
societies were allowed; not to mention the decision on regime
change, as there was no platform and structure for such privilege
or luxury.
However, the Post War I and II era witnessed the thawing of
autocratic colonial governance in West Africa. The recruitment of
West African soldiers, during the Wars exposed them to the
vulnerability of the white man to all maladies of life as well as the
ideals and dynamism of Western Philosophies Liberalism,
National self Determination, Egalitarianism, Fraternity and Basic
Rights of Man, among others. Their return after the wars was
critical in democratic struggles in different colonies of the subregion. This struggle was boost by educated elites quest for power
in order to share in the accumulation; and the innocent civil society
20
organized along trade unions, students bodies, market women and

other grassroots organizations. They all rose in one accord
demanding political representation and handing over of power to
the indigenes. Hence, Elective Principles was introduced into
Nigeria in 1922 with limited indigenous representation, in Sierra
Leone in 1924 by Stiller Constitution, in Ghana in 1925 and
expanded in 1951 by Coussey Constitution; Cote dIvoire Senegal
and
other
francophone
countries
had
experienced
limited
representation since late 19th century with the inhabitants of the

principal towns representing their interest in parliament as the
centre of French Rule in West Africa. As of Liberia, democracy and
indeed representative government dated back to Independence in
1847. Nevertheless, by 1960, most West African colonies had
become independent with one form of democratic structure or the
other; majority patterned in line with that of their colonial masters
and according to the dictates of the European hegemony.
The colonial democratic experiments were not credible, as in most
cases the coronation of the Western colonial masters. Again, the
21
damage was already done to a well oiled system of indigenous

governance in which various strata based on age, sex, ability and
professional
competence
deliberated
on
issues
and
reached
democratic decisions (Williams 1999). Mores, the colonialist

bequeathed
bureaucracies
on
Independent
West
African
that emphasized hierarchical
Government
compliance and
discipline with little or no respect for equally important issues like

public
accountability,
representation
and
responsiveness,
respect
for
Rule
popular
participation,
of
as
Law
well
as
Constitutionalism. These legacies formed the foundation upon

which post colonial West African leaders continued to build
governmental structures and processes upon. There were effort to
indigenized the personnel of the public service, but no serious and
sustained effort was made to democratize and indigenized the
structures, operations and administration of Electoral bodies, as
well as holistic periodic review of electoral process and satisfactory
management of post-electoral issues. These made West African
government to be highly oppressive and dictatorial and were
excused on developmental imperative, as observed by Bluwey
22
(1992) the pioneer nationalist leaders were able to thwart internal

demand for accountability by arguing that multi-party was a
luxury their New States could ill-afford in the face of pressing
demand for development. Ake (1992) puts it differently, to
discourage opposition and perpetuate their hold on power, they
argued that the problems of development demanded complete unity
of purposes, justifying on the grounds the criminalization of
political dissent and the inexorable march to political monolithism.
Surely, resisting pressure for structural transformation and redistribution, their egoistic and psychological enrichment becomes
societal development through the accumulation of social surpluses
into
private
treasures.
Therefore,
it
was
fundamental
misconception on the internalizing ability of West African elites to

the norms of Western Rule as exemplified by colonial rules or may
be, cynical hypocrisy which encourage the introduction of pseudodemocratic governance; despite the absence of structural and
normative imperatives necessary for such governance, as these
were earlier destroyed by the colonialist themselves about a century
earlier.
23
Consequently, the decade of the independence witnessed the most

severe assault on democratic process in the sub-region. Olowu
(1999) observes by the end of the decade majority of West
African nations that started out of independence with one form of
democratic governance or another had come under full blown
dictatorship or some variant of authoritarian civil rule: Nigeria,
Sierra Leone, Togo, Benin had succumbed to bloody military
interventions, while Cote dIvoire into an one party autocracy and
others to more version of personalized rule. The trend continued
for much of the Cold War years until it demise in 1990 with the fall
of the Soviet
Union and it attempt at universal communism;
leaving the Western Liberal Democracy as the only power bloc with
Politico-military and economic might.
The implication this amongst others is the Western domination and
dictation of the direction of International Politics and system, hence
the upliftment of Liberal Democracy to a global common and the
subsequent institutionalization of collective mechanisms for its
installation, protection and sustenance. Such mechanism include
24
Supplementary Protocol and Democracy and Good Governance

adopted by ECOWAS Heads of States and Government on
December 20, 2001 to complement its Protocol relating to the
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution,
Peacekeeping and Security which was in effect since December
1999; necessitated by the conflicts in the Mano River Region which
were precipitated by self perpetuation in power as well as inept and
corrupt leadership, a fallout of doctored elections.
Thus at the dawn of the New Millennium, almost all the countries
in the sub-region experienced the third wave of democratization
with various version of democracy but the process leading to the
installation of such elected government remain a source of
concern to citizens and observers alike, and generate instability
and internal divisions in these countries. Internal uprising in Cote
DIvoire corrected Robert Gueis self succession bid in 2000 and
Laurent
Gbagbos
ECOWAS/ECOMOG
inglorious
activities
self
inauguration
supported
the
in
processes
2011.
and
administrations in Sierra Leone and Liberia, even after the forceful
25
exit of the erstwhile war Lord - Charles Taylor in 2003. In Senegal

coalition of opposition in 2000 favour of Abdullahi wade ended the
patrimonial rule President Diouf and voided Abdullahi Wades third
term bid in 2011. Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Mali are heading for
failed state but for ECOWAS intervention while Burkina-Faso,
Gambia and Togo empirically are autocratic democracies. Ghana on
the other hand has emerged as a bastion of electoral democracy
since Jerry Rowlings Presidency set the pace for smooth exchange
of
power
cumulating
between
to
the
the
2008
government
and
Elections
which
opposition
parties
confirmed
Ghana
democratic maturity; whereas Nigeria has been the home of

controversial elections since her return to civil rule in 1999 and
just had a turn of fortune in April 2011, acclaimed to be free and
fair.
Hence, it has been a mixed fortune for electoral process and its
outcome in the sub-region, despite the existence of mechanism for
its regulations, and global support, especially from the Western
countries, as they assume that there is direct correlation between
26
Credible Elections and stability in nation states; a prerequisite for

Foreign Direct Investment, Economic Growth and Development as
well as the Economic Integration as envisioned by the founding
fathers of ECOWAS.
1.4
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
The ascendancy of Liberal Democracy to a Global Common has

led to the rush towards competitive elections worldwide. This has
created the problem of effective conduct of Credible Elections
acceptable to all parties involved in electoral processes. The
organization and administration of Elections and their outcomes
have resulted into violence and acute socio-political insecurity.
Electoral violence has manifested in political thuggery, riots, arson
and sometimes, outright killings in many Third World countries,
not the least in almost all the sixteen West African countries.
Despite the support of the Global Community, Local, and
International Governmental and Non-Governmental Organization
27
(NGOs) sponsored observers as well as eminent personalities all

over the world to ensure the administration of Credible Elections in
West Africa; accusation and counter accusation of manipulation,
rigging and outright hijacking of the processes continue to
characterize electioneering process in the sub-region.
The victory at all cost syndrome of parochial political culture and
the Elitist-centered nature of electoral politics promotes chaotic
scenarios. The implication of these amongst others are electoral
and post-electoral violence, loss of lives and properties, lack of
legitimacy or erosion of confidence in the new government and the
entire democratic project and sometimes outright failure of the
process leading to, and promotion of resentment among political
groupings, ethnic nationalities and religious divides, which are
veritable seeds of political instability in the sub-region. Such were
the conflicts which cost so many lives and properties in Liberia,
Sierra Leone, Cote dIvoirre, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Guinea.
Such conflicts and their retardation effect towards the realization of
the objective of ECOWAS necessitated the protocol relating to the
28
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution,

Peace and Security, adopted in 1999 which dwells on internal
crisis prevention, democracy, good governance, rule of law and
individual rights as well as the Supplementary Protocol on
Democracy and Good Governance in 2001, and ECOWAS Conflict
Preventive Framework in 2008, specifically for early warning
signals..
1.3
OBJECTIVE OF STUDY
The Central objective of this study is to explore the variables which

hinder the organization and administration of Credible Election
acceptable to all parties involved in the sub-region, using Ghana
and Nigeria as the parameters. Others include.
1.
To evaluate the political structure and culture inherited from

the colonial master and its relationships with genuine
democratic project.
2.
To examine the political culture of both countries and its

impact on electoral processes.
29
3.
To access the dominant character of the National Elite and its

inherent impact on the competitive politics of multiparty
democracy.
4.
To interrogate the role of external environment and the

internal milieu in the promotion of Credible Elections in these
countries.
1.4
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
(a)
What are the impact of Colonial legacies on the conduct of

Elections in Ghana and Nigeria?
(b)
What are the influences of Political Culture of Ghana and

Nigeria on the conduct of 2008 and 2011 in these countries?
(c)
What are the effect of Elites on the conduct of elections in

Ghana and Nigeria?
(d)
What are the significance of external and internal environment in

the conduct of Credible Polls in Ghana and Nigeria?
1.6
SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY
30
The essence of the study is to expose the impediments to Credible

Elections in West Africa using the case of most stable English
speaking
countries
in
the
sub-region
as
the
yardstick.
Fundamentally, the Elections of 2008 in Ghana and 2011 in

Nigeria were widely accepted within the countries and globally,
hence the study hope to lay bare the strategies employed in
overcoming the perennial challenges in Electioneering processes in
the sub-region.
Again the comparative appeal stands to show the level and
dynamics of challenges within the two states, thus facilitating
partnership and collaboration in the areas of strength and enhance
healthy competition among members of ECOWAS towards the
organization and administration, of Credible Elections as an
integral part of its protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention,
Security;
Management
Supplementary
and
Resolution,
Protocol
on
Peacekeeping
Democracy
and
Governance and ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework.
31
and
Good
Moreso, understanding the impediments and shortcomings of the

past as exposed in this study will help all actors involved in the
process in future, to avoid the pitfalls and consolidate on the gains
already made, for the sustenance of democracy and indeed stability
in the fragile post-colonial states in the sub-region. This is
imperative given the global acceptance of periodic Credible
Elections as the most acceptable tools for changing the Ruling
Elites in the contemporary World.
1.6
SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY
Given the problems and level of this study, emphasis will be laid on
the challenges to credible, free and fair elections; particularly those
specific to Ghana 2008 Elections and Nigerias 2011 Elections.
They include late arrival of voting materials, poor training of
electoral officials, procedural confusion, multiple voting lists,
political tension and violence, missing of voting materials, absence
of polling officers, underage voting, in secrecy voting. Poor voters
education, abuse of State and Administrative
Resources, poor
monitoring of political financial, bloated voters register, gender
32
inequality, insecurity of voters, materials and polling officials,

ethnic and religion play outs as well as the determination of voters
intent during the count, amongst others.
Nigeria is regarded as the continental hegemony and the subregional power house. With an estimated population of over one
hundred and sixty-seven million;(NPC, 2011) the country is indeed
the most populous black nation in the world, at the same time
accounting for fifty two percent of the sub-region and eighth in the
world. The country has witnessed about thirty-years of Military
Rule between 1966 1999 and started off the present democratic
dispensation late 1998 after the death of General Sani Abacha and
Chief MKO Abiola. The Elections of 1999 and 2003 which were won
by Chief Olusegun Obasanjo and that of 2007 claimed to be won by
Late Uniar YarAdua wee controversial almost in all aspects. These
prompted the Electoral Reforms of 2010 enroute the 2011
Elections. The outcomes of the Elections were accepted to a large
extent to meet the minimum requirement of election observers and
monitors and therefore the true reflections of the will of the people
33
hence were declared credible, free and fair. It is this departure from
the past controversial exercises and the relative legitimacy of the
present administration in the Nigerian state well as her status in
the continent and sub-region which make the discourse in this
landmark Election desirable and hence justify our focus on Nigeria.
Ghana on the other hand is a pacesetter in the sub-region. The first
independent country south of Sahara in 1957 and the home of the
well known Pan-Africanist, Late Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. The country
has remained one of the most stable polity in the sub-region except
for the period between the end of Nkrumahs rule and the
emergence of Flt. Lt Jerry Rawlings in the early 1980s. Jerry
Rawling rule for about ten years as a military junta within which
appropriate and institutions were build for effective democratization
process. He submitted himself for elections as a civilian President
and won on two occasions 1992 and 1996. By the end of his tenure
in 2000, an opposition candidate, Professor John Kufour was
elected the President of Ghana who also won the 2004 Elections.
However the 2008 Election marked a watershed in Ghanas
34
democratic history. Professor John Atta Mills was Rawlings Vice

President who had lost elections to John Kuffour but was running
against the former Foreign Minister, Nana Akufor Addo of the New
Patriotic Party the ruling party, there were a couple of smaller
Parties candidates for the Elections of December 7, 2008. After the
first round, there was no clear winner of the require fifty percent of
the vote cast, therefore there was a run-off between the National
Democratic Congress (NDC) Candidate. John Atta Mills and
National Patriotic Party Candidate Nana Akufo-Addo on December
28, 2008, the outcome was the closest election in Ghanaian history
with Atta Mills scoring 50.23% and Nana Akufo-Addo 49.77%. The
administration of the Elections of this magnitude and the maturity
display by the Ghanaians which is a marked difference from what
is obtainable in other countries of the sub-regions especially the
capacity of an opposition candidate to win such a close election
makes academic discourse of this landmark event imperative and
therefore our focus on Ghana.
35
The scope and universe majorly dwell on the landmarks Elections

of Ghana 2008 and Nigeria 2011; the challenges and strategies for
improvement.
1.7
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Given the resources at our disposal, this study shall rely on

secondary sources of data. This involve extensive review of relevant
literatures such as textbooks, articles in journals, magazines,
newspapers and seminar papers covering such areas like Ghanas
and Nigeria history of Political Development and Elections. Others,
include: Electoral legal Frameworks, Election Administration, vote,
counting,
candidates,
Electoral
parties
Dispute
and
the
Resolution,
campaign
Voters
registration,
environment,
voters
education, vote buying, political violence and thuggery, women

participation, media environment, civil society and domestic
observation, political finance and the use of State Administration
Resources in Respective Elections under focus.
36
Some of the secondary data will include statistical records of

Government agencies, non-governmental institutions and others.
These data are presented in form of statements and tables, while
analysis or interpretation is by way of inference or induction.
37
REFERENCES
Ake C (1992) Rethinking African Democracy in Policy Analysis
Accra: Institute of Economic Affairs.
Bluwey Gilbert (1992) Democracy at Bay: The Frustration of
African Liberals in B. Caron et al (ed) Democratic Transition
in Africa, Ibadan: CREDU pp. 39-50.
Olowu D (1999) Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa in
Dele Olowu et al (eds) Governance and Democratization in
Nigeria, Lagos: Spectrum Book.
Williams A (1999) Fictionalisation of Democratic Struggle in Africa:
The Nigerian Example in Dele Olowu et al (eds) Governance
and Demcoratisation in Nigeria, Lagos Spectrum Books.
38
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
LITERATURE REVIEW
The contemporary nature and the significance of the subject matter
as expected have spawned large range of literature. This section of
the chapter examines the relevant literature on Elections for the
required insight; starting with the insight from other experiences,
before narrowing it to Ghana and Nigeria.
Other Experience
Anifowose (2003) gives a broad definition of elections as the process
of elite selection by the mass of the population in any given political
system. This is the direct outcome of the need for representative
government. He argues that the practice is accepted across board
in the contemporary global system irrespective of the prevailing
ideology, structure and level of development as some scholars sees
it as the very heart of democracy. Therefore, rules and
mechanism for it conducts is said to be mandatory in order to
safeguard its competitiveness, fairness and integrity as the
39
reflection of the will of the people given that all the adult citizen
have equal opportunity to vote and to be voted for; hence he
observes that electoral competition is a highly complex and
controversial issue, as it goes beyond franchise to include internal
democracy within the political parties, campaign, political funding
as well as equal access to media, by the parties in the political
contest; and added that elections serves divergent functions
according to the political system - competitive and non-competitive
system.
A competitive election according to him works as a two way street

where the government and the masses influence one another. It
also facilitate the recruitment and grooming of ruling elite,
formation of government, political representation, voters education,
consolidation
of
legitimacy,
leadership
succession,
popular
participation and means of influencing government decision as well

as strengthening of the elite.
The non-competitive on the other hand enhance ratification of the
existing
leadership,
participatory,
40
legitimizing,
demonstrative,
educational and patriotic act. It serves as an integrative mechanism

for affirmative action and promotes the exclusion of opposition from
the competition and evolution of a single party system. However,
despite his preference for western model competitive elections, he
complains of possibility of flaws in rules and administration which
jettisons the objective of credible, free and fair exercise as provided
by the guidelines leading to illegal manipulation of voting, ballot,
and the counting process by individuals or groups.
He noted that the record of elections in post-colonial Africa is

characterized by electoral manipulation as the ruling elites
maneuvers the state administrative resources and other factors to
perpetuate electoral fraud, while projecting credible, free and fair
election to the global community, hence in his words in most news
state of Africa, politics, and elections in particular are viewed as
fulfilling purposes and functions different from those predicated on
both the liberal and communist model; confirmation of a
government already in power has become a feature of elections
the instances where ruling governments have been changed by
41
means of the ballot box, in a competitive situations is rare indeed.

He however contends that the non-competitive elections in Africa
does not serve the integrative purpose of the ratificatory model of
the communist school due to the weakness of the internal
structures and level of development and could not said to be
totalitarian, but single party pluralist society.
He further postulates that central to election is the electoral
system: a set of rules that governs the conduct of the elections,
the foundation of electoral institutions which must be acceptable to
all the participants, hence the electoral system of the ratificatory
model is dysfunctional to competitive model and vice versa, and
inherently generates stresses as experience in Nigeria in 1965,
1983 and 2003, Cote dIvoire 2000, 2011. Given the prevalence
situation, voters behavior becomes difficult to analyse and added
that elections do not single handedly lead to changes in government
policies.
Although he came short of analyzing the root of electoral fraud and

evolution of political obstructionism, he nevertheless concluded
42
that election is central to the working of every modern state, in his

words without free elections, the vast majority of citizen would
have no meaningful say in setting the national agenda, defining
policy alternatives and determining who will rule. In noncompetitive systems, elections provide legitimacy for the regime,
create a sense of mass participation in government and serve to
create a democratic faade for the regime.
Commenting on nature of election in Africa and West Africa in

particular, Bako (1997) traces it root to the imperialistic nature of
Western Europe and America model of electoral democracy,
fabricated for further entrenchment of the sub-region into the
global capitalist structure in order to facilitate it exploitation;
hence, the big dichotomy between societal values at community and
state level. He further tracks lack of mass participation to the elitist
centered nature of the process, and lack of cultural and material
conditions for electoral democracy as further challenge and
therefore
recommends,
home
grown
democracy
peculiar
to
individual states which will revisit the pre-colonial values, norms
43
and other democratic variables which can be blend with the

progressive provisions of western democracy and fashion a
democratic society suitable for the people of the sub-region, given
their peculiarity.
Amuwo (1992) contends that challenges to competitive elections in

the sub-region could be divided into external and internal factors.
External
to
the
sub-region
are
the
legacies
of
centralized
governance of the colonial masters who handed over power and

electoral process to the people of the sub-region at independence
through personalized statesmen, who in turn appropriated states
powers to themselves and added that the economic hardship and
general poverty pervading West Africa due to oppressive and
obnoxious
economic
climates
dictates
of
the
Bretton
Wood
institutions and the multinational corporations (MNCs) render the

states more oppressive. Besides, the ambivalent attitude of the
West towards competitive elections as their treacherous economic
policy support authoritarian democracies protecting their interest;
illustrates
more
rhetoric
commitment
44
to
genuine
electoral
democracy than in practice, so also is the insistence on NeoAmerican model of development which is less democratic. Internal
to the sub-region, he identifies the politics of sit-tight leaders and
life
president
which
also
pervades
the
civil society,
hence
hierarchical and less democratic civil society finds it difficult to

demand for genuine democratic election from the governments.
Other factors include militarization of the state, discontent
elements of the ruling elites and the citizenry disaffected by delayed
promises of the democratic era. He concluded that the external
environment is more hostile to electoral democracy in the subregion than the internal; thereby stressed the need for prudent
utilization
of
local
resources,
social
justice,
equity
and
accountability as well the effective utilization of any goodwill from

the external environment.
Contributing, Bluwey (1992) support Amuwo on the close nature of

the sub-regional political systems and added the blatant violation
of human rights, minority rule of urban dwellers as well as states
sole control of economic resources and means of terror, oppression
45
and suppression as other factors militating against free and fair

elections in West Africa. He, however disagreed with Amuwos
perception of the external environment; to him, the external
environment is the harbinger of competitive election in the sub
region, which leads to his endorsement all of western measure in
pursuance of credible, fair and free election in the sub region. This
implies his lack of confidence in the internal environment; a
marked difference from Amuwos strong belief in the ability of the
internal environment to breed and harness durable democratic
structures and processes.
Deviating from the structural dimension to the challenges,

Kawonise (1992) dwells on the normative variables within the
societies militating against democratic process and consolidation in
the sub-region. He analyses the linkage between competitive
election
and
normative
order;
and
further
identifies
the
impediments as excessive collective orientation which he contends

is antithetical to individualistic ethic of liberalism as embedded in
Liberal democracy. Such orientation he argued, hardly give room
46
for individual opposition to the perceived collective will of the

community and this intolerance is inimical to competitive election.
In addition, he cited the deference to gerontocracy in political
practice in the region. The beliefs of wisdom being the function of
age often lead to the muffling of the political voice of younger
elements in the society. This also violates the principle of equality,
as the wielding of political influence is largely ascribed than
achieved; hence, opposition by the younger generations is an
intolerable insult. Added to the list according to him include
prebendalism
and
clientelist
politics
which
undermine
accountability and extol political repression of opposing voices of

discontent elements in the society. Kawonise, however sees
competitive election as a farce in the sub-region but failed to
provide alternative to democratic governance acceptable to the subregion.
For Olaitan (1992) the challenges lays on the door post of poverty
induced by bad economy dictates of the Bretton Wood institutions,
the opinion he shared with Amuwo. He also agreed with Kawonise
47
on the normative dimension and identifies with others view of

kleptocratic attitude and mass corruption of leaders as impediment
to competitive election project. Against this background, he
concluded that, the external prodding of the process, given the
prevailing internal variables and dynamics can at best produce half
baked result.
The Nigerian Experience

Specific to Nigeria, Jinadu (2010) avers that the crisis of electoral
governance is at the heart of the general crisis of democratic
politics and governance. Lack of indeterminacy and certainty of
incumbent political office holders to win every political contest
erodes public confidence in the process. Using historical sociology
he analysed empirically the recurrence electoral flaws from 1960 to
2010 hinged on the complicity and partiality of the electoral
empires, the rigging and counter rigging of elections by all parties
in the contest, as well as the manipulation of the law deriving from
the inherent ambiguity of the language of the law to suit a
particular interest in the country which manifested as major deficit
48
in elections and electoral administration. He highlighted twenty-two

of the deficits which can be classified into logistic, administrative,
normative and legal.
He recommends the reformation of the electoral system and

administration, electioneering process and checkmating of the
abuse/misuse of power of incumbency as well the state and
administrative resources for improper electoral gain, including
adjudication process of election disputes. He concludes that only
electoral reforms on normative and legal imperative can strengthen
the
logistic
and
administrative
variables,
and
enhance
re-
orientation from political opportunism and impunity to the

acceptance of the morality of politics.
Onuoha
(2003)
identifies
cultural
and
structural
pluralism,
praetorianism, clientelism and prebendalism as the challenges

which
produce
electoral
corruption
and
violence
rigging,
obstructionism, punitive control and repatrimonialism in the

conduct of election. He argues that these arise from the character
of the state and dominant political class whose interests are
49
copious. Hence, the dominant class uses the state as an

instrument of appropriation of the common wealth and protection
of their interest, which accounts for non autonomy of the state in
arbitrating among groups in Nigeria. Election being the only route
to democratic governance become an instrument of the class
perpetuation in power; bringing about common pattern in electoral
processes in the country. He divides the elections in the country
into two classes between 1959 and 2003, and argues that the
transition elections of 1959, 1979, 1992 and 1999 were more
orderly due to their organization by neutral bodies the colonial
masters and the military, despite being an interesting players, but
the consolidation elections of 1964, 1983 and 2003 were incredible
similar in election issues.
These include the prevalence of thuggery, obstructionism, punitive
control and rigging in the effort of retaining state power and
system of rewards. He concluded that all the elections were
influence by primordial and ethno-regional considerations and
featured fraud, bribery and rigging of votes and therefore call for
the restructuring of the Federation and transfer of resources to
50
component
nationalities
desiring
greater
autonomy
and
the
development of effective civil society which would ensure the

organization of credible poll beyond ethno-regional interest.
In supporting Onuoha, Okolie (2010) believes that the character of

the African states and Nigerian state in particular as well as
dominant class remain the greatest challenge to competitive
election in the country as this rules out a politics of moderation
and mandates a politics of lawlessness and extremism. Dwelling
on the 2007 general election, he added that the concept of return
has replaced voting, the masses are alienated from political
participation even at the lowest symbolic and tolerable level
indicating that the votes of the masses did not count as the results
of the elections were already falsified before the elections, which he
argues hampers participatory democracy. According to him, the
political godfathers use the state apparatuses to truncate the
electoral
process
and
voting
becomes
metaphor
for
disempowerment of the people as many are deceitfully made to vote

without choosing He concluded that state is the main instrument
51
of electoral fraud but failed to suggest ways of overcoming this

challenge.
Commenting on the electoral pattern and process Ikelegbe (2010)
opines that elections in Nigeria has been a straight fight between
the conservatives typified by NPC, NPN, NRC, NNDP, MDE, NNA
and the progressives typified by AG, NCNC, NEPU, UMBC, UPGA,
UPN, GNPP and SDP and added that the conservatives won
majority in all elections except for the annul June 12, 1993
President Election. In agreement with most of the literature he
identifies irregularities, malpractices, thuggery, rigging and violence
as the main features of the elections. He also observes the
centrality of ethno-religious factors as the major influence of
manipulation despite candidates identity with political parties,
manifestoes and strategies. He however failed to recommend ways
of overcoming the perennial problem of election credibility in the
country.
Idahosa (2010) points to regionalism of Nigerian politics as well as

political parties as the major bane of competitive election, as this
52
inherently lead to ethno-regional block vote in favour of the

preferred political party in a region. He analysed the elections in
the first and second republic and concluded that the results of the
consolidation election of 1964 and 1983 which reflected a pan
Nigerian outlook were indeed monumental fraud of the hegemonic
political party in power to muffle opposition and gain absolute
majority in all domain in the country. However he did not proffer
solution to this challenge.
Deviating from voting and counting process Bratton (2008) dwells

on the campaign strategies. In the run up to the 2007 General
elections in Nigeria, he observes that vote buying and violence were
the major impediment to competitive polls. He posits that violence
reduces turnout; and vote buying enhances partisan loyalty. They
are indeed against the principle of freedom to choose as embedded
in international codes for elections and impact negatively on
political equality, as well as diminish the legitimacy of the electoral
outcomes and set the stage for governance by corruption. In his
words vote buying and violence enable the elevation into elected
53
office of cronies, criminals and strong-arm god fathers who are

singularly unfit for public service.
His assertion that compliance with political entrepreneur works

better at community level, as most members of a community would
not want to be seen as deviants explains the block vote at local,
state and regional level which is a recurring decimal in Nigerian as
African politics. He concluded that irregular elections tampers with
the institutionlisation of political accountability and recommended
the disarmament of militant group, reformation of electoral body
and civility as well as impartiality of the security operators.
Besides, the re-orientation of the citizenry towards clean elections
to him remains imperative for the attainment of development and
reduction in the existing in equalities between political elites and
ordinary citizens.
Lewis (2006) takes a look at the correlation between performance
and legitimacy of democratic governance and their impact on
elections. He observed that lack of performance by the elected
leaders makes democracy less appealing to the citizenry especially
54
in a new democracy, which in turn affect their attitude towards

elections leading to voters apathy and possible preference for
undemocratic alternatives. He therefore appealed for the electorates
understanding of the task of nation building and challenge the
leaders to be open and accountable to the people in order to
enhance the legitimacy of the government and stimulate the
interest of the governed in elections as a credible peaceful electoral
process is likely to reinforce confidence in basic institutions; a
highly
flawed
and
unstable
election
exercise
could
further
discourage voters and undermine the foundations of democratic

rule. The appeal seem to have worked because, even the flawed
election of 2007 has not lead to total rejection of democracy but the
operators, which led to their replacement in some part of the
country in 2011 elections.
The National Mirror Editorial (April 1, 2011) focused on the need

for credible elections in the 2011 polls. It identifies security as the
major concern of the electorates: hence the need for peaceful
conduct of actors throughout the process voting should take place
55
in an atmosphere devoid of coercion and or intimidation. The

editorial advised the political parties, their leaders as well as
candidates to observe the code of ethics and act only within the
law to treat opponents with respect, to shun violence and
fraudulence, to respect the peoples choice and promote the peace
and good image of the country. It argues that credible election
depends on the competence of the electoral body, its integrity and
transparency in handling the entire process which will reflect the
will of the people and this it maintains must be the goal of all
Nigerians at every stage.
Kila (2011) while reviewing the conduct of 2011 national assembly

election in Nigeria, appreciates the peaceful atmosphere as well as
the synergy between the electoral officers and the voters which
enhances confidence of the public, he appreciates the transparency
of the voting and counting processes but wonders the electoral
body delay in the release of the results, he therefore called on the
Independent National Electoral Commission to imitate the voters
who used their electronic gadgets to collate the results of the
56
Election, he however failed to mention the impact of the insecurity

caused by the Bomb blast at Suleja office of the electoral
commission.
Bekoe (2011) claims that the 2011 Presidential Election was Best
Run, but Most Violent. He analysed the mechanism and strategies
employed by the electoral body to administered from voters
registration to the announcement of result and avers that the
process was transparent; and there were ominous signs of
potential violence which erupted in the northern part of Nigeria
and claim over 800 lives and displaced 65, 000 persons. He
recommended punitive measures for offenders and believes only
such a significant break from the past can help Nigeria move
towards realizing the fruits of a well organized and administered
electoral campaign. He concluded that national level reforms must
be accompanied with strong local peacemaking institutions and
improvements in the capacity to manage elections must be
accompanied by programs to strengthen the pillars of democracy at
the local level, away from an emphasis on regional, religious and
ethnic mobilization and towards a focus on common issues across
57
groups. Bekoes analysis reflected the reality of the Presidential

election but as noted, the reports on the violence has not been
implemented and no one has been punished fuelling the culture of
impunity.
Countering Bekoe and general belief in the integrity of the 2011

Elections, International Crisis Group (2011) posits that apart from
1,000 people killed, the polls were riddled with malpractices,
logistical deficiencies and procedural inconsistencies. Besides, the
acclaimed of above 78 percent turnout in the South-South and
South East during the Presidential Election were more than the
national average by at least 50 percent which according to the
briefing suggested electoral fraud. It however agreed with other
reports that the polls were on the balance, the most credible to
date. The strength of the electoral process appeared mostly to
have trumped its weaknesses, since Goodluck Jonathan was the
first southern minority leader to win a Presidential Contest, 72 of
109 senators lost their seats, 260 of 360 members of the lower
house are newly elected and the ruling party lost its two-third
58
majority in the senate have 23 governors as against 27 after 2007

elections. The brief however called for a combination of electoral,
constitutional and economic reforms in order to make the 2015
polls truly free and fair and to ensure they are not tainted by
blood. It concluded that much need to be done in voters education
as well as the creation of employment for the idle youths who are
easily
recruited
by
political
entrepreneurs
for
electoral
malpractices, including violence.
INEC and FES (2011) report voters apathy as another challenge to

competitive election. The report claims 18% in 2003 and 31% in
2007 and projected an increase of 11% in the 2011 elections. It
rightly observed without voters, or without a sufficient turn out,
there can be no true elections. A low voters turnout will not
guarantee the will of the people, but only that of a minority. But a
high voter turnout will not only make the result of an election more
credible. It will also deter criminals from hijacking or sabotaging
the electoral process, guarantee more impartiality and fairness, and
will increase the pressure on the electoral officials to live up to the
59
electorates expectations. The report indicted INEC, government,

politicians, press and voters themselves. It attributes these
behaviours
to
violence
and
inadequate
security,
electoral
malpractices fraud, long registration and voting process and nonfulfillment of electoral promise. Voter mobilization, integrity of the
electoral body, accountability of the government, voters education
and impartial press coverage, are noted as remedial measure.
Onyekpere (2011) identifies non-adherence to ethics and ceiling on

campaign finance and the use of state and administrative
resources,
especially
in
the
2011
Presidential
Election
as
impediments, stressing that leverage was given to the incumbent

candidate at the expense of others. He however concluded that the
one billion Naira ceiling prescribe by the law is too low and
unrealistic considering enormous cost of voter mobilization and
education central to credible election as attested to by INEC and
FES report, but call for adequate regulation and reporting on
campaign finance in line with the provision of relevant laws to
create a level playing field for all contestant.
60
Supporting the need for equity among political contestant, Institute

for Media and Society (2011) confirmed that the three big political
parties received more attention than the minor ones. The People
Democratic Party (PDP) led the group followed by Action Congress
of Nigeria (ACN) and the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) had
better media coverage, well over others. According to findings,
media reportage of the elections were skewed in favour of male
politicians, while female politicians did not get as much as 10%
such attention given to male politicians and it also favoured
happenings in urban areas as against the rural areas. It is how be
it gratifying to note from the findings that an appreciable
proportion of the identified electoral issues were given good
prominence, which is an improvement from the indictment of the
Nigerian media by European Union Election Observation Mission
over 2003 elections.
The Ghanaian Experience

Ghana started as a multi-party state at independence and ended
the first republic as a one-party authoritarian state which was
61
inherently contradictory to the spirit and practice of competitive

elections. This according to Democracy Watch (July 2007) is
because at independence, we built a state structure where all the
executive power is concentrated at the centre and in the hands of a
unitary president. As a result, Ghana lacks meaningful subnational or sub-presidential training grounds for Presidential office.
The import of the assertion is the structural deficiencies of the
political system which gives enormous power to an individual. This
might
as
well
administration
explain
and
the
the
autocratic
nature
sub-sequence
match
of
to
Nkrumah
political
monolithism which eventually led to the demise of the Republic in

1966 (Ojelabi, 1970). Zounmenoun (2009: 2) attests that Ghanas
political life has been marked by a series of alternations between
authoritarianism and attempt to democratize the political system.
There were three periods of elected government and three of
military rule between 1957 and 1992. Crawford avers that apart
from the First Republic under the leadership of Nkrumah, the
interludes of civilian government under the second (1967-72) and
the Third Republics (1979-81) were short lived, unable to endure
62
for longer than 30 months, thus the structural deficiency which

promotes authoritarianism and the perceived failures of the
government of the day that led to repeated military interventions.
Hence the return to multiparty elections in 1992 was a milestone in
search of political stability, development and good governance
which had been the bane of most West African countries.
Democracy Watch (2004:2) identifies faulty voters register as a

major hindrance to credible polls: it could be that if the previous
elections in 1992 and 1996 had all been contested with a clean
voters register, the total number of eligible voters would have been
lower than the figures given to us, and therefore the percentage of
those who actually voted would have been high, even as high as in
the December 2004 elections. Thus bloated voter register flawed
the elections of 1992-2000 under the leadership of Jerry Rawling
and of course was a factor in the preparation for the landmark
elections of 2008 despite the creation of a modicum of an accurate
register for 2004 elections (ibid). This publication also identifies
the weak management of the sporadic incidents of post-election
63
violence especially in the northern regions as issue of urgent

national important.
Added to this, is the dearth of ideology by the political parties and
politicians and the institutionalization of ethnic politics leading to
the danger of permanent polarization, freezing out of smaller ethnic
groups and inducement of a feeling of entitlement on the part of
other ethnic groups.
International IDEA (2006) looks at the capacity and political

finance of parties and candidates. While accepting the policy of no
ceiling to spending which is dangerous as political entrepreneur
may hijacked the process. This is worrisome given experience in
Nigeria as in elsewhere in Africa where political god fatherism sets
in and undermine the competitive polls for self-aggrandizement
when most of the responsibility for raising, funds rest with the
individual candidate. Added to this are weakness in capacity
building, fund raising membership drives and registering, party
organization, the mainstreaming of women, accountability and
codes of conduct. These are essential ingredients of modern party
64
system without which, elections would have lost its indeterminacy

due to weak party and emergence of personalized groups inimical
to competitive election built on vibrant and enduring institutions.
Little wonder that Ghanaian parties are largely non-ideological and
non-programmatic, rather are vehicles for men and women of
ambition to seek power and take control of the vast patronage
resources located within the state Gyimah-Boadi et al (2007: 5).
This invariably leads to emergence of party foot soldier defines as a
person who devotes exceptional amounts of his or her time and
energies to canvassing support and votes for a party and its
candidates as well as countering similar activities by rival
parties(Ibid). In essence, the so call party foot soldiers are political
thugs recruited to perpetuate or counter election related thuggery
for their respective political parties and candidates. Although said
to be a product of late colonial period, continues to haunt Ghana
politics
and
elections
till
date,
as
the
party
foot-soldier
phenomenon deepens the neo-patrimonialism and clientelism; the

politics of big man patronage which may result in imperial
presidency as experienced in the past.
65
Zounmenoun (2009: 4) while praising Ghana for five successive

presidential and parliamentary elections and two alternations
between the two major parties in 2009, which indicates progressive
improvement in the electoral process overtime warned of poor
resourcing of the electoral commission and other key institutions
chiefly, human, financial and logistic capacity as well as the
sustainability
dependent.
of
the
position
commissions
supported
budget
by
which
African
is
Peer
donor
Review
Mechanism report on the country in 2005. However, the limited

voter registration exercise of July 13 and August 12, 2008
confirmed this fear as the electoral commission announced that it
registered 1, 835, 417 voters during the exercise as against about
one million originally expected represented an increase of about
290 percent over a similar exercise in 2006 which had recorded
632, 087 voters (Gyimah-Boadi, et al, 2009). This created mistrust
among political parties and generated tension and animosity
between the two leading political parties, as this was blamed on the
electoral commission poor planning as well as administrative and
logistical structure put in place for the exercise. Such would have
66
messed up the whole process. Gyimah-Boadi (2009: 1) also added

the election was nearly compromised by flaws and significant
education gaps which, in turn created the conditions for electoral
conflict and violence There was too much negative and non issue
based campaigning especially in the Presidential run-off election.
Some political parties and element within the media and civil
society, mobilized ethnic hatred. Parties and candidates declared
their respective so-called strongholds no-go areas for their
opponent. These factors raise many questions about the quality of
election in West Africa, if Ghana, is seen as almost the perfect
example of credible elections, given alternation of power between
the two dominant parties in the last twenty-years.
Amoah (2009) raises the politics of obstructionism as counter to

credible election as it was in Ghana 2008 elections. He dwells on
the mysterious decision taken by the incumbent government to
close Ghanas eastern international border with the Republic of
Togo from midnight Friday 5 December, 2008. The implication of
the governments action was the disenfranchisement of Ghanaian
67
citizens in Togo who intended to vote in Volta Region, a stronghold

of opposition NDC party. Despite pressure from civil society and
ECOWAS, Ghanaian government was adamant signaling it assent
to political obstructionism which has bedeviled the sub-region, as it
was in Cote dIvoire over President Alhassan Ouattara. Any form of
political exclusionism is antagonistic to credible election in civilized
society especially in an election as close as the 2008 Presidential
elections in Ghana.
Jockers, Kohnert and Nugent (2009) listed ethnic block voting and
electoral fraud as major deficit to the 2008 Ghanaian election; as
electoral malpractice and vote rigging along ethnic lines in Ghanas
tacit two party system gain momentum during the exercise and
warned of inherent danger, shunning diplomatic and technocratic
applause of the election as a cover-up to save the failure of this
Western institution. They pointed at the extra-ordinary voter turn
over in Volta and Ashanti region which affected the poll and could
have titled the outcome to either side. This indeed is expected in
68
winners takes all politics, which encourage zero-sum political

culture as reflected by politics in the country.
Meissner
(2010:
3)
appreciates
the
acceptability
and
implementation of electoral outcome in Ghanas fourth republic,

but warned against a large measure of mistrust vis--vis official
politics citing manipulation of elections, vote buying and political
pressure as part and parcel of the system, perpetuated by the two
main political parties and their agents. He doubts the extent of
tolerance of the parties involve in future elections against the
backdrop of inherent danger in brinkmanship if adopted by a losing
incumbent leader as experienced elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.
As apart of it 2009 final report, European Union Election
Observation Mission, submits that abuse of state administrative
resources was reduce at National level, but the same could not be
said of regional and local levels. Moreso, the media coverage was in
favour of the incumbent NPP and accused media of partisanship
especially towards the end of campaign for the run off Presidential
Elections when a section of media acted irresponsibly by
broadcasting a wide range of unsubstantiated rumour and
69
speculation questioning the veracity of the elections (EU EOM;

2009: 5). The report also indicted the marginalization of women as
representatives in the election. Besides the logistical problems
leading to the postponement of election in Tain constituency during
the run-off increased tension, as well as the uninvestigated
unusual high turn out in five constituency of Ashanti Region. These
variables among others as pointed out raise the stake for credible
election in the country as in the sub-region.
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The analysis of the challenges facing the organization of credible
elections requires sound framework, as such one would have
expected the study to be grounded either on the modernization
theory of development, since to a large extend, political pluralism
and competitive election is regarded by the West as an integral part
of overall development of any state. However, the recent decimal
performances of Western Economies and steady ascendancy of
China economy and the revival of Russias, empirical punctures
competitive
electoral
democracy
as
critical
component
of
development, hence the preferred viable framework for the current

70
study is Elite Theory which would be complemented by the Theory

of Political Culture.
Elite theory exposes the rule of minority in every society with the
perceive qualities needed for ascendancy to the pinnacle of sociopolitical structure, who are always conscious, coherence and
conspire against the slavish masses when the need arises. They are
seen as excellence, intelligent and noble in character. It takes a
critical look at how leadership changes hand in a society through
the circulation of the governing elites and the instrument of their
governance as well as the mechanism for the stabilization of the
polity.
Essentially elite perspective would reveal the administrative,

structural as well as the normative inadequacies associated with
the organization of credible elections in neo-colonial states like
Ghana and Nigeria and the moderation role of the external
environment. Besides, most of the challenges could be trace to the
characters of the governing elites and their perception of the
process, outcome and its aftermath which majorly may be rooted in
71
the antecedence of the recent past history as well as character of

the masses, their perception of their process, outcome and
aftermath. This synergy between the Elites and the masses lends
credence to the model framework of analysis.
Political Culture on the other hand seeks to explain an aspect of
general culture relating to the perception power, authority and
legitimacy of government over the governed overtime in a given
milieu. As a framework of analysis seconded to Elite model in this
study is meant for effective comparison between the two countries
under focus more so since political behavior are measured and
determine by political culture, it is handy to unearthed the
normative variables in the two milieu which give rise to different
behavior
despite
common
historical
experience
especially
colonialism and military adventurism into politics.

These realities informed the preference of Elite model and Political
Culture framework over other alternatives and would enhance our
understanding of the challenges, either as self-inflicted or an
outcome of a misfit institutions demanding adjustment by all and
sundry given the acceptance of credible election as the only
72
legitimate instrument of Governing Elites circulation in the

contemporary International Politics.
73
REFERENCES
Adele Jinadu (2010) Electoral Reforms and the Future of Democracy
in
Nigeria,
Lagos:
Unilag
Department
of
Political
Science/CBAAC 2010 Public Lecture.

Amoah Michael (2009) The Most Difficult Decision Yet: Ghana
2008 Presidential Elections African Journal of Political
Science and International Relations, Vol. 3 (4) pp. 174-181.
Amuwo Kunle (1992) The International and Domestic Context of
Democratic Transition in Africa: Roadblock to Democracy? In B
Caron et al (ed) Democratic Transition in Africa, Ibadan:
CREDU pp. 129-140.
Anifowose Remi (2003) Theoretical Perspective on Elections in
Remi Anifowose and Tunde Babawale (ed) 2003 General
Elections and Democratic consolidation in Nigeria, Lagos
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
Bako Sabo (1997) Problems of Democracy in Nigeria: Cultural
Imperatives and Impediments in Yakubu Nasidi et al (ed)
Culture and Democracy, Zaria: ABU press pp. 224-232.
Bekoe Dorina (2011) Nigeria 2011 Elections: Best Run, But Most
Violent USIP Peace brief 103.
74

in Africa, Ibadan: CREDU.
Bratton Michael (2008) Vote Buying and Violence in Nigerian
Election Campaigns, Afro barometer working paper No. 99
June.
Crisis Group (2011) Lessons from Nigerias 2011 Elections ICG
Africa Briefing No. 81 September.
EU EOM (2011) Important Step Toward Strengthening Democratic
Elections, but Challenges Remain European Union Election
Observation Mission: Abuja April 18.
Gyimah Boadi et al (2007) The Party Foot Soldier Phenomenon and
Ghana Democracy, Democracy Watch Volume 7 No. 3 July.
Gyimah Boadi et al (2009) Worrisome Development in the 2008
Polls, Democracy Watch, Volume 8, No. 2 May.
Idahosa S. (2010) Issues and Problems in Nigeria Politics: Tribes
Ethnicism and Religion in Ola and Imhanlahimi (ed) Nigerian
Political System Trends and Perspective, Benin: University of
Benin.
IDEA (2004) Ghana: Country Report based on Research and
Dialogue with Political Parties Stockholm: IDEA.
75
Ikelegbe A. (2010) Political Parties, Interest Groups and Elections in

Nigeria in Ola and Imhanlahimi (eds) Nigerian Political
System Trends and Perspectives, Benin: University of Benin.
IMS (2011) Media Coverage of Electoral Issue in the 2011 Elections
in Nigeria, Nigeria IMS.
INEC/FES (2011) Voter Apathy and the 2011 Elections in Nigeria: A
Research Report Nigeria: INEC and FES.
Jocker Heniz, Kohnert Dirk and Nugent Paul (2009) The Successful
Ghana Election of 2008: A Convenient Myth? Ethnicity in
Ghanas Elections Revisited Hamburg: German Institute of
Global and Area Studies (GICA), July.
Kawonise
Sina
(1992)
Normative
Impediment
to
Democratic
Transition in Africa in Caron et al (ed) Democratic Transition

Kila Anthony (2011) A Tale of two cities National Mirror, April 18.
Lewis Peter (2006) Performance and Legitimacy in Nigerias New
Democracy Afro barometer Briefing paper No. 46 July.
Meissner Kathrin (2010) Elections and Conflict in Ghana: Country
Analysis Accra: Friedrich Ebert Stifung.
Ojelabi Adekunle (1970) A Textbook of West African History
Ibadan: Valuta Educational Publishers.
76
Okolie Aloysius (2010) The State, Electoral Fraud and Illusion of

Participatory Democracy in Africa: Lessons from 2007 General
Elections in Nigeria Lagos: Unilag Journal of Politics.
Olaitan Wale (1992) Democracy and Democratization in Africa: Not
ye the Glorious Dawn in B Caron (ed) Democratic Transition
Onuoha Brown (2003) A Comparative Analysis of General Elections
in Nigeria in Remi Anifowose and Tunde Babawale (ed) 2003
General Elections and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria,
Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
Onyekpere Eze (2011) Non-Transparent Spending (A Report on
Campaign Finance and Use of State and Administrative
Resource in the 2011 Presidential Elections) Abuja: Centre for
Social Justice.
Zounmenoun David (2009) Ghanas 2008 Election: Towards a
Consolidated Democracy? Situation Report, Institute of
Security Studies, July.
77
CHAPTER THREE
BACKGROUND TO ELECTIONS IN GHANA AND NIGERIA
INTRODUCTION
Modern election was introduce into Ghana and Nigeria by the
colonialist through constitutional Development, especially the
inclusion of Elective Principles in Guggisberg Constitution and
Clifford Constitution of 1925 and 1922 in Ghana and Nigeria
respectively. However, Elections during the colonial rule had one
major pattern; the struggle against the colonialist, therefore voters
behaviour
and
other
electoral
issues
were
not
subjects
of
discussion; but the need to Africanized the structure and process

of governance was imperative, which may as well be a pattern
across board until the split in the United Gold Coast Convention,
(UGCC) between the Dr Danquah and Nkrumah in 1949 leading to
the formation of Convention Peoples Party in Ghana. In Nigeria,
the
regionalization
of
the
country
into
three
by
Richards
Constitution in 1946 brought in ethno-regional and religious fervor
78
into electoral process in the country. Howbeit, this chapter dwells

on elections from the eve of independence: identifying the historical
pattern of elections in the two countries in the first part, and
narrate the history of elections in the two countries as second and
third parts respectitively.
3.4
HISTORICAL PATTERN OF ELECTIONS IN GHANA AND

NIGERIA
The pattern of elections in the two countries in comparative term

has been a mixed. While Ghana tends to have alternation of power
based on historical orientation of groups and personalities as well
as ideology, with high degree of indeterminacy, Nigeria on the other
hand has been a show of dominant group which makes the predict
ability of the outcome as sure as day, since they have never been an
exchange of power between incumbent and opposition at the
National level. The details of these patterns are briefly discussed
below.
3.4.1 Historical Pattern of Elections in Ghana
79
Nkrumahs split from the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC)

and indeed parting way with Dr Joseph Danquah and subsequent
formation of Convention Peoples Party (CPP) led to the emergence of
two interest block in Ghanas political landscape: the DanquahBusia partisans who represented educated, indigenous traditional
and merchant elites, against the Nkrumahists who represented
urban workers and rural peasant (Morrison 2004, Wiseman,
1990:119-120),
These power blocs alternate themselves in ruling Ghana starting
with Nkrumah and his group at Independence Elections of 1956 till
the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections. Lindberg and
Morrison 2008:3 observe: In 1966, a military government that
generally
reflected
the
Danquah-Busiast
bloc
displaced
the
Nkrumah-led CPP government. A civilian was elected in 1972 that

brought Busia (and the Danquists) to power, whose short tenure
was again interrupted by another military intervention. This
military junta represented elements associated with Nkrumah and
the were succeeded by an avowedly Nkrumahist civilian government
80
in 1979. The involvement of the military in the alternation game to

a large extend reveal not only the politicization of the army, but the
ideological underpinning of the two power blocs. The socialist
orientation of the Nkrumahs CPP and Jerry Rawlings National
Democratic Congress (NDC) versus, the traditional liberal market
oriented Danquah-Busia, United Nationalist Party and the fourth
Republic New Patriotic Party (NPP).
Added to the ideological inclination is the ethnic fervor, as result of
elections in Ghana also suggests historical Ashanti-Ewe cleavage,
Ashantis supports Danquah-Busia as well as the New Patriotic
Party (NPP), while the Dagombas and Ewes typically support the
National Democratic Congress (NDC). The pattern of the elections
in the same vein reflects ethnic contestation between the Ashantis
and Ewes interest in Ghanaian politics (Ibid: 23) which generally
leads to the speculation of ethnic block voting and proxy votes.
Nevertheless, the most significant historical pattern is the kick the
rascal out culture which reflects the orientation of evaluation in
terms of introspective versus prospective voting: rewarding of a
81
performing incumbent or voting for opposition based on the

campaign promises and manifesto of the party and indeed the total
punishment of the incumbent through rejection at the poll and
absolute confidence in the opposition to deliver the most needed
dividends of democracy. This explains the alternation of power
between the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic
Party between the founding elections of the fourth republic. The
NDC was retrospectively rewarded in 1992 and 1996 and was
kicked out in 2000 while the NPP was prospective trusted in
2000, retrospectively rewarded in 2004 and kicked out in 2008.
This voting behaviour portrays Ghanaians as rational voters
capable of using their votes to hold their leaders accountable in a
transparent electoral contest.
Amoah (2009) also observes the politics of alliances as a recurring
decimal in electoral process especially if an election proceeded to a
second round, the incumbent suffers because opposition ganged
up against it. This opposition gang-up was given credence in 2000
Presidential Election when Atta Mills lost in the second round and
82
in 2008 Presidental Election when Akuffo Addo of NPP lost in

similar situation to Atta Mills. The trend is facilitated by the large
swing voters capable of subsuming ethno-regional and other
primordial interests inherent in African politics and raising the
premium on patriotism of an average Ghanaian. Besides, is the
progressive improvement in the electoral process as noted by
Zounmenoun (2009:4) five sets of Presidential and Parliamentary
elections held subsequently. Two turnovers of the governing party
and perceived advances (review of electoral laws and practices civic
education, reinforced capacity of key electoral monitoring bodies
including the judiciary each time in the quality of electoral process
may as well confirmed political maturity of the elites and the
electorates
which
translates
into
widespread
acceptance
of
Elections results and reduction in the adjudication of electoral

outcomes. As such, Ghanaians have considerable experience in
negotiating their political interest (Lindberg and Morrison 2008:3),
leading to the reduction of electoral related violence when compare
with other countries in the sub-region.
83
3.4.2 Historical Pattern of Elections in Nigeria

The regionalization Richard constitution 1946 as cited earlier on
encouraged the emergence of ethno-regional based politics and
political parties in Nigeria. The Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) in
the North, the Action Group (AG) in the West and the National
Council of Nigeria and Cameroun/Citizen (NCNC) in the East.
Strengthening the regional structure was the unbalanced and
skewed Federation favouring Northern dominance, re-enforced by
the neo-colonial political economy and non-autonomous of the
Nigerian state which collectively compressed the elections into a
predictable patterns.
Onuouha (2003), identifies the uniformity of transition elections
and consolidation or second term elections in Nigeria and argues
that all the elections in each category bear the same trade mark
the transition elections are the 1959, 1979, 1999 June 12 1993
aborted general election had some unique features. The political
actors were more cautions about the electoral rules, and had less
opportunity to break the rules. The elections appeared less
84
expensive, more orderly, freer, fairer and more credible. On the

other hand, the Consolidation Elections of 1964, 1983 and 2003
feature the prevalence of thuggery, obstructionism, punitive
control and rigging (Ibid) which leads to progressive decline in the
acceptability of elections by political parties and the general public,
as the 2007 state and federal elections declined even deeper and
more precipitously than the 1964/65 (Jinadu, 2010, Okolie, 2010).
Thus in Nigeria, transition elections are better organized and
administered than the consolidation elections when the incumbent
is also an interested party in the exercise. This overbearing posture
of the incumbents in the consolidation elections generates ripples
in the military intervention of 1966 and 1983 (Onuoha, 2003,
Jinadu, 2010, Akinboye and Anifowose, 1999).
Reflection on ideology in the recurring pattern of election in Nigeria
may confirm a straight fight between conservatives typied by NPC,
NPN, NRC, NNDP, MDF, NNA etc and the progressives typied by AG,
NCNC, NEPU, UMBC, UPGA, UPN, GNPP SDP (Ikelegbe, 2010).
Incidentally
the
classification
85
of
the
parties
makes
the
conservatives victorious except for the aborted Third Republic when

the SDP was the acclaimed winner. This of course, may be one of
the reasons for it annulment; after all Onuoha (2003) have argued
that though apparently neutral bodies the transitional authorities,
the colonial masters, and the military, were interested parties in
the outcome of elections. Hence the continuous domination of
Nigerian conservatives which represent the Northern Interest and
hegemony, a factor brought about by the skewed federal structural
fabricated by the colonialist as stated earlier; concretized by the
military rule, as Akinyemi (2007) succinctly asserts that the
Nigerian Army between 1966 and 1999 could be seen as the
political party protecting the interest of the North and indeed the
conservatives:
these
interests
and
concerns
were
strongly
demonstrated in the NPN (1979 and PDP 1999) electoral victories

under military transition exercises (Onuoha, 2002: 331-336).
Expectedly, these variables highlighted above snowballed into
endemic violence, loss of lives and properties as well as general
states of insecurity and massive electoral fraud which has almost
86
become acceptable norm in electoral process in the country. Ethnic

block and proxy votes are so conventional that the 1993
Presidential Election, was perceived as abnormal since these
variables were not noticeable and might have contributed to it
annulment, hence, there had never been power turnover between
the Ruling and Opposition in the Electoral History of Nigeria at
Federal level, which makes the predictability of electoral outcome
certain even by a lay man on the street, convulsing into the
progressive rise in voters apathy and illegitimization of the Nigerian
state and government by citizenry.
3.5
HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN GHANA
With the formation of Convention Peoples Party by Dr. Kwame

Nkrumah and the dwindling in the popularity of the conservative
United Gold Coast Convention, Nkrumah emerged as the dominant
political figure in Ghana from 1951 to 1966. The Legislative
Election of 17 July 1956 leading to the Independence was won by
Nkrumahs CPP, taking 71 out of the 104 seats in the Parliament,
scoring 57.10% followed by Kofi Busias National Liberation
87
Movement (NLM) with 20.89% although with 12 seats and Northern

Peoples Party 10.39% amazingly with 15 seats. Thus, Nkrumahs
CPP introduced the motion for Independence and remain the ruling
party when it was granted on March 6, 1957.
On April 27, 1960 Ghana had a plebiscite alongside a Presidential
Election to ratify the Republican Constitution under Unitary
Government with a powerful President without a federal trait. This
Elections had only Nkrumahs CPP and Dr. Danquahs UP as
candidates and the winner was expected to pioneer the running of
Ghana as a Republic as provided by the New Constitution.
Expectedly Ghana voted for the Republican Constitution and its
initiator, Dr. Nkrumah. The plebiscite had 1,008,740 yes votes
(88.47%) and 131,425 No votes (11.53%) with the Nkrumah CPP
garnering 1,016,076 (89.07%) (Ghana elections database), thus
Nkrumah orchestrated the march towards political monolitheism
with the Constitution Referendum of January 31, 1964 for the
ratification of CPP as the Sole Legal Political Party and despotic
presidency with the claim of 2,773920 (99.91%) of affirmative vote.
88
Therefore, CPP Government organized the first single party

elections, selecting the 198 candidates at central committee level
without the actual election taking place on June 9, 1965 as
schedule but declared them elected. This high-handedness and
closure of political space among other factors led to the demise of
the First Republic when the military struck in 1966.
Following the military stage-managed transition programme, the
August 29, 1969 National Assembly election took place with the
Progressive Party winning 105 seats (58.33%) and the closet rival
National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) coming second with 29seats
(30.891%). However the Presidential Election brought in Kofi Busia
as the President, starting the alternation of Nkrumahist and
Danquist tradition of power exchange in Ghanaian politics. However
the civilian administration was short live as the military again
struck
in
1972,
leading
to
about
seven
years
of
military
dictatorship in Ghana, during which electoral politics was an

aberration.
89
Another military fabricated transition to civil rule led to the June

18, 1979 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections contested by six
political parties and independent candidates, under the watchful
eyes of Flt Lt Jerry Rawlings who was the military Head of State.
The Presidential Election went into the first run-off Election in
Ghanaian history. Hilla Limann of Peoples Nationalist Party (PNP)
scored 631,559 (35.32%) and Victor Owusu of Popular Front Party
(PFP) followed with, 533,928 (29.86%). Thus without any candidate
garnering the required 50% + 1 vote as stipulated by the law, there
was a run-off on July 9, 1979 where Hilla Limann of PNP emerged
a winner with 1,118,305 (61.98%) and Owosu, PFP, 686, 097 votes
(38.02%). In the Parliamentary Election, the PNP won 71 seats,
while PFP had 42 seats, the remaining seats were shared by the
four smaller parties and I independent candidate. This democratic
experiment however lasted for about 23 months as another military
take-over was witnessed in December 1981 due to legislative
idiosyncrasy and economic down which turned public opinion
against Limanns government (Carter Center 2009:8). Rawlings
90
again emerged as architect of the coup and the Head of the Military
Government which lasted over a decade.
International and local pressure forced Rawlings to initiated
another transition to civil rule in the early 1990s (Zounmenoun,
2008:3). The ruling Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC)
which Rawlings was the chairman set up the National Commission
for Democracy, upon whose recommendations in May 1991,
Rawlings government approved the restoration of a multiparty
political system and created the Consultative Assembly to aid the
transition to a Constitutional Republic (Carter Center, 2009:8). The
government retained a ban on political party formation during the
Consultative Assembly; Riedl (2010:14) to ensure that the process
of constitutional deliberation was non partisan (Daily Graphic
1997). With the adoption of majority recommendations by the
National Commission for Democracy by the Consultative Assembly,
the constitution of the Fourth Republic was approved by National
Referendum in April 1992 by 92 percents of votes cast, with voter
turnout of 43.7 percent (Carter Center, 2009:8).
91
The government lifted ban on political party formation and

development in June 1992 and made the registration of parties
extremely rigorous, through The Political Parties Law of 1992
passed by the PNDC which in addition to party constitution and
registration fee, calls for at least one founding member of the
political party from each of the 160 districts within sixty days the
party must provide evidence of the existence and location of
national, regional and district offices in each locality (PNDC
Political Party Law, 1992). These high barriers to entry forced the
majority of citizens interested in joining a party or running as a
candidate to align with one of the two main contenders, which had
established the necessary infrastructure and asset for party
maintenance (Riedl, 2010:15). The PNDC transformed itself into
National
Democratic
Congress
(NDC)
alongside
other
pro-
governmental organizations, the splintering of the Nkrumahist

movement left the door open to Rawlings to move into their
traditional arena (Andre and Mesple- Somps 2009:4) and presented
a populist platform ideological close to the Nkrumah tradition
(Morrison, 2004). On the other hand, the NPP was made up of
92
disparate communities of antiauthoritarian groups and presented

the Danquah/Busia movement supported by the Ashanti and is
deemed the right wing party (Andre and Mesple-Somps, 2009:4).
In the founding elections of the Fourth Republic in 1992, the
Presidential and Parliamentary Elections held on separate dates.
The major political parties that took part in the election were the
New Patriotic Party (NPP). The National Democratic Congress
(NDC), the National Independence Party (NIP), the Peoples Heritage
Party (PHP) and the National Convention Party (NCP). The outcome
of the November 3 1992, Presidential Election gave victory to the
NDC candidate, Flt Lt Jerry Rawlings with 58.4%, while the NPP
candidate, Albert Adu Boahen had 30.4%, (Ghana elections
database). The NPP led other political parties in protest against the
outcome of the election, alleging widespread irregularities and
eventually boycotted the Parliamentary Election of December, 29,
1992, paving way for the NDC to win 197 of 200 seats and the
remaining three seats went to independent candidates, the NPP
catalogued a number of irregularities allegedly perpetrated by the
93
NDC and individuals associated with it in a book entitled: The

Stolen Verdict. The results of the elections however, were not
challenged in court (IDEA, 2004:5). The boycott made the
parliamentary election not competitive, as such, the 1992 can be
said to be transition from the military government to civilian
administration without democracy, despite the apparent signs of
basic institutions for electoral democracy. It was indeed significance
in the transmutation of a military junta into a democrat, the first in
the history of Ghana. Rawlings was subsequently sworn in as the
President in January 1993; the Provisional National Defense
Council was dissolve and the new unicameral legislature dominated
by the NDC inaugurated.
The next round of Elections came up in 1996. This time the
Presidential and Parliamentary Elections were scheduled for the
same date, December 7, 1996. The election was characterized by
alliances of political parties the Peoples Heritage Party, the
National Independence Party and a faction of the Peoples National
Convention merged to formed Convention Peoples Party. The newly
94
formed Convention Peoples Party went into electoral coalition,

christened Great Alliance with John Kufour as their Presidential
Candidate (Carter Center, 2009:9). While the NDC canvassed for
support from other elements outside the Great Alliance to form
what was known as the Progressive Alliance. However, the
alliances failed to work against Rawlings as he was returned as the
winner of the Presidential Election with a comfortable 57.2
percent of votes cast (with a 76.8 percent turnout) (ibid). In the
Parliamentary Election, because of disagreement over which partys
nominee should stand as candidate in some consistencies, the
alliance achieves little (IDEA, 2004:5). However, the NPP won
60seats, while the NDC continued to dominate the Parliament with
133 seats. This was indeed the first competitive Multiparty Election
in the Fourth Republic and there was remarkable improvement in
the process and electoral administration. Characteristically, the
opposition still alleged manipulation of the incumbent but the
results were not challenged in court. Again, for the first time
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) trained and brought together a
Network of Domestic Election Observers (NEDECO), comprising
95
more
than
20
civil
society
groups
and
Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) to observe the polls (ibid). The Involvement of

domestic and foreign observer promotes confidence and integrity of
the process and it outcome and as such strengthen the legitimacy
of Rawlings second term as the Civilian President.
The 2000 Elections were significance in several ways amongst
which was the first civilian to civilian transfer of power in Ghanaian
history, since the incumbent, President Rawlings was ineligible to
stand for the election and he so honoured the constitution and
nominated his Vice President John Evans Atta-Mill as the NDC
Presidential Candidate, while the NPP retained the candidacy of
John Kufuor. However, the first round of the Election which was
keenly contested by the two main political parties did not produce
an outright winner as required by the electoral law: 50% plus I vote
cast. In the Election conducted on December 7, 2000 alongside the
Parliamentary Election, John Kufor of the NPP had 48.4%, while
Atta Mills garnered 44.8%. This led to the first Presidential run-off
election of the Fourth Republic which was won by John Kufuor of
96
the NPP with 56.9%. The NPP also enjoyed a slim majority in
Parliament with 99 seats, closely followed by NDC with 92 seats,
hence ensuring healthy opposition in Ghanaian politics. The
transfer of power was generally peaceful and remarkable. While
the
reconverted
President
JJ
Rawlings
National
Democratic
Congress (NDC) victories in the 1992 and 1996 Presidential

Elections were seen as the re-birth of a political pluralism in
Ghana, it was the peaceful transfer of power to the opposition New
Patriotic Party (NPP)s candidate following the 2,000 elections that
was seen as a landmark achievement in Ghanas democratization
experiment (Zounmenoun, 2009:4).
The major actors in the 2004 Presidential and Parliamentary
Elections were quite similar to the 2000 scenario with the elections
date on December 7, except for the electoral alliance formed by the
CPP, the PNC and the Great Consolidated Peoples Party (GCPP)
named Grand Coalition with Edward Mahama as her Presidential
candidate. Unlike the 2000 Elections, John Kufuor won the
Presidential election in the first round with 52.45%, closely follow
97
by the Atta Mills of NDC with 44.64%, while Edward Mahamas

Grand Coalition secured 1.92%. Hence, Kufuor was elected into his
second term in the office peacefully. But there was improvement in
NDC performance in the Parliamentary Election with 94 seats in
the expanded 230 House of Representatives, a strong opposition
continues to characterized the Ghanaian politics. However, the
greatest development in the Parliamentary Election was the high
number of turnover of incumbent Parliamentarian as 88 were not
returned (Democracy Watch, 2004:2) translating into 44% of
Former Parliamentarian which was remarkable, leaving behind 113
of their members to be supported with 118 with ones (with the
expansion of the Parliament to 230 members by the Electoral
Commission). This infusion of new blood into the Parliament
regenerates the institution. Again quite significance was that some
of the parliamentarians were sitting Cabinet Ministers.
The 2008 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections were slated for
December 7, 2008. With the incumbent President completing his
second tenure, therefore not qualify legible to contest, the NPP
98
chose Nana Akufo-Addo as her flag bearer in the Presidential Poll

while the NDC retained Atta Mills as her candidate for the Election
which ran into the second round like the 2000 Election and was
won by the opposition Atta Mills with 50.23% against NPP AkufoAddo 49.77%. The closet election in Ghanas electoral history. The
NDC also secured majority in the Parliament with 114 seats in the
230 Parliament, while the NPP become the opposition with 107
seats. Again, confirming the strength of opposition in Ghanaian
politics. Details of the selections will be discuss in the next chapter.
Meanwhile we shall trace the history of Elections in Nigeria in the
next part of our discourse.
3.6
THE HISTORY OF ELECTIONS NIGERIA
The Parliamentary Constitution leading to the Independence in

1960 favoured regionalism as outlined in Richards Constitution of
1946, which as stated earlier encouraged ethno-regional base
parties as reflected by the NCNC, NPC and the AG. Thus, the
December 12, 1959 House of Representative Election was by and
large,
the
reflection
of
this
reality
99
despite
the
seemingly
harmonization of ideology across regions as illustrated by alliance

between the NCNC and NEPU. This election was the first transition
election, this time from the colonialist to Nigerian Elites. The
campaign was relatively peaceful as the major parties tried to
defend their respectively territories from intruders. The Western
and Eastern Regions enjoyed Universal Adult Suffrage, while the
women were excluded from the process in the North. The election
result gave victory to the NPC with 148 seats in the 312 House
memberships; NCNC-NEPU had 89 seats, while AG and her allies
won 75 seats. The NPC lacked the required majority to form
government, therefore went into alliance with NCNC. Thus, the
emergence of Tafawa-Balewa as the Prime Minister, forming
government and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, the ceremonial President of
Nigeria, Chief Awolowo the leader of opposition in the constituted
House of Representative.
The next round of Election came up in 1964, the first election to be
administered by Nigerian turned out to be nightmare. The process
is
succinctly
summarized
by
100
Anifowose
(1982:61-62)
The
campaign and the conduct of the 1964 federal election itself were
clear examples of the bitter struggle of power among the politicians
of the major political parties. The election was marked by thuggery
and hooliganism. The instruments of power were also misused by
those in office to repress and stifle opposition. Accusations and
counter-accusations of evil intentions, sabotage and fraudulent
election practices marked the campaign. The election was also
marked by the progressive alliance of NCNC, NEPU, AG and other
parties in attempt to wrestle power from the conservation NPC who
also went into alliance with a splinter party from AG, the NNDP in
the West to form the Nigeria National Alliance. Following the refusal
of the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) request for the
postponement of the election date by the Prime Minister and
perceive irregularity in the run-up to the election, UPGA boycotted
the election which gave absolute victory to the NNA, winning 198
seats while UPGA was accredited with 109 seats in the run of
election of March 1965. The despite, alleged unprecedented
irregularities, abuse and violence which attended the election
barred the President, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe from calling on Prime
101
Minister and leader of the NNA, Tafawa Balewa to form a new

government. A stalemate ensued since Azikiwe was not willing to
accept the outcome of the election, but was advised by the judiciary
of the limitation of his power in the constitution. Consultation and
compromise among the elites led to the resolution of the stalemate
through
the
agreement
of
abroad
base
government
and
electoral/constitution reforms. The arm-twisting tactics of Balewas

government in electoral process and administration, in the Western
Region among other factors led to the demise of the First Republic
as the five majors struck on January 15, 1966, thus ending the
British Parliamentary experiment.
The Military Rule lasted well over thirteen years characterized by
counter-coups. However Muritala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo
in 1975 promised to return the country to Civil Rule in 1979.
When,
Muritala
was
killed
in
Colonel
Dimka
failed-coup.
Obansanjo stated I can pay him no better tribute than to continue

to in the spirit with which he led this country, that of complete
dedication. All policies of the Federal Military Government continue
102
as before, all ministries should continue their duties. This tragic

incident can only lead to greater dedication to the upliftment and
progress of the nation (Obasanjo, 1990:33-34). Thus the sanctity
of the transition was upheld and implemented to the letter, starting
with the creation and establishment of New States and Constitution
Drafting in 1975 and 1976, Local Government Reforms and
Summoning of a Constituent Assembly to deliberate on Draft
constitution between 1976-78, Electoral Constituency delimitation
and lifting of ban on political party activities in October 1978;
holding of elections at state and federal level in 1979 (Adekson
1979:220).
The Elections of 1979 like the 1959 election was less chaotic. It was
also significance as the Parliamentary Constitution was replaced
with
American
modeled
Presidential
System:
consequently,
Nigerians for the first time had the opportunity to vote for their
head of state and government directly. Equal franchise was also
extended to the women in the Northern part of the country. Five
political parties participated in the elections: The National Party of
103
Nigeria (NPN), the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Nigeria Peoples
Party, (NPP), the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) and the Great
Nigeria People party (GNPP). In the Senatorial Election, the NPN
won 36 of the 95 seats, UPN 28, UPN 16, GNPP 8 and PRP 7. The
NPN also won 168 seats in the House of Representative UPN, 111,
NPP, 78; GNPP, 43, and PRP, 49. The outcome of the Presidential
Election of August 11, 1979, however was the acid test as the NPNs
candidate, Shehu Shagari scored 5,668,857 (33.72%) of cast votes
and did not win the polls with 122/3 majority as stipulated by the
electoral law (Dudley 1982:166-178, Kurfir, 1983).
The UPN candidate, Chief Obafemi Awolowo challenged Shagaris
election in the Supreme Court which duely upheld the election of
the later. NPN went into Alliance with the NPP and formed a new
government, a reminiscent of NPC/NCNC coalition of 1959.
The Consolidation Election of 1983 was a replica of the 1964
Election except for the dramatis Personae. A new political party was
registered: The Nigerian Advance Party led by Tunji Braithwaite.
Notably in this election was the outrageous growth in eligible voters
104
especially in the NPN dominated areas which witnessed about 33%

increase in four years compare to UPN dominated and of 12.3%
(Joseph, 1991:172-3). Joseph (Ibid) also observed that the 1983
election had the highest turnout since 1959, 65 million voters as
against 48 million in 1979. The NPN manipulation of the register
as indicated ensures her absolute victory even before the polling
process. Besides, the thuggery, obstructionism, punitive control,
looting and arson and the rigging of 1964/65 General Election were
rehearsed in 1983 in an incredible accuracy. (Onuoha, 2003). The
outcome was as expected, Shagari was convincingly returned to the
Presidency; NPN secured 60seats in the Senate and 306 seats in
the House of Representatives; UPN came distance second with 16
Senatorial seatsand 51 seats in the House of Representative.
Indeed, the NPN dominated everywhere and opposition was reduced
to by stander in the political affair of the country. Like 1964/65
elections, the military intervened once again to restore law and
order due to widespread discontentment with the outcome of the
Elections on December 31, 1983 among other factors. Thus it was
another transition away from democracy (Ifidon, 2002).
105
The Military Regime of General Babangida embarked yet on a long

transition to civil rule programme since 1987. However the handing
over date keeps changing with the process and the rule of the
game. Eventually Babangida formed two government funded
political parties at the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National
Republican
Convention
(NRC).
Thus
introducing
two
party
democracy to Nigeria. The National Assembly Election of July 4

1992 gave 52 seats out of the 91 Senate seats to SDP and 314 seats
in the House of Representatives. The NRC had 37 and 275 seats in
the Senate and House of Representatives respectively. However, the
Presidential Election was said to be won by the SDP candidate,
Chief Moshood Abiola on June 12, 1993 and was annulled by
General Bahagida on June 26, 1993 despite it claim to be the freest
and fairest election to have been conducted in post-independent
Nigeria (Akinboye and Anifowose, 1999; Onuoha, 2003; Imhan
lahimi and Obakhedo 2010; Jinadu, 2010:7). It was indeed
peaceful and regarded as a departure from the past troubled and
turbulent electoral history which had favoured a particular section
of the country. This also reinforced the contention that there
106
existed a northern oligarchy ready at all times to resist any shift of

power away from the North (Akinboye and Anifowose, 1999). This
led to political impasses as Babangida made an inglorious exit after
swearing in a hand-picked Interim National Government (ING)
headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan on August 27, 1993. Strikes and
protest persisted, excusing military coup detat led by General Sani
Abacha (Babawale, 2007:91) which raised and dashed the hope of
the validation of the election result.
General Sani Abacha in self-succession bid launched his transition
programme from 1995 cumulating to the formation of the five
political parties: the United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP), the
Democratic Party Nigeria (DPN), the Congress for National Conesus
(CNC), the Grassroots Democratic Movement (GDM), and the
National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN) which was described by
Late Bola Ige as the five fingers of the leper as they all worked
towards the adoption of the General as the only Presidential
candidate in the country in October 1998. Election into the
National Assembly on April 25, 1998 showed the UNCP leading
107
with 61 and 229 in the Senatorial and House of Representative

respectively. However the death of the General on June 8, 1998 and
the lack of competitiveness, compounded by low turn out make
these elections of no use in the present discourse.
General Abdulsalam Abubakar succeeded late General Sani Abacha
and dismantled all the political contraption of his predecessor. He
replaced Abachas NECON with Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC) headed by Ephraim Apata. He embarked on the
shortest transition to civil rule programme which lasted less than a
year. The Electoral guideline for party registration stipulated
minimum of five percent of the total number of votes in at least 24
states in the December 5, 1998 Local Council polls as the
mandatory
requirement
for
registration.
Of
nine
political
associations which participated in the council polls only three met

the requirement and were subsequently registered: Alliance for
Democracy (AD) All Peoples Party (APP) and the People Democratic
Party (PDP). However, the PDP dominated the state Gubernatorial
Election leading to its dominant in the Parliamentary polls of
108
February 20, 1991, where PDP won 69 of the 109 senatorial and
206 House of Representatives seats respectively. This was followed
by the APP with 21 Senatorial 74 House of Representative seats,
while the AD came third with 19 senatorial and 68 seats in the
House of Representative. Thus the pattern of election was clear
leading to the Presidential Election. By and large the AD and APP
formed alliance and Presented Olu Falae as their Presidential
candidate, while the PDP through its primary declared Chief
Olusegun Obasanjo as the flag bearer for the election, who was the
eventual winner of the election marked by low voters and
widespread disparity between the number of voters observed at the
polling stations and the final results that were reported at several
states (Momoh and Thovethin, 2001). Obasanjo was accredited
with 18,738,154 votes, winning five of the six geo-political zones in
the country against Falaes 11,110,287, winning only the SouthWest geopolitical zone.
The result was
upheld after
much
negotiation by Yoruba elites, given the initial rejection and

challenge of the result by Falae. Obasanjo was sworn-in as the
founding President of the Fourth Republic on May 29, 1999.
109
The 2003 General Election was remarkable in the number of

Political Parties contesting the election as court judgement in
December, 2002 favoured political association against INEC strict
control over party registration. Subsequently, the party numerical
strength was increased to 30 but many lack the financial and
logistic requirements to field candidates for election. This was
compounded by the financial weight of the PDP, which had
enormous resource through unrestricted support as attested to by
Onuoha (2003): indications were that the funding of 2003 general
election and particularly the party in power was lavish. There were
publish reports of support (which would have included financial) of
the party in power by large corporate bodies. This was done openly
and more than had ever known. Thus with these resources the
ruling party simply bought it way through in the elections and
fixed the result of the elections they desired to win (ibid).
Consequently
like
the
previous
consolidation
elections
the
incumbent mobilized all the resources at its disposal to overwhelm

the opposition as indicated in the result. PDP won 76 Senatorial
out 109 and 223 of the 360 seats in the House of Representative.
110
President Obasanjo was returned with 24,456,140 (61.94%) votes

cast. However, the military did not intervene as done in previous
consolidation election; this might not be unconnected with its
battered image by General Babangida and Abacha regimes as well
as the global disapproval of such regime change.
The do or die politics took over the General Elections of 2007. The
incumbent
President
having
failed
in
cajoling
the
National
Assembly to amend the constitution which would have provided for

third term for the executive, turned to stop his vice from contesting
the Presidential Election. State and Administrative Resources, such
as the anti-corruption agencies, the security agents and the
electoral body were employed for this purpose. It took the
intervention of the Supreme Court for Vice President Atiku
Abubakar to contest for the predetermined election (Okolie, 2010).
These same State Instruments were used to intimidate, harass and
frustrate opposition or perceived opposition within and without the
ruling party. Again internal democracy was thrown to the dustbin
as candidates were appointed and substituted according to the
111
dictates of dominant interest within the parties. As observed by

(ibid): Therefore, to state that the 2007 general elections in Nigeria
were
characterized
by
monumental
fraud
is
simply
to
underestimate the reality. It was a sham, a facade characterized by

unprecedented, bizarre and brazen display of rigging, intimidation
and total eclipse of fundamental moral code guiding electioneering.
Hence the presidential candidate of the ruling party, Umar
YarAdua was accredited with 24,638,063 (69.60%), Muhammadu
Buhari of ANPP, 6,605,299 (18.66%) and Atiku Abubakar of AC,
2,637,848 (7.45%). PDP also strengthen its hold on the National
Assembly as 87 senate and 263 House of Representatives seats
were allocated to its. ANPP had 14 senate and 63 House of
Representatives, while AC took 6 Senate and 30 House of
Representatives seats. The outcome was subjected to judicial
process
by
aggrieved
parties
which
led
to
nullification
of
considerable results across board with the Supreme Court

removing one elected Governor and replacing him with another
candidate (Jinadu, 2010:8). Acknowledging the fraud, Yar-Adua
112
promise electoral reform and set up Justice Uwais panel for that
purpose on resumption of office.
The death of Presidential Yar-Adua in May 2010 and the
subsequent installation of Goodluck Jonathan as the President of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the much taunted electoral reforms
came to forefront and was intensified after the President relief
Professor Maurice Iwu, of the Chairmanship of INEC in June 2010
and the subsequent appointment of Professional Attahiru Jega,
leading to reorganization within INEC and update of voter register
in the run-up to 2011 election. The election gave victory to the first
Southern minority President, with major turnover in the National
Assembly. Although dainted by post-election violence, was accepted
generally as the most credible to date (International Crisis Group,
2011:1). Details of the election will be discussed in the enxt
chapter.
113
REFERENCES
Adekson J. B. (1979) Dilemma of Military Disengagement in Oyeleye
O. (ed) Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule,
1966-1976, Lagos: Macmillan.
in
Nigeria,
Lagos:
Unilag
Department
of
Political

Akinboye and Anifowose (1999) Nigerian Government and Politics
in Remi Anifowose and Francis Enemuo (eds) Elements of
Politics, Lagos: Sam Iroanusi Publications.
Akinyemi B (2007) Ethics Militias and National Question in Nigeria
in Tunde Babawale (ed) Urban Violence, Ethnic Militias and
the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria, Lagos:
Concept Publications Ltd.
Science and International Relations, Vol. 3 (4).
Anifowose R. (1982) Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv, Yoruba
and Niger Delta Experience Lagos: Sam Iroanusi Publications.
Babawale T (2007) Nigeria in the Crises of Governance and
Development Volume 1 Lagos: Concept Publication.
114
Carter Center (2009) Observation Mission to Ghanas 2008

Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, December 2008
January 2009 Final Report Atlanta: The Carter Center.
Dudley B. (1982) An Introduction to Nigerian Government and
Politics Longman.
Ifidon E. (2002) Transition from Democracy in Nigeria: Toward a
Pre-emptive Analysis African Journal of Political Science, Vol.
7, No. 1.
Imhanlahimi J and Obakhedo N (2010) Electoral Reform and the
Future of Democracy in Nigeria in RF Ola and J. E.
Imhanalahimi (eds) Nigerian Political System: Trends and
Perspectives, Benin: University of Benin.
Joseph R. (1991) Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The
Rise and Fall of the Second Republic Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
Kurfi A. (1983) The Nigerian General Elections, 1959 and 1979 and
the Aftermath Lagos and Ibadan: Macmillan.
115
Lindberg S. et al (2008) Are African Voters really Ethnic or

Clientelistic? A Survey Evidence from Ghana Political Science
Quarterly, 123 (Spring) pp. 95-122.
Momoh A and Thovoethin P (2001) An Overview of the 1998-1999
Democratization
Process
in
Nigeria
Development
Policy
Management Network Bulletin, Vol. XIII No. 3, September pp.

4-9.
Morrison M (2004) Political Parties in Ghana through Four Republic:
A Path to Democratic Consolidation Comparative Politics 36:4
(July) pp. 422-24.
Obasanjo O. (1990) Not my Will, Ibadan: University Press.
Rield R (2010) The Iron Cage of Democracy: Institutional Similarity
and Statis in African Political Party-System Kellogg Institute
Working Paper No. 372, November.
116
Wiseman J (1990) Democracy in Black Africa: Survival and

Renewal New York: Paragon.
117
CHAPTER FOUR
CREDIBLE ELECTIONS IN GHANA AND NIGERIA: A CASE
STUDY OF GHANA 2008 AND NIGERIA 2011 ELECTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Clientlism (Lemarchand, 1972) neopatrimonialism (Merdard, 1982)
and Prebendalism (Joseph, 1987) are common concepts in the
discourse of African politics indeed voting pattern and alignment in
election and electoral outcome overtime due to weakness of state
institutions saddle with the responsibility of conducting free, fair
and credible election. This was compounded by Personalism
(Jackson and Rosberg 1982) of the state by leaders who perpetuate
themselves
in
monolitheistic
power
strategy.
through
one-party
However,
by
the
rule
dawn
or
of
alternative
the
New
Millennium, credible, free and fair election has gain momentum,

worldwide leading to pressure on Africa and indeed West Africa to
comply. This chapter therefore, dwells on Ghana 2008 Elections
which facilitated the second peaceful alternation of power between
118
the two dominant political parties in the closest ever electoral

contest, and Nigeria 2011 Elections regarded as a break away from
the three flawed elections (International Crisis Group 2011:10)
leading to large turnover in the Parliament as well as the emergent
of first ever southern minority President in the history of the
country as the reflection of the seemingly changes towards Credible
Election.
4.1
THE 2008 ELECTION IN GHANA
Preparation for the 2008 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections

started
with
delayed
limited
voters
registration
postponed
repeatedly from January to August 2008. The registration was

chaotic in some areas and eventually contain roughly one million
more names than they should have based on statistical criteria
(Meissner, 2010:8), despite the short duration of 10 days. However,
the Electoral Commission (EC) embarked on the cleaning process,
eliminating double registration, as well as minors and deceased
which helped to expunge as many as
500,000 names from the
provisional voters register (Democracy Watch, 2009:3), which was
119
acceptable to all parties despite the apathy display throughout the

process by the political parties and general public.
Political Parties
Political parties primaries went according to the schedule of
individual parties. The NDC had nominated the veteran Presidential
candidate, Professor John Atta Mills as its flag bearer sicne 2006
and the NPPs primary in December 2007 failed to produce an
outright winner of 50% of votes, as Akufo Addo got 47.9% and
Kyerematen supported by incumbent President John Kufuor 32.5%.
Howe ever, Akufo Addo was ratified as the candidate for election in
a controversial circumstance A total of 8 political parties field
candidates for presidential office and 1060 candidates for the
parliamentary seats throughout the country providing voters a
range of choice as to whom to vote for to represent them in
government. (EU EOM 2009:5). Besides, the six main political
parties in collaboration with the Electoral Commission, NCCE and
IEA developed and signed a code of conduct as a commitment to
violence free election on July 24, 2008 which provided an
120
important basis for applying public pressure on the parties to

conduct their campaigns fairly and without violence (Carter Center,
2009:26).
Campaign Environment
The campaign environment was generally peaceful and carnival
like atmosphere was common especially during the campaign train
of the two leading parties in their regions of dominance NPP in
the Ashanti and NDC in the Volta. However, as the smaller parties
still enjoy element of followership from their supporter according
the resources available to them. The incumbency factor in
campaign was also reduced, since John Kufuor was not standing
for the election but there were times that conflict of interest exist
between state and party of incumbency which altered the political
playing field at regional and district level, but was effectively
managed at the national stage.
Voters Education
121
Voters education was carried out by the Electoral Commission as

well as the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), so
also did the political partial parties with numerous advertisement
in media at national level. Such education covered voters
registration, as well as voting procedures and post-election
orientation. Although the parties were keen on the need to vote for
their candidate and making sure it counts, the governmental
agencies worked on the need for orderly peaceful and free election
for all Ghanaians.
Media Reportage
Freedom of speech was also promoted through the media. There
was no intimidation of opposition or marginalization of any group
in airing their views. The media was neutral throughout the first
round campaign for the election. As noted by the EU Observers
Final Report The media provided a wide range of neutral coverage
122
of the election campaigns (ibid) which was dominated as expected

by NPP and NDC, followed by CPP and PNC as well as the other
smaller parties. However, the NPP enjoyed the advantage of
incumbency in the state owned media due to the coverage of
presidential activities which are always accredited to the party as
achievement.
Women Participation
Women representation and participation in the electoral process
was lopsided, as they majorly participated as voters and polling
staff. In terms of contesting Carter Center (2008:10) observed that
women represent less than 15 percent of electoral contestants
which was collaborated by EU observers aversion that of the 1,060
contesting
parliamentary
candidates
only
103
were
women,
representing less than 10 percent of all candidates and none of the

eight Presidential candidates were women. Three of the presidential
running mates, were however female (EU, EOM 2009). Thus the
electoral contest was dominated by men, as were the political
parties and other sector of national life raising concern on the
123
commitment to the equality of all groups in electoral contest, there

was no technical or legal impediment to the participation of women
and other minority group in any aspect of the process.
Civil Society
The civil society was also active throughout the process. The
Network of Domestic Election Observers (NEDECO) which first
appeared on the scene ion 1996 Election metamorphosed into
Coalition
of
Domestic
Election
Observers
(CODEO)
and
international observers among other groups monitored the process

from voters registration (Democracy Watch, 2009:2) and the
engagement of over 7,000 domestic observes the election day in
polling and counting (EU EOM, 2009:6) and pro-peace initiatives
that had genuine impact on electoral process (Carter Center,
2008:10). The religion institutions were also involve in preaching
tolerance and educating their members, so also were the traditional
institutions which encourage peaceful co-existence as well as the
professional bodies, who insisted that the general interest and
harmonious existence of prosperous Ghana is greater than the
124
interest of any group of elite or personalities, as such reduce the

incidence of violence, as politics of moderation was upheld. Carter
Centre and Ell also organize workshop on Election monitoring and
peace building across board during the polls.
Integrity of the Electoral Commission
The Integrity of Electoral Commission was not in doubt despite the
flawed limited voters registration. The chairman of the Commission,
Dr. Kwadwo Afari-Gyan had been in charge of the commission for
over a decade and had consistently improve on each election,
having organized the 2000 election which alternated power between
the two leading parties was not new; but truly independent and
impartial arbiter with self imposed procedure as Amoah (2009)
asserts. Indeed the EC was buoyed by the austerity nature of their
own procedures at all levels from the polling station right up to the
strong room at the headquarters in Accra where the grand total of
votes is collated. The competence of the commission therefore
enhance public confidence in the process as in the outcome.
125
Electoral Dispute Adjudication

In the anticipation of Electoral Dispute that may arise the Chief
Justice of the Ghanaian Supreme Court came up with measures to
facilitate speedy adjudication process which include modifying
existing dockets to give priority to election cases (Carter Center,
2008:8) by establishing a system comprising of at least two judges
from High Courts in each of the nine regions to deal solely with
parliamentary petitions and there were a further three Fast Track
courts in Accra also assigned this role (EU, EOM 2009:6). The
Judiciary Service also published a manual containing the guideline
on Electoral Dispute Resolution to assist the judges in their job and
also encourage alternative dispute resolution to hasten the
settlement of electoral dispute.
Security Agencies
The security forces were effectively involve in the process; working
with the electoral officers at the registration centre during the
126
limited voter registration, deployed throughout the campaign period

to ensure the safety of all Ghanaians and were observed to p;lay a
constructive role in the process (Carter Center 2009:27). Security
operatives were also involve in the distribution of sensitive electoral
materials across the country and ensure the safety of voters on the
polling day, as they enforced the restriction of movement order and
their permeasive presence enhanced voters confidence and turn
out.
Election Day
The Presidential and Parliamentary Elections took place on
December 7, 2008 in a peaceful and credible manner and vote
counting occurred in a transparent environment (ibid:6) the
electoral officers were assisted by party agents whenever the former
were overwhelm, while the security operative were up to the task.
The turnout was low at 69.5% when compared with the 85.1% in
2004 polls (Ghana election database). There was delay in some
polling centre due to late arrival of materials and high voters
turnout in the urban centres. Some parts of Eastern region voted
127
on the following day due to the late arrival of materials on the

Election Day. The commitment of the Electoral Commission to
ensure that all Ghanaian voters are enfranchised through flexibility
in voting arrangement was commendable and lends credibility of
fairness to the commission in contrasts with the Ghanaian
government decision to close the border with Togo on December 5,
which disenfranchised many Ghanaians living across the border.
The media especially the radio stations provided wide coverage of
polling and alert the Electoral Commission whenever need arises
(EU EOM, 2009:22).
The Elections Result
The outcome of the first round of the Presidential Election put the
incumbent party candidate in the lead with 49.13% of vote cast and
was closely followed by the NDC candidates 47.92%. Given that no
candidate had 50% + l votes cast as required by law, the second
round of the election was inevitable. However, the opposition NDC
won 115 seats in the 230 member Parliament and was followed by
the NPP with 108 seats.
128
The Presidential run-off election was scheduled for December 28,

2008. With so much at stake, the two leading political parties
engaged in a grassroots strategy of door-to-door campaign which
was tension packed. This was moderated by the Civil Society
notably, the National Peace Council of Ghana which includes
representatives of the two leading political parties, major Ghanaian
religious leaders as well as economic and political interest who
discuss the imperative of peaceful run off election. The Electoral
Commission apart from embarking on voter education and staff
training to correct the abnormally noticed in December 7 polls,
took significant steps to ensure proper allocation of all voting
materials (Carter Center, 2009:6). The election took place with
active participation of all actors in a relatively peaceful atmosphere
and the counting was opened to both domestic and foreign
observers, under the watchful eyes of the security agents. There
was unusual high voter turnout in Ashanti and Volta region which
heightened tension as we as discrepancies in result collation. How
be it, the commission met with the political parties to douse the
tension on December 30, 2008 and announced the candidate of
129
NDC, Professor Atta Mills as leading with 23,055 with 229

constituencies counted but noted that, with outstanding election in
Tain constituency with 54,000 voters, there was no clear winner, till
the Tain election of January 2, 2009 is decided.
The NPP filed a last minute lawsuit seeking to place injunction on
the Tain election and to restrain the EC from declaring final result
of the elections until allegations of irregularities in the Volta region
had been fully investigated (Democracy Watch, 2009:5). Sensing the
aftermath of granting such request on the stability of Ghana, the
judge refused to hear the ex parte and ruled that hearing would
taker place on January 5, after the National Democratic Congress
and Professor Mills, as interested parties, were served and given
opportunity
to
respond
(Carter
Center,
2009:45).
The
NPP
subsequently withdrew the two motions on the day of the election

and instructed its agents to boycott the polls. The election went on
as planned and was monitored by both domestic and foreign
observers with low turn out; but was peaceful. The collation of the
Tain re-run was given live coverage on the television which
130
enhances transparency. The outcome did not alter the initial result
of the December 28, as the candidate of the NDC, Professor John
Evans Atta Mills was declared the winner with 50.23% of the
popular vote over Nana Akufo-Addo s 49.77%. The fifth parliament
and the third President of the Fourth Republic were sworn-in on
January 7, 2009.
4.4
THE 2011 ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA
In preparation for the 2011 polls in Nigeria, the Chairman of

Electoral Commission, Maurice Iwu was replaced by Professor
Attahiru Jega -formerly, the Vice Chancellor of Bayero University,
Kano. Jega appointment generated a lot of optimism as he made
headway on electoral and logistical reforms (International Crisis
Group, 2012:2). The first in the series was the production of a new
voter register using Direct Data Capturing (DDC) machine. The
registration exercise was expensive gulping about eighty Billion
Naira and was flawed and inflated as observed by the Jega himself
who sought partnership with the Nigerian Bar Association to
prosecute 870,000 for multiple registration (National Mirror, March
131
31, 2011:5). However, the final register displayed in preparation for

the Elections was about the best in Nigeria electoral history
capturing the data of about 73,528,040.
Political Parties
The political parties organized their respective primary but lacked
internal democracy except the ruling partys Presidential Primary
which was docked by the controversy over the zoning arrangement
within the party (Ojikutu, 2011) with the North canvassing for the
Presidential slot culminating into the nomination of Alhaji Atiku
Abubakar as the North Consensus candidate. However, Dr.
Goodluck Jonathan eventually emerged as the PDP flag bearer. The
ANPP presented Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau, the CPC, General
Muhammadu Buhari, and ACN, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu. There were
also 16 other candidates representing the smaller political parties,
so also were numerous candidates for the Parliamentary Election,
as in Gubernatorial and States Assemblies. The pluralism provides
voters with wide choice inherent in competitive electoral system.
The electoral commission also ensures threat 52 political parties;
132
including the incumbent PDP signed the code of conduct for the
elections (International Crisis Group, 2011:2).
Campaign Environment
The Campaign environment was free of any form of intimidation.
Most of the rallies were lively in parties stronghold, ACN in South
West Zone, PDP in South South, South East and North Central,
while there were frenzies in CPC rally in the Core North States. The
incumbent
was
factor
as
President
Jonathans
official
engagements were given prominent coverage. Moreso, the PDP was

more organized administrative and financially, hence President
Jonathan utilizes door-to-door campaign strategy tacked neighbour
2 neighbour, with elaborate advertisement across media in the
country. Colourful posters and parties symbols were prominent as
well as T. Shirt and face-cap which were worn by supporters of
parties and individual candidate, cumulating to abuse of State
Administrative Resources across board. Onyekpere (2011) reported
that PDP spent about 5 Trillion, ACN about 800million; ANPP,
about 794million and CPC 445 million Naira in their respective
133
Presidential campaign. This put PDP ahead of other political parties

in campaign finance which ceiling is 1billion Naira place on
individual parties and not on the candidate, raising the question of
level playing field for contestant in the electoral race in Nigeria. The
same could be said of Gubernatorial election, where there is no
proper monitoring of campaign finance.
Voter Education
The
Political
Parties,
Electoral
Commission
and
National
Orientation Agency engaged in voters education which was

effective, with the use of Yoruba language in the South West to
local resident Hausa in the North Igbo in the East and Pidgin
English through Public Service Announcement (PSA). However one
man, one vote assurance by President Jonathan was quite
encouraging, which was better understood than the call for vote
protection by opposition parties, which many believe contributed to
the post election violence in the North where illiteracy and other
negative socio- economic indices are high.
134
Media Reportage
The media played constructive role throughout the election. There
was freedom of speech and intimidation was less pronounced. The
media were open to all parties in the contest, but was highly
skewed towards the major parties due to financial strength Institute
for Media and Society (2011) reported that three major parties
namely the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Action Congress of
Nigeria (ACN) and the Congress for Progress Change (CPC) had
more favourable media attention than all the other political parties.
The PDP between March and May had 8,929 ACN 5,313; CPC,
3,224; APGA, 1,644; ANPP, 1,289 and LP 629 reportage on the
media, the rest political parties outside of these is did not get as
much as 100 mention in any month (Ibid: 25-26).
Women Participation
The marginalization of women in representation is not new in the
political history of the country, but they massively participated in
135
the campaign rallies as well as in polling duties and voting. In total

40 percent of the staff and 36 percent of the presiding officers were
female, female party agents were present in 96 percent and
domestic observers in 35 percent of the sampling polling units (EU
EOM; 2011). Moreso, the women politicians for the first in Nigeria
electoral history were supported by Federal Ministry Women Affairs
through the agency of the Nigerian Women Trust Fund with 50
million Naira, (The Nation, March 25, 2011). However, research also
show that female politicians were the least subject of relevant on
the radio stations throughout the election period featuring 1.82%
(Institute for Media and Society, 2011:34). This may as well
correlates with the election of 26 women (Seven Senators and
nineteen representatives) into the National Assembly, reflecting a
Lilliputian 7 percent (International Crisis Group 2011:11). All said
no minority group was discriminated against legally and technically
throughout the process with the operation of Universal Adult
Suffrage.
Civil Society
136
Nigerias civil society groups were active throughout the electoral

season. The religious bodies actively educated their followers and
prayed for peaceful election. The Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC)
used the period to pressurize for the implementation of the 18,
0000 Naira minimum wages by advising the elaborate to vote out
anti-minimum wage governors (National Mirror, April 4, 2011).
Movement for Democratic Sustenance (MDS), Centre for Convention
on Democratic Integrity (CCDI), Free and Fair Election Coalition
(FFEC) and others partnered with Rights Monitoring Group (RMG)
as well as the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) to observe
electoral activities from the voter registration to the polling and
counting. The Transition Monitoring Group deployed a total of
10,536 observers across the countrys 12 not spot states (Oyo,
Ogun Katsina, Kano, Benue, Borno, Gombe, Nasarawa, Bayelsa,
Akwa Ibom, Ebonyi and Anambra) (TMG, 2011, International Crisis
Group, 2011:3) during the polling and counting as well as ten of
thousands more in other states. Traditional institutions played
prominent role promoting peaceful poll by educating the subjects
and warning the politicians against do or die politics (Sunday
137
Mirror, April 17, 2011). To crown it all, the Federation of Muslim

Womens Association in Nigeria (FOMWAN), Justice Development
and Peace/Caritas (JDPC), the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA)
came together to execute project 2011 swift count with the
mandate of promoting free, fairs, credible and legitimate elections
(PSC, 2011) by collating election results across polling centres in
the country and comparing them with the final results released by
the INEC whose correlation confirmed the integrity of INEC and the
electoral process.
The integrity of INEC
The integrity of the Independent National Electoral Commission
(INEC) was boosted by the appointment of Professor Attahiru Jega,
known for dogged forthrightness and radicalism as ASUU President
during Babangida Regime and a staunch administrator as the ViceChancellor of Bayero University Kano (BUK). Despite the flawed
voter registration mentioned earlier and the postponement of the
parliamentary election of April 2, the Commission enjoyed a high
level of credibility through reforms such as the planned revamping
138
and revival of Registration Area Camps (RACs) for officials and

material accommodation at the eve of elections (ibid:2) barring of
political office holders from monitoring or serving as party agents,
unless they resigned the appointment (International Crisis Group,
2011) and the utilization of the members of the National Youth
Service Corps (NYSC) as adhoc staff, so also was the redeployment
of Electoral Officers in the 774 local government, including those
who had spent up to ten years in their constituencies (Sunday
Mirror, March 27, 2011:18) as well as the usage of public schools
as collation centre instead of local council secretariat which may be
advantageous to the ruling parties. In addition, Senior Academics
were used as the returning officers at state level instead of the
Electoral Commissioners and citizens were encourage to collate
results from their respective polling booth, followed by the Modified
Open Ballot System (MOBS) which enhance transparency in the
process. INECs Election Monitoring and observation committee
registered and accredited 337 domestic observation Groups and
numerous International observers (Nedelcheva, 2011:127) Electoral
Dispute Adjudication.
139
In anticipation of Electoral Dispute, the amended Electoral Acts of

2011 provides 6month time frame for adjudication of all issues
brought before Tribunal and Courts. The Chief Justice, Katsina-Alu
was quite firm when he addressed the judicial officers serving in
the Post-Election Petition Tribunal: any substantiated complaint of
impropriety against you will go before the National Judicial Council
and you will pay dearly for such (The Guardian, March 22, 2011).
This was indeed a clear signal that the era of frivolous judicial
decision on electoral cases was over and was quite re-assuring to
many Nigerians who regard judiciary as the last hope for common
man.
Security Agencies
The security agencies were very active participant in the process
providing coverage for the movement of sensitive Electoral materials
and well as the safety of the citizenry at large. Some paid the
supreme price in the hands of the Boko Haram sect (Sunday
Mirror, April 19, 2011). The National Security Adviser on his part
placed
the
local
government
chairman
140
and
some
political
appointees on security watch list in order to check the hiring of

thugs (National Mirror, April 6, 2011:2) and thugs were to be
treated as robber (National Mirror March 24, 2011:7). The
Inspection General of Police on his part also effect mass
redeployment of commissioners of policies across the country to
check collaboration of the police authority in any electoral fraud
nursed by politicians (National Mirror, April 1, 2011). The conduct
of the security agents were generally constructive and civil even on
the Election days, providing security covering for Electoral officials
and citizenry in the midst of the security challenges of Boko Haram
and political violence by unscrupulous politicians which encourage
electorates to turn out for the elections. As commended by
International Crisis Group, institutional support from the police,
army and other security agencies was invaluable (Op. Cit).
Election Days
The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) had a false
start (Abatai, 2011) to the 2011 General Elections with the
postponement of the April 2 Parliamentary Elections which was
141
reschedule for April 9, which according to the chairman was meant

to maintain the integrity of the elections and retain overall control
of the process (BBC News Africa, April 2, 2011) due to late arrival
of voting materials to North Central, South-South and South East
Zones. Although perceived as an elaborate attempt to rig the
elections, abroad move to block such attempts, sheer incompetence,
or a mixture of the three (BBC News Africa, April 4); Jega was
courageous enough to take and stood by the decision. Howbeit, the
Parliamentary Election took place on April 9 and voters conduct
and turn out was described as with decorum and dignity by
Festus
Morgae,
Former
Botswana
President
and
head
of
Commonwealth Observer Group and was lauded as the first ever

credible, transparent, free and fair general election by US
Ambassador to Nigeria, Terence McCulley (The Punch, April 12,
2011). The result reduced the ruling PDP Senatorial seats from 99
to 71 and swells opposition seats to 38 making PDP to come short
of two third majority by two seats. Besides, notable Senators were
not returned including Iyabo Obasanjo, the daughter of former
President, Obasanjo, Ahmed Makarfi, former governor of Kaduna
142
State, Iyiola Onisore, former departy governor of Osun State,

Olagunsoye Oyihlola, immediate past governor of Osun State and in
the Lower House, the greatest loser was the speaker of the House,
Honourable Dimeji Bankole. Its share of the total seats in states
Houses of Assembly dropped to about 64percent from about
70percent in 2007 (620 of 963 seats) (International Crisis Group,
2011:10).
In the Presidential Election held on April 16, 2011 the leading
candidates among the twenty political parties were the incumbent
President, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan (PDP), General Mohammadu
Buhari (CPC) Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau (ANPP) and Mallam Nuhu
Ribadu (ACN). The election was said to be generally peaceful, calm,
organized and transparent even in the hot spot states (TMG,
2011:15). The turnout was 53.7% and President Jonathan of the
PDP was declare winner with 58.89 percent of the popular vote cast
and had up to 25% of vote cast in thirty two states of the
federation, thus meeting the constitution of 25% of cast votes in
2/3 of the states in the federation. General Buhari (CPC) came
143
second with 31.98%, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu (ACN) followed with

5.41% and Mallam Shekarau (ANPP) had 5.41% of votes cast;
marking the first election of Southern minority President in the
history of the country through popular and competitive polls.
Disturbing trend in the election was the unprecedented violence
which started with the bombing of Suleja Electoral Office at the eve
of the Parliamentary Election, which metamorphosed into the
ravaged stage following the announcement of the Presidential
Election result on April 18, 2011, affecting fourteen Northern
states and most severe in Adamawa, Kano, Kaduna, Nasarawa,
Bauchi and parts of Niger States (Human Rights Watch, May 16,
2011). The Post Election Violence claimed over 1000 lives including
members of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) who were
allegedly raped, harassed and assaulted, billions of Naira worth of
business, properties and churches destroyed; leading to the
displaced of about 74,000 persons (Nigeria Red Cross, April 20,
2011, Human Right Watch, May 16, 2011). Many reasons were
given for the riot, including the idea of born to rule in the North
and the dumping of the zoning of the PDP Presidential ticket to the
144
North which would ensure the election of Northern President to

replace
late
YarAdua,
others
include
ethnic
and
religious
undertones. Thus, for United States Institute for Peace (USIP), the
Elections were the Best Run but most Violent (Bekoe, 2011: 1).
Nevertheless, President Jonathan was sworn-in as the Third
President of the Fourth Republic on May 29, 2011; while General
Buhari challenged the result in the court.
4.5
COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS
OF
GHANA
2008
AND
NIGERIA 2011 ELECTIONS

The Analysis of the Competitive Elections under discourse would
focus on the preparation for the Election, the Electoral outcome
and reactions to the outcome of the electoral contest.
The Electoral bodies in the two countries had credibility and
integrity and as such commanded confidence from the electorates
despite flawed voters registration exercise. The institutions also
reacted to flawed exercise by clearing up the registers. While the
Electoral Commission of Ghana took decisive step of expunging
145
suspected false identities from the register, Independent Electoral

Commission (INEC) in Nigeria went a step further to seek
partnership with NBA towards the prosecution of the offenders.
The media and campaign environment were fairly opened to all
sides in the Electoral Contest which were facilitated by vibrant Civil
Society as well as committed security agencies who worked together
for the actualization of the prevalence of the peoples will. Again,
although there was no legal or technical obstacle to participation
and representation, the women massively participated, but were
poorly represented in the two countries in the Electoral process
amounting to less than 10% (EU EOM, 2009; Carter Centre,
2008:10) Crisis Group, 2011:11). The Judiciary were adequately
prepared for adjudication of electoral disputes in the two countries,
while Ghana has evolve a comprehensive legal framework for the
process as contained in the 1992 constitution as amended and the
Representative
of
the
People
(Parliamentary
Constituencies)
instrument (C. 1.46) of 2004; Nigeria relied heavily on the provision

of the 1999 constitution as amended and 2010 Electoral Act as
amended, nevertheless both countries are signatories to major
146
International instruments on Political Rights and commitment to

Competitive Election such as the 1966 International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on
Democracy and Good Governance, all formed the basis for effective
adjudication of the Electoral dispute, however Ghana judiciary also
publish a manual to guide judges in the discharge of duties and
Nigeria Chief Justice warned with (punitive statement against
erring by Judiciary officers in discharging their duties on Election
issues).
The 2008 Elections in Ghana rekindled the Busia/Danquah and
Nkrumahist contest which was a tradition in political power
alternation as represented in the Fourth Republic between the NDC
and NPP; Ashanti and Ewe cleavages, as well as the socialist and
liberalist tradition as highlighted earlier on in the discourse. The
alignment of Atta Mills, the NDC Presidential Candidate with
Northern Vice- a Fante (a sub group of Akan) Presidential
Candidate on the perceive Ewes political party against the power
bloc of Ashanti, the majority Akan group reduce ethnic colouration.
147
Most important was the relative peaceful process leading to the

alternation of power between the incumbent party and the
opposition as well as the gaining of majority seats in the Parliament
by the opposition. On the other hand, the emergence of Goodluck
Jonathan as the PDP candidate a southern minority element;
nominated as a candidate of the mainstream political party
symbolizes the power of institution over some elites/ethno-regional
interest, so also was his election as the President through popular
votes as discuss in this study, a break from the past. As it was in
Ghana that serving ministers lost their parliamentary seats, so also
was the fall of power brokers in Nigeria National Assembly
including Iyabo Obasanjo and the (then) incumbent speaker of the
House of Representative, Dimeji Bankole. The indeterminacy of
these elections reflects the will of the people and enhances
legitimacy of the governments.
Also brought to focus was the character of the national elite as well
as political culture in the two countries. Ghanaian elites in charge
of the institutions of the state to a large extend depersonalized such
148
institutions. The Electoral Commission was truly independent

imposing on itself strict procedure which enhance its inetrgity
(Amoah, 2009). As observes by Meissner (2010:3) the constitution
is honoured by large parts of the political class, who regard it as
their paramount point of reference which enable the then
incumbent President to rise above party interest and remain
neutral throughout the elections. The judiciary must also be
commended for rejecting to issue frivolous injunction would have
engender instability in the post election era as requested by NPP
and its Presidential candidate, so also was the withdrawal of the
law suit by the NPP and the eventual acceptance of defect by its
candidate leading to the reduction of tension across the country.
More so, the civil society continued to remind the politicians of the
unwillingness of the people to sacrifice the stability of the country
to the selfish interest and design of the ruling elites. Thus, respect
for the constitution as the foundation for democratic order (ibid)
ensures that the general will of the people prevail at all time and
checkmates personalism of the state and its institutions which
promote clientelism and repatrimonialism of such institutions.
149
This contrast the trend in Nigeria, where the elites manipulates the
institutions to their advantage. The CPC candidate, Buhari was in
ANPP and was indeed its Presidential flag bearer in 2003 and 2007
and eventually moved to CPC to actualized his presidential
ambition. The same could be said of Atiku Abubakar, a former Vice
President under the PDP who was an AC Presidential candidate in
2007; and staged a come back to PDP to contest the party primary
for 2011 due to perceived personal interest/ethno-regional and
religious interest. This was play out throughout the 2011 election
as the Northern part of the country continued to clamour for
presidency as
its
entitlement and
attempt
at
manipulating
institutions such as the ruling party and the court to stop

Goodluck Jonathan from contesting the Election. When this failed,
the mass protest in that part of the country as discussed earlier on
orchestrated by the inflammatory utterances by prominent elites in
the zone in the run up to the Elections and indeed by the Stalwarts
of opposition Congress for Progressive Change, including its
Presidential Candidate, General Buhari give credence to zero-sum
attitude of Nigerian elite in electoral contest. This of course might
150
not be unconnected with rentier and distributive nature of Nigerian

state structure which encourage clientelism, and patrimonial
politics after Independence. However, the reduction in PDP
dominance of the political landscape in an election conducted by a
PDP government, and the seemingly discernable pattern of the
South West Zone and core South East States of Anambra and Imo
as opposition to the conservative dominated Central Government
which was the emerging pattern at Independence gives hope in the
revitalization of strategic institutions necessary for free, fair and
credible election in the country.
All said, despite the deficits observed in the Elections in the two
countries International Observers, including European Union,
Commonwealth, Carter Foundation, African Union as well as
ECOWAS gave pass mark to the processes and certified them
credible, free and fair; indeed the true reflections of general will of
the peoples, so also did the CODEO and TMG in Ghana and Nigeria
respectively.
REFERENCES
151
Abati R (2011) April 2: INECs False Start: Jegas Failure The

Guardian, April 3 p. 66.
Carter Center (2008) Ghana Presidential and Parliamentary
Elections December 7, 2008, Election Observation Mission
Preliminary Statement Accra: Carter Centre.
152
Jackson R and Roserberg (1982) Personal Rule in Black Africa

Berkeley and Los Angels: University of California Press.
Joseph
(1987)
Prebendalism
and
Democracy
in
Nigeria
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lemarchand R (1972) Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in tropical
Africa: Competing Solidarity in Nation Building American
Journal of Political Science Review 66: 1 (February) pp. 6890.
Merdard J (1982) The Underdevelopment State in Tropical Africa:
Political Clientelism or Neopatromonialism? In Christopher
Clapham (ed) Private Patronage and Public Power: Political
Clientelism in Modern State, London: Frances Printer.
Nedelcheva M (2011) Report of European Parliament Election
Observation Delegation to the Presidential Elections in
Nigeria Abuja, April 16.
Social Justice.
153
TMG (2011) 2011 Presidential Election: Final Report Transitional

Monitoring Group.
154
CHAPTER FIVE
CHALLENGES OF CREDIBLE ELECTIONS IN GHANA AND
NIGERIA
INTRODUCTION
It is heart warming for Ghanaians and Nigerians that the
immediate past Elections of 2008 and 2011 were the true reflection
of their wills respectively. This is confirmed by several reports from
observers across the globe. However, the changes in the Electoral
process and its outcome overshadowed, the seemingly challenges
associating with the conduct of polls in West Africa and these
countries in particular. This chapter there fore dwells on the
perceived challenges in the conduct of these Elections while
highlighting socio-political as well as administrative and logistically
challenges, effort is made to compare their intensity and variation
in both countries.
155
5.4
SOCIO-POLITICAL CHALLENGES OF GHANA 2008 AND

Ethno-regionalisation of Politics
Ethno-regional loyalty has been a factor in Africa politics in the run
up to independence and indeed in the post independence era. This
remains a major obstacle to electoral processes in the West Africa
sub-regional and expectedly, was a deficit in these elections. In
Ghana, Loetzer and Moenikes (2009:73) observed the growing
ethnization of politics, as ethnic block voting remain a concern, at
least in the strongholds of the two major contesting parties
(Jockers, Kohnert and Nugent, 2009:2). Akufo-Addo and NPP had
75% of votes cast in Ashanti, while Atta Mills had 86% of votes cast
in Volta-a region, tagged the World Bank of the NDC by former
president Rawlings in the first round of the Presidential Polls.
156
Gyimah-Boadi (2009:143) added that both parties shamelessly

attempted to mobilize ethnic votes, virtually declaring their
respective strongholds as no go zones for their opponents during
the campaign for the second round of the presidential polls. This
must be understood against the dominance of the two parties by
the ethnic interest as Ashanti in NPP and Ewe in NDC as discussed
in this study. This, of course warranted the closure of Ghanaian
border with Togo by the Central Government, so as to forestall the
participation of the Ewe people across Togo order, knowing the
advantage this would give to the opposition (Jockers, Kohnert and
Nugent, 2009; Meissner, 2010, Zounmenoun 2009). Balancing,
this, NDC reminded the Fante people that the Election was their
true opportunity to produce a president in the person of Atta Mills
since the inception of independence (Democracy Watch, 2009).
Nigeria on the other hand felt the impact of this variable right from
the inception of Jonathan administration with the death of Late
President YarAdua. Several effort were made by the Hausa/Fulani
within the ruling PDP to stop the candidacy of Jonathan in the
157
Presidential Election, leading to Northern Consensus Candidate

arrangement in the PDP primary and the eventually protest block
vote for Buhari, the CPC candidate in the Presidential Election
who hails from this region. The same token was experienced in the
South-South and South East, which transformed themselves to the
strongholds of PDP and indeed Jonathan Presidency due to the
prevailing ethnic regional fervour and the ambition of producing the
First Executive President from the former Eastern Region, perceived
to have been marginalized in leadership at this level. Thus, the
Presidential Election was a direct contest between the North and
South which was perfectly reflected in the outcome of the poll: an
enduring trend in ethnic block and proxy voting capable of
jeopardizing credible, free and fair election. Besides, as electoral
campaign are not issue based but whipping of ethno-regional
sentiments and hatred for the opponents which have the potential
of destabilizing the polity as experienced in the past elections.
Electoral Fraud and Rigging
158
Again, of great concern is Electoral fraud and rigging which

undermine the will of the people and negates the very essence of
elections. Common is the rigging along ethnic line as witnessed in
Ghana 2008, where the difference between valid votes in the 1st
and 2nd round in Ashanti Region amounted to 241,284 (Jokers,
Kohnert and Nugent, 2009:6). The breakdown shows extremely
suspicious results from a couple of constituencies with unusual
turnout. At Manhyia where the recorded turnout was 95.7 percent,
the NPP vote rose from 66,116 in the first round to 95,281 in the
second (+24 percent). At Nhyiaeso, where the alleged turnout was
98.3percent, it rocketed from 37,043 to 54,545(+26 percnet), and in
Suame it climbed from 47,768 to 67,790 on a 95 percent turnout
(+24 percent). The total turnout figure for Ashanti (83.3 percent)
were out of line with figures for the rest of the country
(72.7percent) (ibid). More worrisome was the Regional Electoral
Commissions delay in the announcement of results from the region
and these constituencies in particular including Kwadaso and
Bantama with 95 percent turnout, which had the capacity to
upturn the outcome of such a close electoral contest. In the Volta
159
Region, speculations came in the heel off higher turnout in the

second round showing an increase of 60,600 votes from 679,396 in
the first round to 739,669 in the decisive round. Noted increase
were in Ketu South 11, 167 more votes, Anlo 4792, Avenorr
5,073, Tongu North 4,786, Ho Central 4,495 and Ho East 4,954.
Similar occurrence took place in Nigeria where there was an
astonishingly high voters turnout in South-South and South East
States of Cross River, Rivers, Delta, Abia, Imo Anambra and
Bayelsa, with Jonathan garnering over 97percent in all the states
except Bayelsa with 99.6percent, raising speculation of PDP
sophisticated tampering with the result, giving its notorious record
in election rigging. In the North, underage voting was widely
reported (Crisis Group, 2011:6) as in Gombe State, where the
Resident Electoral Commissioner (REC) and journalists ran into a
police station for protection when the angry underage voters
pursued the REC for trying to stop them from voting who confirmed
that more than half of the voters are underage (Abati, 2011).
Electoral Violent and Intimidation
160
Electoral Violent and intimidation leads to delegitimation of

Electoral
outcome
and
insecurity
in
the
polity which was
experienced in Ghana as was in Nigeria. In Ghana, this started

with the limited voters registration exercise and snowballed into a
shooting incident at campaign rally in Tamale Metropolitan area
between the NPP and NDC supporters; culminated into killings
and a wave of arson attacks in Gushegu on September 1, causing
the death of six people and the burning of a National Democratic
Congress office and supporters homes and vehicles (Carter Center
2009:27). Similar incident was also reported in Berekum in the
Brong-Ahafo region (Democracy Watch, 2009:4) and was deepened
by the report of former President Rawlings mobilization of exmilitary chief for defence of NDC interest through military
alternative; generating the ban on the visit of some ex-military top
brass to military formations across the country by the NPP
government which further fuelled the already tensed campaign
environment exacerbated by the call by both parties leadership on
their supporters to defend their rights and interests, even if it
meant doing so physically (ibid). However, the actual day of the
161
Elections on December 7, was peaceful but intimidation and violent

resumed with the deadlock in the 1st round of the Presidential
Election. Political thugs from the keep fit clubs were employed as
instrument of intimidation in Bawku, Cape Coast and Accra.
Ashiaman constituency in Greater Accra Region boiled when angry
NDC supporters protested against the suspected collusion between
security agents NPP members to rig the polls by snatching of the
ballot boxes, so also was the 100 macho Boys sent from Accra by
NPP, aggreviated the heightened tension in Volta Region two days to
the Elections and harassed the voters, which generated ill-feeling
(Jockers,
Kohnert
and
Nugent,
2009:17).
Democracy
Watch
(2009:8) observed that Election related violence continued even

after the swearing-in of John Atta Mills as the new President of
Ghana on January 7, 2009. The violent attacks on NPP supporters
at
Agbogboloshie
market
in
Accra
and
their
subsequent
displacement and refuge at the NPP national headquarter, marked

the height of post-election violence in the 2008 polls.
162
Crisis Group (2011:7) reported that between 22 and 25 March,

reckless and indiscriminate violence rocked a third of the 36 states:
Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Bayelsa, Benue, Delta, Edo, Ekiti, Kowara,
Niger, Oyo, Plateau and Taraba. Such was the extend of violent in
the 2011 Elections in Nigeria where electoral contest as highlighted
earlier on, takes a form of zero-sum game but was said to be limited
in magnitude in the pre-election period. PSC (2011) reported a
steady progression in levels of critical incidents from the national
assembly through to the Presidential and gubernatorial elections,
indicating
201
during
the
Parliamentary,
628
during
the
Presidential and 937 during the Gubernatorial polls. Adding that

the
most
frequently
reported
incidents
of
violence
were:
intimidation or harassment; political attacks, bullying, and ballot

box snatching (ibid: 5) Nedelcheva (2011:5) observed that few, if
any, states were entirely immune to political violence. There was
also reports of kidnap and harassment of Election observers by
party
agents
and
thugs,
Local
Government
Chairmen
and
community members. All these were dress rehearsal for the postelection violence which generated in the Northern part of the
163
country ravaging businesses, churches and houses, claiming over

1,000 lives, including some NYSC members and displacing about
74,000 people. This empirically confirms Bekoe (2011) assertion
that it is the most violent in Nigerias history, taking the security
and intelligence communities by surprise.
Abuse of State and Administrative Resources by Incumbent
The fairness of an Electoral system and indeed an election lies in
providing level playing field for all contestants in competition. This
will
include
the
elimination
of
advantages
associated
with
incumbency in the electoral process. This was easier in Ghana,

where President. Kufuor was not a candidate, neither was his
choice, Alan Kyerematen the flag bearer of his party, as such there
were no tangible signs that incumbency or access to state
resources was exploited to the advantage of the governing partys
candidates during the election campaign period at national level
(EU EOM, 2009). The Campaign Finance of individuals and parties
are loosely regulated by the Electoral body, however, the State
supports parties with vehicles during electoral campaign according
164
to their strength in the Parliament the NDC and NPP twelve each
the CPP ten, PNC five and the DPP two. Nevertheless state owned
television and radio broadcasters failed to provide equal or
equitable coverage of candidates or their parties (ibid). Both Ghana
Television (GTV) and Radio Uniiq coverage tilted in favour NPP,
consolidated by the coverage of President Kufuor and his ministers
activities, although neutral in tone. This seems to be advantageous
to the ruling party which contravenes Article 17 (3) of African
Union Charter on Democracy, elections and Governance provision
that State Parties (should) ensure fair and equitable access by
contesting parties and candidates to state controlled media during
elections and was followed by the coverage of NDC and its
candidate. The closure of Ghanas border with Togo as discussed
earlier was another abuse of states administrative resources which
disenfranchised opposition supporters working in Togo which was
indeed the only border closed during the entire elections.
Fortunately, attempt to use the judiciary by the party in power over
the outcome of the run-off election was effectively checkmated by
the vibrant and erudite Judge as discussed in the study.
165
In Nigeria where the line between the ruling party and the state is
blurred may have resulted in an uneven playing field for the
opposition (Nedelcheva, 2011:5), contrary to the section 100(2) of
the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) which forbids the use of state
apparatus including the media for the advantage of any political
party or candidate in any election. As was in states of the
Federation, the Presidential Candidate of the PDP and his vice,
made extensive use of government vehicles and aircrafts during
campaign rallies, which were not available to the opposition
candidates. Besides, police permits to organize rallies for the
opposition candidates were withdrawn due to nebulous reasons
(Onyekpere, 2011:8). State Media the NTA and the FRCN and it
affiliates favoured the incumbent party and her candidates. For
instance during the NTA prime time, 80 percent of the coverage
allocated to political actors was devoted to PDP with regard to
direct speech in the NTA news bulletins, 75 percent of it was
dedicated to incumbent President Jonathan (Nedelcheva, 2011:8).
Onyekpere (2011:8) also noted that illegal public holidays were
declared in some states, market closed by incumbents at state level
166
to promote the candidacy of their Presidential Candidate. This is

compounded by the loose regulation of campaign finance and
sources for funding such activity. Presently, a billion Naira is said to
be the ceiling for partys funding of the Presidential Election, but no
ceiling on individual candidates spending as well as restriction on
amounts to be donated by individuals and corporate supporters of
candidate. The implication is that political patronage is established
and nourish by incumbent leading to patrimonialism. More so, with
much resources at the disposal of incumbent money politics and
vote buying spring up; further altering the level playing field in
electoral contest, as was the public servants salary increase in the
run up to the election and legalization of the 18,000 Naira
minimum wage.
Poor Voter Education
Informed voters are essential for rational choice and participation
in electoral process, as such that UN Human Rights Committee,
General Comment No. 25, Paragraph (11) mandates states to
ensure that voters education gets to the broadest possible pools of
167
voters so that they can effectively exercise the right to vote. It

implementation in Ghana, as in Nigeria left much to be desired and
was a deficit in the Elections under focus. The bloated voters
register in Ghana after the limited registration exercise was
attributed to poor voter education, since a large number of those
who went forward to register in the exercise did so for other reasons
other than electoral (Democracy Watch, 2009:2), others thought
they could register to replace the lost cards, reregister if they
relocated, or assumed that the exercise was a complete revision of
the voters roll, which potentially led to multiple registrants (Carter
Centre, 2009:22). More so, the billboard, posters, rallies and media
hypes all concentrated in the urban area and were limited in
scope and therefore cannot adequately and effectively reach the
broadest pool of voters, especially the rural folks who had no access
to radio and television. The effect was critical since the relatively
high number of rejected ballots in the first round; totalling 2.37
percent (EU EOM, 2009:20) in a keenly contested poll where every
vote counts as Akufo Addo needed only 0.87% to win, contributed
to the second round poll.
168
The situation in Nigeria is very similar to our short discussion on

Ghana, in relation to the registration of under age and double
registration as highlighted in the study leading to bloated register.
Nedelchevas observation on the situation in Nigeria is quite
indicting given it impact on the authenticity of the electoral
outcome. She reports that puzzled voters were seen in rural areas,
especially women, do not know how to read. On the other hand,
people did not seem to know for whom to vote for nor how to vote. A
voter education campaign took place in the print and audiovisual
media but obviously did not appear to reach the poor countryside
(Nedelcheva 2011:10). It contributed also to the post-Election
violence in the North as it is assumed that some rioters believed
that because Buhari won in their immediate vicinities, he had
become president. They equated victory in their own states to a
Nigeria- wide victory (Crisis Group, 2011:8). Poor voter education
and indeed general level of education remains a great challenge to a
democratic citizenship.
Voters Apathy
169
INEC/FES
(2011:6)
observes
that
without
voters,
without
sufficient turnout, there can be no true reflection of the peoples

preferences, but only that of a minority. Voter Apathy had been a
challenge to Elections worldwide and came into play during the
Elections in our discourse. It impact on the outcome is relative to
the Election. For instance, Ghana 2008 Presidential Election had
69.3 percent turnout in the first round and 72.9 percent in the
second round (EU EOM, 2009:30) which is relatively high; but the
outcome of the first round of the poll shows that Akufo-Addo
needed 73,478 or 0.87% votes to win which was within his reach, if
640,401 registered voters in the Ashanti Region and up to 446,274
registered voters in Eastern Region (who) also failed to vote on this
day (Amoah, 2009) had voted, given that these were the
strongholds of the NPP. Undoubtedly, there would not have been
any need for the second round which upturned the poll against
Akufo-Addo and NPP. More so the apathy in Tain during the second
round was instrumental to NDC victory.
170
Nigeria on the other hand had been a home of voter apathy due to
other challenges discuss in this section, which either scare the
voters or discourage them. However, the persistent average turnout
as
it
was
in
the
Presidential
Elections
which
stands
at
approximately 37.5 million, indicating that only half of the

countrys 74 million voters participated on the Election Day
(Nedelcheva, 2011:(1). With President Jonathan garnering, 22,
495,187 votes means that less one third of eligible voters actually
imposed their will on all Nigerians believed to be 167million
(NPC/WHO, 2011). Thus, a leadership chose by a fraction of the
population may not be the reflection of the general will of the people
and legitimate given democratic leadership as one legitimated by
majority.
5.5
ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES OF

GHANA 2008 AND NIGERIA 2011 ELECTIONS
Experience suggests that the executions of electoral events are

often impaired by logistical issues (shortage of materials and
officials, among many others) (Democracy Watch, 2009:4). Such
171
was the Ghanaian experience in the run-up to 2008 Elections. The

timing and eventual execution of limited voter August, three
months to the polls generated negative ripples as a result of two
earlier postponement blamed by EC on non arrival of requisite
materials for the exercise (ibid). Carter Center (2009:5) asserts
that
the
exercise
was
procedurally
hampered
by
several
irregularities involving procurement, poll workers training and

allegation of ineligible registrant. Again half of the machine
required for the exercise was supplied, which forced the EC to
combine
polling
points
and
sometimes
encourage
mobile
registration which created sense of despair in the mind of the

voters; thus generating long queue and violent confrontation
between parties supporters. The failure was blame on poor
planning (and) complacency (which) are enemies of credible
elections (Democracy Watch, 2009). Little wonder why the bloated
voter register proved to be the most contentious issues in the 2008
Elections despite the mopping up or clean up exercise by the
Electoral Commission.
172
The challenges of voters and civic education earlier discussed were

partially attributed to the NCCEs lacked (of) adequate funds (EU
EOM, 2009). The situation affected the printing and distribution of
handbills and other needed materials to the rural area. The entire
Volta Region was said to have only three vehicles for NCCE
operations, thus signing the failure before the commencement of
this critical exercise in the run up to the Elections.
On the Election Day, December 7, Carter Centre (2009) observed
late poll openings, missing materials, absent presiding officers,
and untrained poll workers. This administrative and logistic deficit
affected the smooth running of the voting process and raised
tension in the affected areas. More so, untrained poll workers posed
serious threat to the process, which might have contributed to the
reject ballots. EU (2009:6) also asserts that there were some cases
where polling officials did not fully comply with procedures during
the 7 December Elections. This of course was a violation of the
guideline for the election which had the potential of undermining
the integrity of the process, as it tends to create double standard.
173
Worthy to note is that voting materials were not delivered to some

places by December 7, hence places like the Afram plains in the
Eastern Region held special Election on December 8 as sanctioned
by the Electoral Commission (Carter Centre, 2009). The same
logistical problems also led to the postponement of Election in
Tain, Brong Ahafo Region, (Democracy Watch, 2009; EU EOM,
2009) which eventually took place after the run-off, on January 2,
2009. As argued earlier and confirmed by the delay of the Electoral
Commission in announcing the winner of the run up, probably
without the logistical impediment to Tain election on December 7,
there would not have been second round vote. Besides, inadequate
training as reflected in observers reports in many case where
procedures were not fully complied with and the quality assurances
in a number of collation centres were not properly managed, which
can negatively affect the integrity of the outcome, so also was the
completion of Statement of Poll forms, which in several cases
resulted in single-digit discrepancies between the vote count and
the totals reported. (Carter Center, 2009:7). Observers conclusion
was that the Electoral Commission: face challenges that were
174
mostly related to the timetable that it set itself. The schedule for
these elections was extremely tight for a number of key components
of election preparations and this put staff under unnecessary
pressure. Also because of time constraints there was not always
enough time for the Electoral Commission to implement some of its
transparency mechanisms to best effect. This was a result of lack of
forward planning to take advantage of the full legal time period that
could have been used to organize these elections (EU EOM, 2009).
The Nigeria experience is similar to the Ghanaian account in voter
registration but was compelled by the changes in INEC leadership
and its desire to produce a new voters register despite tight
schedule and logistical challenge of covering an estimated 70
million voters (Nedelcheva, 2009:7). This led to discrepancy
between the provisional registration figure of about 68million and
the about 74million certified by INEC on March 2, which the
electoral
body
blamed
on
lack
of
timely
and
effective
communication between local officials and headquarters (Nigeria

Election Watch, March 15, 2011). More Worrisome was the
175
admission of multiple registrations of 870,612 detected cases,

which were expunged by INEC, however, nobody knew the criteria
for such detection as the Electoral body claimed to have use special
software for it. Understanding the role of voter register as central to
credible Elections, opposition party criticized the exercise as a
grand machination for the rigging of the elections. This led to doubt
on the capacity of Professor Jega to preside over credible polls.
The doubt was re-enforced by the April 2, announcement of the
Commissions boss on the postponement of the National Assembly
Elections scheduled for that day due to late arrival of the result
sheets in many parts of the country (EU EOM, 2011:3). The
confusion and criticism which followed this announcement was
enormous and further eroded public confidence as well as that of
opposition calling for his resignation. However, consultation with
political parties resulted in a reschedule of the elections a week a
head of the original dates. Still, reprinting of a number of ballot
papers by INEC caused a third postponement for 15 Senatorial
Districts and 48 Federal Constituencies (ibid). This deepened the
176
sense of uncertainty in the areas affected and may have

contributed to voter apathy discussed in this study.
Also noted as challenging was the training of the polling staff which
was generally inadequate considering the time and material factors.
There training (was) considered to be insufficient and poorly
conducted, with overcrowded halls and lacking reading materials
(ibid) as noted in Ghanaian experienced, poorly train poll staff are
liability to the integrity of the electoral process as they lack the
basic skill for the administration of elections as required globally.
This manifested in the missing names on the voter register used for
the election. Crisis Group (2011) gathered that in Kabuga area of
Kano, about 900 voters could not find their names on the register,
of only 150 apparently eligible voters out of 600 remained on the
list in Tuddan Gabas village, a mere sixteen out of 1,000 at the
Yartasha, Makaranta polling unit and 32 out of 600 in the Magaji
Area Ward at Odelle Gangan, Kwara State. Also worrisome was
INEC inability to divide the polling units to maximum of 300 as
promised which led to time wasting on the polling days. Another
177
deficit is the lapses in the electoral law which fails to give time limit
for adjudication on parties primary prior to the election, hence, the
printing of electoral materials especially ballot papers are delayed
and voters are not aware of the actual contestant in the election,
notably in the rural areas where media reach is limited. In addition,
INEC had difficulties meeting with the schedule of accreditation of
313 organizations approved for the election stated for March 23-25
due to poor capacity to timely organize the accreditation process.
On the Election Days, there was shortage of essential materials and
absence of polling staff, as it was in Ghana. (EU EOM 2011) also
observed inconsistent implementation of procedure at some
polling point as pointed out in Ghana, that this has the tendency to
undermine the integrity of the process and indeed the outcome.
The activities on the day of the Presidential Election were
summarized this way: in 26 percent there were instances of
interference by party agents in the process and in 47percent, the
secrecy of vote was not respected. General lack of organization was
noticed in 19 percent. The share of underage voting remains
178
constant at 12 percent In a sixth of the observed polling units,

the unused ballots were not properly accounted for and their
number was not recorded, the results forms were packed in tamperproof envelopes only in two-thirds of the observed polling units.
Arithmetic errors were noted in 70percent of the visited ward
collation centres and in 87 percent of the observed LGA Collation
Centres (EU EOM, 2011:10). All these shortcomings are potential
threats to credibility of the elections, as they were in Ghana.
5.6
COMPARATIVE
CHALLENGES
OF
GHANA
2008
AND

The challenges of Credible Elections in the two countries are
similar with elements of variation in context.
The inadequacies of the voters registration in the Ghana, as was in
Nigeria suffered the same fate of poor staff trainings, inadequate
materials, leading to long queue and anxiety. Both countries relied
on foreign companies for the supply of the computers and
accessories for effective implementation of the exercise as well, but
179
a closer understanding of Ghanaian experience shows lack of

forward planning, since the Electoral Commission had four years to
plan for the exercise, given the relative stability in the leadership of
the institution. On the other hand, Nigeria was thrust into the
challenge by the desire of the new leadership of INEC to have a
break from the past flawed register, fabricated under the immediate
past leadership which was responsible for the shameful elections of
2007. Thus, circumstances led to the tight time framework for
Nigeria, where as, Ghana showed the complacency of leadership in
planning of electoral events. Howbeit the Electoral bodies in the two
countries had enough financial resources for the faulty exercise.
The deficits in voter education as well as the timely delivery of the
electoral materials to the rural areas reveal the fundamental
problems of underdevelopment of infrastructural facilities in both
countries. Most of the public goods associated with democracy are
urban centred. Thus, poor roads criss-cross both countries and it
is during election that the elites in most cases remember the rural
folks as part of the society. This accounted for high level of illiteracy
180
which undermined the capacity of the electorates in the rural areas

to know what to do, as highlighted in Nigeria situation, as was in
Ghana which led to high rejected ballot. These challenges, is an
indictment on the ruling elites of these countries and reflect the
impact of Elitist Democracy in these countries. However, given the
experience of Ghanas Electoral body, the logistic problem was not
as widespread as it was in Nigeria, but again, the size of the
country as well as the population density and the change in
leadership may have accounted for the intensity of this challenge in
Nigeria.
The inconsistent in procedure application during accreditation and
discrepancies in collated figures as observed are rooted in poor staff
training which is anchored on the capacity of the institutions to
recruit and train polling officials. Arguably, the Ghanaians having
conducted four elections in the Fourth Republic creditably ought to
have a databank for the adhoc staff which could be calls up when
duties demands. It also reveals the attitude of elites to manpower
development in critical sector of public life, which election
181
administration is one. The leadership may underwent refreshing

courses across the globe, but not much is done to improve the
capacity of most field staff as reported in Nigeria, where the halls
were overcrowded, without reading materials. More so, the deep
involvement of the NYSC member in poll duty in Nigeria is one of
the innovations of Jegas leadership and time is needed to build a
databank for this category of staff for future elections as envisaged
by INEC, for experienced staff in electoral duties is one of the
greatest assets for credible polls. Therefore, for Ghana, this flaw
may be attributed to improper maintenance for adhoc staff
databank which mandates fresh recruitment in the run-up to the
2008 Elections, couple with institutional attitude towards training.
The ethno-regional challenge in Ghanaian context reveals attempts
to deny non-authentic ethnic groups, e.g. the Ewe and Dagomba,
their Ghanaianess (Jockers, Kohnert and Nugent, 2009, Nugent,
2002, Amenuumey, 1989) by the dominant Ashanti, perceived by
Ewes as aggressive and arrogant, which has translate into
ideological divide between the Elites in socio-political arena, but
182
hardly reflected in daily life. As such, this divide is much of political

ideology: when harness positively leads to healthy democracy as
seen in Britain between the Conservatives and Labour, as well as
the United States between the Democrats and Republican. But the
Nigeria context reveal deep resentment of
ethnic groups against
one another and the desire to maintain ethnic hegemony in sociopolitical sphere, despite the inherent diversity of multi-cultural
society like Nigeria. The sum total of this is that, such divide has no
ideological base, but a myth by the elites to further their ambition
and entrench themselves in power, which is antithetical to fairness
and equality as required by democracy. Thus election is seen as a
ratification instrument for the existing ethnic hegemony, anything
short of this generates ripples, such as witnessed after the
Presidential in the Northern part of the country.
Electoral Fraud is universal in nature and always condemned when
it becomes obvious and primitive in practice. President Bush
election in 2000 was controversial yet upheld. The Ghanaian
experience in this study reveals a clear machination of incumbent
183
party to remain in power, despite ominous desire for change or

power alternation as become the tradition in Ghanaian politics but
was checkmated by the opposition, the Civil Society, Judiciary and
the Electoral Body. The resilient of these institutions was crucial to
the survival of democracy and indeed, organization of the credible
elections. On the other hand, Nigerias experience of 2011 was the
replay of what use to be the norm which was aborted by the
revitalized INEC, Civil Society and the Judiciary. Thus, in terms of
oppotunity, the incumbent NPP in Ghana was more daring giving
the widespread of NDC structure across the country, but the PDP,
in Nigeria, arguably had easier situation since the CPC lack the
basic infrastructure in most of the southern parts, if in all the
Northern part to canvass for votes in the Elections.
Violence and intimidation has been part of West African politics
which has been traced to the colonial legacies of undemocratic and
divide and rule. However, it occurrences in Ghana 2008 Election
was majorly along party line as NDC and NPP declared their
stronghold in Ashanti and Volta no go area for their respective,
184
opponent using the foot soldiers to harass and intimidate one

another. Again, the leadership of former President Jerry Rawlings
in NDCs Progressive Youth as well as the mobilization of the Exmilitary chiefs aim at checking the abuse of incumbency inherent
in West African politics and as such did not make any section of the
country to be a target of punitive measure. It can be regarded as
part of Elites strategy of manipulating the masses and again was
limited in scope which was easily handled by the security
operatives. Nigeria on the other hand, is submerging in the culture
of impunity use of force; and in politics always reflects ethnicregional and religion colouration. The post-Election violence in the
North was clearly a punitive measure against the Southerners and
the Christians in the North perceived to be responsible for
Muhammadu Buhari lost of the Election. Thus, while Ghanaian
experience was to checkmate the rigging of the Election, Nigerian
version was a punitive measure and expression of frustration over
the lost of power by the Northern Elites.
185
The Ghanaian Elites as reveal in this study respect the constitution

and adhere to it as the guiding principle of governance, hence
President Kufuor, powered by his neutrality in the Elections clearly
separated the state from his party and therefore enhance the
reduction in the abuse of the State and Administrative Resources.
Although
media
coverage
of
his
activities
as
well
as
the
unwarranted closure of Ghana-Togolese border gave advantage to

his party, they were not overwhelming compare to Nigeria where
there is a blurred line between the ruling PDP and the state as
highlighted in this discourse, compounded by the candidacy of
President Jonathan. These intensified the abuse of State and
Administrative Resources and were further concretized by weak
legislation on campaign finance and lack of INEC control and
enforcement capacity over political parties. The sum total was
severe abuses which gave the incumbent undue advantages as
discuss earlier on. Thus Nigerian Elites obey the law more in
breach than adherence given the culture of impurity inherent in the
political system.
186
The participant political culture evolved overtime in Ghana politics

has reduce the challenges of voter education to logistic reason in
dissemination of information on electoral process to voters and
enhance
participation.
The
National
Commission
for
Civic
Education is saddle with this responsibility in partnership with the

Electoral Commission which illustrates the seriousness attached to
tackling this deficit. However, in Nigeria, where parochial political
culture persist, voter education is relegated to background, after all,
before 2011 elections the votes of the electorates were but symbols
of election, therefore, the National Orientation Agency functions as
the state propaganda machine on all issue and only committed to
election related issues, when need arises, this is compounded by
poor funding and accessibility to the rural areas due to the
infrastructural deficits discussed in this study. The consistent high
turnout of Ghanaian voters in the four elections of the fourth
republic and indeed the 2008 Elections and the reduction of
rejected votes in the second round in the Presidential polls shows
reduction in this challenge compare to Nigeria where voter apathy
has becoming endemic, with the women in the rural area lacking
187
the knowledge of who to vote for and how to vote, especially in the
core Muslim North, where women participation in socio-political
activities is highly restricted by the practice of Muslim faith, thus
perpetuating political ignorance and voters apathy and the
elevation of violent politics and whipping of hatred and sentiment
against perceived opponent in electoral contest.
All said, the involvement of the international community in
managing these challenges must be acknowledged. The Carter
Center,
European
Union,
National
Democratic
Institute,
Commonwealth, Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), African

Union
(AU),
Economic
Community
of
West
African
States
(ECOWAS), European Parliament amongst others organization

across the globe sent in Electoral observers who were on hand to
encourage dialogue between the political parties and the Electoral
bodies as well as key national institutions on the need to promote
free, fair, peaceful and credible Elections. They also engage in voter
education and dialogue with the Civil Society Organizations in
Nigeria and Ghana, training these societies on Election Monitoring
188
and building of confidence in the Electorates that their votes will

really count in these elections. The impact of their activities was
the relative peaceful environment leading to the election as well as
orderliness and reduction of impunity associated with state use of
power as experienced in the past. The collation of electoral results
by these international organization and indeed harmonization with
that of the local civil society organizations and the Electoral bodies
in these countries confirmed the accuracy of these results, hence
the reflection of the will of the people. Therefore the challenges
discuss in this study did not in any way affect the integrity of these
elections as agreed by these bodies but provide a call for improve
electoral processes in future elections.
189
REFERENCES
Guardian, April 3.
Amenumey D (1989) The Ewe Unification Movement: A Political
History Accra-Ghana University Press.
EU EOM (2009) Final Report on Presidential and Parliamentary
Elections 2008 European Union Election Observation to
Ghana, July.
190

Nugent P (2002) Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on
Ghana-Togolese Frontier Oxford: James Currey.
Social Justice.
191
Psc (2011) Final Statement on April 2011 General Elections:

National Assembly, Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections
Abuja: Project 2011 Swift Count.
CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
INTRODUCTION
There is no other legitimate means of the circulating the Ruling
Elite in the contemporary global system; but election generally
accepted as the reflection of the general will of the people
represented by the majority of voters in a given poll. The
achievement of Credible Election in every country becomes the
acceptable norm and priority of every civilized country. This
192
requirement exerts enormous pressure on elites in every country to

comply; and empower the masses to monitor the activities of their
leaders during and after elections, thus challenging the entire
system to participate in the act of governance and decision making.
This study has covered different challenges to Credible Election in
West Africa using Ghana 2008 and Nigeria 2011 as the parameter;
having
built
on
independence,
historical
using
antecedents
inductive
and
and
patterns
inferences
from
inherent
in
qualitative method of data analysis. This concluding chapter

therefore summarizes the study and its findings, draws conclusion
from the findings of the study and makes recommendations as
suggestive panacea for the challenges so discussed in this
discourse.
6.4
SUMMARY
The 1884-85 Berlin conference legalized the brutal intervention of

European powers in African affairs which led to the balkanization
of the societies into modern state in an undemocratic manner. The
structure and process of governance were autocratic, tailored to
193
suit the interest of the colonial powers, which simultaneously

destroyed democratic values embedded in West African societies.
The end of colonialism did not correspondently lead to the demise
of European autocratic structures and values, but were transferred
to Africans who became more dictatorial, kuptoccratic and wasteful
in
the
first
three
decades
of
independence,
establishing,
establishing Personalism, clientelism and neopatrimonisalism,

inimical to the conduct of competitive polls inherent in multi-party
democracy.
The third wave of democracy and the thawing of autocratic
dynamics of the global politics due to the demise of the Cold War in
1990; and the upliftment of the Liberal Democracy to global
common, placed extra demand on West African States as on all
global community on the need for competitive and Credible
Elections, which has been a mirage in the sub-regional. Several
attempts in Cote Divoire, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Niger, Nigeria,
Guinea and Guinea Bissau has led to wanton destruction of lives
and properties as well as overt threat to the survival of these post-
194
colonial states. But the Ghana 2008 and Nigeria 2011 Elections are
the current references of the attainment of the said goals, which
make this academic discourse desirable.
Using Elite Theory and supported by Political Culture model, the
study examines the impact of colonial structure and culture; the
differences in the political culture of the states in focus; the
character of National Elites as well as the role of external and
internal environments on the organization and administration of
Credible Elections as witnessed in the referenced Elections in
Ghana and Nigeria. By inductive reasoning and inference from
secondary
data
collated
from
existing
textbooks,
journals
newspapers and reports, the study highlights the history and

historical patterns of Elections in the two countries; outlines the
process and administration of Ghana 2008 and Nigeria 2011
Elections and makes comparative analysis of the two experiences. It
also
identifies
and
discuss
the
socio-political
as
well
as
administrative and logistical challenges to these elections; and
195
makes comparative analysis of these challenges between the two

countries.
The findings of the study shows that despite the structural and
normative set backs of colonial past; it is possible to organize and
administer Credible Elections in West Africa. This depends largely
on the character of the National Elites in the sub-region as well as
the prevailing political culture.
In Ghana, where the Elites reverence the constitution, with
participant political culture, swing votes remains the key to
electoral victory between the two dominant parties, whereas, lack of
respect for the law by Nigerian Elites and the existing parochial
political culture ensure that ethno-regional religion remain the
determinants of Electoral victory. It also exposes the supremacy of
strong impersonal and unbiased institutions over the idiosyncrasies
of the elites, in managing elections issues, so also is the support
and moderating roles of the international community as well as the
assertiveness of the internal environment through civil society in
the conduct of credible polls.
196
6.5
CONCLUSION
Drawing from these findings, the impediments to Credible Elections

in West Africa and indeed in Nigeria and Ghana is obvious. They
are challenges arising from the historical antecedence of the
colonial past and developmental deficits which are surmountable.
This responsibility does not rest only on the government and its
institutions alone but on the entire citizenry, as it is an act of
nation building, demanding collective responsibility. Ghana has
risen above primordial interest to evolve a pattern of power
alternation
along
ideological
block
despite
ethno-regional
undertone and may as well mirror America and Britain. This has
reduced tension as opposition parties are sure of having their turn
in future elections. The indeterminacy of Elections in these
countries
promotes
transparency,
accountability
and
good
governance. So also is the election of Jonathan as Nigerian

President which confirmed the NIgerianess of the minority. Such
feats promote national cohesion and integration necessary for the
197
transformation of colonial structures into viable and vibrant nation.

More so, the study has shown that there is no socio-political
contraptions which cannot be overcome, with collective will and
sincere of purpose, and therefore demystify the stereo-type
stratifications of citizen which cages talent and promote mediocrity.
Noteworthy was Atta Mills perpetual election failure translation
into victory in the second round of the election which he was in
opposition; and a southern minority Christian emergence as the
President of the Nigerian Federation skewed in favour of Muslim
dominated North. These show the supremacy of strong and vibrant
institutions over Elite group and individuals which are essential for
the survival of any society. These gains must therefore be preserved
and the challenges tackled for the continuous improvement of
electoral processes in these countries and indeed the sub-regions,
thus necessitating the recommendations.
6.6
RECOMMENDATIONS
Following the findings of this study, the following recommendations

are made:
198
(1)
Component units and nationalities in West African States

must freely discuss their future in a National Conference,
since their creation by the colonialist were meant to serve the
exigencies of the creators.
(2)
Electoral violence should be capitalized to serve as deterrent

to potential perpetrators and sponsors.
(3)
A legal framework establishing clear and enforceable rules for

regulating campaign environment and enhances greater
transparency measures in political party and campaign
funding should be institutionalized.
(4)
The Electoral bodies should publish a detail timetable of

electoral events in advance and work towards meeting the
schedule of the events.
(5)
Voter registers in these countries must be extensive reviewed

and their security strengthened in other to ensure their
accuracy; stakeholders must be carried along in the process.
199
(6)
Effective framework checkmating the excessive influence of

incumbent party on the state must be evolve, so as to make
the state more autonomous.
(7)
Electoral offences commission given the power to investigate

and prosecute electoral crimes should be established, so also
is the political parties commission to oversee the compliance
of these parties with the law and code of conduct.
(8)
Improvement of basic infrastructural facilities necessary for

civic and voter education should be prioritized by the
government.
(9)
Training and re-training of polling staff should be encourage

with accurate preservation and update of the data bank.
(10) Socio-economic
and
constitutional
reforms
which
will
empower the electorates irrespective of social background and

affiliation should be initiated to reduce the ethno-regional
sentiments in socio-political sphere and enthrone issues base
debate in public domain.
200
(11) Time limit should be given to judiciary for the dispose of

parties primary cases weeks before elections, so as to
ascertain the candidature of contestants.
(12) Orientation towards national integration and cohesion should
be backed by appropriate policies, so as to reduce the
stratification of the society along ethno- regional and religion
line.
(13) The government should create an integrated and impartial
electoral security coordinating body, bringing together all
security services and other national stakeholders such as
representatives of political parties, civil society and media
that play a role during electoral processes in order to facilitate
coherent, professional and effective policing around elections.
(14) Political parties should be committed to peaceful actions at all
times, especially during electoral periods, sign and enforce
codes of conduct, and educate party leaders and activists to
honour their provisions.
201
(15) Security
agencies
should
conduct
electoral
threat
assessments and prepare security plans in advance of

Election Day in order to ensure that training has been
conducted,
communication
networks
are
in
place
and
response capacity has been tested.

(16) Election monitors and observers should use new technologies
and methodologies, such as statistically based random
sampling or Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT), to enhance the
quality of observation efforts.
(17) Constitutionalism and Rule of Law must be upheld in respect
to states behaviour. Nobody should be above the law and the
promotion of the basic rights of the people must be
guaranteed at all times.
202
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APPENDIX 1: MAP OF GHANA
213
APPENDIX 2: MAP OF NIGERIA
214

The Challenges of Credible Elections in Nigeria and Ghana

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THE CHALLENGES OF CREDIBLE ELECTION IN

WEST AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF GHANA 2008

OKON ENOCH NDEM

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE

This is to certify that this project entitled The Challenges Of

Credible Election In West Africa: A Case Study Of Ghana 2008

through, making observation and corrections. Your suggestions are

Action Congress of Nigeria

Alliance for Democratic

All Nigeria People Party

All Peoples Party

Congress for National Consensus

Coalition of Domestic Election Observers

Congress for Progressive Change

Convention Peoples Party

Democratic Party of Nigeria

Economic Council of West African States

European Union Election Observation Mission

Great Consolidated Peoples Party

Grassroot Democratic Movement

Great Nigeria Peoples Party

Institute of Economic Affairs

Independent National Electoral Commission

Independent National Electoral Commission

Interim National Government

Movement for Democratic of Substance

National Alliance of Liberals

Nigerian Advance Party

National Commission for Civic Education

National Council of Nigeria and Cameroun Citizen

National Centre Party of Nigeria

National Convention Party

National Democratic Congress

National Electoral Commission of Nigeria

Network of Domestic Election Observers

Northern Element Progressive Union

National Independence Party

Nigeria Labour Congress

National Liberation Movement

Nigerian National Alliance

Nigerian National Democratic Party

National Population Commission

Northern People Congress

National Party of Nigeria

New Patriotic Party

Nigeria Peoples Party

Northern Peoples Party

National Republican Convention

People Democratic Party

Popular Front Party

Peoples Heritage Party

Provisional National Defense Council

Peoples Nationalist Party

Peoples Redemption Party

Social Democratic Party

Transition Monitoring Group

United Gold Coast Convention

United Middle Belt Congress

United Nigeria Congress Party

United National Party

United Progressive Grand Alliance