Identities in Motion:

From Precolonial to
Posthuman
Sadeq Rahimi, 1999
Transcultural Psychiatry
McGill University

INTRODUCTION
Threatened Identities
A FRAMEWORK OF CHANGE
The posthuman
A hyperquest: academia
A hyperquest: real life
A hyperquest: the collective
Disappearing space, shrinking time
The smooth space
New philosophies and the mimetic evolution
Fragmentation and multiplicity
A note on the politics of fragmentation
SEMIOTIC SELVE AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES
A sense of coherence
The psychological self
Loosening the Empire: Other Conceptions of the Self
A collective illusion
CONCLUSION
The advantages of a semiotic model
A concept-to-work-with
A final note on politics
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Comments

INTRODUCTION
Identity is the question of our era. Contemporary developments have added much
tension, weight, and intricacy to the terms self and identity. Traditionally the
philosophers game alone, self and identity are now open ga mes to the psychologist,
the anthropologist, the sociologist, the mathematician, the physicist, the computer
scientist, the geographer, and many more. Human and social sciences are especially
overflowing with passionate discussions of who, what, and how t he subject is (see
for example Ashmore & Jussim, 1997; Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Markus & Herzog,
1991; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Marsella, DeVos, & Hsu, 1985; Porter & Washington,
1993; Whittaker, 1993 for literature reviews in different areas).

Threatened Identities
One possible explanation for these developments is the now old threatened identity
hypothesis. Whether played in the colonial context as the threat from the Other, or in
the postmodern field as the threat of falling apart; and whether felt at the individual
level as the pathology of multiplicity, or at the collective level as the loss of
cultural and social values, threatened identity has been a common human concern
for the last few centuries. "Wh y, indeed, should we have so many identity problems
in modern life? It cannot be for lack of rationality for we have more rational
information and techniques than ever," writes Klapp (1969). Certainly not for lack of
rationality, I would insist. Lerner (1 959) had earlier addressed this question, with
reference to rituals and traditions. As the process of modernization progressed and
the new environment asked for new behavior, Lerner (1959) explained, a
displacement of old traditions had to take place, whi ch in turn called in for changes
in our sense of identity. This, of course, was before the age of mobility, when
globalization was not yet the buzzword; and exclusively western, where there was
no threat of a robust Other deliberately seeking to displace your identity. Though
much has changed since the times of Lerner (1959) or Klapp (1969), the spirit of
their concerns seems to apply to recent developments in similar ways. If the
postmodern condition is a continuation, or an ;aftermath of modernization (see
Harvey, 1989; or Jameson, 1984, for example), one which would not have come to
be without the modern predicate, then change and speed might give useful clues to
the qualitative differences between the eras. And if we accept Giddens (1991)
description of modernity as a "post-traditional order," (p. 2), then post-modernism
may be described as simply furthering the irreverence of modernity for tradition, to
target "order" itself. Human mind, in this account, is un dergoing continuous and
fundamental change in response to the shift in environmental demands, from
premodern to modern to postmodern. "Never before," writes Melucci (1996), "in the
history of the great transformations have the changes under wa y been met with
such a bewildering confusion" (p. 99). More specifically, connectedness and
identification are the two senses where such shifts are experienced most
dramatically by both individuals and collectives as instability and lack of coherence
at p sychological (the epidemy of modernism) and metaphysical (marking the
postmodern condition) levels. Warning against the postmodern notions of self and
identity, Glasss (1993) lament testifies to just that sense of threat: "the danger to
identity her e seems obvious: a boundaryless self is a self without identity . . ." (p.
148).

A FRAMEWORK OF CHANGE
The following paper is a theoretical discussion of recent transformations of the
human condition, with an accent on developments that constitute the postmodern
condition. While it is difficult to elucidate wh at exactly the phrase recent
transformations means, locating it against a general framework might help. An
important determinant in constructing such a framework is the coincidence of
technological and political (colonial, to be exact) develop ments. It is an important
coincidence, because while each of the two can be laid singularly to map recent
transformations, neither can fully express the multiple dimensions of these changes,
nor would these changes have taken place in the same way in the absence of either
factor. Briefly, I tend to break down the history of these changes on the

precolonial/premodern; colonial/modern; and postcolonial/postmodern scale of

reference, mainly to acknowledge the multiple facets of change, as well as the
differe nt perspectives (specifically, ethically and politically) within which these
changes could be evaluated. While it is true that the "projects" of postmodernism
and postcolonialism are very similar in their battle against the "logocentric master
narratives of European culture," or the "centre/margin binarism of imperial
discourse" (Ashcroft et. al., 1995, p. 117), it is also true, however, that the post in
postmodern is not quite the same as the post in postcolonial (see Appia h, 1992 for
further discussion). Apart from (and perhaps because of) diverging political and
philosophical concerns, the colonial/postcolonial discourse provides a rich context
for political and ethical investigation, while a more technologically-informed
approach to modernization/postmodernization might offer a better working ground
for observing the role of technology in these developments. The discussions that
follow are more accentuated on the postmodern aspect of this scale than the
postcolonial, for at least three main reasons. First, that postmodernity, a western
phenomenon by definition, is rapidly contaminating the globe, specifically on the
wings of new digital information and communication technologies. Globalization, in
other words, seems to b e in effect a global spread of the capitalist reality, which has
dominated the west for centuries, in its postmodern guise. Secondly, contemporary
technological developments, also west-born phenomena, cannot be seen as separate
from the colonial enterpris e. Both modernization and colonialism carry and spread a
reality which is western by conception, and which has become possible through the
overwhelmingly rapid and efficient scientific/technological developments in the
west. And finally, the simple fact i s that my arguments here are also articulated and
embedded within the western discourse on humanity and sciences, a condition which
automatically coerces me to play within (an always limited range of) available
western language games. That is to say, I find it more practical to accept the force of
the current discourse and play the privileged language game, than to try to create a
separate reality and establish communication ports from within that environment.
The way recent human transformations have been understood by human sciences
and the way they have affected global and local realities are thus the focus of the
first part of this paper. I will present the question of identity within the framework o
f change, arguing that such change, and specifically, the speed of change, have
problematized identity and continue to do so. I will discuss identity as a concern for
not only the individual, but also the collective. Emphasizing the necessity of a
theory of identity in motion, I will consider the psychological and the
anthropological perspectives on identity concerning individual and collective levels.
I will then go on to argue for practical, as well as theoretical imp ortance of
conceptualizing collective identity as a concept-to-work-with for understanding
local and global social phenomena. Simply put, the purpose of this paper is to
demonstrate how and why it is important to develop a theory o f identity that can
accommodate both the individual and the collective within a context of continuously
shifting paradigms. I will suggest the need for an understanding of identity
(individual and collective) as a semiotic construct independent of spatial , or
temporal grids of reference in its inception (i.e., capable of existence in the absence
of these parameters). As discussed below, independence of time and space would be
a necessity for any identity discourse that is committed to acceptin g fluidity and
change as a premise, since dependence on either factor would imply continuity (and
thus constancy) through time or space, a continuity that may best be described as a
semiotic illusion (see below). As the roles of space and time as constituents of

human reality become less inflexible, it becomes imperative for any new theory of
identity to accommodate a conception of identity ultimately unconstrained by these
grids. It is possible, I will suggest, only by removing th e notion of identity from
phenomenological domain to the semiotic field, to dismiss direct involvement of
either time or space in its construction.
Finally, despite the specific philosophical perspective endorsed through the language
of this paper (i.e., western postmodern), and while accepting Baumans (1995)
suggestion, that "identity is a name given to the sought escape from uncertaint y" (p.
82), I would insist nonetheless that political and clinical concerns demand certain
concepts-to-work-with, certain constructions meant to translate Being into the
human reality. True, such translation spells violence, but th e fact is that in a final
analysis violence appears as the other name for being, and any semiotic
construction of the world always already exists through a systemized (if partial)
negation of Being. That is to say, a philosophical appreciation of the void behind the
term identity does not necessarily render a conceptualization of identity futile, or
useless. The challenge, however, may lie in gradually freeing the concept, so as to
move as far as possible from positivistic reification towards the least rigid
conceptualizations permitted within the current discourse of a given era. Currently,
for example, the notions of change and fluidity championed by postmodern thinkers
may provide useful metaphors towards such liberation of the working conc ept. That
is why environmental change is the main theme of this paper, and that is why I
suggested earlier a theory of identity in motion.

The posthuman
The environmental changes the current paper is concerned with may be recognized
in the structural and semiotic transition from the modern to the postmodern. In other
words, the current hyperquest for identity can be considered a conversion effect of
a postmodern condition replacing the modern. The frenzy with which human
consciousness is struggling to locate itself and its world well signifies the
disorienting effects of shattered grand narratives and the deconstruction anxiety that
results from a continuous calling into question of reality and truth, the Reality and
Truth which have served as the center of poise for our conception of Being
throughout the history of consciousness. This is a state of liminality well beyond
what human consciousness has experienced or is prepared for; a passage to a
universe so different one may call it posthuman. No rites de passage have been
prescribed for this transition, so anxiety, fear and mourning seem to be the only tools
our species has for rendering the passage meaningful. For the human (or more
precisely, the posthuman) subject to be at ease within a world that is not bound
together with static concentric patterns, and to find exhilaration in fragmentedness
and comfort in multiplicity and super-rapid change, a serious reorientation, a redefining of the system of signification has to take place, and anxiety is bound to be a
side-effect of such transformation. Anxiety may thus be recogniz ed as the drive
behind contemporary passion for identification, if we understand this enterprise in
terms of an attempt at reorientation. If it is true as Douglas (1966) asserts, that what
cannot be classified is dangerous and polluting, what would be the logical
consequence of the prospect of everything slipping into that space between the
boundaries where current human structures simply do not cohere? Let me repeat
Glasss (1993) classic statement of horror: "the danger to identity here seems
obvious: a boundaryless self is a self without identity..." (p. 148).

A hyperquest: academia
lund (1997) claims that during the past two decades "the quest for identity ... has
become one of the most central characteristics of our civilizations transformation"
(p. 102). According to Ashmore and Juss im (1995), self-concept and self-perception
have expanded to have the largest number of abstracts in psychological literature
over the last two decades (p. 5). Though North American psychological literature
reflects a long tradition of neglecting the _ 5;collective to favor the individual, the
collective has always been present in the margins of this tradition. Psychological
theories of Baldwin (e.g., 1897), James (e.g., 1890), or Jung (e.g., 1945), as well as
more sociologically infor med thinkers like Cooley (e.g., 1902), or Mead (e.g.,
1934), though far from being the mainstream material, have nonetheless survived on
the margins. More importantly, the recent resurgence of interest in self and identity
is certainly accompanied by an i ncreased consideration of the collective even within
the North American psychological mainstream (see Banaji & Prentice, 1994, and
Markus & Wurf, 1987 for example reviews). For the anthropologist, of course, the
collective has always played an imp ortant role in understanding the individual (see,
for example, Klukhohn & Mowrer, 1944; Honigmann 1967), even for those who did
not take clear sides in the culturalist/universalist game (e.g., Hallowell, 1955 or
Obeyesekere, 1981).

A hyperquest: real life

One might argue that if the dynamics I have suggested were in place, then
consequences should be traceable not simply in research literature, but in the actual
lives of those touched by the postmodern condition. First, i t should be noted that
scholarly activities are as much bound and directed by the law of current discourse
as are the individual and the collective. That is to say, it is not logically unsafe to
assume that trends in scholar activities reflect current sta tes of meaning and the
interests of the specific discourse these activities perpetuate, and such discourse
would simultaneously encompass the scholar community and the rest of the society
where that community thrives. Secondly, real life, _ 5;empirical consequences of
these dynamics are easy to find.
One traditional explanation for the fact that fashion statements and eccentric
lifestyles are increasingly frequently displayed in more (post)modernized societies
[whether you choose a geographical, technological, or temporal perspective] comes
fro m this hypothesis. "Fad and fashion," writes Klapp (1969), "symptomize a
restlessness about identity which is becoming characteristic of much of the modern
world" (p. 73). If the more traditionally safe society of the 60s experienced
"restlessness about i dentity," it only makes sense that with the advent of the
postmodern era the already endangered sense of identity would become only more
threatened, and beyond and above individual identity confusion and alienation,
societies become involved i n "mass groping for activities and symbols with which
to restore or find new identity" (Klapp, 1969, p. vii), a collective meta experience
of identification loss. According to lund (1997), "insecurities and crises in the west
generally are created by the fragmentation of close social ties, the erosion of metasocial guarantees, and the dissolution of more or less homogeneous identities and
ideologies of classes and nations," and in explaining such insecurities, she points
ou t a "profound feeling of social and cultural erosion" (p. 102). Turkles and
Haraways famous digital selves (see, for example, Turkle, 1984, 1995, and

Haraway, 1985, 1997; or even Gergen, 1991) may provide further support for the
perspective th at prophesizes the end for human identity. The quality of changes
assessed by these (and many other) thinkers, and the practical implications of such
changes may not be as easily observable (nor understandable) in daily life as they
are in the realm of di gital mimesis, but as more humans adopt dual citizenships of
the real and the simulated worlds the experience becomes more translatable from
one realm to another. Experiences whose pronunciation alone would have spelled
psychosis a generation or two ago are now common place channels of
communication, especially within virtual communities. The very notion of identity,
stability over time, is directly challenged and destroyed by experiences which are
becoming part of the norm before most of us have a chance to create cognitive maps
to trap and solidify them: identities without precedence.

A hyperquest: the collective

If it is true that contemporary developments have led to an identification anxiety and
a quest beyond the individual, at a collective level, then one would tend to interpret
in identification terms collective actions ran ging from cult behavior to inter-ethnic
tensions, war and genocide, to revolutions and fundamentalist movements.
Supporting this perspective, Melucci (1996) writes: "ethnic, cultural and nationalist
impulses are not solely, nor necessarily, triggered by d iscrimination or exploitation."
Such impulses he says, are formed because "individuals and groups find
themselves acting in situations of uncertainty bereft of stable reference criteria" (p.
159). It is perhaps an unnecessary distinction on th e part of Melucci (1996), to
divorce discrimination and exploitation from that which causes uncertainty and
bereavement of referential stability. One could argue, for example, that it is exactly
such quality of exploitation and discriminations that establ ishes western colonialism
as a cause of uncertainty and destruction of the sense of identity and stability in its
prey cultures. It is not easy to imagine a peaceful dialogue between two realities
causing the extremely destructive effects west ern colonialism has had on its victims.
Bereft of the security of locatedness, the individual (and the collective) would be
prepared to enter lengths of aggression and violence to preserve or re-establish that
"identity-securing interpretive s ystem," (Habermas, 1976). Current collective efforts
around the globe for such re-establishments tend to display two distinct qualities,
which well reflect the double effects of postmodern/postcolonial predicaments: first,
construction of the collective a t the cost of the local, as a reply to the postmodern
call (e.g. Lyotard, 1991, pp. 61-5). "On the one hand", writes lund (1997), "we see
the emergence of increasing societal reflexivity in the identity-forming processes on
both individual and coll ective levels" (p. 103). The second effect, however, is what
one might construe as a postcolonial phenomenon, a renewed effort to resume
historical or mythological veins of collective reference which have often been
effaced or displaced through the proces ses of colonialism and modern boundary
buildings. "On the other [hand]," continued lund (1997), "we see new enclosures
following ethnic lines" (p. 103). This double-sidedness seems to be an
authentically postmodern phenomenon, one readi ly demonstrable in recent events
of the Middle East or Eastern Europe, where new collectivities are emerging (or
struggling to do so) from the fragmented heaps of former collectivities like the
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia etc., or from yet-not-deconstructed states (e.g., Iran, Iraq,
or Turkey). Melucci describes ethnic identity as "a container which offers
individuals and groups a high degree of certainty in an uncertain world" (p. 159).

Erikson (1959) explains prejudice as a response to the anxiety of losin g the

collective sense of identification: "the expression of the individuals deep fear of
being alone" (p. 17). Ignatieff (1994) predicts collective anxiety in response to a
similar threat: "there is one type of fear more devastating in its impact t han any
other: the systemic fear which arises when a state begins to collapse" (p. 16). The
spot where the postmodern and the postcolonial predicaments join (or cross?) one
another, can be defined precisely by such "loss of the collective sense of identif
ication," and the acute sense of uncertainty and confusion which accompanies such
loss.
"Postmodern culture," writes Lyotard (1991, p. 64), "is in fact on the way to
spreading to all humanity". As the postmodern deconstruction of systems of
identification remove the boundaries (either spatial or temporal) with which humans
have learne d to map and contain their collective reality, two immediate
consequences would be imaginable: an increased waning of the individual and the
locally constructed collectivities, and simultaneously, an increase in significance of a
larger collec tive. Both the collapsing boundaries and threatened identities, and the
emergent globalization may thus go far in explaining many recent
international/intergroup events. The postmodern culture is spreading to include the
human community, thus introducing a new collective, "but to the same extent it is
tending to abolish local and singular experience, . . . the new culture can produce
such divergent effects, of generalization and destruction" (Lyotard, 1991, p. 64).
As local collectivities are impelled by the contraction of space and time to merge,
the collective grows to assume inordinate significance where the question of human
life, mental or physical, is involved (for more detailed discussions of these dou ble
sided developments see e.g., Anderson, 1991; or Melucci, 1996). The individual
(either whole, bounded, impermeable or emergent, unbounded, fluid) would
gradually fade as the source of agency and intentionality, to be understood simply as
t he locus of collective agency.
If it is true then, that the collective is becoming an increasingly significant point of
reference in social and human sciences, then a conception of the collective and
collective identity warrants attention and continual refinement, specifically o ne
which appears to promise a useful concept-to-work-with, towards explaining
patterns of social and political movements in the increasingly postmodern world. It
is specifically towards such concept-to-think-with that I have tried to limit my
discussions to the borders of social and political applicability. I would like to point
out the importance of the term concept-to-think-with at this point. A concept-tothink-with is not a claim to truth, nor is it a reference to a complete system of sign
ification, it is simply a way of trying to provide a communication field that does not
impose the obligations of a full-fledge reificatory regime.

Disappearing space, shrinking time

As Klapp (1969) elaborates, modernization led to strong loss of identity by
depriving geography of identity, and replacing place by space. "Space," writes
Klapp (1969), "robs identity. Place, on t he other hand, nurtures it, tells you who you
are" (p. 28). If the replacement of place by space is an achievement of modernity, the
replacement of space by time can be considered a postmodern hallmark. "It is
increasingly true," writes Schwartz (1995), " that cultures are [now] bounded more
in time than in space" (p. 70). It is, in other words, time that reflects change, much
more than does space. In fact, space itself (in the scientific sense of the word) is now

defined by time in scientific discourse. T he unit of length (meter) for example, is

reduced directly to the unit of time. Again, if the modern question of identity
concerned locality and spatial reference, what concerns the question of identity in
the postmodern condition is primarily defined by temporal locatedness. For
example, the notion of speed inevitably informs the issue of identification reference
in a postmodern context. The speed of environmental change is gradually
approaching a point where identity would lack a reference, a precedence with which
to identify oneself. The conflict is fundamental: if self-identification has traditionally
always already implied a reference in time, then acceleration is inherently the enemy
of identity, by continuously curtailing the stuff iden tity is made of.
As time, the final shelter for identity after the decline of space, is increasingly
shrunken by technology magic, identity continuously approaches zero. What comes
to mind in imagining the process of contraction is the Doppler effect. The better kn
own part of Dopplers effect is the change in the frequency of sound (or light) as the
source (of sound or light) approaches the perceptive agent. That is how physics
explains the perceived change in the pitch of a sound produced by a racecar as it a
pproaches and subsequently distances from a by-stander. The less well-known part
of Dopplers effect, however, is perhaps even more relevant to my discussion of
postmodern identity. If the source of sound moves towards the perceptor at rates
higher t han the speed of sound, the order of reference disintegrates. At exactly twice
the speed of sound, for example, you will hear the produced sound in a reversed
order. What I would like to draw from this analogy is the unknown effects on the
notion of ident ity, as speed increases. In the same way that the change in temporal
perspective with regard to the incidence of sound elements can lead to differential
perception of those elements, changing temporal perspectives with regard to the
incidence of identity elements may imply drastic changes in ones understanding of
ones continuity memory, and thus the (semiotically conceived) construct reality of
his/her universe. Fraser (1994) recognizes similar effects of the rapidly changing
environment, prop osing that as the flow of time alters, "the environment created by
individuals and societies outruns the adaptive capacities of their creators and leads to
a loss of temporal horizons" (p. 5).

The smooth space

If we describe our current postmodern condition as a condition where the critical
referential distance of identity approaches zero (the contraction of time), then the
increase in speed of change can, theoreti cally at least, lead to a reversal of the
orders of reference (see above). This may in fact be conceptualized as a reversal in
the order of signification, so that the signifier precedes the signified. Though
extremely important for a theory of posthuman i dentity, the possibility and
implications of such reversal are not within the scope of the present paper. Presently
applicable, however, is the more-or-less current postmodern predicament, within
which self-identification seems to be running short of refe rence. To imagine a
system of meaning wherein the act of self-identification (as traditionally done by
humans) is unfeasible is to imagine a constant state of flux, a seamless ocean of
meaning, a state traditionally considered pathological and diagnosed s chizoid: a
"smooth space," which is "in principle infinite, open, and unlimited in every
direction;" and which "has neither top nor bottom nor center" (Deleuze & Guattari,
1977, p. 476). It is not difficult to realize that the self native to this environment
cannot be the human self we are familiar with. In the words of Gergen (1991), the

postmodern self resides in "a continuous state of construction and reconstruction," a

fluid landscape where "each reality of self gives way to reflexive questioning, irony,
and ultimately the playful probing of yet another reality," a reality where "the center
fails to hold" (p. 6). While such conception of a posthuman to come may appear
fantastic, the undeniable fact is that the postmodern condition is c onstantly
expanding its reach, dissolving boundaries and transforming nations.

New philosophies and the mimetic evolution

The new conceptualizations of self and identity as multiple and fragmented may not
be regarded as historical discoveries, in the sense that they (may or) may not be
referred to the past eras of the human mind. The contem porary fascination with and
proliferation of the postmodern theories of self and identity may be understood as
the human reaction to technology: "I define postmodern as incredulity toward
metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the
sciences" (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiv). Postmodern philosophies of difference, or more
generally, the new philosophies (new, as in dating after Nietzsches spreading the
news of Gods death) may be seen as ef forts to maintain meaningful the changes
the unfoldings of consciousness have brought the human reality. These changes have
transformed the human condition, the semiotic environment of the human mind, to
the extent that it would appear impossible for the human species (as signified by the
human mind) to survive without undergoing fundamental adaptation.
Despite the apparent naivet of attempting to approach such (mimetic, rather than
biological) transformations of the human condition via the conventional
evolutionary discourse, an evolutionary language does offer useful metaphors of
change. Even if the human physiology could properly respond to the increasingly
novel demands of technology with more or less unchanged appearance, it is almost
impossible to imagine human mind surviving the demands of the new environment
without _ 45;falling apart. Exploring relevant areas, Donald (1993) for example,
suggests the concepts of cultural and cognitive evolution. He divides this evolution
in three major transitions: from culture of apes to the culture of ho mo erectus,
from the culture of homo erectus to that of homo sapiens, and finally the recent and
largely nonbiological stage, the emergence of visual symbolism and external
memory. Each of these stages, according to Don alds (1993) model, involves
structural change in cognitive organization, and profound cultural changes, in
addition to (and in correspondence with) biological "hardware" changes. What sets
the latest stage of this evolution apart from the rest, howe ver, is that cognitive and
cultural changes in this phase rely on hardware changes that are "external to the
biological memory system and reside in the technology of culture" (p. 18). The
technology of culture or external mem ory for Donald (1993) is defined as a
"storage and retrieval system that allows humans to accumulate experience and
knowledge," (p. 309) a concept that would lead ones mind to the field of computer
science even without Donalds own explic it reference to computer networks in
elaborating external memory. Two aspects of Donalds (1993) work are most
relevant to my current arguments, the notion of cognitive evolution, and that of
external memory. Though beyond the present paper, the theo retical possibility of
investigating technological effects in an evolutionary framework introduces
important implications for a theory of posthuman identity. More readily applicable,
however, is the notion of external memory. Establishing a relationship b etween
external memory and the sense of identity would readily suggest a displacement of

the locus of identity, or at least an expansion of the locus of identity, from the
bounded unit traditionally understood as the individual to the wider domain of _
5;culture, the collective. "The memory system," writes Donald (1993), "once
collectivized into the external symbolic storage system, becomes virtually unlimited
in capacity and much more robust and precise." (p. 311). Such dynamic can be
discussed i n two terms: the presence of the collective in what constitutes the
individual, and the expansion of the individual through the collective. The notion of
a collective that informs the individuals sense of identity is in fact what will be
discussed b elow as collective identity. The notion of expansion, the individual with
a sense of memory and identity spread beyond and outside his or her traditional
self, is closely relevant to the postmodern notion of fragmentation discussed
below. While I used earlier the metaphor of falling apart to suggest a dysfunctional
reaction to environmental demands, I would like to propose that the phenomenon
most frequently described as the fragmentation of human identity w ithout any
implications of a disorder, may be understood as an adaptive response to those
demands.
Jean Baudrillard (1987) reports contemporary human condition in this way: "[we
are] in that state of hyperreality . . . we are dealing with a sign that posits the
principle of non-reality, the principle of the absolute absence of realit y. We went
beyond the reality principle a long time ago, and now the game which is being
played is no longer being played in the world of pure illusion..." (pp. 46-47). Note
that Baudrillards hyperreality is not a simulated reality, it i s a state of reality,
one which Levin (1996) calls "reality conceived without otherness" (p. 274). It is
more in line with Heideggers Ge-Stell, which describes an enframing of the human
experience of Being by the creation of its o wn mind, i.e., technology. Baudrillards
conception of the simulacra --the third order, to be more specific: see Baudrillard
(1993) for details-- as the narrative of human identity in the postmodern condition,
would be a useful framework for conceptu alizing the transformation of human
identity as a result of technological change. Far from revolutionary, as notes Pefanis
(1991), the simulacra (and hence the theoretical possibility of transitional
developments of meaning), could be defended with perspe ctives as old as Platos
notion of society as mimesis (see pp. 59f.). Once we recognize social human as a
simulation, an abstraction shared by (and, simultaneously, constitutive of) the
individual members of a given society, then the transition from one level of
simulation to the next would be more readily conceivable. Baudrillard (1983) speaks
of the latest order(s) of simulation as maps without a territory. "Simulation is no
longer that of a territory," he writes, "it is the map that precedes the t erritory...that
engenders the territory" (p. 2). Philosophically, I would problematize the idea of "no
longer". To use that means to imply that at some point these maps, the simulations
within which humans semiotic existence has been established, ac tually referred to a
territory, a substance, a referential being. It is the assumption of this paper that
such substance has never been in place, and thus has never disappeared or replaced,
despite the fact that certain perspectives have assumed (and thus observed) such
qualities. To use other words from Baudrillard himself, it is in fact more true to
understand all systems of representation as "the situation created by any system of
signs when it becomes sophisticated enough, autonomous enough, to abolish its own
referent and to replace it with itself" (1991, p. 157. Note also that the notion of a
map that precedes its territory has implications for my earlier discussion of the
theoretical possibility of a reversal in the orders of signification and identification).

Fragmentation and multiplicity

"Once considered the rarest of clinical oddities," writes McAdams (1997), "multiple
personality disorder has re-emerged as an astonishing cultural phenomenon in North
America during the past 25 years" (p. 50). It takes l ittle effort to find much literature
on the recent mushrooming of these phenomena [see for example, Cardena (1994);
Hacking (1995); Kihlstrom (1995); Klein and Doane (1994) and Spanos (1994)].
True, so-called personality disorders generally associated wit h qualities of
multiplicity and fragmentation may have become more common in North America,
and this development may indeed correlate positively with technological
advancements and the unfoldings of the postmodern condition. Something, however,
sets Deleu ze & Guattaris postmodern praise of fragmentation distinctly apart from
Yeats modern dread of falling apart. If a center which does not hold signals the end
of the world to Yeats but the beginning of a new philosophy to Derrida, this is no t
necessarily because they are talking about different centers: it may simply be that
they are both right. Would it be too far-fetched to assume that Yeats falcon was
simply hyper-sensitive to seismic waves of the "rocking cradle"? My answer is no.
The schizoid self native to Deleuze and Guattaris "soft space" is not a pathological
human, it is the posthuman subject. It is not pathological, not because its
fragmentation is qualitatively different from a traditional schizophrenic, but be cause
it is lived in the context of a different environment, a different reality. It is this
difference which is often erroneously interpreted to represent a disjointment of
scholar and intellectual from political and clinical in postmodern th ought. Glass
(1993), for example, criticizes the postmodern perspective as a "dangerous
advocacy," discussing passionately what he perceives to distinguish postmodern
ideas from those of the object-relations school, and Melanie Klein and Winnicotts
traditions. Seconded by many, Glass (1993) describes what he considers the
postmodern idealization of multiplicity and fragmentation, as "a radical insensitivity
to . . . the feelings of abandonment, terror, and implosion" experienced by
individuals expos ed to such processes (p. 14). "There is something terribly wrong in
the postmodernist interpretation of what multiplicity or fragmentation of self
means," he writes (p. 8). Criticizing Deleuze and Guattaris calling schizophrenic
process a "potential for revolution" (see Deleuze & Guattari, 1977, e.g. p. 341),
Glass (1993) contends: "what kind of revolution? How can persons who hallucinate,
who live in fear, who refuse to speak, who are desperately afraid of other persons,
who lack a sense of a h istorical self, be in any way considered "revolutionary" . . .
Deleuze and Guattari distort a process that in its reality portrays loss, despair,
impotence, and futility" (p. 148). While not necessarily lacking in logic, Glasss
contention seems to l ack somewhat in imagination. The question is perhaps not as
much how Deleuze and Guattari could ignore the "loss, despair, impotence, and
futility" which accompanies schizoid deconstruction today, as is the changes born of
shifting realities, or what such deconstruction might mean in a different reality.
Jameson (1984) captures the spirit of this difference, where he predicts that
"schizophrenic disjunction or criture, when it becomes generalized as a cultural
style, ceases to entertain a n ecessary relationship to the morbid content we associate
with terms like schizophrenia, and becomes available for more joyous intensities"
(p. 74). While joyous intensity may carry (unnecessarily) a sense of naive
excitement, the idea that in a postmodern condition such schizophrenic disjunction
can assume new meanings is certainly not naive.

A note on the politics of fragmentation

"For political outcast," writes Glass (1993), "terror comes from external agents; for
the psychically disconnected, terror radically disrupts internal forms of identification
and knowledge" (p. 148). Visible in this comm ent is the distinction between the
internal forms of identification and knowledge and external agents, a dualism that
succeeds to find the individual capable of living dual realities of inside and outside,
by failing to understand the subject as a part and product of its context. In fact only
such a distinction would allow imagining a subject made of material qualitatively
different from its context. What led Yeats to believe the End was close was the
vision of a modern subject, a falcon assessing its reality by reference to the center,
cast against a postmodern stage where the center did not hold. It might, however, be
as rare an incident in real life to see a dinosaur roaming contemporary Albertan
plains as it is to f ind a modern subject treading postmodern plateaus. What even
Glass (1993) cannot (and does not) deny is the social realization of the postmodern
condition. What he may be failing to take into account, however, is that an adaptive
strategy in o ne environment can simply be a dysfunctional flaw in another (and vice
versa). In other words, if a unified sense of self, a center, serves human survival in
the modern reality, this is not sufficient reason that the same would apply in the
postmodern.
Despite the theoretical plausibility of a postmodern subjectivity and even the farfetched notion of a posthuman subject who thrives not on coherence and unity but
fragmentation and multiplicity, in at least one respect I tend to agree with Glass a nd
others discontent with the movement called postmodernism, and that is the actual
distance between the postmodern/posthuman and the human subject as it exists
today. I would like to call to attention two aspects to this issue. First, that th e
posthuman is more a prediction, yet to come, than an observation, a case at hand;
and secondly that the discourse called postmodernism makes sense more as a
descriptive language game than a prescriptive regime. It is an important fact that d
espite the significant presence of postmodern elements such as technological
objects-to-think-with [as Turkle (1984, 1995) calls them] and globalized culture and
economies, the postmodern reality is not yet the established dominant reality aro
und the globe. While our era may be understood as the link that connects the human
to the posthuman, where the human sense of reality is fundamentally disturbed, the
ultimate moment of transformation is yet to come. It is not difficult to unde rstand
Glass (1993), when he complains "the most powerful evidence against the
postmodernist concept of self comes not from theory but from the words and lives of
individuals actually experiencing the terrible psychological dislocation of multiplici
ty" (p. xii). While it is possible to argue that what we understand as a healthy
sense of coherence and identity at either individual or collective levels is a mere
illusion (see below), it is also true that our current collective unders tanding of
individual, mental health, or reality does not generally regard these as illusory
constructs, certainly not the western tradition. Similarly important is the question of
the postmodern as a condition and postmodernity as a state of affairs vis--vis
postmodernism as a prescriptive discourse, an ideology. Unlike Glass and many
others (some of whom would gladly accept the title postmodernist) who see m to
understand postmodernism in the latter terms, I tend to view postmodernity in
Lyotards (1984) terms, as "incredulity toward metanarratives" (p. xxiv), which
Jameson (1984-b) finds in accord with Deleuze and Guattaris (1977) &#
145;warning that "the schizophrenic ethic they proposed was not at all a
revolutionary one, but a way of surviving under capitalism" (Jameson, 1984-b, p.

xviii). In other words, it may be an uncalled-for error to interpret and thus reject
postmodern literature (or at least all postmodern literature) as prescriptions for
dysfunctional pathologies based on "distortions" of "the face of madness" (Glass,
1993, p. 148). "If postmodernism is a historical phenomenon," writes Jameson
elsewhere (1984, p. 85), "then the attempt to conceptualize it in terms of moral or
moralizing judgements must finally be identified as a category-mistake."

Semiotic Selves and Collective Identities

I have thus far suggested that self and identity have become common themes of
investigation because human reality has encountered a demand for change in
adjusting to new technologies, which in turn demands a change in hu man
identificatory system. I have also suggested that postmodern notions of multiplicity
and fragmentation provide useful metaphors in postulating what an adaptive
response to these demands may be. Earlier I also suggested, as part of such adaptive
respon se, an increasing importance for the collective as a replacement for the local
and the individual, and the need for the construct collective identity as a concept-towork-with for better understanding collective phenomena. In order to bring these
theoreti cal discussions down to the practical context of my current project, I will
discuss below an understanding of collective identity and collective self-esteem,
against the general theme of identity. To facilitate my discussions, I develop my
arguments using the anthropology vs. psychology frame of reference.
I propose collective identity as a semiotically conceived sense of coherence that is
experienced by the individual with reference to a specific collectivity that individual
considers him/herself to be a part of (see below for further discussion). F urther, and
based on this understanding of collective identity, I use also the concept of collective
self-esteem, as a way of referring to the overall positivity of an individuals
perception of that collectivity. Clearly these constructs can be prob lematized at both
theoretical and practical levels.

A sense of coherence
I have chosen to understand identity (personal or collective), as a semiotically
conceived sense of coherence. There are a few arguments for this choice, one of
which I discussed earlier as the need to locate human (sense of ) identity outside the
rigidities of time or space. Somewhat traditionally, American theorists of self and
identity have generally relied heavily on temporality as the anchorage of their
theories, even where their conceptualizations have been proposed as semiotic
arguments (see, for example, the theories of Mead, Peirce, James, or Dewey, all of
whom claim more or less semiotic bases for their understanding of the self). In a
recent reconciliatory attempt at combining the different American the ories of self
and identity (specifically, those of Mead and Peirce) together as complements, Wiley
(1994) suggests a "triadic" theory of identity. Wileys (1994) triad locates human
identity in a triangular relation between temporal, semiotic, and di alogical elements.
He suggests a merger of theories locating identity in each of these domains, arguing
(naively, I should add) that "this theoretical whole [is] greater than the sum of its
parts" (p. 216). Rejecting the semiotic theory of Eco (e.g., Eco, 1976), he writes,
"for Eco the self is a sign in the same way that ordinary words are signs. But
obviously we are not . . . otherwise these words or others like them, would also be
humans" (p. 217). Apart from the generally simplistic treatment of the (S aussurian)
semiotic approaches employed or implied in European thought (e.g., Wittgenstein

and Lacan, or more generally, in structuralist, post-structuralist, and postmodernist

literature) American critics too often ignore in their discussions the impasse
positivism faces in accounting for the changing face of reality.
One problem with efforts to establish identity in temporal dimensions, for example,
is that once we can conceive of temporality as itself an object of subjective
construction, then the sense of coherence which is the marker of identity may not be
based in it. In other words, for the subject to be able to achieve and maintain a sense
of coherence while accommodating a shifting element, it is a logical requirement of
that sense of coherence to accommodate the element, rather than being
accommodated by that element. The problem with time as a scale against which
identity has been generally conceived, is that as technology dislocates it, identity
loses its meaning. By locating identity outside temporality, an d thus by breaking
the rigidity of temporal structure of our conception of identity, however, we can then
be open to the possibility of a sense of coherence in a posthuman reality, where the
word coherence itself has been translated into the new semiotic environment to
signify a quality perhaps much obscure to our current understanding of identity in
time. If a sense of coherence suggested by my definition of collective identity is to
be understood as semiotically based and thus illusory , then the field of movement
is open for the construct, in both trans-cultural and trans-temporal senses of
difference (see below).
The terms collectivity and membership are also highly problematic terms. People
usually consider themselves a part not of one specific group, but of a number of
collectivities simultaneously. These collectivities are often in undefined (if not
problema tic) relation to one another, some mutually exclusive, some overlapping,
some contained within the other, and so on. Collectivity may thus seem to be a
challenging locus of reference, for identity or self-esteem. It appears, however, that
collectivity is no more problematic as a locus of identity as is the subject,
specifically if we adopt the non-positivist conception of the subject as unbound and
permeable. It might be helpful at this point to briefly compare the two main views
on identity and the self (to which I earlier referred as the anthropological vs.
psychological) before I can better discuss collective identity.

The psychological self

The traditional western conceptualization(s) of self, identity, and the individual,
often generically categorized under positivist approaches (and traced back as far as
Platonic and Christian teachings, to th e more recent Cartesian and Kantian
epistemological systems [see, for example, Lutz, 1988]); may be discussed against
the non-traditional western conceptualization(s) which, in the absence of more
precise terminology, I might broadly refer to as Nietzsche an-Derridian perspectives
in recognition of the great influence these philosophers have had on articulation and
assertion of such perspectives. Since any detailed imagemapping of these differences
would be beyond the present papers capacity, I limit my discussions to those
aspects more relevant to the concepts of collective identity and collective selfesteem.
A traditional western positivist understanding of the self has commonly been
attributed to the American and European psychological and, by extension, social
psychological perspectives; an attribution which, though perhaps too broad to be ju
st, does not appear unjustified [Although see, for example, Murray (1993) for
arguments against a historically western positivist tradition of understanding the self,

or Ewing (1990) for an alternative perspective on such attribution]. Within t his

perspective (to which I will refer alternatively as the traditional western or the
psychological perspective) the self, though admittedly a difficult-to-pinpoint
concept, has been assumed to be the "center" of the person, somewhat imaginab le
as a "core" around which various personality aspects are arranged in a spherical
manner and in varying distances from this core, according to their import in defining
this person. More-or-less impermeable, this bounded core is then assumed to remain
co ntinuous, and rather stable (or a derivative of such quality) through time. One of
the main qualifiers of this perspective is the ascription of transcendence to the
construct called self. Such transcendental self is conceptualized in associati on
with the "universals of human nature or experience", often understood in terms of
shared biological and/or psychological processes of the organism (Battaglia, 1995),
and perceived as "an insoluble unit, fundamentally different from anything not
human." (Roseman, 1990). In short then, the perspective attributed to the western
(social) psychologys understanding of an individual might be broadly captured in
Geertzs words, as a " bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and
cogniti ve universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgement, and action,
organised into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against other such wholes
and against a social and natural background" (Geertz, 1979).
One immediate implication of attributing wholeness to the self is the possibility of
distinguishing between the individual and its surrounding environment, as Roseman
(1990) or Geertz (1979) pointed out. Most importantly, such attribution will enab le
a distinction between the individual and the society which is comprised of other,
separate, individuals who are in turn whole, insoluble, and bounded around their
own cores. The society which is made of the collection of these individuals then, is
simp ly that. That is to say, even thought the individuals who make the society may
indeed interact at influential levels with other individuals, the extent of such
influence will be eventually determined by each recipient individuals self, o r in
other words, the individual is essentially and theoretically capable of (if not
necessarily able to, potentially capable of) separating its-self from the society
surrounding him/her and thus limiting such influences. In the words of Kohut and
Wolf (1978), the self becomes originally "crystallised" via an "interplay of
inherited and environmental factors", and the end result is "the self, an independent
centre of initiative, an independent recipient of impressions." It is this individual
which has been referred to as an "autonomous distinctive individual living-insociety" (Shweder & Bourne, 1984).
As an example of this psychological understanding of the self embedded in the
social psychological context, consider the way the role of the society has been
incorporated within the notions of the self and identity in relation to the society.
Henry Tajfel, founder of the Social Identity Theory, defines social identity as
follows: "social identity is that part of an individuals self-concept which derives
from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together wi th
the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1981, p.
255). So a person has something called social identity which, as Tajfel envisions it,
is derived by that person, from awareness of his/her membership in a s ocial group.
Notice that in order for this relationship to hold, there must be an individual outside
the society, which at the same time belongs inside that society, and in fact stands in
the very middle of the society, is the center of that society, and decides how far the
society may or may not influence his/her ways of being. In other words, not only is
this individual a complete whole regardless of the society, the way the society does

affect this individual is via the coming to b e of a "knowledge cloud" (which comes
to be as a synthesis of the individual thought and the social conventions, perhaps)
which the individual then analyses, and from which s/he then "derives" a certain
sense of identity, and based on which s/he develops a sense of "value and emotional
significance" regarding her/his membership in that group. As Levin (1992) describes
it, the American academic psychology "tends to be tough-minded. It has little
tolerance for abstract, the speculative, or the psychoanalyti c" (p. 126). The fact is
that even those of this group who select less main-stream approaches to self and
identity, like Cooley (e.g., 1902) or Mead (e.g., 1934) who ascribe great importance
to semiological notions tend to do so within certain boundaries. Meads dialogical
self, for example, appears in the first glance to be located in the semiotic realm. A
closer look, however, shows that semiotics remains external to Meads self, a
mediator between the subject and the surrounding s ociety. Unlike that of
Wittgensteins, this subject is not a semiotic entity, even though it develops via
semiotic means (see Mead 1934, for example). Cooleys subject seems also to look
into the mirror to become who/what it become s, just like Lacans does. Once again,
however, a closer look reveals that these two mirrors dont reflect the same thing:
while Lacans mirror brings into being the self, Cooleys mirror simply allows an
already-inquisitive self to ha ve a look at itself, to reflect upon itself. Even to the
semiotically-inclined North American theories of self and identity, a claim like "the
limit of my language means the limits of my world" (Wittgenstein, 1922, p. 117)
may appear too extre me. It is tempting to follow the significance and implications
of this perspective and the general social/political role of such conceptualization as a
product of the capitalist economy. It is not this papers intention, however, to enter a
detailed discussion of either perspective, and instead of a more in-depth discussion
of the psychological perspective I now consider some of the views challenging the
American psychological perspective.

Loosening the Empire: Other Conceptions of the Self

As Sampson (1989b) suggests, the opponents of the psychological perspective can
be grouped under at least 6 main headings. The appearance and development of
those disciplines of the human sciences dedicated to cros s-cultural observation of
cultures Other to the Euroamerican traditions is seen to be of significance to the
progression of these alternative perspectives on self and the individual, at both
political and philosophical levels. Derrida (1 978) speaks of a recent historical
"moment when a decentering had come about: at the moment when European
culture -- and, in consequence, the history of metaphysics and of its concepts -- had
been dislocated, driven from its locus, and forced to stop cons idering itself as the
culture of reference" (p. 282). Specific historical/political events and eras may
indeed become useful in signing the emergence of certain philosophical
perspectives, as Derrida does, though this should certainly not be taken for a c ausal
explanation of such changes. Perhaps an aftermath of the "moment" described by
Derrida (1978), the recent trend of "cross-cultural investigation" (Sampson, 1989),
(which I use here not to refer simply to the last few decades introduction of cr osscultural studies to different disciplines, but rather to the recent few centuries of
mainly colonial interaction between the west and the rest) seems to have
tremendously facilitated the progression and indeed the explosion of new western
conceptual/p hilosophical trends challenging the traditional western views.
Technological advancements providing considerably higher speeds and volumes of
interaction and immigration at a global level and exploding international

consumption rates have further provided fertile grounds for rapid political and social
mushrooming of marginally-based efforts in decentralisation of power, politically,
socially, and inevitably, philosophically and psychologically. As I discussed
earlier, the gradual dislocation o f the center (or what is claimed to mean that) in
various domains has been well represented within the human sciences occupied with
the conception of the individual and the self. The dislocation of the centre from the
self to the society, to the language, and eventually to nowhere has progressively
created the most essential challenge to the old "bounded universe" (Geertz, 1979)
which has been the western individual. A very interesting question which springs out
of this discussion is why withi n the human and social sciences psychology should
decide to ignore these challenges, and has managed to remain mostly nonpermeable against these developments, faithful to the western tradition. Though
again outside the limits of this paper, I find most convincing the arguments
advocated by the critical theorists who have "located the current North American
conception [of the individual, as psychologys subject] in the heartland of advanced
capitalist ideology" (Sampson, 1989b, p. 2). It is worth mentioning before I move
on, that as I suggested earlier the west, specifically North America has been the main
source not only of colonialism, but also of developments that have unfolded the
transformation from modernity to the postmodern condit ion. An important
postmodern object, the Internet, for example, is not only a western phenomenon,
but in fact a direct product of capitalist self-protection tactics (consider the case of
ARPANET for example). It is ever ironic that while weste rn technology, backed by
its complementary psychologies, contributes immensely to the development of the
posthuman, it remains itself extremely resistant to considering the possibility of such
transformation.
One may use Derridas description of the subject as "a system of relations" to refer
to the most outstanding perspective raised to challenge western psychological idea
of the individual. This "system of relations" does not have a center, and d evoid of
any stable solid core, it is a process rather than a beginning or an end (Sampson,
1989b). Not only does this decentered self not function as the center of the society, it
may not even be viewed as having a center: a process rather th an an essence.
"Selfhood by this figuration", says Battaglia (1995), "is a chronically unstable
productivity brought situationally --not invariably-- to some form of imaginary
order, to some purpose, as realised in the course of culturally patterned inter actions"
(p. 2).
It is worth mentioning that instead of seeing an epistemological difference between
the views I have mentioned above, some have suggested a semiotic difference.
Ewing (1990), argues for a general misunderstanding between the anthropological
and psy chological views: while cultural anthropologists have argued that selves
are "culturally shaped and infinitely variable," Kohut, has claimed that "every
normally functioning, healthy adult has a bounded, cohesive self". Ewing in fact
goes on t o suggest that even though these disciplines may think that their
understandings of the self are in conflict, "they are, in fact, not talking about the
same thing." She explains "semiotically constituted concepts of self" as the notion
with which the _ 5;anthropological researchers are more often concerned, while
what the psychological/ psychoanalytical literature refer to is often a, "pre-reflective
self-experience". It is, according to her, this differential reference that initiates the
psycho-/ anthropological debate over the nature of the self. Clearly the first premise
of this argument is a dichotomization of self experience at the semiotic versus the
pre-reflective levels. What such dichotomization would imply is that the pre-

reflective self is not semiotically conceived, an argument that seems similar to that
of North American semiological social psychologists, as I discussed earlier. While it
might again be beyond the scope of this paper to enter a detailed discussion of this
suggestion, I do not find Ewings (1990) distinction convincing. These differences
arise not at a semiotic level as she proposes, but rather from two fundamentally
different interpretations of the universe and what constitutes reality within this
unive rse, and of what is or is not out there to be known.
Incidentally, Ewing (1990) does express in the same article a criticism of what she
calls the anthropological assumption of a "single model of self or person", which
"can be described in terms of a few key concepts and symbols", an assumption deriv
ed from the understanding of cultures as coherent systems. Without intending any
detailed discussion, this is an argument which I tend to interpret, in an indirect way,
as again a criticism of the perception which has been traditionally attributed to the
psychological conception of its subject, at a social/cultural level. And this criticism
does not appear to be attributing the difference between the two perceptions of
culture to semiotic miscommunication.

A collective illusion
An important argument within Ewings (1990) article is her suggestion of a
semiotically-constructed illusion of wholeness, a cohesive self which, though may
not be described as anything more than a reifi ed idea, nonetheless bears important
implications for any work, specifically any cross-culturally oriented study of self
and identity. Such wholes, she argues, "are fleeting, [but] they are experienced as
timeless." (p. 263). I find this argument importan t since I tend to locate the notion
of collective identity within this very illusory realm. It is possible to raise the
argument that, given the existence of such illusory context, it is logically sound to
explore the construction of this illusion, and to study the various representations of
such construction in the individuals behaviour and interactions. It is, in other words,
exactly within this semiotic realm that I would locate the sense of identity, and it is
in reference to this illusory ;collectiveness (to which Fernandez (1986) refers as a
"conviction of wholeness") that I suggest a persons perception of his/her
collectivity to be understood.
What I am suggesting is that what --and perhaps the only thing that-- individuals
sharing a culture actually share is the "conviction", or rather, the illusion that they
share a common system of values and perspectives. In o ther words, not only do I
consider the perception of oneself as a stable, coherent, and continuous source of
action an "illusion" as Ewing (1990) suggests, but further, what is normally referred
to as "culture" I regard as an imagined space where persons who are the members of
that specific collectivity believe to share sets of values and symbols. These sets of
values, beliefs, and symbols may indeed be empirically found to be incoherent and
diverse, despite the sincere conviction of each member of the gr oup that what s/he
shares with others is a set of similar perspectives. This semiotically constructed
collective illusion (or illusion of collectivity) gives birth to a world, in a
phenomenological sense, within each individual, wh erein every member of the
culture including one-self is represented and shares a set of values as the group.
Discrepant relationship between value system and self-categorization, for example,
can be explained with this model . If it is not the empirical similarity of values or
behaviour schema that rigidly establishes a persons sense of collective identity, then
it would be possible to have discrepancies between the group a person might appear

to belong to, and the group that person actually believes to belong to. As I will argue
later, this model also accommodates the fact that an individual could have multiple
collective identities without experiencing internal discrepancy as a coherent
psychological agent .
Ewing (1990) argues for a system of self-representation utilised, along with the
representations of others, towards the constitution of a "symbolic whole". Even
though she does not enter into further details regarding the representations of others
and considers the role of such representation only with regard to the processes which
constitute the "illusion of an ongoing experience" of the self as an individual, I
would like to extend her arguments in discussing the semiotic experience which
constit utes identification with a group, or collective identity. Fernandez (1986) and
Ewing (1990) present interesting arguments for an illusory sense of " wholeness"
with respect to the individual sense of the self (Ewing), and "religious culture"
(Fernandez). I find both their arguments similarly applicable to the "whole"
generally referred to --and experienced-- as "culture". As per Ewing, I agree that
such ambiguity-based semiotic devices and processes as metonymy, analogy, and
metaphor (which are also sugge sted by Fernandez, and Ewing [1990] tries to
capture in psychoanalytic terms) can not only explain the conviction of wholeness
within a religious context, but may also be further employed to describe "the
processes people use to organise and to interpret their sense of self", since they use
"the same semiotic processes to constitute experience in all situations" in doing so
(p. 265). In extending Ewings arguments I propose that culture, conceived and
experienced by the members of a specific group as a commonly shared space, is also
a semiotically-constructed psychological experience (of the individual member), and
that such semiotic devices and processes as described by Fernandez and Ewing can
be considered fundamental for the existence and maintena nce of this space and the
individuals sense of identification with and within this imagined whole.

Conclusion
The advantages of a semiotic model
A semiotic understanding of both self and identity offers a way of establishing
notions of self and identity outside temporality, so that the question of selfidentification can be conceived free from the que stion of stability over time. As
mentioned earlier, the semiotic model is also able to accommodate the self/others
categorisation discrepancy, i.e., the discrepancy between an individuals own belief
of what culture s/he belongs to and th e others perception of her/his social and
cultural patterns of behaviour and value system. A next advantage of this model of
interpretation would be that the fact of "multiple-belonging" or the individuals
compartmentalisation of his/her simul taneous identifications with groups which
may stand in differential positions to one another can be explained in a manner very
similar to what Ewing (1990) utilises to explain the phenomenon she calls "shifting
selves" (p. 268), to which I referred earlie r in discussing multiplicity and
fragmentation. In this fashion contradictions (collective or personal) can be
contained within the psychic structure, without necessarily causing the whole to
deconstruct itself in the atomistic search of the Whole (for a psychoanalytic
articulation of this concept see also Ewings [1990] suggestion of the term
"contextual unconscious"), thus making possible a sense of identity in the absence of
wholeness or temporal permanence. To use the well-known thread-and-beads
analogy then, this models notion of the differential cultural contextuality of the self

may be visualised as a series of threads stretching in various directions (instead of a

single thread suggested by Mead and utilised by Ewing or others), with be ads
which, rather than being structured statically in one specific order and around one
specific thread, are capable of changing threads in a fluid state as demanded by the
cognitive/psychological representations of the environment.

A concept-to-work-with
At this point I would like to propose the conditional use of such concepts as
collective identity and collective self-esteem as defined above, i.e., as semioticallyconceived phenomena which are psychologically experienc ed, and at times
cognitively perceived (hence the psychological self-concept as a quantifiable
construct). The state of conditionality arises on two grounds, philosophical, and
political. Philosophically, the legitimacy of using such construct s would be
contingent on the basic understanding of such constructs as mere violence, imposed
out of a perceived need for an epistemological model, and nothing more than that. In
this case, for example, it would be important to note that even though the s
uggestion of a collective identity which exists only as a semiotic construct
experienced by another illusory entity called the individual is by definition not
grounded in an essentialist interpretation, nonetheless all this does not deprive the
model of political implications, nor of an inherent quality of violence. It is for this
reason then that the awareness of such models being nothing more than just that
becomes important.
I would further like to address the political and practical need for a system of
representation based on a structured interpretation of the set of relationalities
constituting the world, the individual, and the society. Even though impo sition of
structurality is generally known by postmodernism ( take Lyotard or Rorty, for
example) as a betrayal of the tenets of the philosophies of difference, and even
though it may indeed be so at a philosophical level, I would like to argue again (see
above) that given the already imposed sense of structure to which we are born, I
cannot possibly imagine any political resistance without reification of certain
concepts such as collectivity and solidarity, nor can I imagine a study of increa
singly serious global developments without some conceptualization of identity at
both individual and collective levels. What may appear to be a sincere loyalty to the
cause of philosophy, may lead to a cruel deprivation of the marginalised (ironically
eno ugh, for whose sake most such theories claim to thrive) of the one and only
means of empowerment they can have in the face of an overwhelmingly progressed
system of impositions, i.e. a sense of collectivity and solidarity.
In short, I emphasise that it is important to remember that any model of
understanding is by definition already a systematised violence, and specifically, any
model which approaches the idea of structure away from a decenterisation and a
system of differences takes on the challenge and the risk of succumbing to the
"terroristic" demands of the status quo, as Rorty would suggest. I would like to also
emphasise, however, that the constructs I have suggested as objects-to-work-with are
understo od and located within a semiotic and illusory field of fragments in
motion, which is indeed always already decentered, given the non-essentialist
model of the individual and identity in which these notions are introduced; and that
it is also important in any effort in dealing with the marginalised to not render the
very subjects of that effort powerless, which I believe to be problematic with many
major philosophical and scientific claims that locate themselves within the domains

r ecognised as, or associated with deconstructionism, poststructuralism, and

postmodernism.

A final note on politics

In a final analysis, the postcolonial/postmodern tension deserves much more
detailed articulation than it has been given in this paper. The daily political
concerns of the millions of humans affli cted by the aftermath of the imperial greed
which fuelled colonialism and which has been reproduced and fortified through the
capitalist cultural logic is not likely to dissipate in a postmodern context. The truth is
that postmodernism is itself the cultu ral product of western capitalism, and is thus
bound to embellish the universe in which it has been conceived. The postmodern
culture may indeed be "on the way to spreading to all humanity" (Lyotard, 1991, p.
64), but this is as much good news as bad. It extends beyond this paper, or my
ability, to predict the hows and whys of this spread, but what is clear in advance is
the double-edged-ness of the postmodern condition. It is simply my wish to argue
from the position Jameson (1984) so well describes as t he perspective that affords
an understanding of "the cultural evolution of late capitalism dialectically, as
catastrophe and progress all together" (p. 86).
The ideas of decentered politics, societies without margins, and local narratives
replacing universal ones may all have a tempting utopian ring, but the less admitted
question is the significance of all these notions coming from&# 146; a western
capitalist reality. The postmodern condition is not a desirable place for the modern
or the premodern human, they will fail to find traces of their values and hopes, they
will fail to find depth and unearthable meaning. To repeat Jameson, i t is worth
remembering " the obvious, namely that this whole global, yet American,
postmodern culture is the internal and superstructural expression of a whole new
wave of American military and economic domination throughout the world: in this
sense, as t hroughout class history, the underside of culture is blood, torture, death
and horror" (1984, p. 57). And by extension of the same argument, my introduction
of the posthuman idea is already built upon such duality: the dreadful beauty of the
temptation th at bewitches our species to constantly move towards a selfannihilation which serves the continuation of life itself through our disintegrated
existence. Life which can live only through death. The posthuman is not a better
human, nor is it st ronger or more aesthetically pleasing. The posthuman begins at
the point where human values and beauties as we know them are no longer in effect,
no longer valued no longer beautiful. The posthuman lives where the human dies, it
is not a pleasant dream, n or a utopianistic mirage at the edge of the capitalist
wasteland: it is the capitalist wasteland all the way, catastrophe and progress,
catastrophe of progress.

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