Spartan Policy in The Archidamian War

Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War
Author(s): P. A. Brunt
Source: Phoenix, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Winter, 1965), pp. 255-280
Published by: Classical Association of Canada
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1085826
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SPARTAN POLICY AND STRATEGY

ARCHIDAMIAN WAR
IN THE
P. A. BRUNT
THE AVOWED AIM of the Spartans in 431 was to liberate the subjects
of Athens (2.8.4; cf. 1.139.2);1 but, accordingto Thucydides,theirtruest
motive formakingwar was the growthof Athenianpower and the fear
it inspiredwhich forcedthem to fight(1.23.6), and the Spartans voted
forwar in 432 "not so much persuaded by the speechesof theirallies as
because theywereafraidthat the Athenianswould acquire greaterpower,
fortheysaw that the largerpart of Greece was already subject to them"
(1.88). Thucydidesindeedheld that the Spartans werenormallyreluctant
to enteron wars, "unless they were forcedinto them," a conditionthat
in his view was now fulfilled;theyat last resolvedto check the Athenians
when "their power was patentlygrowingand when they were striking
at the Spartan confederacy"(1.118).
It is no part of my plan to re-examinefullythe true cause of the
Peloponnesianwar. I believe that Thucydides' explanationwill stand in
essence. The truthis, however,perhaps a little more complex than he
makes explicit.The allies of Sparta at whomAthenswas directlystriking
in 432 were Corinth and Megara. Thucydides makes the Corinthians
threaten to abandon the alliance with Sparta and turn elsewhere,if
Sparta refusedtheirsupport(1.71). This was surelyan emptythreatand
known to be such at Sparta. There was no reason to thinkthat Corinth
could obtain help against Athensfromany otherquarter,if Sparta failed
her. Argos, the only strongcity in Greece which was uncommitted,had
a secular feud with Sparta over Cynuria or Thyreatis; she never abandoned herclaim to thisborder-land,and would make no permanentpeace
with Sparta, only truces;' with Athens she had no quarrel, but an
ideological link by reason of her democraticinstitutions.'In any event
Argos was not strong enough to give Corinth effectiveaid.4 Corinth
1I have found no satisfactorydiscussion of the subject of this paper in any of the

standard historiesof Greece (that in E. Meyer, Gesch. d. Alt. 44 [Stuttgart1937-1939]
25 ff.is the best), nor in workson Thucydides, nor on thePeloponnesian war. I owe much
to suggestionsby Mr. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix.
All referencesto book and chapter where the author's name is not given are to
Thucydides; I cite Aristophanessimply by naming a play.
25.14.4; 41.2; cf. Hdt. 1.82; Paus. 2.20.1; 3.2.3; Polyb. 9.28.7. The disputed land was
ultimatelyawarded to Argos by Philip II.
35.44.1; cf. 29.1; Arist. Pol. 1302b 18; 1304a 25; Schol. Knights853.
'The Argive levy was said (but cf. 5.68.2) to number 7000 in 394 (Xen. Hell. 4.2.17).
In 418 the Spartans with some Arcadians apparently outnumbered the army provided
by Argos, Cleonae, Orneae, Mantinea, and Athens (which sent 1300 men), 5.67-68;
cf. 61.2.
255
PHOENIX,Vol. 19 (1965) 4.
256
PHOENIX
could not reasonablyhope forSyracusan intervention,and she could not

inducementto renewhostilitieswith
offerthe Persian king any sufficient
Athens. It was hardlyto be supposed that she would be so far ready to
spite herselfas well as Sparta as to go over to the Atheniancamp. Events
in 421-420 were to show that Corinth could raise up no powerfuland
durable anti-Atheniancoalitionof which Sparta was not a member,and
this could surely have been foreseen.The enmity the Corinthiansfelt
forAthens tied them to Sparta's coat-tails. None the less, the Spartans
could not affordto brush away Corinthiangrievances.To deny support
to Corinthcould only appear a symptomof weakness, and was certain
to damage Sparta's prestigeto an extent that mighthave incalculable
resultson the cohesionof the PeloponnesianLeague.
As events after425 were to show, Sparta's hegemonyelsewherein the
Peloponnese was not unshakeable. Argos was irremediablyhostile,and
the Achaeans, allied with Athensuntil 446, had not (with the exception
of Pellene) joined the PeloponnesianLeague in 431 (2.9.2), nor did they
do so until in 417 the Spartans "settled affairsin Achaea which were
previouslyunsatisfactory"(5.82.1).5 It also seems probable that until
then the Achaeans had enjoyed some formof democraticgovernment.
They were not alone in this. Despite Thucydides' statement(1.19; cf.
144.2) that the Spartans arranged for their allies to have oligarchical
systemsconvenientto themselves,it appears that even withinthe league
itselfdemocraciesexisted. This was true of Mantinea (5.29.1),6 in some
degree of Elis, and probably of Sicyon too (5.81.2).1 At Megara it was
only in 424 that an oligarchywas set up (4.66.1; 74.3-4). Democrats in
all cities looked to Athens forsupport (3.82.1); the oligarchicrevolution
at Megara was accompanied by a massacre of Athenian partisans. To
judge fromevents in the fourthcenturytoo, elementscould everywhere
be foundhostileto Sparta and to the oligarchicprinciplesshe favoured.
Moreover,some of her allies at least entertainedambitionsto establish
littleempiresof theirown, and Sparta stood in theirpath. Elis had succeeded in reducing to subjection certain small neighbouringpeoples,
probably at a time in the fifthcentury when Sparta was preoccupied
in fightingArgos or the Arcadians or repressingthe great Helot revolt.8
CertainlySparta was to protectLepreum against her in 421 (5.31), and,
partly as a reprisalforher hostilityor neutralityduringthe remainder
1J.A. O. Larsen, Stud. presentedto D. M. Robinson (St. Louis, Miss. 1953) 2. 804 ff.,
shows that afterwardsthe Achaeans were fairlyreliable allies.
6To judge from Arist. Pol. 1318b 6-27 the real power at Mantinea remained with
the upper class.
7For Elis see Xen. Hell. 3.2.27 ff.(400 B.c.) and Hill's Sourcesfor GreekHistory', ed.
A. Andrewes and R. Meiggs (Oxford 1951) Index IV, 2.2-4.
8Hdt. 4.148.4 Cf. Hill's Sources (see n.6) Index IV passim for Sparta's difficultiesca.
478-460.
THE ARCHIDAMIANWAR
257
of the Peloponnesian war, to liberate her subjects by forcein 400.9 In

the 470's or 460's Sparta had had to fightthe Arcadians, and therewas
soon to be more trouble in Arcadia;10afteran indecisivebattle in 423
betweenthe Mantineans and Tegeans and theirrespectiveallies (4.134)
we find that by 421 Mantinea had subjugated the Parrasians, taking
advantage of Sparta's preoccupationwith the Athenianwar; as soon as
that was over, Sparta intervenedand freedthe Parrasians again (5.29.1;
33). It was of course the interventionsby Sparta on behalfof Lepreum
and the Parrasians that threwElis and Mantinea in 420 into the arms
of Argos and Athens."1But the ambitionsof these cities were hardlyof
recent growth.It is natural to suppose that they subsisted in 431 but
were held in check by Sparta's power. If, as happened afterthe capture
of Pylos, Sphacteria, and Cythera, and the compromisepeace of 421,
Spartan prestigewas diminished,and her allies had any reason to think
that herpowerhad declined,the loyaltyof all could no longerbe counted
on. Except forthe Isthmus states, the Peloponnesianallies probablyhad
no quarrelof theirown withAthens.Thucydides makes the Corinthians
recognizeby implicationthat those livingin the interiorof the Peloponnese had not yet experiencedany harm fromAthenian"aggressiveness"
(1.120.2). It was the hegemonyof Sparta that had oftenbeen irksometo
them. It was importantthereforeforSparta not to give them cause to
thinkthat she lacked the means or resolutionto resistAthensin the cause
of her "injured allies." If Sparta betrayedweakness,her controlof the
Peloponnese mightcrumble.
Fear of Athenswas not a noveltyforthe Spartan in 432. Thucydides
rather exaggerates their previous quietism. In 477/6 they had still
thoughtAthens well-disposedand for this and other reasons had been
preparedto leave her in chargeof naval operationsagainst Persia."2But
9Xen. Hell. 3.2.30-31. For Elis' later attempts to recover control and also to subdue
Lepreum,ib. 6.5.2; 7.1.26;33; 38; 4.12 and 14.

'oSee n.8.
"Though Mantinea was forcedback into the Spartan alliance after418, Sparta could
not trust her and in 385 seized the opportunityto break up the Mantinean synoecism,
Xen. Hell. 5.2.
121.95.7. But cf. 1.90 ff.for their attempt to prevent the refortification
of Athensat the instigationof the majorityof their allies, who feared the size of Athens' fleetand
the audacity she had shown in the war. This majority doubtless included Corinth
which had been markedly friendlyto Athens so long as Aegina was the chief naval
indeed
power in the Saronic Gulf (cf. Hdt. 5.75 and 92; 6.89; 108.5); the
uro6p6v tapLoos
dates from Athens' interventionon behalf of her old rival, Megara
(Thuc. 1.103) and
was renewed in 433 when Athens saved Corcyra fromher vengeance. Trade is not in
my view the source of the enmity; if pottery finds are any guide, Athenian products
had ousted Corinthian in western markets at the time when the two states were on
excellent terms (cf. T. J. Dunbabin, The WesternGreeks [Oxford 1948] chap. 8; his
hypothesisthat Corinth forsome time retained the carryingtrade is mere conjecture);
258
PHOENIX
if therebe any truthin Diodorus' storythat in 475/4 they were barely

dissuaded by Hetoimaridas frommakingwar on Athens,l3theysoon had
misgivings.In the same decade they at least allowed Pausanias on his
second and "private" enterpriseto do what he could to embarrass the
Athenians.14A few years later they secretlypromisedhelp to revolted
Thasos (1.101.2). Their own wars in the Peloponnese had perhaps done
most to inhibitany action against Athensup to this time,and the grave
crisis of the helot insurrectionactually made them invoke the still
nominallysubsistingalliance and seek Athenian aid. But with one of
those sudden turns so characteristicof Spartan policy they rapidly
dismissed the Athenian contingent,and left Athens in little doubt of
their latent hostility (1.102). The fact that from460 to 446 Athens
controlledthe Megarid sufficesto explain whyin the warfarethat ensued
the Spartans struckno effectiveblows at Athens; they could not safely
cross Geraneia (1.107.2). They must have transportedtheir army by
surpriseacrossthe CorinthianGulfintoCrisa in 457, and once an Athenian
fleetappeared there,theycould not returnthe same way; probablythey
were able to pass throughthe Megarid on this occasion because of the
temporarywithdrawalof Atheniantroops.15Megara's revoltin 446 gave
them an opportunitytheywere quick to seize, and the peace termsthey
then imposed on Athens clearlydid not satisfyall opinion at Sparta. It
mustsurelyhave been theywho demandedwar at the timeof the Samian
revolt, only to be held back by Corinth.16Their attempted mediation
between Corinth and Corcyra in 435 (1.28.1) probably indicates that
they foresawthe danger of Corinth driving Corcyra into the arms of
Athens,and it was beforethe Corinthianshad passionatelyappealed for
theirhelp and castigatedtheirslownessin takingaction that the Spartan
authoritiesearly in 432 had promisedPotidaean representativesthat an
Athenianattack on theircity would be avenged by an invasionofAttica
(1.58.1). The Spartans were not as backward at counteringAthenian
expansion as Thucydides' commentsmake out.
To destroythe Athenian empire, the Spartans needed total victory.
To eliminatethe threatto theirown hegemonyin the Peloponnese,they
and if Corinthianpolicywas in fact influencedby commercialconsiderations,
they
shouldhave made forpeace (as in 440; cf. 1.40.5),sincein war Corinthiantradewas
boundto suffer
fromAtheniannaval power.
'3Diod. 11.50. The absolutedate may be right,the relativedate (afterPausanias'
death) wrong.
'4A regent,providedwitha skytale(1.131),cannothave leftforforeign
partswithout
publicauthority.I suspectthat Sparta wouldnot have disownedhimif he had been
successful.
on Thucydides
1'1.107-108.2with A. W. Gomme'snotes, HistoricalCommentary
1(Oxford1945).
oftheCamb.Philol.Soc. (1952-1953)43 f.
16A.H. M. Jones,Proceedings
THE ARCHIDAMIANWAR
259
had at least to reduce Athenianpower and demonstratetheirability to

remedy the grievances of the allies who had appealed to them. Their
avowed and secret aims alike demanded an effectivestrategyof attack.
By contrast,Athens' policy was in the firstplace simply to concede
nothingand to retainher existingpossessions.Periclesadvised his people
to take no risksand seek no aggrandisementof the empirewhilethe war
lasted (1.144.1; 2.13.2; 65.7). In this way, he said, they would "win
or reptevat).17The phrase is ambiguous. Prima
through"(OreptLylveoOat
was
with a stalemate. But a stalemate might
Athens
to
be
content
facie
be morethan a merelydefensivesuccess. If Sparta failedin herpublished
aims and real desires,the reactionsmightbe momentous.The shock to
her reputation might dissolve her confederacy.Athens mightrecover
controlof the Isthmus,and even displace Sparta in the hegemonyof the
Peloponnese. But Athenianpolicy and strategy,which have been much
discussed,are not the subject of this paper. Less thoughthas been given
to Sparta's conductof the war, and this is now to be examined.
The Spartans were bound to take the offensive,but they could not
do so by sea. Here Athens was too strong.She had 300 triremesin her
dockyards(2.13.8) and in 430 employed150 triremes(including50 allied
ships) round the Peloponnese (2.56.2).18 In 433 the Corinthians and
allies had put to sea with 150 ships (1.46), but in the Archidamianwar
the largestPeloponnesiansquadron numbered100 (2.66). Various reasons
forthe failureof the Peloponnesians to use more of theirships may be
suggested.The triremesavailable were divided by the Isthmus(2.92-93),
thoughthey could be dragged across.'9In 433 the Corinthiansand their
allies had been able to recruitrowersin cities of the Athenian empire
(1.35.3), as Athenswas thenneutral;but once war had brokenout, these
seamen were not likelyto riskexile fromtheirown homes to serve in a
fleetwith small prospectsof victory(1.143.2), while the peasants of the
Peloponnese were unskillednautically,and could not affordto be absent
forlong fromthe fields(1.141.4). Moreover therewas insufficient
money
to pay oarsmenforlongperiods,whethertheycame fromthe Peloponnese
or abroad. This alone was bound to prevent the trainingof unskilled
men, which the Corinthiansare said to have proposed (1.121.4), and
which on other grounds Pericles is representedas declaring to be impracticable (1.142.6 ff.).Lack of trainingmade the Peloponnesian ships
in
171.144.1;2.13.9; 65.7. A merelynegative sense ("not be defeated") fits rEptLETVa
in 1.55.2; 2.49.7;
3.4.7; 79.7; 3.24.3; 82.8 (second occurrence) and 7rEpLyLyvEoOat
3.98.3; 4.27.1; 5.96; 6.102.2; but 7rptEi^Vatclearly means "win" in 6.80.2 and 4 (absolutely) and 8.89.1 (with gen.), and ireptylyvEoOatin 8.73.6 (absolutely); 3.82.8 (first
occurrence); 8.53.1; 76.6 (with gen.). Mr. de Ste. Croix has pointed this out to me.
make no use of 3.17, which I incline to think spurious rather than misplaced
181sI
(contraGomme,ad loc).
193.15with Gomme's note.
260
PHOENIX
inferiorto the Athenian qualitatively as well as numerically.While the

Athenians had perfectednaval manoeuvres in the course of prolonged
operations against the Persians, the Peloponnesians, for instance at
Sybota, still practisedthe outwornmode of fightingat sea (1.49), which
had won the battle of Salamis in narrowwaters,20 and was indeed (with
certain improvements)to give the victoryto the Syracusans in similar
conditionsin the Great Harbour (7.36; cf. 52.2), but which was wholly
inadequate on the open sea.21 Thus Phormioat Naupactus and Nicostratus at Corcyra could defeat or match Peloponnesian squadrons against
heavy odds, and the qualitative superiorityof the Athenians made it
unnecessaryforthem to use theirfullstrength,which they mighthave
found it hard to do; crews mightnot readily have been found,and the
cost would have been unduly burdensome.Moreover confidencein their
trainingand tactics gave the Atheniansthe moral advantage. Phormio
used to tell his seamen that they could fightagainst any odds (2.88.2),
and in 413 the Corinthiansthoughtit was victoryforthem not to be
severelydefeatedat sea by an Atheniansquadron (7.28.7). It is a commoninspires courage and the lack of it
place in Thucydides that
lu7repLa
as
and
other
timidity;22
hoplites hardly dared face the well-drilled
just
42 ships fledat the sightof a couple of
on
so
Alcidas
with
land,
Spartans
Atheniantriremes,in fearof meetingan Atheniansquadron (3.33.1), and
again with53 shipsdid notdare to renewthe fightagainstthe Corcyraeans
because of the presenceof Nicostratuswith 12 Athenianships (3.75 ff.).
In these circumstancesthe Spartans were impotentto supportthe malcontentsin the Athenianmaritimeempire.
To provide money for fittingout and manning a larger fleet the
Corinthiansdeclared that the Peloponnesian allies would gladly contribute (1.121.5), but Pericles was right in supposing that peasant
communitiescould not financea long and costly war fromtaxes, and
reservesthey had none (1.141). The Corinthiansalso allegedlyproposed
in 432 a loan fromthe treasuresof Delphi and Olympia (1.121.3). Neither
the Delphians, whose priestsmade Apollo promiseassistance,naturally
only spiritualassistance, to the Spartan cause (1.118.3), nor the Eleans
who controlledOlympia and who wereat best onlylukewarmallies,would
readily have sanctioned action amounting to sequestration.23The
20Hdt. 8.60 ao; cf. 10.1. I do not accept the later testimonyof Plut. Them. 14; cf.
Cimon12.
21Cf.2.83.
22For
onthistheme
variations
cf.1.121.4;142.8;2.84.3;85.2;87.2-5;88.2-3(cf.91.4);
5.69.2(butcf.75.2).See alsoAristE.N. 1116b2 ff.
oftheArcadian
treasure
wasdefeated
leaguein363toseizetheOlympian
23Adecision
on the ground that it was not right (Xen. Hell. 7.4.34)
ELS r6v &el Xp6vov
KTcrXLtarELV
Trot
sratoLvpYKX7yaCL
ro^ro rpbsrobsOeobs.ThoughthePhocianswerealliedwith
Aeschines
to defend
theirseizureoftheDelphian
(2.114ff.)didnotventure
Athens,
treasures.
THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR
261
Athenianscould borrowfromtheirpatron goddess and fromtheirother

gods monies with which they themselveshad endowed theirown civic
shrines,and all the more readily as they had a reasonable prospect of
repaying; forthe Spartans it would have been sacrilegeto seize on the
fundsof Panhellenicsanctuaries;they would have forfeitedthe goodwill
they counted on and probably have violated theirown consciences.24
If
the Corinthians in fact made the suggestionThucydides imputes to
them, we might conjecture that it was because with their maritime
relations they were more exposed to the influenceof the sophistic
than the majorityof the Peloponnesians. At any rate, the
Aufkliidrung
was
not adopted even in 412 when the Peloponnesians set to
proposal
workbuildingships on a large scale; and nothingmoreis heard of it.
The Spartans themselves sent to their friendsin Italy and Sicily,
"ordering" them to provide 500 ships; or so the MSS of Thucydides
(2.7) assert; a corruptionin this figuremay be suspected.25There is
some reason to think that Athens was apprehensiveof interventionby
the westernGreeks.26The alliance with Rhegium and Leontini,renewed
in 433/2,and with Egesta, and the foundationof Thurii,mightbe taken
as evidence that Athens in Pericles' time was concernednot so much to
establish bases forextendingher influenceor dominionin the west, as
to preventSyracusefromacquiringa hegemonythereand thendeploying
the resourcesof the weston Corinth'sbehalfin old Greece.The argument
of the Corcyraeansthat the friendshipof Corcyra would enable Athens
eitherto despatch a fleetto the west or to hindera westernfleetfrom
crossingthe Adriatic,whichaccordingto Thucydidescarriedsome weight
with the Athenian assembly," fits either an offensiveor a defensive
of Athenianpolicy. In 415 the Egestans triedto alarm the
interpretation
Athenianswith the danger that Syracuse,once supremein Sicily, would
join Sparta in attackingthem,and Nicias counteredtheirargumentby
contendingthat two imperialistpowers would find a common interest
in non-aggression,and that the Adriaticwas a natural frontierbetween
theirspheresof influence(6.11.2,3; 13.1). Of courselong before415 there
were people at Athens who hankeredafterexpansion in the west,28and
if (as is probable) this was known in Sicily, that in itselfprovided a
motiveforthe Syracusansto embarkon a preventivewar. But thewestern
Greeks had never intervenedin the home country,not even in 480; the
Syracusan fleet,except in the special conditionsthat obtained in 413,
24Forconscientiousremorseat Sparta cf. 7.18.2.
26See Gomme, ad loc.
2"Hill's Sources (see n.5) assembles evidence on Athens' relations with the west before
431.
271.36.2;44.3 with Gomme's notes.
28Plut.Per. 20.4-21.1; Alc. 17.1; Thuc. 3.86.4 (but cf. 115.4); 4.65; Knights1303 ff.
See H. D. Westlake,Historia9 (1960) 385 ff.
262
PHOENIX
was quite unequal to the Athenian;29even in 412 the Sicilians sent only
20 ships to assist Sparta (8.26.1), despite the injury they had received
fromAthens,and in the Archidamianwar Syracusewas preoccupiedwith
herown quarrelsand ambitionsat home.There was therefore
no prospect
that the "orders" that Sparta sent would be obeyed, or that the ships of
the westerncolonies would or could redressthe balance of naval power
in Greek waters.
Archidamusadvised that Sparta should apply to the Persian king for
ships or money (1.82.1). By the spring of 431 the Spartans (like the
Athenians)werereadyto act on thisadvice (2.7). In 430 theirambassadors
on the way to Persia were captured and put to death on theirway to the
satrap of Dascylium, Pharnaces, who had undertaken,doubtless as the
resultof earliernegotiations,to send them up to Susa (2.67). But later
embassies got through,and achieved nothing. In 424 the Athenians
arresteda Persian envoy, Artaphernes,on his way to Sparta, bearing a
message in which the king complained that he did not understandwhat
the Spartans wanted; they had sent many embassies to him, but none
of them said the same thing; if they were prepared to make a plain
statement, they should send representativesback with Artaphernes
(4.50).
It is not hard to surmisewhy these negotiationsfailed.The king had

both ships and money,and a motiveforenteringthe war againstAthens,
the recoveryof the Greek cities Athens had freed fromhis rule. But
Athens had proved that she was a dangerousenemy,and he could not
be expected to embarkon war with her,unless Sparta was ready to pay
the price and recognizehis sovereigntyover these cities. And this was a
price that Sparta, the self-styledliberator of Hellas from Athenian
"tyranny," was reluctant to pay. Was it worth bargaining away the
libertiesof Greeks,and losing much goodwill in the process,unless she
could at least be certainof effectivePersian support?Was it not natural
forthe Spartans to take refugein ambiguous formulas,at least until the
king was fullycommittedto the war? And was it not equally natural for
the kingto demand a plain recognitionof his rightsbeforehe did commit
himself?Inevitably the negotiations founderedon reciprocal distrust,
and king Darius renewedthe "peace of Callias" withAthens.30
The story of collaborationbetween Sparta and Persia after412 confirmsthese surmises.In 412 Athenian aggressionhad already provoked
the king into hostility,3"and as the greater part of the Athenian fleet
29The Syracusans manned only 80 ships in the firstsea battle in the Great Harbour,
7.22.
30See H. T. Wade-Gery, Essays in GreekHistory(Oxford 1958) 207 ff.I do not accept
the views of D. L. Stockton, Historia 8 (1959) 61 ff.
318.5.5; 19.2; 28.2; 54.3. cf. A. Andrewes,Historia 10 (1961) 1 ff.
THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR
263
had been lost at Syracuse,he had less reasonto feara second Eurymedon.
It was thereforenow the Persians who offeredhelp to Sparta, and the
Spartans, with the scent of victoryin their nostrils,were rather more
disposed to sacrificemoral advantages forassured material gains. Even
so, the Spartans insisted on limitingPersian claims. The terms of a
compact which seemed to acknowledgePersian sovereigntyover all the
land and cities his ancestors had held32were rejected by the Spartan
commissioner,Lichas, on the ground that no subsidies would justify
Sparta in recognizingthe "enslavement" of all Greeks as far as and
including Boeotia (8.43). A new pact had to be made in 411, which
merelyincluded the tautologousstatementthat "all the king's territory
in Asia is the king's" (8.58), and if this was understoodas surrendering
the Greek cities in Asia, Lichas glossed it by tellingthe Milesians that
they must be "slaves and renderreasonable services" to the Persians"until they brought the war to a successfulissue" (8.84). Five years
later the Spartan admiral, Callicratidas, was saying that if he returned
safelyhome, he would use his influenceto reconcileSparta with Athens
rather than see the Spartans fawningon Persia for money (Xen. Hell.
1.6.6 ff.). His indignationhad been stirredindeed by the difficulty
of
from
subsidies
the
Persians.
This
was
getting adequate
difficulty
persistent. Not only did the Persians never provide any naval assistance;
at most times they kept the Peloponnesianfleetso shortof money as to
impairits efficiency.
Tissaphernesdeliberatelyadopted the policy (which
it perhaps did not need Alcibiades' perspicuityto suggest) of lettingthe
two Greek rivals wear each other out; and if the Spartans were careful
to withholdany unambiguous rcognitionof Persia's territorialclaims,
the Persians did not commit themselveseven to subsidies on the scale
required forvictory.Mutual distrustprevailed until Lysander was able
to reach an understandingwith Cyrus.This understandingwas probably
not based simply on a reciprocityof personal admiration. Cyrus could
perhapsforeseethat he mightstand in need of Spartan aid to secure for
himselfthe Persian crown, and Lysander was bent on establishingan
empireforSparta, and almost forhimself,on the ruinsofAthenianpower;
the old ideal ofliberatingthe Greekswas franklyabandoned,and Spartan
imperialismdemanded Persian support. At no previous time in the
Peloponnesian war were there conditions in existence for harmonious
collaborationbetweenSparta and Persia.33Certainly,in the Archidamian
war therewas no prospectof an entente.
328.37; cf.theearlierpact,8.18.
23In 2.65.12 Thucydidescalls attentionto Persianintervention
onlyin the timeof
theimportance
of earlierPersiansubsidies
Cyrus'command;thissomewhatunderrates
in at least keepinga Peloponnesianfleetin being,whichcould and did stimulateand
supportrevoltsfromAthens.
264
PHOENIX
In these circumstances,the Spartans could not attack Athens by sea,

but only by land, wheretheirsuperioritywas unchallengedand immense.
Just forthis reason they could not expect that theywould be given the
chance to strikea knock-outblow.
They had to adopt a strategyof attrition.Thucydides says expressly
that they thoughtthat withina fewyears they would destroythe power
of Athens if they devastated Attica (5.14.3), and that in 431 no one in
Greece (obviously outside Athens) supposed that the Athenians would
hold out formore than three years of Peloponnesian invasions (7.28.3).
Any warningsuttered by Archidamus were thus evidentlydisregarded.
This is not surprising.Even at Athens not every one shared Pericles'
confidence(cf. 6.11.5). Of course it was known at Sparta that with the
Long Walls completeAthenscould not be invested,and that in the then
state of siegecrafther fortifications
could not be taken by assault; nor
is there any reason to think that any one hoped at this time that a
surpriseassisted by treacherywithincould bring the war to a sudden
conclusion. It mightthen have seemed reasonable to predict that with
her command of the sea and of resources to import necessities from
abroad Athenscould affordto writeoffthe losses that invasionsof Attica
would inflict.This was indeed what happened. But we must beware
of hindsight.
In makingplans fora new war the Spartans would naturallyhave been
guided by past experience.They could recall that in 479 the Athenians
had pressedthemto drivethe Persiansout of Greece and restoreto them
the use of the soil of Attica (Hdt. 9.7-9), and that in 457 the Athenians
had come out to fightat Tanagra. But unless the Spartans had heard
the storyof theprolongedresistanceof Miletus to Alyattes(Hdt. 1.17 ff.),
theycould have knownof no instancein whicha Greek cityhad held out
forany lengthof time in relianceon seaborne imports,and imagination
probably did not supply the lack of experience.Moreover, they could
argue that the invasion of Attica in 446, half-heartedas it seemed to
some, had even after the completionof the Long Walls coerced the
Athenians into importantconcessions,and that more systematic and
persistentdevastationsmightresultin Athens' surrender.
The circumstancesin 446 were indeed complex and mysteriouseven
to contemporaries.Euboea had revolted,and Pericles had crossed with
a sizeable force into the island when the Megarians too rose against
Athens and massacred the Athenian garrison,except for those who
escaped to Nisaea; thatport,likePegae, remainedforthetimein Athenian
hands (1.114.1 and Gomme,ad loc.). It was at this juncture that the
Spartans,withthe road intoAttica open once moreas a resultofMegara's
defection,organizedan invasion.Pericleshad hurriedback fromEuboea.
than theThriasianplain (1.114.2;
King Plistoanax in factcame no further
THE ARCHIDAMIANWAR
265
cf. 2.21) and then withdrew; it was said that he and his adviser,
Cleandridas, were bribed (5.17.3). Pericles was left free to reduce the
Euboeans to subjection. None the less, soon afterwards,the Athenians
agreed to termsof peace under which they surrenderedNisaea, Pegae,
Troezen, and Achaea (1.115.1), besides of course making no effortto
recoverMegara itself.It seems not unlikelythat these termshad been
negotiated with the king and Cleandridas at the time of the invasion.
In that event their condemnationand flightshould be dated after the
conclusionof the peace; until then,theirinfluenceremainedstrong,but
a reactionfollowed,in which it was held that but forbribes they might
have exacted more rigorousconditions.34However that may be, it was
a reasonable interpretationof the events of 446 that Athens had been
broughtto heel by the strategyof invasion. It was true of course that
the revoltofEuboea on thatoccasionmade it impossiblefortheAthenians
to do what they did in 431, remove theirlivestockto the island (2.14);
Thucydides stressesthat duringthe later Peloponnesianwar the Athenians derived more benefit from Euboea than from Attica (8.96.2).35
However, even if the Spartans took this factorinto account, they could
reflectthat Athens had still been ready to make large concessionsafter
recoveringEuboea. It was then quite reasonable forthem to thinkthat
Archidamus'warningswere refutedby the success of 446. We ourselves
may wonderwhyit was that Periclescould adopt in 431 a strategywhich
he did not apparentlyventureto recommendon the earlieroccasion. It
may be that he had no belief in the practicabilityof Athens retaining
mainland dependenciesand did not regard the losses involved in continuingthe war as warrantedin 446,36 whereasin 432/1 Athens' maritime
empire was at stake, and compromiseimpossible. But perhaps in 446
he had not the authorityto induce the people to accept the abandonment
of their lands, or not enough time to persuade them-the revolt of
Megara and the ensuingPeloponnesianinvasionwas a surprise-whereas
in 432/1 he had the winterto work on the minds of his fellow-citizens.
Even so he could not trustthe assemblynot to reversehis strategyunder
the immediateimpact of the firstdevastations.37
Between 431 and 425 therewere only fourseriousinvasionsof Attica;
it was thesamepartyat Spartawhichadvocatedintervention
in favour
"4Presumably
of Samos (n.16) and promisedhelpto Potidaea.See Appendix.
ofEuboea, 2.26; 32; 3.93.1; 7.28.1; 8.1.3; Wasps715 ff.
35Forimportance
at Athensremembered
and resentedthelosses;cf.4.21.3.
36Others
172.21-22.
I supposethatthegeneralsmusthave had therightto declarethatpublic
safetypreventedthe assemblyfrommeeting(e.g., if the wallswereunderattack) and
that Pericles'auctoritas
was such thathe could use thisright(in concertwithhis colleagues) even thoughthe properconditionsforits use hardlyobtained.There is no
reasonto credithim withextraordinary
potestas;cf.K. J. Dover,7HS 80 (1960) 61 ff.,
fromwhoseviewson p. 75, relatingto thispassage,I slightlydiverge.
266
PHOENIX
in 429 the Spartans did not enter Attica at all, perhaps fromfear of
infectionby the plague (cf. 2.57); in 426 theyturnedback beforereaching
the countryout of superstitiousfearsof earthquakes (3.89); and in 425
news of the occupation of Pylos sent them home again afteronly a few
days (4.6). The longestinvasion,in 430, lasted only 40 days, the fourth
in 427 perhapsonly a littleless (2.57; 3.26), the shortest,in 425, 15 days
(4.6). The invaderscould not stay long; comingwhen the grain was still
ripening(2.19.1; 3.1) and when it was still green (4.6), they could not
live to any greatextentoffthe country,but broughttheirown provisions
(2.10.1), and had to leave when these ran out (2.23.3; 3.1; 26.4); in any
case, two thirdsof the Peloponnesian workingfarmers(2.10.2; 47.2; cf.
1.141.3) could hardlybe spared fromtheirown harvests; forthis reason
the allies in 428 wereslow to musterfora second invasionin the summer
(3.15); they were harvesting,and also weary of going on expeditions.
The effectiveness
of the devastationscan hardly be determinedexactly.
that
in 430 (as distinctfrom431) theyravaged the whole
Thucydidessays
in 427 theydevastated what theyhad cut down
and
that
country(2.57)38
before,if anythinghad grownagain, and what they had passed over on
previousincursions(3.26). This gives the impressionthat seriousdamage
was done. But Athenian forts39and cavalry40must have limited their
operations, cutting corn was a slow process, and it is open to doubt
whetherthey did much at this time in destroyingfruit-trees;
even after
the occupationof Decelea thesewerenot systematicallydestroyed.There
was some loss of slaves and animals.41But Thucydides later remarks
(7.27.4) that these short incursionsdid not preventthe Athenians from
enjoying the land at other times, and the anonymous Oxyrhynchus
historian"4that until the occupation of Decelea Attica sustained little
harm.
It is plausible to hold that this historian,like Thucydides,underrated
the effectof the earlier devastations in the light of the more serious
damage done after413. CertainlyThucydides' own language in describing
the invasions of 430 and 427 leaves a different
impression;probably he
3sBut it is said that they scrupled to harm Decelea (Hdt. 9.73, cf. E. T. Salmon,
CR 60 [1946] 13 f.) and the Tetrapolis (Istros, Jacoby, FGrH 334 F 30; Diod. 12.45.1).
3SCf.L. Chandler 7HS 46 (1926) 1 ff.
402.22.2; 7.27.5; Diod. 13.72.7.
41W. G. Hardy, CP 21 (1926) 346 ff.,makes a careful assessment of damage done,
citing allusions from Aristophanes. For sparing of sacred olives, Androtion (Jacoby,
FGrH 324 F 39); Philochorus (Jacoby, FGrH 328 F 125); Istros loc. cit. (see n.38);
perhaps Sophocles (O.C. 698 ff.)only had the sacred olives in mind; Lysias 7.6 ff.need not
be veracious on their destruction.Polyaenus 2.1.21 refersto the reluctance of Spartan
allies to cut down fruit-treesin Boeotia under Agesilaus; but there is no comparable
testimonyfor the Peloponnesian war.
42Hell.Oxy. 12.5 (Oxf. text) = 16.5 (Bartoletti).
THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR
267
was writingclose to the events and did not revisethe relevantsentences

in his earliernarrative.Individual Atheniansmust have sufferedheavy
losses, and many of the refugeespenned withinthe walls were subject
to serious hardships so long as the invaders remained in the country
(cf. 2.16-17). (The plague, of course, was a calamity forAthens not to
be foreseen,which the overcrowdingwithinthe walls may have aggravated.) In the firstinvasion Pericles foundit hard to preventthe Athenians fromgoingout to fightagainst overwhelmingodds with resultsthat
must have been disastrous (cf. n.37). Moreover, apart fromeffectson
individuals,the city's economywas bound to suffer.Athenscould import
what she needed fromoverseas, but her import-billwas increased and
No doubt
exportsof oil or wine must have been somewhatdiminished.43
the extracosts of importscould be met indirectlyfromimperialrevenues,
the sourceof paymentsforpublic services;the citizensdrewmoneyfrom
the state, much of which then went throughimportingmerchantsto
foreignproducers.But, as the war proceeded,imperialrevenues ceased
to suffice.A heavy eisphorawas imposed, forthe firstbut not the last
time in the war, in 428;44 and the burden of liturgieswas not light for
the rich,of whom the majoritymust normallyhave depended chieflyon
the incomeof landed estates.45
However,it is clear that the strategyof devastationbecame immensely
more damaging to Athens once the Spartans established a permanent
fortin Attica in 413. It was only then that the Atheniansweredeprived,
according to Thucydides (7.27-28), of the use of all their land, that
desertionsof over 20,000 slaves occurred,that all the cattle and draft
animals were lost, the horsesmaimed and wounded as the cavalry tried
to protect the land, the best route fromEuboea (across fromOropus
throughDecelea46) cut, and the citizenssubjected to a fearfulstrainin
guardingthe walls against sudden assault; in addition,if the predictions
ascribed to Alcibiades were fulfilled,
the workingof the silvermines was
interferedwith (6.91.7), thoughnot broughtto an end.47
43Wasps 252 actually attests a scarcity of oil at Athens.
443.19.1with Gomme, ad loc.
4'I accept the view that trade and manufacturewere mainly in the hands of metics.
60On this see H. D. Westlake, CR 62 (1948) 2 ff.
47Athenssufferedfromthe depredations of Boeotian marauders (n.42) and of larger
forcesfromthe Peloponnese at times (e.g., 8.71.1) as well as of the garrisonat Decelea.
Xen. Vect.4.25 also attests the loss of slaves at Laureum but S. Lauffer,Die Bergwerksklavenvon Laureion (Mainz 1955-1956) 214 ff.,shows that workingof the mines was
not wholly discontinued; they were protected by fortsat Sunium (8.4), Thoricus (Xen.
Hell. 1.2.1), and perhaps Anaphlystus (Xen. Vect. 4.43); the countrysideseems to have
been inhabited as far as Acharnae and Anagyrus (Lysistr. 55 ff.), and until its siege
communications were maintained with Oenoe (8.98.2). Lysias (7.6) says that only
r& 7r6ppco were devastated by the enemy, and raids up to the walls of Athens(8.71;
Xen. Hell. 1.1.32; Diod. 13.72) were rare.
268
PHOENIX
We must then ask why it was that the Spartans did not build such a
fortat the first.To thisit is only a partial answerthat even the fortification of Decelea proved indecisive,and that Athens carried on fornine
more years. It is plain that the losses inflictedby the Peloponnesian
garrison there contributedto the financialweakness and the growing
war-wearinessat Athens in the last stage of the war, and thereforeto
the growthof internalstasis, in whichThucydides himselfsaw the chief
reason forAthens' ultimate defeat (2.65). In any event, if the Spartans
believed that devastation of Attica would win the war, we mighthave
expected themto tryto make the devastation as completeas possible.
If certainspeechesin Thucydides' firstbook were not retouchedin the
light of later experiences,the possibilityof such a fortin Attica was
canvassed on both sides in 432 (1.122; 142), and Alcibiades is made to
say in 415 that it had long been most dreaded in Athens (6.91.6). The
authenticityof the speeches,that is to say the reliabilityof Thucydides'
versionsof themas indicationsof what was actually said, must probably
always be in dispute; and I only recorda subjective opinion that those
here in question may well correspond quite faithfullyto the historic
record and that if he made additions in the light of subsequent experience,he was false to his carefullystated promiseto inventonlywhat
a Irapbvrwv. However this may be,
speakers mighthave said ireplirovaL
it is in the narrative, where we have no right to be sceptical, that
Thucydides says that in the late winterof 422/1 the Spartans began
preparationsto build such a fort,ifonly to put pressureon the Athenians
to accept peace terms(5.17.2). The idea had thereforeoccurredto them
beforeit was advocated by Alcibiades. Why did theywait so long before
carryingit out?
An answercan only be conjectural.48
Hammond has said "that if such
a post was to be maintainedthroughoutthe year and ifregularoperations
were to be conducted in Attica, the Peloponnesians and Boeotians had
to have a large marginof militarysuperiorityover the Athenian fieldarmy.Such a marginfirstcame intoexistencein 422, and it recurredwhen
Athenswas deeply engaged in Sicily."49This explanationdoes not strike
me as fullysatisfactory.The Peloponnesian and Boeotian armies at the
strengthin which they invaded Attica in the Archidamian war were
immeasurablysuperiorto the Athenian;50and even though the margin
was increased by the plague and to a much less extent in 413 by the
48F. E. Adcock (CR 61 [1947] 2 ff.) stresses the time and difficultyof the work of
fortification,and the militarypreponderance necessary for its defence against circumvallation, and suggests that the Spartans had good reasons for deferringthe venture
till 425, afterwhich their fears for the safety of theirprisonersdeterredthem.
49N. G. L. Hammond, Hist. ofGreece(Oxford 1959) 396.
5oPlut. Per. 33 (on uncertain authority) gives 60,000 men.
THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR
269
absence of Athenian hoplites in Sicily, and thereafterby the losses at

Syracuse,I doubt if this factoris in itselfenough to account forthe fact
that what was practicablethenwas neverattemptedbefore.It had always
been possible forthe Spartans to build a fortsomewherein Attica (not
necessarilyat Decelea) on any of their annual invasions, without fear
that the Athenian army would be able to prevent them. The great
difficulty
lay in preventingthe Atheniansfromtaking the fortonce the
grand army had returnedhome. Then the Athenianscould have turned
out 7ravorparct, and even if they could not capture the fort, constructed
lines of circumvallation,impregnableto a relievingforce,and starved

out the garrison." The mass of the Peloponnesianswould have been too
far away to interfere,all the more as it was found impracticable to
remustertheirarmyfora second invasionof Attica in one year(cf.3.15).
The Boeotians,however,werenear at hand and geographicallycapable
of saving the fort.The doubt must have been whetherthey were strong
enough to do so. Before 431 there was every reason to think that the
Athenians were more than a match for the Boeotians. The nominal
strengthof the Boeotian hoplite forceswas 11,000 but in reality they
could never put so many men into the field.52On any possible interpretationof Thucydides 2.13.6 the Atheniansoutnumberedthem,at least
until the plague carriedoffperhaps one thirdof the population. History
confirmedstatistics.In the last decade of the sixthcenturythe Athenians
had defeatedthe combinedlevies of the Boeotians and Chalcidians.53In
479 theyhad beaten theThebans on therightof the Persiansat Plataea.54
About 457, some sixtydays aftertheirbloody "defeat" by the Spartans
at Tanagra, they had overwhelmedthe Boeotians at Oenophyta and
become mastersof most of theircountry(1.108). Against all this there
was to be set only the reverseat Coronea in 447, incurredby a hastily
raised forceonly 1000 strongas the resultof an ambush.55No one in 431
could have foreseenthe issue of Delium, wherethe new Theban tactics
and the diminishednumbers and morale of the Athenians upset the
experienceof eightyyears. It was only afterDelium that any one could
5"On Greek siege-warfaresee Gomme, Hist. Comm. on Thuc., vol. 1, pp. 16 ff.
5tHell. Oxy. 11 (Oxf. text) = 16 (Bartoletti). At Delium there were 7000 hoplites,
1000 horse, and 500 peltasts, 4.93.3, in 418 an expeditionary forceof 5000 hoplites and
500 horse, 5.57.2. From the fourthcentury the largest army recorded is 8000 hoplites
and 600 cavalry (Xen. Hell. 4.2.17; Plut. Pel. 24; Diod. 15.26; 52; 68; 71; 80 with Plut.
Pel. 31 and 35) except in 354, when Diod. (16.30) gives 13,000 hoplites; I conjecture
that the Boeotians then armed thetes, who soon afterwardsconstituted the mercenary
forcePammenes took to Asia, too far forpeasants.
53Hdt. 5.77.
54Hdt. 9.67.
161.113; Diod. 12.6.7 (ambush); Plut. Per. 18.2-3 (size of Tolmides' army). The fact
that Athens did not tryto reversethe decision of Coronea suggests that Pericles did not
favour the policy of holding Boeotia down; cf. perhaps Plut. loc. cit.
270
PHOENIX
have supposedthat the Boeotianshad the powerto protecta suitably

situatedfortin Atticaagainstan Athenianattackin fullstrength.
Two
the
threatened
establish
to
such
a
and
when
fort,
yearslater,
Spartans
theyexecutedthethreatin 413, theytookcare to selecta place almost
equidistantfromAthensand Boeotia(7.19.2).
But evenwithoutestablishing
a fortin AtticatheSpartanscouldand
did do the Atheniansmuchharmby annualdevastations.In a war of
thesidethatdoes all thedamagemustwinin theend. Chance,
attrition
assistedthe Spartans-in the shapeof thegreatplague.The
moreover,
Athenianslostheartand sued forpeace (2.59.2).We do not knowwhat
termstheyoffered,
onlythattheydid notsatisfySparta.Spartanhopes
werestillhigh,and eventhoughtheAthenians
discontinued
negotiations
and showedthat theirnaval strengthwas unaffected,
at Naupactus,
and Corcyra,
thattheAthenians
Mytilene,
theymightstillhavereckoned
wereincapableof effective
that
and
time
mustgive them
retaliation,
victory.
The Spartan strategyof attritionpresupposedthat the Athenians
couldnotstrikeequallyormoreseriousblowsat thePeloponnesians.
This
was
the
earlier
conflict
of
the
450's.
assumption apparently
justifiedby
In the previouswar withAthens,the Athenianshad been able to
conquerBoeotia,Phocis,and OpuntianLocris.But at thattimeAthens
was alreadyin controloftheMegarid,and so longas thiswas so, except
on the one occasionon whichthe Peloponnesians
had made a surprise
of
the
Corinthian
Gulf
in
and
landed
crossing
Boeotia, a factwhich
Athenianvigilancepresumably
made unrepeatable,
the Peloponnesians
had beencut offfromCentralGreece.56
Now theyhad no reasonto fear
forthe safetyof theiralliesin thatarea. The Megaridwas theirs,and
Nicaea (4.66.4); iftheBoeotianshad beenhardpressed,
theygarrisoned
theSpartanscouldhave cometo theirhelp.
Again, in the previouswar the Athenianshad sailed round the
andmadedescentson Laconia,wheretheyburnedGytheum,
Peloponnese
and on theterritory
ofCorinthand Sicyon.It couldbe expectedthatthe
AthenianalliancewithCorcyraand withotherpeoplesin thenorth-west
wouldfacilitatea resumption
of thisstrategy.57
But theSpartanscould
withsome reasonsupposethat theyhad littleto fearfromit. They
themselves
had fewcultivablelands accessibleto naval raids,and even
some
of theiralliesweremorevulnerable,
theirsufferings
would
though
not be decisive.It was at leastunlikely,
ifdue precautions
weretaken,
that any cityor stronglyfortified
post wouldfallto Athenianattack.
The Spartanswereso confident
on thisscorethateven afterexperience
58ForPegae as naval base, Plut. Per. 19.2.
57Cf.2.7.3. It was also obviously Athens' policy to destroy Corinth's little empire in
the north-west(on which see U. Kahrstedt, Gr. Staatsrecht
[GSttingen 19221 1.357 ff.).
THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR
271
of the Athenian naval expedition of 431 they chose to settle the expatriatedAeginetansin Thyrea,perilouslyand (as it proved) disastrously
near the coast; not until 425 was any attempteven made to provide the
settlementwith walls (2.27; 4.56-57). The failureof the Athenians to
capture Epidaurus in 430,58 despite the fact that theyhad fittedout the
largest armada of the war before415 (6.31), and put on board 4,000
hoplites and 300 horse (2.56) can only have served to confirmsuch
calculations. And even Athens' great financialresourceswere bound to
be exhausted by many such expeditions.Mere "hit and run" raids conducted by smaller forcescould be viewed with some equanimity. Such
forcescould neitherpenetrate deeply into Peloponnesian territorynor
stay forprolongeddevastations.If Periclesset highhopes on the effectiveness of such attacks, this shows only that like Britishstatesmenin the
wars withFrance he overestimatedthe potencyof maritimesuperiority."5
There are some suggestionsthat the Athenians hoped to injure the
Peloponnesians seriouslyby preyingon theirseaborne trade. Triremes,
however,could not keep the seas long enough to blockade the Peloponnesian coast,"6and even the possessionof such bases as Athenshad from
424 at Cythera,Pylos, and Methana did no more than facilitateprivateering,thoughthis mightassume seriousproportions(as the Athenians
foundin later wars whenthe Spartans had a base on Aegina);61 similarly,
an Atheniansquadron operatingin the Straitsof Messina or offthe east
coast of Sicily could only have had very limitedchances of cuttingoff
grain ships near theirpoint of departureforPeloponnesianports. It was
doubtless somewhateasier fortriremesbased on Naupactus to close the
CorinthianGulf and compel the Isthmusstates to relyon costlyand slow
overland transport,presumably packages on mules, from the Elean
coast.62 The Athenians did place at Naupactus a squadron for this
purpose (2.69), but never perhaps one sufficiently
strongto preventthe
Corinthians,when they chose, escortingmerchant ships through the
straits; Thucydides records how this was done in 413, because the
merchantships were then carryingtroopsto Syracuse (7.17.2-4; 19.3-5),
but we need not suppose that this was never done on any previous
occasion or that ships could not slip past by night. Thus with some
to bringArgosinto the war; cf. 5.53 forArgos'claimson Epidaurusand
"8Probably
its strategicvalue. Cleonlateris said to have intrigued
at Argos,Knights
465 ff.
"9SeeH. D. Westlake,C. 39 (1945) 75 ff.
60A.W. Gomme,Essays in GreekHist. and Lit. (Oxford1937) 190 ff.;cf. Westlake,
op. cit.(see n.59) 77 f.
61Xen.Hell. 5.1.1-24; in 29 he even speaks of the Atheniansas "besiegedby the
piratesfromAegina";cf.4.61 (in 376 grainshipswouldnotsail beyondGeraestusout
of fearof a SpartanfleetoperatingroundAegina,Ceos, and Andros);6.2.1.
62Westlake,
op. cit.(see n.59),suggeststhatonce Methanawas occupiedthechannel
betweenthatpromontory
and Aeginacouldbe closed.
272
PHOENIX
not only Corinthand Sicyon,but Megara too, throughthe port

difficulty
of Pegae, could be supplied-despite the blockade of Nisaea that the
Athenians kept up. Moreover in any event we must not overrate the
dependenceof the Peloponnese on overseas supplies. Despite occasional
referencesto imports,63the difficulties
of land transportalone make it
that
the
interior
of
the
probable
Peloponnese relied on its own produce
when
local
harvests
failed.
(One might wonder how they could
except
have paid for large scale imports. Probably such failuresresulted in
faminesanyhow.) The maritimecities may have procuredmore of their
essential supplies abroad, but the fact that both Corinth and Megara
were opposed to peace in 421 (5.17.2) must warn us at least against
supposingthat theyabsolutelydependedon imports,or, if theydid, that
the Athenians had been able to cut offsupplies. In short, Sparta had
littleto fearfroman Athenian"blockade."
This is not to deny that the Athenianplunderingraids on the Peloponnesian coast were vexatious. Corinth too sufferednot only from the
blockade at Naupactus but also fromthe loss of dependenciesin northwest Greece. The Athenian raids and communicationswith Naupactus
were at least facilitatedby the Athenian possession of secure bases in
the north-west(2.7), and it was to take one of these,Zacynthus,that the
Spartans launched the largestof theirnaval expeditionsin the Archidamian war (2.66). But with the methodsof siege-craftavailable they could
no more take that city than the Athenians could take Epidaurus. In
429 a combinedoperation by sea and land was undertakenin the hope
of reducing Acarnania, Zacynthus, and Cephallenia, impeding the
Atheniancircumnavigations
and even capturingNaupactus (2.80.1). The
miscarried
both
enterprise
by sea and land. Perhaps in the next year the
Atheniansdid not leave Naupactus so dangerouslyweak. It was not till
427 that stasis at Corcyra seemed to give the Spartans anotheropportunityto destroyAthenian power in this region; once more there were
only twelve ships at Naupactus (3.69). But even this squadron could
preventa decisiveSpartan successuntilthe arrivalof a superiorAthenian
fleet.In 426 the Spartans again sent 3000 hoplitesto join the Aetolians
in an attack on Naupactus, which was barely saved (3.100 ft.). Eurylochus' subsequent disaster in Acarnania, the virtual elimination of
Ambracia fromthe war, and the final reductionof Anactorium (4.49)
and Oeniadae (4.77) leftAthens in controlof a regionin which Spartan
activitieshad never had any purpose beyond that of cripplingAthenian
offensives.
What the Spartans did not reckonwithwas the dangerof the Athenians
establishingfortifiedposts on or offthe Peloponnesian coast, and the
unpredictableand avoidable disasterof Sphacteria. But here again there
6*Hdt.7.147.2;Thuc. 3.86.4;4.53.3.
THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR
273
were no precedents,and their calculations were naturally founded on

past experience,the defectat all timesof mostmilitaryplanning.Pericles
was no more perspicaciousthan the Spartans. If indeed he did suggest
in 432, it was an idea that he did no more than play with.
Y7r1oLXwLOO
However
sound the general lines of his strategywere, he seems to have
lacked the coup d'oeil of the truegeneral.He did not even see that it was
more effectiveto blockade Nisaea fromMinoa than fromSalamis; that
was Nicias' doing (3.51). He never noticed the advantages of Cythera,
known to Herodotus (7.235)64 or of Methana (cf. n.62). His successors,
until Demosthenesshowed the way, saw no meritsin occupyingbarren
headlands in the Peloponnese (4.3.3). It is not surprisingthat on their
side the Spartans in 431 entertainedno apprehensionof such forts.
The occupationof Pylos by itselfled the Spartans to withdrawat once
fromAttica and concentratetheireffortson capturingthe fort(4.6 and
8). Their errorin placing a garrisonon Sphacteria and theirdespair on
findingthat it was cut offprecipitatedthem into making a truce, by
whichtheirfleetwas committedto the ill faithof Athens,and to offering
a peace that would have made nonsense of their pretentionto be the
champions of Greek liberty,65and have damaged their prestige,while
leaving the dreaded power of Athens intact. Not only was their offer
rejected,but theirships remainedin Athenianhands. They now had less
chance than ever of hittingat Athens by sea. The capture of theirmen
on Sphacteria followed, and anxiety for their safety precluded any
furtherinvasion of Attica; then Cythera and Methana were occupied.
From the last strongholdTroezen (4.118.5) and Halieis66were harried
into making a separate peace. Further defectionsmight be feared. In
424 Megara was barely saved. The activities of Mantinea and Elis
towards the end of the Archidamian war show how Spartan control
of the Peloponnesewas impaired.67
The Spartans had now to defendtheir
own shores against depredationsfromCythera and the possibilitythat
still furtherfortsmightbe establishedin theirterritory(4.55), and they
were particularlyalarmed by the danger of Helot revolt (4.80; 5.14.3),
a fearthat persistedbeyondthe conclusionof the Peace ofNicias (5.23.3).
In 425/4 repeatedoverturesforpeace, in whichSparta must surelyhave
offeredtermseven more favourableto Athens, were rejected (4.41; cf.
Peace 665 ff.).
It was only at this juncture that the Spartans determinedto attack
"6Busolt, Gr. Gesch. 3.2.1126, n.4, conjectured that in 424 the Spartans had only
recentlywithdrawna garrisonforfear that it mightmeet the fate of that on Sphacteria.
"6They proposed joint controlof Greece (4.20.3), the policy perhaps once maintained
by Cimon (Plut. Cim. 16) and revived in 421 (cf. Peace 1082) and in 369 (Xen. Hell.
6.3.14-17). The fears it aroused in 421 are illustrated by 5.27.2; 29.3.
66IG 12. 87, on which see Meritt and Davidson, A,.P 56 (1935) 65 ff.
67Supra;cf. 5.28.2 forSparta's loss of prestigeby 421 and 75.3 forits recoveryin 418.
274
PHOENIX
the only part of Athens' empire which they could reach by land, the
Thracian district.The cities subject to Athens here paid relativelylittle
tribute and were comparativelyunimportant,except for Amphipolis.
But Amphipoliswas of the greatestvalue to Athens (4.108.1; cf. 105.1),
both forits miningrevenues and timberand forits strategicsituation
commandingthe passage of the Strymon;controlof Amphipoliswould
open the route to the rich subject allies of Athens to the east and even
imperilAthens' grain supply through the Hellespont or Bosporus. In
426 the Spartans had taken the firststep towardsa campaignin the north
by foundingthe colony of Heraclea in Trachis, convenientlyplaced not
only for descents on Euboea but also for a march throughThessaly
(3.92). But more could not be done until there was a favourableconjuncture of events,and this did not occur until 424.
In Thrace the Bottiaeans and Chalcidians had revolted fromAthens
in 432 and never been suppressed.68They now urged the Spartans to
send an expeditionand to put Brasidas in command. Brasidas himself
welcomed the opportunity(4.81.1). But it was only the co-operationof
Perdiccas of Macedon that made the expeditionpossible. Perdiccas was
always hostileto Athenseven at times,such as the present,when he was
nominallyat peace with her (4.79.2).69 Inevitably he must have wished
to controlthe coastland of his own realm,and the miningarea of mount
Pangaeum, whence his fatherhad drawn a rich revenuebut fromwhich
the Athenians at Amphipolis now excluded him."7But his intentions
and constancywere ever uncertain.In 432 he had encouragedPotidaea
and the Chalcidians to revolt and then deserted them. His immediate
motive for seeking Spartan aid in concert with the Chalcidians in 424
was a war with his revolted vassal, the king of Lyncestis. Without his
support a Peloponnesian forcein the northhad no good base, and could
hardly be fed and maintained;Perdiccas and the rebelliousChalcidians
appear to have promised to share the cost of Brasidas' army.71More
importantstill, it was only with his good officesthat the long march
throughThessaly could successfullybe undertaken.The Thessalians were
nominal allies of Athens (2.22.3), and even though only the wrMX~os
was
truly pro-Athenian,they were, naturally enough, not inclined to let
belligerentstraverse their land (4.78.2). Brasidas got throughonly by
forcedmarches and thanks to intrigueswith some Thessalian notables
(4.78), of whom one at least and probably all were friendsof Perdiccas.
s81.57.5;58; 2.79.
9"OnAthens and Macedon see G. Glotz, Hist. Gr. (Paris 1936) 3.214 ff.;and in more
detail, F. Geyer, Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung
Philipps II (Munich 1930) 50 ff.
70Hdt. 5.17. Cf. ATL 3.313.
714.80.1; 83.5-6.
THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR
275
But Perdiccas' support was unreliable,and the diversityof his aims

fromthose of Brasidas soon led to a breach. Once this had occurred,
his relationswith Thessalian magnates enabled him to block reinforcements fromSparta.72Brasidas was cut off. Given Perdiccas' notorious
infidelity,this was an event that must always have seemed likely. Nor
could it be foreseenthat in the interimhe would have secured in the
Greek cities new bases and sourcesof supply. These cities were fortified,
and only minoritieswere ready to rebel.7" The Spartans may indeed
have entertainedoptimisticviews of theirdisloyaltyto Athens,but even
they can hardlyhave expected that the Athenian colony of Amphipolis
would fall into Brasidas' hands. Indeed Brasidas' successes were due as
much to Atheniannegligenceas to his own celerityand diplomaticskill.
The news of his arrival in the northreached Athens presumablyin the
autumn (4.82; cf. 84.1), and perhaps it was then that Eucles and
Thucydides were despatched to the scene. But it is clear that they had
only small forces,and even in the winterwhen (too late) the Athenians
sent out furthertroops as garrisons,they cannot have been numerous,
to judge fromthe case of Torone (4.108.6; cf. 110 ff.). Even at this
stage therewas no reasonwhy Brasidas should not have been annihilated
by superiorforceswell led. Thus his enterprisewas hazardous fromthe
first.Naturally his army was small, 700 freedHelot volunteers(whom
the Spartans were glad to be rid of as potential insurgents)and 1000
Peloponnesian mercenaries(4.80; cf. 78.1). Apart froma few officersit
comprisedno Spartiates. It was an expendable force,and no wonder.
It is evident that the home governmentand Brasidas were not of one
mind on the purpose of the expedition.7"According to Thucydides
7"See infra.
7"Though I agree with T. J. Quinn, Historia 13 (1964) 257 ff.,that even democracies
were likely to preferindependence to subjection to Athens wheneverthey were confident
that they could be preservedwithoutAthenian support, I think that this condition was
seldom realized, and that on the whole G. E. M. de Ste Croix, Historia 3 (1954) 1 ff.,is
right against Quinn and Bradeen, Historia 9 (1960) 257 ff.So far as concerns Brasidas'
successes,force majeure explains not only the revolt of Acanthus but also that of Amphipolis: Brasidas controlledits territory;many of the citizens were caught outside the
walls (4.103.5-104.1) and they had kinsmen within who were apprehensive for their
safety(106.1); moreovertheAmphipolitanscould notexpect much help fromThucydides,
who had to call on local levies, not yet mustered (105.1). Torone was betrayed by a
minority.I do not agree that at Scione "it is absolutelyclear that the majorityfavoured
revolt." This mightjust as easily be alleged of Mende on the strengthof 123.2; here the
sequel proves it false. At Scione too some accepted revoltonly whenit was afait accompli,
with less reluctance because of Brasidas' promises. The adoption by the Athenians of
Cleon's mistaken policy of terrorismproves nothing. We do not know that it is significant that the rebel cities which were not recaptured by Athens did not return to
theirallegiance, as we do not know whetherdemocrats remained in control.
74See Appendix.
276
PHOENIX
(4.81.2) the Spartans desired fromthe firstmerelyto capture Athenian

possessionswhich they could bargain away in a peace that would give
them back Pylos and Cythera and freethem fromthe menace of devastations and Helot revolt.Afterthe capture of Amphipolis,in the winter
of 424/3, Brasidas appealed forreinforcements,
and his appeal was not
answered (4.108.6-7). Winter expeditions were alien to Spartan, or
Greek, habits (cf. Dem. 9.48), and probably in any event the Spartans
would have taken no action till the spring,when it was too late, but
Thucydides explains their failureto respond by the jealousy that the
leading men felt for Brasidas (who was probably, like Lysander after
him, a powerfuland ambitiouspolitical figure,and not just a romantic
war-hero),and by theirdesire to recoverthe prisonersfromSphacteria
and to end the war. Hence, instead of assisting Brasidas to followup
his advantage, they seized the opportunityto conclude a truce, which
was designed to be preliminaryto peace (4.117). By contrast,Brasidas
had been givingout in Thrace that he had come in fulfilment
of Spartan
intentions to free Athens' subjects (4.85.1; 86.1); he was perfectly
capable of deceit (4.86.7; 108.5; cf. 72.2; 78.1), despite Thucydides'
eulogy on his justice (4.81.2), but he was probably sincerein this. By
accepting revolted Mende under his protectionon the plea that the
Athenians too were contraveningthe truce (4.123.1), he showed that
it was not his aim to promotean accommodation,and Thucydides says
outrightthat he was an obstacle to peace (5.16.1). His successor,Clearidas, was to act in the same spiritafterhis death in refusingto hand over
to the Atheniansthe revoltedcities (5.21), and thus preparingthe way
forthe breakdownof the Peace of Nicias.
It is hard not to sympathize with the Spartan governmentin its
failure to support Brasidas. In spite of his unexpected successes, his
position was still precarious. Much still turned on Perdiccas' attitude.
Already in 424 Perdiccas had quarrelledwith Brasidas and reduced his
subsidy fromone half to one third of the maintenance of his army
(4.83.5-6). In the spring of 423 the break became complete (4.128);
Perdiccas made peace with Athens,and used his influencein Thessaly
to prevent the passage of the reinforcements
the Spartans had at last
decided to send, after the truce had patently broken down (4.132).
Similarlyin late summerand winter422 a second army of 900 hoplites
was unable to get throughThessaly (5.12-13); admittedlyits attempt
was ratherhalf-hearted.Brasidas' expeditionwas cut off,and even after
Cleon's disaster,a determinedeffortby Athens in fullforcemighthave
restoredto her controlof Thrace. But the Athenians were themselves
war-wearyand wanted peace; even in the subsequent years, when the
Spartans had withdrawnfromThrace, and the termsof the treaty had
been rejected by the rebels there,no seriouseffortwas made to subdue
THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR
277
them.The limitedobjectives with which the home governmenthad sent

Brasidas out were thus realised. Brasidas' acquisitions were enough to
compel Athens to accept a compromisepeace of the kind Sparta had
sought ever since the garrisonon Sphacteria had been cut off.But the
experienceof his expeditiondid not encouragethe Spartans to renewan
offensivein the north,even after413, when they were bent on total
victoryand were certainlyactingwithmore apparentvigourthan in the
Archidamianwar. The explanationis probablyto be foundin the attitude
of Macedon. Athenian losses in Thrace made Athenian power less
constrictingto the kings of Macedon, and they probably had no wish
afterPerdiccas' experienceof Brasidas to introduceSpartan forcesinto
their dominions.At any rate, Archelaus, who succeeded Perdiccas in
and thereis some evidence
413, seems to have been friendlyto Athens,75
forSpartan hostilityto him after404.76
At home the Spartan positionwas fullof perils.Mantinea had already
shown signs of independence.The dispute with Elis arising fromElis'
claims to Lepreum must be prior to the peace; forif Elis voted against
the conclusionof peace (5.17.2), althoughshe had no grudgeof her own
against Athens,the explanation must surely be that she wished Sparta
to be preoccupiedby the prolongationof war. Raids were still going on
fromthe Athenianepiteichismoi;Helots were deserting,and the danger
of Helot revoltmust have been steadilygrowing(5.14.3). The trucewith
Argos was due to expire in 420,77and Sparta had to reckon with the
probabilitythat Argos would not be disposed to renew it, if she could
count on assistance fromAthens and on secessions fromthe Peloponnesian league and perhapson a Helot rising.It was therefore
prudentfor
to
make
even
on
terms
that
than
more
ever
affronted
Sparta
peace
Corinthand Megara; forCorinthwas not to recoverherlost dependencies
in the north-west(5.30.2), and Nisaea had to be leftin Athens' hands
(5.17.2). It is less easy to be convincedthat the interestsof Athens did
not require her to press home the advantages which Sparta's embarrassmentsafforded.It was fortunateforSparta that the Athenianswere
dispirited by recent disasters and ready to listen to Nicias with his
desire to avoid all risksand his vain hope that a permanentententewith
Sparta could be secured7'.
"7Tod, GHI 91; Andoc. 2.11; Diod. 13.49 (cf. Xen. Hell. 1.12).
76Ps-Herodes rept 7roXtreras19 ff.(cf. Wade-Gery, Essays in Greek History271 ff.
for bibliographyon this work).
7"This date is implied by 5.40.2 and not excluded by 5.14.4; 28.2. Thucydides' narrative, moreover,seems to show that there was no imminenceof hostilitiesearlier than
spring 420. And the Athenian readiness to make peace in 421 is more easily comprehensible if they could not hope for Argive interventionuntil a year had passed.
78Itis characteristicof Thucydides that he ascribes personal motivesto Cleon, Brasidas
(whom he undoubtedly admired), Nicias, and Plistoanax alike and does not seem to
278
PHOENIX
It is plain
Thucydidesis highlycriticalof Spartanlack of enterprise.
fromlaterpassagesin hisworkthatifhe did notinventthe Corinthian
in 1.70, he concurredin it.79He even contraststhe
character-sketch
in
the war to theirdisadvantagewith the
Spartans' spirit fighting
who
let themselves
be beleagueredby forces
had
(8.96.5),
Syracusans
on land and wouldhardlyhave comethroughsuccessfully
inferior
but
forthenavaldevicesinventedby Corinthians
and theleadership
supplied
of Spartaseems,however,
by the SpartanGylippus.His condemnation
an attackon
too severe.Theirfaultin 432 lay not in too longdeferring
Athensbut in overestimating
theirchancesofsuccess.But theestimate
theymade,thatdevastationofAtticawouldgivethemthevictoryand
thatAthenscouldmakeno equallyeffective
reply,was at leastbasedon
theexperience
ofthepast,thoughbeliedin theevent.Whentheannual
invasionsfailedand were actuallyabandoned,therewas nothingleft
forSparta to do exceptto embarkon the perilousnorthern
adventure.
This theydid in theveryyearafterPylos.It was moresuccessful
than
if
have
been
the
to
and
mightreasonably
predicted,
Spartanspreferred
"take profits"ratherthan gamblefurther,
not
were
they
necessarily
wrong.They had indeedto maketheverykindof stalematepeace that
Pericleshad probablysoughtfromthe first;and theirprestigeand
in the Peloponnesewas brokenforthe time.Eventsshowed
authority
thattheyretainedthesolidmilitary
powerneededto restoreit.
APPENDIX
is knownof Spartanfactions,no doubt becauseof Tr Kpur7rT6v

rTs
(5.68.2). It is not even known who really directedSpartan
roXtEas
The
Assembly clearly exercised little power, at best answering
policy.
Yea or Nay in an open vote to questions put to it by a magistrate(cf.
1.87). Whatever constitutionalpowers belonged to the gerousia and to
the ephors,it is not likely that eitherbody was normallyof one mind;
moreoverAristotleremarksof the gerousia (which consistedof men over
sixty,chosen forlife) that "there is an old age of mind as of body" (Pol.
1270b 40) and of the ephors that they were often low and corruptible
nobodies (1270b 7 fl.); Plato says that the officewas virtuallysortitive
(Laws 692a), and the list of eponymousephors preservedin Xen. Hell.
2.3.9-10 contains only one well-knownname, that of Brasidas (the
emendation of EGiSLKosto "Evptos seems unjustified), although we are
LITTLE
allowthat any of themwereactuatedby the interestof his cityas he saw it; thisinmaynot be rightin every,or in any,case.
terpretation
79Cf.1.118.2; 4.55.2; 8.96.5 forremarksby Thucydideson the Spartan character
whichagreewiththeportraitallegedlydrawnby the Corinthians.
THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR
279
acquainted with a considerablenumber of Spartiates who held responsible posts as navarchsor harmostsduringthe Peloponnesianwar. As for
the kings,Herodotus (6.52.8) tells us that the royal houses were always
quarrelling,a statementconfirmedby numerousinstances,of which the
feud between Cleomenes I and Demaratus is only the most notorious
(cf. Paus. 3.5.2; Xen. Hell. 5.3.20; 4.25 ff.;Arist.Pol. 1271a 25), and this
inevitably reduced each king's influenceexcept when the other house
was reduced to nullityby prolongedminorities,as were the Agiads in
the fifthcentury.(Herodotus, 6.51, says that the Agiads were superior
to the Eurypontids,but thisceased to be trueafterthe death ofLeonidas.)
The kingshad certainlylost the powerto make war on whomtheypleased
(Hdt. 6.56, contrastXen. Resp. Lac. 15.2); thougha kingstillcommanded
on major expeditionswith absolute discretionin militarydecisions(e.g.,
Thuc. 5.66), he was accompanied by two ephors (Hdt. 9.76; Xen. Resp.
Lac. 13.5), who could bringhim to account on his return,and he could
not make decisions of policy (Xen. Hell. 2.2.11 ff.;4.37-38). Aristotle
even treats the kings as no more than hereditarycommanders-in-chief
(1285b 27), a view which neglectsthe auctoritasthat mightcome with
age, experience,and success and whichmade, forinstance,Agesilaus the
dominantfigureat Sparta in his reign.The kingscould certainlybecome
rival partyleaders (Xen. Hell. 5.4.25 ff.)and use theirinfluenceto manipulate the otherorgansof government;but so could able privateSpartiates,
such as Brasidas or Lysander.How oftenand whentheypulled the strings
we do not know. It is certainlyfallaciousto interpretSpartan policy in
termsof rivalrybetweenthe kings and ephors. Not only were the kings
themselvesusually at variance; but so mightthe ephors be (Xen. Hell.
2.4.29); it proves nothingthat a single ephor is hostile to one of the
kings (Thuc. 8.12.2).
What is clear is that the twists and turnsof Spartan policy towards
Athens must often be explained by party strugglesat Sparta, whether
those struggleswere prompted by genuine differencesof opinion (the
most straightforward
interpretationof the diverse views expressed in
432 by King Archidamus and Sthenelaidas) or by a mere contest for
influenceand power. Hence perhaps the appeal for Athenian aid just
afterthe secret promiseto Thasos, followedin turn by the repudiation
of the Atheniancontingent;the banishmentof Plistoanax and his adviser
soon aftertheyhad negotiatedpeace withAthens;the probablereadiness
of Sparta to interveneon behalfof Samos; the bellicoseattitudeof a new
board of ephors withina few monthsof the conclusionof the Peace of
Nicias (5.36.1); the discontentevinced by Callicratidas with Lysander's
conduct in the east in 406; the reversalof Lysander's policy to Athens
in 403 broughtabout by king Pausanias with the supportof a majority
280
PHOENIX
of the ephors (Xen. Hell. 2.29), followedby the overthrowof the decarchiesLysanderhad set up in the Aegean,despitethe fact that Pausanias had to stand a trial and was acquitted probably only by Athena's
casting voice (cf. Beloch, Gr. Gesch. 32.1.15-16). The jealousy that
Sparta's leading men feltforBrasidas (4.108.7) fitsinto this pictureand
no doubt contributedto the strengthof the argumentsthat could be
adduced in favour of making peace. It is clear that in 421, as in 446,
king Plistoanax, who had returnedfromexile, led the peace party for
personalreasons (5.16).

Spartan Policy in The Archidamian War

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Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War

SPARTAN POLICY AND STRATEGY

1I have found no satisfactorydiscussion of the subject of this paper in any of the

could not reasonablyhope forSyracusan intervention,and she could not

of the Peloponnesian war, to liberate her subjects by forcein 400.9 In

Lepreum,ib. 6.5.2; 7.1.26;33; 38; 4.12 and 14.

Xen. Hell. 5.2.

if therebe any truthin Diodorus' storythat in 475/4 they were barely

had at least to reduce Athenianpower and demonstratetheirability to

193.15with Gomme's note.

inferiorto the Athenian qualitatively as well as numerically.While the

on the ground that it was not right (Xen. Hell. 7.4.34)

ELS r6v &el Xp6vov

THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR

Athenianscould borrowfromtheirpatron goddess and fromtheirother

See H. D. Westlake,Historia9 (1960) 385 ff.

It is not hard to surmisewhy these negotiationsfailed.The king had

THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR

In these circumstances,the Spartans could not attack Athens by sea,

THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR

was writingclose to the events and did not revisethe relevantsentences

THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR

absence of Athenian hoplites in Sicily, and thereafterby the losses at

lines of circumvallation,impregnableto a relievingforce,and starved

have supposedthat the Boeotianshad the powerto protecta suitably

THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR

not only Corinthand Sicyon,but Megara too, throughthe port

THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR

were no precedents,and their calculations were naturally founded on

THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR

But Perdiccas' support was unreliable,and the diversityof his aims

(4.81.2) the Spartans desired fromthe firstmerelyto capture Athenian

THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR

them.The limitedobjectives with which the home governmenthad sent

is knownof Spartanfactions,no doubt becauseof Tr Kpur7rT6v

THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR

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