Professional Documents
Culture Documents
*
FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR., petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT,
MATEO
A.T.
CAPARAS,
AND
THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
Remedial Law; Pleadings and Practices; Nature of a
complaint.A complaint is defined as a concise statement of
the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff s cause or causes
of action. Like all other pleadings allowed by the Rules of
Court, the complaint shall contain in a methodical and logical
form a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate
facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim, omitting the
statement of mere evidentiary facts. Its office, purpose or
function is to inform the defendant clearly and definitely of
the claims made against him so that he may be prepared to
meet the issues at the trial. The complaint should inform the
defendant of all the material facts on which the plaintiff relies
to support his demand; it should state the theory of a cause
of action which forms the bases of the plaintiffs claim of
liability.
Same; Same; Same; Rules on pleading speak of two kinds of
facts, the ultimate facts and the evidentiary facts.The rules
on pleading speak of two (2) kinds of facts: the first, the
ultimate facts, and the second, the evidentiary facts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Ultimate facts and evidentiary
facts defined."The term ultimate facts as used in Sec. 3,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, means the essential facts
constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if
it cannot be stricken out, without leaving the statement of
the cause of action insufficient, x x x, (Moran, Rules of
Court, Vol. 1,1963 ed., p. 213). Ultimate facts are important
and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of
the primary right and duty, or which directly make up the
wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does
not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence by which these material elements are to be
established. It refers to principal, determinate, constitutive
facts, upon the existence of which, the entire cause of action
rests. while the term evidentiary fact has been denned in
involved and what are their values, how and when have they
been acquired.
The Solicitor General, for and in behalf of respondents
(except the respondent Sandiganbayan), opposed the
motion.11 After the petitioner had filed his reply12 thereto,
the respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated on 21 April 1990
a resolution13 denying the petitioners motion for a bill of
particulars on the ground that the particulars sought by
petitioner are evidentiary in nature, the pertinent part of
which resolution reads, as follows:
We are of the considered opinion that the allegations in the
Expanded Complaint are quite clear and sufficient enough for
defendant-movant to know the nature and scope of the
causes of action upon which plaintiff seeks relief. They
provide the factual scenario which, coupled with other
allegations set forth in the Common Averments and further
specified
in
the
Specific
Averments
of
herein
defendantmovant and his co-defendants illegal acts which
are within defendant-movants peculiar and intimate
knowledge as a government official and corporate executive,
will enable him to make the proper admission, denials or
qualifications, set out affirmative and/or special defenses and
thereafter prepare for trial. E videntiary facts or matters are
not essential in the pleading of the cause of action, nor to
details or probative value or particulars of evidence by which
these material evidence are to be established (Remitere vs.
Yulu, 6 SCRA 251). The matters which he seeks are
evidentiary in nature and, being within his intimate or
personal knowledge, may be denied or admitted by him or if
deemed necessary, be the subject of other forms of
discovery."14
Petitioner moved for reconsideration15 but this was denied
by respondent Sandiganbayan in its resolution16 dated 29
May 1990.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition.
The principal issue to be resolved in the case at bar is
whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed resolutions.
RFM that the said container van had been transferred to the
bonded warehouse of the Luzon Brokerage Corporation and
asked RFM to take immediate delivery of the cargo (Decision,
p. 9; Rollo, p.48).
The bonded warehouse of Luzon Brokerage Corporation is
located in Pasig, Metro Manila and in the vicinity of the offices
of RFM.
For the third time, petitioner sent a notice to RFM on July 12,
1974 that the cargo had been transferred to the Luzon
Brokerage Corporation (Exh. 6, Sea-Land).
The cargo was unloaded from the container van on July 13,
1974 in the presence of the Luzon Brokerage Corporation
personnel. It was at this time that portions of the shipment
were found to be in bad order. It was only on July 24, 1974
that RFM took delivery of the shipment from the Luzon
Brokerage Corporation bonded warehouse and transferred
the same to its plant in Cabuyao, Laguna. A survey
conducted at the consignees plant showed that the fresh air
damper and the coil support frame assembly had been
damaged while several pieces of parts of the food processing
machinery were missing. By this time, Sea-Land had been
relieved of responsibility over the cargo under Section 15 of
the Bill of Lading.
There is no dispute that the cargo was shipped H to H
container STC 3 complete units food processing machinery,
meaning that the shipper itself loaded the cargo into the van,
which was sealed before its delivery to the carrying vessel.
There was no evidence presented by Assurance as to the
actual condition of the cargo when it was loaded into the
container van by Julian Engineering Co., the shipper.
Assurance issued the insurance policy without prior
inspection of the cargo on the assumption that the cargo
loaded into the container van was complete and in good
order. The insurance policy was issued when the cargo was
inside the sealed container van. Assurance was aware that
the carrying vessel had not accepted the cargo as complete
and in good order as shown by its qualified receipt as
appearing in the bill of lading (Exh. 1, Sea-land).
being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also
in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rules to be applied
where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim
purely for money or damages, and there is no precise
statement of the amounts being claimed, or where the
pleading specifies the amount of every claim, but the fees
paid are insufficient.Two situations may arise. One is where
the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for
money or damages and there is no precise statement of the
amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is that the
pleading will not be accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record. In other words, the
complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the claims as to
which the amounts are unspecified may be expunged,
although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit
amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees
provided the claim has not in the meantime become timebarred. The other is where the pleading does specify the
amount of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and
here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a
reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or
the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is
cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the
action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and
consequently barred the right of action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the action involves
real property and a related claim for damages, the legal fees
shall be assessed on the basis of both the value of the
property and the total amount of related damages sought;
Rule where no amounts of the damages are specified.
Where the action involves real property and a related claim
for damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the
basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total
amount of related damages sought. The Court acquires
jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory
pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite
fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the
Puno
(Chairman),
ChicoNazario, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez,
Tinga
and
and (d) miscellaneous litigation expenses. In Civil Case No. D5216, petitioner Ramon Abad further asks for moral and
exemplary damages.
On 2 March 1981, defendant in Civil Case No. D-5408 filed an
Omnibus motion to: (1) annul all proceedings, (2) lift and
dissolve all attachments, levies or executions, and (3) dismiss
all cases. A similar motion was filed in Civil Case No. D-5216
on 30 January 1981.12 The principal ground alleged in
support of the motion to dismiss is lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the trial court. DIMCONTRAD maintains that SEC has
jurisdiction over the claims of petitioners pursuant to Section
5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended.
The respondent Court thereafter promulgated two (2) orders,
one on 25 May 1981 (Civil Case No. D-5408) and the other on
27 May 1981 (Civil Case No. D-5216) dismissing the said
cases on the ground that since the plaintiffs therein allege
fraud in the acquisition of investments, the matter falls within
the jurisdiction of the SEC.13
Petitioners then jointly moved for a reconsideration of the
said Orders14 on 22 June 1981 which the respondent Court
denied in its Order15 of 12 October 1981, ruling therein that:
x x x From the very allegations of the complaint, the
plaintiffs admit having made investments at different times,
different sums of money, with the defendant corporation at a
fixed return of investment. In his (sic) motion and rejoinder,
plaintiffs, thru counsel, alleged that plaintiffs are collecting
their investments from the defendant corporation at the
agreed rate of interest. But the plaintiffs can not now
abandon the allegations of the complaint in which they
stated several times in different paragraphs that they made
investments of different amounts at different times with the
defendant which they admit is a private corporation duly
organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines duly registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, further alleging in par. 10 of the complaint that
there exists prima facie evidence that defendant employed
fraudulent means to induce the plaintiffs to make
investments. (p. 4, par. 10, Complaint).
I
CIVIL CASES NOS. D-5216 AND D-5408 INVOLVE THE
COLLECTION OF SUMS OF MONEY ARISING FROM
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP (sic), AND THEREFORE,
PARTAKE THE NATURE (sic) OF ACTIONS FOR SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE WHICH FALL WITHIN THE ORIGINAL
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
(NOW REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS); and
II
THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 902-A DO
NOT APPLY TO THE CASES AT BAR.
They submit that the actions filed before the court a quo are
for specific performance because their principal purpose is to
seek the refund of the amounts that were invested, together
with the unpaid earnings thereof pursuant to the contracts
entered into; petitioners aver that such actions, incapable of
pecuniary estimation, fall within the jurisdiction of the
respondent Court.
In support of their arguments, petitioners point to the
allegations in the complaints filed with the trial court which
readily reveal that plaintiffs therein are seeking full and
faithful compliance by defendant therein with its
commitments to the former, namely, the refund of the entire
investments and the payments of the outstanding and
unpaid earnings thereof as stipulated in the investment
contracts.19 While conceding that the complaints allege
fraud, even going as far as specifying the paragraphs
containing the said averments, petitioners stress that these
allegations do not alter the nature of the actions as the same
are mere incidents to the contracts of investment sought to
be enforced. The same do not refer to the schemes or
devices used or employed by private respondent in its
business in general, but to specific acts committed by the
latter against the petitioners. Moreover, such allegations
were made to substantiate petitioners claim for damages
and bolster the prayer for preliminary attachment.
xxx
3.0 Duties of Representative
3.1. REPRESENTATIVE SHALL:
3.1.1. Not represent or offer for sale within the Territory any
product which competes with an existing ITEC product or any
product which ITEC has under active development.
3.1.2. Actively solicit all potential customers within the
Territory in a systematic and businesslike manner.
3.1.3. Inform ITEC of all request for proposals, requests for
bids, invitations to bid and the like within the Territory.
3.1.4. Attain the Annual Sales Goal for the Territory
established by ITEC. The Sales Goals for the first 24 months
is set forth on Attachment two (2) hereto. The Sales Goal for
additional twelve month periods, if any, shall be sent to the
Sales Agent by ITEC at the beginning of each period. These
Sales Goals shall be incorporated into this Agreement and
made a part hereof.
xxx
6.0. Representative as Independent Contractor
xxx
6.2. When acting under this Agreement REPRESENTATIVE is
authorized to solicit sales within the Territory on ITECS behalf
but is authorized to bind ITEC only in its capacity as
Representative and no other, and then only to specific
customers and on terms and conditions expressly authorized
by ITEC in writing.17
Aside from the abovestated provisions, petitioners point out
the following matters of record, which allegedly bear witness
to the respondents activities within the Philippines in pursuit
of their business dealings:
a. While petitioner ASPAC was the authorized exclusive
representative for three (3) years, it solicited from and closed
several sales for and on behalf of private respondents as to
their products only and no other, to PLDT, worth no less than
US $15 Million (p. 20, tsn, Feb. 18, 1991);
b. Contract No. 1 (Exhibit for Petitioners) which covered these
sales and identified by private respondents sole witness, Mr.
SHOPPERS
PARADISE
REALTY
&
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. EFREN P. ROQUE, respondent.
Civil Law; Property; Donation; In donations of immovable
property, the law requires for its validity that it should be
contained in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy; It is enough, between the parties to a
donation of an immovable property, that the donation be
made in a public document but, in order to bind third
persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of
Property.The existence, albeit unregistered, of the donation
in favor of respondent is undisputed. The trial court and the
appellate court have not erred in holding that the nonregistration of a deed of donation does not affect its validity.
As being itself a mode of acquiring ownership, donation
results in an effective transfer of title over the property from
the donor to the donee. In donations of immovable property,
the law requires for its validity that it should be contained in
a public document, specifying therein the property donated
and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The Civil Code provides, however, that titles of ownership,
or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly
inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property (now
Registry of Land Titles and Deeds) shall not prejudice third
persons. It is enough, between the parties to a donation of
an immovable property, that the donation be made in a
public document but, in order to bind third persons, the
donation must be registered in the Registry of Property
(Registry of Land Titles and Deeds).
Same; Same; Land Registration; Where a party has
knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at
the time he acquired a right thereto, his knowledge of that
prior unregistered interest would have the effect of
registration as regards to him.A person dealing with
registered land may thus safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor, and he is not required to go
beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the
A.
Yes.
Q.
You did the inquiry from him, how was this property given to
them?
A.
By inheritance.
Q.
Inheritance in the form of donation?
A.
I mean inheritance.
Q.
What I am only asking you is, were you told by Dr. Felipe C.
Roque at the time of your transaction with him that all these
three properties were given to his children by way of
donation?
A.
What Architect Biglang-awa told us in his exact words: Yang
mga yan pupunta sa mga anak. Yong kay Ruben pupunta kay
Ruben. Yong kay Efren palibhasa nasa America siya, nasa
pangalan pa ni Dr. Felipe C. Roque.
x x x
xxx
xxx
Q.
When was the information supplied to you by Biglang-awa?
Before the execution of the Contract of Lease and
Memorandum of Agreement?
A.
Yes.
Q.
That being the case, at the time of the execution of the
agreement or soon before, did you have such information
confirmed by Dr. Felipe C. Roque himself?
A.
Biglang-awa did it for us.
Q.
and for commencing a suit in court, as their excuse for noncompliance therewith does not deserve serious attention.
Same; Same; Right of action; The right of action does not
arise until the performance of all conditions precedent to the
action and may be taken away by the running of the statute
of limitations, through estoppel, or by other circumstances
which do not affect the cause of action.It bears restating
that a right of action is the right to pre-sently enforce a cause
of action, while a cause of action, while a cause of action
consists of the operative facts which give rise to such right of
action. The right of action does not arise until the
performance of all conditions precedent to the action and
may be taken away by the running of the statute of
limitations, through estoppel, or by other circumstances
which do not affect the cause of action. Performance or
fulfillment of all conditions precedent upon which a right of
action depends must be sufficiently alleged, considering that
the burden of proof to show that a party has a right of action
is upon the person initiating the suit.
Maritime Commerce; Contract of Shipment; Notice of loss or
injury to the goods; Notice of loss or injury protects the
carrier by affording it an opportunity to make an investigation
of a claim while the matter is fresh and easily investigated so
as to safeguard itself from false and fraudulent claim.More
particularly, where the contract of shipment contains a
reasonable requirement of giving notice of loss of or injury to
the goods, the giving of such notice is a condition precedent
to the action for loss or injury or the right to enforce the
carriers liability. Such requirement is not an empty
formalism. The fundamental reason or purpose of such a
stipulation is not to relieve the carrier from just liability, but
reasonably to inform it that the shipment has been damaged
and that it is charged with liability therefor, and to give it an
opportunity to examine the nature and extent of the injury.
This protects the carrier by affording it an opportunity to
make an investigation of a claim while the matter is fresh
and easily investigated so as to safeguard itself from false
and fraudulent claims.
On the first issue, petitioners contend that it was error for the
Court of Appeals to reverse the appealed decision on the
supposed ground of prescription when SLI failed to adduce
any evidence in support thereof and that the bills of lading
said to contain the shortened periods for filing a claim and for
instituting a court action against the carrier were never
offered in evidence. Considering that the existence and tenor
of this stipulation on the aforesaid periods have allegedly not
been established, petitioners maintain that it is inconceivable
how they can possibly comply therewith.12 In refutation, SLI
avers that it is standard practice in its operations to issue
bills of lading for shipments entrusted to it for carriage and
that it in fact issued bills of lading numbered MD-25 and MD26 therefor with proof of their existence manifest in the
records of the case.13 For its part, DVAPSI insists on the
propriety of the dismissal of the complaint as to it due to
petitioners failure to prove its direct responsibility for the
loss of and/or damage to the cargo.14
On this point, in denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals resolved that although
the bills of lading were not offered in evidence, the litigation
obviously revolves on such bills of lading which are
practically the documents or contracts sued upon, hence,
they are inevitably involved and their provisions cannot be
disregarded in the determination of the relative rights of the
parties thereto.15
Respondent court correctly passed upon the matter of
prescription, since that defense was so considered and
controverted by the parties. This issue may accordingly be
taken cognizance of by the court even if not inceptively
raised as a defense so long as its existence is plainly
apparent on the face of relevant pleadings.16 In the case at
bar, prescription as an affirmative defense was seasonably
raised by SLI in its answer,17 except that the bills of lading
embodying the same were not formally offered in evidence,
thus reducing the bone of contention to whether or not
prescription can be maintained as such defense and, as in
xxx
A
With respect to the shipment being transported, we have of
course to get into it in order to check whether the shipment
coming in to this port is in accordance with the policy
condition, like in this particular case, the shipment was
transported to Manila and transhipped through an inter-island
vessel in accordance with the policy. With respect to the
losses, we have a general view where losses could have
occurred. Of course we will have to consider the
different bailees wherein the shipment must have passed
through, like the ocean vessel, the interisland vessel and the
arrastre, but definitely at that point and time we cannot
determine the extent of each liability. We are only interested
at that point and time in the liability as regards the
underwriter in accordance with the policy that we issued.
Yes, sir.
Q
xxx
A
No, sir.
xxx
Neither did nor could the trial court, much less the Court of
Appeals, precisely establish the stage in the course of the
that the trial court did not have the authority to render its
August 23, 2001 Decision.
We clarify.
Service of Summons
In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant either by the service of summons or
by the latters voluntary appearance and submission to the
authority of the former. Where the action is in personam and
the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons
may be made through personal or substituted service in the
manner provided for by Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which read:
Section 6. Service in person on defendant.Whenever
practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive
and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Section 7. Substituted serviceIf, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendants office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
Personal service of summons is preferred over substituted
service. Resort to the latter is permitted when the summons
cannot be promptly served on the defendant in person and
after stringent formal and substantive requirements have
been complied with.7
For substituted service of summons to be valid, it is
necessary to establish the following circumstances: (a)
personal service of summons within a reasonable time was
impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and
(c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age
and discretion residing at the partys residence or upon a
competent person in charge of the partys office or regular
place of business.8 It is likewise required that the pertinent
not been joined, it is the duty of the court to stop the trial
and to order the inclusion of such party.
Same; Dismissal of Actions; The Rules of Court does not
comprehend whimsical dropping or adding of parties in a
complaint.The apparent idea below is to rely on the theory
that under Section 11 of Rule 3, parties may be dropped by
the court upon motion of any party at any stage of the
action, hence it is the absolute right prerogative of the
plaintiff to choosethe parties he desires to sue, without
dictation or imposition by the court or the adverse party. x x
x But the truth is that nothing can be more incorrect. Section
11 of Rule 3 does not comprehend whimsical and irrational
dropping or adding of parties in a complaint. What it really
contemplates is erroneous or mistaken non-joinder and
misjoinder of parties. x x x The rule presupposes that the
original inclusion had been made in the honest conviction
that it was proper and the subsequent dropping is requested
because it has turned out that such inclusion was a mistake.
And this is the reason why the rule ordains that the dropping
be on such terms as are justjust to all the parties. x x x
His honor ought to have considered that the outright
dropping of the non-defaulted defendants Lim and Leonardo,
over their objection at that, would certainly be unjust not
only to the petitioners, their own parents, who would in
consequence be entirely defenseless, but also to Lim and
Leonardo themselves who would naturally correspondingly
suffer from the eventual judgment against their parents.
Respondent court paid no heed at all to the mandate that
such dropping must be on such terms as are justmeaning
to all concerned with its legal and factual effects.
Attorneys; Legal ethics; Counsel should not attempt to
befuddle issues of a case.Parties and counsel would be well
advised to avoid such attempts to befuddle the issues as
invariably they will be exposed for what they are, certainly
unethical and degrading to the dignity of the law profession.
Moreover, almost always they only betray the inherent
weakness of the cause of the party resorting to them.
Civil procedure; Default: Being declared in default does not
imply an admission that plaintiffs cause of action is lawful.
Branch III in its Civil Case No. 12328, an action for accounting
of properties and money totalling allegedly about P15 million
pesos filed with a common cause of action against six
defendants, in which after declaring four of the said
defendants herein petitioners, in default and while the trial as
against the two defendants not declared in default was in
progress, said court granted plaintiffs motion to dismiss the
case in so far as the non-defaulted defendants were
concerned and thereafter proceeded to hear ex-parte the rest
of the plaintiffs evidence and subsequently rendered
judgment by default against the defaulted defendants, with
the particularities that notice of the motion to dismiss was
not duly served on any of the defendants, who had alleged a
compulsory counterclaim against plaintiff in their joint
answer, and the judgment so rendered granted reliefs not
prayed for in the complaint, and (2) prohition to enjoin
further proceedings relative to the motion for immediate
execution of the said judgment.
Originally, this litigation was a complaint filed on February 9,
1971 by respondent Tan Put only against the spousespetitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay. Subsequently,
in an amended complaint dated September 26, 1972, their
son Lim Teck Chuan and the other spouses-petitioners
Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo and their son Eng
Chong Leonardo were included as defendants. In said
amended complaint, respondent Tan alleged that she is the
widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was a partner in the
commercial partnership, Glory Commercial Company. . . . .
with Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Ng Sua; that defendant
Antonio Lim Tanhu, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua, Lim Teck
Chuan, and Eng Chong Leonardo, through fraud and
machination, took actual and active management of the
partnership and although Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan was the
manager of Glory Commercial Company, defendants
managed to use the funds of the partnership to purchase
lands and buildings in the cities of Cebu, Lapulapu, Mandaue,
and the municipalities of Talisay and Minglanilla, some of
which were hidden, but the description of those already
refused and stated that they would not give the share of the
plaintiff. (Pp. 36-37, Record.)
She prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that judgment
be rendered:
a) Ordering the defendants to render an accounting of the
real and personal properties of the Glory Commercial
Company including those registered in the names of the
defendants and other persons, which properties are located
in the Philippines and in Hong Kong;
b) Ordering the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff after
accounting, one third (1/3) of the total value of all the
properties
which
is
approximately
P5,000,000.00
representing the just share of the plaintiff;
c) Ordering the defendants to pay the attorney of the plaintiff
the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00)
by way of attorneys fees and damages in the sum of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
This Honorable Court is prayed for other remedies and
reliefs consistent with law and equity and order the
defendants to pay the costs. (Page 38, Record.)
The admission of said amended complaint was opposed by
defendants upon the ground that there were material
modifications of the causes of action previously alleged, but
respondent judge nevertheless allowed the amendment
reasoning that:
The present action is for accounting of real and personal
properties as well as for the recovery of the same with
damages. An objective consideration of pars. 13 and 15 of
the amended complaint pointed out by the defendants to
sustain their opposition will show that the allegations of facts
therein are merely to amplify material averments constituting
the cause of action in the original complaint. It likewise
includes necessary and indispensable defendants without
whom no final determination can be had in the action and in
order that complete relief is to be accorded as between those
already parties.
COUNTERCLAIM
A. That the defendants hereby reproduced, by way of
reference, all the allegations and foregoing averments as
part of this counterclaim;
B. That plaintiff knew and was aware she was merely the
common-law wife of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan and that the
lawful and legal is still living, together with the legitimate
children, and yet she deliberately suppressed this fact, thus
showing her bad faith and is therefore liable for exemplary
damages in an amount which the Honorable Court may
determine in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion. In
the event that plaintiff is married to Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan,
then, her marriage is bigamous and should suffer the
consequences thereof;
C. That plaintiff was aware and had knowledge about the
quitclaim, even though she was not entitled to it, and yet
she falsely claimed that defendants refused even to see her
and for filing this unfounded, baseless, futile and puerile
complaint, defendants suffered mental anguish and torture
conservatively estimated to be not less than P3,000.00;
D. That in order to defend their rights in court, defendants
were constrained to engage the services of the undersigned
counsel, obligating themselves to pay P500,000.00 as
attorneys fees;
E. That by way of litigation expenses during the time that this
case will be before this Honorable Court and until the same
will be finally terminated and adjudicated, defendants will
have to spend at least P5,000.00. (Pp. 44-47. Record.)
After unsuccessfully trying to show that this counterclaim is
merely permissive and should be dismissed for non-payment
of the corresponding filing fee, and after being overruled by
the court, in due time, plaintiff answered the same, denying
its material allegations.
On February 3, 1973, however, the date set for the pre-trial,
both of the two defendants-spouses, the Lim Tanhus and Ng
Suas, did not appear, for which reason, upon motion of
plaintiff dated February 16, 1973, in an order of March 12,
ORDER
Acting on the motion of the plaintiff praying for the dismissal
of the complaint as against defendants Lim Teck Chuan and
Eng Chong Leonardo.
The same is hereby GRANTED. The complaint as against
defendant Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo is
hereby ordered DISMISSED without pronouncement as to
costs.
Simultaneously, the following order was also issued:
Considering that defendants Antonio Lim Tanhu and his
spouse Dy Ochay as well as defendants Alfonso Ng Sua and
his spouse Co Oyo have been declared in default for failure to
appear during the pre-trial and as to the other defendants
the complaint had already been ordered dismissed as against
them;
Let the hearing of the plaintiffs evidence ex-parte be set on
November 20, 1974, at 8:30 A.M. before the Branch Clerk of
Court who is deputized for the purpose, to swear in witnesses
and to submit her report within ten (10) days thereafter.
Notify the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, October 21, 1974. (Page 52, Record.)
But, in connection with this last order, the scheduled ex-parte
reception of evidence did not take place on November 20,
1974, for on October 28, 1974, upon verbal motion of
plaintiff, the court issued the following self-explanatory order:
Acting favorably on the motion of the plaintiff dated October
18, 1974, the Court deputized the Branch Clerk of Court to
receive the evidence of the plaintiff ex-parte to be made on
November 20, 1974. However, on October 28, 1974, the
plaintiff, together with her witnesses, appeared in court and
asked, thru counsel, that she be allowed to present her
evidence.
Considering the time and expenses incurred by the plaintiff in
bringing her witnesses to the court, the Branch Clerk of Court
is hereby authorized to receive immediately the evidence of
the plaintiff ex-parte.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, October 28, 1974. (Page 53, Record.)
Upon learning of these orders, on October 23, 1973, the
defendant Lim Teck Cheng, thru counsel, Atty. Sitoy, filed a
motion for reconsideration thereof, and on November 1,
1974, defendant Eng Chong Leonardo, thru counsel Atty.
Alcudia, filed also his own motion for reconsideration and
clarification of the same orders. These motions were denied
in an order dated December 6, 1974 but received by the
movants only on December 23, 1974. Meanwhile, respondent
court rendered the impugned decision on December 20,
1974. It does not appear when the parties were served
copies of this decision.
Subsequently, on January 6, 1975, all the defendants, thru
counsel, filed a motion to quash the order of October 28,
1974. Without waiting however for the resolution thereof, on
January 13, 1974, Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo
went to the Court of Appeals with a petition for certiorari
seeking the annulment of the above-mentioned orders of
October 21, 1974 and October 28, 1974 and decision of
December 20, 1974. By resolution of January 24, 1975, the
Court of Appeals dismissed said petition, holding that its
filing was premature, considering that the motion to quash
the order of October 28, 1974 was still unresolved by the trial
court. This holding was reiterated in the subsequent
resolution of February 5, 1975 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the previous dismissal.
On the other hand, on January 20, 1975, the other
defendants, petitioners herein, filed their notice of appeal,
appeal bond and motion for extension to file their record on
appeal, which was granted, the extension to expire after
fifteen (15) days from January 26 and 27, 1975, for
defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Suas, respectively. But on
February 7, 1975, before the perfection of their appeal,
petitioners filed the present petition with this Court. And with
the evident intent to make their procedural position clear,
counsel for defendants, Atty. Manuel Zosa, filed with
respondent court a manifestation dated February 14, 1975
stating that when the non-defaulted defendants Eng Chong
Leonardo and Lim Teck Chuan filed their petition in the Court
of Appeals, they in effect abandoned their motion to quash
the order of October 28, 1974, and that. similarly when
Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and
Co Oyo, filed their petition for certiorari and prohibition . . . in
the Supreme Court, they likewise abandoned their motion to
quash. This manifestation was acted upon by respondent
court together with plaintiffs motion for execution pending
appeal in its order of the same date February 14, 1975
thiswise:
O R D E R
When these incidents, the motion to quash the order of
October 28, 1974 and the motion for execution pending
appeal were called for hearing today, counsel for the
defendants-movants submitted their manifestation inviting
the attention of this Court that by their filing for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the Court of
Appeals which was dismissed and later the defaulted
defendants filed with the Supreme Court certiorari with
prohibition they in effect abandoned their motion to quash.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the motion to quash is ordered
ABANDONED. The resolution of the motion for execution
pending appeal shall be resolved after the petition for
certiorari and prohibition shall have been resolved by the
Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 14, 1975.
(Page 216, Record.)
Upon these premises, it is the position of petitioners that
respondent court acted illegally, in violation of the rules or
with grave abuse of discretion in acting on respondents
motion to dismiss of October 18, 1974 without previously
ascertaining whether or not due notice thereof had been
served on the adverse parties, as, in fact, no such notice was
timely served on the non-defaulted defendants Lim Teck
Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo and no notice at all was ever
This being the rule this court cannot compel the plaintiff to
continue prosecuting her cause of action against the
defendants-movants if in the course of the trial she believes
she can enforce it against the remaining defendants subject
only to the limitation provided in Section 2, Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court. x x x (Pages 62-63, Record.)
Noticeably, His Honor has employed the same equivocal
terminology as in plaintiffs motion of October 18, 1974 by
referring to the action he had taken as being dismissal of
the complaint against them or their being dropped
therefrom, without perceiving that the reason for the
evidently intentional ambiguity is transparent. The apparent
idea is to rely on the theory that under Section 11 of Rule 3,
parties may be dropped by the court upon motion of any
party at any stage of the action, hence it is the absolute
right prerogative of the plaintiff to choosethe parties he
desires to sue, without dictation or imposition by the court or
the adverse party. In other words, the ambivalent pose is
suggested that plaintiffs motion of October 18, 1974 was not
predicated on Section 2 of Rule 17 but more on Section 11 of
Rule 3. But the truth is that nothing can be more incorrect. To
start with, the latter rule does not comprehend whimsical and
irrational dropping or adding of parties in a complaint. What
it really contemplates is erroneous or mistaken non-joinder
and misjoinder of parties. No one is free to join anybody in a
complaint in court only to drop him unceremoniously later at
the pleasure of the plaintiff. The rule presupposes that the
original inclusion had been made in the honest conviction
that it was proper and the subsequent dropping is requested
because it has turned out that such inclusion was a mistake.
And this is the reason why the rule ordains that the dropping
be on such terms as are justjust to all the other parties.
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record to legally
justify the dropping of the non-defaulted defendants, Lim and
Leonardo. The motion of October 18, 1974 cites none. From
all appearances, plaintiff just decided to ask for it, without
any relevant explanation at all. Usually, the court in granting
such a motion inquires for the reasons and in the appropriate
instances directs the granting of some form of compensation
has a right to presume that the law and the rules will still be
observed. The proceedings are held in his forced absence,
and it is but fair that the plaintiff should not be allowed to
take advantage of the situation to win by foul or illegal
means or with inherently incompetent evidence. Thus, in
such instances, there is need for more attention from the
court, which only the judge himself can provide. The clerk of
court would not be in a position much less have the authority
to act in the premises in the manner demanded by the rules
of fair play and as contemplated in the law, considering his
comparably limited area of discretion and his presumably
inferior preparation for the functions of a judge. Besides, the
default of the defendant is no excuse for the court to
renounce the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor
and conduct of the witnesses of the plaintiff, the better to
appreciate their truthfulness and credibility. We therefore
declare as a matter of judicial policy that there being no
imperative reason for judges to do otherwise, the practice
should be discontinued.
Another matter of practice worthy of mention at this point is
that it is preferable to leave enough opportunity open for
possible lifting of the order of default before proceeding with
the reception of the plaintiffs evidence and the rendition of
the decision. A judgment by default may amount to a
positive and considerable injustice to the defendant; and the
possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a
careful and liberal examination of the grounds upon which
the defendant may seek to set it aside. (Moran, supra p.
534, citing Coombs vs. Santos, 24 Phil. 446; 449-450.) The
expression, therefore, in Section 1 of Rule 18 aforequoted
which says that thereupon the court shall proceed to receive
the plaintiffs evidence etc. is not to be taken literally. The
gain in time and dispatch should the court immediately try
the case on the very day of or shortly after the declaration of
default is far outweighed by the inconvenience and
complications involved in having to undo everything already
done in the event the defendant should justify his omission to
answer on time.
that after the death of her husband on March 11, 1966 she is
entitled to share not only in the capital and profits of the
partnership but also in the other assets, both real and
personal, acquired by the partnership with funds of the latter
during its lifetime.
Relatedly, in the latter part of the decision, the findings are to
the following effect:
That the herein plaintiff Tan Put and her late husband Po
Chuan were married at the Philippine Independent Church of
Cebu City on December 20, 1949; that Po Chuan died on
March 11, 1966; that the plaintiff and the late Po Chuan were
childless but the former has a foster son Antonio Nuez
whom she has reared since his birth with whom she lives up
to the present; that prior to the marriage of the plaintiff to Po
Chuan the latter was already managing the partnership Glory
Commercial Co. then engaged in a little business in hardware
at Manalili St., Cebu City; that prior to and just after the
marriage of the plaintiff to Po Chuan she was engaged in the
drugstore business; that not long after her marriage, upon
the suggestion of Po Chuan, the plaintiff sold her drugstore
for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband in
the presence of defendant Lim Tanhu and was invested in the
partnership Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that
after the investment of the above-stated amount in the
partnership its business flourished and it embarked in the
import business and also engaged in the wholesale and retail
trade of cement and GI sheets and under huge profits;
x x x x x x
That the late Po Chuan was the one who actively managed
the business of the partnership Glory Commercial Co.; he was
the one who made the final decisions and approved the
appointments of new personnel who were taken in by the
partnership; that the late Po Chuan and defendants Lim
Tanhu and Ng Sua are brothers, the latter two (2) being the
elder brothers of the former; that defendants Lim Tanhu and
Ng Sua are both naturalized Filipino citizens whereas the late
Po Chuan until the time of his death was a Chinese citizen;
This is to certify that I, Miss Tan Ki Eng Alias Tan Put, have
lived with Mr. Lim Po Chuan alias Tee Hoon since 1949 but it
recently occurs that we are incompatible with each other and
are not in the position to keep living together permanently.
With the mutual concurrence, we decided to terminate the
existing relationship of common law-marriage and promised
not to interfere each others affairs from now on. The Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) has been given to me by Mr.
Lim Po Chuan for my subsistence.
Witnesses:
Mr. Lim Beng Guan
Mr. Huang Sing Se
Signed on the 10 day of the 7th month of the 54th year of
the Republic of China (corresponding to the year 1965).
(SGD) TAN KIENG
Verified from the records.
JORGE TABAR
(Pp. 283-284, Record.)
Indeed, not only does this document prove that plaintiffs
relation to the deceased was that of a common-law wife but
that they had settled their property interests with the
payment to her of P40,000.
In the light of all these circumstances, We find no alternative
but to hold that plaintiff Tan Puts allegation that she is the
widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan has not been satisfactorily
established and that, on the contrary, the evidence on record
convincingly shows that her relation with said deceased was
that of a common-law wife and furthermore, that all her
claims against the company and its surviving partners as well
as those against the estate of the deceased have already
been settled and paid. We take judicial notice of the fact that
the respective counsel who assisted the parties in the
quitclaim, Attys. H. Hermosisima and Natalio Castillo, are
members in good standing of the Philippine Bar, with the
particularity that the latter has been a member of the
x x x x x x x;
That the late Po Chuan was the one who actively managed
the business of the partnership Glory Commercial Co.; he was
the one who made the final decisions and approved the
appointments of new personnel who were taken in by the
partnership; that the late Po Chuan and defendants Lim
Tanhu and Ng Sua are brothers, the latter two (2) being the
elder brothers of the former; that defendants Lim Tanhu and
Ng Sua are both naturalized Filipino citizens whereas the late
Po Chuan until the time of his death was a Chinese citizen;
that the three (3) brothers were partners in the Glory
Commercial Co. but Po Chuan was practically the owner of
the partnership having the controlling interest; that
defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua were partners in name but
they were mere employees of Po Chuan; x x x x (Pp. 90-91,
Record.)
If Po Chuan was in control of the affairs and the running of
the partnership, how could the defendants have defrauded
him of such huge amounts as plaintiff had made his Honor
believe? Upon the other hand, since Po Chuan was in control
of the affairs of the partnership, the more logical inference is
that if defendants had obtained any portion of the funds of
the partnership for themselves, it must have been with the
knowledge and consent of Po Chuan, for which reason no
accounting could be demanded from them therefor,
considering that Article 1807 of the Civil Code refers only to
what is taken by a partner without the consent of the other
partner or partners. Incidentally again, this theory about Po
Chuan having been actively managing the partnership up to
his death is a substantial deviation from the allegation in the
amended complaint to the effect that defendants Antonio
Lim Tanhu, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua, Lim Teck Chuan and
Eng Chong Leonardo, through fraud and machination, took
actual and active management of the partnership and
although Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan was the manager of Glory
Commercial Co., defendants managed to use the funds of the
partnership to purchase lands and buildings etc. (Par. 4, p. 2
of amended complaint, Annex B of petition) and should not
court. (Zarate vs. RTC of Kalibo, Aklan (Branch 2), 316 SCRA
594 [1999])
Where some but not all the defendants have answered,
plaintiffs may amend their Complaint once, as a matter of
right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the nonanswering defendants, but not as to claims asserted against
the other defendants. (Siasoco vs. Court of Appeals, 303
SCRA 186 [1999]) [Remington Industrial Sales Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 382 SCRA 499(2002)]
filed one (1) day late, and that it was merely pro forma,
because of which it did not suspend the running of the period
to file his answer. The Court of First Instance granted the
motion to dismiss and denied the motion to declare Dolosa in
default. A reconsideration of the orders to this effect having
been denied, Enguerra interposed the present appeal,
directly to the Supreme Court, alleging that the lower court
had erred (a) in not declaring Dolosa in default; and (b) in
dismissing the complaint herein.
As regards the first alleged error, Enguerra maintains that the
extension of 30 days granted in the order of February 6,
1963, expired on March 7, 1963, because the order stated
that said period should be counted from today, which,
Enguerra maintains, should be understood to maintain from
February 6 to March 7, 1963. An identical theory was rejected
in Ulpiando vs. Court of Agrarian Relations1, in the following
language:
The petitioners raise procedural questions. On 2 August
1957 the respondents received a copy of the decision dated
22 July 1957 (See Annexes E & F). On 15 August they filed a
petition for extension of time to file motion for
reconsideration, dated 13 August, because of lack of
material time to read the voluminous transcript of
stenographic notes and for that reason they could not readily
formulate their arguments in support of the motion for
reconsideration (Annex F). On the same day, 15 August, the
Court entered an order granting the respondents fifteen (15)
days counted from today within which to file their motion for
reconsideration of the decision rendered on July 29, 1957
(should be 22) in the instant case. (Italics supplied.) On
August 30, the respondents mailed their motion for
reconsideration in the post office of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The
petitioners claim that counting from 15 August, the day the
15-day period commenced to run, to 30 August, when the
respondents mailed their motion for reconsideration, 16 days
already had elapsed, and contend that the Court had already
lost jurisdiction of the case and could no longer reconsider its
decision dated 22 July.
xxx
xxx
xxx
the court before which the case is pending, coupled with the
other circumstances hereinafter adverted to and appearing in
the records of both casessaid motion, manifestly, is not pro
forma2 and its presentation suspended the running of the
period for the filing of de-fendants answer.
The next and most important question for determination is
whether or not Civil Case No. 1800 is for the same cause of
action as Civil Case No. 1804, both being admittedly between
the same parties. In this connection, it should be noted that
the basis of the complaints in both cases is the same,
namely: that Enguerras rights as Dolosas chief baker, from
June 18, 1959 to October 8, 1961, have been violated by the
latter. The alleged violations may have several aspects, such
as: 1) underpayment of wages; 2) nonpayment of overtime;
3) transfer, allegedly equivalent to unjustified dismissal, and,
hence, the claim for separation pay; 4) damages
(compensatory, moral and exemplary, and attorneys fees).
Yet, the cause of actionthe spring from which the right to
sue emanateswas only one and the same breach of their
contract of employment, without which none of the claims
made by plaintiff would have no leg to stand on.
The statutory provisions regarding termination pay, minimum
wage, overtime and damages are as much a part of said
contract of employment as the pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code on obligations and contracts, in general, and on
lease of services, in particular. The difference between
underpayment of wages on a given day and nonpayment of
overtime for work done on the same day, is notinsofar as
the cause of action therefore is concernedmaterially at
variance from that which exists between said underpayment
of wages for the day given and the similar underpayment of
wages for the next day. Indeed, if one month later, the
aggrieved laborer should decide to sue the employer for
breach of contract, it is obvious that the former cannot file a
complaint for some effects of such breach, and another
complaint for its other effects. He must include in the
complaint his claim for the underpayment for the
aforementioned two (2) days, both being overdue at the time
of the commencement of the action.3 Similarly, if
Of course the court during trial may find that some of the
alleged tort feasors are liable and that others are not liable.
The courts may release some for lack of evidence while
condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is
true even though they are charged jointly and severally.
In a joint obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of
the whole liability; in a solidary or joint and several
obligation, the relationship between the active and the
passive subjects is so close that each of them must comply
with or demand the fulfillment of the whole obligation.31 The
fact that the liability sought against the CCC is for specific
performance and tort, while that sought against the
individual respondents is based solely on tort does not
negate the solidary nature of their liability for tortuous acts
alleged in the counterclaims. Article 1211 of the Civil Code is
explicit on this point:
Solidarity may exist although the creditors and the debtors
may not be bound in the same manner and by the same
periods and conditions.
The solidary character of respondents alleged liability is
precisely why credence cannot be given to petitioners
assertion. According to such assertion, Respondent CCC
cannot move to dismiss the counterclaims on grounds that
pertain solely to its individual co-debtors.32 In cases filed by
the creditor, a solidary debtor may invoke defenses arising
from the nature of the obligation, from circumstances
personal to it, or even from those personal to its co-debtors.
Article 1222 of the Civil Code provides:
A solidary debtor may, in actions filed by the creditor, avail
itself of all defenses which are derived from the nature of the
obligation and of those which are personal to him, or pertain
to his own share. With respect to those which personally
belong to the others, he may avail himself thereof only as
regards that part of the debt for which the latter are
responsible. (Emphasis supplied).
The act of Respondent CCC as a solidary debtorthat of filing
a motion to dismiss the counterclaim on grounds that pertain
only to its individual co-debtorsis therefore allowed.
vs.
P244,480.35
1955 ................................................................................
243,636.19
British Traders Insurance Co., Ltd. did not include in its gross
income the above amounts when it filed its income tax
returns for 1954 and 1955 and withheld no income tax
thereon. So, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued
against it the following assessment for withholding tax under
Sections 53 and 54 of the Tax Code.
1954
Premiums ceded ...................................
P244,480.35
Tax due thereon at 24% ................................
58,675.00
25% surcharge ............................................
14,668.75
Compromise for non-filing of return ......................
P 800.00
Total amount due ......................................
P 73,643.75
1955
Premiums ceded .............................................
P243,636.19
Tax due thereon at 24% ................................
58,473.00
25% surcharge ............................................
14,618.25
Compromise for non-filing of return .....................
300.00
Total amount due ..........................................
P 73,391.25
British Traders Insurance Co., Ltd. protested the
assessments, reasoning that the cessions of reinsurance
premiums were not subject to withholding tax. After its
protest was denied by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
it appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. On January 30, 1962,
the Tax Court rendered judgment sustaining the
assessments, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
petitioner British Traders Insurance Co., Ltd., is hereby
ordered to pay the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the
total amount of P117,148.00 as withholding income tax for
the years 1954 and 1955, within thirty (30) days from the
date this decision becomes final.
If any amount of the tax is not paid within the time
prescribed above, there shall be collected a surcharge of 5%
of the tax unpaid, plus interest at the rate of 1% a month
from the date of delinquency to the date of payment,
provided that the maximum amount that may be collected as
interest shall not exceed the amount corresponding to a
period of three (3) years. With costs against the petitioner.
Subsequently, on March 1, 1962, British Traders Insurance
Co., Ltd., for and in behalf of its non-resident foreign
reinsurers, filed income tax returns for the years 1954 and
1955, declaring therein the aforesaid reinsurance premiums,
and thereupon paid the corresponding income tax for 1954 in
the amount of P6,212.50. No tax was due for 1955 per the
corresponding return.
On March 6, 1962, before the decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals would become final, British Traders Insurance Co.,
Ltd. attempted to file a supplemental petition for review,
alleging therein the filing of the income tax returns for 1954
and 1955 and praying for relief from payment of withholding
taxes as provided for in Section 53(e) of the Tax Code. The
Tax Court did not give due course to it on the ground that the
supplemental petition for review would entirely change the
MARCIANO
LAMCO,
petitioner,
vs.
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and ALVARO
ENTERPRISES, respondents.
WORKMENS
J. BARRETO
private
The Facts
The antecedents of the case are succinctly summarized by
the Court of Appeals in this wise:
The original complaint was filed against JB Lines, Inc.
[Petitioner JB Lines, Inc.] filed a motion to dismiss complaint,
to strike out false-impertinent matters therefrom, and/or for
bill of particulars on the primary grounds that [respondents]
failed to implead Jose Baritua as an indispensable party and
that the cause of action is a suit against a wrong and nonexistent party. [Respondents] filed and opposition to the said
motion and an amended complaint.
In an Order dated December 11, 1984 the trial court denied
the aforesaid motion and admitted the amended complaint of
[respondents] impleading Jose Baritua and alleged the
following:
(10) The late Dominador Mercader is a [b]usinessman mainly
engaged in the buy and sell of dry goods in Laoang, N.
Samar. He buys his goods from Manila and bringt[s] them to
Laoang, Northern Samar for sale at his store located in the
said locality;
(11) Sometime on March 16, 1983, the late Dominador
Mercader boarded [petitioners] bus No. 142 with Plate No.
484 EU at [petitioners] Manila Station/terminal, bound for
Brgy. Rawis, Laoang Northern Samar as a paying passenger;
(12) At that time, Dominador Mercader had with him as his
baggage, assorted goods (i.e. long pants, short pants,
dusters, etc.) which he likewise loaded in [petitioners] bus;
(13) The late Dominador Mercader was not able to reach his
destination considering that on March 17, 1983 at Bailey
(Bugco) Bridge, Barangay Roxas, Mondragon, Northern
Samar, while he was on board [petitioners] bus no. 142 with
Plate No. 484 EU, the said bus fell into the river as a result of
which the late Dominador Mercader died. x x x.
(14) The accident happened because [petitioners] driver
negligently and recklessly operated the bus at a fast speed in
wanton disregard of traffic rules and regulations and the
prevailing conditions then existing that caused [the] bus to
fall into the river.
II
Did the CA also ignore the fact that the trial court was not
paid the correct amount of the docket and other lawful fees;
hence, without jurisdiction over the original and amended
complaints or over the subject matter of the case;
III
Did the CA likewise arbitrarily disregard petitioners
constitutional right to procedural due process and fairness
when it ignored and thrust aside their right to present
evidence and to expect that their evidence will be duly
considered and appreciated; and
IV
In awarding excessive and extravagant damages, did the CA
and the trial court adhere to the rule that their assailed
decision must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the
laws on which they are based?
Distilling the alleged errors cited above, petitioners raise two
main issues for our consideration: (1) whether the CA erred in
holding that the RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case, and (2) whether the CA disregarded petitioners
procedural rights.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction
Petitioners contend that since the correct amounts of docket
and other lawful fees were not paid by respondents, then the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case.
The Court, in Manchester Development Corporation v. CA,8
held that [t]he court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment